

U.S.I. JOURNAL



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JANUARY 1957

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
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


THE KWANS OF CHINA...




In China, tea is not an informal pleasure, but an important and exacting ceremony. It is proffered to guests as they enter the house. It is taken from a cup with a lid but no handles, and tea leaves are infused in the cup itself. Milk and sugar are not served. It takes practice and skill to drink, raising the lid with one finger slightly. The offer of a second cup of tea is usually a polite hint that it is time the guest left. In China, land of indirect speech and eloquent gesture, tea serves not only as the chosen beverage of a great nation, but as a gracious vehicle for hints, compliments, negotiations and friendships. Forty crores of Chinese drink tea, from morning till night to their pleasure, comfort and refreshment.

TEA
the
universal
beverage



Wherever one turns in China, there is a Kwans (Chinese for tea house) round the corner. A centre of social life, each Kwans has its own fixed clientele. Different groups of customers attend at different hours and the kettle is constantly kept on the boil.



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of the

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GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1947:

"MAN MANAGEMENT"

Entries are invited from all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces, from gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India, and from officers of the Indian States Forces.

Essays, which should be typewritten (double spacing) and submitted in triplicate, must be received by the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla, on or before June 30, 1947. In order that the anonymity of each candidate should be preserved, a motto should be written at the top of each entry. A sealed envelope, bearing on the outside the motto, and containing inside the name and address of the author of the essay, must accompany each entry.

Entries should not exceed fifteen pages (approx. 8,000 words) of the size and style of the Journal. Should any authority be quoted in the essay, the title of the work referred to should be given.

Three judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution of, the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October, 1947 issue of the Journal.

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
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Stringer Lawrence

THE "FATHER" OF THE INDIAN ARMY

This painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds of Major-General Stringer Lawrence is reproduced from Colonel J. Biddulph's book "Stringer Lawrence", published by Murray, (London) in 1901. Some interesting aspects of the life of General Stringer Lawrence are referred to in the article, "The Early Commanders-in-Chief in India", which appears in this issue.

The Journal

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Vol. LXXVII

JANUARY, 1947

No. 326

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

MATTERS OF MOMENT

HISTORY fails to reveal any transfer of a country's rule so vast as the change of Government taking place in India. We do not propose to touch on the magnitude of the task except in its relation to the Fighting Forces and the capacity of India to defend herself. As to the latter, read the article in this issue entitled "A Panorama of India's War Potential", which records how India bore her share of the blood, toil and sweat during the war. It is an article which can be read by Indians of all shades of opinion with real pride. Of the Fighting Forces much might be written of the fashion in which Indian officers came to the fore; they, having proved their worth, are now setting the example to their fellows. And as British Officers built a tradition of leadership in the Indian Army, so they, as their successors, are building theirs, and building it well. It has not been easy, but unwearied and braced, they have shown the way to others who will have to fill the vacancies when British Officers disappear. Our present Indian officers are the best ambassadors of India's future forces. Why? Not least because they have forsaken their "communal" beliefs for the grander design of a nation. They firmly believe in a national navy, army and air force. They have helped in no small measure to make the Armed Forces of India their own, and it now needs others to follow their example with equal faith and equal energy. In their new sphere India's peoples must realise that freedom demands service, and every educated Indian youth worth his salt must weigh his actions on the scales of conscience, and, if he considers himself fit, answer the clarion call

**The
Call
To Duty**

to duty. The new Indian Government want a happy and prosperous country; they want an India which will live in peace and goodwill with all nations. But until a great change takes place in world affairs the defence of the country against any possible external aggression must be their paramount duty. To assist the new Government there must arise throughout India a wave of patriotism which will sweep away all communal misgivings and suspicions, leaving in its wake an atmosphere of loyalty, understanding and good faith among its peoples.

** ** ** **

“WE HAVE many British Officers who have served the Army faithfully and loyally, and it is nobody's desire that in achieving our objective of complete Indianisation of the Armed Forces we will be unjust to them”. That tribute and promise from the Hon. Sardar Baldev

**The
Defence
Member's
Tribute** Singh was warmly welcomed when he made his recent broadcast to the Forces. He continued: “They and others before them have contributed greatly in fashioning the steel that is the envy of others. I have every hope that their help and co-operation in the great task of Indianisation will be available now as in the past; we shall value their talent and their co-operation as ever before”. The words were no mere empty expressions; they showed with crystal clarity that in the Defence Member we have one who will not hesitate to voice publicly his acknowledgment of the help British Officers have given to the Indian Armed Forces and to India. His plea for co-operation will not go unanswered, for every British Officer is aware that the nationalisation of the Forces is accepted policy and that it is his duty to assist in the change-over to the utmost of his power. Sardar Baldev Singh has taken over his task as a duty, and all who wish India well will not hesitate to support him.

** ** ** **

SINCE the “drive” for commissioned officers was initiated there has been a constant emphasis on seeking for men to be “leaders”, for the effectiveness of an Army depends more on the quality of its leaders than on anything else. Because of his close contact with his men leadership is a quality of first importance to the young officer,

**“Leadership”
Defined** who must realise that it is the art of imposing one's will in such a way as will stir his men to obey him, to have confidence in him, to inspire his men to do things they

don't want to do and make them enjoy doing them. Leadership brings out all that is finest in man, for a good leader is courageous, just, tactful, sincere and loyal, quick to recognise merit, and be able to think straight. With the Indian soldier a reasonable sense of humour is worth a lot; on the proper occasion a good officer need never hesitate to make him laugh—it will show the soldier that his officer is human, and that is one step in

training them to follow his lead. The successful leader does his work completely, thoroughly; is sympathetic; studies his profession and knows his job; is honourable; and has trained himself to control any evidence of fear; and he will forget he has rank—he *will be himself*, exercising his authority by his own character and example. Which thought leads us to another aspect of leadership of by no means little interest to soldiers in India.

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REFLECT upon some words in the article in this issue on the entry of cadets into the West Point Academy in America, wherein the writer says: "In India we have more than one religion, so it would not be possible to have (in the new War Academy) one house of worship.

On Religion

But what is possible, and what I would like to see, is at least one chamber connecting the various houses of worship, so that if nothing else, the pattern will be one. This should not really be difficult, for after all, do not we all worship the same God—only in different styles?" Religion is a delicate topic on which to write, but India is a country different from many others, in that religion is talked of with complete frankness and without smugness. Some may declare that less religion would sweep away many of India's troubles. Is that true? Most thinking people will deny it emphatically, for it is the base of civilisation. British Officers have always been scrupulously careful to avoid hurting or interfering with the religious feelings of their men; they have been sympathetic and tolerant—and what has been one of the results? One of the finest armies in the world, whose soldiers have—and always will have—a firm faith in a Divine Providence. It is an inspiration and shield. Religion is a brotherhood, which advances with justice and sympathy; it is fundamental in any Army worthy of the name. Religious teachings profoundly influence character, and we feel that our contributor has made a suggestion which deserves careful thought.

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KASAULI, that delightful hill station overlooking the Punjab plains, is also one of the most interesting from a soldier's point of view. Nearby is the Lawrence Royal Military School, which this year celebrates its centenary; in the township are the Central Research Institute and the

The New I.A.P.T.C.

Army School of Physical Training. Of the first two much of real interest could be written, and we hope later to have the privilege of publishing articles about them; of the latter we have memories of a most entertaining two hours watching Indian troops being trained to become instructors. Apart from their physical fitness and agility, their obvious pleasure in

their work was notable, and was a sufficient answer to anyone who doubts whether the average sepoy is a happy individual. It is of particular interest to refer to this School of Physical Training, however, for it has recently been decided to form an Indian Army Physical Training Corps, which will train instructors for India's future Army. The Corps is to be organised on the lines of the British Army Physical Training Corps, which during the past eighty years has evolved a system of Army Physical Training second to none in any army in the world.

* * * *

Naturally, great care is being taken in the selection of instructors for the new Corps, for the purpose of the exercises carried out lie far beyond the gymnasium and the parade ground. Candidates must undergo a preliminary course, return to their unit and train recruits in P.T.; later, if they prove good leaders, they may attend an Advanced Course at the Army School of Physical Training, and outstanding students on that course may then be recommended for a further selection course for potential Corps Instructors. If selected, they will then be admitted to the Corps on probation as paid Havildar Instructors, and after six months finally accepted into the Corps. The training of an Instructor may thus extend over a number of years, but quite clearly it will provide the Corps with the cream of the material available.

** ** ** **

THE FUTURE reorganisation of Infantry in the British Army marks a new stage in the development of a modern army fitted to fight in contemporary warfare. Seventy years ago the Cardwell system was applied to British Infantry of the Line. Under that system most infantry regiments comprised two battalions, one serving abroad, the other stationed in the United Kingdom. Drafts were sent from the Home Battalions to their opposite numbers abroad to keep them up to strength. The system did not work during war, when it was found impossible to send to battalions on active service reinforcements from their own regiments; but it has now been found that even in peacetime it is too rigid to be workable. In future, owing to the need for armoured and airborne divisions, and the reduction of forces in India, fewer Infantry battalions will be required, while there will also no longer be an equal number of battalions at Home and abroad.

**British
Infantry
Reorganised**

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The British Government has accordingly decided to institute a system of grouping of regiments by forming fifteen groups which have territorial or traditional connections. One group, for instance, will comprise The Royal Scots, The Royal Scots Fusiliers, The King's Own Scottish Borderers, The Cameronians; another The Queen's Royal Regiment. The Buffs, The Royal Fusiliers, The East Surrey Regiment, The Royal Sussex Regiment, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment; a third will be The Royal Warwickshire Regiment, The Lincolnshire Regiment, The Leicestershire Regiment, The Sherwood Foresters; a fourth is composed of the K. R. R. C. and the Rifle Brigade. Every battalion in each of these groups will retain its separate identity, but, in order to effect a reduction in the number of Battalions, some will be relegated to a state of "suspended animation", without officers or men on their strength, but ready to be re-created. County primary training centres are to be set up in the old regimental depots. The Secretary of State for War has promised that whenever possible soldiers will be posted to battalions of the Regiments of their choice, on which point he later stated in the House of Commons that men called up under the National Service Act would first be posted to the General Service Corps, after which they would be posted to various arms, priority being given to those who wished to go to Regular regiments. Time will prove whether this new system is successful, but clearly it has been introduced after much careful thought, and with due regard to the high traditions built up over centuries by individual Regiments.

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THE INDIAN ARMY POSTAL SERVICE did grand work during the late war, and now that its functions are being progressively handed back to the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department it is fitting that public tribute should be paid to those who laboured on its behalf. During its lifetime it was a vital cog in the military machine. Whether soldiers were serving in Italy, Egypt, North Africa, Greece, Iraq, Persia, Burma, or throughout S.E.A.C., mails in most cases reached them speedily and regularly, and none can deny that the general efficiency of the mail service contributed in large measure to the high morale of Indian forces. That the members of the I.A. Postal Service fulfilled their task well is reflected in the ninety-three honours and awards they received. Ninety-eight of its staff made the supreme sacrifice; and 282 others suffered as prisoners of war. The work of the Service was an excellent example of co-operation between Civil and Army authorities, and it is well worth recording that the Indian P. & T. Department, despite

**The
Indian Army
Postal
Service**

its own shortage of manpower, provided nearly 60% of the personnel of the Indian Army Postal Service, gave priority whenever possible to Forces mails, and generously conceded many postal concessions to the Armed Forces. The I.A. Postal Service lightened enormously the heavy burden which fell on the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department, which for ninety years has provided some form of Army postal service for the Indian Army whenever it has been engaged on operations overseas or on the North-Western Frontier.

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From the beginning of the late war Field Post Office units operated with Indian troops serving in the Middle East, Persia and Iraq, but in 1942

How it was decided, because of the requirements of military
It security and mobility, and to supplement the resources of
Expanded the P. & T. Department in areas of large military concentration, to set up Indian Army postal service installations within India itself. The new organisation was handicapped by having no Centre, depot, training manuals or Staff Officers, but despite these drawbacks, it quickly established itself. A training centre was set up at Ambala, a syllabus of technical and military training arranged, experienced officers were appointed, and soon the organisation was working smoothly. Eventually the Service attained a strength of 5,000 officers and men, of whom about 3,000 were serving in India. With the phenomenal expansion of G.H.Q. an Army Post Office was opened in Delhi in April, 1944, and that it was badly needed is proved by the fact that it handled an average of 12,00,000 postal articles each month, while the average monthly revenue accruing to Government by its work amounted to about Rs. 2,00,000. The Delhi A.P.O., and among others No. 12 A.B.P.O. in Calcutta, No. 23 in Deolali, and No. 17 in Secunderabad have now been transferred to the Indian P. & T. Department, and so another milestone on the road to normal peacetime postal arrangements for the Forces in India has been passed.

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It is a matter for regret that during the period between wars the Indian Army Postal Service was completely liquidated; no continuity of experience or training was maintained. To avoid this recurring, the

**Maintaining
 A Postal
 Reserve in
 Peacetime**

Q.M.G. has proposed that in future a section of the Indian Army Reserve should be formed from the civil postal service, in order that experience and knowledge should be maintained. Such a measure would form a permanent link between the civil postal service and the Armed Forces. Officers of this Postal Branch, if it is formed, would take their places in training at Army Schools of Instruction and at the Staff College. Moreover, records would be made of sufficient details of the postal organisation required in any future war based on the lessons of the past, and with those provisions

and with the continued support of the Indian P. & T. Department, it would be possible to look with confidence to the speedy provision of adequate postal facilities for the Indian Forces in any future emergency. The Q.M.G. made this announcement in handing over the Army Post Office in G.H.Q. Delhi to the civil P. & T. Department, when he pointed out that the I.A. Postal Service had been only one end of an organisation which maintained contacts with the soldier and his home. That Service had been the soldier's end; the collection and delivery of letters in his home village and town was the responsibility of the civil postal service, which had never failed to extend to the Forces the utmost co-operation in every sphere of postal work.

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EVERY reader of this Journal will agree with the thoughts of one correspondent whose letter appears in our "Letters to the Editor" feature concerning the Nursing Services in India during the War. Thousands of nurses came from modern well-equipped hospitals in Great

**In
Tribute
to the
Nurses**

Britain to serve in Field hospitals on the Burma Frontier and in hot weather stations in India—the latter often lacking the luxury of an electric fan in the nurses' quarters. They worked—and worked hard—for the sick and wounded. In the case of Indian troops the language problem presented some little difficulty, but it was nevertheless overcome. The service these nurses rendered to India was not qualified by thoughts of race or colour; they upheld the fine traditions of their calling; and many a wounded Indian soldier has good reason to be grateful—and is grateful—for the devoted care bestowed on him by nurses who travelled half-way round the world in their determination to serve to the best of their skill and ability. They came—and thousands of them have gone—quietly and unassumingly. But Indians, and the members of its Armed Forces, would, we venture to suggest, do themselves honour if their thanks to the Nursing Services could be expressed in some permanent fashion. It might with advantage take the form of endowing a Nurses' Training Centre; scholarships for training Indian nurses might be instituted; or some permanent amenity might be installed in Military hospitals for the benefit of the nursing staff. Tens of thousands of Indians and Europeans alike who gave freely to War funds during the War would warmly welcome such a gesture, which would be not only an acknowledgment of work well done, but also in some measure attract Indian girls to a career which can do so much to benefit their own country.

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“WRITING is a normal and necessary tool of war for the sailor, soldier or airman, just as it is the normal tool of business for the business man.” So wrote our American contemporary, “The Infantry Journal,” in a recent issue, and we entirely agree. Writing has a very

**For
Writers**

important place in the career of any officer, and a glance at some of the articles in this and past issues of “U.S.I. Journal” shows how skilful are some officers as writers. Some soldiers believe, like many people in other walks of life, that one who writes is not quite the hairy-chested he-man he should be, but it is one of those fallacies which a glance at any issue of this Journal will explode. We have been fortunate in the wide variety of topics with which our writers deal, and the result is a publication whose standard is particularly high. Credit for it goes mainly to our contributors and we thank them for it. To officers who wish to take up this hobby a few words of advice: first, study your journal; watch the length of paragraphs and average length of articles; avoid abbreviations; introduce as much “human interest” as you like; make your article readable—and write your first and last paragraphs carefully. Remember, a dramatic touch in an article detracts in no way from the lucidity or clarity of its contents. A contributor writes so that others may read—indeed, he should persuade them to do so by his style, his fluency and his enthusiasm.

Members are earnestly requested to notify any change of address to the Secretary without delay. Such co-operation will not only help to ease postal traffic at a time when mail services are over-burdened, but will also ensure prompt receipt of the Journal each quarter.

A PANORAMA OF INDIA'S WAR POTENTIAL

BY MAJOR-GENERAL E. WOOD, C.B., C.I.E., M.C.*

THIS subject is a very large one, and in my available time there is much that I must omit. I shall deal with the matter in three parts. First, I shall touch on the history of war supply prior to the recent war. Next, a brief picture of what was done in the recent war. And lastly, I will draw certain important lessons for the future.

Let us begin with the overthrow of Ibrahim, Sultan of Delhi, at Panipat in 1526 by Babar, who had invaded India from Kabul. Babar was the first to appear on the Indian scene with the range of weapons that are the forerunners of much that we have to-day. Among his armament he had the atom bomb of the age—the cannon and the mortar—the first in India. Ibrahim did not commit the mistake that we made with our tanks in 1914-18, or for that matter the mistake the Germans made with their poison gas. Ibrahim brought a full and adequate artillery. He realised that there must be sufficient of a new weapon used with surprise effect, if decisive success is to be obtained.

There followed in India what is happening throughout the world to-day in respect of atomic energy—a frantic race in many places and in many States to discover the new secret—how to make cannons, shot and gunpowder. And so, in the middle of the 16th century, were the first beginnings of an armament industry established in India. But for over 200 years thereafter much more was imported than was manufactured locally. Soon the East India Company was on the scene, and from its first reluctant steps to safeguard its conferred trading interests, the Company's history of war supplies in India began.

Those who know the origins and development of what is now the Indian Army and the Indian Navy, will appreciate that over the next two and a half centuries the development of war supply in India was largely concerned with guns, gun carriages, small arms, ammunition, and harness and saddlery.

That was all that Authority provided to its Defence Services. The unit had to provide the rest. There were contracts between Authority on the one hand and the man or his commanding officer on the other, to provide all else. These contracts were the silledar system, the half-mounting system, and similar measures. Before 1914, the man not only fed himself and his horse, but he built his own barracks.

Up to 1800 was a period during which the East India Company, in respect of the five items I have mentioned, obtained its requirements partly from overseas, partly from private manufacture in India, and partly from their own factories. That was the order of their importance. There were many European and other technicians manufacturing guns, gunpowder, muskets and similar items in India and on their own account.

But gradually the Company learnt the lesson that so many Governments so readily forget. That is, that there are two methods by which warlike stores

* In a lecture delivered in Delhi.

can be obtained in a hurry once the war emergency has arisen. Either you can obtain from private contractors inferior goods at very great cost, or you can obtain reliable goods from Government factories at a reasonable cost. And so the Company gradually became possessed of its own factories, but not until it had paid dearly, and many times, for its lesson.

From 1800 the Company began to own more and more of its own factories. The process was accelerated by four major evolutions in weapon and ammunition, each having a great effect on the tactics and strategy of the time :—

- (a) 1844—The percussion cap was perfected. It became no longer necessary to load weapons through the muzzle.
- (b) 1856—The rifling of barrels was introduced.
- (c) 1864—The unparalleled advance in the manufacture of steel, particularly for gun barrels, led to the “quick fire” guns. Up till then, most guns were of brass or iron. I remind you that the full title of the 18 pdr. is the 18 pdr. Q. F.—quick firing. The 18 pdr. is a definite link with the rifled brass cannon.
- (d) 1890—Smokeless powder was invented. Incidentally, it was adopted in India quite early because Lord Roberts refused to send troops from India to fight in Africa with smoke powder.

In 1892 the Ordnance Factories became the first authentic manufacturers of mass produced steel in India and so pointed the way to Tata. They remain to-day the quality steel producers of India, and they make their own steel for all the weapons they produce. In 1905 the first Rifle Factory was built.

By the outbreak of war in 1914, the Ordnance Factories of India could manufacture the 4.5 inch howitzer and repair all field and horsed artillery ; make rifles ; supply most of the gun and rifle ammunition of all calibres required for the Service ; meet all harness and saddlery needs ; and supply all uniform and leather equipment. All else was either bought through contractors or was imported. General Headquarters only handled the imported items, and the regiments themselves obtained most of the remaining supplies.

Before passing beyond 1914, allow me to make two comments. The first concerns the present locations of Ordnance Factories. Originally, and many centuries ago, they were placed at the major ports of India, as this was the best and safest way of making deliveries having regard to the lack of internal communications and the disturbed state of the country. One of the first moves inland was away from Bombay, where there was insufficient space to carry out further expansion. But Kirkee was only chosen as an expansion area after a Division had carried out an exercise to prove that the surrounding topography made it possible to defend the new installation.

In those days there was considerable fear from the Mahrattas. But as British influence spread throughout India an entirely new policy was followed, which was to place gun foundries, gun powder works and carriage works at many centres throughout India and convenient for local deliveries. With the 18th century the age of industrialization came and it became necessary, for production purposes, to concentrate manufacture in a few establishments, and it is a medley of these opposing policies that accounts for the locations of Ordnance Factories to-day.

What of the future? We do not yet know the scope and extent of the defence arrangements we must now take against atomic bombs, but I personally feel we would be well guided if, in respect of any new building, we laid out existing installations, whether an Ordnance Factory or a Depot, in localities where hills rise from the plains, so that at least we have available the most simple problem of going underground, that is, underground in a horizontal direction and not vertically.

My second comment is to draw your attention to the point that from the close of the 19th century and up to date one of our fundamental policies in India has been that whereas we cannot make all the weapons we want, we must attempt to make all ammunition we require in the Service. This policy has been of great value to the British Commonwealth on many occasions, and I will only mention two.

First is that throughout the whole of the fighting in Italy in the recent war, India supplied all the requirements for 25 pdr. ammunition. The second case concerns Dunkirk. With the retreat to Dunkirk, all ammunition had necessarily to be abandoned to the enemy and, in the concluding stages of the battle, there was no ammunition for the fighter squadrons of the R.A.F. India was able to supply 15 million rounds by air and, without these, the R.A.F. could not have defended the Dunkirk beaches.

Before passing on I will add a tail piece. Many of the younger members of this audience may perhaps think that Florence Nightingale was the first to point the way to the use of women power in war. She was preceded by the best part of a hundred years by a gallant lady named Mrs. Ainsworth, who was the officer in charge of the gunpowder establishment at Bombay in 1747. Her title, which was that of the officer in charge, was "The Gunner". Unfortunately she was blown up the following year when mixing her brew.

To pick up the story where I left it at 1914. On the outbreak of the 1914-18 war, India was still importing a major portion of her war supply needs, and particularly in terms of tonnage. But as the war went on and shipping losses became more and more heavy, the question was raised at the end of 1916 whether more could not be secured from India.

The result of this enquiry was that the Indian Munitions Board was set up on the 1st of April 1917. As the Montague Chelmsford Reforms had not yet been introduced, Provincial Governments were in all respects subservient to the Central Government and so organisation was a relatively simple matter. Each Province was required to appoint a Controller of Munitions, and these Controllers had virtually to do the job under the supervision of the Munitions Board consisting of a Chairman and four members. I will not go into more details, as those who are interested will find them in the "Industrial Handbook of the Indian Munitions Board 1919".

In the 18 months of its existence, which marked the stage of the heaviest demands of the war, the Munitions Board secured war supplies from India to the extent of Rs. 34½ lakhs, or about one-third of a crore. It is of interest to place against this figure the cost of war supplies secured in India in the six years of the recent war. Figures are not yet complete and certain additions have yet to be ascertained. But the verifiable figure to-day is some Rs. 1010 crores, or roundly £800 million. For an equivalent period of 18 months the Supply Department produced 250 crores worth of war supplies as against one-third of a crore by the Indian Munitions Board.

That, in a way, is another way of explaining the great measure of industrialization that had occurred in India between the two wars but, of course, the effort had to be organized. For this we have to thank the Principal Supply Officers Committee (India) that, over the seven or eight years before 1939 produced, with the assistance of Indian industry, the fundamental plan for the great war supply effort. The driving force for this effort was almost exclusively provided by Defence Services officers who gave generously of their spare time, in the years when war was approaching, to leave nothing undone. The really substantial task that they completed was a complete survey of all raw materials and all industry in India.

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In attempting to give you some idea of India's war supply effort in the recent war it is necessary to be highly selective. In these six years India provided :—

805 3.7 inch howitzers

700,000 rifles

Nearly 9 million rounds of gun ammunition of all kinds.

Nearly 5 millions of mortar ammunition, grenades and mines.

Nearly 1000 million rounds of S.A.A.

Over 1 million respirators.

Over 200,000 oil cookers.

20,000 modern binoculars.

5,000 prismatic compasses.

50 million pairs of socks.

We were making tentage to the value of upwards of £1,000,000 a month for over four years. Our wartime clothing factories turned out for years over 10 million garments a month.

14 million blankets.

50 million pairs of boots and other footwear.

100 million yards of electric cable.

Nearly 400 million dry cells and batteries.

Over 100 million petrol containers.

5 floating docks including two of the biggest in the world.

250,000 chassis were erected and bodies built on them.

Towards the end of the war we produced 750 broad gauge wagons a month, or 15 new goods trains every 30 days. As regards ships and aeroplanes, I can only give you peak figures of the highest monthly production, which were that in one month 214 ships were under construction, 458 ships were being repaired, 146 air frames were re-built, and 197 aerial engines were overhauled.

But apart from production responsibilities the Director General of Munition Production and the Director General of Supplies had between them very heavy responsibilities in the collection and distribution of a whole range of essential raw materials. Of the things we wanted, to keep our own efforts going as well as Industry generally, we had to get sisal and wattle bark from South Africa, blister copper from Rhodesia, manilla and tin from S. E. Asia, mercury from Spain and sulphur from wherever we could find it. What we had to collect and supply from India, for the war supply needs of the Allied nations, such as mica, monozite, magnesite, the titanium-rutile-beryllium group, chrome etc., was much more of a headache, and I will tell you some details of the worst of all; Hog's BRISTLES.

This bristle, required in quite astonishing figures of tons, is graded by lengths and by colours for different purposes and must be exported so sorted. It is a "live" crop, *i.e.*, it is plucked from the back of the living pig and must only be plucked at stated periods. The pig doesn't like all this. When the Burma road was cut, the Allied nations were cut off from China, the only available world source. India never had a trade, so I had to organise it. What had to be done was to train the sweeper of each of the 500,000 villages in India how and when to pluck, how it was to be collected and paid for, and next how it was to be graded before shipping, etc. A nice little problem of organization some of you may care to think over. It was one of our very successful enterprises.

I am only too conscious that there were delays and failures, but in my last two years as D. G. M. P. these amounted to less than 1% of all demands that were placed upon us, and that such was invariably due either to absence of the requisite capacity or the absence of raw material or there being too little time. Of one thing I am certain. The war supply effort of India got very poor publicity, and very few know the magnitude of the achievement. I have mentioned that the ascertainable figure to-day is £800 million of war supplies. I ask you to put this figure against the sterling debt to India of £1200 million.

The final organisation of the Supply Department consisted of a head office and four executive branches each under a Director-General. The four executive branches were:—

Munitions Production; Shipbuilding and ship repair; Aircraft repair; and Supply *i.e.* everything remaining.

At its peak the strength of the organisation consisted of —

1820 officers; 44,000 clerks, chemists, technicians and other officer workers; and 116,000 men in Ordnance Factories.

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I have now approached the concluding part of my lecture. In the brief period at my disposal it has been quite impossible to state the factors from which I will now draw what I conceive to be the important lessons for the future. In putting these before you I am conscious that we are now moving into a new era of warfare. We are now in the atomic age, with guided projectiles and micro-biological warfare of terrifying possibilities. Nevertheless, I consider my lessons will stand for the future, and of these there are six.

The first concerns the preparatory planning in peace. When someone has to turn to planning the industrial mobilization of the country, both in support of the war effort and in support of the civil community, there will be all kinds of ideas as to how the job should be done. When that time comes I hope the people concerned will pay regard to two vital essentials.

First is the need to make a complete and exhaustive statistical survey of raw materials and the industrial capacity; to list it and specify it most clearly. There is then available the fundamental data of: "Can we or can we not produce this or that, and how much of it, whatever the circumstances the new war may bring." The second is to lay in stockpiles to cover deficiencies of essential raw materials. These were not covered in the recent war, and had a grievous effect on our war supply effort, particularly in terms of delay.

The second lesson is that we must design our war organisation on sound lines. Many people think that administration is a natural gift like an ability to sing. A surprisingly large number of people think that administrators are born and not made. This delusion is prevalent among one of the senior

Services of this country. The fact of the matter is that administration is a very exact science. Research of an exacting nature, particularly in America where vast activities have to be controlled by one man, has shown a common conclusion, which is that a large enterprise must be directed and controlled by three elements—the head, the staff and the line executives. This modern research shows us that the Army organisation is the right one. The line executives, who are the Directors-General, must have uninterrupted contact with the head; the staff merely existing not as a sponge to absorb the shocks between the two, but as an instrument for facilitating the work of the head on the one hand and of the line executives, that is the Directors-General, on the other.

My third lesson is that the powers to be vested in the line organisation, that is to say the Directors-General, must be co-equal and co-terminus with their responsibilities. There is always a danger in Government practice to give a man responsibility but not give him the full range of authority and power with which to execute his responsibilities. In this connection I am always reminded of the story of Marshal Joffre, who is reputed to have said, "I don't know who won the battle of the Marne but I know who would have been responsible had it been lost."

The fourth lesson is that the Finance Department must not, on another occasion, fail in their responsibility of making reasonable prices possible. During the last war the Finance Department failed in two respects:—

- (a) The first was the limited concept of Excess Profits Taxation, i.e. E.P.T. The rough idea of E.P.T. is that any industrialist was permitted to take any three pre-war years over a given period to calculate his average peace profit, and during war all profit over this average level was treated as an excess for war taxation. But whereas in England the taxation was 100%, in India, with other taxation, it amounted to a little over 80%. So because there was left an additional margin of free profit of some 20% over and above the average peace profit, therefore almost every contractor fought for the highest possible prices in order that he could inflate the content of the free 20%.
- (b) The second failure was refusal to prescribe any standard rate of profit. That is to say a profit in terms of a return on capital or a return on a contract expressed as a percentage. The Supply Department was left to flounder in this field and to fix whatever rate of profit it thought best.

These two points are of tremendous importance, and any Supply Department is entitled to have their task made easier by careful attention to them.

My fifth lesson concerns staffing. If the War Department wishes to be well served in war supply in a future emergency then I would advise that there be set up a military reserve of officers in peace who would provide for three things. First, to expand the inspection staffs of the War Department; secondly, to expand the development staffs of the War Department; and thirdly, to assist the Supply Department, to provide Government representation on the floor of every major workshop in the country. I suggest it should be a supplementary reserve which trains the officer initially and only at long intervals thereafter. It would be drawn from industry itself.

Why should Government representation be available on the floor of contractors workshops? Here is the reason. In the recent war we had no such representation, and we had no real means of checking whether the order book of any contractor was grossly overloaded or not. Too many contractors

were more than willing to accept all or any orders so that, regardless of delivery dates, they could choose from their order book the things that were most profitable and convenient to them to make.

My sixth and last lesson concerns bribery and corruption. Before making my point I would like to say a few words on this unsavoury subject. First, bribery is not merely an affair of money. It takes many forms, and when you begin to think in terms of wine, woman and song, you are getting a clearer picture of the possibilities. Secondly, although flagrant and rank when in full growth, bribery starts as a very tender plant. No one is going to walk into your office and put down Rs. 50,000 and ask a favour. The person it is hoped to bribe is reconnoitred with the full care of an enemy's defensive position, and the first approaches will be made most delicately.

If the officer is not to be bribed, the offer will never be made. But in this regard the honest officer should be scrupulously careful not to place himself under an obligation of any kind whatsoever. As regards the honest officer, he can be either an active or passive resister of bribery. If he is zealous to put down bribery and corruption, he must do so with his eyes wide open. He must be prepared for his name to be vilified and worse. One military officer zealous in suppressing bribery had his house burgled five times in 14 months and left India, at the beginning of this year, with literally nothing more than the clothes he wore.

Much can be done to make bribery and corruption difficult through the forms and systems that are devised for the transaction of business. The key-point here is to so arrange that the agreement to anything involving money requires two people, and so introduce an element of conspiracy on the Government side, *i.e.*, there have to be two crooks before bribery commences.

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Despite many shortcomings, due to factors over which the Supply Department had no control, I consider a great job was done. Of one thing we may all be certain. If we had fought the last war on the same terms that we fought the 1914-18 war, and had had to rely on external production to that extent to support the Fighting Services of India, then it would have been quite impossible to raise and maintain anything approaching the numbers that India was able to put into the field, into the air and into the ships at sea.

What of the future? In the atomic age it will be as equally imperative to secure the needs of the civil community and to keep intact the civil economy as it will be to secure the needs of the Fighting Services. There must be a mobilization plan for the industrial and other resources of India that makes a carefully calculated apportionment between the civilian population and the Fighting Services. Indeed, the needs of the former may well impose limits of size on the latter.

How is this to be done? If the past and the present afford any sure guide, then you may rely on it that the job will substantially have to be done by the Fighting Services themselves. In this country the Army always seems to be the last and only machinery when anything falls apart or anything has to be built up. On the analogy of the story that in the past cavalry had its place in an Army because it was necessary to add tone to an otherwise vulgar assembly, there would be some civilians to grace the effort. But the real effort of drawing up these plans—plans more vital than any other that fall to G. H. Q.—will fall on the M.G.O. or whatever equivalent may exist in the future.

It will be a grinding toil requiring years for completion, and the future organisation of the Armed Forces at Headquarters should take full account of this first and most important of all future war preparedness measures.

HAM VICTORY PARADE KARNE WILAYAT GAE THE

SUBEDAR SULEMAN KHAN*†

HINDUSTANI fauj ki wuh pánch partyan, jo fatah ki khushi manáne ke mauqe par, Inglístán men *Victory Parade* ke lie bulái gai thín. Un men ek party hamári 1st *Punjab Regiment* ki bhi thi. Pahle to ham log *Barcilly* gae, jahán *Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Auchinleck* Sahib hamáre muáine ko tashrif láe. Wuh hamáre lie bari khushi ka din tha. *Barcilly* men ham ne apne safar ki puri taiyári ki. Wahán ham ko *battle dress* aur sardi ke kapre die gae.

Barcilly se ham log *Bombay* rawána hue; jahán pahunch kar, hamen ek zabardast bahri jaház "*Mauritania*" men sawár ho kar, Inglístán rawána hona tha. Yih jaház *Bombay* ki godi se tín mil ke fásle par khara tha. Dúr se to kuchh aisa bara málúm nahin hota tha, magar jab ham kishtion men baith kar is ke qaríb pahunche, to is 35,000 ton ke lambe chaure jaház ki haibat hamáre dilon per chha gai. Ham ne itna bara jaház pahle kabhi nahin dekha tha. Yih char pánch manzil ka fauládi qila bari shán se khara tha.

Jab ham is ke andar pahunche, to hamen is ki safái dekh kar bara achambha hua. Is ke har kamre men *bath room*, aur *bath room* men *flush system* tha, jis tarah Hindustán ki relon ke *first-class* men hota hai. Har jawán ke lie ek qism ki chárpái thi, aur har sardár ke lie aláhida kamra.

Do roz yih jaház langar andáz raha. Tísre din is ne apna safar shuru kia. Is jaház men chhe hazár musáfir the, aur suná gaya hai kih larái ke daurán, is men 9,000 musáfron ne ásáni ke sáth safar kia hai. Is shán-dár jaház ki raftár bahut tez hai;

chunánchih is ne *Singapur* aur *London* ki dauron men awwal number hásil kia tha.

Bombay se jab hamára jaház rawána hua, to samundar ka mausim achchha tha, aur tufáni hawáen nahin chal rahi thin. Is wajah se jaház rel ki tarah hamwár chalta raha, aur terha tirschha nahin hua. Waise bhi chunkih jaház bahut bara tha, musáfron ko yih mahsús hi nahin hota tha, kih ham safar kar rahe hain. Sháyad isi wajah se kisi ko matli aur qae ki shikáyat bhi nahin hui.

Ráste men *Aden* dikhái dia, aur phir ham *Buhera* *Qulzum* men dákhil hue. Rát ke waqt *Mecca* aur *Madina* ki bijli ki battián bhi do derh sau mil ka fásla hone ke báwajúd dikhái din. Sáre Musalmán adab se khare ho gae, aur bare shauq se us taraf dekhne lage.

Is ke bád nahar *Suez* ái. Nahar *Suez* samundar jitni gahri nahin hai, aur bare jaházon ko jawár bháte ka rukh dekh kar, is men chalna parta hai. Ittifáq se jawár ki wajah se nahar *Suez* men páni áya hua tha; is lie ham dákhil ho gae. Yih nahar koi assi nawwe míl lambi hai, jis men jaház áhista áhista chala ja raha tha.

Chhe ghante men ham ne yih safar tae kia, aur phir *Bahr-i-Rúm* ke lambe chaure samundar men dákhil ho gae. *Málta* *Sicily* aur *Gibraltar* hote hue, ham Inglístán ki taraf barhe, to ham sab logon ko sardi si mahsús hui, aur ham ne garm *battle dress* pahan li. Chand ghanton ke safar ke bád Inglístán ka sáhil nazar áne laga. Hamen *Liverpool* ki bandargáh par utarna tha.

Is jaház ne jis men ham ne safar kia, kai hazár míl ka fásla sirf bárah

*Jaisa ke Subedar Suleman Khan Sahib ne Lieut. Ibu-i-Hasan Sharique se bayan kia.

† An English translation appears on page 21.

din men púra kar lia. Yih bárah din bhi ham kabhi na bhúlenge. Ham log din rát khushián manáya karte the. Jaház hi men *cinema* tha; jaház par hi *loud-speaker*-on ke zarie elánát sunáe játe the, aur mukhtalíf *unit*-on ke gáne bajáne wále, dholak par apne apne gáne gáte the. Kháne ka intizám bhi máqúl tha, aur Hindustáni tarz ki khurák milti thi. Algaraz bahri safar khatm kar ke, ham *Liverpool* pahunche.

Liverpool Bartánia ke junúbi sáhil ki bandargáh hai, aur abhi godi tñ míl ke fásle par thi, kih jaház ke donon taraf kai kai manzil ki imaraten aur *factory*-án dikhái de rahi thín. Goya hamára jaház ek páni ki aisi gali men se guzar raha tha, jis ke donon taraf khushnuma imáraton ka silsila maujud tha.

In imáraton ko dekhte dekhte, ham khas *Liverpool* par ja lage, jahán ja kar jaház godi ke sáth is tarah ja laga, jis tarah *railway station* par rel gári lag játi hai.

May 22 ki subah ko hamára jaház laga, magar ham ko 23 tárikh subah, das baje, jaház se utarne ka hukm mila tha. Kyunkih 22 tarikh ko *civilian* log utarne wále the. 23 ko ham ne apni *uniform* durust karke, *single file* men utarna shuru kia. Hindustán ke yih sárhe sát sau jawán, jis án bán se sar zamín Inglístán par utre hain, wuh bhi ek dekhne ki chíz thi.

Bandargáh par *police* ke sipáhi qatár andar qatár hamára intizár kar rahe the, aur un ka *band* apne dhíme suron men hamára istiqbál kar raha tha. Inglístán ki *police* ke sipáhi siyáh wardi pahante hain, aur bare tagre khubsúrat jawánon hi ko *police* men bharti kia jata hai.

Hazarha shahri tamáshái hamára istiqbál karne áe the, aur har taraf rang barang ki jhandian lehra rahi thin. In khushnuma manzaron se lutf utháte hue, ham *railway train* men baithe, jo godi ke bilkul sámne khari thi.

Inglístán men relon ka bahut achchha intizám hai. Wahán ka

third-class hamáre hán ke *first-class* se achchha hota hai. Har pandra *minute* bád *station* par gári á játi hai, aur ek hi simt men din bhar gáron ke chalne ka tánta bandha rehta hai. Is wajah se *station*-on par musáfiron ki bhír nahin hoti.

Rel ki chhe chhe *line* barábar barábar chalti hain. Halánkih hamáre mulk men aksar sirf ikehri patri hi hai. Wahán gárián tez bhi bahut chalti hain. *Liverpool* se *London* tak tñ sau míl hai, magar ham chhe ghante se bhi kuchh kam men wahán pahunch gae. Rel gáron men, aur *station* par, kahin kúra karkat nám ko dikhái nahin deta tha.

Har jagah kachre ke lie díbbe rakhe hain, aur logon ko inhen istimál karne ka salíqa bhi hai. Aksar gárián aisi hain kih *engine* se *guard* ke díbbe tak dhura dhur rásta hota hai. Chár musáfiron ke darmián ek mez hoti hai. Ek *dining car* aur *canteen* bhi zurur hota hai. Inglístán ki gárián Hindustán ki gáron se chaurái men zara choti hoti hain.

Jab ham *London* pahunch gae, to hamen ek *camp* men thairáya gaya, jo *Kensington Gardens* men banáya gaya tha. Yih bág *London* shahr ke qaríb hi hai, aur is ke pás *Albert Hall* ki shándár imárat hai.

Camp men kháne píne ki chízon ki kami na thi. Gosht, sabzi tázi áti thi. Sálan bháji pakáne ke lie masála, áta aur ghi ham apne sáth hi Hindustán se le gae the. Ham ne qaumwári *mess* taiyár kar lie the, aur Hindustáni taríqe se khána pakwa kar kháte the.

London men bher ka gosht milta hai; bakre bahut kam hain. Bakre ka gosht bahut chikna hota hai, aur gal bhi jaldi játa hai. *Camp* men kháne píne se fárig ho kar, har jawán ko bahar sair sapáte ko jáne ki ijázat thi, balkih hamári rehnumái ko wuh *officer* sáhibán, jo Hindustán se ja chuke the, ya chhutti par gae hue the, á gae the. Un men se aksar Urdu bol sakte the; wuh hamáre *guide* bane, aur *London* ka chappa chappa dikha dia.

Victory Parade men abhi kai dīn bāqī the, kih Bādshāh Salāmat ki sawāri āi. Thūk das baje *Alexandra Gate* se un ki *motor* āti dikhāi di. Hamāra *Contingent* sarak ke donon taraf ikehri qatār men khara ho gaya. Bādshāh Salāmat ke sāth Malika Muazzama, un ki donon shahzādian aur *Field Marshal Auchinleck* bhi tashrif lāe.

Bādshāh Salāmat aur Malika Muazzama ne, ham men se, kai jawānon se hāth milāya, aur muskra kar kuchh kaha. Wuh Urdu zabān nahin jānte, magar hamāre Sarkhail *Brigadier Chaudhri* se unhon ne angrezi zabān men yih kaha, kih: "Mujhe Hindustān ke bahādur sipāhion ko dekh kar, bahut khushi hāsīl hui hai".

Ath *June* ko hamāri *Victory Parade* thi. Siwāe Rūs ke, sārī dunya se sipāhi āe the. *March Past* ka fāsla chār mīl lamba tha. Bahut chauri khulī sarkon par hamen *march* karāya gaya. Chālīs hazār faujion ki ek lambi qatār thi.

Har jagah khubsūrat imāraten aur sarak ke donon taraf hazāron lākhon ādmion ki bhīr nazar āti thi. Imāraton ki chhaton par ranga rang ke jhande lahra rahe the, aur beshumār ādmi ūnchi ūnchi khirkion me se hamen dekh rahe the. Jūn jūn hamāra *march* khatm ke karīb hota jāta tha, sarkon par ādmion ki bhīr zīāda hoti jāti thi.

Ham *Whitchall* men se, jahān tamām sarkāri dafter hain, guzar kar, *Trafalgar Square* men pahunche. Phir wahān se mur kar, *march* karte hue, *Saluting Base*, yāni salāmi ki jagah se guzre. Yahān bahut ūnche ūnche jhande lahra rahe the. Wāh! Wā! kitni bhīr aur kaise khushi ke nāre the!

Bādshāh Salāmat, *Navy* ka libās pahne hue the. Is julus men hamāre *Contingent* ke āge āge *Mechanized Unit*-en thin, aur hamāra *Contingent* bari ān bān se qadam milae ja raha tha. Dekhne walon ka kahna hai kih Hindustāni fauj ne jis

shān se *march* kia hai, aur us ke *brass band* ne jo jangi nagme bajāe hain, wuh Bartānia wālon ko barson yād rahenge. Kisi aur mulk ka *turn-out* aisa umda na tha.

Buckingham Palace ke pās *saluting base* bana hua tha, jahān Bādshāh Salāmat aur shāhi khāndān ke ādmi, aur wazīr log, jama the. Ham ne bari chusti phurti se *Eyes Left* ki salāmi di, aur phir ek baje apne *camp* men wāpas ā gae. *Parade* ke bād, shām ko *St. James Park* men ātishbāzi dekhne gae. Aha! kya shāndār nazāra tha. Wuh bhi kya khūb shāndār dīn tha!

Ham ne *London* shahr ki bhi ji bhar sair ki. Pachās lāriān hamāre lie muqarrar thin. *Windsor Castle*, *Albert Hall*, *Parliament House*, *India House* aur *Madame Tassauds* nāmi ek ajāib ghar bhi dekha jis men mashūr logon ki murtiān mom ki bana kar, kapre pahna die gae hain.

Yun to wahān beshumār murtiān thin, lekin Hindustān ke bāshindon men se sirf ek Mahātmā Gāndhi ki murti thi. Yih murtiān hu bahu asl ādmi, jaisi hoti hain, balkih *police* ke sipāhi ki murti par, to bari āsāni se asl sipāhi hone ka shuba ho jāta hai.

London shahr tīs mīl lamba hai, aur assi lākh ādmi is men ābād hain. Makān kai kai manzila hain, aur sarakon par *traffic* ke alāwa, zamin-doz rel gārion ka bhi jāl bichha hua hai. Shahr ki safāi tārīf ke qābil hai.

Har *Hotel time* par khulta hai, aur har dūkān par chizon ki qimat likhi rehti hai; qimat chukāne aur jhagarne ki mutliq zururat nahin parti. Sarakon par *traffic* ka *control automatic* hai; kisi chaurāhe par sipāhi nahin hota; sirf lāl, hari battian rahnumai karti hain.

Zamīn-doz *train-on* ke *ticket* mashīn se kharīde jāte hain. Mashīn men manzil-i-maqsud ke *ticket* ki qimat dāl di jāti hai, aur ek taraf se *ticket* dusre taraf se baqia raqm khud bakhud nikal ati hai. Zamin-doz relen bijli se chalti hain, jin ki raftār sāth mīl fi ghanta se kam nahin hoti.

Zamin-doz rel gárlon tak pahuncháne ke wáste áp ko un sírhion par khara hona parta hai, jo níche játi hain. Páon rakhte hi, wuh sírhi áp ko níche le játi hai. Jab áp tah par pahunch játe hain, to sírhí gáib ho játi hai, aur áp ka páon zamín par á játa hai. Jab áp rel men baith kar, kisi dusri jagah pahunch játe hain, to áp ko úpar le jáne wáli sírhíán milti hain. In sírhion par qadam rakhte hi, áp úpar á játe hain.

Zamín-doz relen ek gol surang men se guzarti hain. Wuh surang rel-gári ki chaurái se zara yúñhi si chauri hoti hai. Rel is surang men se tír ki tarah guzar kar, दूसरे *Station* par pahunch játi hai, to púri *train* ke darwáze ek dam khul játe hain, aur musáfir utar játe hain. Jab दूसरे musáfir is men sawár hote hain, to koi kahta hai: "Darwázon ka khayal rakkho". Báz dafa yih áwáz kisi *loud-speaker* men se áti hai. Is áwáz par tamám darwáze band ho játe hain, aur *train* fauran rawána ho játi hai. Rel ke dibbon men naqshe lage rahte hain, jin se áp ko apne utarne ki jagah málum ho sakti hai.

Inglistán ke log bahut maze ki zindagi guzáte hain, aur har kám muqarrara waqt par karte hain. Un ke chehron par khushi aur itminán dikhái deta hai. Aisa mahsús hi nahin hota, kih is mulk par jang ki musibat pari bhi thi.

Har makán men bijli se khána pakáya játa hai. Bijli se kapre dhoe játe hain, yáni har kám bijli se kía játa hai. Gáyon ka dúdh bhi bijli se nikála játa hai. Har makán men *telephone* laga hua hai.

Inglistán men rehne wálon ki síhat dekh kar rashk áta tha. Auraten aur bachhe shám ko hawa-khori zurúr karte hain. Tálím ka intizám bara achchha hai. Jáhil to wahan dhundé se bhi nahin miltá. Hukumat ki taraf se jabaria tálím hai. Bachhon ko *school*-on men tálím muft, sawári muft, balkih ek waqt ka

khána bhi bachhon ko muft miltá hai.

Ek bát is mulk men ajíb málum hui. Jidhar dekha auraten hi auraten! Hamen batáya gaya kih is waqt Inglistán men 70 fi sadi auraten our 30 fi sadi mard hain. Magar wahán ki auraten bari sehat wáli hain. Shádi se ziáda ázádi se khud apni rozi kama kar, zindagi basar karne ko pásand karti hain. Relon men *ticket checker* wagaira to umuman auraten hi hoti hain, magar wahán ki auraten itni sharmíli nahin hotin.

Inglistán ke káshtkar kheti bári men khúb táq hain. Zamin kam hone ki wajah se chappa chappa zamín kásht ki jati hai. Hal bijli se chaláye játe hain. *Tractor*-on se bhi hal chalte hain, aur báz maqámát par bare ghoron se bhi. Gáe bari achchhi nasl ki hoti hain. Un ki dekh bhál aur kháne wagaira ka khayál rakha játa hai, tab hi to wuh das bárah ser dúdh rozána deti hain.

Ham ne *Scotland* bhi dekha. Yih ek pahári muík hai. *Sheffield*, *Newcastle*, *Edinburgh* aur *Glasgow*, chár bare bare shahron ki sair ki. *Newcastle* men bare bare jangi jaház taiyár hote hain. *Sheffield* men cháqu, chhuri, kánte aur lohe ka aur saman taiyár hota hai.

Newcastle ke *Lord Mayor* bahut búrhe hain; wuh is qadar kamzor the, kih wuh hamáre istiqbal ke lie khud khare nahin ho sakte the; unhen sahára de kar, do jawánon ne utha lia tha, magar phir bhi Hindustáni jawánon ke istiqbál karne ka shauq un ko is qadar tha, kih wuh muáina karne páñch May ko báhar áe. Is se hamáre dil par bahut gahra asar para.

Ham men se bárah jawán *Germany* ki sair ko gae, jise ab ínton aur malbe ka dher kehna cháhie. Bandargáh *Hamburg*, jo gáliban dunya ki sab se bari bandargáh thi, bilkul tabáh aur barbád ho gai.

Tabáhi aur barbádi ki taswír mujas-sam dekhni ho, to is bandargáh ko dekh lijie.

Sainkron ábdozen túte phúte sáhil par idhar udhar pari thín. Sára shahr, jis men satra ya atthára lákh ádmi reh rahe the, ab khandar bana hua tha. Sau men se mushkil se do char makán khare the.

Wahán se ham bazaria rel *Berlin* pahunche. Apne dushman ke ghar men pahunch kar, *Victory Parade* karne se hamen bari khushi hui. Sáth hi *Berlin* ki khauf-nák tabahi se ibrat bhi bahut hui. Wahán ke báshinde bahut zíada pare-shán aur garíb ho gae hain.

Aksar peron ki phalián aur patte chaba chaba kar ji rahe hain. Ham

men se koi shakhs agar *cigarette* phaink deta tha, to us par das bára ádmi tút parte the. *Cologne* men ham ne *Krupp Factory* dekhi, jo ab khandar ka dher hai.

Ham ne jahán tak dekha, *Germany* ke cháron taraf tabáhi dekhi. Hamen ek cháqu aur ek *cigarette lighter* bhi bataur tohfa dia gaya.

Phir ham *London* wápas á gae. Wahán se "*Garthej*" námi jaház men apne watan Hindustán áe. Is safar ke bád, hamen yaqin ho gaya, kih hamára mulk dusre mulkon se bahut piche hai. Hamen taraqqi karne ke lie, bilkul waqt zae na karna chahie, aur tálim ám kar deni cháhie.

Admiral Cowan, now Honorary Colonel of 18th Cavalry

An Admiral as Honorary Colonel of a cavalry regiment is a novelty in any army but Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, who has just been appointed Honorary Colonel of the 18th (K. E. VII. O.) Cavalry, I.A.C., is an unusual Admiral.

A contemporary of the late Lord Beatty, he got his first D.S.O. as far back as 1898 and commanded the first Light Cruiser Squadron of the Grand Fleet in 1917. But Admiral Cowan has always had a liking for soldiers and soldiering. He contrived to escape from the Navy and served as A.D.C. to Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts in the South African War.

In the late war, having come out to the Middle East as a Commander R.N.R. for duty with Commandos, he again escaped and joined the 18th Cavalry in Tobruk during the siege. There he insisted on going out on patrols, although he was already over 70, and became so famous a character with the sepoys that they said that England could never be beaten if even the old men were as tough as this.

After a spell in Syria with his adopted regiment, Admiral Cowan returned to the Western Desert and shared its fate when it was overrun by German tanks in May 1942. The German tank commander who came to capture him found, however, that he had a difficult subject to deal with for the Admiral fired six shots at him with his pistol with such accuracy that the tank commander had hurriedly to retire into his tank and close the lid.

Admiral Cowan was repatriated from a prison camp in North Italy on the grounds of old age and ill-health, an act of clemency which surprised the rest of the camp since he could still outwalk both the Italian sentry who took him out for exercise, and most of the British officers in the camp.

That he was far from finished with war was shown when, within a month or two of his release, he led a commando raid on the Albanian coast and was given a Bar to his D.S.O. for great gallantry under fire. An interval of 47 years between two D. S. O's is probably another record.

J-758
12/10/64

WE WENT ON THE VICTORY PARADE

BY SUBEDAR SULEMAN KHAN *

(1ST PUNJAB REGIMENT)

OUR party from the 1st Punjab Regiment was one of the five parties which attended the Victory Celebrations from the Indian Army. We first of all went to Bareilly, where H.E. Field Marshal Auchinleck came to inspect us. It was a very happy day for us. At Bareilly we were fitted out for the journey and given battle dress and other clothing for the cold weather.

From Bareilly we went on to Bombay, there to embark on the ship "Mauritania" for England. It was anchored out three miles off-shore. It did not seem so very big from a distance, but when we went out to it in a small boat and got close to this magnificent 35,000 tons ship we were wonderstruck! Never before had I seen such a big ship. In it there were four or five storeys of decks.

When we went inside we could see how nice and clean everything was. In the rooms there were bath-rooms and in the bath-rooms the flush system. It was just as it is in the 1st class Indian railway carriages. For every jawan there was a special kind of bed, and for each V.C.O. there was a separate room.

Two days we waited at Bombay, and on the third day we began our journey. In the ship were 6,000 travellers, but I was told that during the war she had carried 9,000 men at a time. She was a very speedy ship, and had made the fastest journey between Singapore and London. When we started the weather at sea was quite good, and the wind was not blowing; it was like the railway, and none of us were ill. The ship was so big that it was hard to realise we were travelling.

We saw Aden and later entered the Red Sea. At night we saw the distant lights of Mecca and Medina, and all the Musalmans on board looked respectfully in that direction.

After that we came to the Suez Canal; it is very narrow, and as it is not very deep the big ships have to pass through very carefully. It is about eighty or ninety miles long, and the ships have to go through it very slowly.

Six hours we took to pass through, and then we entered the Mediterranean Sea. Malta, Sicily and Gibraltar passed by, and as we neared England we had to put on our battle dress. A few hours later we saw the coast of England. We disembarked at Liverpool.

We had taken only twelve days to travel thousands of miles. These twelve days we shall never forget. We had been happy the whole time. We had a cinema on board, we listened to the loud speaker telling us about the places we passed, and the different units on board had their bands. The arrangements for meals were very good, and we had the same diet as we have in India.

Liverpool is on the western side of England, and for three miles before we arrived we saw big ships, buildings and factories on each side. Our boat went through this street of water which had beautiful buildings on both sides.

At last we reached Liverpool Docks, and our ship stopped there just as a train stops at a railway station.

On the morning of May 22 our ship reached the docks, but we did not leave until 10 o'clock the following

*As related to Lieut. Ibu-i-Hasan Sharique, 1st Punjab Regiment.

morning; on the first day only the civilians disembarked. On the morning of the 23rd, our uniforms neat and tidy, we went off in single file. Seven hundred and fifty of us Indian soldiers landed on English soil—it was a sight worth seeing!

On the port the police were there to make arrangements for us, and their band welcomed us. The English police wear black uniform and are very strong and handsome jawans.

On all sides as we landed there were flags of all colours flying. As we got off and into a beautiful building there was a train waiting in front of us, and we seated ourselves in it.

In England the railway arrangements are very good. The third class is better than our first class in India. Every fifteen minutes a train leaves, and throughout the day this is going on regularly. Because of this no crowds of passengers are ever seen at railway stations.

There are six pairs of railway lines running side by side, whereas in our country there are usually only two, and sometimes only one pair. The trains in England run very fast. From Liverpool to London it is three hundred miles, but we only took less than six hours to get there. There was no dust or filth either in the trains or at the railway stations.

Everywhere there are dust-bins, and the people use them. Generally there is a corridor running through the whole train from front to back. Four travellers between them have one table in the train; a dining car and canteen was also attached. The British railway carriages are narrower than the Indian railway carriages.

When we arrived in London we were taken to a camp in Kensington Gardens. It is a big London park, and near it is the famous Albert Hall.

Food and drink were not short. Fresh meat and vegetables were supplied. For cooking purposes we had brought

masala, atta and ghee from India. We arranged our messes according to our religions, and arranged to have our food cooked in the Indian manner.

In London you can get sheeps' meat, but goats' meat is rare. Fortunately, we had some British officers who spoke Urdu, and they were able to show us each and every place in London and explain things to us.

Some days before the Victory Parade His Majesty the King came to see us. Sharp at 10 o'clock we saw his car arrive at the Alexandra Gate. Our Contingent stood on both sides of the road. With the King was Her Majesty the Queen and their two daughter Princesses, and with them was Field Marshal Auchinleck.

The King and Queen shook hands with some of us, but as they could not speak Urdu, they told our Brigadier Chaudhri in English how very happy they were to see the men from the Indian Army.

June 8 was our Victory Parade day. Soldiers had come from all parts of the world, except from Russia. The procession was four miles long. We marched through wide open streets—40,000 soldiers.

There were beautiful buildings everywhere; thousands upon thousands of people were crowded on the sides of the roads; flags were flying from the tops of the buildings; and you could see people looking out of the windows high above you. The crowds got thicker as we got nearer the end of the march.

We marched through Whitehall, where all the Government offices are, on to Trafalgar Square and then turned to march up past the saluting base. On that road there were flags flying from masts on either side. What crowds there were! And what cheering!

The King was dressed in naval uniform. In front of us in the procession were the mechanized units, and then behind them was the Indian Contingent, marching with great pomp and

show. The march past of the Indian soldiers and their brass band will be remembered by English people for years. None of the soldiers of the other countries were turned out as well as we were.

Near Buckingham Palace was the saluting base, and there the King and the members of the Royal family, as also the chief Ministers, had gathered. We saluted with a smart "Eyes Left" and marched on back to our camp, where we arrived at one o'clock. In the evening we went to watch the fireworks in St. James' Park. It was a splendid scene. What a famous day it had been!

We made several journeys in London, and fifty lorries were given to us to take us round. Windsor Castle, the Houses of Parliament, India House, the British Museum and a place called Madame Tassauds, where they make models of people in wax and dress them up in their clothes—all these places we saw.

But although there were many famous people at Madame Tassauds I saw only one Indian—that of Mahatma Gandhi. These statues are like living men, and you can easily mistake the statue of a policeman for a real policeman.

London is thirty miles long and about 80,00,000 people live there. There are many-storeyed buildings, and apart from the traffic on the roads, there are underground railways, too. Sanitation is very remarkable and praiseworthy.

The hotels open at appointed times, and everything in the shops is marked with a price; there is no need for any argument. The traffic on the roads is automatically controlled by traffic lights of red and green, and there are no traffic police.

On the underground railway stations you buy your ticket from a machine; you drop your coin in the right place and from one side the ticket comes out, and from the other side the change

drops out by itself. The underground railway trains run by means of electricity, and never go less than sixty miles an hour.

To get to the trains below ground you stand on a stairway which moves downwards; you just stand on the step and it carries you down, and when you get to the bottom the steps disappear and your foot slips on to the firm ground. Having got into the train and travelled to your station, there are other steps which move upwards; you step on and the steps carry you up.

The trains run through a long tunnel, which is circular and is just a little bit larger than the train. The trains rush through the tunnel at a terrific speed and then stop at the next station. All the doors in the length of the train then open at once and the people who want to get out at that station get out. When other people get in, some one shouts—sometimes it is from a loud speaker—"Mind the Doors"—and all the doors close at once and immediately the train starts again. There are maps in the carriages so that you can see where the stations are.

The English people live a very happy and disciplined life. Their faces are cheerful and show signs of satisfaction. They do not give the appearance of having been through the miseries of a war.

In all the houses they cook their food by means of electricity; they clean their clothes by electricity; and in fact they do nearly everything with the help of electricity. They even milk the cows by electricity! The telephone is installed in every house.

English people are very healthy; in the evening time the ladies and their children go out for a walk. Arrangements for education are very good, and wherever you search you will not find illiterate persons. Education is compulsory and free for children; they are given free travelling to and from their schools and get free food, too.

One thing in England is very strange—wherever you look you see women and more women. We were told that at present there are 70% women and 30% men in England. All the women are very healthy. They prefer to earn their living by themselves rather than get married. Many of them work as ticket collectors on the railways; they don't feel very shy.

English farmers are expert in farming. The land is small, and because of that every available piece of land is cultivated. Ploughing is generally done by means of electricity, but they also plough their fields by tractors and sometimes with the help of big horses. The cows look very fine, and the farmers look after them very well. As a result they give ten to twelve seers of milk every day.

We went to Scotland, a hilly country; and we saw Sheffield, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow, four big cities. In Newcastle they build big battle-ships; in Sheffield they make knives, forks and other iron things. In Newcastle although the Lord Mayor is too weak to walk, yet he was so eager to meet us that he came out to see us with the help of *jawans*. It made a deep impression on our minds.

From our party twelve of us were chosen to visit Germany, which is a

scene of ruins to-day. Hamburg, which was one of the world's biggest ports, is now completely destroyed. This is a true picture of destruction.

Hundreds of damaged submarines were lying here and there. The whole city, which had a population of between seventeen and eighteen lakhs, now has only a few buildings left.

From there we went by rail to Berlin. We were very glad to make our Victory Parade in the enemy's home. There was great destruction in Berlin, too. The people there are very disturbed in their minds, and have become very poor.

Most of the people feed on leaves and beans of trees. If any from among us threw away a cigarette end, there would be ten men to pick it up. We also saw Cologne and the Krupp factory, where they made guns and ammunition.

Wherever we looked in Germany there was destruction. We were offered and accepted a knife and a cigarette lighter.

Then we came back to London, and there we went on a ship called *CARTHAGE* to come back to India. Having been on this journey I believe that our country is much behind other countries, and for our country's progress we must waste no time, and must give as much education as we can.

5th Battalion Sikh Regiment Disbanded

After a great record of service in China, France, Malaya and India, the 5th Bn. (Duke of Connaught's Own) The Sikh Regiment—better known by its previous title, "47th Sikhs"—has been disbanded.

Raised at Sialkot in 1901, the 47th saw much service in India and North China before World War I. During that war the 47th served in France as part of the 3rd (Lahore) Division. Arriving just after the fall of Antwerp, it was immediately thrown into the critical battles of La Bassée and Armentières and fought with distinction throughout the campaigns of 1914 and 1915 in France.

In the short Malaya campaign in World War II, the battalion again proved worthy of its proud traditions, fighting as part of the 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade.

On disbandment, the battalion presented its regimental property to the Sikh Regiment and various Sikh units. An endowment fund of Rs. 70,000, for the benefit of ex-soldiers and their children, has been inaugurated from the battalion funds.

INDIA AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1946

BY COLONEL M. HAYAUD DIN, M.B.E., M.C.

TWENTY-ONE nations participated at the Peace Conference in Paris, which I had the privilege of attending as a military member of the Indian delegation. The Conference dealt with only five ex-enemy countries—Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland; Peace Treaties with Austria, Japan and Germany are to be taken when central Governments are established in those countries. Other countries and victims of aggression were also invited to state their case (Albania, Cuba, Egypt, Iran and Mexico), while Austria was given an opportunity of speaking on the question of South Tyrol, which concerns her frontier with Italy.

This Conference differed from previous Peace Conferences in many respects. Never before have so many countries been given an equal opportunity and a right of membership as at this Conference. The Versailles Treaty was conducted mainly by the three principal victorious Powers; representatives of other countries stated their case but took no active part; there was no voting or vetoing; no decision could become final unless the Powers mutually consented. Neither were the ex-enemy States given an opportunity of stating their point of view. Another important difference was that at the Vienna Peace Conference in 1814 and at the Versailles Conference in 1919, discussions took place *in camera*, while at Paris the proceedings were open to public and Press. At Versailles, formal proceedings only were open to the public.

To return to our Paris Conference. Draft treaties were first drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, composed of Ministers from America, Russia, Great Britain and France. These four Powers agreed that they would not accept any amendment to an agreed clause unless it was acceptable to all four. In other words, if one of the seventeen countries presented an amendment to an agreed clause, and one or more of the Big Four were against it, then all four big Powers had to oppose it. Certain articles in the draft Treaties had not been agreed upon, and these were left to the Peace Conference for a solution.

To facilitate its work, the Conference decided to 'divide itself into various Commissions, which were:—

- (a) Political and territorial. Five: one for each ex-enemy country.
- (b) Military.
- (c) Economic. Two: one for Italy; the other for the Balkans and Finland.
- (d) Legal and drafting.
- (e) General.

Membership of a Commission was confined to those countries which had declared war on the ex-enemy States, besides members of the Council who had prepared the draft Treaties. Thus, Brazil was not a member of the Political and Territorial Commission on Bulgaria, because she had not been at war, although she was one of the twenty-one nations. The Military and Legal Commissions were composed of representatives of all the member States. India was a member of all Commissions.

At the plenary sessions, the Chairmanship went in rotation to one of the Big Four, plus China, in French alphabetical order. Each Commission also had a President, Vice-President and a *Rapporteur*, all three elected by members of the Commission. Presidency of each Commission was confined to the small sixteen nations, and no country could provide more than one President for a Commission.

India provided a President for the Economic Commission on Italy; he was Sir Joseph Bore. President of the Military Commission was Brigadier-General Mossor, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Polish Army. The Conference, as well as the Commissions, had their own secretarial staff, with a Secretary-General for over-all supervision and co-ordination. In addition, there was an Administrative Secretariat, which was exclusively French.

The three official languages spoken were English, French and Russian. Any member was at liberty to speak in any of these languages; his speech was then translated into the other two languages. Often four to six hours were spent listening to one speech and its translations, but later translated copies of the speeches were distributed beforehand, which saved much time. The difficulty was to find enough good interpreters, especially Russian, but fortunately in Paris there is a large colony of White Russians, who were found most useful.

Proceedings of the Conference were issued in three languages. Russian texts were always late in production, as they were not prepared to accept any text in their own language unless it had been approved by their own official translator, who was often so busy that delay inevitably took place. Incidentally, none of the interpreters took notes in shorthand; they preferred their own longhand notes and relied on memory and experience. On the whole they were amazingly quick.

The "interpreters" occasionally provided a certain amount of 'humour'. One day, when the Australian delegate finished his speech, which was in English, the interpreter started translating it in English again, which brought down the meeting at the expense of the Australian delegate! M. Molotov had his own private interpreter, who translated his speeches from Russian; the Russian Foreign Minister never used interpreters provided by the Conference.

All twenty-one nations participated on a footing of equality, each possessing a vote. Any proposal which obtained a two-thirds majority was considered a recommendation, likely to be accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers. In other cases, where a simple majority was obtained, two reports were to be sent, giving the views of the majority as well as of the minority. In the case of a tie, the motion was considered lost. On top of this, each of the Big Four had the power of veto.

All five ex-enemy States were invited to the plenary as well as to Commission sessions. They were given every opportunity to state their point of view. Members were at liberty to sponsor any point in the memoranda presented by these ex-enemy States, as an amendment to a Treaty, if it was considered necessary. This time it was not a dictated peace for them.

Here is a summary of each treaty, giving results of the main problems which came up for discussion:

ITALY

The greatest time was spent on this treaty. The most important political questions concerning Italy were her colonies and the position of Trieste. As to the colonies, the Council of Foreign Ministers had previously decided to postpone the future of Italy's colonies for a year, when the problem was to be examined more thoroughly. Many complicated issues are involved; Ethiopia has claimed Eritrea, and France demands a portion of Fezzan; Egypt wants an area west of Sollum and the oasis of Jarabub; while Great Britain has promised to the Senussis that Italian rule shall never come back as far as they are concerned. There is also the question of Italian colonists living in these colonies, the demand by the Arab League for the independence of Libya, and a proposal to unite all Somalis into a Great Somalia.

As regards Trieste, the Council of Foreign Ministers recommended internationalisation of the port and surrounding country. The difficulty arose where to draw the boundaries of the international town and adjacent area. Yugoslavia and Italy put forward claims and counter-claims. The problem presents a Gordian knot, owing to the mixed population: Italians predominate in the towns and Yugoslavs in the country. America, Great Britain and France each submitted separate plans; eventually the French proposal, known as the French line, was adopted.

Along with the boundary question there was also the vexed problem of the Statute of the Free Territory. Here the Big Four were not in agreement when it came to the powers of the Governor of Trieste. The majority wanted a Governor nominated by the Security Council, with sufficient powers to maintain law and order, preserve the independence and integrity of the territory, and to protect human rights and the fundamental freedom of the inhabitants.

The minority proposal, supported by Russia, Yugoslavia and other Slav States, wanted the Governor to be a figure-head, and gave Yugoslavia almost virtual control of the customs, currency and foreign affairs. This would have made the free territory a Protectorate of Yugoslavia and the United Nations would have been powerless to interfere. No one wishes to repeat the unfortunate episode of Fiume after the first Great War, when it was seized by Italy, although it had been allotted to Yugoslavia.

The majority view of the Big Four was not acceptable to Yugoslavia, which claims the whole of Trieste, and she took a dramatic step in walking out of the final session of the Conference, disagreeing with the decision of the Conference.

The new frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia leaves large minorities on either side, makes no provision for the salutary transfer of populations, and thus provides a lasting ground for bitter antagonism between the two neighbouring countries. Within the international boundary relations between Slav and Latin elements are at present considerably strained, and unless a spirit of good will is shown on both sides (as the port depends for its economic existence on the hinterland, which belongs to Yugoslavia) the prosperity and economic development of the port and the international territory will be seriously jeopardised.

Many people are sceptical about the future of Trieste, having seen the fate of Danzig; it is, however, wrong to compare the two, as Danzig served only one country, whilst Trieste serves many besides Italy and Yugoslavia; moreover, Danzig would have been a success if there had been no Hitler.

Dodecanese.—These islands are ceded to Greece, and are to remain demilitarised.

Franco-Italian Frontier.—Rectification of this frontier, chiefly in the area of Mont Cenis and Tenda districts, was made in favour of France.

South Tyrol.—Although there was no agreement on the frontier changes between Austria and Italy, the two countries were encouraged to solve the problem of Austrian minority in South Tyrol in a bilateral arrangement. Italy guarantees to respect the human rights and national character of Austrian people in this area.

Fighting Forces.—The Italian Navy is reduced to one-fifth of its pre-war size; tonnage is limited to 67,500 tons, personnel to 22,500. Land forces are limited to 250,000, including 65,000 *gendarmarie*. She is not allowed to possess more than 200 medium and heavy tanks. Her air force is limited to 350 aircraft, but no bombers, and 25,000 personnel. In recognition of her services as a co-belligerent for two years before the end of the war, this is considered to be a sufficient level of armament to enable Italy to maintain adequate defensive forces, and to satisfy her national prestige.

Italy's frontier on the French and Yugoslav side is demilitarised up to the width of 20 Km. She is not allowed to possess any aircraft carriers, submarines, motor torpedo boats, bombers, atomic weapons, or guns with a range of more than 30 Km. She is allowed to retain two battleships over and above the tonnage permitted, but these are not to be replaced if lost. Surplus war material and naval craft will be divided by the Four Powers amongst all the Allies who suffered losses through Italian action. This will also apply to the other ex-enemy States.

Economic.—Ethiopia stated that her reparation claim should be considered from 1935 onwards, when Mussolini invaded the country. The Greek, Albanian and Yugoslav claims were also high, and if accepted would prevent Italy from recovering an economic and financial stability so essential to avoid chaos, with its corresponding repercussions impeding reconstruction work all over Europe.

The principal of 100% reparations for the damage caused was therefore not accepted, but as a partial compensation, Italy is to pay reparations to the countries which suffered from her aggression. These may still seem high to some, but they are considered quite inadequate by those countries which will receive them. America, Great Britain, India and some other countries waived their claim for reparation.

It must be borne in mind that Ethiopia and Albania inherit all Italian assets in those countries, which should partially compensate them for their losses. These assets consist of some useful public works, lines of communication, buildings, hospitals, schools, etc.

ROUMANIA

This Treaty did not cause much controversy, except on the question of free navigation on the Danube. Russia maintained that the Danube should be controlled mainly by the riparian States; America, Great Britain and France disagreed, and considered the Danube an international waterway. Although free navigation of the Danube was accepted by a majority, Russia refused to accept the decision.

Politically, Roumania gains by the transfer of the whole of Transylvania to her from Hungary; the problem of the considerable Hungarian minority of this area who thus come under Roumania needs careful study to avoid future conflicts. Roumania cedes Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Russia, which held Bessarabia from 1812 to 1917. The province was acquired by Roumania in the confusion following the Russian Revolution in 1917.

On the military side, although no portion of Roumanian territory is demilitarised, her armed forces are considerably reduced to a size which prevents her becoming a menace to her neighbours.

BULGARIA

This Treaty caused controversy and heated arguments. Russia championed the cause of Bulgaria, which has become a communist State, whilst the other big Powers wanted to treat her in the same manner as all ex-enemy States, without any discrimination. Bulgaria is the only ex-enemy State which had the audacity to put a territorial claim against an ally, *i.e.*, Greece, in the shape of her demand for an outlet into the Aegean Sea by the cession to her of Western Thrace. It sounds very peculiar, but it did happen. Needless to say, the demand was rejected.

Greece, on her part, demanded a rectification of the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier to ensure her security from the north. She has been invaded three times in the last forty years from the same direction by Bulgaria and naturally does not want it repeated. This traditional route of invasion from Bulgaria cuts across Western Thrace, with its important port of Salonika, separating it from the Greek mainland. Western Thrace has little width, and can be easily overrun from the north; in places it is hardly eighteen miles wide. All the communications are liable to come under long-range gun fire from across the Bulgarian frontier, where the Bulgarians have every natural advantage and the Greeks none. Greece originally demanded a large slice of Bulgarian territory, consisting of rich tobacco-growing districts, but this was later modified to a line slightly north of the present frontier, and to include Mt. Beles.

When the problem of the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier came up before the Plenary Session to confirm the existing frontier, twelve members abstained from voting, thus implying that they were not satisfied with the present boundary. The Article in the Treaty was not therefore adopted, and it is now up to the Council of Foreign Ministers to re-consider the matter. The Greeks consider this a moral victory.

The inhabitants of the area immediately north of the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier are, I should add, Pomaks, who are neither Bulgarians nor Greeks, and they are all Moslems. It is believed that they wish to be incorporated into Greece rather than Bulgaria, where they are being persecuted and terrorised for their pro-Greek sympathies.

Bulgaria has gained territorially by the return to her of 7,000 square kilometres of territory of Southern Dobruja from Roumania.

The Greeks also claimed the area of Mount Epirus from Albania, which contains a considerable Greek population, but she was persuaded to withdraw this claim, which she has done, though only temporarily. She is likely to raise the question again later.

Military.—Bulgaria has the unique distinction of being the only ex-enemy State whose armed forces have increased as a result of the Treaty compared with her pre-war strength. Her naval tonnage is increased six times, whilst her naval forces are more than three times their pre-war figures. Furthermore, her land forces are bigger than those allowed under the Treaty of Versailles.

Greece proposed that Bulgaria should be prohibited from possessing motor torpedo boats, which Italy is forbidden to possess. Russia supported Bulgaria very strongly against Greece, and thus made it impossible for the four Powers to agree on this or on any other matter affecting Bulgaria adversely. We were therefore faced with the strange problem of denying help to an ally for the sake of an ex-enemy. The amendment, however, was accepted by a two-thirds majority, and it was also agreed that the prohibition of M.T.Bs should apply to all ex-enemy States.

Demilitarisation of the Bulgarian frontier on Bulgaria's side was also asked for by Greece, but it was opposed by Russia. The proposal was, however, adopted by the Conference.

The Greek delegate proposed that (i) the percentage of officers and N.C.Os in the Bulgarian Army should be restricted to 5% and 10% respectively, and (ii) that the mobilisation of the Bulgarian Army should be prohibited. He proposed that similar restrictions should also apply to the Italian armed forces, but it was opposed by the majority of members for the following reasons:

Further restrictions will need an army of inspectors to ensure that they are carried out; this would be a difficult task, and would cause more bitterness. Secondly, every arm of the Service needs a different proportion of officers and N.C.Os. Thirdly, even if the restrictions were imposed, the countries concerned could still evade them by training more officers and N.C.Os without giving them such rank. And lastly, if a country was allowed to possess an army it must also be allowed a right of mobilisation in self-defence, or may be in aid of U.N.O. Greece agreed to withdraw her proposal.

Bulgaria has not yet signed the Treaty, but she has already started making attempts to find loopholes to increase her armed forces. She tried to evade the reduction of her forces by transferring the Bulgarian Frontier Militia from the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior. But it was made clear at the Conference by Great Britain and America that it made no difference which Ministry controlled what forces, as long as the total forces did not exceed those laid down in the Treaty. Any body of men carrying weapons and undergoing military training would be considered an illegal force if it was outside the number permitted under the Treaty.

Economic.—It was decided that Bulgaria is to pay reparations, to be equally divided between Greece and Yugoslavia.

HUNGARY

The only important issue involved was the transfer of 200,000 Magyars from Czechoslovakia to Hungary. Czechoslovakia expressed a desire not to keep any Hungarians in her territory, owing to the treacherous part played by them at the time of, and since, Munich. Hungary said she was not pre-

pared to accept them, for economic reasons. Further, if she was forced to do so, she wanted a frontier rectification to find room for them, as she had already lost Transylvania.

It must be remembered that, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, Hungary will be compulsorily expelling nearly 500,000 Germans from her territory to Germany. This deportation of Germans should leave enough room for the absorption of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. The matter has been left to the two countries to come to a bilateral agreement, but if this is not possible within six months, then Czechoslovakia is authorised to take it up with the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Conference also decided that Hungary should cede a slice of her territory opposite Bratislava for town expansion to Czechoslovakia. On the military side, Hungary was to have the same restrictions and prohibitions as other Balkan States.

FINLAND

This was the last controversial issue, as there were only two countries really concerned—Russia and Great Britain. On the reparation question America maintained that the figure for Finland was too heavy; she appealed to Russia to agree to something less, equitable with the financial condition of Finland and her economic situation. America maintained that the same yardstick for reparations should apply to all ex-enemy States, according to which Finland will have to pay something far less than the sum she is now called upon to pay. Russia was not prepared to accept this, and consequently no reduction could be made.

SOME INTERESTING STATISTICS

The Conference cost £2,500 every day for the 79 days during which it lasted. Official figures show that credits totalling nearly £300,000 have been granted for the payment of salaries, cost of materials (Machinery, official receptions, paper, ink, etc.). Throughout the Conference 2,000 persons, including 1,040 members of the Security service, 60 Boy Scouts, and 157 Post Office employees, were employed. It is believed that as much as 18 tons of paper were used for documents and notices in a single week; the peak figure for a single day was five tons of paper.

A Post Office was installed in the Luxembourg Palace for the Conference, and special Peace Conference stamps were issued by the French Government. A radio system was established inside the Palace, and those who could not attend the sessions or Committee meetings could listen to the proceedings. Nearly 23 miles of cable were used for this service. More than 2,500 journalists, radio reporters and photographers covered the Conference.

History will decide whether the Conference was a success or not. It was, however, a good dress rehearsal for the three Peace Conferences to come. It brought out clearly some useful lessons to be learnt in the matter of procedure and organisation. There were many disagreements among the Big Four, which it was felt might be ironed out in a bigger Conference, but unfortunately the differences became more acute and no solution was found where the Big Four had disagreed before. This particularly applies to all the major issues, like Trieste, the Danube, the Italian colonies, and the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier.

The cleavage at Paris was significant, but may be due to the fact that proceedings were conducted under a blaze of publicity, which I suggest should be avoided in future if agreement is required between the Big Four. At the same time it is desirable that every nation and every party should have the fullest opportunity of stating its case to the world. Moreover, the Russian conception of democracy is not the same as that of the Western Powers. In spite of the majority decision going against them on many issues, they seemed not prepared to accept it because it was different to their idea. In fact, M. Molotov in his final speech called the majority decision "undemocratic".

I would point out that the majority of the delegates at the Conference, when voting down the minority, had in fact decided nothing if the minority included one of the Big Four. In fact, it created a deadlock and made it all the harder to solve the problem. These differences must not disappoint us. History tells us that after every great war the victorious Allies have found their differences more acute and sharp when it came to making the Peace. The Conference provided the Allies with a chance to understand better the problems and points of view of one another. The personal contacts made will also help towards better understanding in the future. Generally speaking, agreement was found on all military and economic clauses. It was on the political clauses where sharp and irreconcilable differences were encountered.

On the whole, reparations are considered heavy, but, of course, the views of the countries which were laid waste by the Fascists were different from those which had escaped occupation by the enemy forces. The former demanded high reparations to compensate them for their losses, while the latter advocated a policy which will enable the ex-enemies to rebuild their shattered economic lives.

To sum up, let me quote Mr. Byrnes, U.S.A. Secretary of State, about the Conference: "The Treaties as they stood at the end of the Peace Conference were as good as we can hope to get by general agreement now or within any reasonable length of time".

Indian Pioneer Corps Demobilising.

In rapid process of demobilisation is the Indian Pioneer Corps, which includes in its ranks Pathans, Punjabi Mussalmans, Sikhs, Madrassis, Bengalis, Biharis, men from Bombay Presidency, the Central Provinces, the United Orissa and hill men from Nepal.

Raised in 1941 as the Auxiliary Pioneer Corps, it was reorganised and renamed the Indian Pioneer Corps in 1943. It grew rapidly until, by August 1945, the Corps had a strength of 200,000 men of all ranks.

The Indian Pioneer Corps has seen service in the jungles of Burma and Malaya, the deserts of North Africa, as well as in Italy, the Cocos Islands, Ceylon, the Netherlands East Indies, Palestine, Iraq and Iran. Chief among its tasks have been the building and maintenance of roads, portering stores, erection of stores, dumps and the building of airfields.

Among its outstanding achievements are the part it played in the construction of the Stilwell Road, the laying of oil pipelines from Ledo to Myitkyina, the construction of vital strategic roads leading out of Imphal to Tammu and beyond and to Tiddim. The Pioneer Corps also helped in the reconstruction of the Bombay docks after the tragic explosion in 1944.

In 1944, nearly 200 Pioneer companies and 20 headquarter companies were granted combatant status.

THE SOLDIER

By PHILIP WOODRUFF.

KESHAR Singh felt happy as he stood looking at the dancers. He had good reason to feel happy, though it would never have occurred to him that anyone needed a reason for something so natural. It was the day of the annual feast in the cypress-grove at Wan, a day of feasting and rejoicing and dancing. Everyone was happy on such a day, when people came together from all the villages in the valley, as many as seven or eight hundred people, all gathered in one place. That in itself was something almost intoxicating; for Keshar Singh was used to herding sheep in the high lonely pastures that were covered with snow most of the year, or to ploughing all day by himself in little winding shelves of field that followed the contours of the hill in strips not half a dozen paces across. There were only twenty odd families in his own village up the hill, and the people did not often meet together; crowds such as there were here in Wan today were the kind of thing that only happened once a year.

He decided to join the dancing, for it was a pity to waste even a moment of the feast day. He ran down a steep bank between the huge boles of the cypress trees and joined the line of men. They were linked arm to arm, a dozen of them, facing a line of women linked akimbo too; they jigged up and down as in country dances all the world over, to the broken pulses of the drums; the two lines facing each other slowly revolved.

It was a scene to make anyone happy, the dancers beneath the vast trunks of ancient trees that had stood for hundreds of years, the sloping green turf, the little stream that sprang iccold from the hill-side and ran down over the turf, fed by the snows of Trisul and Nanda Devi that hung in their hugeness above the village to the north-east. The spectators moved round, laughing and playing tricks on each other, breaking away suddenly from a group in chase or pursuit, forming again into dark blanket-clad whorls. Everyone was happy.

Behind the dancers, they were leading up the goats to be killed for the feast. Each goat, reluctant or recalcitrant, was led forward to the little shrine, not three feet high, where the godling lived who ruled the valley. The priest put a little dab of colour on the forehead between the horns and stuck on two grains of rice. Then as the next goat came forward in its place, the anointed victim was taken twenty paces away; one took hold of the horns and leaned back; a second held the hindquarters, stretching the neck and spine. A third man swung over his head a pole on the end of which a kukri was mounted; he swung right back in a flat arc behind his shoulders, like a golfer driving, then reversed his swing with all his might backwards and downwards. The goat's neck was cut clean through; the man holding the horns staggered back; blood spouted over him; everyone laughed happily. It was the turn of the next goat.

Soon Keshar Singh would be far away from all this, for he was going to be a soldier. There was much that he would miss later without knowing what it was he had lost. He would remember that he had been happy at the feast, but his mind had not learnt to analyse or distinguish; his memory would not call up the smell of the cypress-trees and the green turf, the delicate tang of running

water, wet rock and distant snow, the smell of blanket soaked in bitter wood-smoke and men's sweat. Of all that came to his nostrils now, the only scent that was to be familiar to him in the days to come was blood.

But to him there was nothing sad about the thought of going away. It was one of his reasons for being happy. Another reason was that he had just been married. He would go away to the army in a fortnight, and at first his father had said he should be married when he came back for his first leave, because by then he would have saved some money to pay for the bride; but his mother had pleaded for him and in the end they had borrowed the money from a neighbour, and he had been married. He was lucky in his wife. She was gay and comely, a little round face with dimples below the high cheek-bones when she laughed, and she worked hard, too. There she was, dancing in the row of women opposite; he caught her eye and she smiled; someone noticed, and made a rude joke about the newly married. Everyone laughed again.

Present happiness, and a consciousness of adventure and excitement to come; what more could youth ask? For it was very exciting to be going away to Lansdowne to be a soldier, even though it was the need for money that had driven his father to send him. There were three brothers, and that meant three families to be fed by their father's land, and three bride-prices to be paid. The family land was not very much, and the family hoard of silver was low anyhow, because Keshar Singh's father too had been one of a family of brothers with no girls.

So when Keshar Singh came of age to be married, it was clear he must go out into the world and earn his living. They had gone for advice to an old soldier who lived in their village. He had been a sergeant, and was proud of that; he was still more proud that he had been centre-half for his company and later for his battalion. He had loved football and soldiering. He told Keshar Singh that his first days would be very strange, and perhaps he would want to run away; but he must not run away, for he would be punished if he did, and besides he would soon grow to like the army.

"You will like it so much," said the old soldier, "that when the time comes to go, the tears will run down your face. And when you come back to the village, at first you will think only of the battalion and when you hear that an officer is coming on tour to give you news of what is happening in the battalion, your heart will leap in your breast with joy. That is how it was with me."

They made sure in the village that Keshar Singh would be chosen, although in those spring days of 1939, finance was still supreme and the army was so small that only one recruit would be taken from a hundred volunteers. They had heard that the doctors would turn a man down for things that everyone knew made no difference to his worth, a touch of goitre, or a broken tooth. But there was nothing wrong with Keshar Singh, and the old sergeant was sure they would have him. Not a crooked toe or finger. His legs were straight, his muscles firm and supple. His shoulders were broad, his chest deep; and there was a merry willing look in his broad reddish brown face that would attract anyone. Most important of all in the eyes of the village, he had a cousin who was a sergeant, and his uncle too had been in the Regiment. Oh, they would take Keshar Singh.

He felt confident himself when he set out a fortnight after the feast, but as he drew near to Lansdowne, he began to feel less sure. It was hotter down here, too hot for Keshar Singh in his thick hand-woven blanket, and the sweat ran down his spine as he walked. Early spring at Wan became full summer as one got nearer the plains, and the heat added to the feeling of unfamiliarity.

The mule-track along which he trudged everyday grew dustier and drier; the villages grew larger, till he passed through one where there must have been as many people as in all the eight or nine villages of the whole Wan valley. His long hair and the blanket draped round his shoulders looked outlandish here, where people wore coats and trousers made of cotton cloth from the plains.

And then he came on the road. It took his breath away. It was as wide as one of the widest of his fields, smooth and hard and shining; it wriggled away interminably in coils and links and zig-zags to the plains. It must have cost a great deal, much labour and much money. And immediately there was a fresh wonder to see, for up the road came two shining mules, legs twinkling, long ears flapping, pulling behind them a box made of iron, with spinning discs of iron below on which it ran. On the box sat two superior beings in khaki clothes, with tall starched turbans on their heads. The time would come when Rifleman Keshar Singh would think very little of a driver in the Supply Corps; but now they seemed almost divine. For he had never before seen a cart, not even a bullock-cart. He had never seen a wheel.

And hard on this marvel came another. There was a house, a great wooden house, full of people, painted an attractive bright red, moving up the road of its own will, with nothing to pull it. They had told him of such things, but he had not believed them. Surely in a place where such miracles as this could happen, it would be the greatest miracle of all if anyone wanted Keshar Singh. He moved up the road slowly and wonderingly, exclaiming at the telegraph wires, the bridges, the size of the buildings. He held out a postcard with his cousin's name on it to the first man he met and stood speechless till he was directed the right way.

The old sergeant was right and Keshar Singh was enlisted. They clipped the long hair from his head till nothing remained but the Hindu tuft on top; they washed him and gave him instead of his blanket a grey woollen shirt, khaki shorts and pull-over. They fed him; and to Keshar Singh the food was bewilderingly rich and varied. The town-bred recruit in a few years' time would be complaining that it was monotonous and coarse, but not Keshar Singh, who was used to unleavened pancakes, and porridge of millet or barley, and meat only at feasts. Here there was meat daily, vegetables, potatoes, flat cakes of wheaten bread, all unbelievable luxuries to him.

But most bewildering of all was the change in the speed at which he was now to live. He had been used to get up when it was light and sleep when it was dark; in between there was food and the slow labour of the farm, but you ate when you were hungry and it did not usually matter which of the farm tasks you did first. There was less sense of the fleeting hours of day than of the slowly revolving seasons. That was the old life; but in the new, everything went exact to the minute, by the sound of bell and bugle. The singing bugles woke him while it was still dark, and from that waking till lights out he was busy, drilling, playing games, eating, training his body to jump and run, shooting, always learning, and always obeying orders, till obedience became part of himself, and the main part.

He made a good soldier. His muscles filled out and hardened, his back straightened; under the black pill-box hat, his round reddish face shone with health and happiness, an engaging face with a cheerful terrier-like air of being ready for anything. He liked drill, and wanted to drill well. He smacked his rifle-butt so hard that his fingers were numb with pain; he would practise by himself so that he should be perfect. A day came when he was made the

right-hand man of the front rank in his recruits' squad. His heart was full of pride as the sharp word of command sent him forward, with the quick short rifle regiment's pace, stamp, stamp, click ; as he waited for the word : "Swords !" that would bring his bayonet out in a sweep and fix it neatly on his rifle. He would have done anything rather than look down at his hands in that tense moment.

But perhaps most of all he enjoyed shooting. When he had learnt to sight his rifle in the miniature range, and later had grown used to the kick of .303 ammunition, he came to love his weapon and everything to do with it, the smell of oil and cordite, the polished brown of the stock. He liked to settle down comfortably, cuddling the stock ; he liked the male leap of it when he gently squeezed the trigger in the second pressure, and the satisfaction of seeing his score at the butts mount up. He would have liked more shooting ; but it was still a peace-time army which had to be sparing of ammunition. Every round must be accounted for, and empty cartridge cases had to be carefully collected and handed in after a shoot. Keshar Singh's frugal peasant mind took kindly to this, and he always brought back the full tale. Yes, he was a good soldier ; but he would never make an N.C.O., said his company commander. And this was true ; he never did.

The summer of 1939 passed ; Hitler went into Poland and the world to war. Keshar Singh was drafted to a battalion ; he went to Africa. Italy stabbed France in the back, and Keshar Singh came under fire at Gallabat.

This was before the days of courses to teach men what it was like to go into battle. Keshar Singh had never been fired at, and it was less than two years since he had first seen a mule-cart. Here there were aircraft plunging straight towards him from the sky, screaming, hurling bullets. Lead whistled and whined everywhere ; he was bombed ; he was shelled ; bursts of machine-gun fire filled the air with singing danger. Smoke ; confusion in the half-light of dawn ; the deafening suddenness of explosion ; this was all round him. He was frightened ; he clung to the ground, he tried to melt into it, he was conscious of nothing but fear and tumult and the nearness of his end. But nothing happened ; it did not hurt ; he was still alive.

The short five minutes of panic passed, and left him excited, stimulated, but dazed and unthinking, remembering only the lessons he had been so carefully taught. He did as he was told ; it was the only thing to do. He went on forward, lying down, taking cover, firing. Before the end of the battle, he had found a new pleasure. To take that second pressure, quietly, steadily, as on the range, and see your mark fall ; that was better than seeing a bull signalled from the butts. The fighting spirit was born in him, and he knew what the kukri was for that bumped against his hip.

He was a proved fighting man when the time came for the frontal attack on the enemy's position at Keren, so carefully fortified that they believed it to be impregnable. His battalion went forward against a mountain wall of rock crowned with long prepared defences. There was no way round ; there was nothing else for it. Keshar Singh moved as he had been taught. He was not frightened now ; he was a little excited, he wanted to get his man, to see a little figure tumble slowly down the rocks, but he knew he would not be hurt himself. To be hit by a bomb or a bullet was not a thing that happened to him. But it seemed to be happening to a lot of other people. Two men of his own section had been left behind. The section on the right had lost men too.

Keshar Singh's section was on the extreme left. They worked forward into a little pocket of ground from which they could keep up fire on the enemy in his posts in the high rocks ahead. They could not see the section on the right, but they would see when next it went forward, and then they would go forward too. Meanwhile, there was nothing to do but fire at any movement on the heights. Keshar Singh made himself as comfortable as he could behind a natural shield of two sharp rocks with a V between them, and settled down to the occupation he liked best of all, steadily taking the second pressure whenever he saw a movement.

They were not to know, in that left-hand section, that their colonel had been killed by a burst of machine-gun fire, that every King's officer was dead or wounded, that the battalion had still gone forward under the command of a subedar until it was ordered to retire. The battalion went back at less than half its strength; fresh officers were brought up. It was to go in again at dawn next day.

But the left-hand section knew nothing of this. Their orders were to go forward and take cover and then fire at the enemy till the next section passed them and then go forward again. And if the next section did not pass them, why then there was nothing to do but to stay where they were and go on firing. After an hour, the section-leader began to have doubts and sent out a man to his right, to find out where the next section might be; but he never came back. A few minutes later a fragment of a bomb killed the section leader himself. Neither Keshar Singh nor the remaining rifleman were men to think out a tactical problem; they had their orders and that was enough. Keshar Singh thought that he might as well use the automatic; he crept over, pushed aside the body behind it, and fired bursts at every movement on the heights while he had ammunition in the drums. When nothing was left but clips, he went back to the magazine rifle.

By night-fall, the fire died down; nothing came near them now but an occasional rifle-bullet, although there was artillery fire all round and flares every few minutes. The two men decided to sleep in turns. They were very tired. Their clothes were sodden with sweat. They were filthy. There was a smell of blood and death and corruption, hot metal, oil and cordite. They had four water-bottles, but the water was warm. It was not much answer to an African thirst, after a day's fighting, for excitement had dried their mouths as much as heat. They divided the water, so that it should last them till morning. They did not want to eat.

The man who was waking fired now and then at lights and movements, not enough to draw the enemy's serious attention. But it was not an easy night; both were haggard and exhausted when the firing began again, just before the dawn. Their movements were languid, as though they had been drunk last night; they felt as though their bellies had been taken away from them. But both were awake; they took their rifles and fired, deliberate aimed fire, at flashes in the half light.

Aircraft came screaming over them again. A bomb fell ahead of them: they were covered with dust, and splinters *ricochetted* off the rocks. The next was closer still. It was almost a direct hit. There were showers of earth and rock. Keshar Singh felt hard numbing blows in his side and leg. He looked down and in surprise saw the blood seeping slowly through khaki drill and grey

wool. This was not the kind of thing that happened to him. He called to his companion, Makar Singh :—

“Oh, Makru !” he said..

But there was no answer. He tried to turn himself round so that he could see over his shoulder. It was very difficult to move, but he managed to do it. Then he saw why Makru did not answer. He turned back again to his V between the two rocks, pulled back his bolt, and put a round into the chamber. The sights were swaying, and the heights ahead seemed to be moving too, but he must keep steady, he must squeeze slowly and lovingly. He saw a figure rise to throw a grenade ; sights and figure steadied for a second ; he fired. The little figure tumbled slowly down the rocks. It was a hit. Well done, Keshar Singh. But the man had been throwing a grenade ; then there must be someone to throw at. The right-hand section must have gone forward and Keshar Singh had not seen them.

He tried to get up and move forward but blood ran surprisingly from his mouth, like the blood from the goat at Wan. It had spurted all over someone then ; people had laughed. He ought to join in the dance, he would stand opposite his wife and smile at her ; it was a pity to waste even a moment of the feast day. But his legs would not carry him into the dance ; how silly of him to think of that kind of dance here in Lansdowne where you drilled on the grey gravel all day and the dances in the barracks at night were men's dances. And anyhow he was the right-hand man of the line fumbling for his bayonet so he couldn't dance ; and he couldn't find his bayonet ; and besides there was no time because you had to pick up cartridge cases and keep moving forward whatever the right-hand section did.

Suddenly his brain and eye cleared. Someone had crawled into the circle of rock and dead bodies. It was an officer. Keshar Singh tried to stand up and salute, but his body did not obey and again there was that red blood from his mouth. But he tried very hard, and at last he was able to speak. He said :—

“Forgive me, lord. I have used too much ammunition and I have not picked up the cartridge cases.”

Then he fell forward cuddling the stock of his rifle and did not move again.

A DAY WITH THE "PLEBES"—AT WEST POINT

BY COLONEL NAWABZADA MOHAMMED SHER ALI KHAN*

IT WAS the 1st of July and I had come to the United States Military Academy, at West Point to see the "Plebes" come in. The word "Plebe" is borrowed from the Latin. It was applied to the lowest class of ancient Roman, which became known as the Plebian Class, its members being called Plebes. My object in being there was to contact the new batch of cadets and study the life of a cadet at West Point, to do which it is best to start from the beginning.

First of July is the day when the new "appointees" begin to assemble. After the oath ceremony later in the day, they become "Cadets". They come from all over the country, representing every state and many varied walks of life. The authorised strength of the Corps of Cadets is 2,496, apportioned as follows :

8 from each State at large	384
4 from each Congressional District	1,740
4 from each Territory (Hawaii and Alaska)	8
6 from the District of Columbia	6
4 from natives of Puerto Rico	4
2 from Panama Canal Zone	2
172 from the United States at large	172
180 from among the enlisted men of the Regular Army and of the National Guard, in number as nearly equal as possible	180
Total			2,496

Three of the above are appointed upon the recommendation of the Vice-President ; 40 are selected from among the honour graduates of those educational institutions designated as "honour military schools", and 40 are chosen from among the sons of veterans who were killed in action or died of wounds or disease contracted whilst on duty during the two World Wars.

This year's Fourth Class, the 1950 Class, was going to be about 1,000 strong. Usually they arrive on the 1st of July, but some arrive later for various reasons, and if those reasons are not "reasonable" they find the reception on the first day even tougher than they anticipated. They come by train, motor bus, boat, or car. Some come in glistening limousines ; others hitch-hike. Many are in Army uniform ; others are in tailor-made clothes ; some wear sports suits, and altogether they are a varied, healthy crowd of young men, a true cross-section of American youth. This year's batch included some ex-soldiers and a few ex-officers. But they all have to go through the same mill—rich or poor, officer or no officer. West Point certainly sets a true example of democracy.

West Point has been called the most picturesque architectural mass in the country. It is neither town nor village. The name is derived from the promontory and lofty plateau on the west bank of the Hudson River, where the stream makes a double angle turn some fifty miles north of New York city, and has come to symbolise the Military Academy of the U.S.A.

*Military Attache for India in Washington.

Henry Hudson, in his voyage of discovery up the river which bears his name, anchored his ship "Half Moon" opposite the present site of West Point on 14th September, 1609. George Washington recognised its strategic importance, and in January, 1778 it became a Post, and troops were regularly stationed there. West Point is the oldest Military Post in the country.

The proposal for a Military School in the United States was first made in 1776 by Brigadier-General Henry Knox, first U. S. Secretary of War. In 1794 Congress authorised the organisation of a Corps of Artilleries and Engineers, with two Cadets to a Company. This is the first mention of the grade of "Cadet" in the Army annals of the United States. A school was started but did not last long, and was discontinued when fire destroyed the buildings two years later.

Congress passed the Act now considered to have established the U. S. Military Academy on 16th March, 1802. Since then West Point has been the trainer of some of the greatest figures in American history. To-day it is an integral part of the life of the nation.

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
We stood near the Administrative Building, where throngs of young men who for the next four years were to be classmates had already assembled to report to the Adjutant. Enlisted men acted as guides. A few of the Upper Classmen had been selected to form the New Cadet Detail. They were responsible for receiving and training the new arrivals under the supervision of officer instructors.

The Corps is officered entirely by the Cadets, who are selected on the basis of demonstrated capacity to command, and not on the basis of scholarships, from the First Class (which corresponds to the "Senior" at the R.M.C., Sandhurst). These Cadet Officers include all, from Lieutenants upwards, who in the Army are Commissioned Officers.

Cadet Sergeants are also selected from the First class, and the Corporals are chosen from the Second Class. All these selections are made by the officers of the Tactical Department, with the usual Regimental and Battalion staff. Each Battalion is divided into four or more Companies—an officer being in charge of a Company. The Regiment is commanded by a Colonel, and each Battalion by a Lieutenant-Colonel.


This year's Fourth Class had been formed into a Regiment of two Battalions, and I had arranged to "walk the course" of the first day with the "Plebcs". The "course" meant going through the various stages called "stations". The class started its processing at 8-30 a.m. First to go were the enlisted men, who were present for discharge prior to entry. Every effort was to be made to conclude processing by 3 p.m., so that the new Cadets might appear in proper uniform to be sworn in at 5 p.m.

Proceedings were to be interrupted at 11.30 a.m. for lunch. All candidates then in Stations 2-7 were to continue until completed. They were to drop baggage at Station 8, and were to go to lunch in a Group, guided by a member of the New Cadet Regimental Staff and returning to Station 8 after lunch. Candidates who had not been processed were to drop luggage at the Baggage Pool (Station 1) and be guided to lunch as another Group. After lunch they were to return to Station 2 for proceedings.



↑ WEST POINT ACADEMY FROM THE AIR


WEST ACADEMY BUILDING, WEST POINT





GYMNASIUM BUILDING, WEST POINT

PARADE GROUND, WITH CADET CHAPEL IN
BACKGROUND



Before a candidate is turned over to the New Cadet Detail (First Class men) he must have visited each of the eight stations, which were established in the West Academic Building and adjacent area. Moreover, before all these proceedings begin every appointee has to give a statement that he is not now and never has been married, and has to give a written engagement to serve in the Army of the United States for eight years from the date of his admission as a Cadet, unless discharged earlier.

Here is a summary of the Processing Stations:

STATION No. 1.—BAGGAGE POOL. In charge: Barrack Policemen-Lieut.-Colonel . . . Place: Rooms 106, 107, and 109, West Academic Building.

Procedure: Candidates enter through the north doors of the West Academic Building. Signs direct them to where baggage is to be placed in one of four rooms, marked alphabetically. After each candidate has visited Station 7, he has again to go through the Baggage Pool and pick up his own property before reporting to Station 8.

I felt sorry for those who had brought cabin trunks or even heavy suitcases, for there were no porters, and in any case such items are not allowed in the barrack room. There was a cabin trunk to be seen, which, I was told, "will probably lie there till it can be got rid of".

STATION No. 2.—EXAMINATION OF CREDENTIALS. In charge: Adjutant-General's Officer, Mr. . . . Place: Hallway, West Academic Building.

Procedure: Candidates report to one of the three tables, according to alphabetical order. The clerk extracts from the files the candidate's card. A fully qualified candidate gets a white card; a man whose mental qualifications have not been completely established gets a pink card; and a man not physically qualified gets a red card.

Candidates who have taken validating examinations are required to produce evidence of graduation from High School. Those physically unqualified and those unable to produce evidence of mental qualifications are escorted to the Post hospital by a guide. Also at this Station a record is kept at such tables of those men who had reported for entrance. I very nearly received a pink card—just to show me the routine of that side of things!

STATION No. 3.—COLLECTION OF FUNDS. In charge: Treasurer, U.S.M.A., Mr. . . . Place: In central hallway of West Academic Building, from East Sally Post to South Entrance.

Procedure: Clerks at the door issue to each candidate a blank receipt and a deposit card. Each man then proceeds along the hall to one of the seven clerks, who take from him whatever money he has in his possession. The clerk notes on the deposit card the amount of the deposit, and completes the blank receipt, which is retained by the candidate. Currency is strictly forbidden in the Corps.

STATION No. 4.—ISSUE OF PROPERTY. In charge: Cadet Store, Mr. . . . (four orderlies). Place: In hallway of West Academic Building near entrance to Room 116.

Procedure: As candidates file past the Station, *en route* for Room 116, each receives a laundry bag, issue book and an athletic supporter. Instructions for the use of these two articles are given at the next Station. By this time candidates had collected quite a weight, and some were a bit wet in the face, as everything had to be done at the double. I, having been allowed to "walk the course", was not as hot as the candidates, who kept running past me to the various Stations. As they swept by I had an opportunity to study their expressions—some anxious, some confident, some bewildered—but all showing signs of the heat and their exertions.

STATION No. 5.—PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. In charge: Post Hospital, Captain Place: Room 116, West Academic Building.

Procedure: Candidates undress completely at one of the chairs in the centre of the room. Each reports to one of the officers for physical examination. He then returns to his clothing and places it in his laundry bag. He puts on the athletic supporter and leaves the room through the West door, carrying the laundry bag. I was not subjected to this stripping, as my word was accepted when I said I had not contracted any disease while in the States!

STATION No. 6.—POSTURE PHOTOGRAPHS. In charge: Master of the Sword's Office, Mr. Place: Room 117, West Academic Building.

Procedure: Candidates receive numbered cards upon entering the room. At the same time a clerk records the name of the candidate opposite that number, on a list provided for the purpose. Candidates are then directed to one of the cameras, where an attendant directs them to a small, low platform with a black back to it. On this small stage there is a height measuring stick and a plumb-line directly in front of him.

The plumb-line should divide the body equally in half—running through the centre of the nose, etc. A picture is taken in this position. Then the candidate is instructed to turn to the left, right cheek facing the camera. The plumb-line should now run through the centre of the lobe of the ear, through the centre of the shoulder, and, finally, through the centre of the ankle. A picture is taken in this position. Finally, the candidate faces the black back-cloth, with his back to the camera. The plumb-line should this time run through the centre of the vertebral column. A picture is taken in this position.

The object of these posture photographs is to study the "build" of the candidate, so that faulty postures can be corrected. After an interval of a few months the Cadets are again photographed and the records compared. I also faced the camera. The results were gratifying, which goes to prove that money spent on me at the P. T. School at Kasauli in 1936 had not been wasted after all!

After these posture photographs have been taken, the candidate picks up his laundry bag (which has been next to him the whole time, except when on the stage in front of the camera), dresses at one of the chairs provided, and reports at the next station.

STATION No. 7.—ASSIGNMENT TO COMPANIES. In charge: S-I 1st Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel. Place: Room 117, West Academic Building.

Procedure: Candidates are directed to one of the six desks, where clerks take from them the card indicating that they have been to each of the previous Stations. An assignment card is issued to each candidate, showing the Company to which he has been assigned. A duplicate card is retained by the clerk. Candidates verify the correctness of their names as they appear on the card; if a name is incorrect it is corrected by a clerk at this Station. Candidates leave the room at a door in the south-east corner, go through the Baggage Pool (Station No. 1) and report to Station No. 8.

The Cadets are assigned to Companies according to their height. A man's height is a matter of record long before he arrives to report for duty. If this stature comes within the feet and inches specifications for A-I Company, or H-I Company, into A-I Company or H-I Company he goes and stays, the object being to have the tallest in the two flank Companies, which lends uniformity of height on parades.

STATION No. 8.—DELIVERY TO COMPANIES. In charge: Enlisted Guides: Lieutenant-Colonel Place: East end of central area.

Procedure: After obtaining their baggage from the Pool, candidates proceed to the roped enclosure, where they are admitted only if they have an assignment card in their possession. Guides are required to take from all uniformed candidates their insignia of commissioned rank, campaign and citation ribbons and badges. These articles are carried in the pockets of the individuals concerned. They are then formed into groups by Companies, and are shown to the Company area by guides. As soon as a member of the Cadet Detail has checked the Assignment Card, and ensured that that candidate is at his proper Company, the procedure is completed.

At this point the novitiate and his fellows are deserted by their guide, and left face to face with a group of Upper Classmen. Then something happens! These Upper Classmen are members of the "Beast Detail". They have been assigned the job of taking in hand the newcomers, known as "beasts", and of introducing them to the "Plebe System". This is where the "barking" begins, and the poor Plebes start getting hell.

All the affectionate emotions of welcome which the Upper Classmen may have for the newcomers are hidden under the grim and barking exterior. The newcomers attempt to comply with the bewildering number of orders given to them at the same time. The results are confusing—as is evident from their anxious and perspiring brows. This is the stage when the breaking in of the remount begins, and, as someone so aptly puts it, "West Point rides them in with spurs".

In the Orderly Room the new arrival surrenders such "contraband" articles as he may have in his possession, including playing cards, dice, and liquor. Articles of value are tagged and turned over to the Treasurer, who gives a receipt for them. The newcomer is then assigned to his room, which he will share with one or two others of his class, who are wished upon him. A room mate is known as a "wife".

The next step is the Barber's Shop, where all beautiful curls—if any—disappear. Thereafter the hair is usually cut at weekly intervals. This reminded me so much of my Sandhurst days, when my Sgt.-Major used to bark at me for a haircut. Sometimes I had to visit the barber's shop as often as twice a week! It wasn't that my hair grew so fast, but I had the misfortune of having an easy name to bark out, and so when in doubt, say something—and so my name came out.

It was now 11-30 a.m. and time to form up for lunch. All the Plebes who had gone through the eight Stations were being collected in the barracks central area, to be marched off to the Mess Hall. There was a sprinkling of Upper Classmen or "Beast Detail" in every squad to guide the newcomers in the new routine of life. Promptly at noon the music started and the long columns of these new arrivals started entering the Mess Hall. Music is provided at all meal parades, three times a day.


I lunched with the Officer of the Day (Officer Instructor) on the balcony which overlooks both of the large wings of the hall. This balcony is known as the "Poop Deck", and from it you get a wonderful view of the immensity of the hall. Built of native granite, Washington Hall is one of the most imposing of West Point structures. It is very cathedral-like in its proportions, and is adorned with works of art on every wall. Most conspicuous of the pictures is the colossal mural painting, executed in tempera on plaster, that covers the entire Centre Hall. It is seventy feet long and thirty feet high, and is reputed to be the largest single mural painting in the country. In this work of art the painter, Major Tom Johnson, used the figures of great military commanders to symbolise the battles in which they were victorious, beginning with Cyrus at Babylon in 538 B.C., and ending with Joffre at the Battle of the Marne in A.D. 1914.

The atmosphere inside was like that of any large mess hall—talking, shouting, and the clatter of knives and forks creating the constant drone of noise that is so typical of such places. Each table accommodated the Cadets. At the head sat a First Classman, who presided as "table commandant". The Officer of the Day has a chart next to him that gives the position of every table in the Mess Hall. He can communicate with any table by messenger or through the microphone installed in the balcony and through which all orders are passed.

At the foot of each table sit, in silence, a few Plebes, stiffly erect and balanced on the edges of their chairs, with chins drawn back, eyes downcast, and arms hanging stiffly at their sides. How they manage to eat sometimes baffles one, but they do. The present Superintendent has ordered that every Cadet will be allowed to have a square meal and that if anyone has been shouted at too much, and hasn't had much chance to get down to eating, he can remain behind—but this seldom happens. I have been there more than once now, and it hasn't happened yet. About twenty minutes are allowed for each meal. When the First Captain considers that the meal is finished the Adjutant reports to the "Poop Deck" and requests permission to use the microphone.

After lunch I went round the Barracks area and saw the "Beast Detail" breaking in the new arrivals in the Central Area, getting them into shape for the coming Oath Ceremony in the evening. The Upper Classmen were taking them through the last items of the routine reception of the first day. New arrivals were pouring in, and were being put through the same routine. They would all be ready by 5-30 p.m. when, formed up by Companies, they would march from the Central Area to the Battle Monument, to take the Oath of Allegiance and hear the Superintendent's address.


While all this was going on I walked round the grounds to take a peep at the magnificent buildings. It could only be a "peep" for to see them properly would take days. From the West Academic Building I went to the Grant Hall. This building was only completed in 1931, having been built on the site of the old structure, also called the Grant Hall, which for generations served as the Cadet's Mess Hall. On the first floor is a reception room for Cadets and their guests, the office of the Cadet Hostess, and the "Boodler's"—the Cadet's name for the icecream parlour.




↑ SWIMMING POOL, WEST POINT

EAST ACADEMY BUILDING, WEST POINT





CADETS ON PARADE AT WEST POINT



Across the road is the Administrative Building, which houses, as its name implies, all the Central Administrative offices of the garrison at West Point. Below the Administrative Building is the riding hall—like a great granite fortress, and it is indeed the biggest and most solidly built riding hall in the world. Soon it will be turned into an Academic building, I was told. As an ex-cavalryman I felt sad at the thought.

From here I went to the Library, where alone I could spend weeks seeing some of the wonderful books collected there. In 1841, when plans were being drawn up for the new modernised Academy, some style of architecture had to be selected with which the old buildings would harmonise. The library was designed and erected in 1841 and was selected to form the keynote for the design of the halls which have since been raised. It is still regarded as one of the finest examples of Collegiate Gothic in the country, and is to-day the oldest of the academic buildings. It contains some 104,000 volumes on military and allied topics, maps, manuscripts and other items, and is believed to be the oldest government library in the United States.

Here I once again read those memorable words of Abraham Lincoln :

"Let us have faith that right is might, and, in that faith, let us dare to do our duty as we understand it".

From this building I went to the Cullum Memorial Hall, a beautiful hall, the east balcony of which overlooks the Hudson river. It is here that the Cadet dances are held. They call them "hops". It is an ideal setting for the young to get together and indulge in the noblest of all feelings—sincere affection.

I went round Flirtation Walk. It is an ideal walk for flirtation, winding through the woods, hugging the banks of the river, but unfortunately Cadets can only walk there during the day, and as this walk is in great demand they must find it somewhat crowded. I sat in the Sheridan Memorial on the Flirtation Walk—I could have sat there the whole day, the view was so beautiful.

I sat under the Kissing Rock. Tradition affirms that if any young lady passes under this rock without conferring upon her Cadet escort the osculatory salute from which the rock derives its name, not only would the boulder crash upon them, but the walls of the Academy buildings would crumble. No such thing has happened yet, so evidently the young ladies have done their stuff. As some say, "If it hadn't been for me the entire Academy would have been in ruins". But the following story is better: When a vivacious young visitor was asked if she had seen the Kissing Rock she replied: "Well, I think so, but, you see, there were so many rocks along the Walk".

Flirtation Walk has relics of sterner mould scattered along it. Chief among them is the bronze plaque driven into the huge rocky ledge at Chain Cove, which served as the West Point anchorage of the Great Chain. It tells its own tale in the inscription:

*THE GREAT CHAIN
was anchored in this cove
1778—1783.*

*It was forged at the Sterling Iron works in Orange
County and was first stretched across the river
under the direction of Thomas Machin, Captain
of Artillery in April, 1778*

The Great Chain was placed there to stop any British ships passing along the river. The strength of it was never tested, as no British ship came near it.

As it was nearing 5-30 p.m. we moved to the Battle Monument erected in memory of those West Pointers who fell in the War of Rebellion—the Civil War. Flirtation Walk terminates very close to this Monument. The newcomers had by now been barbered, temporarily uniformed with issue clothing, and sufficiently drilled to be marched in formation with some semblance of order. Unexpectedly it turned out to be an ideal day at the last minute. The rain stopped just in time, and the evening sun appeared in a crystal clear atmosphere.

Battle Monument at the Trophy Point is an ideal spot for this ceremony. The Hudson river can be seen for miles and miles, and the setting can only be felt and appreciated, and hardly described. The newcomers formed up in front of the Monument. The colours took up their position in front, and in the middle of the formation. The Oath of Allegiance was taken. It runs :

"I, John Smith, do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States and bear true allegiance to the National Government ; that I will maintain and defend the sovereignty of the United States paramount to any and all allegiance, sovereignty or fealty to any State, county or country whatsoever; and that I will at all times obey the legal orders of my superior officers and the rules and articles governing the Armies of the United States".

The Superintendent made a fitting speech of welcome. The evening gun was fired. The National Anthem played. And the ceremony came to an end.

I shall always remember this impressive ceremony. As I watched the Cadets march by, my mind drifted into the future. One day I hope to see a similar ceremony performed at the National Military Academy of India. I hope it will not be long before I shall stand to salute the Colours of that Academy as well. I have designed a crest for the Indian National Military Academy—it resembles that of West Point but is yet so different. As we are basing our teaching on the principles of West Point it is only fitting that the crest should also be similar, not only in shape but also in spirit.

Those familiar with the crest of West Point will notice that I have added the words "Loyalty" and "Unity" to the crest. That has been done deliberately for, even in my short experience in this world, I have noticed that the lack of the quality "loyalty" is very apparent in every walk of life to-day. And what is "loyalty" to a soldier ? It is almost the only thing that makes all the difference. Loyalty to what ? To a soldier it should be loyalty to his pledge, loyalty to his profession, loyalty to his superiors, and loyalty to his subordinates. It is amazing how easy it is to forget this simple word, in the present atmosphere of rapid scientific developments, and what some term as "logic".

The importance of the word "Unity" needs no explanation.

From the Battle Memorial I went to the Cadet Chapel. This is an impressive example of Gothic architecture, perched high up on the mountain side, like a spiritual guardian over the buildings below. Though it is huge, even inside it has a seating capacity of only 1,500, with the result that there are two sittings for each service. The organ is the third largest church organ in the world, in mere size alone ; it is fifth among all kinds of organs. The instrument is equipped with 13,529 speaking pipes, and is divided into seven parts, each of which is called an organ. Some of the pipes are as small as a lead pencil, while the five largest are 34 feet long, weigh over 1,000 pounds each and are 21 inches across the mouth. Some pipes have a pitch nearly out of reach of human hearing.

The view from the chapel entrance is beautiful, overlooking the Hudson river curling and looping like an old snake. The sun was now setting and the white clouds moving casually in the clear blue sky helped me to move casually into the future again. I visualised the building of the Indian National Academy taking shape, and with it the places of worship. In India we have more than one religion, so it would not be possible for us to have one house of worship. But what is possible, and what I would like to see, is at least one chamber or hall connecting the various houses of worship, so that if nothing else, the pattern will be one. This should not really be difficult for, after all, do not we all worship the same God—only in different styles?

I have not attempted to describe the work done at West Point. To study the Academy there would require time; to write about it would take volumes. The first impression of such a vast place, formed in a day, can only be but sketchy; yet the atmosphere felt could never be forgotten. I have on purpose wandered through the buildings and the surroundings, for such things are an important part of the life and the traditions of great institutions like this.

Very briefly, the mission of the U. S. Military Academy is to produce officers of the Army having the qualities and attributes essential to their progressive and continuing development, throughout their careers as officers and leaders. The purpose of the Fourth Class system is to lay the proper foundation, early in a cadet's career, for the development of those qualities of character which he must have to be a successful officer and leader of men in the United States Army. Qualities such as prompt, ready and willing obedience to proper authority, self-control, loyalty, honesty, attention to duty, co-operation, accuracy, self-reliance, resourcefulness, courtesy, consideration for others, cheerfulness, dependability, and thoroughness are essential to success in a military career.

The mission of the Indian National Military Academy will be on the same principles, but the methods employed for carrying out that mission will probably vary. The method of breaking in the Indian remount will differ from that used for breaking in the American young steed—the temperaments are different. The finished article, however, will be the same—a highly-trained officer, proud of the institution that built him into an officer, proud of the Army which he will join, and proud of the country which he will serve as a soldier.

The new Indian National Academy will be an entirely Indian institution; the traditions will be built by Indians on Indian lines. It is therefore up to every Indian to see that the very best come forward to build such noble traditions. And it is the duty of every Indian soldier to ensure that the lead they have taken towards showing the truer meanings of the word "Indian" to the whole of their country is maintained, and that the National Academy is "national" in every sense of the word, and as great in every way as their great country deserves.

A LONG-TERM ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN FOR INDIA

BY "ROLAND" AND "OLIVER"

1.—*The Atomic Threat.*

DEVELOPMENTS in applied science not only render armies and their weapons obsolete; they also call for a thorough revision of the administrative and maintenance organisation of armies, and of the country serving as a base.

Due regard must be paid to the necessity for developing a sound relationship between the industrial and general economic structure of any country, and the requirements of defence. The whole project must inevitably be vastly expensive in money, material, labour and time. Careful planning is essential and cannot be hurried, and it is with the object of stimulating thought and soliciting ideas that this paper has been written.

Our object is to plan an administrative layout suitable to serve the defence of India under all strategic and tactical conditions, whether geographically immediate or more remote, which will ensure that military maintenance, movement, and administration will continue under all circumstances.

The Threat.—Since the atom bomb, and guided missiles, are in their infancy, it would not at this stage be sound to base an appreciation of their ultimate potentialities on present known characteristics, or on rumour. It is already known however that the destructive effect of atomic bombs is many thousands of times greater than that of a similar weight of other explosives, and is achieved by: (a) blast, (b) scorching effect, and (c) Radio active rays.

It seems safe to assume that the greater the range of a bombardment, the less will be its accuracy and intensity. We may also assume that the main attack will be launched from the direction of the land frontiers, and that only sporadic and unsustained raids may be expected from the direction of the sea. It follows, therefore, that a target's vulnerability will vary in indirect proportion to its distances from the land frontiers, and that as we must plan to meet a threat from either the eastern or western frontier, the least vulnerable parts of India will be the Centre and South.

The threat may be summarised from the administrative aspect as falling under four headings:—

- (a) Destruction of civil factories, military factories and depots.
- (b) Destruction, or disruption, of the means of transportation, and destruction or denial of ports.
- (c) Destruction of personnel, and particularly the destruction or demoralisation of personnel engaged in essential work in factories and military installations, and on the L of C.
- (d) Demoralisation of personnel in the essential civil services, and of the populations of the great food-producing areas.

The extent to which atomic attack may be countered by scientific measures or offensive action is not within the scope of this article. It must be emphasised however, that all major construction necessary either for passive defence or to

enable an offensive to be mounted should be complete before an act of aggression on India becomes imminent. We have experienced in the last war the grave disabilities arising from the necessity of engaging in depot, airfield, road, and railway construction while at the same time waging a war over the very L of C which is under construction; and it is suggested that if we are not ready for the first atomic bomb we shall never be ready.

The deduction, from a strategic aspect, is that it is more necessary than ever before to take the initiative and decide in what area the main effort is to be made, and to retain the initiative by resolutely adhering to this decision.

Strategical Principles Governing Adm. Layout.—The main battlefield areas must be as far forward as possible, taking into consideration the size and nature of the forces available, in order to safeguard our industrial and administrative areas and ports from intensive and well-directed air attacks. Favourable sites for the launching of guided missiles must be denied to the enemy, and a strategic defensive will thus dictate a tactical offensive by both air and ground forces.

Under conditions of atomic war, however, reliance can no longer be placed on long ground Ls of C, particularly in Asiatic fields of war where such Ls of C are often confined to a single road or railway line; and the threat to an L of C obviously increases the further forward it extends.

While land communications therefore must continue to carry the bulk of the load in the main industrial zone, the maintenance of the main battle zone may have to be entirely by air. Alternative methods must, however, be developed at every stage—in the main industrial zone in peace, and in forward zones as far as may be, having regard to their position and to resources available.

These factors point to the conclusion that we should consider the entire Administrative layout in three main zones:—

- (a) The main administrative zone, which would include ports and balanced bases, and would approximately be co-incident with the main industrial zone.
- (b) The rear battlefield administrative zone, which would contain balanced *advanced* bases, from which maintenance aircraft will operate to.
- (c) The main battle zone, which may be maintained entirely by air.

These zones do not lend themselves to precise geographical definition; the differentiation has been made in order to facilitate clear thinking.

Each of these three zones might well be of considerable depth, and they might also be separated by distances running into many hundreds of miles. (In the case of a—b it may be four figures. In the case of b—c, distance would be limited only by turnround of aircraft). The main industrial zone would inevitably be predominantly static, but there would have to be progressive elasticity in the forward ones.

Effect of Atomic Attack on L of C Organization.—We do not propose in this paper to deal with problems appertaining to the rear battlefield administrative zone or the main battle zone, except in very general terms and in relation to the use of air transport. There are, however, certain general principles likely to affect both the rear battlefield administrative zone and the main industrial zone, which must be considered.

In the past, armies have usually been maintained from large bases with extensive rail communication and elaborate marshalling yards. Now railway lines themselves are unlikely to be particularly susceptible to atomic attack,

though bridges may well be. Marshalling yards, however, have always been vulnerable to bombing and will be even more so to atomic attack, as the effect of radio activity may well prevent any repair work being carried out for some weeks after the attack. It appears, therefore, that the system of large marshalling yards controlling rail traffic from very large bases is doomed, and that we must rely in future on a number of smaller bases with correspondingly smaller and less vulnerable marshalling yards.

Even given multiple bases and small marshalling yards, interference with the rail L of C must be anticipated, particularly at important bridges, of which India has many. Alternative means of transport must therefore be organised. We must be prepared to operate our main Ls of C with diesel-driven heavy road vehicles fitted with trailers. These will be less liable to interruption, except at focal points such as bridges, depots, dumps and junctions. Roads and bridges must be built and maintained to adequate specification, and materials for emergency bridges held at main river crossings.

It should be noted that there is a limit to the length of L of C which can be economically served by M.T., and over certain distances even in rear areas, it may be that heavy air freighters will be more economical. Heavy air transport must in any case be developed to provide, as a last resort when both road and rail Ls of C have been disrupted, a means of transport for essential commodities.

At every stage of the chain of movement, plans must be made for transferring lift from ground to air, when, at times and throughout certain areas, ground movement, may be disrupted. These considerations should be given due weight in the co-ordination of the development of internal civil airways, a matter to which we may possibly be paying insufficient attention on the administrative side.

The development of inland water transport must not be lost sight of. There are many rivers in India, and if planning is done in time and provision of adequate river craft made, they can be put to good use. The circumstances of 1942 and 1943 must not be repeated when, with inadequate rail communication, and no road, we were unable to make full use of an excellent water L of C,—the Brahmaputra,—because we had insufficient river craft.

Before, and throughout, a campaign, a large programme of engineer work will be required for airfields construction. In our view, there has never been enough Engineer potential in our Orders of Battle. It could be increased, in future, by accepting the fact that it does not take a skilled engineer to drive a bull-dozer or a grader, any more than to operate a tractor or mechanised plough. The troops as a whole always had to dig as well as fight. Give them and let them learn the use of the modern equivalent of the entrenching tool, and they will clear landing strips in the future, as they did bivouac sites in the past, and their own entrenchments as well. Keep the technicians for technical work.

II.—THE MAIN BASE.

We must now consider in more detail the location and organization of the main administrative zone, which is our ultimate base in this country. In order to work towards a definition of its boundaries, it is necessary to examine the location of "points of origin" of our supplies and equipment, in relation to the general directions in which the maintenance flow would be needed.

Ports.—The following ports (and ports are “points of origin” in relation to imported items)—CALCUTTA, VIZAGAPATAM, MADRAS, BOMBAY and KARACHI—possess between them a capacity far in excess of that of all other ports existing or potential. Moreover, the capacities of the principal railway routes south of the line BOMBAY—NAGPUR—CALCUTTA are low, in comparison with the routes to the north of that line. Any considerable increase in their capacities would call for a great and expensive engineering effort, and the requirement of locomotives, fuel and rolling stock would naturally increase in relationship to the length of the haul.

While, therefore, the direction of the threats and the existence of MADRAS tend to draw one towards the South—though not south of a line from BOMBAY to MADRAS—as the rear boundary of our base area, the railway transportation factor brings that Southern boundary northwards to the line BOMBAY—NAGPUR—CALCUTTA. The adoption of this line is further supported by the distribution of those Indian resources and industries which are important to defence.

It would appear, therefore, that continued ability to make use of the ports of CALCUTTA, BOMBAY and KARACHI, will be of great importance and, if this is so, their defence must be adequate. This is not to say, however, that we should allow the matter to rest here. We must have alternatives. COCHIN, TUTICORIN, CALICUT, TELLICHERRY MANGALORE, KARWAR, and MARMAGOA, all have a limited capacity for handling ocean-going ships. Their characteristics could be studied and their capacity, as alternative ports of entry, or as transshipment points to smaller coastal craft, could be developed.

The rail service behind these secondary ports is generally unsatisfactory, but it is susceptible of improvement, though, if they are ever to become of more than subsidiary importance, the broad gauge lines MANGALORE—MADRAS—BOMBAY and MADRAS—BEZWADA would need to be doubled; certain sections in the Eastern Ghats would need re-grading and there would be the need for a direct broad gauge connection between MANGALORE and BOMBAY.

There are also certain other smaller ports which are at present of use only to coastal shipping, but they would be of growing importance as points of ultimate discharge, if and when the use of the main northern ports became restricted, and it became necessary to supplement the long rail haul from the Southern ports by the use of coastal shipping. We will only mention OKHA, SIKH (CUTCH), BHAVNAGAR, SURAT, BHATKAL (N.KANARA) and COCANADA. They and their rail connections are well worthy of study.

Finally, a study should be made of the possible value of at least holding in reserve some pre-fabricated constructional equipment of the “Mulberry” type, and the accumulation of information regarding localities which might prove suitable for its use in emergency.

No military depot, other than purely transit accommodation, should be situated within the zone likely to be affected by atomic bomb attack on a port. Rapid clearance must be the motto; transport must be predominantly heavy-duty M.T.; essential labour must be provided with deep shelter accommodation at their work sites, and the number employed must be reduced to a minimum by the introduction of every appropriate modern handling device.

Internal Points of Origin.—Having found a Southern boundary for our main administrative zone, within which our base to meet a threat from west or east will lie, we find that the locations of economic resources of industries

and of indigenous foodstuff surplus areas, together with the necessity for economising in the length of transportation haul, show a line from DELHI to BOMBAY to be our western boundary, while on the east we can only suggest the line SAHIBGANJ to (inclusive) CALCUTTA.

The country thus enclosed is already more generously provided with transportation facilities than any other part of India, and it is in this area that, from the strategic aspect, the industrialization of India should be developed. If we are on the right lines, it is within this zone that our G.H.Q. installations must be constructed.

From these G.H.Q. installations the rear battlefield administrative zone will be maintained, and from which alternative routes by rail, by road, by air and, where possible, by water, must lead. Our stocks must be distributed on a plan of balanced dispersion, in installations so designed that the maintenance machine will be as near invulnerable as possible.

Protection of Principal Industries and their Personnel.—There are three means by which protection can be afforded to Indian industries against an atomic threat:—

- (a) To disperse them over a far wider area than they at present occupy.
- (b) To put them below ground.
- (c) To reconstruct them in present locations to a design which will afford them maximum protection against an atomic bomb, consistent with construction predominantly above ground.

In Germany, before and during the last war, many factories were placed underground. In Russia, industry was withdrawn to the Ural Mountains, which of course, contained coal and many essential minerals. Here they were remote from the danger of air attack. India, however, contains no hinterland equally secure from attack, since even the sea provides a potential launching area.

Dispersal.—The heavy industries are at present sited in relation to resources of coal, iron, and steel. Any move away from these resources would add enormously to costs of production, and would render industries dependent on the regular and unfailing supply of their raw materials over long rail hauls. As the coal resources of India are insufficient to admit of further large-scale industrial expansion, the future of Indian industry appears to lie in the development of hydro-electric power. Given this development, industry could be dispersed away from the highly congested areas it now occupies.

Burial.—The 100% burial of industries, held by some to be the only solution, would be enormously costly. It is believed, however, that this extreme is avoidable, and that a solution can be found based on the burial of essential components, *i.e.*, vital parts of plants and machinery which are not manufactured in India and the repair or replacement of which would take a long time. Those portions of factories which would remain above ground would require strengthening and replanning possibly on earthquake-proof lines.

The primary need is the total protection of labour, since, without this, labour will disperse to their villages at the first attack. Labour must be provided with deep shelters which must be well-lit, well-ventilated, and commodious, and must be self-contained for periods long enough to permit their occupants to remain in them until radio-activity has subsided after an atomic attack.

Key personnel at least, both in industry and in the vital Civil Service, should, in peace, be members of the Armed Forces Reserves.

Design and Construction of Depots and Military Factories.—For our own military base depots we suggest a combination of balanced dispersal and of "burial". It must be impossible for all of them to be put out of action in a single attack, or in an intensive period of attacks, and a sufficient proportion of them must at all times remain operable to ensure continuance of the flow of receipt and dispatch. They must be well served by road, rail and air communication, yet their location in hilly country will facilitate concealment and protection by traverses, to the avoidance of complete "burial" and all that that involves.

Their construction will be a big physical and financial task, but upon them will depend the success or failure of the initial, and hence perhaps the decisive, campaign. It might, as a start, be possible to put all jail labour available in India, to work on them. There is much room for improvement in the internal design of depots. The installation of such aids as roller conveyors, operating between loading bays and packing sheds, would speed up operations and eliminate much manual labour.

All personnel employed in a depot or factory, and in the transport termini, must be accommodated adequately below ground.

Detailed selection of locations for Balanced Bases does not fall within the scope of this paper, but we suggest that the following further factors will require consideration before sites are pinpointed:—

- (a) Close access to the main road and rail L of C.
- (b) Terrain, from the point of view of ease of burial.
- (c) Whether suitable ground exists near at hand for an airfield.
- (d) Source of personnel locally employed as labourers and artisans.

A general survey of the area suggested for the main industrial zone show that it is topographically suitable, in that it is mountainous, and there should be many places where installations can be dug into hills. There are already a number of airfields, showing that further sites should not be hard to come by and road and rail communications are reasonably good. We should plan for eight Balanced Bases, each capable of holding 10 days requirements of all natures. For reasons principally of transportation, groups of two bases with local tactical dispersion of, say, 100 miles between the two is suggested.

The Military Collecting System.—The movement flow should be even, and there should be as few breaks as possible. Every transit or depot area involves delay, increased vulnerability to attack, and additional labour and M.T. At the same time it is essential to provide adequate transit and depot areas to take up the flow in the event of interference with rail or road communications and to enable transportation facilities to be used economically and to full capacity.

Within ports, as already mentioned, speed of flow will be the vital factor, and only above-ground stores transit arrangements will be required. Behind every port, but not within the area likely to be affected by enemy attack on the port, will be transit stores depots. These will be below ground and will be served by road, rail and air. They will hold stores temporarily until they can be cleared to the G.H.Q. Balanced Bases.

Within every area where food-stuffs or raw materials required by military factories are produced, or material is manufactured, collecting and holding centres will probably be needed. Where possible, particularly in the case of large factories, the products may be despatched direct by rail, but alternative methods will be required to meet possible interference with rail communication. These collecting centres will not be required to hold big stocks or to hold them for long periods, and may, therefore, be sited above ground. Personnel to operate them must, however, be provided with underground accommodation.

The collecting centres should be provided with M.T. and must also be close to railways and air strips. From collecting centres, stores should be despatched to the appropriate G.H.Q. Depot or factory which will normally be at one of the G.H.Q. Balanced Bases from which replenishment of advanced base depots is carried out. In certain cases, where collecting centres lie in front of the zone of balanced bases, it may be possible to despatch certain items, particularly foodstuffs, direct to advanced bases and so avoid a double haul.

In the case of foodstuffs the lesson of the last war must not be forgotten. Shortages occurred through natural causes, *i.e.*, cessation of imports, increased consumption by armed forces, or crop failures, and these were aggravated by hoarding in the hope of forcing up prices. In addition, collection from farm or factory and dispatch to railways provided a great problem, as shortage of petrol and requirements for the armed forces starved civil transport of the resources necessary to keep it on the road.

These questions are primarily the responsibility of Provincial Governments, but joint planning between the Civil and Military departments concerned should be instituted before the outbreak of war. The provision of adequate reserve stocks, suitably stored under Government control, should defeat hoarding and enable prices to be controlled. Suitably sited collecting centres in the surplus areas, which may coincide with station supply depots and the supplementation of normal methods of collection by organised water transport under Provincial control, or in the form of Civil or Military G.T. Coys., should overcome the difficulty of collection.

Adequate refrigeration facilities, both stationary and mobile, are vital if troops in the field are to be provided with fresh food. Refrigerated aircraft may therefore be required.

P.O.L. Installations.—To lighten the load on railways and roads and to ensure against breaks in the supply of these vital commodities, all petrol and oil should be moved forward as far as possible in buried pipelines and should be stored in underground tankage. Ample container refilling apparatus must therefore be provided at forward pipeline termini.

At ports, petrol and oil should be discharged whenever possible direct from ship by pipeline to underground storage tanks. Port bulk installations should be sited to serve both G.H.Q. Balanced Bases depots and advanced bases in the Rear Battlefield Administrative Zone, to which the fuel will be pumped direct through pipelines. The network of pipelines will therefore branch out from ports to serve R.A.F. and Commands within the non-operational areas of India; to the Advanced Bases, including R.A.F. operational and transport airfields; and to the G.H.Q. Balanced Base depots. In addition, pipelines must run from the G.H.Q. Balanced Base depots to the Advanced bases in the Rear Battlefield administrative zone.

The second instalment of this thought-provoking article, which deals with the importance of Air transport in long-term administrative planning, will appear in our next issue.—*Ed.*, "U. S. I." *Journal*.

THE EARLY COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA

BY BRIGADIER H. BULLOCK, O.B.E., F.R. HIST. S.

THE first difficulty, in writing of the early Commanders-in-Chief in India, is to determine who they were.

Appointment as Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies carried not only the supreme command over the Company's forces in each and all of the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, Bombay and (at one time) Fort Marlborough, with usually certain outlying settlements as well, but also of the King's troops in the Company's territories, if there were any.* Failure to appreciate the wide scope of this great Office of State has led to mistakes in many books and lists, official and private, old and new, which have wrongly described Clive, Adlcreron, Carnac, Stibbert and others as Commanders-in-Chief.†

To command the Bengal Army, sit in the Council at Calcutta, and act as military adviser to the Governor-General, were not sufficient: these were duties which might be done by the Provincial Commander-in-Chief in Bengal. Nor, if there were any of His Majesty's men in the East Indies, was it enough to be appointed by the Court of Directors in London to command all their forces there, for a senior officer of the Royal Army might come along and "scoop the pool", and indeed once did so. Nor again did the senior of the three Provincial Commanders-in-Chief have authority over the other two by virtue of his seniority, which did not extend his power of command beyond his own Presidency.

Posterity has been perplexed, and it is not surprising, for there was sad confusion even at the time. Eyre Coote was chosen by the Company as their Commander-in-Chief; the King approved; the Court of Directors gave him "a splendid entertainment at the London Tavern"; two days later he kissed His Majesty's hand; he was appointed by his sovereign a Major-General in his service in the East Indies; he went out armed with a formal commission—and as soon as he set foot in Madras it was "ruled" by the local Council that the commission produced by a Mr. Du Pré as "Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Fort and Settlement at Madras" trumped Coote's ace.

Coote not unnaturally lost no time in making straight for England by the shortest but then (1770-71) almost untrodden overland route to lay his case before the Company. They upheld him, with compliments, and censured Mr. Du Pré and his Council; but they had by then lost a first-class commander who knew the country and had fought at Plassey, as well as the sum of £14,916. 5s. 4d. which it cost them eventually to settle his outstanding bill for pay and travelling allowances up to 1773. It was all very futile, for they were only too glad to get Coote to go out again four years later. We may presume that next time the terms of his appointment were foolproofed, but they do not seem to be on record.

Countless official and unofficial lists of Commanders-in-Chief have been published, amongst them those given annually in the *India Office List*. Yet not one of these lists was accurate, as was shown in 1944 by Sir Patrick Cadell

* There were, for instance, no King's Troops in India between 1764 and January 1780.

† See Appendix A.

historian of the Bombay Army*. I have taken his version, with some revision of dates, as the best list of early Commanders-in-Chief, and set it out below. From it, curious facts emerge.

The first Commander-in-Chief was a rear-admiral—a precedent that was not followed for nearly two centuries till, in 1946, a vice-admiral was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief for a few days and thus exercised by law all the powers of the Commander-in-Chief during Sir Claude Auchinleck's absence in England on duty.

The second Commander-in-Chief (Lawrence) was a major. He was re-appointed as a lieutenant-colonel, for a second term. He was made Commander-in-Chief yet a third time, and advanced to Major-General. No one else has been three times Chief, though five men (Coote, Cornwallis, Lake, Auchinleck and Wavell) have held office twice, and Cornwallis nearly had a third tenure.

The final list runs thus :—

Rear-Admiral Hon. Edward BOSCAWEN (29 July 1748—21 October 1749).
Major Stringer LAWRENCE (first term, 14 March 1752—24 September 1754).
Lt.-Col. Stringer LAWRENCE (second term, 11 November 1757—9 April 1759†)
Major-Gen. Stringer LAWRENCE (third term, 3 October 1761†—April 1766†)
Major-Gen. Eyre COOTE (first term, 2 July 1770—13 October 1770†)
Lieut.-Gen. John CLAVERING (2 November 1774—30 August 1777).
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Eyre COOTE, K. B. (second term, 28 December 1778†—26 April, 1783).
Lieut.-Gen. Robert SLOPER (21 July 1785—11 September 1786).
Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS, K. G. (first term, 12 September, 1786—27 October 1793) (also Governor-General).
Major-Gen. Sir Robert ABERCROMBY, K. B. (28 October 1793—16 May 1798).
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Alured CLARKE, K.B. (17 May 1798—13 March 1801).

Their basic dates are :—

	Born.	Entered service.	Became C.-in-C.	Died.
Boscawen	1711	1726	1748	1761
Lawrence	1698	1727	1752	1775
Coote	1726	1745	1770	1783
Clavering	1722	17—	1774	1777
Sloper	1729	1744	1785	1802
Cornwallis	1738	1756	1786	1805
Abercromby	1740	1758	1793	1827
Clarke	1745(?)	1759	1798	1832

In the pages that follow, my aim is to deal with them from a personal angle only, for accounts of their military exploits are accessible if not familiar to the reader, and need not be repeated here.

* *Journal* of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. xxii, p. 220. Official rolls have amazingly, included a completely bogus Chief, "Colonel Alexander Chapman", who Sir Patrick Cadell observes "appears to be a telescopic contraction for two entirely distinct officers, Charles Chapman and Alexander Champion", though neither of them was ever Commander-in-Chief in India!

† The evidence for these dates is given in Appendix B.

THE FIRST COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

The career of Edward Boscawen, first Commander-in-Chief in India, belongs more to naval than to military history, and his connection with India was short and ill-starred. Third son of the first Viscount Falmouth, he became a lieutenant in 1732 and saw much active service. In 1747 he was wounded off Finisterre, an event which is commemorated to this day by the iron posts in front of his house, No. 2, St. James's Square, which are French cannon that he then captured. In the middle of that year, 1747, he was selected to command "all the land and sea forces in the East Indies", but did not reach the Madras coast till 29th July 1748, from which date his tenure of command is reckoned. He was then only thirty-six years of age. His activities in India were all singularly unfortunate, the most so being the attempt to take Pondicherry. Once or twice there was local success on land, for which much credit must go to Stringer Lawrence who was then serving under him.

Still, Boscawen had his brief hour of glory, when he accepted the rendition of Fort St. George to the British power. His critics alleged that he was profoundly ignorant of the proper conduct of land warfare. Judging by results, he may well have been, but perhaps it is unfair to try to assess his form on the basis of a single innings, on a wicket which was not too good. He left India on 21st October 1749. With his later life we are scarcely concerned, but he became a lord commissioner of the Admiralty, admiral of the Blue, and a privy councillor; fought the French at Louisburg, Lagos and Quiberon; and died before he was fifty.

What is more interesting is to follow the Churchill strain through him. For his mother was Francis Godfrey, daughter of that Arabella Churchill who was mistress of King James II and mother of four of his children. Thus it came about that Boscawen's uncle in blood was a Marshal of France, James Fitz James, the Duke of Berwick who fought the Turks in Hungary and William III in Ireland, led the French Army in Spain, and defeated the English at Almanza on that extraordinary occasion when the French were commanded by an Englishman and the English by a Frenchman, Ruvigny. Arabella Churchill's brother was the great Duke of Marlborough, and her great-great-great-great-great-grandnephew (named Winston after their father) is the greatest living Englishman.

Boscawen's younger daughter married the fifth Duke of Beaufort, whose youngest son was Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea. Raglan—previously Lord Fitzroy Somerset—was Wellington's aide-de-camp in the Peninsular and lost an arm beside the Duke at Waterloo. By his marriage he merged the English strain of Churchill with the Irish one of Wesley (later spelt Wellesley) for his wife was a daughter of that Earl of Mornington who was a brother of the Iron Duke and of the Marquis Wellesley, Governor-General of India.*

The position of the young naval officer Boscawen who held an integrated command of naval and military forces in the East Indies affords a striking parallel to that of Lord Louis Mountbatten nearly two hundred years later, as Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief, South East Asia; but the respective effects produced by them do not bear comparison.

* Through this union comes a connection also with two later Commanders-in-Chief in India, since Lady Raglan's sister took as her husband the eleventh Earl of Westmoreland and Sir Henry Fane (C.-in-C. in India, 1835-1839) came of this family and was grandson of the 8th Earl, nephew of the 9th, and cousin of the 10th, whose sister married Sir Edward Paget (C.-in-C. in India 1823-1825).

STRINGER LAWRENCE.

Of Stringer Lawrence's private life and family next to nothing is known. He was born at Hereford on 24th February 1698, the son of one John Lawrence, who was probably either a brewer or an apothecary of that city, and his wife Mary, *née* Stringer. The future Commander-in-Chief was commissioned, at a later age than usual, in the 14th Foot (West Yorkshire) in December 1727* ; and he saw service in Spain and Flanders and at Culloden in the Forty-five. He was promoted lieutenant in 1736 and captain in 1745. In December 1746 the East India Directors in London decided to appoint him as Major of the Garrison of Fort St. George at £250 a year, with a hundred guineas passage-money. On 20th January 1747 he resigned the King's service, and sailed for India on 18th February, but it took his ship eleven months to get there.

His first tour of service in India came to an end on 25th September 1750, when he resigned from the Company's army, disgusted at their neglect of their forces, and returned to England. But before he had been home two months he was appointed, in circumstances which have never been explained, Commander-in-Chief of all the Company's Forces in the East Indies, on £500 a year, with another £250 "in lieu of diet money, servants, horses and all other privileges and perquisites whatever". He reached Madras on 14th March 1752, from which date his first term, as the second Commander-in-Chief in India, is reckoned. This term is taken to have come to an end on 24th September, on the arrival in the country of the 39th Foot ("Primus in Indis") commanded by Adlercron who, though a very indifferent leader, was senior to Lawrence and thus assumed command of the Company's troops. Lawrence was then given a commission as lieutenant-colonel in the King's service (but was junior as such to Adlercron), and retained the chief command in the Company's forces.

When Adlercron and the 39th Foot with a few details of the Royal Artillery embarked for England on 11th November 1757, Lawrence resumed the chief command, and his second term as Commander-in-Chief begins at this date and continues till he resigned, completely broken in health, and intending never to return to India, on 9th April 1759. For some reason which is unknown he did not embark for England till late in August 1759.

On his arrival in England, the Directors of the Company granted him £500 a year, and set up his statue in their sale-room. But—again in circumstances which do not seem ever to have been made clear—he stayed only a year in his own country. Returning to Madras, he took his seat in Council there on 3rd October 1761, with a new commission from the King as major-general in the East Indies, a rank which secured him from supersession by a regimental officer such as Adlercron.

His third term of office was almost peaceful, and the veteran commander left Madras for the last time in April 1766. In his retirement he had an annuity of 3,750 pagodas (say £1,500) from the Nawab of the Carnatic, and (it seems a little odd) a private allowance of £500 a year from his friend and disciple Clive. The East India Company continued their annuity of £500, and presented him with a diamond-studded sword worth £750—though only after Clive had refused one worth £500 unless Lawrence was honoured likewise. With two thousand

* The battalion was then serving at Gibraltar and the writer of the article in the *Dictionary of National Biography* suggests that he may have served in the ranks of some regiment there, during the preceding siege. This, if a correct surmise, would explain why he was so old when first commissioned.

a year, no income-tax, and no known encumbrances, he must have been pretty comfortably off in the short years of his retirement, and from his acceptance of three separate pensions we may infer that he had not shaken the pagoda tree successfully, if at all.

The "Father of the Indian Army" died in London, at his house in Bruton Street, on 10th January 1775, and was buried in Dunchideock church near Exeter, where his close friend Sir Robert Palk, the former Governor of Madras, lived and set up a memorial obelisk on Haldon Hill. The East India Company erected in Westminster Abbey another monument to his memory, the main features of which are his bust and a relief picturing the Rock of Trichinopoly. The inscription on it was written by Robert Orme, historian of the campaigns in which Lawrence rose to fame; and the armorial bearings incorporate the "cross raguly gules" which in some shape, form or combination has been borne by most of the Lawrences and is supposed to derive from a grant made to Sir Richard Lawrence for his bravery in the Crusade in 1191, when serving under Richard the First at Acre*.

By his will he left an annuity of £800 to a married nephew of the name of Twine, who appears to have been his only known relative, and legacies to various servants. The residue of his estate went to Palk, of whose son Lawrence he was godfather. From that day till the family recently died out the name of Lawrence was always given by the Palks (then baronets, and later Barons Haldon) to their eldest sons, a gracious and lasting tribute to the memory of our first and perhaps greatest Sepoy General of whose own family so little is known.**

EYRE COOTE.

Unlike all the rest, Sir Eyre Coote is the subject of a scholarly, full and modern biography (by Colonel H. C. Wyll, 1922), and for details of his career it is only necessary to refer to that work, which should be in all military libraries. Colonel Wyll, by the way, gives valuable extracts from records which throw much light on the appointment of early Commanders-in-Chief and which will find a place in any full treatment of the subject.

We may remark that Coote was the first Commander-in-Chief to act personally as such in more than one Presidency, for Lawrence's exploits were confined to Madras, and Clavering's markedly by passive military command kept him in Lower Bengal. Coote spent a long time, and saw much fighting, in both Bengal and Madras.

His army career opened in a singular manner, with his courtmartial upon a charge for alleged cowardice at the battle of Falkirk (17th January 1746). He had been commissioned only eighteen months before, at the age of seventeen or eighteen†, in the Inniskilling Regiment of Foot, and with it took part in the

* Biddulph suggests that there may have been some connexion between Stringer and Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayor of London in 1664, who was granted similar arms in that year; but the Librarian of the Corporation of London, Guildhall, informs me that, though he has a mass of written and printed material about this Lord Mayor, he is unable to trace any direct connexion with Stringer.

** I have made enquiry from the City Librarian of Hereford, for I thought that something more might have been discovered about Lawrence and his family since the appearance of the article in the *Dictionary of National Biography* in 1892 and Biddulph's short *Life* in 1901; but apparently local historians have not devoted research to Hereford's distinguished son, and nothing new has come to light.

† The *Dictionary of National Biography* states that he was born at Ash Hill, county Limerick, in 1726. Wyll gives the date as 1727, and states that the exact date and place are not known. Coote himself made more than one statement at variance with both these authorities.

operations against the Jacobite rebels. Falkirk was the regiment's first engagement of the campaign, and it was not a fortunate one. Three days later Coote, with two lieutenants of his battalion, was brought before a general court-martial at Edinburgh. He was "accused of cowardice in leaving the regiment and going before it to Edinburgh", but was found "not guilty of cowardice but guilty of a breach of part of the 14th Article of War, by misbehaving in going to Edinburgh with the Colours, before the Regiment", and was sentenced to be suspended. The King was "not pleased with the sentences of the court-martial . . . on the trial of the three . . . officers for misbehaviour at the battle of Falkirk, as he does not think the excuses made by them sufficient justification for their not returning to join their regiments." Less than a month later, sentence was promulgated "that His Majesty has no further occasion for their services."

Thus Eyre Coote's military career seemed to have come to an end, and not a creditable end, almost as soon as it had begun. But clemency was extended to him two years later, when he came back into the army by being gazetted a half-pay cornet in the Inniskilling Dragoons on Christmas Day, 1748. Despite laborious research, Colonel Wyllly was unable to discover the precise circumstances in which Coote was thus reinstated, but he found that there was an old regimental tradition in the 27th Foot that, after the trial by court-martial, it came to light that Ensign Coote's motive in escaping from the ill-fated field of Falkirk to Edinburgh was to save the King's Colour which had been entrusted to him from falling into the hands of the enemy. This may be supported by his acquittal of the actual charge of cowardice; and we may suppose that his military character was eventually cleared to the satisfaction of the authorities.

So much for the opening act of his army life. The last fall of the curtain was no less dramatic. The Commander-in-Chief, now in his sixtieth year, left Calcutta with Lady Coote and his personal staff on 20th March 1783, by the Company's armed vessel *RESOLUTION*, bound for Madras. There he was to take the war against Tipu into his own hands. He had been very ill, and had had a stroke. Only three months before, Warren Hastings had reported to England that Coote's "constitution is so broken that I fear for his existence. Yet, infirm as he is, he is our only resource, and his presence would yet retrieve the miserable state of the Carnatic, even though he should be deprived of the power of motion. He is willing and sometimes impetuous in his resolution to return thither."

Game to the last, Coote set out on his final voyage. At first all went well with the *RESOLUTION* and her passengers, but on the 14th April, when only one day's sail from Madras, four large ships were sighted and proved to be the enemy—two line-of-battle and two frigates. From that dawn they hotly pursued the *RESOLUTION*, till on the night of the 18th they gave up the chase. "On the third day", runs the captain's report, "big with the fate of the Service, wrapt up with his country's cause, and feeling I believe his own consequences and the benefit the enemy would reap if they captured him, his family also on board and a thousand other points crowded on his shattered frame, the trial proved too great and the General dropped on deck, struck with a paralytic stroke."

He was still alive when they came into port on 24th April, and he lingered two days on shore. On the 27th April 1783 he died, and was buried on the next day in the historic church of St. Mary, in Fort St. George. At the beginning of the new year his remains were exhumed and taken by his widow to England, where they found a final resting-place at the little village of Rockbourn, in the church of the parish wherein lay his seat of West Park, up a tiny valley which

runs down to the Hampshire Avon at Fordingbridge. It is a remote and secluded spot, and there one of India's greatest generals sleeps beneath two stand of tattered old regimental colours.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF A DAY.

Clavering's tenure as Commander-in-Chief is inextricably bound up with the complex political history of the times, the feuds and intrigues in the Supreme Council in the days when Warren Hastings, Philip Francis, Barwell, Clavering himself, and Monson were members. His arrival in Calcutta from England with Francis and Monson in October 1774 began the conflict which ran on for six years till Francis retreated to England. For Clavering, that unhappy period came to an end with his death in the autumn of 1777; but though he was in India for less than three years, there were two incidents which must be mentioned in any account of this Commander-in-Chief. He fought a duel with his fellow-councillor Barwell; and, for one day only, he usurped the office of Governor-General.

The duel with Barwell took place in April 1775. The quarrel which led up to it may never be explained fully, for three or more conflicting contemporary accounts exist. The immediate occasion of the clash was an altercation which had occurred at a meeting of the Board of Revenue, when Clavering took exception to Barwell's private trading and seems to have suggested that he was fraudulent as well. Barwell's rejoinder was, "Whoever says that I have done anything inconsistent with my oath to the Company is a rascal and a scoundrel", at which—the stories vary—Clavering either put his hand to his sword, or merely protested, "These are strong terms, Mr. Barwell, very strong".

But there is no doubt that a lady was at the bottom of the case. By his first wife, Lady Diana, daughter of the first Earl De La Warr, Clavering had, with two sons, three daughters of whom the eldest was a striking beauty and had accompanied her parents to Bengal. It was not long before Barwell fell in love with Maria Margaret Clavering, and it was felt that they would soon make a match of it. But her father thought otherwise. We are told that he was "a peppery martinet", and his prospective son-in-law was pictured by Francis as "rapacious without industry and ambitious without an exertion of his faculties or steady application to affairs". The Commander-in-Chief must have held similar views, and probably did not hesitate to express them with some freedom.

The quarrel at the Revenue Board was followed by a challenge from the General that same evening, to a meeting the next morning. Barwell accepted the challenge, but is said to have asked for a postponement of two days to make his will and put his affairs in order, and after that again for two days more. On the fifth day, a Sunday, they met without seconds "on the new road to Budge-Budge". "What distance do you choose, Sir?", asked Barwell, "The nearer the better". They faced each other at eight yards. "Will you please to fire, Sir", said Clavering. "No, Sir, you will please to fire first". "Is your pistol cocked, Mr. Barwell?" "Yes, Sir". "You will give me leave to look, Sir—I did not hear the drawing of the cock".

The General advanced, satisfied himself that his adversary's pistol was primed, cocked and ready; retired to his stand; and fired. The ball passed between Barwell's thighs, grazing the inner part of one. "Fire, Sir", said Clavering. "No, Sir, you will give me leave to decline that. I came here in obedience to your summons, and I think I may now, without any imputation to

my character, declare that I have no enmity, and that I am sorry of what is past." "Sir, I must insist on your firing. If you continue to refuse, you will oblige me to fire again." But after much protest and argument by either party, an unqualified apology was given by Barwell, and they left the field. By duelling standards, which are by no means the standards of today, both came from the meeting with credit. Barwell, we may add, married someone else before long.

This business, though extraordinary even by the notions of the time, was not unique, for Warren Hastings and Francis fought a duel at Calcutta some five years later. But it is almost humdrum beside the amazing series of events which led to Sir John Clavering taking the oath of office as Governor-General on 20th June 1777, at the hands of Sir Philip Francis. That was at eleven o'clock in the morning. The Judges of the Supreme Court met at half-past six the same evening and sat far into the night, emerging with a ruling that "the place and office of Governor-General of this Presidency has not yet been vacated by Mr. Hastings and that the actual assumption of the Government by the Member of Council next in succession... would be absolutely illegal".

Clavering and Francis, their bluff called, had to declare that they accepted the decision of the Judges; and on the next day the Council passed a resolution that Clavering by his conduct had forfeited his place at their board, and his office as Commander-in-Chief. Francis counter-attacked: the Council again consulted the Judges: the resolution was rescinded and the *status quo ante* restored. Within ten weeks Clavering was dead. He has been called "the Governor-General of a Day"; but his fame must rest rather on his prowess in early life—"the real hero of Guadeloupe, who has come home covered with more laurels than a boar's head", wrote Horace Walpole—than upon the little that he did in India, where he had no opportunity of adding to those laurels even had he tried.

A FORGOTTEN CHIEF.

Sloper, who has had greatness thrust upon him a century after he had been forgotten, by Sir Patrick Cadell's discovery that he ranks as an early Commander-in-Chief, presents a problem worthy of Sherlock Holmes. Such is the depth of obscurity into which he has fallen that he is not mentioned in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, the *Dictionary of Indian Biography*, or the eleventh (and best English) edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

In other standard works in which he does receive mention, however slight, there seems to be a hoodoo attached to the very whisper of his name. Thus in Wylly's careful life of Coote a passing reference to Sloper has been omitted from the index and can thus only be found by chance; and in the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* (vol. ii) a description of his armorial bearings and their military supporters is made nonsense by the omission of the half of it by the printer's devil.

No man can deserve such treatment at the hands of posterity, nor does posterity deserve to have the task of exhuming the semi-illustrious dead made so difficult. But in the circumstances something has had to be done; and I have therefore felt it to be my duty to begin the biographical rehabilitation of our least-known Commander-in-Chief. I cannot however claim to have done more than dig up some dry old bones: it will be the task of others to set them up as good as life.

An outline of his army life comes from a brief notice in Cannon's *History of the 14th Light Dragoons* (1847)*. He was commissioned in Mordaunt's Regiment of Foot in 1744, and transferred as a captain to the 10th Dragoons in 1750. In February 1759 he went to the 1st Dragoon Guards as Lieutenant-Colonel, and commanded that regiment during the remaining part of the Seven Years War, earning commendation from Prince Frederick of Brunswick and other generals under whom he served. He became Colonel in 1772 and a major general in 1777; colonel of the 14th Light Dragoons on 2nd April 1778; and lieutenant-general on 20th November 1782. He was appointed Provincial Commander-in-Chief at Madras, 7th October 1784, but did not take over until the following June, only a month or so before he became Commander-in-Chief in India on 21st July 1785.

He laid down that office on 11th September 1786, and returned to England. He was created Knight of the Bath on 6th June 1788, transferred as Colonel of the 4th Dragoons in 1797, was promoted general on 3rd May 1796, held office as Governor of Duncannon Fort, and died in 1802.

He married Jane, the third daughter of Sir John Willes, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas; and one of their sons, Granby Sloper, after leaving Charterhouse was appointed a cadet in the Madras Army in 1781, promoted ensign the next year, was A.D.C. to his father on the latter's arrival in Madras, became a lieutenant in 1789, and seems to have left the service by 1793 though he was alive in 1802.†

SIR ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

Cornwallis and Alured Clarke will be dealt with in the third article in this series, on the Commanders-in-Chief in India 1800—1857, as both of them held office in the nineteenth century: Cornwallis during his brief second term in 1805, and Clarke from 1798 till he was relieved by Lake in 1801. It remains to deal with Robert Abercromby.

Robert Abercromby was one of the four sons of an advocate of good family of Tullibody in Clackmannanshire, three of whom attained great distinction. The eldest brother was the famous Major-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, who died of his wounds at the taking of Alexandria in 1801, in the hour of victory. In honour of his achievements his widow was at once created Baroness Abercromby of Aboukir and Tullibody. Their three sons were respectively the second Baron, General Sir John Abercromby, G.C.B., the captor of Mauritius in 1809, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army 1809-1831, and C.-in-C. and temporary Governor at Madras 1813-14; and Lord Dumfermline, sometime Speaker of the House of Commons. The second brother is said to have been a captain in the East India Company's Service, but I have not been able to find him in lists of their military and marine officers. Robert, the third brother, was the Commander-in-Chief with whom we are now concerned; and the fourth of the brothers was a well-known Lord of Session, Alexander, Lord Abercromby.

Robert served throughout the American War: at Yorktown he had Cornwallis above him and Lake under him. He was Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Bombay from 21st January 1790 till he went across to Madras two years later

* It is repeated with minor additions but almost *verbatim* in the later *History of the 14th (King's) Hussars* by Col. H. B. Hamilton (1901), where, by the operation of the printer's devil again, the single reference to Sloper in the index appears under the heading "Single Combat"!

† Information from Major V. C. P. Hodson.

to join Cornwallis in the attack on Tipu Sultan at Seringapatam and, on its successful completion, to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief in India in the following year.

APPENDIX A.

THE FAULTY LISTS.

To go thoroughly into the old inaccurate lists and to expose their invalidity would entail the presentation to the reader of a paper of great length, for it would be necessary to set out several lists in full and to compare them item by item, quoting the evidence of the Records for and against each name and date in dispute in each list. An initial concise demonstration of their erroneousess has been made by Sir Patrick Cadell, as stated above; and his article can be consulted in the libraries of the United Service Institution of India and of G. H. Q. India, for example. But he does not quote detailed references to his sources, which however accurate were chiefly if not entirely secondary ones and which should be supplemented in any fairly full discussion of the subject. I will reserve such a discussion for another occasion, more suited than the present article to its necessarily technical nature.

Meanwhile, I would observe that the list which has undeservedly been the origin of much recent error is that in Cardew's *Services of the Bengal Native Army*, published by the Government of India in 1903. Though it is clearly headed "Commanders-in-Chief of the Bengal Army", it has equally clearly been taken by others less well informed as a list of Commanders-in-Chief in India. Compare the list of Commanders-in-Chief given in *The Army in India and its Evolution*, published by the Government of India in 1924. See also that in *India's Army* by Major D. Jackson (no date, about 1942), which is said to have been supplied to the author by Army Headquarters India and to have been the same as that once inscribed in the Commander-in-Chief's former office at Army Headquarters, Simla. These recent lists are practically the same as Cardew's, except that they insert the names of Stringer Lawrence and Adlercron at the beginning. The persons responsible for their preparation were evidently under the mistaken impression that the Provincial Command in Bengal was the same appointment as that of Commander-in-Chief in India, and ignored Cardew's heading of his list—which list seems to be a perfectly correct roll of what it purports to be, the Commanders-in-Chief in Bengal, not in India.

I make this point about Cardew's list, as Sir Patrick Cadell does not do so. Other points must be reserved for a technical paper; but I would remark that the lists in the classic "Dodwell and Miles" are equally misleading. This book, always known by the names of its compilers, is properly entitled *Alphabetical List of the Officers of the Indian Army, with the dates of their respective promotion, retirement, resignation, or death, whether in India or in Europe, from the year 1760, to the year 1834 inclusive, corrected to September 30, 1837* (London, 1838). In it are to be found four lists of Commanders-in-Chief, (i) Commanders-in-Chief in India 1770-1837; (ii) Commanders-in-Chief, Bengal 1777-1837, (iii) Commanders-in-Chief, Madras 1784-1837; and (iv) Commanders-in-Chief, Bombay 1785-1837. But though these lists purport to distinguish between true Commanders-in-Chief in India and Provincial Chiefs, in fact the two offices are hopelessly confused, and I believe that this confusion is the cause of nearly all the errors which have occurred in other lists of Commanders-in-Chief during the last century.

APPENDIX B.

ON THE QUESTION OF DATES.

The question of certain dates is also too lengthy and too technical to be suitable for examination here, and I propose to deal with it on another occasion, when it will be possible to set out the evidence in detail. I will confine myself now to giving my authority in each of the four instances where I have ventured to correct or expand Sir Patrick Cadell's date. These are :—

	<i>Cadell's date</i>	<i>My date.</i>
A. Lawrence's second term ended	—April 1759	9 April 1759
B. His third term began ..	3 March 1761	3 October 1761
C. His third term ended ..	—April 1766	4 April 1766
D. Coote's first term ended ..	Summer 1771	13 October 1770

To take each briefly :—

A. The Proceedings of the Madras Council for 9 April 1759 show that Lawrence's resignation was tendered and accepted on that day ; though (contrary to the statements of most authorities) he did not sail for England shortly afterwards, but remained at Madras until he embarked on the ship WARREN on 20th (or 21st) August 1759, which reached England on 27th March 1760 (Madras and India Office Records).

B. He arrived at Madras by the ship Fox on 2 October 1761 (Madras Records, Public Department, Diary and Consultation volume, under that date), and appears to have taken over command the next morning.

C. He left Madras by the ship PACIFIC on the night of 3 April 1766, according to the Madras Records (Military Consultations, 3 April 1766). The India Office Records give the date as 4th April, probably reckoning by the forenoon, as is often the official practice to this day.

D. Though Wyly states that Coote left Madras for Calcutta in October 1770 and went overland to England in the early summer of 1771 (in which statement Sir Patrick Cadell follows him), the original records show that this is wrong. Coote did indeed plan to proceed from Fort St. George to Calcutta, and actually made some arrangements to do so ; but as Governor Du Pre would not allow him to take any military retinue he changed his plans, and left for Basra by the sloop HAWKE on 13 October 1770. The point of departure is not stated, but it must have been Madras : Coote's last letters are dated from St. Thome. (Madras Press List, vol. ix, p. 240 ; Secret Consultations, Imperial Record Department, 12th Dec. 1770, pp. 426, 470, 471).

* * * *

For great help on this question of dates, I wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. B.S. Baliga, Sir Patrick Cadell, Major V. C. P. Hodson, and Dr. Surendra Nath Sen.

T W W D O A J*

By "CECIL VARCUS".

"**H**ULLO, I see that JCOSA is to be housed in Australia. Unfortunately BIEJCOSA insist on being present whenever JCOSA wants to discuss BCOF. It appears that in desperation OCCCS is going to bring the whole matter before UNO."

"No, I don't know. Before who?" I murmured sleepily.

"Don't be silly, you know UNO. You see something about it every day in the papers. By Jove! Did you see this? Some Indian Army Officers have quietly slipped away from India on SEWLROM, taking with them both SLICK and STIFF, leaving ETRC shivering with rage at being left behind under the sponsorship of DWE."

GERA put down his file and sighed. "The morals of this world are not what they used to be. In my day, officers would have been content with just STIFF, or even SEWLROM alone for that matter."

GERA, let me explain, is a very old friend of mine and inclined to take life a little seriously. His name GERA stands for GEORGE EDWARD RONALD ADAMS. This is the new method adopted in that All-India Reformatory, G.H.Q.(I)—to avoid a general mix up over officers with similar surnames.

I pondered over what GERA had read out. I had understood most of it, having already completed a term at G.H.Q.(I). There was no doubt, however, that we seemed to be slipping into talking and writing a new kind of dialect; a dialect of abbreviations; of strange letters standing for many words; a sort of "morse" speech; a tapping out of first letters only, instead of wasting time on complete words.

The funny thing about it was that after a time one forgot what the actual letters stood for, although one knew quite well the general meaning of the group of letters.

Take, for instance, that well-known name UNRRA. Everyone knows what it means in a general sense, and why it was created a United Nations organisation to administer and assist in the conquered territories. How many of us, I wondered, knew what each letter really stood for or, for that matter, knew how to spell it correctly in its abbreviated form. I didn't!

The day I returned from LILOP I remembered reading in some file that the Q.M.G. had ruled that when cases are referred to the D.F.A.(Q), this will be done in the RF and not on the BM. Wsof was to be suitably amended. That floored me! I knew the Q.M.G—of course, not personally, but by name and reputation. I had, in fact, always hurried past his door whenever I had occasion to take a short-cut by the portals of the Mighty. The D.F.A.(Q) I knew of old too, and thought of the many financial wrestling matches we had

*The World-Wide Dialect of Abbreviated Jargon.

indulged in. A slippery customer! Whenever you thought you had got a good hold, he always managed to render it harmless by slipping in a cunning catch-can, or catch-it-if-you-can, kind of argument.

But this RF and BM stuff I had forgotten for the moment. No doubt it would quickly come back to me now I was once again down for a third stretch of hard labour in those whitewashed tenements of G.H.Q.(I)—the creator of this new strange medium of communication between wardens and inmates. I suppose that like UNO, G.H.Q.(I) houses such a veritable babel of foreign tongues that some sort of common *lingua franca* is essential—a kind of Urdu in fact.

But who was this WSOF? She's a newcomer surely! Sounds a bit Russian! Perhaps the A.G. brought her back with him from the snowy heights of Teheran. I wonder whether he fought any duels over her—with rapiers of course! Whoever she was, she apparently had to be suitably amended. A pity, that. It might spoil her romantic name.

But the new language is apparently world-wide and is not confined to G.H.Q. compositions and chatter. I remember the time when my last sentence was commuted from three to two years. With what joy did I walk out through the barbed wire tall gates of G.H.Q.(I), into the sun and clear, sharp air of the outside world! I remember eagerly questioning the first human I saw, and asked him what was happening these days. Was the cost of living any cheaper?

He glowered up at me with surprise and contempt.

"Cheaper! That's a good 'un!" he croaked glumly. "Haven't you heard the news?"

"What news?" I enquired anxiously.

"Why, UNRRA has failed to produce the goods, so the AICC has appealed for assistance to UNO through its intermediary organisation, the FAO. Unless the USA and the USSR can come to terms at the next Big Three meeting, I see us all starving. The BAOR is already coming back." With that, he humped his shoulders and slouched off a trifle uncertainly.

I stood there for a moment or two in a kind of mental haze. What on earth was he talking about? I knew UNRRA slightly, but who on earth were the AICC and the FAO? I suppose the Big Three referred to Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. But surely Roosevelt had died shortly before the war had ended? Who were the Big Three now? Eisenhower, Monty, and that chap Zharov? I must buy myself a newspaper and get myself acquainted with the world's new language.

I bought one at the nearest railway station, and sinking back luxuriously in a corner seat, I opened it. The first paragraph that struck my eye was to the effect that ELAM, ELAS and AFARE were threatening to seek an interview with the USSR with the object of putting up an official complaint to UNO. Poor UNO! Everyone seemed to be complaining to UNO. But who on earth were ELAM, ELAS and AFARE? I turned over a page.

The next thing I spotted was that the Communists had betrayed the AFL and had sabotaged the cause of national unity. That sounded serious. I supposed the AFL, whoever they were, would shortly be appealing to UNO too. I searched for some kind of glossary in the paper but found none.

I read on a bit further to find that an YMRU gunman, backed by a Croat Fascist Organisation (CFO), had murdered yet another victim. Meanwhile the Right Wing Party in France was deliberately adopting the policy of weakening the MRP in the hope that this would draw it into the Right Wing Coalition.

I put my paper down with a sigh. It was clear that I would have to take a course of study before I could again take my rightful place in world affairs. I could never again venture to drink beer at the Cock and Bottle, and take part in the discussions there in my present state of ignorance.

I looked up suddenly from my reverie.

"GERA! I can tell you what is required, not only in this Reformatory, but also for the great English-speaking public at large. What we want is some kind of dictionary. A sort of glossary of common abbreviations. What do you think?"

"Well, GIGA,* there is a pamphlet issued presumably by the Reformatory in London. It is, of course, suitably amended for India. Its the FSRB or to give it its full name, the FIELD SERVICE POCKET BOOK (INDIA), Part I, Pamphlet No. 3, ABBREVIATIONS, 1944. It states at the bottom that 'this pamphlet supersedes the 1943 edition and amendments No. 1 thereto'. It was reprinted in India in June 1945. Here it is."

I took it and idly turned over its pages. I saw that it contained some thirty of them, and that it started off with a warning that "abbreviations, whether authorised in this pamphlet or not, will only be used if the writer is satisfied that there is no possibility of their meaning being mistaken or not understood by any one of the addressees of the document he is originating."

That sounded reasonable enough. It went on to say that "the guiding principle with abbreviations is that those in commonest use should be authorised for general use, but that their number should be kept within reasonable bounds. Unauthorised abbreviations are not encouraged, but if used, must be explained or defined the first time they appear, *e.g.*, : ERI (Expeditionary Force Institute)."

There were then a couple of pages of grammatical rules for plurals, punctuation, months and days, points of the compass, verbs, titles, etc. Just the sort of thing we are looking for, I thought, not only for this Penitentiary, but on a world-wide basis. I turned over a few more pages.

First we had abbreviations for Units of the British Service. Three methods appeared to be used in their construction:—

(a) First letter of each word of or only one word *e.g.* LG (Life Guards), 3H (3rd Kings Own Hussars)

(b) A shortened form of the word, *e.g.* HAMPS (Hampshire Regiment)

(c) One complete word or name picked from a group *e.g.* CAMERONS (Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders)

There were the inevitable exceptions, of course. For instance, although we have LG for Life Guards

IG for Irish Guards

SG for Scots Guards

WG for Welsh Guards

*That's my name—GEORGE IMLAY GUSTAVIUS ADAMS. Yes, we were both ADAMSES.

yet for Coldstream and Grenadier Guards, we have respectively COLDM and GREN GDS, in spite of the fact that the abbreviations CG and GG do not appear to be used to mean anything else. Of course GG (Gee-Gee) might have sounded a little childish!

On the other hand, while IG means Irish Guards, it can also mean Inspector General, or even a more Instructor of Gunnery. However, I suppose a careful study of the context would avoid a court-martial.

Abbreviations for the Indian Service were not nearly so confusing, being either HORSE for any Cavalry Regiment containing that name *e.g.* I HORSE (Skinner's Horse (1st DYO Cavalry), CAV for the same reason *e.g.* 7 CAV (7th Light Cavalry,) and L for Lancer Regiments *e.g.* 19 L (19th Kgo Lancers). There were also some exceptions.

As for the "Arms of Decision", they launched forth, without any nonsense, straight into their own names *e.g.*: 14 PUNJAB, MAHRATTAS, DOGRA, SIKH, JAT, etc., while FFR, FFRIF and 1 to 10 GR are too well known to require a dictionary. Admin. Services stuck rightly to the letter abbreviations, *e.g.*: RIASC, IAOC, IEME, etc. The ladies were catered for, *e.g.* S. cont. (Senior Controller), J. comd. (Junior Commander), 2 SUB (Second subaltern).

Finally, there were some miscellaneous abbreviations. The main anomaly appeared to be the various interpretations which can be applied to one small abbreviation. For instance, our old friend "comd" can mean command, commander, commandant, commanding, or commanded.

CB can mean either confinement to barracks, counter-battery or a Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath.

HE can mean either His Excellency, High Explosive, or Horizontal Equivalent. Indeed a variety of interpretations! However, there seems to be some kind of connection between them, since any error made with the first named would be met with a roar from the second, terminating in the posture defined in the third. Incidentally, I saw that what is commonly called Pow (Prisoner of war) was shown as PW. Perhaps there was a missing amendment.

It seemed as simple as ABC, although I am told that even that term is not so simple after all, *e.g.* ABC can mean "So-and-so doesn't know his ABC", or Aerated Bread Company, or for one of their tea shops in London, while a farmer speaking of the ABC process would be referring to an obsolete method of making artificial manure, said to be named from the initials of Alum, Blood, and Clay, the three chief ingredients!

"A comprehensive little pamphlet, GERA," I remarked handing it back to him. "The trouble is that it is designed for Field Service, and therefore only contains the simplest of abbreviations. There is no reference in it to the dialect we use in the Reformatory, neither can it be used as a guide to assisting us in reading our daily papers. We want something with far wider scope than this."

"Yes, GIGA, you're right," GERA admitted. "What I think we require is some kind of continuous general education in learning new words. This could perhaps be done by means of the BBC, Quizes in the popular magazines

and daily papers, while an up-to-date Glossary of words, as used in the International Press could appear in the papers on the first day of each month. Why, only to-day I saw a new term. Fortunately it was the first time it had appeared, so the Editor obeyed the rules and explained it. He talked about the USI (United States of Indonesia) and the NIU (Netherlands Indonesia Union) and said that matters would be handled by negotiation between USI and NIU. So what! If I had not spotted them to-day—the first time they appeared—where would I have been? I would have been flummoxed and left groping in the darkness.”

“Yes, if we can get the Nations interested, then the world will be safe for you and I to live in. But the Reformatory should also issue its own glossary, say in Durbar Notes, and so keep us up-to-date as regards military jargon. We shall then at last be able to understand each other when atomic energy, rockets, guided projectiles, radar, jet propulsion, bacteriology, and week-end visits to the Moon come to brighten us all up. Any failure to grasp the meaning of a word then may well end in total extinction or a forced landing on Mars”.

I sighed. Life was becoming indeed a little Wellsonian!

I sprang up suddenly. By Jove! I had nearly forgotten that meeting. I hurried off to attend a FAO meeting on a high level to decide whether, in view of failure of supplies ex UNO, UNRRA, and FAO, we should continue to maintain ALFSEA, NIESEA, and BCOF. Surely a matter for the Psosin consultation with the C-in-C and FA! Why bring GIGA into it?

* * * * *

Here is a Self-Quiz for those who are interested. No prizes are offered, but you will find the answers on page..183.

Military.

- | | |
|--------------|--------------|
| 1. JCOSA. | 17. LILOP. |
| 2. BIEJCOSA. | 18. FARLEAF. |
| 3. BCOF. | 19. DOMCOL. |
| 4. OCCS. | 20. PYTHON. |
| 5. ALFSEA. | 21. ETRC. |
| 6. SEAC. | 22. DWE. |
| 7. SACSEA. | 23. ISDPS. |
| 8. SHAEF. | 24. LFG. |
| 9. BAOR. | 25. DSK. |
| 10. MELF. | 26. POWD. |
| 11. ALFNEI. | 27. DGIMS. |
| 12. BTI. | 28. BLA. |
| 13. SEWLROM. | 29. PPA. |
| 14. LIAP. | 30. JOIR. |
| 15. STIFF. | 31. CSEU. |
| 16. SLICK. | |

Unofficial.

- | |
|--------------|
| 1. ELDAD. |
| 2. LOLLIPOP. |
| 3. WSOF. |

Political.

- | | |
|-----------|------------|
| 1. EAM. | 12. MOF. |
| 2. ELAS. | 13. FAP. |
| 3. AFARE. | 14. UNRRA. |
| 4. AFL. | 15. USI. |
| 5. UNO. | 16. NIU. |
| 6. MRP. | 17. SNOF. |
| 7. USSR. | 18. NOF. |
| 8. YMRU. | 19. NOMS. |
| 9. CFO. | 20. AFZ. |
| 10. FAO. | 21. KKE. |
| 11. ENSA. | 22. SCAP. |

THE DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AND FAR EAST*

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL G. L. W. ARMSTRONG.

ANY study of defensive problems in the East must start with certain assumptions. For the purpose of this paper the following has been assumed :—

(a) That the close Allied diplomatic and military co-ordination of the War years has continued in peace, and that for purposes of major military policy, the British Commonwealth and United States are at one.

(b) That, by agreement, the Americans have accepted responsibility for the defence of the Pacific area and China, whilst the British Commonwealth is responsible for the area FRENCH INDO-CHINA—AUSTRALASIA—INDIA, as marked on the attached map.

(c) That the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, SIAM and FRENCH INDO-CHINA are friendly to us, and their foreign and military policies co-ordinated with those of the British Commonwealth ; if such is not the case, it will be one of our first tasks on the outbreak of war to bring about this state of affairs.

(d) That South and East AFRICA and MADAGASCAR form an effective part of the Commonwealth defence scheme.

(e) That powerful British forces are located in the Middle East, and only in the unlikely event of the total defeat of those forces would serious danger from that direction arise.

Apart from sentiment, and a regard for the welfare of British subjects in these lands, the security of the area FRENCH INDO CHINA—AUSTRALASIA—INDIA is vital to the British Commonwealth. It contains the great industrial and food-producing bases of INDIA and AUSTRALIA, both of which contribute, in peace and war, a vital part of the needs of the British Commonwealth. In addition, a large portion of the world's supplies of tin and rubber are found in this area, both of these commodities being essential to the waging of modern war. A further factor is that FRENCH INDO CHINA, SIAM and BURMA together form the granary of the East, exporting to deficit countries, such as INDIA and MALAYA, their surplus crops of rice. Unquestionably, therefore, the defence of any part of this area is bound up in that of the remainder.

The first priority in our defence plans must therefore be the security of the Australian and Indian Bases from air, sea and land attack ; as second priority will be the protection of the important areas of SIAM, MALAYA and JAVA. To achieve both of these objects it is essential that the bastions of FRENCH INDO CHINA, BORNEO and NEW GUINEA with the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO be firmly in our hands, with sufficient airfields and aircraft to dominate the outer approaches and to destroy any enemy air forces which may attempt to attack from the East. The Air Forces will also combine with the Navy in destroying any naval attacks which the enemy may attempt. As long as the British Commonwealth retains air and naval superiority in this forward area, any Eastern enemy will be powerless to damage our vital interests.

*This was the winning essay in the Gold Medal Essay Competition for 1945-46 conducted by the United Service Institution of India. Subject set for the competition was :

“Co-ordination and control in peace and war of the Forces of all three Services, British and Dominion, in the Indian Ocean and neighbouring territories.”

As regards the danger from the West, the Indian Base is potentially threatened both from the sea and from the land. Assuming the security of South and East Africa and the Middle East, we need not consider further the threat from these areas. The possibility of attack from PERSIA or AFGHANISTAN remains. In the present undeveloped state of these countries, such a threat is not serious; it could in any case be adequately guarded against by the deployment of bomber and fighter resources along the North West Frontier of India. Should these countries, however, come under the influence of a Power unfriendly to the British Commonwealth, and their communications and airfields be developed, our air defences would have to be greatly strengthened, and ground defences would have to be developed to hold the vital mountain ranges of the North West Frontier. Depending on the direction from which the attack came, our plans might provide for standing firm in this vital area whilst a wide encircling land, air, and possibly sea, attack is launched against the enemy from one or the other flank.

The immense fastnesses of the Himalayas make attack from the North so unlikely as to be ignored, with the one exception of the approach from KUNMING into BURMA. This area is, however, within the sphere of our American Allies, and, in any case, provided we had full air superiority, we should have no difficulty in destroying any small force which might be so bold as to attempt an attack from this direction.

STRATEGIC CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL.

We have, therefore, to decide on the best method for the co-ordination and control of the Forces in the area FRENCH INDO CHINA—AUSTRALASIA—INDIA. As the system for co-ordination and control in peace must essentially be based on that required in war, the remarks which follow take primary account of War-time requirements.

British Commonwealth strategic control will probably be exercised by the British Chiefs of Staff on behalf of the Combined British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff. Within the British area of responsibility in the Far East, strategic control should be achieved by a local Chiefs of Staff Committee (designated the Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff—FECOS), composed of representatives of Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly the French and Dutch. This Committee might be built on the nucleus of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, with the addition of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the countries concerned.

Members of FECOS would represent their respective Chiefs of Staff in the same way as the Senior members of the British Army Staff in WASHINGTON represented the British Chiefs of Staff on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. Care must be taken to prevent the membership from becoming too large, with resultant unwieldiness, but at the same time, all three Services must be represented. The members of FECOS would be individually responsible to their own Governments, and collectively responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff. The best location of the Committee would probably be in Australia, which is strategically the most central point in the area.

Coupled with strategic and operational control, a machinery will also be required for administrative control and co-ordination. In the Far East more than in any other part of the world, undeveloped communications, together with climatic and geographical factors, present administrative problems which only the greatest energy and ability can surmount.

If the British Commonwealth is forced into war in the Far East, logistical support must be based on the great industrial bases of the U. K., India and Australia, in each of which the local Ministry of Supply will probably control all war production, and procurement from outside sources. To achieve effective co-ordination between these Ministries, and with the Service administrative machine in the Far East, a Far Eastern Joint Supply Council will be required, composed of representatives of the various Ministries.

It will be the function of this Council to co-ordinate all requirements and production of raw materials, foodstuffs, textiles, and war-like stores, both for the Armed Forces and for civil needs. It will not, however, be the responsibility of the Council to take executive procurement action for particular requirements; this will be the responsibility of a "Base Organisation".

One of the outstanding characteristics of both sea and air power is mobility. This gives opportunity for decisive concentration of effort and economy of force, but cannot be fully exploited unless command is centralised at a high level. In this the Naval and Air Forces differ from the land Forces. The former two Services are concerned with maintaining the security of the sea and air communications within the theatre and with other theatres; on this subject they will receive orders direct from the U.K. and from FECOS. From the U.K. they will receive orders co-ordinating their activities with those of the Naval and Air Forces in other theatres, whilst within the Far East they will receive policy direction on local matters from FECOS. This necessitates the appointment of Theatre Naval and Air Cs-in-C for all Naval and Air Forces in the Far East, and these Theatre Cs-in-C will be under the direct control of FECOS and of the appropriate Service Commands in the U.K.

For purposes of overall co-ordination in fulfilling this task, all Naval and Air Forces in the Far East will be subject to the control of Theatre Cs-in-C, who must at the same time ensure that in controlling the activities of forces allocated to local Commanders, they do not affect adversely the operations controlled by the latter. It is a difficult situation, requiring tact and co-operation from all concerned. This system of command, whereby overriding co-ordination of the activities of naval and air forces is effected at the highest level, has the added advantage that it permits swift and effective action to be taken against the enemy naval and air forces, which, with their mobility, may well operate between two or more Commands.

Under the Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff, it is proposed that three inter-Service Commands be set up on the outbreak of war:—

Firstly, a South East Asia Command, comprising FRENCH INDO CHINA, BORNEO, CELEBES, JAVA, SUMATRA, MALAYA, BURMA and SIAM.

Secondly, an Australasian Command, comprising NEW GUINEA, SOLOMON ISLANDS, NEW ZEALAND and AUSTRALIA.

Thirdly, an India Command, comprising INDIA and CEYLON. The boundaries are shown on the attached map.

The extent to which the British Commanders will exert command over forces in non-British territories depends, of course, on agreement with the countries concerned, but British military interests in those countries will be the responsibility of the Supreme Commanders in whose areas they fall. As regards BURMA, it is a matter of doubt whether it should be in the South East Asia or India Commands. It is suggested that it would be best included in the South

East Asia Command, but that should the remainder of the South East Asia Command be over-run by the enemy, it should then revert to the India Command.

A Supreme Commander should be appointed to each of these Commands, responsible to the Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff. The primary concern of the Supreme Commanders will be the land battle, but the naval and air forces will play important parts in this battle, therefore the system of command must be fully integrated between the three Services at the highest level.

Each Supreme Commander should have a C-in-C for each of his three Services, although in certain circumstances it may be possible for the Supreme Commander to exercise direct command of the Land Forces. Supreme H.Q.s will be responsible for outline planning and inter-Service co-ordination, but they will not normally be required to act in an executive role, as this will be the responsibility of the H.Q.s of the Service Cs-in-C. Similarly, the Supreme Commander will receive advice on Service matters direct from his Commanders-in-Chief.

The H.Q.s of the Naval and Air Forces in each Command will be subordinate to their respective Theatre H.Q.s, especially in administrative matters, and they will not, therefore, have to be as large as the Land Force H.Q.s. The latter must be fully capable of acting as G.H.Q.s and must be in a position to carry out full operational and administrative control of all land forces in their Commands.

INTELLIGENCE.

The problems of Intelligence will require special treatment. Up to the present, the machinery for effective inter-Service Intelligence co-ordination at all levels has been subject to criticism. The Intelligence Services of the Navy, Army and Air Force should form one organisation, and be subject to central control. In the Far East, the head of the Intelligence Service should be a Director of Intelligence working under the Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff.

It would be the task of the Director of Intelligence to achieve full co-ordination between the civil and military intelligence organizations in the Far East; for co-ordination with other Theatres he would be subject to the control of a central intelligence organization in the U.K. Similarly, the Intelligence Services on the staffs of Supreme Commanders, Theatre Naval and Air Cs.-in-C, and subordinate commanders should be responsible to the Director of Intelligence for technical intelligence matters. It is only by the adoption of such a system that intelligence from all sources—civil, naval, army, air and para-military—can be fully and speedily collated, and made available to commanders at all levels.

ADMINISTRATION.

Under modern conditions, the term "war administration" embraces the whole administrative and productive effort of the nation. No longer is it merely a question of the efficient maintenance of the Armed Forces; on the contrary, the war machine is so complex and highly organised, that it is difficult to tell where the civilian administration ends and that of the Armed Forces begins. The intensity of modern war demands absolute efficiency, the maximum economy in the use of men and material, and the extraction of the greatest possible value from all resources expended.

The administrative machine in the Far East must, then, be designed to work smoothly, as part of the large British Commonwealth unit. The machine will, of course, be organised to cover both the civil and Service elements, and these elements will in their working be closely integrated. For the purpose of this paper, however, we are concerned only with the Service element, with which the following paragraphs deal in detail.

It is the task of the administrative machinery of the Armed Forces to ensure that the fighting troops are maintained in such condition, and provided with such resources, that they are capable of bringing about the overwhelming defeat of the enemy. Resources will almost invariably be limited, and it will be necessary to have centralised control in order to ensure that the maximum resources are concentrated in the vital areas when needed. This means close integration of the administrative organisation and resources of all three Services, and care will be necessary to prevent overlapping and duplication of effort.

It is assumed that the Governments of the U.K., AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND and INDIA have set up Ministries of Supply, responsible for collating the requirements of the three Services for war material of all natures, and for the co-ordination of production to meet these requirements. Departments with similar functions will have been set up in BURMA and the British Colonial territories, and the co-ordination of their production and assets will be the responsibility of Ministries in the U.K. Within the Far Eastern Theatre, the allocation of responsibility between the U.K., INDIAN, AUSTRALIAN or NEW ZEALAND Supply Ministries for the provision of Service needs for war material, is a matter for inter-governmental agreement, through the medium of the Joint Supply Council.

In LONDON, where the ultimate policy regarding the U.K. and Colonial Forces is decided, administrative co-ordination is achieved by the Principal Administrative Officers' Committee, composed of the heads of the Administrative Staffs of the Navy, Army and Air Forces, and their counterparts in the Civil Government Departments. AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND and INDIA will require similar organisations for the administrative co-ordination of their Armed Forces.

To advise FECOS on administrative and logistical matters a Joint Logistical Planning Committee should be formed, composed of the Chief Administrative Officers of the Base Organisation and of the Theatre Naval and Air Cs-in-C, the Chief Administrative Officers of the Supreme Commanders, and the Major Generals Administration of the Land Force Cs-in-C in the three Commands. The size of this Committee is admittedly undesirably large for day-to-day working, but it is difficult to see how it can be reduced in the absence of a unified Land Force Command; if the three M.Gs A are not included, there is danger of the Land Force aspect being inadequately considered. These Senior Officers will not, of course, be able to be present continuously at the seat of FECOS and it will therefore be necessary for them to be permanently represented there by Deputies.

It is proposed that an inter-Service Base Organisation be set up for the whole theatre. Its task will be to control all reinforcements of men and animals, and all hospitals, depots and installations within the two main bases of INDIA and AUSTRALIA. It will be responsible for the control of stocks and scales of reserves within the bases, and for taking provision action to meet the requirements of all three Services of men, animals and war material of all kinds.

It will also be necessary for it to maintain close liaison with the Joint Logistical Planning Committee of FECOS, in order that action can be taken to provide such special resources as long-term plans prepared by FECOS may require. This is particularly necessary, as the extent of such requirements is often such as to require special production, with an interval of 12-18 months between the dates of demand and delivery. At the head of the Base Organisation will be a Chief Administrative Officer, who will be responsible direct to the Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff.

Each Supreme Commander will require a Chief Administrative Officer, responsible for Inter-Service administrative co-ordination within the Command, but not for executive action, which will be carried out by the staffs of the Cs-in-C. CAOs at Supreme H.Q.s will normally effect co-ordination through Committees composed of the appropriate administrative staff officers of the three Services. They will only require small personal staffs (which must be composed of members of all Services) to enable them to carry out this function.

Under modern conditions, the achievement of maximum efficiency and economy demands that a large degree of uniformity and integration be attained between the three Services. It is considered that the Naval administrative machine must be modified considerably if it is to meet this requirement.

At present, for practical purposes, no true administrative staff exists in the Navy outside the Admiralty, although during the late war certain small administrative staffs were set up in certain areas. Furthermore, the provision of naval requirements of Victualling, Naval and Armament Stores throughout the world is still done by a civilian organisation, whose local officers are responsible to departmental heads in the U.K. Local Naval Commanders have practically no control over the Stores Officers in their areas, all orders being given direct from the U.K.

The result of this lack of co-ordination between Naval Commanders and their Provision Services is inefficiency and wasteful over-provision. The absence of any machinery for carrying out co-ordination between the operational staff and the three Stores Departments means that the latter are unable to carry out accurate long-term provision planning, and must instead keep permanently locked up large stocks of stores, to meet the sudden and unexpected demands which they so often receive.


The answer, it is suggested, is to set up a trained administrative staff of sufficient size to ensure that maximum efficiency is attained with a minimum expenditure of resources. The present Victualling, Naval and Armament Stores Departments must be put into uniform, and whilst owing allegiance on matters of technical policy to their Departmental heads as at present, they will for all other purposes be under the control of the local Naval Commander through his administrative staff.

Thus the task of the Theatre Naval C-in-C will be to take provision action to meet the needs of all the naval forces in the Far East, based on normal scales which will be laid down by Service Ministries. He will also be responsible for taking provision action for special requirements, not covered by approved scales.

The main Naval Base should be in CEYLON, with forward Naval Bases at SINGAPORE, and at SYDNEY or FREEMANTLE.

CHAIN OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

JLPC FECOS



It is considered that the present administrative organisation of the British Commonwealth Air Forces requires no major modification to make it suitable for use in the Far Eastern Theatre, and that it presents no particular features militating against inter-Service economy and integration. Overall control over administration and forward provisioning will be carried out at the H.Q. of the Theatre Air C-in-C, who will place demands on the Base Organisation.

Each of the H.Q.s of the three Land Force Cs-in-C will have to act as a G.H.Q. for the forces under its command, and will be responsible for placing on the Base Organisation its requirements of personnel, animals, vehicles, stores and supplies. No basic alteration is required to the present army administrative organisation. The main Bases will be in INDIA and AUSTRALIA, under the control of the Base Organisation, and an Advanced Base will be required in SINGAPORE.

The above proposals take no account of the possibility of inter-Service integration of certain administrative Services, which, though highly desirable, is considered to be beyond the scope of this paper.

ORGANISATION OF HEADQUARTERS.

The Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff will require a Secretariat which will include a Joint Planning Staff. This Secretariat will be fully integrated and composed of members of all Services. The Joint Planning Staff will be responsible for studying and reporting on matters passed to them by the Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff, for the preparation of subjects to be considered by the FECOS, and for the issue of instructions to implement the decision taken by FECOS. In particular, the Joint Planning Staff will be responsible for examining and advising the FECOS on all plans submitted to them by Supreme Commanders, or by Theatre Naval and Air Cs-in-C. for approval. This permanent Joint Planning Staff will include an administrative element, which will work under the Joint Logistical Planning Committee, and ensure that in the preparation of papers for the FECOS, administrative factors are given proper consideration.

Political factors will have an important bearing on the work of the FECOS, and arrangements will be necessary for them to receive the necessary guidance on these matters in their day-to-day work. The number of independent governments involved will probably prevent any one Political Adviser being acceptable, but it might be possible to arrange for the FECOS to receive political guidance on day-to-day matters from the Australian Government, who would be responsible for ensuring that it voiced the views of the member Governments as a whole. This arrangement would not, of course, prevent member Governments from issuing to their representatives on the FECOS, such political instructions as they considered desirable.

The functions of the Supreme Commanders will be to carry out forward planning and inter-Service co-ordination, rather than executive command. The size of these H.Q.s should therefore be small, and they must be composed of representatives of all Services, mixed at all levels. There is often a tendency for senior officers to prefer subordinates of their own Service, because they understand their methods of staff work, but this should be avoided at all costs, or the work of the departments concerned will cease to cover the needs of all Services. A symptom of this is the tendency to duplicate appointments in order to ensure inter-Service representation, a wasteful and unnecessary practice; it is a fact that in a H. Q. of this nature any educated officer with a fair share of common

sense can quickly pick up sufficient knowledge of the other Services (provided staffs are well mixed) to enable him to fill a junior staff appointment. Representatives of the Technical Services will not be required at Supreme H.Q. and the Supreme Commander will receive his advice on matters affecting the three Services from his respective Commander-in-Chief.

At Supreme H.Q.s Planning Staffs will be set up consisting of representatives of the three Services. These representatives will be individually responsible to their respective Cs-in-C, whilst being collectively responsible to the Supreme Commander. They will prepare outline plans for consideration by the Supreme Commander in consultation with his Cs-in-C. These plans, after being approved by FECOS, will be passed to the Force Commanders concerned for detailed plans to be prepared.

Finally, detailed plans will be subject to the approval of the Cs-in-C and of the Supreme Commander. Administrative planning will be co-ordinated by a member of the staff of the Supreme Commander, known as the Director of Administrative Plans. He will work under the Chief Administrative Officer, and will preside over an Administrative Planning Committee composed of representatives of the Administrative Planning Staff, of the three Cs-in-C. He will be responsible for ensuring that full consideration is paid to administrative factors in the work of the Planning Staff, and for the administrative portions of plans prepared by them.

The Chief Administrative Officer to each Supreme Commander will require a sufficient staff to brief him on inter-Service, political, and Civil Affairs Administrative questions, and to provide the Secretariat for the various Committees through which he will exercise his co-ordinating function.

Other subjects on which considerable inter-Service co-ordination is required, necessitating special staffs at Supreme Headquarters, are Civil Affairs (in occupied territories where civil government is not functioning, the Supreme Commander is Military Governor), Public Relations, Service Relations (responsible for Service Newspapers and publications, and for Radio Broadcasts for the Forces), Signals, Intelligence, Clandestine Forces, Airborne and Combined Operations, and Operational Research. It will be necessary also for Political and Financial Advisers to be appointed to the Supreme Commanders.

The Headquarters of the Theatre Naval and Air Cs-in-C, Service Cs-in-C in Commands, and subordinate Commanders, will follow the normal practice accepted at present, subject to the reorganisation of the Naval Administrative Staff and Services which is referred to above. The organisation of these H.Q.s is not, therefore, examined further.

MODIFICATIONS IN PEACE.

The organisation proposed above is based on the requirements in war—in peace, of course, such large staffs are not required, but sufficient skeleton staffs must be maintained to prepare strategic mobilisation plans.

The Far Eastern Chiefs of Staff will be required in peace, with a small planning staff, and it will be their task to prepare full mobilisation plans in order to permit quick and efficient expansion in war to the full organisation outlined above. They will, of course, delegate certain of these duties to the various H.Q.s commanding the peace-time forces stationed in the Theatre, and will review plans so prepared to ensure overall co-ordination.

Major projects, such as airfields, base installations, repair facilities, etc., must be constructed in peace in accordance with the plans approved by the

FECOS, and they must be manned in peace by skeleton staffs, to permit their smooth expansion on the outbreak of war.

The plans prepared by the FECOS will require, of course, to be approved by the various member Governments and by the British Commonwealth Chiefs of Staff. In their turn, the Governments concerned should ensure that their mobilisation plans are so framed that they meet the needs of the approved FECOS plans.


Apart from the staffs referred to above, and the H.Q.s of the peace-time garrisons in the Theatre, which will be earmarked for conversion to operational H.Q.s on the outbreak of war, the remainder of the organisation proposed in this paper should in peace exist on paper only, all steps being taken, however, to implement it the moment the Governments concerned consider it necessary.

CONCLUSION.

The organisation proposed in this paper may appear to be unwieldy, but if one considers the overlapping which is caused by the present separate organisations for each Service and country, it will be seen that the proposals permit a considerable saving of men and material. Under the conditions of the present day, wireless and air communications provide the Armed Forces with enormously increased mobility, and it is only by centralised control that this characteristic can be utilised. It is suggested that the scheme proposed gives flexibility, economy and the maximum efficiency.

This paper is based on the maintenance of air and sea superiority, permitting relatively small and well-trained forces to dominate a wide area, and to destroy any enemy forces entering the Theatre. In order to make this effective, an extensive airfield construction programme must be carried out in peace, thus permitting large air and land forces to be transferred, say from Australia to French Indo China, in literally a matter of a few hours. Given adequate airfield and maintenance facilities, whole Divisions can be (and have been) transferred by air from one area to another in a few days. The system of command, therefore, must be framed to make use of this factor at the critical moment in the battle, when a few hours delay may make all the difference between success and failure.

CHAIN OF COMMAND - INDIAN OCEAN



NOTE:—Chain of Command for SEA and India Commands is similar to that for Australian Command and has not, therefore, been shown.

THREE YEARS WITH THE CHIN LEVIES*

BY H. E. W. BRAUND, M. C.

I ARRIVED in Haka early in September 1943, just in time to help put down a quite unexpected liquor ration, the arrival of which, moreover, had coincided with Italy's eclipse. Early in October the Japs, who were being held in Tiddim, attacked the Haka and Falam Zones. In Haka they came up by a different track to that on which they had received such rough handling from Jamie's Levies, but as on that occasion, their tactics seemed to be to move forward without precautions until they bumped trouble.


Bump it they did, thanks to some brilliant disposing of his four Levy platoons (mostly Burma Rifles in this case) by Dick Rees on the basis of information he had received barely twenty-four hours previously. Rees himself caught the main body, about 400 strong including some 100 Burmese coolies, all heavily laden and flat out on the ground after a stiff climb. His ambush consisted of himself and fourteen men, the majority armed with automatic weapons (we had outgrown our flintlock apprenticeship by this time!), and they tore into the exhausted Japs with these and hand grenades from a range of forty yards. For long after Rees and his party had pulled out, the chaos caused was clearly audible, and the Japs were observed to spend the next five hours cremating their dead at the foot of the next slope.

The following day the Jap force reached the village of Hata (not to be confused with Haka itself), and here, thanks to thick jungle extending almost up to the walls of the houses, another ambush party was lying up in a position to cover the compound of the headman's house in the hopes that at least a patrol would visit it for information if nothing else. The gamble succeeded beyond expectations. The entire enemy force entered this very small village, and into a fenced-in compound packed with Japs the ambush party threw every grenade and fired every round of Tommy gun ammunition it was carrying before pulling out.

These were the two main actions of several that took place during those two days, and the Japs were later quoted as saying in Haka that the cost to them was 132 casualties. Levy casualties were one "A" Levy wounded. This man (he must only recently have exchanged his flintlock for rifle!) shot one of a party of three Japs he met on a jungle track, but was then himself shot through the shoulder while trying to discover how to get another round up the spout! His disgust at being thus let down was all he could talk about when I met him being carried into hospital.

This great performance won for Rees an immediate M.C., but it did not this time turn back the Japs, who were out on something bigger than a patrol in force, and the following day Rees had to pull back his Levies several miles nearer Haka to the next line of hills. Here, with three platoons of Levies under Ian Hillis doing equally good work some miles to his left, and a company of Gurkhas

* The first instalment of this article appeared in our October, 1946 issue.



from the Chin Hills Battalion under Frank O'Donel in support of both, the Japs were held and actively harassed for a further four weeks. That they had received a severe shock was evidenced by the fact that, after digging themselves in on the ridge they had so hardly won from Rees, they switched the direction of their advance away from Haka to Falam.

I had joined Hillis by this time and we were favourably placed to raid the Jap L of C as it lengthened out towards Falam. In due course we were reinforced by three platoons of Falam Zone Levies under Pat Rathbone who, after a brave attempt to hold the Japs, by this time using artillery, was ordered to cross the Pao River, which divided the Zones, and join his force to ours, leaving behind him a straight fight between the Japs and the Chin Hills Battalion, (now commanded by Lieut-Colonel W.R.V. Russell, M.C.) less its Gurkha company.

And now, since this account must tell the bad with the good, follows the period when for a time we were to a great extent "bust". Falam was evacuated on November 7, and the Japs occupied it next day. There had been no further move against Haka, but since the new situation left us with a Northern flank of greater potential danger than our Eastern front, "Cultivated" Oats, who at this time had his tactical H.Q. at Haka, moved some miles to the West and simultaneously ordered me to withdraw all my Levies to a much shorter line covering Haka from the North and East.

The Japs wasted no time, however, in pressing home their advantage, and by attacking and capturing Pioneer Camp (only one stage out of Haka on the Falam road) almost before it was manned, they compelled a further withdrawal on our part to the West of Haka. Now the Chin had not the mentality to appreciate the strategical considerations which dictated our hasty withdrawal from excellent positions covering his Mecca, positions which, as he was only able to see it, we had held with conspicuous success for the past month. The Levies covering Haka were themselves mostly Hakas and had their families in and around Haka; and the Chin's family ties are very strong. Suffice it to say that our voluntary but inevitable yielding of Haka to the enemy caused a landslide in our following, which left us West of Haka with little more than O'Donel's Gurkha company by way of fighting strength.

Lack of W/T communication and the breakdown of our runner system left us in ignorance of how James, Byrne and Cozens were faring away to the South, while Rees, due East of Haka, was missing, and Hillis had got through with only little to spare. He and I, perished with cold, spent the night of 10th/11th November sharing a single blanket on an exposed hilltop listening to the Jap mortars shelling a by now deserted Haka and, towards dawn, the maniacal shouts of the invaders as they entered the place. It was a sad moment.

At dawn the forward Gurkha picket effectively attacked a Jap force sent out to follow us up and, as rearguard commander, I started to withdraw Westwards along the Haka/Lungleh road. Luck was with us during that day, and twice the Japs came down with mortar fire on positions which, under a time programme, we had evacuated barely an hour previously. But that night we were badly caught, partly perhaps because of our exhausted condition, but undoubtedly also because of clever tactics on the part of some Jap officer or other.

I shall remember the occasion if only for the reason that I nearly qualified as an involuntary contributor to the vocabulary of famous last words. Lying awake and discussing the events of the day with O'Donel and Hillis I made the rash observation that of the many mortar bombs I had heard explode that day not one had been aimed at me. At 2 o'clock, under a risen moon, I was rudely awakened by a three-inch bomb bursting a few yards from where I was lying, and by the sight of tracer flowing through the camp. I moved very fast! The Gurkhas behaved splendidly, and had their own mortars in action in a very short space of time. Their steadiness saved a disaster, and we were able to pull out of a nasty jam with the loss of only four killed and a few wounded. We heard later that the attackers suffered to about the same extent.

Here ended temporarily our contact with the enemy and began a weary eight-days trek to Tuipang just across the Lushai border, where an air drop had been arranged for us. It was a sorry procession. The Gurkhas, through casualties and sickness, were reduced to barely two platoons, while of the officers Pat Rathbone with pneumonia and Bryan Smyth with phlebitis were being carried on stretchers. The only relieving gleam, but a most welcome one, was the arrival one evening of a very weary Dick Rees. Through the failure of runners to reach him he had fallen back on Haka in complete ignorance of the fact that it was already Jap-occupied. He was actually dropping down into Haka when he saw some Jap soldiers strolling across the parade ground. His reactions can fairly be guessed at, and after a wide detour across country he managed to catch up with us. Soon after we reached Tuipang Jamie and "Joe" Byrne also turned up.

Of David Cozens, in the extreme South, there was no news for some weeks. Finally two of his runners arrived with a report to say that as his Levies were still holding together and the Japs had not come that far South he proposed hanging on for as long as possible. In the end he never did come out, but managed to keep his sector together (despite two-and-a-half months without rations when he had to feed a force of over a hundred men off the country) until in January the rest of us started to edge forward again. We made cautious progress to start with, but the response of the Levies to the news that we were still in the offing was remarkable. Having moved their families to villages outside the area of Jap occupation they came singly or in small parties with their arms and equipment to wherever they could find an officer.

By mid-February were we operating with over ninety per cent of our original force, Cozens and James in their former areas, and Lees and Byrne within a day's march of Haka from the South-West and North-West respectively. Our account with the enemy was brilliantly re-opened by Cozens, who on the information from his agents that a Jap foraging patrol of only ten men had moved South out of Haka, caught and ambushed them after over forty miles of forced marching and killed them to a man. Their arms, equipment and identifications made an impressive pile, the arrival of which in Tiddim happily coincided with that of Lord Louis Mountbatten, who witnessed a demonstration under firing conditions of the mortar and machine gun included in the haul.

Our new lease of life, however, threatened to be short lived when, in face of the Jap offensive in March 1944, the 17th Division withdrew from Tiddim and the tide of battle flowed West as far as Imphal and the streets of Kohima. Coming at a time when we were struggling to re-establish our shaken reputation, the offensive lurked as a threatening question mark along our Northern flank and

to well in our rear. It was also a most unfortunate circumstance that a small band of wavering chiefs and others from the Haka area who had been taken to Tiddim on a sight-seeing tour designed to re-establish their confidence in the might of British arms, arrived back in the Haka area in time to hear that Tiddim had been yielded! Incidentally, the withdrawal from Tiddim nearly cost us our C.O. and Adjutant, for "Cultivated" and Gemmell, trudging West from Tiddim with the Levy records, ran into a strong outflanking force of Japs during the night, and it was only due to the surprise being mutual that they got away with it, each officer by a different route and each breathing a prayer for the repose of the supposedly departed other.

The rains of 1944 made us all very far from comfortable. Having lost on our eviction from Haka, all but what we stood up in, we were almost as badly off as in 1942, even allowing for the impersonal and (to one of my bulk) ill-fitting garments that were dropped to us by air. There are some personal comforts that no Quartermaster's store can adequately replace. My beautiful razor, for example, gave way to a bakelite affair that almost blew away in a strong wind. The technique of shaving with it became the reverse of normal, that is to say the razor had to be held in a rigid position and the face moved up and down in contact with the blade. Having outgrown the novelty of a beard by this time I had to steel myself to acceptance of this agony. But bless the chaps all the same who, rain or fine, dropped us as much as they did. We gave them the code name of "Manna" and in these doubtful days their propaganda value was greater than ever, for between the Japs in Haka uttering dire threats against village headmen if sufficient coolies were not produced to hump their rations up from the Gangaw valley, and ourselves being supplied by air at any point where we chose to ask for it, was a comparison for all to see.

Despite the rain and discomforts of life, these months did me this service, that no longer having a fixed H.Q. as I had had in Haka I became mobile to an extent not previously possible, and saw quite a bit of Chin life and custom in the course of my touring. *Zu* has already been mentioned. The part it plays in the life of the Chin is really astonishing. No wedding or funeral would be complete without it. No business can be transacted or dispute settled except around a pot of the stuff; while the shooting of a bear by a member of your household is the immediate signal for two or three pots to be broached. In fact any excuse for a party, and as the arrival of an officer in the village for the night was invariably such an excuse, one had to get used to marching in the morning with a hangover!

The *zu* is served in large earthenware jars resembling in shape those in which the forty thieves are pictorially depicted as meeting their end, and averaging about three feet in depth. The already fermented rice or millet is held down by a platform of banana leaves, so that when the water is added the grain does not float. A hollow bamboo "straw", through which everybody present has to suck in turn, is pushed down through the leaves and the grain to the bottom of the pot, and beside it a sliver of cane, the top of which is two or three inches below the water level. All is now set for you to be led to the pot to drink your way down until the cane breaks surface; and then, because as an Officer you must show your calibre, to have the pot refilled and repeat the performance.

The setting for this bibulous scene is a low beamed, smoke-filled Chin house lit only by the flare of burning pine chips. Round the drinker a circle of as many

men and women as the place will hold, all talking hard and expectorating through holes in the floor: an outer circle of children, dogs and chickens all giving tongue in their fashion, and paddling around under the house two or three grunting pigs to provide the base note. If the occasion is a "proper do" dancing will be a feature of the evening—as big a circle as possible of alternate lads and lasses, holding hands and shuffling their way round to the beat of a drum and the strains of a monotonous chant. Rate of progress I found to be just slow enough to ensure that by the time I had worked my way round as far as the main beam supporting the roof I had forgotten the crack on the head it gave me on the previous circuit and so got another one.

The routine of *zu* drinking becomes endowed with a refreshing variant when the "belles" are present, as you are then led to the pot with one of them as a partner and, with your arm around her, suck your way down to the cane alternately before leading her back into the dancing circle. Should the Officer pass out during the course of the evening the success of the party is thereby assured, and he is made as comfortable as possible for the night on a bearskin and under a Chin blanket.

October brought not merely the end of the rains but also the Fourteenth Army's counter-offensive as an established fact. I was on my way back from my second spell of leave at the time, travelling overland from Chittagong through the Lushai Hills: and so fast were events moving that Levy H.Q. was rivalling my rate of progress two marches ahead of me, and were already ensconced in Falam when I finally caught up. Haka had fallen to my chaps at about the same time, so I made my personal re-entry comfortably and by way of the main road from Falam.

With the re-occupation of Haka and Falam a chapter was ended, but to set the seal on the ejection of the Japs from the Chin Hills, the Haka Levies were given the promising task of harassing them in the Gangaw valley well ahead of the Fourteenth Army column advancing South from re-captured Kalemyo, while the Falams had an equally spectacular role in their task of being the first to reach the Chindwin South of Kalewa. We, the Hakas, organised ourselves into three columns of about two hundred men each. These were commanded by Cozens, Rees and George Wilson who, since he has not yet been mentioned, is introduced as an ex-regular Officer, a comparative newcomer to the Levies, but for me an old friend of the Mergui mining area in pre-war days. My H.Q. continued to be as mobile as possible so that I was free to attach myself to any particular column at will.

My first task, since beyond about seventy pack ponies we had no transport, was to acquire some. In peace time the Gangaw valley was a stronghold of the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation, the biggest extractors of teak in Burma, and knowing that their elephants would be scattered throughout the area and probably still in charge of their *oozies* (the Burmese "mahouts"), I set about collecting them. Considering that almost the whole of this area was still occupied by the Japs, who were themselves making considerable use of elephant transport, the fact that during the weeks that followed we got together a herd of over forty complete with staff and carrying gear represented no small achievement and no mean solution to our transport problems.

The first three of these elephants were actually taken off the Japs in an ambush, and with this as a start, the others began coming in. In several cases

oozies, carrying on under pressure for the Japs, gave them the slip by night and came over to us with their elephants. We enlisted them as "A" Levies and they received the same pay and rations as the Chins. They were a grand crowd of chaps and served us most faithfully during the three months they were with us.

The nature of the country and the general conditions under which we now had to operate were very different from those of the Hills. In the flat "Indaing" jungle of the valley I soon found to my surprise that the Chin's sense of direction which had guided us in the Hills was not an instinctive bump of locality, but merely a matter of visual recognition of familiar landmarks viewed from high ground. In the valley where, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages, there was little such visibility, Levy patrols began losing themselves in a most disconcerting manner, and to a great extent we were forced to abandon our policy of small and numerous patrols in favour of patrols in strength under an Officer with a compass.

Nevertheless, some of these were conspicuously successful, notably a raid by George Wilson with a force of a hundred men on a Japanese supply dump some twelve miles in rear of their positions at Gangaw, which at this time they were strenuously defending. Wilson got his large force across the Myittha River and through the jungle to the dump, which was a large one comprising bags of rice, crates of biscuits and tinned fish, ordnance stores of all kinds and a godown full of nothing but ammunition of every calibre the Japs were using on this front. A platoon of Japs guarding the dump was driven off with the loss of four killed and at least two wounded, and by the time they ineffectually counter-attacked every building was blazing. Wilson got his force back intact, he himself resembling a Christmas tree, with samples of just about everything the dump had contained slung about his person, in addition to the identifications from the dead Japs.

Over fifty miles further South Cozens was also achieving results. The small town of Tilin was evacuated by a garrison of about five hundred Japs on Christmas Eve after they had burnt large dumps of their stores. Cozens got into the place before dawn on Christmas morning in time to catch a small rear party of Japs in the Post and Telegraph Office. He surprised and drove them out, and the identifications he recovered from two dead were, we learnt later, of the greatest value. Cozens withdrew his force from Tilin after the action, and the town was then re-occupied by a company of about two hundred Japs until it was captured by Fourteenth Army at the end of January.

At about same time, Rees, in the Minywa area midway between Cozens and Wilson, had the unpleasant experience of being attacked while a plane was actually dropping supplies to him. The crew apparently did not see the bursts of the mortar bombs, so that until the sortie was complete and the rations dragged away to safety Rees had to continue the action in conditions unfavourable to himself. Fortunately the attacking force was not a large one, and Rees got away with it for the loss of only one Levy killed.

A few days later I became involved with him at Thanbaya in the biggest single action ever fought by the Levies. We were attacked by moonlight just after 2 o'clock by a force of about a hundred Japs from Tilin. Once they had established contact they deployed with incredible speed and, probably to impress us with the fact of encirclement, sent up a tremendous number of red Verey lights from all round our perimeter. They made several attempts to get inside our position, relying as much as anything on demoniac shouting to rattle the Levies;

but the Levies behaved splendidly and were busy answering the shouting in kind. It is as well to point out, since the Japs were armed with bayonets, that a straight fight of this nature was so far outside the traditional Levy role of hit and run that at no time in our history had we either bayonets or entrenching tools. The sight of cold steel is not pleasant even when you are in a position to return the compliment, while had we been a regular unit every man would have been fighting from a dug position instead of from behind natural cover only.

The battle lasted for two hours, during which time fire from both sides was continuous and heavy, and I had a small piece shot out of my hat! When the Japs finally gave us best and beat it they did so in ignorance of the fact that I had issued our last round of reserve .303 and that our three-inch mortar had fired its last bomb! As can be imagined, I was sweating with indecision under this handicap, and my relief when the Japs cleared off was something I cannot describe. They left two dead behind them, including an officer, and we learnt that of six wounded men they managed to get away, one was the commander of the Tilin garrison in a mortally wounded condition. Our casualties were one killed and four slightly wounded from grenade fragments. Next night we lay doggo in hiding—still without ammunition and in some trepidation; but the following day "Manna" turned up in response to our SOS and dropped us everything we had asked for. I'd like to meet that pilot and stand him a big drink.

Now, since foot-slogging Levies cannot for long keep ahead of an Army Corps moving in motor transport, we near the end of the tale. The leading Brigade of East Africans caught us up near Tilin towards the end of January. It was an entertaining meeting, since very few of the "A" Levies had ever seen as much as a bicycle. They were now treated to the spectacle of lorries, carriers, artillery, etc., rolling southwards down the same road that three years previously had witnessed the tragic scene with which this story opened.

Till mid-February we continued to patrol a large area of country South of Tilin so that 4th Corps could go through and Eastwards to Pakokku without themselves having to detach a force for this purpose. When the dust behind their last vehicle had settled our job was done, and the enthusiasm with which the Levies, after almost three years of continuous service in the field, set out on the long march back to Haka needs no description.

Before leaving the valley, however, there is one subject that, in justice, calls for comment. To what I have always considered a most discreditable extent, our historians of the Burma campaign of 1942 placed a major share of our failure on the shoulders of the "traitorous" Burmese. That there were such traitors no one who knows Burma will attempt to deny: but then the "fifth column" was not coined in Burma; it has been an universal phenomenon wherever the scourge of the late war was laid. In Burma, as elsewhere, it was an unfortunate fact that the traitor's power for evil was out of all proportion to his numbers, but that the incidence of traitors in Burma was greater than, say, in Holland or Norway, to name two Allies who have earned our respect, is, I consider, a ridiculous assertion, particularly since it comes so often from those who do not know the country nor had any part in the campaign.

Even though the Gangaw Valley is traditionally one of the most peaceful areas of Burma, the fact that, with the exception of one established and one possible instance of treachery, I met with nothing but friendliness and co-operation (despite that in many cases, notably those of the elephant men, guides and agents, such co-operation was attended by no little personal danger) goes far to prove the argument.

A further point to be stressed if this account is to be appreciated in its true perspective is that the humdrum in everyday life gains nothing in interest

by being translated on to paper. If these pages read like a racy account of life at high pressure, it is only because the long periods of inactivity, the innumerable negative patrols and ambushes and the tedium of administration are there, but with so little story value as necessarily to be assumed by the reader to lie between the lines.

It has been, furthermore, a strictly personal account, and in no sense a complete history. Levy Officers, whose trails never crossed with mine, could doubtless write just as interesting an account without featuring any of the incidents that I have related. The frequent charge of exaggeration or "line shooting" is best countered by the record of honours won by the Levies to date. They include 1 D.S.O., 1 O.B.E., 2 M.B.E's., 8 M.C's., 5 B.G.M's. (that I can recall) and a number of "mentions".

As to what was achieved in concrete results, I have had too incomplete a contact with the Tiddim and Falam Zones to give more than the figures for Haka, which are that for a total of probably more than 400 casualties inflicted on the enemy we lost 8 men killed in action or died of wounds, 8 more by drowning, accident or illness, while of 7 wounded in action only 2 are incapacitated for further service. These scarcely credible figures speak volumes for the policy of fighting always, as far as possible, in conditions of our own choosing, and even then by the inglorious tactics of hit and run. That these are the right tactics for Levy warfare is indisputable when, with every member of your force a local, the effect on morale of heavy casualties would be disastrous.

What we achieved as a screen of intelligence covering for nearly three years a large extent of the land frontier between India and enemy-occupied Burma only G.H.Q. are in a position fairly to assess. The respect in which we were held by the enemy came most interestingly to light in an Intelligence file found in the Japanese civil office in Tilin after our occupation of the town. The reports from enemy agents which it contained gave us credit for performances and force of numbers that would have cheered us up no end had we known of them twelve months earlier, and they well-illustrated the value of mentally putting yourself in your enemy's shoes and trying to sense his difficulties instead of too readily assuming that the only difficulties are your own.

At a time when the Press is busy extolling the partisan movements coming to light in countries attaining liberation from their oppressors, there seems to be a tendency to exclude such classic examples as lie within the borders of our own Empire. Among these the record of the Chin Levies may well provide as fine a story as any. Through the greater part of their campaign they (speaking particularly of the Hakas and Falams) had no regular backing other than their own Chin Hills Battalion. Despite the accent on "we" which underlies this account, the fact remains that Levy Officers were so few in number as utterly to have been unable to counter a general throwing-in of hands at any of the two or three periods of crisis when this was possible. To a great extent we were present as advisers and co-ordinators of effort, and as liaison and administrative agents (or, as one Officer put it, to see that when a week's rations were dropped to the Levies they did not eat everything on the first day!).

Many ventures led by Officers had actually been proposed and planned by the Levy leaders themselves and, while privately reserving the right to veto any scheme that appeared to be too wild and woolly, we pushed for all it was worth the atmosphere of War for the Chins by the Chins themselves. It was not an easy role to learn and we had our share of failures; but that the end justified the means is a claim that none of us feels need come from himself.

"RETRIEVING" IS OUR BUSINESS!

BY MAJOR H. G. MILCHEM.

THE LATE war taught us all many lessons, but one of the most important was that very little in this world is useless. Proof of this is shown by the fact that salvaged material has been sold for more than one crore of rupees each month for the past six months. That figure reveals not only the vastness of the salvage machine in India, but also the immense success of organised salvage collections in this country.

A Salvage Depot is not a dumping ground for unwanted rubbish. Come with me to a Depot and let us see how it is organised. At the gate we shall be asked who we are, and why we have come, our answers being recorded in the gatekeeper's book. Civilians are not allowed to enter without the Manager's permission. On auction days, however, each visitor is issued with an armband, all of them being checked on entry and departure. Stores drawn by units or individuals are recorded on vouchers and checked at the gate before the person is allowed to leave with them. Articles are chiefly recorded by weight, but vehicles and large containers are usually identified by numbers. Auditors are just as fussy with "salvage" accounts as in other departments!

We will follow a load of salvage as it arrives at the Depot. It arrives in a lorry—a mixed load of what may appear to be junk. The load is deposited in the receiving section, where it is all sorted, and the dump of each type is sent to the particular Group handling that material; there it is further sorted down. Here in Karachi we have four chief Groups: Ferrous, Non-Ferrous, Miscellaneous, and Packing Material.

To digress for a moment. It was difficult at first to train the men doing this sorting work. They are ordinary coolies, to whom "Ferrous" and "Non-Ferrous" conveyed nothing. We supplied them with magnets, showed them how to apply them to the articles under test, and very quickly they understood the difference between ferrous and non-ferrous. With the use of an ordinary file, other cooly sorters were shown how to sort brass and copper. Thus we are able accumulate our material into orderly heaps, enabling units to search for what they want with little trouble.

To draw any article from Salvage you have to show in the indent the purpose for which it is being drawn. That is done for two reasons: first, it acts as a deterrent to units drawing salvaged articles and using them in place of good ones, which a subordinate may dispose of illegally; and secondly, it keeps the Unit officer informed of the use to which the salvage material is being put. Depot Managers assist Units by suggesting possible substitutes for articles they need, should the required article not be in the depot.

Some things were re-conditioned or re-fabricated—the former by robbing good parts from a damaged machine and putting them in another to bring it into working condition; while re-fabrication led to the opening of small workshops in the Depots, some of the methods invented and adopted in those workshops, though they were of a Heath Robinson type, being of immense use and saving much in labour costs.

We also have an M.T. Breakdown Depot, where motor vehicles are broken down, the parts therefrom being available to units needing them. This particular section expanded greatly, since thousands of parts had to be recorded and issued. Our present policy, however, is not to break down vehicles but to sell them to the public in the open market. Such sales are controlled by the Directorate of Disposals, and are carried out either by public auction or by private treaties. The goods so auctioned are sold on the site, and after the purchaser has paid the money into the Government Treasury, the Depot hands over the materials.

But perhaps the most interesting part of Salvage work lies in the way we have been able to improvise. For instance, on one occasion several thousand pigs were due to arrive in India, and arrangements had to be made for their transportation to various stations. Jute netting we had salvaged came in useful here for keeping the pigs in the lorries. Feeding troughs had to be provided for them on the railway; this we did by cutting in half, longitudinally, large useless aeroplane tyres and twenty-gallon oil drums, fixing legs below them to keep them steady. Both expedients were successful.

Rail travel in the Sind Desert in the hot weather is pretty grim, and something had to be devised to lessen its discomforts. The railway authorities had no more ice containers for the carriages, and the Army authorities were quoted Rs. 39,000 by contractors to supply a thousand containers. Salvage then came into the picture. We in the Karachi Depot improvised the containers from 40/45 gallon oil drums, and before summer came we managed to supply three thousand—not at the quoted price of Rs.40 per container, but at Rs. 2. That alone saved the Government Rs.1,11,000!

Fuel, as everyone knows, was very short in India during the war, and it was decided to make sawdust cookers and improvise the Delhi cookers. The saw dust cooker was generally the size of an ordinary sigree, so empty paint drums were the answer. We made several sawdust cookers and 500 Delhi cookers. Each Delhi cooker could cater for 150 men, so that a camp of 75,000 men was adequately provided with cooking arrangements at very small cost.

The Butchery at Karachi was used for slaughtering cattle on separate days of the week by American and Indian troops. One day it was seen that the American had more up-to-date equipment in the way of head stands, "Vessa" trays, etc., for the examination of the internal organs of cattle. The Veterinary Department asked us if we could make them, and as a result we were able to produce quite a satisfactory number.

On the Medical side we were able to help considerably. Doctors gave us designs, and from them we produced special Bradford frames, made of light material we had salvaged, for the use of bed-ridden T.B. cases. Trolleys for use in operation theatres were made of angle iron, and the wheels from Bren gun carriers; these were much stronger than the trolleys previously used. Anaesthetics were in short supply, and we were told that the anaesthetic administered to a patient could be conserved by retrieving it from the gases breathed out by the patient, passing them through a solution which separated them. After-effects of re-used gas would not cause vomiting, we were told, and the danger of burst stitches would be minimised. We found a "Y" shaped light metal tube, and on each leg of the "Y" we fixed a length of rubber tubing, in which non-return valves were placed which permitted the inhaled and exhaled gases to follow different routes. That solved one problem for the doctors and saved much valuable anaesthetic.

Thousands of mules were arriving from abroad, and the Army Remount Department had Rs. 30,000 allotted for the preparation of temporary paddocks. Remount officers visited the Salvage Depot and found all their needs; in addition we were able to build them hundreds of movable troughs, which were ready for the mules when they arrived.

Many unusual instances of improvisation could be quoted. On one occasion we constructed a movable boxing ring, which was made from frames of aero engines and the flats of lorries; we also built a stage in a local hospital for the entertainment of wounded Indian soldiers. When a tidal wave caused such havoc near Karachi last hot weather, we received an urgent SOS., and within eight hours we sent to a waiting rescue ship sufficient tentage, old clothing and blankets to satisfy the needs of over 9,000 people.

Ice boxes were made by utilising the planking from dismantled lorries; for the insulation part of the boxes we used sawdust or cork; and the boxes were completed by lining them with old ghee tins. For the superstructure of lorries we arranged interlaced hoop iron and fitted a door—the result being a movable fowl pen; if shelter from the sun was required we laced on some old tentage or tarpaulins. A small pressing machine was improvised from bits of old steel sheets and an endless screw found in the salvage; this machine, by the way, was drawn by the medical authorities for compressing bandages, cotton wool, etc. into small parcels for despatch by air.

Iron seats of old lorries were re-modelled by the addition of angle iron legs, and converted into garden seats, while seats from aircraft, with slight modifications, made excellent revolving desk chairs.

To help the "Grow More Food" campaign we adapted old oil paint drums and made them into water cans; hoses, khurpies and rakes were designed and prepared from scrap material; picks and shovels were found in abundance in salvage and only needed handles in most cases. We also made egg boxes, with partitions for each egg, to hold 72 dozen eggs each.

Canteen trollies for the use of troops in transit on the railways were manufactured entirely from salvage and equipped for both hot and cold food, and for drinks, aluminium sheets from aeroplanes came in very useful for these trollies. The breakdown of aircraft called for a specially durable type of axe, and as none were available the ends of main springs of heavy motor vehicles were cut off six inches from the eye of the springs, and forged to make a suitable axe; the eye served for the insertion of handles; wooden handles proved a failure, so iron piping was utilised with great success.

Our staff is well cared for. Though Salvage Depots are under Army control, they are managed and staffed by civilians, whose welfare is borne well in mind; ration cards are made out for them; housing is arranged. Our Depot at Karachi has also instituted a Thrift Scheme for its staff, the members of which are encouraged to open Savings Bank accounts and deposit small monthly amounts. The Savings Book remains in the custody of the Manager and depositors are not allowed to draw their savings without the Manager's permission, which is granted only in exceptional circumstances. On discharge the Savings Book is handed over to the depositor.

We are also doing our bit in pre-release training of sepoys, and two-month courses have been organised for driver mechanics, carpenters, blacksmiths, painters and tinsmiths. Driver mechanics are trained to drive, dismantle, refit and carry out running repairs. Those wishing to become car-

penters are taught the names and correct use of tools, how to tongue and groove and make simple (and later, more difficult) articles. Blacksmiths are trained in the use of tools, of fires, tempering and sharpening of tools, making punches and chisels, rings and chains, tongs and hot sets, welding and weld scarves, bolts and nuts.

Those wishing to become painters are taught how to prepare paint, mix and match colours, make putty, the use of blow lamps, preparation of surface for paints and varnishes, cutting stencils, glass, etc. Literate sepoys are taught sign painting. Tinsmiths learn soft soldering and brazing, making funnels and boxes, repairing utensils, rebottoming pails, etc. Lectures are taboo; practical training is what the men want and what they get.

How are we organised? At present we are a Branch under the Master-General of Ordnance, and are controlled by the Controller of Salvage, who is assisted by Deputy and Assistant Controllers. To keep everyone in the organisation fully informed on salvage matters, the Controller circulates useful Intelligence Summaries, based on reports sent in by the Depots. We are thus able to learn what other Depots are doing, what methods of improvisation have proved effective and successful, how articles can be re-used, and how re-fabrication can be undertaken. Details of prices realised at sales are also given, and useful statistics compiled and circulated.

What, then, is the most important lesson to be learned from all this effort? Surely it is that the Salvage Branch has proved its value? It is no small Branch, but has developed into one that is of such importance that it should remain so even in peacetime. The organisation, I suggest, should not be allowed to wither away. Let there be in peace, as in war, a chain of Salvage Depots throughout India to which units of all Defence Services and Civil Departments shall be able to send their "salvage" material. Properly organised as it is, it can and will save the Government crores of rupees annually.

OH! TO BE IN POONA

(Part II. Eire.)

By "MOUSE".

HOUSE No. 1.

"THERE are two things that grieve my heart ; a man of war that suffereth poverty ; and men of understanding that are not set by." There is no valid reason for starting this article with a quotation from the 26th Chapter of Ecclesiasticus, which I found framed as an illuminated text alongside a stuffed trout from Lough Mask in the hallway of a retired General (late Royal Garhwal Rifles) in County Dublin, Eire.

They are, however, fine words of consolation when one is travelling the land looking for an abode, and the trout was an inspiration, weighing 9½ lbs, the like of which is seen only in dreams or Connaught. I have been fishing in the deceitful troubled waters of the Irish property market. Every Saturday that fine paper, *The Irish Times*, publishes two or three full pages of advertisements of houses, castles, farms and suburban villas for sale throughout the length and breadth of Ireland. The agents are much quicker than the India Office in answering letters, and within a few weeks I had collected a file one foot thick describing properties that would make your mouth water.

Unfortunately only about 2% could command the financial attention of "Mauser's" average retired officer. The rest are too expensive or attached to too much land. In Eire, as in England, the Ministry of Agriculture issues its orders regarding the amount of tillage required in each holding, the Forestry Commission decide the trees to be cut and replanted, and turbary rights are a Government monopoly. I didn't know either that turbary rights meant turf (peat) cutting, so there is no need to feel embarrassed.

A wise friend in England said : "The first thing you should look at in a house is the roof ; if it is crooked or sagging, beware." Another friend in Ireland wrote : "Don't buy a house in Ireland unless your turf requirements are assured and insist on having electric light." I did not realize how important this advice was until later, so a brief note on the fuel position in Eire is necessary.

Petrol : a basic ration, (slightly less than the British allowance, and strictly controlled). Electricity and gas are available in cities and towns, but the ruralization of the Shannon scheme is just emerging from its planning stage, with the result that in many country districts householders have to use turf for heating and cooking and paraffin for lighting. Turf, even at a controlled price of £2-4-5 per ton, is a bulky and uneconomical fuel, but coal is and will be for many years unobtainable. Paraffin oil for lighting is rationed at two gallons per month per house. One had forgotten that so many houses in the country depend on this poor and troublesome method. It will be understood therefore that the Irish fuel position is a major disadvantage in setting up a house in Ireland.

The first house I examined came to my notice from an obscure advertisement of a "Gentleman's Residence" for sale in the west country. It was in a remote district, difficult to get at ; it had 98 acres of "well-watered and well-

fenced arable land"; it had one mile of salmon river flowing through it; the house stood on a "pleasing eminence" and was soundly constructed of free stone. I wrote to a friend in the neighbourhood who, after a quick inspection of the premises, remarked that there was enough good timber on the estate to sell at a handsome profit.

Naturally enough I immediately began to build castles in Eire. I read books on farming, cattle-fattening, salmon fishing and forestry. My wife and I went west. The concluding stage of the journey was in an Emmet Express complete with a bell-bottomed boiler-dome, and one passenger who stopped the train at her cottage door by waving her shopping bag in the driver's face. We dared not comment or laugh as these parts are inhabited by a proud people who take their trains seriously annually.

We reached our hotel at tea-time, our fast having been broken eleven hours previously. When we explained this famished condition to the waitress she exclaimed: "Glory be to God, your stomachs must be rattling!" In a few minutes she produced two plates completely obliterated by several eggs and enormous rashers of bacon. With a certain feeling of guiltiness I consumed an amount exceeding the ration of an English family for a fortnight.

Fourteen miles of unfrequented road separated us from our objective. There were big races in the vicinity (*i.e.* ninety miles away), with the result that it was with great difficulty we procured a car for the next day at a fantastic rate. (Note: I found all taxi charges in Eire exorbitant.) Taking a picnic lunch we set off next morning. Our driver put me at my ease by telling me I was the dead spit of a Colonel Murphy who commanded the Connaught Rangers before the first war, and thereafter told us the history of the neighbourhood with many amazing embellishments. Passing the ruins of an antique castle on the shore of a lovely lough he waved his hand at it:

"That's the very spot where all the trouble between England and Ireland started a thousand years ago," he said. We sat agape. "Ay," he said, reflectively and sorrowfully, "There was an ould King McDermott there whose wife was abducted by a Maguire. The ould king was so mad at the pair of them that he sint over a message to the King of England to help him get his wife back. The same boyo in England had been waiting a long time to get an excuse to set his ugly fut in Ireland and he lepped over the water like a greyhound and has been here ever since."

The property we inspected was an old Rectory, many of which are coming on the market owing to the decrease of Church of Ireland parishioners. A cultured, wealthy Victorian Dean had made it a Gentleman's Residence, planted groves of fine elms and beeches, endowed it with nearly one hundred acres, including the mile of salmon fishing at the foot of the garden, extended its bedroom accommodation over the stable yard, and built walls to include a large garden and orchard. The avenue from the main road was one mile long. After this opulent cleric had been translated the house had been occupied by a succession of country parsons on small, inadequate stipends. The house had fallen into a sad state of disrepair and the land, never good, had been impoverished by neglect.

The auctioneer who showed me over did not try to hide its defects or gloss over its many imperfections. He told me a local timber merchant was also eager to buy. He would demolish the house and cannabalize its saleable material, use the rubble to reinforce the avenue for his lorries and tractors, extract the good timber, and resell the land. I was put in touch with the timber-wala,

who made no bones about the commercial aspect. He said that if I bought the place we could come to a Three-Power Agreement, the Forestry Commission, himself and I, to draw up a protocol on the trees to be cut. These negotiations would take at least six months to conclude and the extraction of the timber would take about two years.

The proposition had its attractions, mainly financial. I sought the advice of a bank manager who reduced the sum to a simple equation: £1500 (cost)+£1000 (repairs)—£800 (timber) equals £1700. He went further and discovered from the local more prosperous farmers that the land was in a chronic state of ill-health and was not worth the cost of the title-deeds. Being Church property, or for some other reason, the land had never come under the compulsory tillage scheme and would cost a small fortune to rehabilitate.

I then discussed and examined the poor acres with the sexton who managed the "letting" of the land for the parson. He said the land was prime for fattening bullocks but for nothing else. He showed me his own six bullocks who looked remarkably undernourished, and swore with many a fragrant oath that, given £50 capital above the purchase price, he would be a millionaire in a few years. I spent that evening writing out the pros and cons of buying in the form of a Military Appreciation (which is a wonderful formula for clearing one's mind.) The Plan evolved was simple and disappointing: Don't.

* * * *

CONVERSATION PIECES

On the famous seven-arched bridge over the Blackwater in Fermoy, Co. Cork, I was watching a heron stepping delicately from stone to stone on the weir. "Like everybody else in this country"—a voice interrupted my thoughts—"that bird is looking for something for nothing." A gentleman whom I had noticed having lunch near my table in the hotel propped his elbows beside mine. I had decided from the good cut and texture of his suit, his silk tie fastened by a slim chain, (rather like the watch-guard affected by the Guards and other distinguished officers), and a packet of Camel cigarettes escaping from his handkerchief pocket, that he was an American tourist. His accent was however pure Cork. "I'm fed up with this b. country," he said sadly, "Worse than Siam."

"Do you know Siam?"

"Niver set foot in it, nor any other heathen country either except America, thank God," he replied piously and offered me a Camel. I wondered if he were in deep trouble or just alcohol, or perhaps both.

"This b. country got its b. independence twenty-five b. years ago," he declared with all the atmospheric conditions of an Australian. "Look at them buildings over there!" he waved his hand at the gaunt ruins of the old British barracks on the hill behind the Parish Church. "The country is crying aloud for places to house the poor and they allow all that cut stone and bricks to go to ruin." I hemmed politely. "No, Captain,"—he was indignant—"you're wrong. Them barracks was burnt down by the Irish *after the Troubles* when they were fighting among themselves for independence. They're all children, and I bet Siam is a better run country." He sighed.

"I landed at Cove from an American ship a coupla weeks ago to see the old country after thirty years. And it's disgusted I am. The thieves. Did you see Rockefeller, worth two millions, refused to pay six shillings they asked

for a linen handkerchief the other day at the aerodrome? Look at the lavatories and toilet rooms, a disgrace to any civilised country. Huh! Civilised!" He spat at the innocent heron.

Gradually his real grievance emerged from a torrent of anti-Irish bitterness. He could discover no exporting firm which would handle the return to the U.S.A. of a radio set which he had brought as a present to relations in Eire. The machine, although a large set with eight "toobs", had failed to elicit even a squeak from the B.B.C. "Independence," he concluded, "has gone to their heads that they are so independent that they don't know what service means. The British, bad as they are, are gentlemen. I'm going over there as quick as I can get out of this b. country."

My own experience has been kinder. During many interviews with plumbers, builders, architects and farmers on questions which were necessarily vague and tentative I found advice, help and suggestions given generously.

On another occasion we stopped to look at the ruins of a castle which we judged to be pre-Elizabethan. Built on a rock foundation most of its interior had been quarried, leaving the gigantic walls precariously balanced around the edges. A farmer approached and told us it was his land. My wife asked him how old the castle was. He gazed up to the heights of a toppling chimney, spat quietly to ensure attention or perhaps to focus reflection and said: "It's bloody old, milady." The expression was not ugly, being only historical emphasis.

"The old Irish kings?" I suggested.

He repudiated the idea with disgust. "It was Cromwell's boyos," he said. "Only the English could build like that and the baron had to keep five hundred horsemen inside them walls to keep the peace from here to Youghal. It is a pity you English ever left; the country has never been the same since. Would yez both do me the honour of stepping down to my house for a cup of tea? I'm sorry, ma'am, I've got no drink in the house for the Major, but I'll have it the next time you are passing."

Ireland remains, thank goodness, the land of good horses and horse lovers. I spent a morning strolling round an old-fashioned horse fair, the streets of the small town crowded with farmers, jobbers, horses, ponies, jennets and mules. If I stopped to look at a horse most of the population appeared to collect to give me advice on the superlative qualities of the animal. I was looking at a child's pony when a perfect stranger plucked my sleeve and whispered pure Guinness into my ear: "If it's a fine leppin hunter you want, General, come round to Cassidy's yard and I'll whip her out of the trap." The characters of Somerville and Ross are as alive and vocal today as they were at the turn of the century.

Witness. I was having a bottle of stout one evening in the hotel bar with the local bank manager. He introduced me to a morose individual who sat slouched on a stool, cap pulled down over a weather-beaten face, dressed poorly but wearing silk socks and good shoes on very small feet. "Cavalry officer?" he asked without offence. "No. Infantry." He viewed me with compassion. "The best riders in the world," he said loudly, "were the British cavalry." "What about the R.F.A.?" piped up somebody else and immediately provoked a hot argument on the respective merits of the late British cavalry and horse gunners. When this subsided my morose friend insisted on standing me a drink. "Like to buy a Grand National winner?" he asked casually. I did not show surprise as Lovely Cottage, this year's winner, had been born, bred and backed by the thousand in the immediate neighbourhood.

He told me he was first whip to the local hounds and we fell to talking hunting shop. I told him of hunting in India, hounds being put into covert at first light and scent failing with the rising sun. "All over, bedad, before we are out of bed," was his only comment. I ordered a round of drinks. He insisted on paying again, and the barmaid refused my money. "Do you want to buy a horse?" he asked. I said I was looking for a house, and that as far as I could see one stood as great a chance of being diddled as in buying a horse. He burst into laughter. "Bedad, that's as good as a play," he exclaimed at my very moderate comment.

He then wrote his name and address in my note-book. "If you ever want to buy a horse or see one write to me. I'll give you and your wife free hunting for a week. I'll take you to the Tallow Horse Fair and show you the best horses in Ireland, not like the rubbish they take to the Dublin show."

I ordered another round of drinks and only by refusing to drink anything did I persuade him to let me pay. The barmaid declared I was the only stranger she had ever seen from whom the proud Mr. O'Connor had accepted a drink, and the bank manager assured me I had made history. Mr. O'Connor accepted his defeat with dignity. "Me and the Captain is friends. He hunts his jackals in India, and I hunt my hounds in Cork, and the only man I would ever drink level with is an English cavalry officer even though he is an Indian." He clapped my shoulder and ordered more, but the merciful barmaid said it was 10-30.

The pious reader may attribute this sudden friendship to the drink evil, and would therein err. I found out later that I could accept Mr. O'Connors' statement as true. He had bred a thoroughbred of the quality of Lovely Cottage, he was the finest judge of a horse in the vicinity, he was a magnificent huntsman and was always up with his hounds. If ever I wanted a good hunter at a reasonable price his friendship and his advice would be invaluable. But I was looking for a house.

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HOUSE No. 2.

The Dublin agents concluded their description of this property with the words: "The House is in need of some repairs." Its price however was within my reach and we inspected it thoroughly. A gracious Georgian building with shallow steps leading to an oak door from which the knocker had been pinched. A basement, common to Irish houses, contained the kitchen, pantry, dairy, cellar and a warren of other dark rooms. The ground floor had a hall big enough for volley-ball, a fine drawing room, dining room, study and breakfast room. Upstairs there were five bedrooms, a W.C. (cracked) under the roof, and a bathroom from which the bath had been wrenched, leaving the viscera of pipes twisted on the floor.

To my expert eye the roof looked excellent, no sagging or leaks. The house was wired for electricity and required only an engine. The yard premises could accommodate easily two companies of infantry. The walled garden was a jungle, with briar growing to the tops of the apple-trees but eminently capable of quick restoration. The land was 15 acres, on which four hunters were summering, and the water was pumped to the house by a ram in a stream in the grounds. The drinking water came from a very Holy Well.

Advertised as being only three miles from the nearest town, the Ordnance map measured just over five miles on a third-class road with no bus service. Servants would stay, I was told, if I provided them with a pony trap or bicycles.

The upstairs floors had been eaten by worm, but after D.D.T. treatment would probably last until the timber situation, controlled as in England, improved. The difficulties to be overcome were formidable but not insurmountable.

I went to Cork—incidentally one of the loveliest cities in the British Isles—and interviewed the architect who had made a survey for a previous client. His report came as a considerable shock, and some of its items may be of interest and profit to my readers:—

<i>Item.</i>	<i>Job.</i>	<i>Cost.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Roof ..	Re-slating ..	£380 ..	The nailing was decayed.
Walls ..	Repairs and plastering ..	£175 ..	Some ham-fisted plumber had made holes in the arches.
Floors ..	Upstairs. Re-flooring ..	? ..	Unseasoned spruce available.
Joinery ..	Doors and windows ..	£45 ..	I intended to buy a blow-lamp in Woolworths and blow myself up.
Plumbing ..	New bathroom ..	£100 ..	No baths in Eire.
Painting ..	Whole interior ..	£250-£450 ..	Essential.
Electricity ..	Engine ..	£100 ..	No engines in Eire.

The reader may add this up and settle on any reasonable total. Recovering from this shock I had tea with a delightful old lady who had lived in the house as a child when they had a maid for the butter-making, a maid for carrying the turf, a maid for milking and a maid for washing—all little maids together in the basement dormitories! She whispered to me the price paid for the property ten years ago. Armed with this intelligence I made an offer through the solicitor for £300 less than this purchase price. He nearly fainted. For two days some telephonic haggling occurred, and I permitted myself to be raised to the original cost, which incidentally was 25% less than the advertised prices. Then, using this offer as a lever, the solicitor persuaded another prospective buyer to raise his offer and confronted me with this rival claim. I handed over the key, collected my goods and chattels and returned to base—bloodied, bowed and beaten.

These two instances show, I hope, that there are some attractive houses to be got in Eire for those who want a quiet country life with gardening and farming to keep them occupied. The last time I spent any considerable time in Eire was during the war of 1921, and the bitter hatred and passion in which one lived decided me never to set foot in the country again. Since then a remarkable change has come over the people, which I like to imagine is real and lasting. England now commands Irish respect and admiration principally, of course, for her courage and world leadership during the war, partly for not taking advantage of Eire's neutrality, and now increasingly for her stalwart attitude in world affairs.

If only, by hook or by crook, I had accumulated another £1000 I would be—in the vernacular—on the pig's back. "There are two things that grieve my heart...."

“FREE RUNNING” ON THE IMPHAL ROAD

BY LIEUT. COLONEL P. J. KENNEDY

INTENSIVE operation of road transport is not new. During the Burma Campaign, however, a system of intensive operation, which differed markedly from the orthodox system, was applied successfully over a long period. This, in brief, was the substitution for normal daily convoy running with night halts, of free continuous day and night running by the use of relays of drivers and an elaborate system of static traffic control.

The transport organisation built up to implement this system of transport eventually developed into one of the largest road transport organisations under one command ever operated by the British Army, and certainly the largest ever operated by the Indian Army. As the free running system has never been fully applied elsewhere, as far as the writer is aware, some description of it may be of value.

Imphal Road, 1942.—Between Assam and Burma is a jungle covered mountain mass some 200 miles deep. In 1942 there was but one possible approach suitable for M.T. through this barrier—the Imphal Road, running from Dimapur, on the Assam Railway, through the picturesque Naga Hills some 7,000 feet high to Imphal, capital of Manipur State, and thence via dry weather tracks to the Chindwin, the Shwebo Plain and Mandalay. The road to Imphal, 134 miles south of Dimapur, was a typical Eastern one-way mountain road, with innumerable bridges, culverts and corners, flanked by steep mountain slopes on one side and ravines on the other.

The whole area is subject to a very heavy monsoon, and only those who have experienced the effect of a monsoon in mountain and jungle country can appreciate what this means. The road itself was treacherous and subject to constant landslides, and during the monsoon all movement off the road was impossible, either in the steamy jungles of Assam and Burma, on the mountain sections, or in the paddy fields of the Imphal Plain.

The Japanese, following up our defeated Burma Army, had been stopped on the Chindwin, some 100 miles south-east of Imphal, by the monsoon in the summer of 1942. For the next 18 months little more than patrol activity took place on this front, but both sides were very busy in rear. The Japanese were building the Thailand-Burma Railway and improving their communications to the north and west. We were improving rail and road communications between India and the Burma Frontier and constructing airfields in Bengal and Assam.

The Imphal Plain was the natural jumping-off place either for an attack on India by the Japanese or an advance on Burma by ourselves. It had to be held; roads, airfields and depots had to be constructed, and troops and materials moved up. But in the autumn of 1942 the one road up which all the resources required on the Imphal Plain had to pass was failing badly, and was proving inadequate even to maintain the small forces present at that time.

This failure was due to many causes. The road itself was still one-way, and subject to frequent interruptions. Transport was insufficient, and had been overworked during the evacuation of the Army and refugees from Burma; sickness, particularly malaria and dysentery, was levying a very heavy toll,

the repair, maintenance and recovery facilities for M.T. were inadequate, and many of the new M.T.Coys coming forward had but little experience of hill driving. It was under these conditions that a G.H.Q. Committee was formed to investigate and report on the measures necessary to enable the road L of C to meet the demands which were likely to be placed upon it. This Committee, known as the L.G.O.C.* Committee, reported in November 1942, and recommended that an intensive running system of transport should be instituted embodying the following features:—

- (a) Central control of all transport on the road L of C.
- (b) Free continuous day and night running by the use of relays of drivers.
- (c) Divorcement of driving and maintenance on the London General Omnibus Company system.
- (d) Pooling of 1st and 2nd Echelon maintenance, which was to be carried out centrally at service stations.
- (e) Pooling of M.T. Stores.
- (f) Establishment of Traffic Control Posts, road patrols, and an efficient telephone system for the use of traffic operation.

Certain changes were found necessary as a result of the experience gained in the first few months of operating, but these recommendations formed the basis of the free continuous running system of operation.

FAILURE OF POOLED VEHICLES AND MAINTENANCE

Following the acceptance of the Committee's recommendations, the Commander of the transport organisation reached Dimapur in December, and assumed control of all existing L of C road transport. Vehicles were removed from companies and pooled; companies assumed responsibility for the provision of drivers only. Improvised service stations were formed from the meagre resources available, T.C.Ps. road patrols and a recovery system established. Road conditions did not, however, permit the commencement of free continuous day and night running until 15th February 1943. Once introduced the advantages of free running were immediately apparent, although service stations, marshalling yards and petrol filling points were still under construction and maintenance facilities inadequate.

The system of pooled vehicles and complete divorcement of driving and maintenance, which had been introduced to make continuous running possible without throwing too great a strain on drivers, did not prove entirely satisfactory. There were several reasons.

- (a) Personnel and resources promised for the service stations could not be provided in time.
- (b) The system of having vehicles driven successively by drivers of different Companies proved definitely bad. Neither driver nor Company could take a pride in the vehicle, and there had been no time to build up an *esprit de corps* for the transport organisation as a whole.

(c) Frequent changes of drivers made it extremely difficult to fix responsibility for damage or loss to the vehicle, its equipment or load, without an interminable series of inspections and checks which slowed up the system.

* London General Omnibus Company.

(d) The rendering of driver's defect reports was difficult and in the absence of these, service stations found difficulty in diagnosing defects speedily.

(e) The pooling of vehicles and maintenance made even distribution of work to 2nd Echelon Workshops, and the checking of their output, difficult.

These difficulties might have been overcome, but as the pooling of vehicle maintenance was only a means to an end, it was easier to discard it when a simpler method of attaining the same end, and one, more in keeping with Military training and organisation, was discovered. The experiment, however, proved what could be done to speed up vehicle turn-round, and also how time could be saved when maintenance was carried out systematically by trained teams with adequate lighting, suitable ramps and modern equipment. It prepared the way for the next step.

In May 1943 another experiment was begun. Seventy new 3-ton lorries were allotted, 10 apiece to seven M.T.Coys, who were made responsible for operating and maintaining the lorries on the free continuous running system. To ensure that the results could be ascertained quickly, vehicles were to be run to destruction by picked drivers as fast as possible. The results were striking, and before the experiment was completed, the restoration of vehicles to Companies began. It was proved that with Company responsibility restored, the standard of maintenance was improved and engine and vehicle life increased considerably.

It was found that personal responsibility of individual drivers for their vehicles was not essential; co-operative responsibility of teams of drivers, with maintenance teams from the same Companies, backed up by inter-Company competition, Company *esprit de corps* and good discipline was adequate. The elimination of innumerable inspections and checks previously essential when vehicles were being driven successively by drivers of different Companies enabled yet faster turn-round times to be achieved. By August most of the Companies had been re-allotted vehicles and through-running by drivers and vehicles of the same Company had commenced.

PRINCIPLES OF FREE RUNNING.

As the system now evolved was to operate successfully for the next two years it is time to give an account of its actual working, the principles applied, the objects aimed at, and the methods used to achieve them.

The road in any intensive running system is but an extension of the railway, and must be controlled as such. There is, however, a big difference between road and rail, of which full advantage has not always been taken in the past. On a road, if it is wide enough, vehicles can overtake anywhere; on a railway such places are few. If this point is realised it will be seen that timed convoys, uniform speeds and fixed halts are not necessarily an essential requirement of an intensive running system if other methods of controlling vehicles can be provided. Free running is possible; that is, vehicles can travel independently to and from their destinations.

The other feature which is applied on railways, but seldom on roads, is continuous running. The mileage limit, normally fixed as a days' run for mechanical vehicles, is based on the human factor and not on the mechanical limit of the vehicle. A vehicle, provided it is well maintained and not overdriven, requires little rest. If additional drivers are provided it can be run practically continually with but short halts for maintenance, refuelling, loading and unloading.

Control under this system was effected very simply, as drivers drove on a fixed route from one check point to another. With good telephone communication and an efficient system of recording their movements, the locations of vehicles could be known practically from hour to hour. Very active patrolling and an efficient system of recovery assisted control, and enabled breakdowns to be dealt with speedily. Telephone connected traffic control posts some 10 to 15 miles apart, along the whole length of the road enabled movement to be stopped, restarted, slowed down or accelerated at will.

It will be seen later that by adopting this system it was possible to apply the four principles of movements: centralization of control, regulation of despatches, even flow, and full utilization of carrying power to a greater extent than is usually possible with road transport.

The main objects of introducing the free continuous running system were simple. They were—

- (a) To enable the maximum use of the road to be made.
- (b) To permit the maximum tonnage to be carried forward with the minimum number of vehicles.
- (c) To utilise transport capacity to the full.
- (d) To reduce vehicle wastage.
- (e) To economise in drivers and reduce driver wastage.

The most important of these was the first, because it was obviously no good having a perfect transport system and unlimited vehicles if the road would not permit their use. The system had therefore to be designed to permit the maximum amount of traffic to pass over the road. But this was not all. The strength of a chain is its weakest link, and in any transport system it is usually found that depots and transit areas form the bottlenecks. The system, therefore, had to be designed to permit the maximum tonnage to pass through the various depots on the road.

The maximum capacity was obtained from the road by the simple device of utilizing every hour of the day and night, and despatching vehicles at a constant density throughout the twenty-four hours. This density was low; for example, with a 2000 ton daily lift the average density over 24 hours was but two vehicles to the mile. Thus serious traffic congestion was rare, a high average speed was maintained, road maintenance could continue and miscellaneous traffic, including formations moving in small convoys could be passed along the road without interference with the free-running fleet.

This even flow and low density also solved the problem of congestion in depots and transit areas, as it enabled the full loading and unloading capacity of these to be utilised. These capacities were limited, but once they were known it was a simple matter to regulate and direct the flow of traffic into the particular depots requiring it at the rate of flow at which they could deal with it. This applied also to central service stations, refuelling points and check points, which would have been unable to cope with a heavy flow of traffic at a high density but which could compete comfortably with an even flow at a low density. The effect of the introduction of this system of regulation of free running lorries was to reduce vehicle turnaround times within depot areas from 12 hours to 1 hour. It was this more than the actual speed on the road which enabled quite remarkable turnaround times to be achieved.

ECONOMY OF VEHICLES.

There were several reasons why it was essential to use as few vehicles as possible. There was a shortage of these in India owing to shipping restrictions and demands of other theatres, particularly the Middle East. Had the vehicles been available, the rail L of C was inadequate to bring them forward, and no through road between India and Assam existed at that time. Furthermore, both the repair organization and the supply of spare parts were inadequate to cope with a large number. But perhaps the over-ruling factor was that the deployment of any large number of vehicles was impracticable at that time. This point was quickly realized by mechanized formations moving forward for the Kohima and Imphal battles a year later, although conditions were vastly improved then, and the bulk of their transport was left back in Assam.

Lest it be thought that this point has been unduly stressed, consider a few figures. Fifty M.T.Coys, or about 7000 vehicles operating on the normal convoy system would have been required to carry the tonnage which went forward daily in 1943 and 1944. The location of these Companies on a single mountain road, and the manipulation of some 200 convoys in the confined depots, would have presented a problem which would have probably defied solution. It must be remembered that the mechanical equipment, bull-dozers, graders, steam rollers, tippers, dumpers, and other equipment which became available later was not present in early 1943. All excavation and construction of hard standings and roads had to be done by manual labour, and airfield construction quite rightly had the first claim on this.

Economy of vehicles was effected as a natural consequence of continuous running. Vehicles did approximately three times the mileage which they would have done monthly on the orthodox system, so that only one-third of the vehicles were required. But this was not all. Under the continuous running system vehicles were either running on the road, or in workshops for inspection or repair. It was, therefore, unnecessary to provide hard standings for more than about 10% of the vehicles on charge. As a result it was possible to locate M.T.Coys along the whole length of the road, the only essential requirement being sufficient width of road to provide a driver-changing post and sufficient space on the mountain side for the men of the Company. This reduced congestion in the depot areas and enabled the bulk of the Companies to be located in the non-malarious Naga Hills between Kohima and Maram.

It was obviously essential that transport be used to capacity to ensure the maximum lift for any given number of vehicles. Centralized control, by enforcing a rigid control over performance, achieved this. All M.T.Companies worked to a task system, a reasonable task which took into account the condition and type of vehicle, the depot, road and climatic conditions having been ascertained by trial.

The task, calculated on a mileage basis, was expressed in the number of loads each Company was required to carry forward daily. The minimum task for 3-ton Companies under average conditions was 9,000 miles, or 30 loads daily, to the Imphal or Pael depots, but this was raised on occasions to 12,000 miles and even reached 15,000 miles daily for short periods in an emergency. Though these Companies were operating with fewer vehicles than the standard Companies, their minimum mileages were from 2 to 2½ times as great as those operating on the orthodox convoy system in the same area.

REDUCTION OF VEHICLE WASTAGE.

The same rigid control was exercised over repair and maintenance to effect a reduction in vehicle wastage, which in late 1942 and early 1943 was a most serious problem on the Imphal Road. Very accurate and detailed statistics of the lives of vehicles, assemblies and other parts of vehicles were maintained, and every effort made by trial, adaptation and experiment to increase these. Full details of road stoppages and accidents and their causes were kept, and action taken to reduce them. Intensive running undoubtedly put a strain on the maintenance organization, but there were two factors which offset this.

In the first place, when running independently, wear, particularly of engine, clutch and brakes, was very much less because vehicles were able to take hills and corners at the speed best suited to the particular vehicle, road surface and ability of the driver, and were not subject to the constant slowing and accelerating inevitable in convoy driving on a difficult hill road. The other factor was this. Vehicles running intensively reach their useful mileage life in a much shorter space of time than those running less intensively. The deterioration due to time and climatic causes, particularly important in a very hot monsoon climate, was relatively less in proportion to mileage, so that the mileage life was increased considerably and vehicle wastage correspondingly reduced.

There was a certain amount of misunderstanding regarding the vehicle wastage rate on this system. Very big mileages were being performed, as much as seven million miles per month, and vehicles owing to their intensive running did reach their life, expressed in terms of months, much earlier than the vehicles doing but a third of the mileage. As the lift could not be allowed to drop, the whole course of the campaign depending on it, and as no margin was allowed for a time-lag in the receipt of replacement vehicles, it was essential that a steady flow of these should come forward. A monthly wastage rate based on the economic life of the vehicle on this system of running was calculated and provision asked for accordingly.

The term "economic life" should be noted. Many of the vehicles thrown up from the main line lift had life left in them and could in fact have continued running on the hill run, though less efficiently. It would have been unsound, however, to have continued to run them, as it would have thrown too great a strain upon the repair and maintenance organisation, and would have merely resulted in a more rapid deterioration of the remainder of the fleet. These vehicles were, however, employed in depots and for plains running.

As a matter of interest, the average economic life of the Chevrolet 3-ton lorry on this road was 18,000 to 20,000 miles for the first engine, and 30,000 miles for the vehicle. These figures compared favourably with those obtained on the orthodox convoy running in the same area.

ACCIDENTS.

It was at one time thought that the vehicle wastage due to accidents would be heavy on this system of running. That was not surprising, as even with one way running and convoy driving the number of vehicles over the khud in 1942 was considerable. With greater speed, two-way driving and night running, the Imphal road was no place for the novice driver. Every step

possible was taken to reduce accidents by cautionary signs, white posts to define the khudside, improvement of corners, intensive patrolling and severe disciplinary action in cases of dangerous driving.

Two other factors tended towards reduction of accidents. When free running, drivers undoubtedly gained confidence and learnt to drive well in a shorter time than when driving in convoy. Secondly, though some 2,000 to 3,000 vehicles passed along the road every 24 hours, the wide dispersion lessened the possibilities of accidents. In the result the accident rate remained surprisingly low, and never seriously affected the vehicle wastage rate.

Economy of drivers was essential, because trained M.T. drivers were not available in sufficient numbers in India at that time. This economy was effected, although more drivers per vehicle had to be provided than on the orthodox system, owing to the very much greater mileages performed by the M.T.Coys. This saving amounted to some 50%, despite the additional requirements for marshalling yards, refuelling points and check points.

The system was also designed to reduce driver wastage. This wastage, due to sickness, had been a big factor causing the partial breakdown at the end of 1942, and indeed the L.G.O.C. Committee had recommended that a sickness rate of 50% should be allowed for in planning. In practice, despite the all-night driving and the long hours at the wheel, the sickness rate never reached serious proportions. This was largely due to the location of 75% of the Companies in the non-malarious health belt, to strict anti-malaria discipline, and to the measures taken to safeguard the health of the men. These measures included the provision of communal cookhouses providing hot meals at any time of the day or night, and rest *bashas* fitted with charpoys and mosquito nets at all the main terminal and transit points.

ORGANISATION OF THE ROAD LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

The actual organisation of the Imphal road for the operation of intensive running is shown in the attached diagram. This was the layout in early 1944, and though interrupted by the Japanese offensive it was restored on similar lines immediately afterwards. It will be seen that the M.T. Companies were grouped together with their 2nd Echelon workshops and their regimental H.Qs at convenient points along the road. The vehicle cycle was that of the endless chain, each vehicle being considered as a bucket on the chain. If a vehicle had to be taken off the chain for any purpose as it passed its Company lines, another had to be put on to take its place.

The whole organisation of M.T. Companies, repair and recovery organisation and Provost was controlled by a H.Q. which initially was located at Nichuguard just south of Dimapur at the Manipur Road base; later it was at Kohima, and finally at Imphal. Allotment of lift and fixing of priorities of despatch was done by the 'Q' Staff responsible, initially by 4 Corps, later an Advanced Echelon of G.H.Q. and later still by 14 Army.

The inclusion of Provost under the transport organisation instead of under Areas was unusual. It was found more convenient, however, to treat traffic control on this line as a general administrative matter rather than one of local administration, because the road ran through several areas, and the transport organisation was the main user of the road, was in possession of the means of communication and the sources of road and traffic intelligence, and was dependent for its successful operation upon highly efficient and co-ordinated traffic control.

TRAFFIC OPERATION AND STATISTICS.

Central control over traffic operation, regulation of despatches and the maintenance of an even flow was the main function of the traffic operation branch. This branch had offices at all main marshalling yards and transit points. These offices were in telephonic communication with each other, with T.C.Ps, with H.Qs of M.T. Regts. and with the main depots, and were manned night and day. The operation branch also received much of the day to day intelligence, which was passed on to the statistical branch to compile.

The statistical branch provided the data on which tasks could be allotted, forward planning and provisioning carried out and performances estimated. It had the great advantage over most army statistical branches in that, being on the spot and in telephonic communication with the sources of information, it was always up to date. This, in the case of large scale transport operations, is an important factor, and enabled deterioration in efficiency and falling off in performance to be detected and rectified at once. Space does not permit the listing of full records maintained by this branch, but it will suffice to say that every type of information in respect of vehicles, road, climate, depots or drivers, which might affect the efficient operation of transport were compiled and were available in readily accessible form.

The statistical and operation branches together formed the keystone of the whole organisation, and upon their efficiency depended the success of the system.

M. T. COMPANIES AND M. T. REGIMENTS.

The responsibilities of M.T. Companies and M.T. Regiments were the same as in the orthodox system of running, with the one exception that as there were no convoys, control of the vehicle once it left its Company lines was exercised by the operational staff of the transport column. The Companies were, however, responsible for so organising their drivers and their vehicle maintenance, that driver and vehicles were always available to keep up the flow laid down by the H.Q. Transport Column.

The ideal arrangement was to have teams of four drivers, two up two resting, allotted to each vehicle and retain the same drivers on the same vehicles. This, however, was seldom possible, and the most that the average Company could do was to keep the same two first drivers and provide the second drivers from any available. It was essential, except for very short runs, to have two drivers always on the vehicle. These drivers might remain on the vehicle from 16 to 36 hours, depending upon the location of the Company. If the Company were near the centre of the road, the tour of duty would be short, and if near either end, long.

It was obvious that with these long hours drivers could not be expected to carry out full daily maintenance. Companies therefore allotted special drivers, usually taken from amongst those who were accident-prone or otherwise unlikely to make good drivers, and trained them as maintenance gangs. It was found that 16 men working in two—12 hour shifts were adequate to maintain all task vehicles of the Company. The maintenance was on the trip and not the daily task system, certain tasks being performed each time the vehicle passed its Company lines. It was found that one hours maintenance for a trip of 300 miles was adequate.

M.T. Coys normally operated 90 task vehicles, of which one-third were retained off the road for inspection, maintenance and repair. Of the balance, it was necessary for a Company to keep 45 to 50 vehicles always running to ensure a 30 lorry lift, or a 9,000 mile daily performance. The faster the turn-round, the larger the balance of drivers and vehicles in reserve, so that all Companies had every incentive to ensure that their drivers did not waste any time *en route*. The work of these drivers was monotonous and continuous; there were no holidays or slack periods, and a very high standard of driving and maintenance was required to enable tasks to be completed.

Repair system.—When the normal system of repair and maintenance replaced the original service station system, there were two dangers to be guarded against. If the workshops were inefficient and failed to turn out road-worthy vehicles, the system would break down. On the other hand, if M.T. Companies failed in driving and maintenance, the workshops would be overloaded and the system would again collapse.

To overcome these dangers each M. T. Company was compelled to withdraw one-third of its vehicles at fixed intervals, and put them into workshops for inspection and repair. When passed out these vehicles had to be fit for another 5,000 miles running. M.T. Companies were thus rationed as to the number of vehicles they could put into workshops, and were compelled to make every effort to keep the remainder running. The workshops, on the other hand, could not plead that they were overloaded, and could be held responsible for the efficiency of the work turned out.


The repair organisation consisted of one civilian staffed workshop at Dimapur, a number of mobile workshop Companies maintaining those M.T. Companies not provided with workshop sections, and certain workshop sections. The latter were grouped and as with the workshop Companies were centrally controlled by the A.D.M.E. of the Transport Column. All store provisioning and forecasting of spare parts and vehicles was done by the A.D.M.E.

Naga Service Station.—When the original service station system was abandoned an experimental service station with limited functions was retained. This was the Naga Service Station staffed by Naga tribesmen. It provided high pressure washing, a mountain stream being harnessed for this purpose, power greasing and tyre pumping. Its capacity was sufficient to cater for the normal flow of vehicles without causing congestion or undue delay, and while it did not relieve Companies of their responsibility for vehicle maintenance, it did assist them very considerably.

CENTRAL UNLOADING RAMPS.

The importance of speedy turnround has been stressed. Amongst the causes of delay were difficulty of access to depots, particularly in the rains, and lack of labour and supervisory staff for 24 hour working. This was particularly the case in the Imphal depots and sub-depots, which were widely dispersed, and which were not dealing normally with sufficient tonnage to justify the additional staff. These difficulties were overcome to some extent by insisting on adequate road communication and traffic circuits within depots, and by adjusting the loading and despatch timings at the base, but this was not entirely the answer.

IMPHAL ROAD ORGANISATION FOR INTENSIVE RUNNING 1943-45



Eventually the system of unloading or transit ramps was introduced. These were merely roadside stations with covered platforms, at which the main line traffic delivered to depot representatives, the individual depots collecting at their own convenience. The additional transport was found by utilising lorries unfit for the main line run, and was justified by the overall saving in turnround time to the fleet.

The additional handling was compensated for by the fact that labour, being concentrated instead of being dispersed, was fully employed, and that depots were able to collect at times when their labour was present instead of keeping labour standing idle to meet the contingency of lorries arriving at night. The system was not used where depot access was good and the lift heavy, or in the case of awkward or dangerous loads such as bridging, ammunition, etc. Many of the larger depots introduced the transit ramp system into their own depots both for receipts and issues.

L OF C TRANSPORT COLUMN, 1943.

In December 1942, before the introduction of the free continuous running system, the turnround time Imphal to Dimapur was 7 days, and the daily lift about 150 tons. By midsummer the turnround time had been reduced to 32 hours, and the lift increased to 1,200 tons. The system triumphantly survived its first monsoon, and in fact proved the ideal system for such conditions, the low density of the traffic and its flexibility enabling the adjustment for time lost on account of landslides to be made more easily than would have been the case with any other system. And an organisation which could run through the monsoon proved equally capable of adjusting itself to the moves of formations, tanks and heavy engineer equipment which took place during the winter 1943-1944 without interference with the free running transport.

On Christmas Day 1943 a record for the year was made; 660 lorry loads were lifted forward that day, the original target of 1,000 tons per day having been doubled and the daily lift having been increased tenfold in twelve months!

KOHIMA AND IMPHAL 1944.

When the free running system had first been introduced doubts had been expressed as to the probable effect upon the morale and discipline of the Companies. In March 1944 this was put to the test, and at the same time the cohesion and flexibility of the transport column was fully tested.

The Japanese striking from the Upper Chindwin threatened Kohima, and it became necessary to withdraw all Transport Column Units on the road between Nichuguard and Kangla Tongbi. But at the same time it was essential to put up the highest lift possible to fill up the Imphal depots in anticipation of the impending siege, and to replace stores and equipment already lost at Tiddim. In addition, large numbers of hospitals and camps between Kohima and Imphal had to be evacuated, and all non-essential personnel brought away from the Imphal Plain.

The drivers of the Transport Column responded right nobly, and in the last week before the road was cut 600 lorry loads a day went forward out of a total fleet of but 1200 task vehicles, and 60,000 men and considerable equipment were brought away. On the night the Japanese finally cut the road, some 1,000 lorries were on the road, but only 12 were lost, the remainder being successfully withdrawn to Dimapur and Imphal.

The closure of the road appeared to mean the end of the organisation, as the conditions for which it had been designed had ceased to exist. But this was not the case. M.T. Companies were scattered far and wide, from Sylhet in the Surma Valley to Dibrugarh in North Assam. Some fought with 4 Corps in Imphal, others provided transport for 33 Corps and 2 Div at Kohima. But the organisation remained intact, ready to move back when the road reopened. Thus, when the road was reopened in June 1944 and the Japanese driven back into the hills, the free continuous running system was re-established without delay, and met the ever-increasing demands made on it as efficiently as ever.

14TH ARMY ADVANCE INTO BURMA 1944-45.

With the rapid advance of the 14th Army into Burma the transport column was faced with new problems. It was found by experience that the most suitable turn round for a 3 ton or 6 ton lorry on this system of operating on a good two-way road was between 300 and 400 miles. Beyond this distance additional relief drivers had to be provided, thus creating administrative difficulties for M.T. Companies, while vehicles remained too long away from their Company servicing points for efficient maintenance. Through running for special loads, particularly bridging, and for 10 ton lorries, often continued up to Kalewa, a 600 miles turn round, but for the bulk of the fleet it was more convenient to tranship loads, the Imphal and Palel depots forming convenient points for this.

Another advantage of this was that there were at this time several types of lorries operating in the fleet—3, 5, 6 and 10 ton lorries. For mechanical and other reasons some of these were better on certain sections of the road than on others, and the splitting up of the L of C into two separate sections enabled these vehicles to be employed to the best advantage. Furthermore, conditions on the forward section in the vicinity of formations were seldom suitable for the full application of free continuous running.

During this period the L of C Transport Column expanded greatly, and there was a gradual change-over to the larger types of vehicles. In addition, the Transport Column operated 800 and 1200 gallon petrol tankers and also had under command a few Companies of tank transporters. The column eventually reached a strength of over 20,000 men, 3,500 task vehicles and 50 units.

Though the value of air supply during the Imphal battle and during the subsequent advance has been rightly stressed, it must be remembered that we never had as much air transport as we would have liked. The actual air tonnage lift during the winter 1944-45 was never more than one-third of the road lift on this front, and half of this air lift had already been carried forward by road to the Imphal Plain airfields. The more the road could be used, the more the air could be freed for the supply of those forward troops who could not be reached by road. It was only by making the maximum use of air and road and later river that the momentum of the advance into Burma was maintained.

LESSONS.

What, then are the lessons of this experiment? It is clear that for the specific conditions on the Imphal road the free continuous running system was undoubtedly the most effective for the purpose for which it was designed. In the closing stages of the campaign, when the bulk of 14 Army had gone on to

air supply and it was no longer necessary to utilize the road to its maximum capacity, the necessity for continuing this system was not so great and convoy running was gradually resumed.

The limitations of the free running system must, however, be appreciated. It is definitely the exception rather than the normal method of operating, and is only suitable for certain conditions. Its limitations are similar to those of a railway, as it is indeed but an extension of the railway system. Thus it is suitable for L of C use only and is unsuitable in forward areas where tactical requirements predominate.

A heavy overhead staff is required which is not economic unless the lift is a big one. Time is required to organize and train the staff and to re-organise and train M.T. Companies to this system of running. Furthermore, though M.T. Companies organized and trained for intensive operation can be employed on normal convoy work, it is wasteful in M.T. drivers to do so as the Companies are equipped with a lower establishment of vehicles. It is obviously inadvisable therefore to introduce the free running system on a big scale unless it is to be continued for some time.

Certain features of the system may, however, be applied with advantage to meet special conditions. For example, where roads are good and clearly defined and a fast turn round is essential, free running may sometimes be usefully employed. The advantages of central control for any large scale transport operation were clearly brought out, and are equally applicable to convoy running.

The value of performance statistics intelligently applied was another important lesson; without these the transport operator is like a man groping in the dark. Though methods of carrying it out varied, the necessity for a high standard of maintenance was as great as ever, and the importance of close co-operation between the operator and the repairer of the vehicle had not diminished. It was also clearly demonstrated that for efficient transport operation efficient organization of depots is a first essential.

The results of the campaign fully justified the confidence of those who had faith in free running, and provides the best tribute to the Indian Drivers of all classes who drove on this road for three years, as well as to their commander, who had the confidence and foresight to persevere and the energy and leadership to carry the experiment through to success.

IS LEADERSHIP MORE IMPORTANT THAN MORALE ?

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL W. R. HOLMAN, M.C., R.A.

FIELD Marshal Montgomery stated in one of his recent official reports: "If I were asked what is the greatest single factor which contributed to the ordinary soldier's success, I would say morale—the greatest single factor in war". Almost all great military commanders and writers on military science have included morale amongst the battle-winning factors, but it has not always been placed first in order of importance. The most usually accepted considerations affecting success in war are the quality and capability of the commander and of the troops, the morale of the troops and the resources available. In order to assess the true value and relative importance of morale, it is first necessary to examine its foundations.

The dictionary defines morale as "the mental state as regards spirit and confidence, especially of soldiers". Nowadays, when the battlefield includes the civilian on the home front, as well as the soldier in the front line, morale is equally important to the whole nation. However, I propose to deal with the subject only in its purely military setting.

The foundations on which the morale of the soldier is built can be briefly summarised as general contentment, confidence, self-respect, and the will to win, including belief in the cause for which he is fighting. These are all to some extent inter-dependent, and no one factor can be said to be more important than another. Differing circumstances cause variations in stress. For morale to be high, all the factors are necessary to a greater or lesser degree, but the predominance of one may reduce the importance of the others. The will to win and the self-confidence of the Japanese were so strong that the contentment and comfort of the troops became relatively insignificant. Their belief in the righteousness of their cause amounted almost to fanaticism.

When dealing with the contentment and well-being of the soldier, many points require consideration: the most important of these are his food, clothing, pay, exercise and absence of family worries. If a soldier is well-clothed and well-fed, no matter under what conditions he may be fighting otherwise, a very big stride has been made towards making him contented. Under these circumstances he is prepared to endure discomfort cheerfully for a certain time, if he knows that no better conditions are possible. The troops in the North African desert fought cheerfully in spite of the heat, the sand and the flies, because they were well-clothed and well-supplied and their morale was high.

In war, the soldier often has few opportunities of spending money himself, but he likes to feel that his family at home is well provided for, whatever may happen to him. Sometimes, other troubles at home may tend to give him a feeling that he should be there to clear them up instead of being far away fighting on foreign soil. An organisation whereby these troubles can be dealt with for him will go a long way towards setting his mind at rest. During the bombing of England by the *Luftwaffe* in the recent war, many British soldiers abroad went through anxious times wondering whether their families and homes

were safe. Speedy news by personal letter or by telegram through one of the organisations which dealt specially with such matters, removed many anxieties and thereby kept the morale of these troops high.

A soldier may be well-fed and well-clothed ; have no pay worries or family troubles ; and still his morale may not be of the required standard to stand the strain of battle. He may grow fat and indolent like the Romans of Nero's day, and his morale may collapse like a house built on sand, as soon as it is put to the test. To guard against this, he must have exercise to keep him both physically and mentally fit, for without exercise he will grow soft and discontented ; time will hang heavy on his hands and he will take to gambling, grumbling and debauchery.

To be contented then, a soldier must have no worries of any sort ; his food and clothing must be good ; his pay regular and adequate ; he must be given sufficient exercise to keep him healthy and in good spirits ; he must be allowed no family worries or troubles at home to take his mind from the job in hand. In short, the administration and man-management must be of a very high order. Good administration depends on good staff work, but as the staff is only there to implement the plan of the commander, good administration eventually depends on him. Man-management also is dependent upon the leader at all levels, so a contented soldier is produced by a good commander, assisted by a good staff.

CONFIDENCE.

One of the essentials of good morale is good training and mutual understanding between leaders and led ; this produces confidence in one's fellows and in one's commander, but the commander is responsible for that training, so this confidence must ultimately depend on him. Indifferent training will breed lack of trust in the leader and amongst the troops themselves, while success in training and later in battle is the surest way to promote it.

Even with all other factors in his favour, a bad commander cannot hope for more than a modicum of success in battle, and the confidence of his men is therefore bound to dwindle with his failures. This applies at all levels, but the smaller the command becomes, the quicker can confidence be built up and the quicker can it be lost. In the section, one failure of a commander through bad leadership will seriously shake the trust of his men unless it has been very firmly established beforehand. Without confidence in him their morale is bound to drop considerably.

The successes of Field Marshal Montgomery in North Africa created a very high morale amongst the Eighth Army men because their confidence in his leadership was profound. Confidence before a battle can be built up by the example and personal contact of the leader. This was fully realised by the Black Prince at Poitiers in 1356, when he made a pre-battle oration and took the trouble to ensure that it was passed on to all ranks, just as Alexander had done before him and Montgomery made a habit of doing later. Then the confidence of the British Army had been built up by ten years of successful campaigning in France and particularly by the successes under the Black Prince during the preceding year or more. Morale proved the deciding factor and that morale was based on leadership.

If the soldiers have gained confidence in their leader, they will be willing to live on short rations, with bad clothing and under inferior conditions for limited periods, provided that they understand the reasons and feel that these are necessary for victory. At the battle of Megiddo in 1918, General Allenby took this

risk in pushing his cavalry far ahead to cut the Turkish line of retreat, while in Cyrenaica in 1941, Lord Wavell took a similar risk in pushing his forces across the desert to Benghazi in order to cut off the retreat of the Italians. Similarly, Lawrence made his Arabs travel light and live on the minimum of rations in order to obtain the mobility necessary for harassing the Turks.

In all these cases, the morale of the troops was high because of the success obtained, but such conditions cannot be imposed on troops for long periods without grave risk of the lowering of morale. The Germans in Tunisia in 1943 showed that continual lack of major successes can undermine morale to such an extent that it will eventually collapse. This seems to be the only explanation for the sudden surrender of thousands of troops who were still in possession of the means to continue the fight.

Regular and sufficient supplies of arms, ammunition, and up-to-date equipment will greatly assist in inspiring an army, as well as increasing the material chances of success of the commander. These supplies depend on good staff work and careful planning on the lines laid down by the commander, so once again confidence is dependent on the leader.

One of the first duties of a new commander is to instil in his men confidence in himself and in themselves. Until that is accomplished, his weapon is not properly tempered and he cannot accept any major task without grave risk of failure. But success in battle is the best way of increasing confidence, so an early victory is most important to him, as soon as he feels that this is possible.

SELF-RESPECT.

Many a time has the front-line soldier, bombed and shelled for days on end, felt like giving up the fight and only his self-respect has kept him at his post. He has been afraid to stand condemned by his own conscience and by his fellow-men, and that fear has overcome the fear of physical harm. Self-respect is the keystone of individual morale, for without it morale disappears and a man speeds along the road to ruin. It can be developed in a soldier by insistence on a smart turnout and strict discipline, together with the fostering of a pride in his personal appearance, conduct, and bearing. This can be expanded in a unit, to develop unit pride or *esprit de corps*. If the men are proud of their regiment, they will not let it down at the critical moment, in just the same way as they will not let themselves down.

This *esprit de corps* is developed by the efforts and personality of the leader, who welds the portions of his command into one corporate body, the strength of which is in its unity. "United we stand, divided we fall" and without a leader, there can be no unity.

THE WILL TO WIN.

When David went forth to meet Goliath, he was indeed ill-equipped compared with the Philistine with his helmet and armour of brass and his large sword and spear. But he had one very strong weapon—the will to win. Then said David to the Philistine: "This day will the Lord deliver thee into mine hand; and I will smite thee and take thine head from thee". His will to win was founded on faith in his supreme commander—God—and other lesser commanders can do a tremendous amount to foster this will to win among their men. If everyone understands the cause for which he is fighting and is

taught to believe in its worthiness, he will have more "stomach for the fight" than a less well instructed opponent who merely fights because he is ordered to.

The Japanese carried the idea of supreme confidence in victory to extremes and fought fanatically even when the odds against them were quite overpowering. Their morale was almost unbelievably high, for their will to win was very strong and was only broken down by greatly superior physical strength.

The belief of the Crusaders in the cause for which they fought inspired them to undergo great hardships far from their own country, and to continue fighting even against very heavy odds. Without that belief, morale would quickly have sunk so low that the campaigns would have had to have been abandoned, and it was only such leaders as Richard Coeur de Lion who kept their faith alive.

The morale of Cromwell's Model Army was founded on the belief in the righteousness of their cause, but without a leader at their head to co-ordinate their efforts, they would have accomplished little. As it was, Cromwell's unbounded energy and tremendous faith moulded an army which was an example to all. Even when times were bad and prospects looked black, their spirit was kept up by this belief in their cause. If Cromwell had never lived, perhaps the Roundheads would still have triumphed, but they could only have done so with the help of a capable man at their head to keep their faith alive in times of stress and to lead them on to ultimate Victory.

THE COMMON FACTOR.

Having now considered the main foundations of morale, we find that they all depend on the common factor—leadership. The contented soldier is only produced by good administration and man-management which depend in turn on a good commander assisted by a good staff at each and every level. Confidence of a body of troops in itself and in its commander can only be built up by the ability of the commander and his staff, first in training and preparation, and later in battle itself. If the leader fails, the confidence of his men will be shaken, even if not broken, and they will eventually fail too, unless a new leader is found to restore their confidence.

Esprit de corps is entirely dependent on the ability of the commander to develop the self-respect of his men and of his unit. Finally, the will to win can be fostered by those in command, but without their encouragement it will eventually crack under the stress of battle. It depends partly on confidence and partly on belief and understanding of the cause for which the men are fighting: both these are dependent on the men who lead them.

It is not the purpose of this article to decide which is the greatest single factor in war, but as morale has been shown to depend on leadership, it would appear that leadership must be the more important.

Far be it from me to question such a proved and experienced commander as Field Marshal Montgomery: no doubt he was loath to state that his own leadership was the greatest single factor in his successes, but the armies which fought under his command hold an unsurpassed record over two and a half years of fighting. If the men are well led, the fight will prosper, but if the men are ill-led, morale will collapse.

THIS DRESS

BY "TICH".

The merit, if any, of this thesis is that 75% of it was written in a quiet moment on leave several years ago, and abandoned in the back of a drawer as unfit for human consumption. This cynical outlook has now, with justification be it hoped, been revised in view of the trend of present-day dress revision.

I WON'T go so far as to say that the only reason I joined the Army was to acquire a plumage superior to that of my fellow-men. Nevertheless, in adolescent days the urge for suitable adornment in bright colours and gold lace must have been a consideration, and MacMunn's "Armies of India" served as a kind of masculine *Vogue* for choice of colours and styles.

Any such longings were, of course, frustrated by the aforesaid war, and on being launched from the R.M.C., the Indian Army second-loot had to be content with embellishing his khaki with breeches of any well-chosen hue (salmon pink was rather a rage), field boots and spurs with chains—the then unassailable right of even the P.B.I.

However, I think we, most of us, then firmly believed that once that particular spot of bother was over, we should rise once more in the hues and patterns of MacMunn's "fashion book". One of my contemporaries was so firm in this belief—or at least his tailor was—that he bought the whole bag of tricks out to India with him, in the middle of the War, right down (or up) to white helmet, gilt spike and all that. He retired in 1920; possibly of a broken heart.

Poor deluded fools! Never were one's laudible, if childish ambitions to be realised, and it is now to be the burden of my theme to show that, instead, we were destined to go through a series of stages of *reductis ad absurdum* or being made to look stupid!

An Adjutant-General once said to me: "Whatever orders I publish on dress, most people disobey them". This, while a terrible indictment, probably held a substance of truth. Why? Because most dress orders published in the next decade or so almost invariably removed some cherished gaud or frippery. I recollect nothing being added to enhance our charm.

Thus, boots gave way to uncomfortable and impractical gaiters, which in their turn gave place to comfortable but hideous 'plus fours'. Spurs were torn off the junior officers, chain epaulettes from the cavalry. A separate treatise could be written on the orders as to who could and who should not wear spurs, and one of the popular pastimes became that of seeing how often these garnishes could be worn surreptitiously with impunity.

It was probably a good thing that red hats and tabs disappeared in large numbers, but it must be noted against their integrity that Very Senior Officers retained these adornments. Metal badges disappeared from helmets (except for biannual ceremonies), and the smart greatcoat gave place to a cross-bred affair which, apart from its hideous lines, did not even keep one's knees dry *a cheval*.

Later the Wolsley Helmet gave place to the Bombay Bowler, or to the Pigsticker. Utility was possibly achieved, but with a definite loss to sartorial effect. Here, again, the V.S.O. stuck to his guns—or his Wolsley, which brings out my point that the juniors were being stripped of their plumage while the V.S.O. retained it—literally in the more advanced cases! Might it have been, do you think, to counteract the effect of advancing years in competition for the favours of the weaker sex?

In war everything must bow to the practical, economical and utilitarian, but few will deny that the ramifications of the late war period have been as confusing as they have been consistently unattractive.

Reams have been written on the dimensions and numbers of the box pleats, or gussets or whatever you call the dam things, on the back of the bush shirt. Then the bush shirt versus blouse (K.D. or O.G.) controversy must have been one of the most acute in History. Succeeding each other as rapidly as the characters of a Harlequinade, they left many of us always a jump behind and produced, in Regimental Centres, the finest variety of costume ever gathered together.

Helmets versus heatstroke is the most shattering *volte face* he *qui-hais* have ever had to encounter. After serving 25 years under the most hair-raising threats of what would befall if caught minus helmet in the sun, now, when our arteries are hardening and blood-pressure going up by leaps and bounds we are sneered at as pansies if we seek to protect our scantily covered pates, with such a totally unnecessary headgear.

At the time of writing the full decisions of the Uniform Committee are, I believe, still *sub judice*. One may, however, take it that our last glory—cold weather mess dress—has, alas, been shorn away.

Owing to circumstances over which I had (little or) no control, I was compelled to buy a new jacket in 1938! The local dance band seems the only likely market. But large and all as is the coat, I don't think it will make up for all four of them. Another suggested use I heard was to wear playing a barrel organ outside the India House if there is any nonsense about pensions!

Enough of this foolery. Let me end with the pious hope that the pendulum will swing back and that the Army of the future will live to dress even more beautifully than those pre-war he-men of MacMunn's pages. Let Vanity rule again and spit and polish become a cottage industry.

* * * *

And now, as I lay down my pen, comes the shattering announcement that Service dress is reserved for general officers. Well, well, well! What have I just been saying?

GHOSTS AND GOVERNORS

By "HYDERABAD."

THE best known ghost story connected with a Governor-General of India is the one which is placed at Hastings House near Calcutta, at Alipore. But as Lord Curzon shattered its veracity to pieces many years ago (in his *British Government in India*, 1925) we need do no more than repeat its main features and expose its falsity once again.

When Warren Hastings left India in 1785, he, or those who packed and shipped his belongings, mislaid an old black bureau which contained some highly prized papers and miniature portraits. There is plenty of evidence that this loss actually occurred, and that it caused Hastings much concern. The sequel—for the bureau was never found—is alleged to have been a nightly visit to Hastings House by the quondam Governor-General in a spectral coach-and-four, of which weird and even blood-curdling details are given by various "authorities"—the champing of bits, the thunder of hooves, the harsh grinding of the wheels on the gravel of the long carriage-drive, and—almost—the ectoplasmic foam straight from the horses' mouths.

Unfortunately for all this, the bureau was lost from Hastings' town house on the Calcutta Esplanade, Buckingham House, and not from Hastings' house at Alipore at all, as is conclusively proved by the contemporary advertisement in the *Calcutta Gazette*: "either stolen from his house on the Esplanade, or by mistake sold at the auction of his effects." There is also, of course, the inherent improbability of a coach-and-four being used as the vehicle for a little quiet detective work.

We believe, however, that we have traced the original Hastings House ghost story. It was narrated in *Phantasms of the Living*, on 25th July 1884, by Mr. Paul Bird, then of 39 Strand, Calcutta, and corroborated by his wife.

"One evening, just at dusk, I was returning home from office in my buggy, with lamps lighted. It was dusk but under the shadow of the trees which overhang the avenue it was pretty dark. I was driving pretty fast, when I heard what appeared to be a run-away *gharri* coming from the house towards me. I immediately checked my horse and peered ahead to see how to avoid the coming danger, but as the noise did not seem to get any nearer, I cautiously proceeded, and when about a hundred yards from the house, distinctly saw the reflections of my lamps on the panels of a carriage in front of me, proceeding the same way, *viz.*, to Hastings House. I kept my eyes on the panels, so as not to run into them.

"The *gharri* turned to the left to go under the portico, followed by me, but when I arrived there, there was no *gharri*—it had disappeared. I was very much puzzled at this, but should probably have thought nothing more about it had not my wife, who was watching for my arrival from an upper window, asked me at once, "What *gharri* was that just ahead of you?"

Mrs. Bird, in a written statement dated a day later than her husband's, says that she has little to add to his narrative, except that she also saw the outline of the *gharri* as it came up the avenue in front of his buggy, with his lamps shining on it so as to define the outline. And, as she was at a window upstairs, she saw the apparition from a totally different angle. She suddenly lost sight of the *gharri*, and did not trace it right up to the portico: she thought that it turned off from the direct road. She heard no sound of a second vehicle, only that of her husband's horse and buggy; but she noticed him check his horse, as if he saw something ahead.

A GHOST IN COUNCIL

But there are other ghost stories connected with Governors-General which rest on better evidence than Hastings' coach. About 1880 there appeared the second edition of a book entitled *Apparitions*, by the Rev. Bouchier Wrey Savile. In the preface we find the following:—

"I am indebted to the kindness of George Sparkes, Esq., of Bromley, Kent, for the following very singular incident connected with that eminent statesman Warren Hastings.... Mr. Sparkes informs me that one evening, when his great uncle Joseph Cator, Esq., the Secretary to Warren Hastings, was sitting with the Supreme Council of India in the Council Chamber of Calcutta, Mr. Shakespear, one of the Members, suddenly looked up, exclaiming, 'Good God, there is my father!' The whole Council then saw the figure of an unknown person glide through the Chamber into another room which had no outlet, and disappear. What particularly attracted the attention of the Council was that the figure appeared with a hat of an unusual shape commonly known in our day by the name of 'chimney-pot'.

"The Governor-General was so struck with the occurrence that he ordered a minute to be made of the matter and placed in the record-chest, where it may possibly still remain. In the course of time a ship from England arrived bringing the news of the death of Mr. Shakespear's father, and likewise a cargo of 'chimney-pot hats,' the first ever brought to India."

The late Sir Evan Cotton, discussing this tale in the pages of the journal of the Calcutta Historical Society in 1929, commented with regret that "it offends not only against chronology but against fact." For Warren Hastings left Calcutta in 1785, but the "chimney-pot hat" does not seem to have been invented till 1797, when a London haberdasher was convicted of inciting to a breach of the peace by appearing in public with what he called a "silk-hat," "a full structure having a shiny lustre, and calculated to frighten timid people." And Cator was never secretary to Hastings, but he was to Barwell, another member of Council. Hastings' secretary for some years before he left India was George Nesbitt Thompson. Finally, no Shakespear was ever a member of Council before 1835.

A year or two later, however, the late Colonel John Shakespear, a descendant, came forward in support of the story, and though he did not maintain that the Rev. B. W. Savile's version was accurate in detail, he asserted that the tale was essentially true. The ghost, he held, was that of Alderman John Shakespear of London, who died on 18th May 1775, the father of John Shakespear, Chief of Dacca, who was a close friend of Hastings and who left India in 1784.

Another version was given to the compilers of *Phantasms of the Living* on 11th August 1883 by Mr. W. C. Moreland, of Lamberhurst Court Lodge, Kent. It runs as follows:—

"My wife's great-uncle was private secretary to Warren Hastings in India, and one day, when sitting in Council, they all saw a figure pass through the Council-room into an inner room, from which there was no other exit. One of the Council exclaimed, 'Good God! That is my father!' Search was made in the inner room, but nothing could be found, and Warren Hastings, turning to his secretary, said, 'Cator, make a note of this, and put it with the minutes of to-days' Council.' As a small incident in the story, it was noticed that the figure had one of our modern pot-hats. Some months after, a ship arrived bringing the news of the old gentleman's death and the first pot-hats that had been seen in India.

"I simply tell you it as I heard it from a Mr. Sparkes, who is now dead, and who, as well as my wife, was a great-nephew (*sic*) to—and probably heard it from—the old Mr. Cator who was present at the Council. I never heard him say whether he heard it direct from Mr. Cator, but I think it likely as he was rather nearly related, and from his age must have known him."

The editors of *Phantasms of the Living* add that precisely similar details were given by Mr. Sparkes to the Rev. B. W. Savile, and published by him in his *Apparitions*; but in the latter account the member of Council who recognised his father figures as Shakespear, not Cator. Further, the editors had the Minutes of Council searched, without finding any entry of the ghost's visit and without any other result save that it did not appear that Shakespear was a member of Council at the time, or that Cator was Hastings's secretary. They, too, point out that chimney-pot hats are generally agreed to have come into use in England between 1790 and 1795, though they seem to have been worn in France as early as 1787; and they cannot therefore have reached India before Hastings left that country in 1785. "Thus," they conclude, "the case assumes a mythical air, and the most we can assume is that probably some coincidence occurred."

LORD HARDINGE'S STORY.

A later Governor-General, who asserted vehemently and upon his honour that he had seen an apparition, was Field-Marshal Viscount Hardinge of Lahore, Governor-General from 1844 to 1848, whose grandson was Viceroy and Governor-General from 1910 to 1916. The story was told in an obituary notice, published in the *Daily Telegraph* of 1st January, 1917, of Sir Charles Parry Hobhouse, who had died a couple of days before. Hobhouse sailed for India in 1844, on being appointed to the Bengal Civil Service, on board the ship *HINDUSTAN* which was taking Hardinge out also. As one of Hobhouse's uncles, a captain who was killed at Waterloo, had served in the Peninsula in the same regiment as Hardinge, the latter took an interest in the young civilian, and told him a remarkable story.

One day, said the old soldier, he with Captain Benjamin Hobhouse and another officer was on outpost duty. Whilst Hardinge and Hobhouse were having luncheon, the third officer was about two miles away, but they kept a

chair for him between them at table. As he did not arrive they began their meal without him. Halfway through, he came in, sat down for a moment, and got up and went away again. They later learned that he had been at that very moment shot dead at his post two miles off.

Sir Charles Hobhouse's own words were: "In impressive tones, Lord Hardinge, in telling me this story, said, 'I demand that people shall believe me, for I have never to my knowledge uttered an untruth.'"

Here both the teller and the hearer of the story are unimpeachable witnesses, and the "demand" of Lord Hardinge has virtually the force of an oath. Can we then reject his statement that he saw, or thought that he saw, the apparition?

THE LOSS OF THE AURORA.

Warren Hastings was of course the first Governor-General; but a supernatural premonition is linked with the name and death of Henry Vansittart, Governor of Bengal from 1759 to 1764. In 1769 Vansittart was appointed with two others to go to Bengal and inquire and report thereon. As his secretary he chose one Alexander Brymer; and the following comes from *Pages and Portraits from the Past* by Admiral Sir William Hotham (1919, vol. ii, p. 117).

Just before Brymer's departure, and when his kit was already on board the frigate AURORA which was to take them to India, his father came down to Portsmouth to say good-bye to him. They slept at an inn in the town, and on the next morning at breakfast the father, to his son's astonishment, suddenly said that the young man's clothes must be landed from the frigate, and that he must give up all idea of going with Vansittart. He added that he personally would undertake to explain away to Vansittart the oddity and abruptness of such a measure. The son pressed to be told the reason for all this, but all he could get from his father was a promise to reveal it six weeks after the ship had sailed.

Alexander Brymer obeyed his father, who on the appointed date disclosed that he had been influenced by a dream which he had had at the Portsmouth inn, in which the AURORA and all on board were lost. As is well known, the ship touched at Cape Town in December 1769 and was never heard of again.

Admiral Hotham adds, by way of verification, that Brymer the younger became an American merchant, after being victualler to the Fleet for some time in the "American War, and settled at Halifax in Nova Scotia. "I have frequently heard the story from himself," he adds, "and afterwards from his widow, corroborated by his son, a respected clergyman, who had often heard it circumstantially related."

GOVERNOR INTO CAT.

In 1863 General Sir Thomas Edward Gordon, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., then a captain and brevet-lieutenant-Colonel, was brigade-major at Poona, when an extraordinary story came to his notice. As he relates it in his autobiography (*A Varied Life*, 1906, p. 56) it was discovered "that for twenty-five years past an oral addition to the written standing orders of the guard at Government House, near Poona, had been communicated regularly from one guard to another, on relief, to the effect that any cat passing out of the front door after dark was to be regarded as His Excellency the Governor, and to be saluted accordingly.

"The meaning of this was that Sir Robert Grant, Governor of Bombay, had died there in 1838, and on the evening of his death a cat was seen to leave the

house by the front door and walk up and down a particular path, as had been the Governor's habit to do, after sunset. A Hindu sentry had observed this, and he mentioned it to others of his faith, who made it a subject of superstitious conjecture . . . ”.

The upshot of this was also rather odd. Some sepoys got to discussing the cat: someone also brought in the subject of transmigration of souls: and it was decided that the Governor's spirit had entered the cat. But Government House harboured several cats, and no one was sure which of them it was that had walked out of the front door on the fatal day. So, Gordon tells us, to be on the safe side “it was therefore decided that every cat passing out of the main entrance after dark was to be regarded as the tabernacle of the Governor's soul, and to be treated with due respect and proper honours. This decision was accepted without question by all the native attendants and others belonging to Government House”, and all sentries complied with the unwritten order, whatever their religion.

At the time—it was 1863—of which Gordon writes, the guard was a weekly one, furnished alternately by each of the two Bombay Infantry battalions of the garrison. The commanding officers of the two corps were “of diametrically different dispositions. The one was of sympathetic temperament and calm judgment: the other impetuous and arbitrary, a rigid disciplinarian and a severe commander.” After satisfying himself of the truth of the cat story, Gordon mentioned it to both commanders, as being remarkable for the long continuance of the verbal order without its having become known to outsiders.

One commanding officer said that he would laugh the Indian officers out of the idea: the other, that he would order them to discontinue the folly. And so the latter assembled his subedars and jemadars and ordered them to refuse to take over, or to countenance in any way, the Cat Order, and threatened them with a court-martial if they did so.

But, as soon as the guard of his regiment next returned from their week's duty at Government House, it was discovered after questioning the subedar in command that he had feared his martinet of a colonel less than he had feared the supernatural, and had carried on the saluting of the cat, for which he was quite prepared if necessary to sacrifice his commission and pension.

The Colonel thereupon placed the subedar under arrest, for “an act prejudicial to good order and military discipline” contrary to the Indian Articles of War, and applied for trial by court-martial. “I know you will laugh at me”, he said to Gordon, “but my authority must be vindicated.” But the Brigadier took a more sympathetic view, ordered the subedar's release from arrest, and counselled the Colonel to deal “more patiently and gently with simple superstitions.” And so, presumably (though we are not told) the cat continued to receive gubernatorial compliments, until the new Government House at Ganeshkhind was taken into use in 1865. For it was at the old house, at Dapuri, that Sir Robert Grant died of apoplexy on 9th July 1838.

HOW WE TRAIN INDIA'S PARATROOPS

By MAJOR W. NAILER.

THE disbandment parade in October 1946 of the Indian Parachute Regiment marked an important change in the policy regarding maintenance of Indian Airborne Forces. Hitherto the Indian Parachute Regiment had been composed entirely of individual volunteers from almost all classes of the Indian Army, few of whom knew each other until they were welded together in their new battalions. The present policy is to form the 2nd Indian Airborne Division from regular battalions and regiments. The results of this change of policy are proving a theory held by most Indian Army officers, that a sepoy if well led and sympathetically taught can be trained to do anything.

Under the old system, men volunteered for paratrooping as individuals. The present system also demands that parachute battalions shall be composed of volunteers, but differs in one major aspect from the old. While the original attractions of pay, *izzat*, novelty or "just for the fun of the thing" still hold good, there is the added attraction of staying in a battalion one knows, or of joining a battalion in which one already has friends or relations. The word "volunteer" is not synonymous with "paratroop", as a fortnight's course must first be successfully completed.

Training a sepoy to become a parachutist is carried out at the Parachute Training School in Chaklala, and requires an exceptionally high standard of instruction. The instructor's task is one of great responsibility, as he must inspire confidence by his personality and example as well as impart knowledge by mere teaching ability. Too intricate instruction may frighten a student while slap-dash, morale-boosting talk can cause an accident.

What, then, does a parachutist require to know about the airborne side of his job? First, he must have confidence in his equipment; secondly, he must have sufficient confidence in himself to jump from the aircraft without a moment's hesitation and sufficient knowledge to do so correctly; thirdly, he must be able to control his flight; fourthly, he must be able to land in such a way that the chances of injury are reduced to a minimum, and fifthly, he must be able to control his parachute having reached the ground.

Having confidence in his equipment includes being able to look upon an aircraft as a normal method of transportation, and so on the first three mornings of the course the sepoy is taken up in a Dakota for "air experience". When I was on my course one lad fell at the first fence—he was very air sick and consequently thoroughly miserable. He had as much control over this unfortunate malady as the average sea-sickness victim, and so was not allowed to continue the course.

The first flight is simply a joy ride. On the second, each man is made to stand in the open door and look out as though he was about to jump, while on the third flight he wears a dummy parachute, hooks himself up and goes through the motions of "preparing for action" and jumping. After three

flights he is capable of moving around in the aircraft as though in a railway carriage, and of paying full attention to checking the important parts of his equipment. Meanwhile "ground training" has started.

Ground training consists largely of rolling about on mats. The paratrooper's roll is designed to spread the shock of landing over the parts of his anatomy best suited to receive it, and at first it is a complicated manoeuvre. The sepoy starts by standing on the edge of a mat, holding his hands above his head and "doing his roll". The first results are highly entertaining and draw shouts of glee from the remaining members of the squad.

As there are six different ways a paratroop may come in to land, depending on his drift, there are six different ways of rolling, namely, forward left and right, backward left and right, side left and side right. They all develop into the same thing, but each requires a slightly different technique to get it started. As he becomes proficient the sepoy starts to jump off steps on to the mat and go straight into his roll.

Next comes the drill to be carried out on his exit from the aircraft and during flight. This is taught by means of a parachute harness suspended from the roof. It is here that the sepoy's confidence in himself is first tried out, as he has to jump from a shelf some twelve feet high. He wears the harness and his drop develops into a swing as his weight is taken by the wires. He therefore never hits the ground but swings as if on a trapeze.

He is required to step off the shelf in an exaggerated position of attention and hold that position while he swings until told to adopt another. The instructor's cry of "Stop waving to me" denotes a student who fails to do this. Finally "flight" and "landing" are combined as the student is let down from the harness to complete his roll.

Other aspects of training carried out are parachute harness fitting, kit bag and valise servicing, emplaning, procedure on take off, preparation during flight and control of a "full" parachute on the ground. These are all taught as drill movements and become automatic.

All this training is done in one short week. The second week is devoted to the "real thing", and on the previous Saturday the sepoy is issued with his crash-hat—the first real article of parachuting equipment. As each student receives his hat he normally adds a remark or picture to the collection already adorning the top and sides. Such remarks as "This side up" and "There you go again" contributed by B.O. Rs. have given way to "*Khuda Hafiz*" and "*Chalo bhai, jump karo*" by I.O. Rs. On the following Monday comes the sepoy's first chance of putting his knowledge and confidence to the test. I say "sepoy" but the reactions are those of a normal human being, regardless of rank.

Early in the morning he draws his parachute from the store. Whereas his practice parachute has become a familiar object, he now carries his real parachute as a proud and slightly apprehensive father carries his first-born. In the aircraft the routine drills now take on an entirely new significance, and having "hooked up," each man spends his short flight to the dropping zone by showing himself and his fellows that he is perfectly happy. What little communal feelings there may have been during the first week's training now vanish and "*Sri Ram Chandra ji.....*" brings shouts of "*..... ki jai!*" from Hindu, Musalman and Christian alike.

The plane I was in for my first jump contained largely Sikh and Muslim, and so "*Sat Sri Akal*" and "*Maro Nara Haidri*" were the order of the day. During one of the short breathers a young Dogra cried "*Sri Ram Kishan ji....*" and was overwhelmed by the "*.....ki jai*" which followed! Immediately afterwards a Musalman sitting next to him said "Come on, let's have another one like that". Well has it been said that leaders of communities should be invited to jump from the same aircraft!

Then all is quiet as the first numbers stand up and prepare to go. As number one stands waiting in the door the aircraft's speed drops, and it is in these few tense moments that the instructor shows his worth. Such remarks as "We're coming up to the Dropping Zone now, you lucky people". And, "It's a lovely day outside" dispel any disquieting thoughts that one may have. Finally, the command "Go!" and the stick of paratroops is on its way. This is the test of individual confidence.

Each man must jump through the door into the 100 m.p.h. "gale" without hesitation. If he hesitates or refuses it puts a severe strain on the morale of his comrades, apart from making the exit of the man immediately behind him more difficult. Hesitation is marked by the instructor, and that man is not allowed to complete the course.

In flight and on landing the student's movements are watched by instructors from the ground, and faults are rectified by further training. The exhilaration felt on completing a successful descent is difficult to describe. The parachutist "owns" the ground he lands on, in fact he "owns" the world and is capable of being very rough with anyone who disputes the fact!

In all, the student makes seven descents, six by day and one by night, during his basic training, and if he refuses he is immediately returned to his unit as being unsuitable material. Refusals during training are to be expected. They prove that when it comes to the point the particular individual cannot bring himself to jump through the door. It is no real disgrace to the student personally, but it is a crime for a trained parachutist. That the percentage of refusals is extremely small is largely due to the type of instructor at the Parachute Training School, whose personality and sympathetic teaching make it possible for so many to jump unquestioningly through the door on the word "Go."

£500 Prize offered for Medal Design.

Designs are invited by the Royal Mint in London for the reverse of the 1939-45 War Medal. A prize of £500 will be awarded to the winning artist, who should be a British subject.

Designs must be submitted in the form of plaster or similar models, preferably 6 to 8 inches in diameter, suitable for the production of a master die by machine reduction. The modelling is required to be in low relief, suitable for striking in a coining press. A suitable degree of relief in an 8 inch plaster is 1/10 inch.

The medal will be of the diameter usual in service Medals—1.42 inches. The obverse will bear an existing effigy of the King and the usual inscription of His Majesty's name and titles. For the reverse, for design of which this competition is held, the artist may adopt such subject or symbol as appear to him most appropriate; the treatment should preferably include an inscription, either 1939-1945, or The War of 1939-1945.

TRAINING—SOME CLUES

BY "THE ADMIRAL".

NOW that the war is over it becomes necessary to those whose profession is that of arms to begin training for the next. The question arises: "What are we trying to do?" and "How are we going to do it?"

Our forefathers were less scientific than we. They had never heard of inferiority complex. They would have thought that a psychiatrist was something out of the Book of Revelations. They had, however, a capacity for clear thought which their descendants lack, and they expressed these thoughts in simple phrases. "Jack of all trades and master of none" was one of them.

Let us understand this. We are about 80 years behind the Royal Navy in our ideas of training, though the complexity of our weapons is about the same. A hundred years ago a seaman could turn from the guns to man the sheets or braces, and close up in his gun's crew again after wearing ship. A ship's company trying this kind of thing to-day would probably be sunk in collision without even seeing the enemy. If we try it, we shall, metaphorically speaking, be sunk too.

How are we going to stay afloat? First, let's think what the career of a soldier is. In normal times he progresses at a fairly slow speed through a Training Centre. When he emerges he is, whether in the British or the Indian Army, a better soldier than he will be again until he has operational experience. This fact is often overlooked. Many officers, through lack of experience or observation, do not know it; but it is true. In some ways, a peacetime cadet is better trained on leaving his cadet college than he will be as a captain; but his case is different, as he has to learn to command as well as be commanded, and that will not come without experience.

In active units of the peacetime regular army we may expect to have, then, a number of well-trained individuals whom it is our task to fit into the unit and formation; but they are not quite well enough trained. Let us turn to the wisdom of our fathers again. "Cobbler, stick to your last". The adoption of the principle that the active Battalions shall again train their own specialists cannot be too strongly condemned.

Men should arrive from centres trained as mortarmen, signallers, M.T. drivers, and so on. They should go straight into the appropriate platoons, and stay there during all their service. Any unevenness in promotion can be compensated for by trade pay and gradings, like those given to fitters or clerks. The loose thinker will at once cry: "What about your specialist reserves? What are you going to do if you have three mortar detachments wiped out in one morning?" Well, what do we do when a complete rifle platoon is wiped out in one morning? We often heard before the war of a hundred per cent. reserve of machine gunners, signallers and, later, drivers. Whoever heard of a hundred per cent. reserve for a rifle platoon?

To take the naval analogy again, if the crew of a 15 inch turret all become casualties together it is not expected that the E.R.A.s, the sick-bay stewards and the bridge messengers shall rush to the spot and man the guns. They go on with their own work. There is a turret out of action and that is all about it. The entire economy of the ship is not deranged in order to find reserve crews.

Mr. Churchill, during the desert fighting, drew attention to the resemblance between the formations moving over the wide desert and fleets moving over the sea. The resemblance still persists in other types of warfare, though it is not so marked. Units are like the ships of those fleets, though transport replaces shell lifts, and good operation orders and battle procedure are substitutes for the mechanism controlling fleets and ships. The whole unit, if it works well, works as a machine which is well designed, well-driven and well-maintained.

It would be folly to construct a combined harvester in which all the parts essential for the reaper, the elevator, and the thresher had been similarly designed and were interchangeable, for they would then all be, to some extent, unsuitable for every one of those uses. Man is, admittedly, more resilient than factory-made parts for a machine, but there is a limit to his adaptability, and to a certain extent the soldier in the unit resembles the part in the harvester. Let us, then, so tool our soldier factory—the Training Centre—as to produce suitable parts for every function of our machine, *i.e.*, soldiers trained to one of all the specialist duties (including the rifle platoon soldier as a specialist). Having obtained our parts we must assemble them. That is done now in the case of units already existing, and it is only necessary to take out old parts and put in new as occasion arises.

Now for maintenance. We must keep our parts clean and oiled and able to fulfil their function. In other words, we must have a certain amount of individual training, to ensure that no man falls below the standard at which he emerged from the Centre. It is not enough, however, for us to oil and clean each part. We must run the machine in. We must frequently give our battalion the opportunity of working as such in the field.

Men cannot be interested indefinitely in preparing themselves individually to take their part in the battalion. They must frequently be given an opportunity of seeing what success, if any, they have had at this. Their commanders must be given the same opportunity of seeing how well or ill their training is working. Then the cogs of the machine must engage and run themselves in, the cogs of the rifle companies with the mortars, and the cogs of the signals and intelligence with all, and so on.

Most important of all, we must have considerable practice in driving our machine. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasised. It is the most difficult task which any officer has, and, of course, it is above all the task for which he is there. No one would play in a polo tournament after not having played for a year, or not having ridden for two months. To drive a car, steer a yacht, or drive a tandem needs practice if it is to be done properly. How much more practice does the direction of various subordinates, the restraining of the impetuous, the urging of the laggard, the heartening of the weak and the instruction of both clever and stupid, require? And while the commander is doing all this, he must see that he himself is taking his own place in the proceedings, that he is carrying out his superior's intention, that he is co-operating with the other arms engaged and—and this matters far more than anything else in any commander—that he is maintaining his sense of balance. However good the machine is, it will not get far if the driver runs it into a brick wall.

We must realise quite clearly what an officer's duties are. Let us first see what they are not. No one possessed of any imagination whatsoever could fail, in pre-war years, to be appalled by the pre-occupation of officers with things which had nothing whatever to do with military matters. By military matters I mean those which affect the preparation for, mounting and maintenance of operations in the field.

Take, for example, losses. On some article becoming lost a court of inquiry would be held. Supposing the loss to amount Rs. 21, the C.O., who had been entrusted with responsibility for the lives of several hundred men, would send details to Brigade for writing off. A clerk (private, acting sergeant) would find some trifling error and send it back, obtaining some junior officer's signature on the letter returning it. It would then be amended and sent in again. The writing off of the sum would then be sanctioned by some staff officer far junior to the C.O. This junior staff officer might frequently be some individual palmed off from his unit for an officiating job, his main qualification being that he was below average as a regimental officer.

A station board of officers was often convened to fix, say, sites for the construction of new latrines in some unit, though probably not one C.O. in a hundred was so deficient of knowledge of the principles of hygiene as to be unable to do it himself. If he was so unable, he should not have been a C.O. To run an officers mess on a contract basis was considered a lazy way of running messing. It was, apparently, more important for an officer to haggle like some fishwife with the cook over the price of a cabbage than it was for him to train whatever sub-unit was entrusted to him.

Due regard must, of course, be paid to administration; but the view expressed by some officers that administration is the most important thing in the army is obviously bosh, as, followed to its logical conclusion, it means that everything else is subordinate to administration, and therefore the army is run in order to provide some administration, instead of having some administration in order to help to keep the army going.

These futile boards must be abolished. The council of war, never highly thought of by any competent commander, became obsolete over a hundred years ago, and there is no excuse whatever for prolonging these pitiful travesties of it. Commanders must command.

We must never allow the present Record offices and the lake of paper in them to be broken up, and their attached account offices to inundate unhappy units. "Cobbler, stick to your last." Let us keep our pay branch just as the Navy does, and let us never have again the pay and mess book. The number of columns in that publication for accounting for a soldier's pay was twice what a sepoy drew in rupees per month. It had no place in any military organisation.

We want officers, not commissioned clerks, to run our units. An officer must be always able correctly to answer this question at once: "What am I trying to do?" He must be able to cause those who are under him to do, with the maximum of efficiency, under the most arduous conditions, that which he is trying to do.

The method by which he achieves this must be that most suited to him, (In the Peninsula, General Crawford and General Hill, divisional commanders, obtained similar results by vastly divergent methods). That is, he must know what his commander wants, and he must know how to get it.

He requires:

(1) The ability and initiative to get on with a job of work by himself. (This is essential).

(2) The instincts of a gentleman. (These are not essential, but they are advisable. Several successful commanders have, however, not had them).

(3) A sense of humour. (Again not essential, but a great help in times of strain).

(4) Constant practice in command. (This obviously cannot be obtained by working out programmes or issuing directives, but by getting about amongst troops on collective training).

(4) is the only one of these which can be acquired, and therefore every officer must be given the maximum possible opportunity of such acquisition.

We have now seen that, in training the infantry battalion we need individual training for the troops, collective training for troops and commanders, and constant collective training for the commander. Taking the naval analogy, again, every ship on commissioning goes on a cruise to shake down the new crew. We should act in a similar manner.

It is of no use whatsoever to embark on a lengthy progressive cycle of training. Everyone will be bored. Men may at various periods in the training rise to considerable efficiency in whatever they are doing at the time. They will forget nearly all of it later in the cycle. If we go pigsticking we don't sharpen our spears for a week, then groom the horse for a week, then clean the saddlery for a week and then start. We keep all these things as going concerns.

Consider, too, the ending of the two-year cycle. What are we going to do? Either we know the work which we learnt in the cycle, or we don't. If we do know it, then it is quite useless starting the whole thing over again. If we do not know it, the thing has been a failure, and it is still no use starting over again. There used at one time to be a generally accepted annual cycle of training, and there was a cant saying at Home: "On the 31st of October every man in the Aldershot Command is a highly trained soldier. On the 1st of November he is a complete fool who has to be trained all over again."

We will therefore act as follows: We will have, every week, three days for individual or section training. We will have a day's Company or platoon training. We will have a day's battalion training. Every month we will have a formation scheme lasting from three to ten days.

Collective training can't usually be made completely realistic, however good it is. There is, however, one way above all others in which its value can be increased; this is, to hold it during bad climatic conditions. It has been said that the greatest thing in married life is collecting memories together. It does not become a bachelor to pronounce on this subject, but of units and formations this is indisputable, that the joint recollection of difficulties successfully and *collectively* overcome does more than anything else to make them a team. The Nahakki in August, Razmak Narai in January, Marten Bargush in the Spring sandstorms—it is common recollection of such things as these, even in peace-time, that does more to weld us together than anything else except a well-fought action.

We learn to scratch each others backs then—those of us who've sense—and we see how necessary we are to each other. The more we can realise that, the better. By these means we can work ourselves up into a good team to function efficiently in warfare of the nature which will suit the particular kind ground of over which we have been training.

We shall have been observing certain basic principles throughout this training. This, however, is not enough, unless we definitely know that we are training on ground exactly similar to that on which we are going to operate. Excepting in the case of N. W. Frontier defence, it will very seldom be possible to know this. Still, we have made a start. To carry our training we require a number of training centres on the lines of the combined operations schools

which functioned during the war. Schools of jungle, mountain, desert, bush, open country (I can think of no better name) and tri-tribious warfare must be maintained. They must be staffed by officers whose perpetual study is the kind of warfare they are teaching.

To these establishments, formations must occasionally go for short courses, not in order to become masters of each of these arts—we have already seen that this would lead to their being masters of none—but in order to see that each of these forms of warfare has its own special problems, and to get some idea of how to begin to learn to cope with them when the time comes. When it does come, the school should be capable of turning units out 100% perfect at their particular job.

This is all that these schools will be capable of doing. Few instructors at any specialist instructional establishment succeed in keeping their sense of proportion about their own subject, and these will be no better than anyone else. The constant flow of formations who are not experts on their particular form of frightfulness may, however, help them to keep their balance to some extent. We all remember how in 1941 India could think of nothing but mechanisation, and now many people don't appear to know that there are some parts of the world not covered with jungle. We must eradicate the "wet hen" school of thought, which rushes widely from one extreme to the other so that we eventually find ourselves with mules in the middle of the Sahara and M.T. on the slopes of Kanchenjunga.

"Let us again praise famous men and our fathers which begat us." Why was the pre-war army as good as it was? A quarter of the year on leave, a quarter on duty, no money for nine-tenths of the training we wanted to do—yet what made the Indian Army a very fine one?

There were several reasons. One was the constantly recurring Frontier tour, which kept us all alive. Another was the very high standard of discipline which existed in the pre-war army. Too few realise this. We talk a great deal about Sir John Moore nowadays. True, a number of people think he wrote an almanac of prophecies. One officer, by no means a junior one, recently referred to him as having captured Quebec. Another, hearing that he had trained the Light Division, though that reference was being made to the 17th Indian Division. Still, some people do know what he did. One of his accomplishments was to train a Light Brigade, which some time after his death became a Light Division.

He was enlightened commander, encouraging initiative, welfare, marksmanship, individual tactics, fieldcraft, the use of brains and the inculcation of discipline by morale rather than brutality. He led rather than drove—a rare thing at the time—and he is, still, the model of the good British officer. It is, however, not generally known that the Light Brigade went to war, and became the Light Division, under General Crawford. It will not, I think, be denied that a formation's first two years of warfare has a tremendous formative effect on it.

During these years General Crawford imposed on his command an iron, indeed a savage, discipline, the harshest in the army. When he was eventually killed at Ciudad Rodrigo the division went to his funeral. While they were there it rained. On the way home a large pond had come into being in their path. Feeling that General Crawford would have objected to the breaking of the line of march imposed by its avoidance, the whole division marched straight on through the middle of it. To be the harshest disciplinarian in an army containing Wellington and Picton was no mean feat.

The Light Division probably shares with the 7th Armoured Division and the archers of Crecy and Poitiers the distinction of being the most skilled land forces the Empire has so far had. We know more about that Light Division than we do about the archers, and we can get a better perspective of it than we can of 7 Armoured Division at present. We know of the debt to Sir John Moore, but let us in fairness ask ourselves how the field days of Shorncliffe compared with the first two years' campaigning in the Peninsula.

We cannot deny, if we are honest, that it is upon its discipline that an army stands or falls. It is not the slightest use to be trained in the most wonderful way if we have not the discipline to apply that training under conditions of hardship, danger and discouragement. "The soldier must develop the stealth and cunning of the jungle animal" we used to say, oblivious of the fact that the jungle animal flies at the noise of a beaten gong. Discipline can be inculcated in various ways, but generally speaking only a small minority of leaders can maintain it as Sir John Moore did.

These days we are prepared to take our methods from commercial travellers, conjurors and so on—people whose business it is to sell things or "put it across." Let's sell instructions as we sell vacuum cleaners, and copy the skilled salesman. They do know something about selling things.

It is a curious fact that almost everything advocated in the "War Office Method of Instruction" is advocated, in rather terser phraseology, in Infantry Training 1924, Chapter I. Those who wrote it had spent their lifetime trying to instruct soldiers, and had recently had an opportunity of seeing their products standing up to the conditions, not always particularly pleasant, of the War of 1914-1918. Our predecessors knew how to instil discipline. The army, with certain exceptions, does not, nowadays, reach their standard. Had it not been for the overwhelming superiority in numbers and material which we had at the latter stages of the latest war this might well have proved our downfall. This, above all else, is what we must put right and put right quickly.

After August 1942 we could scarcely have lost the last war. Let us take thought of why we were so long winning it. Let's not be too complacent about our methods of doing so. Had our armies been put to the same strain as the Germans, would they have lasted us long? How many suicide squads did our armies leave behind during retreats? Our predecessors did win the last battle in every war, even if they had lost all the rest. They must have known something.

They realised this, that if we tie together a bundle of straight sticks we shall have something far stronger than any individual stick. It may be that, in straightening these sticks we shall have to destroy, in some of them, something that made them better than the rest. We shall have to cut off twigs and branches, so all the sticks will lose something; but they will all gain far more from their fellows than they lost of themselves.

So shall we.

CIVVY STREET, RANGOON

BY COLONEL E. C. V. FOUCAR, M. C.

RELLEASE from the Army! The thought conjures up pictures of a home, pleasant meals, all the imagined comforts of civilian life. I say "imagined" advisedly, for there is little enough of comfort in life to-day. . . And for the soldier who boldly elected to take his release in Burma a few months ago there was none at all. In fact, he was destined to fare rather worse than the serving soldiers who accompanied him on the transport to Rangoon. They, at least, had arrangements of some kind laid on for their welfare. There were none for him.

However, warned of what was in store, I came to Burma for my release and was wise enough to bring my camp kit with me. I needed it. My first home was the empty hall of a flat in a grim building appropriately named "Belsen", a small civilian enclave amidst the military population of Rangoon. The atmosphere was depressing. Boarded-up windows, the rubbish-littered compound, dependent on the military for rations and transport induced an unhealthy inferiority complex. This was not improved when, on entering one's own pre-war office, a pink-cheeked corporal stared with ill-concealed contempt at the civilian who dared to demand an interview with that august personage, his Commanding Officer. The latter was charming but adamant. "Terribly sorry and all that, but I am afraid that we shall be here for many months. What! Let you have a corner to work in? Quite impossible, my dear Sir. . . .".

And that was that. In May 1945, when Rangoon was reoccupied, the Army and R. A. F. had found a virtually deserted city. Quite properly they took over the best buildings, spreading themselves over the business centre of the city and the most convenient residential areas. In fact, there was little of the bomb-damaged city that was not required for military purposes. Whilst the war continued and normal life was at a standstill this was a matter of little moment. But when the war ended and the day to day activities of Rangoon were sought to be resumed the presence of an enormous military population possessed of overriding powers of all kinds was a most hampering factor.

On Merchant Street were to be found Army cook houses in a bank building, an officers shop in the bank next door, an officers club in yet another bank, a welfare centre occupying the whole of an important corner site, and so on. It was a state of affairs that could not be adjusted overnight; meanwhile, the rehabilitation of Burma must suffer, for Rangoon was the bottleneck through which all supplies entering the country had to pass and where all business was done. And there were neither business premises, godowns, nor transport for civilians.

As I write (in October) it is possible to record an improvement. For instance, I am back in my old office, which has been derequisitioned. But progress is very, very gradual. The official machine creaks uncertainly, the truth of the matter being that the people of the country are suffering from an acute war weariness and the lethargy that overcame them during the period of the Japanese occupation. The complete stagnation of trade and enterprise that

then prevailed has left its mark. Many people refuse to settle down to a job of work, preferring the easier if more uncertain callings of the black market, of flutters in "flogged" Army stores and in stolen property of all kinds and, of course, in dacoity.

The Statesman gives us more local news than does the official daily paper, a most attenuated publication the reading of which occupies a brief five minutes. However, this bulletin did recently record an interesting item. Reporting an improvement in conditions on Rangoon's waterfront, it stated that no longer were whole truck-loads of goods being stolen!

Stolen property and the black market. We could not get along without them. Do you require electric fans and fittings, furniture, or baths for a house that has been stripped of all these? Then visit a mat-walled shack in one of the bombed-out areas and you may be quite certain of obtaining whatever you require, at a price. The booksellers shops openly display second-hand and obviously looted library editions of valuable books. In some cases they have not even troubled to remove the owners' names. Typewriters are cheaper than in India; they cost nothing to their sellers. Military messes and billets are equipped with furniture that certainly is not Army property.

There are numerous tales of men who remained behind in Burma in 1942, appropriated to themselves their masters goods, and today are persons of property. Here are the makings of many a bitter vendetta; but the gentry who remained behind are in the strong position of wealthy men. The wisest of them invested their easy profits in gold and gems and in British currency. The holding of this last was made a serious offence by the puppet Burmese government, but even members of that government joined in the general scramble to exchange Japanese paper money for something more valuable.

I have yet to meet a self-confessed collaborator. Speak to any man who remained in Burma and you will always get some variation of the same story. It goes something like this. "The Japanese were most unpleasant people. I had nothing to do with them. At least, not very much. They knew that I was a man of influence, so they approached me. I was threatened with arrest if I did not assist them. . . . I could not help myself. I was compelled to do it. Yes, there were a few Army contracts and small matters of that kind. But I made no money at all. My expenses were terrible. And the bribes I had to pay! You have no idea Of course my case is very different to that of A, and B, and C. Those are the fellows who made a very good thing out of the Japs. They had no consciences at all. Not like myself".

And the odd thing about it is that today he and A and B and C are still making a good thing out of life. They hold fat public appointments, are Army contractors and are held in high esteem. That they helped the Japanese is not counted against them. Truly is Burma a strange country nowadays, and one of odd contrasts.

Persons of standing are able to make their purchases, strictly rationed, at the few large shops which have reopened. Here prices are reasonable. The soldier has NAAFI to cater for him But what of the clerk or the artisan? He, unfortunately, must go to the small shop in the bazaar, where until very recently cigarettes cost five rupees a tin, and a bottle of malted milk fetched astronomical figures. It is a condition of affairs that is very wrong and disquieting and reflects no credit on the privileged class. I write as one of that

class and admit that I have made use of my privileges, but I have not gone to the extent of selling to the black market. Some have done so If the question of supplies had been better handled and more equitable treatment accorded to all classes, Burma would now be happier.

Rangoon today is a squalid city. Gone is the cleanliness and order that distinguished it from its counterparts across the Bay of Bengal. Bombed-out areas, and they are many, are covered with a horrid rash of insanitary mat dwellings. The beautiful surroundings of the Royal Lakes are disfigured by the same disease. The Corporation blusters and threatens and does nothing, and it seems certain that we must wait for the hot weather fires to do the work of clearance. Let us hope that such a fire will not start in one of those temporary cinema erections of bamboo. They are death traps of the worst kind. It is astonishing that they are allowed to flourish.

With an acute shortage of building materials, steam rollers, and the like it is certain that the city must be unlovely for years to come. Our roads, cratered and potholed, continue to deteriorate; although the present comparatively good condition of certain thoroughfares like the PROME Road is a tribute to the excellent pre-war care of the Corporation. Years of heavy military traffic combined with neglect have failed to put them out of action, and it is only the unskilled driver who ploughs through every rain-scoured pit.

About our transport one cannot be enthusiastic. The number of new private cars grows slowly; ancient buses that were too dilapidated for the Japanese still do a thriving business; jeeps that have served their time in the Army are now reckoned a luxury by their civilian owners. Of our numerous prewar bullock carts and gharries there remains little evidence. The enemy denuded the country of oxen and ponies for the needs of his Army. We shall suffer for this for a long time to come. Of military transport there appears to be a super-abundance. Even Japanese prisoners, contented and well-fed, ride in trucks to their daily labours. At the lesser men who must walk, they cast supercilious glances.

Khaki and jungle green are to be seen everywhere. Not only do Service men wear it. The demobbed ex-officer, the police, clerks, domestic servants, coolies, all favour the same kit. Members of Aung San's Army use it; so, too, does the up-to-date dacoit. Which, of course, makes matters somewhat complicated. Incidentally, it is not only in matters of uniform that the dacoit has modernised himself. He has gained many a recruit who fought in the war, and operations are conducted with a due regard for the nicer points of tactics. Recently, when a Delta town was raided in a big way the dacoits employed scouts, patrols, and covering parties. Prior to the attack their intelligence section had put in some good work Of course it remains true to say that in the long run dacoity does not pay; but, at the moment, the dacoit is doing quite nicely and looks like having a very long run with his booty before he is wiped out.

The dacoit has a particular dislike for the West African division, his dislike being mingled with a wholesome respect. But the last units of the Division are now leaving us, and without the African troops Rangoon will be less picturesque. The shopkeepers will miss them, for they are eager buyers of gaudy tin trunks, painted paper parasols, and the longest of electric torches; and in a city where most troops off parade are slovenly, the West Africans stand out for their correctness of bearing and dress.

Dacoity, discontent, a devastated land, and all the rest of the foul aftermath of a bitterly contested war are the legacy that Nippon has left to us. All

this is negative. Look for some positive evidence of the Japanese occupation of Burma and you will find nothing. It is a remarkable fact that the invaders have left behind them no lasting traces of their occupation. They came only with weapons in their hands; they looted; they did nothing constructive; now that they have vanished their ravages might equally well have been caused by any barbarian horde. Did their dream of a Greater East Asia really include Burma? Did they ever intend to do more than despoil this land? If they did, then their planning and achievements were childishly inept.

I mentioned all this to a Burman. He smiled. "You forget the children. In a few years we shall see what the Japanese have left behind them". In a sense he is right. But those children will know nothing of their fathers, and it is certain that they will not be brought up to have any love for Nippon. The Japanese version of a Greater East Asia has no protagonists in Burma, although this does not mean that the Burman has any particular love for the British Empire. He has not, and the aftermath of war has done nothing to increase any regard he had.

In this country, a weak link in the Imperial chain, it was essential to make rapid progress with rehabilitation. Instead, it has been painfully slow. Where the fault lies matters little. The important fact is that Burma feels, and rightly, that she has had a raw deal both during the war and in the matter of reconstruction. Today, instead of being assisted by a flow of cheaply imported goods, she faces additions to already heavy duties; the Income Tax Act has just been amended, and men who have just begun to re-organise their businesses are to be burdened with two years' tax; there are other added official financial burdens. Would it not have been easier to allow the country a more easy recovery?

But at long last a forgotten corner of the Empire has been placed on the military map. There are soldiers everywhere And one looks back with a wry smile to those early days of 1942. If only we had had then some of the men and material that fill the country today! Men, who now are wanting a more active job, and the material which lies unutilised: although possibly not unwanted, in vast dumps exposed to the monsoon downpour. But this is the time-honoured British regret. We have won yet another war, and at once go on to criticise the imperfections of our victory "Really, old boy, I can't understand how I won. Of course you were right off your game".

TAKE A LOOK AT THE MAP-MAKERS

BY 'NIDRAJ'

"The invading Armies in Normandy were provided with the most accurate maps ever issued to an Army."—Flight Lt. Anthony Vandyk. Vol. LXXXIV of this Journal.

MY title has been taken from a cartoon by 'Spy' showing a somewhat harassed Survey Sapper at his drawing-board, blushing under the scrutiny of four be-ribboned and obviously be-mused Staff Officers, who are clearly not at all sure what it is all about, anyway. While the Services emphasise the vital importance of map-reading in all training, it is strange how little all arms know of the Survey Service, who actually provide the maps on which they plan, fly and fight.

The main reasons for this are probably the non-existence of any military Survey Service in India, prior to 1939, and the fact that map-makers are always scarce birds, rather shy, and in war, pardonably security minded. With the coming of peace, there will be few active military survey units, and many members of the Forces may serve for years without ever meeting a survey unit "in the flesh". This article is intended to give these members, in brief, an idea as to what the Survey Service is and does.

Survey organisations, and methods vary in detail in different theatres and Commands, but the main features of the organisation and the principles on which they work, are the same everywhere. The details given below are taken from the Survey Service in India Command, the Survey Group, R.I.E.

THE MAKING OF MAPS.

In war, and in peace, the Survey Service is responsible for the provision of all maps for all arms (except, of course, the Navy, whose charts are provided by their own hydrographic service). We all know what a map looks like, and more vaguely, what it is. The Pocket Oxford Dictionary defines a map as "the flat representation of the earth, or some part of it, with its physical or political features."

In appearance it is generally a folded piece of paper, printed in several colours, on which the features of some portion of the earth are shown by means of more or less standardised symbols, on some one or other of a series of standardised scales. Since the earth is not really flat, there has to be some jugglery in order to fit the symbols into approximately their correct relative positions on a piece of paper. The technical name for this "jugglery" is the map "projection". There are a variety of projections in common use which the user can generally distinguish by the difference in shape of the network of lines of latitude and longitude, known as the "graticule", which covers the face of the map. Every map is made up of a framework of points which have been fixed accurately in relation to the graticule, and a detailed mass of symbols fitted to these points. The accurate framework is called the "control" for that particular map.

Production of any map falls into five distinct stages: provision of control, detail survey, fair-drawing of the map in all its symbols, reproduction of the desired number of copies, and finally its distribution to the map users. The

responsibility for all these rests with the Survey Service, except that they do not normally deliver maps forward of Divisional H.Q.

Provision of control for military mapping when required is carried out by the Field Survey Companies, using theodolites similar in principle to the common engineering theodolites, but reading angles to a very much higher order of accuracy. The points so fixed are mostly those which are shown as small triangles on the final map; they are known as "triangulation stations", and can be accepted as the most accurate data on the map.

Survey of detail can be carried out in one of two ways: air or ground survey. Before 1939, in peace time, most detail was surveyed in India by ground methods, originally developed in India and generally adopted by the rest of the world; in this type of work Indian surveyors still excel in both quality and speed. In war, obviously, it is impossible to send out surveyors into enemy territory, with the result that air-survey methods using photographs taken by the air forces, came rapidly to the fore and have now largely ousted ground methods for military purposes. Other things being equal, the best ground surveyors proved the best air-surveyors, and present day Indian air-surveyors are in no way behind the rest of the world in the accuracy of their results, in spite of the handicap of somewhat primitive equipment.

Air photographs, as all those who have tried to make up mosaics will know, provide a distorted view of almost any country, especially if it is at all hilly. The principle of air survey, as used in practice, but not in theory, are simple. They depend on the assumption, which is very nearly true, that a line drawn through any point on a truly vertical photograph and the centre of the photograph will pass through the 'true' position which that point would occupy if there were no distortion. By the use of two overlapping photographs in which the same point appears, it is possible to plot the "true" position of the point in plan at the scale of the photographs.

On a framework of points built up on these lines, the skilled air-surveyor, using the photographs as pairs in a stereoscope to give him a correct view of the country, is able to complete most of the details of the map. Certain information, such as the names of villages, cannot of course be obtained from the photographs and must be obtained from some other source; fortunately, this type of information does not change very rapidly, so it can usually be extracted from smaller scale maps or collected from intelligence sources. Furthermore, its accuracy, or even its absence, in no way detracts from the value of the map to the Gunners, who cannot shoot at a name!

It is most convenient to carry out ground surveys in blocks whose limits are natural obstacles such as high ridges, or rivers; on the other hand, air surveys are most easily handled in blocks which fit conveniently with the strips of photographs. Both types of "original surveys" have then to be combined into blocks of convenient size for the map user: the final individual map sheets. To do this, the "original surveys" are all brought to the same scale by photography and mosaiced together into the layout of the final maps. They are then "fair drawn" by draughtsmen in the form in which they are intended to be published.

All surveyors are trained draughtsmen, but it is frequently preferable not to use them as such but to send the original surveys to a special drawing-office for fair drawing, thus freeing the surveyors for more actual surveys. Normally only the largest scale maps are drawn from original surveys, others being

"compiled" from reductions of the component large scale sheets. Quarter-inch and all smaller scales are generally compiled; their production is then purely an office job, and the result entirely dependant on the skill and experience of the personnel employed. For this reason, most compiled maps are prepared by static units, located far from the fighting fronts, where working conditions are easier and a high standard of draughtsmanship can be maintained.

Map reproduction, the preparation of the printed copies from the fair drawn originals, is carried out by a process known as "photo-lithography". For this process, the original drawings are photographed on glass plates, or photographic films, to the exact size of the final map, a separate negative being made for each of the colours in which the map is to be published. In some methods, positives are made from the negatives at an intermediary stage.

From each of these negatives, or positives, a zinc printing plate is prepared. The zinc plate for each colour is mounted in the printing press in turn and the maps printed from them. Since each colour is printed from a separate plate, very careful adjustment of the machines is essential to ensure that each colour will print down in exact 'register', so that, for example, the hills and streams fall in their correct relative positions.

Lithographic presses of a great many varieties are to be found in the Survey Services of the world. Most presses print only one colour at one time, but presses exist which can print two, three or four colours simultaneously. The value of such machines depends on the number of copies required and the number of colours in which they are to be printed.

The number of colours varies considerably, depending on the complexity of the map and the urgency of the job; the more colours there are the more legible, within limits, the map will be, but the longer production will take. The average number of colours on military maps is about five, but up to thirteen or more have been used on occasion, while those who were in India early in the war will remember the "black-and-brown" maps which were printed when our resources did not permit anything except the utmost "austerity".

There is also a very wide variation in the number of copies; in war-time ten to twenty thousand copies were quite normal, up to sixty thousand not unusual, while in peace, before the war, often five hundred copies would prove too many. The size of the presses available is also one of the main factors in the sizes of the map sheets in which the different scale maps are published. British, and Indian, mobile field printing units are equipped with presses which will print maps up to about twenty-four inches by eighteen inches only, and therefore tactical maps, which it is often necessary to print in the field, are normally kept within these limits.

Semi-mobile units exist, however, which can print up to almost double this size, thirty-five inches by twenty-four inches, and the presses in Indian base units can print up to about thirty-five inches by forty-seven inches, printing in two colours simultaneously. There are presses in the American Army Map Service which can print up to sixty inches by forty inches, but no press of this size has yet been installed in India.

Once printed, the maps are stored in map depots until they are required for actual use. This apparently simple operation is one of the most important and most difficult tasks in the Survey Service. It is complicated by the fundamental nature of the map: that it is a depiction of some definite portion of the

earth's surface. This means that any map is for most purposes only of value when operations take place on that particular portion of the earth that it shows.

Unlike bully beef, beer, or even bullets, which may within reason be required and used anywhere, a map is only useful if it is of the right place and is available at the right time. To send maps of, for example, the Andaman Islands to Siam at a crucial moment is an error which cannot easily be rectified! Moreover, maps are heavy—about five hundred to a maund—and hurried last minute moves just before an operation are most undesirable.

THE MAP MAKERS.

The Survey Service in India is composed of personnel of the Survey Group, RIE, a semi-independent branch of the Corps of Royal Indian Engineers. The Survey Group is under the control of the Engineer-in-Chief for all Corps affairs, but is technically controlled by the operations section of the General Staff. At its head is the Director of Survey, who, with his staff, the Geographical Section of the General Staff, better known as "GSGS", is an integral part of the Military Operations Directorate at GHQ. There are also Survey representatives on the staffs of all formations down to Corps, in war, and Command, in peace.

The Survey units directly concerned with the provision of maps are: Air Survey Liaison Sections, Field Survey Companies, Map Reproduction Groups, Map Depots and Map Supply Sections. Besides these, there are a number of ancillary units, within the Survey Service, whose role is that of maintenance of the "working" units. These ancillary units include the Survey Depot, at Dehra Dun, which combines the functions of Record Office, Reinforcement and Training Centre; Survey Park Sections, which hold Survey stores in the field in similar fashion to the Field Park Companies, RIE; and other small specialised units. In all, more than twenty different types of Survey units were raised between 1939 and 1945 for service in India and South East Asia Command.

Air Survey Liaison Sections are small units whose primary role is to provide the link between the air force which provides the air photographs and the Survey units which want to use them. Survey photographs must be flown to a very rigid specification, which it was found impossible to achieve in war without actual personal liaison between Survey and the actual air force unit which was flying the photographic sorties.

Field Survey Companies are the backbone of the Survey Service. They carry out any ground control necessary, all ground and air surveys, and, normally, the final fair drawing of all maps on scales larger than quarter-inch, but do not do any compiled mapping. Each Company is commanded by a Major, has six other officers, including a non-technical Adjutant-and-Quartermaster, and about 250 other ranks. It is organised into a headquarters, two Ground Survey Sections and an Air Survey Section.

In 1939, Indian Field Survey Companies, like their British counterparts, included a Map Reproduction Section, but this has now been formed into a separate self-contained unit, the Map Reproduction Group, RIE. Map Reproduction Groups are complete mobile lithographic printing sections, with all their equipment mounted on ten-ton trucks, capable of printing about a quarter of a million four-colour maps each month. They are normally located near, and work in close co-operation with a Field Survey Company.

Partly because of the small size of the presses of the Map Reproduction Groups mentioned above, the greater portion of the maps required in war, other than the actual battle maps, are compiled and printed in static and semi-static base establishments. For India, these are mainly the resources of the Survey of India, located in Calcutta and Dehra Dun, which were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the Army during the war and have printed over eighty million maps for the armed forces in India and South East Asia.

The Map Depots, to which the printed maps are sent, are of many different types. Forward depots, located as near the front line as conditions will permit, are usually small and mobile; where road movement is possible they are provided with racked lorries for easy sorting and delivery of their maps. These depots are staffed by personnel of the Map Supply Sections, small units under the command of a Lieutenant, although individual depots are often the responsibility of a VCO. Further back are larger and more static depots, corresponding roughly to the formations and Commands. The largest of these is the GHQ Base Map Depot at Delhi.

MAPS IN WAR.

The part, be it never so humble, played by maps in every phase of military operations, is not always fully appreciated. For an illustration, let us consider a successful seaborne invasion.

The birth of the plan will have taken place at some session of the Higher Command, where the strategical situation will have been studied and discussed over small scale maps of the whole possible theatre of operations. These maps will have been prepared by the Survey Service, long before the outbreak of war, in anticipation of this very need.

The planning staffs will then be asked to produce more detailed plans. For these they will call for more detailed and up-to-date maps of the area suggested, and as the plan crystallises, large scale maps of important potential landing sites. These too, the Survey Service must provide, although the actual number of copies of any map required at this stage will be very small. Meanwhile, the intelligence sections concerned will have been collecting and collating all possible information of military value, including subjects as diverse as possible airfield sites, food stocks likely to be found at any season, the incidence of malaria, or the attitude of the inhabitants. They too, require maps, and at a later stage will probably ask for sketches and diagrams to be printed to illustrate their reports.

It will be noted that, so far, no final plan has yet been agreed on, and the only maps available will be those which the Survey Service are already holding, probably those which were carefully collected and prepared in peace; yet without these maps the planners cannot do their work. It is interesting to recall that at the beginning of this war, practically no maps whatever on a larger scale than one in two million, were available for issue in India; it is perhaps not unreasonable to connect this state of affairs with the fact that no military Survey Service existed in India at the time.

Once a provisional plan of operations has been accepted, the staff of all arms will be hard at work on all the detailed arrangements, and again maps will be in great demand, but still only in small numbers. The air force will be called on to make reconnaissance flights, for which they will need small scale topographical maps and plotting charts on which to navigate. Once more, if the demand is to be met, it must have been foreseen by the Survey Service;

such maps take many months to make and, at this stage, time is likely to be at a premium. From the photographs, taken on these reconce. flights, not only will intelligence information be extracted, but the maps themselves may be checked and revised.

If no large-scale tactical maps of the area exist, these will have to be made; in any case, it is almost certain that special large-scale maps of the actual beaches will be required, so special survey photographic sorties will be flown. On these special maps will later be overprinted intelligence information giving details of the enemy defences; these maps will be prepared by the Field Survey Companies and printed by the mobile Map Reproduction Groups.

No Force Commander has been known to have enough maps, so the limiting factor is usually the capacity of the available Survey troops, who are therefore likely to be hard pressed. Besides the actual maps, which will now be required in large numbers, there will be a steady stream of diagrams and sketches to be printed under conditions of great secrecy, also by the Survey Service.

Not only must the maps be provided for the actual assault, but maps must be prepared in advance for the follow-up, with due thought for a possible inch-by-inch struggle, like Cassino, or a race against time such as followed the break through in Normandy. For either contingency, maps must be ready, in their thousands, for immediate issue when required.

Even after the battle has swept on, the demands for maps go on; road maps will be required for the supply columns going forward, town plans for occupation troops and large scale plans for airfields, depots and dumps, administrative maps for the military officials trying to restore order in the civil affairs. This work goes on until, in time, the civil administration takes over, the civil map making organisation, whatever it may be, returns to work, and the military Survey Service passes unnoticed from the scene to return to its peace station and the making of strategic and other maps, which it is hoped will never be needed.

National Cadet Corps Formed

A National Cadet Corps, has been formed in India, its aims being to develop leadership, character and comradeship among Indian youths and to stimulate an interest in the defence of the country. Those cadets who undergo training in the Corps but do not join the Navy, the Army or the Air Force would still be available in a national emergency, to provide a reserve of leaders.

A committee, the National Cadet Corps Committee, has been set up to make recommendations for the establishment, on a full national basis, of a Cadet Corps organisation, which may comprise both schools and colleges. The committee will decide whether the training of cadets should be confined to basic training common to all three Services or whether cadets should be encouraged to specialise in one of the Services only.

At the first meeting of the Committee it was decided to contact the Secretaries of the Education Departments of the various provinces and States in order to ensure their co-operation. When the required material has been collected a sub-committee will tour the provinces and some of the bigger Indian States to examine the position on the spot. It is hoped that this will enable the committee to frame such recommendations as will command the widest support.

WARRIORS FROM MILKSOPS

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL RAJENDRA SINGH

WHEN we are young we are all milksops because we feed on milk. When we grow up we become either hard, or remain soft according to the circumstances of our life, which, like alloys, give hardness, flexibility or brittleness to the metal. There is a big gap between the origin of the milksop and his christening as a warrior. . .

In 1933 I joined the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun straight out of the embryo; my knowledge of the Army was limited to the stories I had heard from a relative, a Subedar Major in the last war. From the Army point of view I was a "milksop, class I", or, to hide my inferiority, "raw". In our batch were thirty gentlemen cadets of degrees of rawness; some, like me, came straight from a college; at least half were from the ranks. A few had more developed personality than others.

We started to train. We all did our best, but the report at the end of the first term was a revelation. Two cadets were removed; a few dropped; and I and about half a dozen others was condemned in general terms: "If he does not show all round improvement, he will render himself liable for removal." The judgment was passed.

During those days of trial (they were full of suspense and insecurity) I was able to judge the working of the mind of the only person who mattered—the Company Commander. Nobody having told us what was required of an officer, we blundered along to find out for ourselves, and our best method was to compare ourselves with those who were dropped or removed. Let me give you our interpretation of the judgment of the Company Commander:

Lack of Personality.—Three quarters of the removals were on this ground. Comparing the looks of the cadets who were removed and those of the "blue-eyed" boys, we found the meaning of personality—the outward appearance. A few grew moustaches; I shaved a little of mine to give it the right curve. But what, in fact, is personality? It is hard to define.

Lack of Leadership.—Most of the civilian cadets—those who came from the colleges, were removed on this ground. This quality of leadership was easier to apprehend: at every conceivable opportunity we tried to be "forward", to shout louder on the square, and laugh loudest in the mess. But Leadership, as we understand it now, is something more. But how was it then determined?

Physical Fitness.—I took part in every conceivable race and generally came first, but I was termed "physically weak". To become robust we copied the real tough ones and started drinking beer.

Educational Standard.—Quite a few of the army cadets were removed for their educational backwardness. All instructions were in English, so our educational standard was judged according to our knowledge of that language. We therefore read all the cheap magazines to get the real hang of slang words and slang phrases.

Others were removed in the initial stages owing to their lack of character, their mental outlook or practical application, and in the last two terms owing to their lack of professional knowledge. Thus, only twenty cadets passed out; it included a few who had joined us from senior terms. I was one of them. We were commissioned and became warriors.

After a few years I was fortunate enough to be appointed an instructor at an O.T.S., where I could examine the position and development of a cadet in retrospect, comparing him with my own cadet life. Here, however, the metaphors had to be carried out in only six months, and cadets in the company never numbered less than 100; moreover, they were a mixed crowd of British and Indian and varied in service, experience and mentality.

I do not propose to discuss the quality of the officers we produced. What I do want to emphasise is that the cadets from the O.T.S. were removed for the same causes as those who were removed from the I.M.A., and sometimes the wastage was more than 50%. What were the reasons for this wastage?

One hundred cadets were mixed in a company; some were obviously not as good as others—they were the doubtful starters; grouped, as they were, in a company, it was not possible to give them individual attention. Thus the short-cut to getting an average standard of a company high was to remove the weak ones. They can never get a chance unless the system of training is changed, and the Company Commander steps down from the stool of justice where he can do no wrong, and becomes a teacher, responsible for producing quality consistent with quantity.

To teach a cadet who is good is easy; to train an "average" cadet is difficult; and to bring up a backward man requires courage and time. Is it the job of the Instructor to produce good warriors from the stock supplied to him, or is it to use his personality and endeavour to improve the quality of those below average? The answer is difficult. If he concentrates on improving the weak ones he may be losing the time for bettering the good ones. Thus, when considering training we must bear in mind (i) the instructors, (ii) the cadets and (iii) the training methods.

(i) The teacher is the most important factor, and it is on his personality that the shape of the warriors-to-be depends. There are many types of instructors, but generally they can be classified into those who are interested and those who are not. The former are few; their love for training enables them to take a real interest in the cadets; they have an inner urge and produce a personal contact. But most instructors fall in the second category; they are not interested, and carry out their duties according to the book of words; they take refuge behind catch-phrases like "Selection Boards are not sending us the right material" or "The candidates lack background and I have not the time for them". This attitude is definitely wrong.

The greatest mistake, however, lies in the selection of teachers. Someone in G.H.Q. believes that every officer can make a good instructor. It is far from true. Teaching is a profession and requires special qualities of understanding, training and a fair knowledge of human psychology, as well as professional knowledge. Unless we have good teachers we shall not produce the right material. Here, then, are some suggestions for getting better instructors:

The officer concerned must be interested in training.—Unless a person has the inner urge to improve the lot of those under him he will not produce the

right psychological atmosphere. He will, like many of his prototypes in Indian schools and colleges, "exist" during the class hours. Instructors must be volunteers.

Professional Knowledge.—A teacher must be fit for his job. You cannot make an officer an instructor in the Staff College unless he himself has been there. This is even more important at the I.M.A., where instructors have to deal with raw material.

Pool of Training Officers.—A pool of training officers should be created. When an officer attends a course, or shows an aptitude for training, his name should be recommended to the D.M.T.; he should be classified according to his professional knowledge. If more instructors are required, the names of officers who volunteer and are recommended should be called for.

Selection of Training Officers.—The right Instructor should be selected for the right job. An officer earmarked for an instructional appointment should appear before a Selection Board, which must judge his general aptitude and not his professional qualifications. The officer should spend at least three weeks with the Board to see their method of working and their system of selection.

Training of Selected Officers.—The officers must be trained in the methods of training—this is an axiom which cannot be over-emphasised. They must learn the latest methods and appliances available, and not be left to find them out for themselves.

Posting of Officers to Instructional Institutions.—The qualified officers can now be posted to various Institutions, according to their qualifications. It is preferable to "attach" them for three months before they are absorbed into the establishment. This would help the Commandant in making his last sorting, instead of having to accept what is posted to him.

If this system is adopted we shall get the right instructors—but it is obvious that very few officers will like to risk their whole future career if they have to undergo the above ordeals simply for an ideal. We must face facts. Instructors are also human beings, and something must be done to make the teacher's job more attractive and lucrative. Here are some suggestions:

(a) *To be an Instructor is a privilege.*—Instructors after six months at the Staff College get the qualifications of *p.s.c.* An instructor who has done a good job of work for the same period at any school of instruction should be given a degree to add after his name. It may be Q.I. (Qualified Instructor).

(b) *It helps in professional knowledge.*—An instructor must realise that by instructing in a subject he is not only improving his professional knowledge, but is also furthering his future prospects. A Q.I. must be given "D" in the subject he has been teaching.

(c) *Accelerated Promotion.*—Instructors at a school, generally speaking, should hold an appointment one step higher than their actual rank. This would make the appointment more attractive, and, moreover, as it would be a staff appointment, there would be the added inducement that he would draw the appropriate staff allowances.

(d) It must be made clear that an officer who is rejected by the Selection Board or at any stage of training, as unsuitable to be an instructor, will not have an adverse remark against him.

Let us, then, assume that we have the right type of instructors. What of the cadets whom they have to train? I dealt with the subject of their selection by the Selection Board in my article "Is Scientific Selection Successful?",

so here I will set out a few facts which should be borne in mind, and the few defects which I consider should be removed:

(i) At present the Instructional Staff has no say in the selection of cadets (I am only referring to the I.M.A.). Instructors should be attached to the Selection Boards for short periods: *vice versa*, members of Selection Boards must have training experience.

(ii) Candidates will certainly be of varying degrees of intelligence and experience; they must be classified accordingly. This will lead to smaller classes. In any case, one officer should not deal with more than twenty, or at the most, twenty-five cadets.

(iii) Candidates of the same standard of intelligence and experience should study together; they should not be put into one class because they were selected at the same time. Once the various divisions have reached a uniform standard they should be mixed together. This suggestion envisages graded classes—like the rungs of a ladder where persons can be graded up and down according to their proficiency. This may be easier in the earlier stages, but difficult in the later ones, when instruction will have to be more centralised. But the beginning is important.

(iv) Is it better to have one officer responsible for the group throughout the period of training, or should the group be trained by various experts? There are two schools of thought on this point, but I am inclined to a compromise. In the initial stages, when the personal touch and the personality of the instructor plays a vital part, one instructor should be solely responsible. Later, when professional qualifications of instructors are more important, the latter method should be adopted.

We now come to the last factor—the system of training. Bearing in mind our object, the training should be so organised that it not only brings out the best in the man, but also helps him to acquire certain qualities which he did not possess, or qualities which were latent in him. Training in the O.T.S. should be divided into three stages: (a) General development; (b) education; (c) professional knowledge.

In general development I include development of character, personality, and leadership. I do not propose to digress as to the particular methods for developing these qualities—that will be the function of the Training School for Instructors. It requires a very intimate contact between teacher and pupil; unless the instructor knows the strong and weak points of each cadet he will not be able to bring out the best in the individual.

The educational training requires no explanation; it must be practical, and not like that which applied in the I.M.A. in pre-war days, when cadets who had graduated in mathematics were called upon to re-learn addition and subtraction.

As to (c)—well, if after (a) and (b) the milksop remains a milksop, training in arms will not make him a warrior. This professional knowledge training must start only after the architect has approved the laying of the foundations.

I am convinced that if we adopt the above methods, we can definitely reduce the percentage of wastages from the I.M.A. "Removing" a cadet hits back like a boomerang. The more cadets we "remove", the less will be the numbers coming forward for selection by the Selection Board. At the same time, we can never allow "milsops" to impersonate as "warriors".

PROSPECTS FOR NEWCOMERS TO AUSTRALIA

BY LARRY BOYS

AUSTRALIA offers many opportunities for men with limited capital who wish to start small businesses. She has at present an expanding economy, a growing industrialisation programme, and a steadily increasing population which will soon be augmented by a planned immigration scheme.

As industry continues to expand, and the Australian Government's plan for 70,000 migrants a year begins to operate, Australia should provide scope for almost every class of economic activity.

Looking at a map of Australia, it is easy to forget that her population is largely urban. Two-thirds of the total population of $7\frac{1}{2}$ millions live in the towns and cities. Plans are well advanced for the decentralisation of industry. This should mean opportunities in either small or large communities for business enterprise in many fields. There is room for new ideas in every town and city; a number of American ex-servicemen discharged in Australia have already opened up new "lines" with marked success.

INCOME-TAX

Heavy war-time income tax rates are being reduced, and two substantial cuts came into force during 1946. Others will come as soon as circumstances permit. A man with an income of £500 a year (Australian currency) would pay today £98.7.0., if without dependants, and £58.1.0., if with a wife and two children. With £1,000 a year, tax would be £273.7.0 (without dependants) and £217.10.0., with a wife and two children. (£1 sterling equals £1.5s. Australian).

In general, residents of Australia are not subject to tax on income derived from sources outside Australia, if that income has already been taxed in the country of its origin. A retired officer who settles in Australia will find, therefore, that his retirement pension will be free from Australian taxation if it is subject to tax in the country where the pension fund is located.

It should, of course, be borne in mind that owing to the existing exchange rate, a British or Indian Army pension of £500 sterling a year would be worth £625 in Australian currency. All capital transferred to Australia would come under the same rate of exchange, i.e., £1 sterling equals £1.5s. Australian.

At present, the actual purchasing value of the Australian pound, in Australia, is roughly equivalent to that of the pound sterling in England. Certain commodities are cheaper in Australia than in England; others more expensive. The average of all incomes in Australia in 1943 was £327 (Australian) which, incidentally, would generally represent the normal annual earnings of the average skilled adult tradesman.

The basic weekly wage for industry, fixed by the Arbitration Court, is £5 for Sydney and slightly less in the other capital cities. This wage is fixed according to the cost of living, and fluctuates with the prices of certain specified commodities. It is the lowest wage which can be paid to any male worker

over 21, however unskilled, who is working in an industry covered by an industrial award. Extra margins over and above this rate are granted for skill in particular trades.

These figures should give a fair idea of the standard of living and the value of an income. An Army officer retiring on a pension of, say, £500 sterling a year would find that, on the £625 (Australian) which his pension would be worth in Australia, he could live quite comfortably in reasonable middle-class circumstances.

ADVICE TO NEWCOMERS

A newcomer who has no pension should be prepared to maintain himself for some time after his arrival in Australia, while he looks around for a suitable opportunity and location for his business. Once in Australia, he would be in a position to obtain the best advice from reliable sources, and to judge the prospects for himself.

Army officers and others contemplating coming to Australia on retirement or discharge should decide exactly what they want to do there. If they are prospective businessmen, they should know what the position of the market is, and how great is the competition in their own particular line, before making a firm decision on what sort of business to start, or buy, in Australia.

There is little difference between British and Australian small retail, servicing, catering and manufacturing concerns, although in some cases the problems of distribution and delivery are different because of the longer distances involved. The "corner shop" in Australia is very similar to its counterpart in England. Trading conditions and customs are much the same in both countries, though wages received by Australian shop assistants are fairly high in comparison with those paid in other countries.

In Australia, as anywhere else, success in business largely depends on the individual—his experience, business acumen, personality, industry, and, of course, financial resources. Many British ex-servicemen, demobilised in Australia, have set up businesses—a fair number of them with only small capital and already a lot of them appear to have had considerable success. These men have been long enough in the country to look around, weigh up prospects, and be certain of where they will fit in. In a lot of cases, too, they had considerable previous experience in the business they have undertaken.

ON THE LAND

People contemplating life on the land in Australia are generally advised to acquire some experience of Australian conditions before taking over a property of their own, because climatic and other conditions differ greatly in Australia from those in other countries, particularly Britain.

There is comparatively little cleared land available for new settlement, except in Western Australia and Queensland. Apart from certain improved and partly-improved lots, most of the land available for settlement in these two States is in virgin country which will have to be cleared by the new settler before the land can be prepared for crops or grazing.

Although the various State Governments are at present concentrating on settlement of Australian ex-servicemen on the land, British and naturalised British citizens are eligible to acquire land by purchase on the open market, to enter into normal terms of payment, and, on purchase of land, to seek loans on standard terms.

Due to lack of experience in particular local conditions, to restricted knowledge of farming methods in Australia, and to different social conditions, many British settlers who have tried to settle on the land during the past 25 years have failed. There were also migrant settlers who shared with Australian primary producers natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and who failed because they had not had time to establish themselves firmly and were without the necessary financial resources to withstand such setbacks.

Increased mechanisation and more intensive farming due to irrigation and modern fertilisation have considerably reduced the number of workers employed on the land in Australia, without, however, affecting total production. Australia's main wealth still comes from her primary produce, of which there is great variety, owing to the wide range of climates and soils.

Some ex-officers of the Royal Navy and other Services have been successful in purchasing poultry, fruit and mixed farms, but generally speaking not many such properties come up for sale.

HEALTH ECONOMY

An indication of the healthy state of Australia's economy is the fact that already, only a year after the end of the war, demobilisation of the Australian Armed forces has been practically completed, and most of the men and women who were in Australian uniform on VJ Day have been re-absorbed into civilian life without dislocation of industry. Of 500,000 service personnel discharged since VJ Day, only 4,855 were receiving re-employment allowances (payments made to discharged personnel while awaiting employment) in mid-September 1946. One of the main obstacles to full immigration has, therefore, virtually disappeared.

Australia is not looking particularly for businessmen and farmers, though there are opportunities in these groups. Her main need is for skilled craftsmen and qualified technicians to assist in the tremendous expansion of secondary industry. There are good openings for qualified professional men, although overseas qualifications do not always mean registration in Australia.

HOUSING PROBLEM

In the order of priorities recently announced in Canberra, building tradesmen head the list of workers required. A thousand first-class tradesmen are coming from Britain to help solve Australia's grave housing problem. It is almost impossible to rent a home at present, and building materials and workers are in such short supply that it is as difficult to have one built to order.

The Commonwealth and State governments are tackling the problem, and hope to catch up on arrears at the rate of something like 50,000 new houses a year. Even so, it will be some years before the housing position is normal. Anyone who is considering going to Australia at an early date should be, therefore, prepared to lodge, or live in an hotel, or in some other form of temporary accommodation, until he is able to rent or purchase a home. If he is lucky, he may get a flat.

Because the Australian Government is retaining the war-time price-control measures, which include rent-pegging, little exploitation by unscrupulous house owners has been possible.

These price-control regulations have succeeded most effectively in keeping down the cost of living, and Australia can claim to have retained one of the highest living standards in the world. Food is good, plentiful, and comparatively cheap, although to assist less fortunate nations Australia is continuing to ration

certain foods such as tea, meat, sugar and butter. Allowances of these are, however, fairly generous. Hotels and restaurants serve rationed items with only moderate restrictions.

Clothes are strictly rationed, and in short supply. A man who is measured for a suit may have to wait some months before it is delivered. Cigarettes and tobacco are scarce, though the position is expected to ease very soon.

EDUCATION

Education in Australia is free and compulsory from the age of six up to 14, 15 or 16 years, varying with the States. There are also numerous private schools, organised on the English public school model, with fees ranging from £20 to £200 per annum. Free education is provided in State secondary and technical schools, and there are special agricultural colleges for student farmers.

Scholarships are obtainable to carry pupils through universities, and there is a system of subsidies for university and technical students whose parents might otherwise be unable to give them a higher education. Perth, capital of West Australia, possesses the only entirely free university in the British Empire, and one of the few such institutions in the world.

All capital cities, and many of the larger towns, have kindergartens. The demand for pre-school facilities, however, considerably exceeds the accommodation.

CLIMATE

The Australian climate, ranging from the tropical to the temperate, is generally healthy. No Australian capital city gets less than an average of six hours sunshine a day throughout the year. Comparative climates of capital cities are:

Brisbane, semi-tropical; Perth, Adelaide and Sydney, resembling that in Mediterranean countries, but "softer", particularly in Sydney; Melbourne, similar to Paris; Hobart like Devon or Cornwall. The climate of Canberra, Australia's Federal Capital, is quite distinctive; with cold, bright winter days and hot, dry summer. Canberra's spring and autumn seasons are particularly beautiful.

Population figures are—New South Wales, 2,912,791 (Sydney, 1,398,000); Victoria, 2,020,449 (Melbourne 1,170,000); Queensland, 1,085,681 (Brisbane, 370,500); South Australia, 631,596 (Adelaide 362,500); West Australia, 491,579 (Perth 263,000); Tasmania, 249,499 (Hobart 70,800); Northern Territory (whites), 5,239; Australian Capital Territory (Canberra), 14,925.

RECREATION—INE PENSIVE AND VARIES

Australia is a sporting nation, and the main seasonal games, cricket and football, have large followings for such a small population. Football is split into four different codes—Australian Rules (a distinctive national game), Soccer, and Rugby (League and Union). Attendances at horse and dog races total 4,000,000 a year, and gymkhanas, rodeos and country "picnic" race meetings are well supported.

Tennis, golf, hockey, baseball, yachting, lacrosse, bowls shooting and horse-riding are all immensely popular; there is first-class angling in the inland rivers, and in the creeks and estuaries, and the big-game fishing off the coast (marlin, shark, tuna, etc.) is excellent.

Winter sports in the Australian Alps are within easy reach of Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra for week-ends or longer holidays. Tasmania's snow slopes are also attractive.

Australia's ocean beaches are so world-famous as to require only passing mention. In the Sydney area alone, upwards of a quarter of a million people go to the Pacific Ocean surfing beaches in a single summer afternoon.

Apart from the undoubted attraction of its climate and the abundance of life's necessities, Australia is one of the few countries in the world with a clearly apparent future of expansion and development. It is peopled by folk whose loyalty to the Mother Country and the Empire is equalled only by their own national pride. It is a country where a man or woman of British stock is always assured of a fair deal from a kind hearted hospitable people.

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Officers in India who wish to know more of the prospects in Australia should write to the Office of the High Commissioner for Australia, corner Queensway/Connaught Place, New Delhi.

Officers' Pensions Society

A member writes:

With the object of endeavouring by every means in its power to bring the purchasing power of Officers' retired pay and pensions of widows and dependents more in accord with the present cost of living, an Officers' Pensions Society has been registered in the United Kingdom as a limited liability company not having a share capital. Membership is open to retired officers of all three Fighting Services, to wives and relatives of serving or retired officers, and to widows and relatives of deceased officers.

The ratio of retired pay to full pay has decreased considerably since 1914, with the result that the former is now quite inadequate to enable retired officers to maintain their officer status in retirement. Moreover, the nature of their profession and their ages on retirement invariably deprives them of any civilian market value worth mentioning. Pension for officers, widows and dependents, too, have hardly altered since the early years of the nineteenth century.

This unfair and unsatisfactory state of affairs can only be adjusted by those interested forming themselves into an organised body of opinion, and it is in order that that may be done that the Society has been formed. It intends to press the case of officers' pensions before Parliament and public, and in any other direction which they may think will be effective.

Adequate financial resources will be essential, and those eligible for membership are invited to become subscribing members. The annual subscription, which expires at the end of each calendar year, is £1, except for widows of deceased officers, for whom it is 10s.

Subscriptions and requests for all information concerning the Society should be sent to the Secretary, Officers' Pensions Society, c/o Gale & Polden, Ltd., Ideal House, Oxford Circus, London, W. 1.

MY VIEWS ON INDIA'S POST-WAR FORCES

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL C. B. PONNAPPA.

IT IS now accepted high policy that the Indianisation of Indian Armed Forces should be expedited as much as possible, consistent with efficiency. What are the chief points which would help to determine the post-war forces of this country? They may be divided into three: (a) defence; (b) internal security; and (c) finance. Taking them *seriatim*, let us examine and study them under these heads:

Defence.—Our navy must be strong and modern, capable of protecting India's long coast-line, and in co-operation with the navies of the world, assist in protecting international sea routes. Our ships must be owned and manned by Indians; the latter will necessitate the establishment of a reasonably powerful Merchant Marine, which will serve as the man-power for India's coastal and part of her foreign trade. India must have its modern port and training facilities, and must build her own craft and battleships.

The Army must be strong and mobile, containing the nucleus of all arms; it must be strong not only numerically, but also in fire power and mobility. Its units must be stationed in strategic places; its motor and air transport sections will ensure rapid movement to any specified locality.

Our Air Force must be very powerful and modern, its machines owned by India and manned by Indians. India must have equal rights and privileges in passenger and freight air services on international air routes, with a monopoly of internal lines reserved for Indian companies.

Each of the above three Services must have a large volunteer reserve, initial training for which should be three years, followed by eight weeks annual training until the individual reaches the age of 45. A University air and naval training corps should be formed and expanded on modern lines.

Internal Security.—This must be mainly the responsibility of the Police Force. Indian troops may be used in special cases, but no British troops should be employed on this duty.

Finance.—The establishment of an efficient armed force should not be retarded by financial considerations. A strong navy, army and air force is a worthwhile insurance which prevents defeat and changes it to success in war.

Recruitment.—Our requirements will be: (i) Officers, I. C. Os and V. C. Os; (ii) Other Ranks; and (iii) arms and equipment.

The type of person required as an I. C. O. was well described in an article in 1944 in the *U. S. I. Journal* by Colonel D. Portway, who was then President of a Selection Board in India. He said: "The right type of man to lead the Indian sailor, soldier and airman is not the man to whom mere selfish motives make the grateful appeal. It is surely the patriotic motive and that alone that will persuade the better type of Indian to risk the supreme sacrifice in the defence of his country. It is not the man who is seeking safe administrative employment that is wanted, but the fighting leader, whether on land, sea or in the air."

"Surely," Colonel Portway wrote, "it is no good burking the political implication. We must educate the Indians to realise the need for leaders in the defence of an India of full Dominion status. It is appeal to higher motives and ethics, rather than self-interest, which is involved. For India can acquire the spirit of Service quite as much as any other nation, but it will never be achieved under the present educational orientation."

The majority of officers in the post-war Indian Army are going to be Indians, and now that the war is over the Army should have the first refusal of all E.C.I.Os who have the experience, efficiency and essential minimum qualifications. Officers up to 30 years of age should be granted a permanent Commission and be allowed to count their war service for pay, seniority and pension. General Moore rightly said in his article in October, 1944 in the *U. S. I. Journal* that "it is essential that every officer should have knowledge of his job. Most of us would prefer to serve under a leader whose efficiency was undoubted, even though his moral stature left much to be desired."

When and where necessary, only officers from Britain should be employed. No European or Dominion subject should be employed except on a reciprocal basis, and on terms of equality in every respect.

We now come to the V.C.O. category. This is a machine age, wherein mental calibre is going to count over physical strength, and the Army will require men with a high standard of body development and brain. The late war proved that the V.C.O. more than justified himself, and during the possible twenty years' transitional period of organisation, if for no other reason than financial, he must be retained. I am certain that the efficiency of the Army will not be affected by the retention of V.C.Os with war experience.

As to the V.C.Os pay and allowances, I suggest the basic rate should be:

Jemadar.—Rs. 100, rising to Rs. 150, with marriage allowance of Rs. 20, and a child allowance of Rs. 10 for each child.

Subedar.—Rs. 175, rising to Rs. 250, plus similar marriage and children's allowances as for *Jemadar*.

Subedar-Major.—Rs. 300, plus the allowances granted to the above V.C.Os, plus a special S. M. allowance of Rs. 50.

Other Ranks.—I would strongly recommend that Battalions be organised on a Provincial basis, rather than on an All-India basis to begin with. For administrative reasons it may be necessary to have Class companies during the transitional period, but they should be in lower sub-Units. It would be wise to raise a few All-India units. Special organisations like the I.A.R.O. (British Wing) and the A. F. (I) should be abolished, and the Territorial units on a Provincial basis be retained; they must, of course, be armed and trained to meet modern requirements.

Pay rates should be: *Sepoy*, Rs. 50; *L/Naik*, Rs. 55; *Naik*, Rs. 60; *Havildar*, Rs. 70; *Coy. Hav.-Major and Coy. Q. M.*, Rs. 80; *Bn. Hav.-Major and B. Q. M. H.*, Rs. 90. Allowances for all should be Rs. 10 marriage allowance, and Rs. 5 allowance for each child. All Other Ranks should be eligible for Proficiency Pay.

Children of all V.C.Os and men should be given free education in military Garrison Schools up to and including the Middle School standard. It would be wise to make Roman Urdu compulsory in all educational Institutions wholly and partially financed by public funds. Facilities must also be provided to impart technical training to those children who wish to avail themselves of it. Under

this system children of soldiers will grow up in a military atmosphere; should the boys later become soldiers their standard and efficiency will be improved, to the benefit of the Fighting Services as a whole.

Arms, Transport and Equipment.—India possesses unlimited man-power and material resources, and under its new Constitution the country must be raised to a higher standard of industrialisation and protected against foreign competition. All industrialised products used in India and used by its Armed Forces must be thus protected. In consumers' goods and Armed Forces requirements, the country's aim must be self-sufficiency. Control of India's industries and manufactures must never again be in foreign hands, even in the hands of members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, unless it be on a reciprocal basis. This is a right which all equals must enjoy if they are to be equals. Part of the sterling balances should be immediately used to attain this object.

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS

"Half-measures are poor measures." Some sort of compulsory or national service will be necessary, but in drawing up the rules for such service, care should be taken not to legislate against human nature. Every man must be allowed to join the Branch of the Service which he likes best, and which he would like to adopt as his profession in life.

To obtain permanent service in Civil or Municipal departments, a man must have put in at least three years' of military service, which he should be entitled to count for seniority and pension in his permanent service in the Civil or Municipal departments. Students in Universities (except those who are medically unfit) must put in four years military training before they are eligible to obtain a degree of Education or a post in an official Civil or Municipal department.

India must depend on its University Training Corps for its commissioned officers, V.C.Os and N.C.Os. These Corps must be reorganised and controlled on the right lines, so that students may be able to fulfil the above conditions. Military Science must be compulsory in all colleges. Industrial concerns must be compelled to employ men trained in Service Technical Schools and Workshops. If all this is done there will be no dearth of recruits of the right type for the three Services—and it will go a long way to solving the problem of getting our long-service men as volunteers.

It would be a very wise step to establish a system of Home Guards, who could be called up at short notice. The Armed Forces of the future will have in them a place for all types—the brainy, the brawny, the artist, the musician and the scientist. We now have many experienced soldiers of all ranks who would like to remain in the Fighting Services; they can be depended upon to be the "trainees" of future sailors, soldiers and airmen, and as such they are a great asset to our nation.

Pay and pensions for all ranks should not be less than those sanctioned for those in equivalent Civil and Municipal ranks. If anything, indeed, the pay should be more attractive, bearing in mind the risks involved in military service, and the wide area in which they may be called upon to serve. Moreover, in the future Fighting Services science and mechanics will play an important part, so that its members must be educated men, whose pay must be proportionately attractive.

As every officer and man must know of the work and capabilities of the other branches of the Services, it would be advantageous if the curriculum adopted at the American West Point Military Academy was followed; that curriculum provides facilities for making cadets better qualified officers, and more useful citizens.

Staff Colleges for each of the three branches of the Armed Forces should be established in order to help officers to name their special subjects; and each of these Institutions should be established close to each other. There should be only one Defence College for officers of all three Services, and it must be a residential College. Immediate steps should be taken to send some of our Indian Commissioned Officers to specialist colleges and institutions to member-countries of the United Nations in order that they may widen their knowledge and acquire fresh ideas.

Speaking on India at the Youth Conference at Peterborough in 1945, Lord Listowel rightly said: "There is an immediate reservoir of stifled aspiration and hidden talent waiting to be tapped for the service of India." I devoutly hope that this sincere desire will be fulfilled very soon for the good of India and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

CONCLUSION

Here, then, is a summary of my suggestions for the post-war Armed Forces of India:

1. The political status of India and Indians must be changed and become equal to the status of dominions like Canada and Australia.
2. The control of India's Armed Forces must be under the Dominion Government of India, thus transforming the loyal Armed Force of the country into a patriotic one.
3. The Indian educational system must be reorganised to encourage physical and intellectual capabilities; roman Urdu must be made compulsory in all Government Institutions.
4. All Indians must have equal opportunity for military training, and for entry into the Armed Forces of the country. There is only one class in India—it is the Indian.
5. The industry of the country—both heavy industry and that manufacturing consumers' goods—must be encouraged, with a view to obtaining self-sufficiency in all requirements. India's requirements in armaments and all kinds of fighting equipment to be obtained from India.
6. The exchange policy of India must be changed to enable her to buy and sell in international markets without any handicaps or obstruction.
7. Steps must be taken to make Indians patriotic members of the Commonwealth of Nations.

Hard words between friends break no bones; indeed, they prevent fractures, and it is better to express an honest opinion honestly and frankly. It is in that frame of mind I have set out my views, my chief and only object being a just and lasting settlement of our problems to India, to the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to the United Nations of the world.

A TERRITORIAL ARMY FOR INDIA ?

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL W.F.P. SUTTON.

HANSARD, Vol. 424, 26th June 1946, contains many pages of debate on the Army Estimates, including the future of the Territorial Army in Great Britain. As a Territorial Army Officer serving in India and with some pre-war service in the ranks of the T.A. at home, the writer has pondered a little on (a) Is there a place for such an organisation in India's defence scheme? (b) Its advantages, (c) How to get about it, (d) What to avoid. Someone once said "The worst of amateur meat carvers is that the gravy seldom matches the wall-paper". That is my position, in that I know little of the set-up of Territorial or Reserve Forces in India prior to 1939, and no idea beyond press reports of what is contemplated.

India in peace will have her own Regular Army—a voluntary one—to meet her peace-time needs and be the nucleus for expansion if an emergency calls for it. Before the war, to augment the wholetime forces, there were the A.F.I. and the A.T.F. The A.F.I., it is understood, was a body drawn from a circumscribed field of recruitment, a field inhabited by the very people who could not be spared from their normal avocations in time of war—Government servants, and managerial staff of industrial houses. Their peace-time training therefore helped to keep down spreading fronts and enabled them to meet socially in a drill hall, otherwise it was a waste of time and effort. Of the A.T.F. I know nothing, except that it appears to have been a kind of "other ranks" version of the British O.T.C., urban units tied to schools and colleges.

What can a Territorial Army do for India? First of all, though, a definition; "It is a second-line voluntary force, the members of which train in their spare time to qualify for the defence of their country in time of need". In these days of seaborne and airborne forces, India is vulnerable territory, with a vast area and a long coastline to defend. Even granted some warning of where an aggressor intends to strike, to move forces to that point would involve an unpleasantly long-time element, apart from airborne defenders, and they would be in comparatively small strength.

No doubt India will have a Regular Army as small as Finance can get it, and even with its Reservists by no means large enough to cope with an aggressor; so the moment war comes the Army must expand. With what? Completely raw recruits, who have to be trained from scratch, thereby taking up vital time, and diverting the energies of badly-needed instructors from the Regular Army? Or in part by men who have devoted time to basic training—the roughed-out stone requiring only the smoothing-off process, the polishing, for the finished article. The size of such a force is a Staff-cum-Finance affair. Its composition must take account of several considerations, which will give not only the best return in the event of war, but can have a profound effect on the community in peace-time. I will suggest some of them.

(i) It must be drawn from all classes, races, social strata, or whatever one calls it, which make up the conglomeration that is India. As has been shown during the late war, Indians can live in harmony and brotherhood in the

Service, and carry that spirit into their civilian lives. There is a source of man-power which was hardly tapped during the recent emergency, the equivalent of the British middle class, sons of merchants and minor Government servants. They are literate, often in more than one language, educated, their school life has trained them in a measure of discipline and sport. What a fruitful field for potential leaders!

(ii) It must be equipped and trained as far as possible with the tools it will use in war, not with the Regular Army's "left-overs". That needs no amplification.

(iii) *Recruiting* must be selective; that is to say, training must not be wasted on a man whose job would be a key one in the event of war. There are qualifications to this ; for example, certain personnel of the P & T and Railway Departments whom it may be desirable to "militarise" in emergency.

(iv) *Physical standards* must be rigid, both by initial and periodical examination.

(v) *Training periods* should be paid ones; it is suggested that they should be at the rate of one day's pay according to rank for every eight hours training. Two two-hour "drills" per week would thus mean two days' pay per month—not ruinous.

(vi) *Annual Training*.—Definitely. In India, above all, for men to live and work together is very necessary. As many T.A. units as can be brought together in one place should "go to camp", at a judicious time of year. Such camps would also be an exercise for movements and railway staffs and useful to accustom troops to strange terrain—"plains" units to the hills and *vice versa*. Needless to say, full pay and allowances as for a Regular soldier would be given at camp. In the first instance, it would be more profitable, and more in accord with the spirit of such a Defence Force, for it to learn to look after its own area—a kind of Home Guard. The move to other areas could follow later.

(vii) *Age and Service*.—Enlistment between 17 and 21 years of age, for three years, with option to extend, if approved, for one year at a time, until service totals fifteen years for officers, twelve years for senior N.C.Os. and eight years for those below. A small gratuity based on service and rank should be paid on satisfactory discharge, with a certificate.

(viii) *Dress*.—At the end of recruit's training, which should be completed before the first camp, a simple and distinctive uniform should be issued *and worn at all parades*. The difference in bearing and the attitude to training periods when in uniform was very noticeable in the T.A. at home. Nothing looked more sloppy than to see an assortment of civilian dress, from dungarees to gents' natty suitings, on a parade, with much raising of hats as an *ersatz* salute. A uniform emphasises that "you are in the Army now" and is a source of pride. Additionally a lapel badge or brooch should be issued for wear off parade. The wearer is proud of it, and the Force receives publicity. A keen member of the T.A. is the best recruiting agent. Beats all the red sashes and tricolour cockades. He brings in his friends and there is comradeship right from the start.

(ix) Award a decoration for service, *and the same one for all ranks*. Be democratic about this, please. (The writer gets very hot under the collar about medal snobbery).

(x) *Permanent Staff*.—The instructors must be handpicked, fairly young and enthusiastic, not just men sent to complete their Regular service by a spell with the T.A. They must be attached to the unit for one purpose, *training*, and not be cluttered up with administration and recruiting for the Regular Army. Goodness only knows a T.A. Instructor has a full time job, what with training programmes, parades, day or week-end exercises and annual whole-time training. If the unit is embodied this staff should be absorbed into it and not taken away at such a vital time.

There should be a small and separate staff for administrative duties, and this could well be obtained from pensioners or suitable personnel of the Regular Army whose medical category has fallen, necessitating their discharge otherwise.

(xi) *Officers*.—Commissions should only be given by selection after a period of service in the ranks. If the T.A. is formed in the right way its ranks will contain plenty of potential leaders, to be sorted out by the officer element at (x), given special courses and training and tested for commissioned rank. Direct commissions from civilian life have at least two bad effects. They are bad for morale in the ranks, many of whose members are, and know they are, more capable than their officers. Such an officer has had no first-hand experience of how his men "live", in this case on parades and at camps, and there is an insufficient bond of sympathy between leader and follower.

(xii) *Regular Army Reservists*.—The British Government is toying with the idea of a conscription-cum-Territorial Army scheme. Train a man, then keep him in condition. India will not have conscription, but it could amend its Army Regulations so that a man on completion of his colour service served his reserve time in a Territorial Force. It would keep him up to scratch. It would leaven the mixture, give a backbone of experience and stability to a Force composed otherwise of raw material. It may even avoid the breaking up of T.A. units in the event of an emergency arising, and enable them to take up position as a self-contained body, obviously desirable, but not in general a safe proposition if the T.A. is as it was in Great Britain in 1939—keen and willing, but badly equipped and poorly officered. Enthusiasm alone never licks the aggressor. Some of these considerations such as uniform, badges, medals, may appear too small; in the writer's humble opinion they are very important and have a profound effect on recruitment and subsequent keenness.

Consider for a moment the advantages, direct and indirect, of a Territorial Army as part of India's defence forces. The country would have a second line of defence always under training at little cost. It would, by selective recruitment, ensure that this force contained the men whom it wanted for an emergency, without jeopardy to industry. Membership of the T.A. would instil a sense of citizenship in its personnel—that they are Indians first and foremost-part of a great nation, with an individual duty to share in the defence of their land.

The Territorial Army would be as democratic and "neutral" a meeting-ground as could be devised. Regardless of social status, class, creed, race, all sorts and conditions of young men, at a pliable age—Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, would be brought together and build up a comradeship born of a common and fine objective. They would for part of the year live together—a great leveller of ideas and barriers. Training would improve physique, and inculcate discipline. Potential leaders would be available in time of emergency. A source of recruitment for the Regular Army by voluntary transfer would be established. Many more advantages could be enumerated, but suffice unto the day.

The writer, having drawn on his experience in the T.A. in Great Britain in pre-39 days when setting out his factors, emphasises that he feels this is more than a pipe-dream and that the future India will need a second line of defence in this troublous world. Label this Army the India Defence Force, make it a privilege to serve in it, and there will be no lack of recruits.

10,000 Boys Now In Boys' Companies

More than 10,000 Indian lads are now training in Boys' Companies at Indian Army regimental centres. The Boys' Company scheme was introduced during the war to turn out potential leaders and specialists for the post-war Indian Army. In training, great stress is laid on the development of character, determination, initiative and imagination. Particular attention is paid to physical fitness and ability at games, especially boxing, which has proved one of the most popular of boys' sports.

Boys are recruited at the age of 15—a time in their lives when they are particularly receptive to new influences and physically capable of undergoing the training which will turn them into efficient recruits. Many of these lads' families have had a martial history, and the boys often join regiments in which their fathers, or other relatives, have served.

At least two hours a day are devoted to education, in which the target is the 2nd Class Indian Army Certificate and the 3rd Class English Certificate. The boys also receive a thorough grounding in drill and fieldcraft and are encouraged to take an interest in hobbies and handicrafts in their leisure hours.

During training the boys are paid Rs. 10 a month with an additional Rs. 2 for educational proficiency. When they take their place in the ranks as potential leaders, at 17 years of age, they have a background which stands them in good stead for the military career ahead of them.

2,000 Short Service Commissions in the Indian Army

It has been decided to grant 2,000 Short Service Commissions in the Indian Army as an initial allotment. Those eligible are British subjects of Indian domicile or descent or subjects of Indian States who are serving or have been released from the Indian Forces. No Indian Emergency Commissioned Officer, whether still serving or released, will be required to appear before a Selection Board.

RECENT ADDITIONS TO THE U. S. I. LIBRARY

British Officers of The Old Bengal Army

A review of "List of Officers of the Bengal Army 1758-1834", Part III, by Major V.C.P. Hodson, Indian Army (Retired List). Published by Phillimore and Co., Ltd., 120 Chancery Lane, London, W.C. 2. £2.2.0.

This classic memorial to the part which the British officer has played in building up the Indian Army must receive the full notice which it deserves.

Parts I and II of the List appeared in 1927 and 1928, and are now out of print, though the library of this Institution has them. They dealt with the officers whose names begin with A-K. Part III covers L-R, and part IV now in the press will complete the alphabet and contain a general index to the whole series, as well as appendices listing certain "local" (*i.e.*, non-regular) officers and others such as "minor cadets" (*i.e.*, children) who are not fully qualified for inclusion in the main text.

The huge task which Major Hodson has imposed upon himself is to record all the salient facts of the life of every officer who served in the Bengal Army between 1758 (when the earliest army list extant, in manuscript, was compiled) and 1834, up to which year went the printed nominal roll, now hard to find, of Dodwell and Miles. There were about seven thousand of these officers.

Under each man's name the author gives at least the following facts so far as he has been able to ascertain them: (i), the date and place of his birth and/or baptism; (ii), parentage, or other proved and known relatives if his father is not known; (iii), date and place of marriage, and wife's name and parentage; (iv), date and place of his and his wife's death; (v), relationship to other Bengal Army officers and/or their wives; (vi), dates of all commissions, promotions, titles and dignities; (vii), any near relationship to famous persons; (viii), regimental and extra-regimental appointments in which he served for any length of time; (ix), war services, and campaign medals; (x), where his portrait can be seen; together with (xi), references to special sources from which the information is drawn, and (xii), notes on any point of an odd nature or of special interest. It will thus be manifest that it is only by skilful planning and compression that this volume has been brought within the compass of 810 pages; but the abbreviations used are mostly already familiar or explain themselves, and one soon becomes accustomed to the system. (A full explanation, with an admirable bibliography and several introductory notes, appeared in Part I).

The work—a labour of love—has occupied the author for over twenty-five years. When a subaltern, he compiled a model history of the Viceroy's Bodyguard, of which he had been adjutant. He served in Hodson's Horse, being a great-nephew of the founder of the regiment; and ever since his retirement after World War I (except for a substantial break during re-employment in World War II) he has laboured at this monumental task, often amongst the vast records of the India Office, at other times in the fine genealogical and historical library which he has built up at his home in North Devon.

Having outlined the object and nature of the List, we will try to give some idea of its contents—not an easy thing to do when an exhaustive biographical dictionary is concerned, for hundreds of entries must pass unnoticed by the reviewer.

The Officers of the old Bengal Army were from several points of view a mixed crowd, that expression being used in no derogatory sense. So were those of the other Presidential armies of Madras and Bombay, and of the Company's civil, medical and marine services (of which only the medical service has been methodically listed, on similar but much less detailed lines to those of Major Hodson). The nationalities were varied; English, Scots, Irish, Welsh, French, Dutch, German, Swiss, Italian, Norwegian, Polish and Armenian officers are all to be found in the List. Their fathers ranged from a marquess to a slopseller, and Part III even includes the natural son of a Prince of Wales by a lady of the Court. A few had left their country for their country's good: many more had received an East India cadetship by "working the oracle" of patronage, for such a nomination was a valuable prize, the first step on that path to glory which, alas, led too often and too swiftly to the grave.

They were remarkable, by today's standards, even in the manner of their dying. The "liver complaint", the "putrid" or "pucka" fever carried them off, for the most part very young. For these then fashionable terms we should I suppose now read enteric and the viler forms of malaria and dysentery. But some came by stranger deaths. Captain William Mercer of the cavalry was killed in a duel at Ghazipur in 1810 by a civil servant who was closely related to a later Commander-in-Chief and to a Governor-General; and Lieutenant Henry Philipps met a similar fate in an encounter at Calcutta in 1808 with a brother officer against whom a verdict of manslaughter was returned. Captain W.E. Leadbeater killed himself with his fowling-piece in a way that must be unprecedented even for a gun fatality: accidentally discharging it, he died from the blow of the recoil. Another officer was eaten by crocodiles (were they actually sharks?) when bathing on the coast of Arakan.

The List, despite the high proportion that died young, contains a goodly number of men who rose to fame. There are two field-m Marshals, Pollock (son of a London saddler) and Napier of Magdala (son of a gunner major.) There are the Lawrences, foremost of the three brothers in the Bengal Army being Sir Henry of Lucknow; Major-General Claude Martin, also of Lucknow, French founder of the Martiniere Colleges there and at Calcutta; and Sir David Ochterlony, the great soldier-cum-political.

Some lived to extreme old age: General Henry Lawrence (no relation to Sir Henry) saw his first active service in a sea-fight on his way out as a cadet in 1810 and died in 1887, aged 97; General Robert Napier Raikes, commissioned in 1829, died in 1909, aged 95; but both were passed by Lieutenant-Colonel William Price, who was born in 1788 and died in 1888 about seven months short of his century. He had been present at the siege of Kalinjar in 1812.

Queer stories, of which Major Hodson sketches the outline and provides references for the reader who wishes to follow them further, lie behind several entries. The mystery of Major Arnold Nesbit Mathews' birth led to claims by his grandson to the Earldom of Llandaff, and at different times it was variously alleged that he was a Catholic, a Muslim, and a Protestant. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir James Mouat got into trouble for trying to sell a horse to a nabob for a lakh of rupees, was suspended from his duties as professor of

Hindustani at the College of Fort William, went back to being a garrison engineer, succeeded rather doubtfully to a baronetcy, and died at sea on his way home on leave.

Quite a few officers later became parsons. We have noticed five in this volume: W.D. Littlejohn, vicar of Sydenham, Oxon, 1844-79; R.F. Purvis, vicar of Whitsbury, Wilts, for 44 years; A.C. Rainey, a clergyman in Ireland; T.J. Rocke, vicar of Littleham-with-Exmouth, 1843-77; and E.W. Mitchell, vicar of Shirley, near Derby, 1847-72. There may have been others, but none seems to have become a Catholic priest; and the Bengal Army certainly cannot claim to have produced an Eminence of the Roman Church as the Life Guards did Francis, Cardinal Howard; or an Archbishop of England, as the Madras Army did Archbishop Maclagan of York, who remained in the army list and drew his half-pay as a cavalry subaltern till the day of his death.

Others struck out on new careers after leaving the service. The Hon. J. O. Murray became Chamberlain to the King of Bavaria, and Major J. L. C. Richardson was Speaker of the New Zealand legislative council for the last ten years of his life, being knighted for his services in that capacity. He had fought with distinction in the First Afghan War.

Some distinguished general officers were Sir Gabriel Martindell, Sir Henry Ramsay the "King of Kumaon", Sir John Hunter Littler, Sir Abraham Roberts the father of "Bobs", and Sir William Richards who served continuously in India for 67 years and married a Jat lady. One of the most laconic entries relates to one Richard Money, who sailed for India in the ship *Norfolk* in 1767 as a cadet, went on shore at Madeira "to purchase necessities", missed his ship, and is no more heard of—perhaps the shortest Indian Army career on record. Two old families in the service of Company and Crown are represented, the Metcalfes and the Plowdens, though the Metcalfes in particular preferred the civil service to the army.

The persons and subjects mentioned do no more than suggest the richness and variety of the information which can be dug out of this fascinating repository. The officers of the Indian Army of the present and the future will long remain indebted to Major Hodson for the splendid tribute which he has paid to the memory of their comrades of the past.

H. B.

The Story of the Surveys

Historical Records of the Survey of India, vol. I, 18th Century,
by Colonel R. H. Phillimore, C.I.E., D.S.O. 1945. Published
by the Surveyor General of India. Rs. 30 or £2. 7s. 3d.

This is a book of over 400 large pages (about 8 inches by 12), with about twenty maps and plates, a very full biographical appendix, and an excellent index. It describes the origins of the Indian Surveys and the work done on them up to 1800. The chapters deal with Bengal surveys (three), Madras surveys (two), Bombay surveys, Himalayan and frontier surveys, professional methods, revenue surveys, instruments, map construction and preservation, astronomical control (two chapters) and early maps (three chapters). The volume concludes with a series of chapters from the personal angle—Surveyors General, surveyors, pay and allowances, civil establishment, and inhabitants and officials.

There has been no previous account of the Survey of India, its history and functions, with the possible exception of Clements Markham's *Memoir*, an interesting but patchy and now quite out-of-date book published in 1873 (not 1773 as stated at page xix of the present work). When Colonel Phillimore began his present immense task about a dozen years ago, he wisely decided to go to the original records for his principal sources of information. Having examined no less than 700 volumes extending from about 1790 to 1883 in which he found the old correspondence of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, and another mass of papers in bad condition lying at the Calcutta office of the Surveyor General, he then visited Dehra Dun, combed the records of the Geodetic Branch; Bombay, where he spent six weeks in the Government Record Office; Calcutta, then the home of the Imperial Record Office and the Imperial Library; and Madras, where he found much valuable material at the Record Office at Egmore. These and other researches in London and elsewhere provided a wealth of detail, previously almost untapped by any historian, which Colonel Phillimore has distilled and double-distilled into the contents of his first volume. Yet the book shows no signs of over-compression and is readable throughout. A second volume (1800-1815) is in the press, and a third (1815-1830) is well on the way to completion.

In that unmechanical age of the eighteenth century, the art of the surveyor was perhaps the highest form of the practical application of science; and India's mountains and plains provided a boundless field for the exercise of that art. The East India Company and its servants were not slow to realise this, and such of the Company's officers as had a bent for map-making were readily employed thereon, and were reinforced by persons drawn from outside life who appeared to be specially suited to assist them.

Foremost of the Company's regular servants was James Rennell of the Bengal Engineers, founder of a line of eminent soldier-surveyors which included later men of equal or even greater distinction such as Colin Mackenzie, Lambton and Everest. The names of their civilian assistants are less well known to the layman, but readers who had not heard before of, for example, Reuben Burrow and Michael Topping will be grateful to Colonel Phillimore for having effected the introduction through his pages.

Reuben Burrow, a farmer's lad from Leeds, came to London and obtained a post teaching mathematics to "the Cadets of the Drawing Room" in the Tower, quarrelled with his superiors, and in 1782 went to Bengal in search of employment. There he remained, engaged in one form or another of mathematical or astronomical work, till his death at Buxar in 1792. He was a great hater but a lovable character in the eyes of those whom he did not hate. He had a powerful vein of invective, and described the book of a colleague as "stupid, pimping, affected, dull, pert, contemptible, vile, fulsome, nauseous, villainous—the reading of which is enough to make a person spew their liver up, and to give the Devil a vomit". His technical ability seems to have been as great as it was versatile.

Michael Topping's origins are completely unknown, despite intensive research. Coming out in 1785, he died some eleven years later at Masulipatam. He was instrumental in setting up an observatory at Madras, and the author says "he had outstanding talent and strong character, and had he been a covenanted civil or military servant would undoubtedly have risen to high rank". He had also great energy, and when he died it took three men to take over and divide his work.

It should be stressed that this book will interest those who know nothing and care little about the Survey of India, and who have no technical knowledge of its work. The background is fully painted in, and countless passages and even pages take one right back into the rich atmosphere which William Hickey breathed and depicted. The general appeal is increased by the attractive reproductions (some in colour) of old maps, portraits and other subjects. Printing (by the Survey of India itself) and paper are well above normal Indian standards. Colonel Phillimore has earned a heavy debt of gratitude not only from the Department in which he served for forty years but from all those interested in bygone India.

H. B.

A BOOK ON WELLINGTON

WELLINGTON, by Richard Aldington, (Heinemann, 18s).—The cult of Wellington may not be so widespread as that of Napoleon, but it has a legion of followers to whom the appearance of a new biography of their hero is an important occasion. To these devotees, no longer satisfied with the obsolete *Gleig* or even the dry though solid fare of Maxwell, the late Philip Guedalla's *The Duke* from which they perhaps only expected his customary glitter came as the classic Life which they had always hoped some one would write one day. Guedalla applied all his historical scholarship and his aptitude for painstaking research to the task of making Wellington live; and, subduing to a suitable degree the sparkle of his earlier work, produced a noble full-length portrait which would clearly endure. It was a biography to end all biographies of its subject. Though specialised studies of one or other of Wellington's activities over sixty years might yet be necessary, it left little room for further critical studies of his career as a whole.

Thus, though *The Duke* was likely to bring new adherents to his cult, who would tend to turn back to the earlier writings—such as Stanhope's *Conversations*, conveniently kept in print in the World's Classics, it was apparent that the market for new biographies for the next generation or two had been prejudiced if not spoilt, since there was for the moment little or nothing new to be said.

Mr. Aldington and his publishers, though they must have appreciated the force of these circumstances, were not deterred by them. He has written poetry, novels and critical essays, but we believe no previous biography or history. He does not claim to have made use of any new material in the present study, and states that owing to the war he did not have access to the archives at Apsley House. His entry into a field that has already been thoroughly and successfully cultivated by others could thus only be justified by some special merit of its own, as for example a new interpretation of old facts, a quality of prose surpassing that of its predecessors, or a concise presentation of Wellington's character, campaigns or politics had they been rendered too diffusely or vaguely by previous biographers.

With regret, it must be said that Mr. Aldington falls short of satisfying any of these conditions. His treatment of the Peninsular campaigns comes nearest to the Guedalla standard, for he has wisely based it upon the colossal but too little read Oman. The Indian period is patchily depicted: William

Hickey's *Memoirs* require to be used with considerable discrimination as a foundation, for accounts of Calcutta squabbles and potations as seen through the eyes of a tuft-hunting attorney do not necessarily convey a correct idea of the ordinary plain-thinking and quiet living Briton outside the metropolis. (We may remark in passing that Tanjore is not in Malaya, as stated at page 51).

We find also persistent signs of a certain intolerance, which is sometimes perhaps no more than hastiness of thinking or writing. There is a tendency to look upon military men as Colonel Blimps unless the reverse is apparent, an attitude which though it may be all very well for the music-halls is not seemly for a historian and is contrary to the burden of proof. Why is William IV described as a bigamist (page 298)? Is the author confusing him with George IV, or does he allege that the Duke of Clarence went through a form of marriage with Mrs. Jordan on some occasion hitherto unrevealed? He goes on to allude in strong terms to the Duke's own affairs of the heart, but in respect of the greatest of these does not seem to have made use of an important source which appeared a few years ago, the *Correspondence of Charles Arbuthnot*, edited by Mr. A. Aspinall and published in 1941 by the Royal Historical Society in their Camden Series. In such matters we think that the author does Wellington something less than justice.

The book will be read, and it deserves to be; but it will not be read as much as *The Duke* has been and will continue to be. Perhaps its most disappointing feature in the eyes of one Wellington-fan who did not really expect to find anything new in it is the absence of the one thing that he did expect to find: an exceptional literary quality. The printing, binding, paper and illustrations are good. One is always delighted to find a reproduction of Lawrence's charming drawing of the Duchess, as well as Heaphy's sketch of the Duke—one of a remarkable series of portraits of Peninsular officers, now tucked away in one of the obscurer cabinets of the National Portrait Gallery, made by the artist when he visited British Headquarters in the field.

H. B.

REVIEWS IN BRIEF

THREE ASSAULT LANDINGS. By Lt.-Col. A. E. C. Bredin, D. S. O., M. C. (Gale and Polden, Ltd., 8s. 6d.) The story of the landings by the 1st Battalion. The Dorsetshire Regiment in Sicily, Italy and Normandy. The book is a fine story of the spirit and work of British fighting infantry.

NAVAL BROADCASTS. By Rear Admiral R. K. Dickson, D.S.O., (George Allen and Unwin, 6s.).—These broadcasts are contemporary accounts of the war at sea, written at intervals during 1945. They give a vivid description of what naval and merchant seamen were doing in the war just before it ended.

CLIMAX IN CRETE. By Lieut. Theodore Stephanides, R.A.M.C., (Faber and Faber, 8s. 6d.).—The author tells the story of the battle for Crete, and of the retreat and evacuation from Crete to Alexandria. The author's description of this grim and fantastically exciting campaign is full of interest, spiced with a keen sense of humour.

STRATEGY OF INDIRECT APPROACH. By Capt. Liddell Hart, (Faber and Faber, 8s. 6d.).—This new edition of Capt. Liddell Hart's book contains a long letter from Brigadier E. D. Dorman-Smith, who was Deputy Chief of Staff, Middle East, in 1942; Brigadier Dorman-Smith relates how the theory set out by Captain Liddell Hart helped to inspire the plan which checked Rommel's invasion of Egypt at El Alamein. Two further chapters "Hitler's Decline" and "Hitler's Fall" have been added at the end of the book to cover the complete course of the Second World War and bring out its lessons.

EUROPE AND BURMA. By D.G.E. Hall, (Oxford University Press, 12s. 6d.).—This book describes the special features of Burmese history, and then shows how it was that the region in which Burma lies came gradually within the scope of European geographical knowledge and British influence.

BRITISH RULE IN BURMA. By G. E. Harvey, (Faber and Faber, 10s. 6d.).—The author has given a readable and informative account of Burma during the past hundred years; social structure, political events and economic affairs are all described interestingly by the author, who has served with the I. C. S. for the past twenty years and writes with considerable personal knowledge.

THEY REIGNED IN MANDALAY. By Colonel E. C. V. Foucar, (Dennis Dobson Ltd., 10s. 6d.).—The author of this fascinating little volume needs no introduction to readers of the *U. S. I. Journal*, for he has been a frequent contributor to our columns. In this book he gives the little-known story of the rulers of Upper Burma before the arrival of the British. If the contents were not history it could well be read as one of the more exotic legends from the Arabian Nights. It tells of a splendid, corrupt court surrounding a King and Queen who were descended from the mad King Alimpra; behind the glitter of the court was grim cruelty, as when there was an organised massacre of rival princes and their families.

A CONTINENT EXPERIMENTS, (Skeffington, 21s.), by Lt.-Col. C. B. Birdwood.—This book surveys most of the Indian scene—political, economic, religious, military, artistic—and as the author, apart from his duties as a cavalry officer, served for some years as an A.D.C. and with a Bodyguard, he had unusually good opportunities for acquiring a wider knowledge of affairs and personalities than the ordinary Army officer. There is a strong and interesting leaven derived from experiences in World War II and as a Civil Liaison officer in the Punjab, in which capacity he came into contact with many new problems. Colonel Birdwood has the eye of a good observer and ability to describe well what he sees. The Indian scene has, however, changed somewhat since the book was written, so that the advantage of topicality has been lost to a certain degree; nevertheless the book is one which will be read with considerable interest and pleasure.

CALL THE NEXT WITNESS. By Philip Woodruff, (Jonathan Cape, and Thacker, Bombay, Rs. 4/12).—The author of this little volume has been painstakingly accurate in his handling of Indian life and in his descriptions of the Indian landscape, and the book reveals an unusually deep knowledge of this country and its peoples. Crime and its detection in India seldom follow the lines they do in the West, and this story shows how an unconventional type of crime in India was handled by the authorities. The scene is set in an area in Northern India; its *vignettes* of village life are delightful; and the whole story

holds the reader from start to finish. For all the matter of fact way in which it is presented, it seems that the author has been inspired by that happy blend of knowledge and affection for a country he has served for many years.

THE ENEMY AT THE GATE. By Reginald Hargreaves, (MacDonald & Co., London, 15s.).—This book tells the story of famous sieges, their cause, their progress and their consequences. It begins with the siege of Rome in A. D. 410, and includes among others Constantinople in A. D. 1453, Londonderry in 1689, Lucknow in 1857, Paris in 1870, Mafeking in 1899 and Stalingrad in 1942-43. A fascinating and well-written volume.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Schools For Soldiers' Daughters

Lieut.-Colonel B. J. Cole, of Ajmer, writes:—

I have read with interest the letter in the July, 1946 issue of the Journal from "Charles". I am not aware of his identity, but I can assure him that the difficulties of setting up schools for soldiers' daughters on the lines indicated by him are as formidable as the fences in the famous hunting country from which he writes—Melton Mowbray.

I feel sure that he will agree with me that the need for female education is greatest among the pre-war classes, as it is they who are the most conservative in such matters. To change this mentality is the first and most formidable fence to be jumped. It may interest him and your readers to know that for the past three years scholarships have been offered as boarders at the Church of Scotland Mission High School for Girls in Ajmer, to soldiers' daughters who have their homes in Rajputana. The scholarships are provided from the Residents' War Purposes Fund, and by the Jaipur Government. Despite much propaganda in the form of addressing Regimental Centres, notices in *Fauji Akhbar* and so on, the response has on the whole been very poor, and there are now but fourteen girls in receipt of scholarships—mostly Rajputs and Jats—though thirty-two scholarships are offered.

The reasons, of course, are: aversion to sending girls away from their homes at an early age; failure to realise the importance of educating girls; and lastly the all-too prevalent custom of early betrothal and marriage. It is not so much the fathers who are averse to the idea. It is the mothers, and the village elders. The writer can quote the case of a distinguished Rajput subedar-major who was very keen to send his young daughter to the school in Ajmer. He took ten days leave to his village to collect her and bring her along, but feeling in his family and the village was so strongly against the idea that he wrote cancelling the application for admission.

"Charles" thinks that the school he advocates must not be cheap, and that the standard should be the same for the daughters of a sepoy, commissioned officer or sardar. I would ask him to ponder what advantage this would be to a sepoy's daughter. It would, in my opinion, give her ideas of a standard of life far above that obtaining in her own home, and so make her discontented—especially if education is going to cost Rs. 3,000 a year as advocated by "Charles".

I wonder how his idea of importing a staff for the school from the U.K. (presumably without knowledge of the country or its languages) would be received by the new Indian Government? In my opinion, the solution lies in starting hostels for soldiers' (sailors and airmen also) daughters, affiliated to good existing schools in various parts of India, on the lines of the Rajputana scheme. If those in the course of time proved a success, and the demand for such

Hostels increased, then would be the time to think of a large centralised R.I.M. School—though the cost per girl need not exceed Rs. 600 per annum at the outside, for board, tuition and clothing.

I pass over "Charles's" cheap sneer at the "undesirable product" of Missions with the silence it deserves.

Critics of Scientific Selection Answered.

Major-General F. M. Moore, M. A.-in-C., I.S.F., writes :—

In reply to criticisms on Scientific Selection, I wish to make the following observations.

1. Lt.-Col. Rajendra Singh has misunderstood my point when he writes that Selection was introduced in England because all traditional sources of officer material had dried up, and did produce the goods; whereas in India the process was reversed and Boards were introduced to eliminate failures. Selection Boards were *not* introduced in India to eliminate failures and had nothing whatever to do with either placing officers on adverse reports or getting rid of them. All that the Boards did was to ensure that bad material no longer continued to be given commissions.

2. Although it is admitted that Scientific Selection can and will improve, Lt.-Col. Rajendra Singh is hardly right in stating that "our present system is only in its infancy", as Scientific Selection is based on over fifty years psychological experience and research.

3. Both Lt.-Col. Rajendra Singh and Major-General Forman criticise the fact that selection does not pay sufficient attention to C. Os. reports. This, of course, is purely a matter of opinion. I can only assure them that to the best of my knowledge, C. Os. reports are studied very carefully, and full consideration is given to everything reported therein.

4. Lt.-Col. Rajendra Singh criticises the quality of members of Selection Boards. Every possible care is taken to select suitable officers for Selection. For every one G.T.O. accepted, the Selection of Personnel Directorate tried out and trained ten others, who were eventually rejected. The Presidents of Boards were all first-class, in my time, and the Deputy Presidents were all specially selected Indians, for whom I cannot speak too highly. Specialists on the Boards were examined by their brother specialists and, so far, as a layman like myself could judge, were very good at their job. As good specialists became unobtainable in India, owing to demobilisation, several Selection Boards had to go without a technical staff and the principle on which we worked was that it was better to have no technical staff than a bad one.

5. Members of Boards do test candidates independently and their views have equal value at the final conference. I think that here, however, Lt.-Col. Rajendra Singh does not realise that it is not a matter of each member of a Board fighting to have his own opinion accepted, but rather a matter of four individuals expressing their opinions and attempting to mould those four opinions into one fair verdict on the candidate, giving the candidate the benefit of the doubt when there is a wide difference of opinion.

6. Candidates are tested in mufti and numbered. I cannot think what more could be done to hide their identity.

7. In my opinion, the G.T.O. has both time and the scientific technique to observe and record observations. This point has been investigated more than once and G.T.Os. were offered more time, but did not consider they required it.

To answer Major General Forman's criticisms:— I never did suggest that an undue number of unsuitable officers were given advancement. At the same time, it is quite a different thing to report on officers as to their fitness for advancement and to select officers who are likely to make good Regular soldiers. I have no doubt that C. Os. could report objectively and fairly, if they were trained to do so. But having served both as a Commander and as a Director of Selection I realise how difficult it is to assess and report correctly, without training in Selection. My point is that very few C. Os. know what to look for, how to report on what they have found, how to assess and balance the credits and debits they have noticed, and that all of us are biassed towards a certain type we like or against another type we dislike. All this counts a lot when assessing potentiality for the future, but does not affect many hard facts, which a C. O. reports on and which Boards accept as such.

I have no doubt that the C. O's report is based on fact, and I cannot understand why General Forman thinks so little credit is given to C. O's reports. I feel that this is a misapprehension, and that had he worked with a Selection Board for any considerable time, he would have a different opinion about this.

There are a certain number of cases of officers badly reported on by Selection Boards when they have done well in action. But I have never met any member of Selection who did not wish to do his very best for such an officer. At the same time, if an officer has a personality, which is better suited to Civil life, surely it is better to advise him not to continue his career in the army? Is it not better to advise a man, right at the beginning, to go back to the land, or try some other profession, if it is extremely unlikely that he will ever pass a promotion examination? Is it not equally obvious that there are many gallant men, who make splendid junior leaders in war but may not have the brains to go beyond commanding a company and therefore would be foolish to take up soldiering as a career?

To deal with "Lictor's" criticisms.

1. C. Os are not competent to assess intelligence and personality, for the very good reason that this is a highly scientific matter, which can only be done by tests. C. Os are not in possession of those tests and do not know how to administer them.

2. It is quite a relief to receive the criticism that Boards select Staff officers and not Regimental officers! The majority of letters criticising Selection accuse Boards of paying too much attention to the individual obstacle course and out-door tests, which make it very difficult for the non-athletic candidate to succeed. If "Lictor" cares to visit the Selection of Personnel Directorate, he can see these criticisms for himself.

3. The Matrix test has been proved, like all other tests, by "proving" over several thousand Indians before it was taken into use and following up the gradings awarded afterwards.

Before a course was started for training G. T. Os at Meerut, they were trained at Boards. As I have already mentioned, only one out of every ten trained proved up to standard.

4. I am quite certain that every member of Selection Boards can assure "Lictor" that a "Flash Alf" has no chance of getting away with it before a Selection Board. A reserved or shy type is much more difficult to assess, but everything possible is done to grade such officers fairly, and a good Psychiatrist seldom has much difficulty in assessing this type.

"Lictor's" suggested system would obviously not be scientific, and I expect would grade high the particular type which he obviously likes!

The Care of Animals

Mrs. Isola M. Condon, Hon. Assistant Secretary, Simla S.P.C.A., writes :—

All those who have worked wholeheartedly for the protection of animals in this country will deeply appreciate the reference made to the subject in the October *U.S.I. Journal*. It is so seldom that public attention is directed to the question, but yet it is a subject which should be present in everyone's mind, especially in India.

The average Indian is not so much intentionally cruel to animals—the cruelty to, and neglect of, animals in this country arises very largely from lack of perception which is due to lack of education, and to bad living conditions of Indians of the poorer classes. One of the objects of all branches of the S. P. C. A. is to try and inculcate a better attitude towards animals among the poor of this country. In countless cases the sick or injured animals of the poor are treated completely free of charge in our hospitals and also fed free of charge—very often for weeks at a time. As everyone will readily understand, such work requires money,—quite a lot of money! In fact the more subscribers we have, the more help we can be.

Your remarks on the various Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals leads me to think that many officers might like to know a little more about them. First, let me say that they are run by enthusiasts—people who really love animals, so much so that they give of their experience and knowledge freely and willingly. Usually there are some paid workers (every branch of the S. P. C. A. has at least one paid Inspector)—as there must be—but everyone can rest assured that every penny and every anna collected is spent to the best advantage.

Which brings me to the matter of joining your local S. P. C. A.—for everyone who has a pet animal (and large numbers of officers have) should join their local Association. Where is it? If you don't know, then write to the Secretary, S. P. C. A., 5 Cavalry Lines, Old Delhi, giving your name and address and asking the Secretary to give you the name and address of your local S. P. C. A. You can then find out the annual subscription—usually it is a nominal one of Rs. 5/- a year—and then join.

It is not so much the money which Associations want (though many do need money badly to expand their work), but what they also want is the moral support afforded by the feeling that there are people who are sufficiently interested in our work to take the trouble to become members of our Society. It isn't one-sided generosity either, for if your horse or dog is ill you can be sure that the Association will be able to give it expert attention.

If I were talking to all the dog-lovers in India I would say: "Don't join because I suggest it. Join your local S. P. C. A. because you know it is doing good work; because you love animals as your own dog loves you; and because you will be taking an active part in an organisation which helps those who cannot help themselves."

We are always deeply grateful to any member of the general public who will report any case of cruelty, neglect or injury to his local Society. Prompt aid can nearly always be given in such cases.

Assessing an Officers "Interest" Value

Lieut.-Colonel W. N. Pettigrew, of Landi Kotal, writes:—

Rightly or wrongly, the inclusion of a psychiatrist in Selection Boards seems to have been accepted as a permanency. And then, unless, an officer is so unfortunate as to need his professional services, their contact ends.

The present and future employment of an officer lies in the hands of successive commanding officers and the distant constellation of the A.G. and his assistants until he is sufficiently senior to come within the orbit of the M.S. It is desirable to bring the ultimate authorities into close touch with the personality and character of the individuals whose destiny they control. Just as the psychiatrist interpreted the mind at the outset so should these controlling authorities have the mind of individual officers revealed to them constantly.

Any analysis of success will award to "interest" the first place amongst factors which go to achieve it. Hard work, thought and their products have nearly always been the results of the incentive of interest.

In civil life, an individual who finds himself to be a misfit, can easily make a change without completely changing his profession. In the Army, this is not so, but within the Army there is a sufficient range of interests to suit all kinds.

What appears to be wanting is some arrangement to seek the co-operation of the individual in utilizing his "interest" value. Cannot the mind of the individual once more come into the picture? Most men at stages in their lives take mental stock of themselves and indulge in self-analysis. Most are honest with themselves. Cannot in some way the results of their self-analysis be made available to guide others in their maximum useful employment?

I suggest that it can and in this way. Annual confidential reports are with us again. In these, above the space for the C.O.'s report, should be one headed "How do you consider your services may be used in the best interests of the Army, giving reasons?" to be filled in by the individual officer. In the rare cases of over self-estimation the C.O.'s report will provide the corrective.

Such a system will on the average see more round pegs in round holes than our present system provides, especially in the junior ranks.

Madrassis in the I.A.M.C.

Major R.W. Hampton, of Prestalyn, North Wales, writes:—

I was greatly interested in Lieut.-Colonel N. Bickford's letter on Madrassis in the I. A. M. C. in the October *Journal*.

Having served with Indian troops during the past four and a half years I wholeheartedly endorse all he has said about these always-smiling South Indian boys. Even though I am now back in the U. K., all my unit are writing to me regularly, and, indeed, their letters are a credit to them.

They have all done an admirable job of work in Arakan, Burma and on to Malaya, where I left them. Great credit goes to the Madrassi officers and men of the I. A. M. C., and I too sincerely hope that we shall see more Madrassi personnel in the future army. They will do their job 100%.

The Truth About Civvy Street

"W. G.", of London, writes:—

Because I feel officers now serving in India are not fully acquainted with conditions in Civvy Street I am sending you these first-hand views. For myself, I was a regular officer, but resigned because of knee trouble and have been fortunate enough to get a job worth £1,000 a year, plus car and expenses. Business is more than flourishing. I mention this because you'll see that it's not a feeling of "grumbling against humanity at large" which prompts me to write this letter.

But I admit that I made a big mistake in leaving the Army, for I've found the change to civilian ways very difficult. Business, industry, labour—all are in a base-over-apex mess such as I never found in the Army. Ninety-nine percent of ex-officers have not found good jobs; I know of two ex-Lieut. Colonels and one ex-Wing Commander whose salaries are less than £350 a year.

At one Ministry of Labour office the interviewing officer—himself a serving Lieutenant-Colonel—has told callers that they must be prepared to start at £300 a year, *i.e.*, a labourer's wage. And many have to wait six months before getting that. Thousands of jobs are unfilled, but they are mostly in skilled trades.

If anything can be done to stop this enormous wastage of manpower by officers leaving the Service to add to the pile of unemployed it will have been worth while. I wish to goodness someone had told me I was a fool (in spite of my record) to think of leaving the Army. In spite of my present position, I should have been a whole packet happier. Were it not for the fact that a Territorial Air O.P. Flight is scheduled for formation within a few miles of my home I should be trying to get back like a shot.

My advice to officers who are anxious to get back to Civvy Street is "don't rush". Opportunities will still exist when their turn comes—and meantime they can put all their leisure hours in studying whatever line of business they are anxious to enter.

"Labour" in the U.K.

Lieut.-Colonel T. M. Carpendale, of Beccles, Suffolk, writes:—

Officers who may shortly be coming Home may be interested in the experiences of one who retired recently, and has now settled down, on the general question of labour costs here.

After long search I obtained a house and a licence enabling me to spend £195 on repairs to make the place habitable. The "essential" repairs included repairs to the roof and gutters, boilers, w.c.s, latches, floors and distempering the walls. Papering and painting of rooms was not allowed.

Six weeks delay followed—and the men arrived; frequently they were called off for other "council work" under penalty of a heavy fine, but after another six weeks we moved in. At the first heavy rain the annexe roof leaked torrents, gutters leaked, whilst the boiler filled the house with fumes; the w.c. plugs didn't function and the distempering resulted in multi-coloured patches everywhere.

I protested to the contractor and asked what he proposed to do about it. He sent details of his actual costs: £135 for labour, £30 for materials, the balance being his profit and incidentals. I replied that I sympathised with his difficulties, but work contracted for and charged should be carried out before payment, and also that I would gladly submit the case to any Court of Arbitration.

Within a week another gang of experienced old men arrived and put the defects right in a few hours. But had I not taken a firm line I should have been expected to meet the bill. I feel this is typical of many present contractors here. For some electrical work I had done, £19 out of £35 was for "labour"; 30% of the bulbs were useless within a month.

Thus "labour" charges form the greater part of one's expenses, and it definitely pays to do jobs ones' self. A "ca' canny" attitude seemed to be prevalent in towns, but is not so noticeable in country districts, though there it sometimes occurs. Farmers anxious to get their crops in quickly before bad weather breaks occasionally suffer from this lack of interest on the part of their labourers.

Individuals, of course, vary, but even with the best of them it is unusual to find one willingly doing more than his "45-hour week", although he is quite prepared to do overtime or outside work, for which his remuneration is not entered on his pay sheet and is not thus liable to income-tax. Unskilled labour, by the way, is paid for at a minimum of £4 a week of 45 hours, and often 15s. per day if for broken periods; for employers many hours have to be spent in calculating the various tax deductions, filling up forms, etc.

It is older ex-Serviceman whom I have found most satisfactory, and the best I have had were an ex-Sergeant from the Green Howards and another of the Black Watch, with both of whom it was a pleasure to work. It provides food for thought, for it is here that the Army can help more realistically for the good of the Empire. Just as the good old type of ex-sepoy or I.O.R. has been an influence for good on his village community, so, too, can the ex-British serviceman have a beneficial effect on his fellows, if he is trained the right way.

Military Correspondents in the Indian Press

"Avtar", *New Delhi*, writes:—

I must congratulate you for putting up a very bold suggestion that Indian newspapers should publish articles on Army matters, to create more interest in the Armed Forces.

Who, however, is going to write, and in which paper? Most Anglo-Indian papers, such as *The Statesman* and the *Times of India* have articles on the subject, generally borrowed from newspapers in England, but taking them by and large, I don't think they would be attractive to the Indian public. The answer, then, is that such military articles must be written by Indians who have the necessary qualifications and knowledge, and that they should be circulated in all Indian national newspapers.

As to finding a writer, Army authorities will have to give a lot of help. There are not many qualified retired Army officers of this country who have also the gift of writing. There are some still serving, and I believe that if

the authorities permitted them to do so they could assist a great deal in moulding public opinion in favour of the Armed Forces, and also keep the public well-informed on developments in the science of war.

The alternative is putting writers into khaki, but experience has taught us that that would be far from satisfactory. Serving officers with writing ability should be encouraged and permitted to write to the Press without, of course, infringing on discipline or security subjects.

Employing Indian Officers Commissioned from the Ranks

Lieut. B.C. Malik of Aurrangabad, writes :—

An I.A.O. published in May, 1946 (60/S/46) outlined a scheme for employing in the post-war Indian Army officers directly commissioned from the ranks in specialised appointments such as Records and Accounts Officers, Assistant Adjutants and Quartermasters, etc. It was announced that details of the scheme would be published by the end of 1946.

Doubtless many officers, and E. C. Os. who were formerly regular V.C. Os. would be attracted to the scheme, but it is not known what would be the basis for the selection of officers for the appointments. Some such officers have applied for short-service commissions, while others have deferred action till the orders are published.

May I suggest that E. C. Os. and V. C. O. candidates for the above posts, who have not yet earned their minimum pension and are otherwise fit, be given preference over those who are too old and have earned their pensions? Although it may not be possible to fix an age limit for these appointments, it would seem fair not to accept E. C. Os. or V. C. Os. who are, say, over 45 years of age. That would give an opportunity to energetic, outstanding E. C. Os. and V. C. Os. who have less service, to earn their minimum pension.

A Tribute to the Nurses

"Now at Home," London, writes :—

Coming Home we had on board a number of Nurses who had served in India, Burma and some further afield, during the war. Some of us had been wounded in Burma, and we knew full well what sterling work they did. I think, and many others agreed with me, that some public recognition should be given to the work they did. They not only helped their own countrymen, but nursed Indian and British soldiers alike.

I will not attempt to put into words my admiration for them. They did their level best, often in trying circumstances, and their sole reward was usually the sight of a patient walking away fit and well.

Women as a whole did extraordinary good work during the war in their various jobs, and their public spirit is often commended. But nursing seems to have become the Cinderella of women's service. Could not their good work be acknowledged in some way?

NOTES BY THE SECRETARY

Dear Reader,

From time immemorial—or at least since this Institution began!—it has been the custom for the “Secretary’s Notes” feature to be impersonal. The Institution has, however, grown so much in recent years that the time has probably come when this particular feature should appear in a more personal form to members, for there are many interesting aspects of the progress of the Institution which can more easily be expressed in a personal than in a general survey.

Our membership list is growing daily, as you will see from the list which follows. One Regimental Centre in particular deserves special mention—the 16th Punjab Regimental Centre, for from it we have enrolled no fewer than sixteen new members—a most encouraging list, for which we are grateful. Another matter for encouragement is the number of letters we receive from officers who have been demobilised or have proceeded on retirement, and who wish to continue receiving the Journal either in England or in the country of their adoption.

Of course, there are resignations, but a much smaller number than we anticipated. And while on that subject, may I appeal to members whose addresses have changed to send in their new location as soon as possible? We do endeavour to trace the whereabouts of officers whose copies of the Journal have been returned to us by the Post Office authorities, but it does involve a good deal of work to us and to the Post Office. If, therefore, the typed address on the wrapper is not your present address, would you help us by sending in the correct one?

Here, then, is the list of new members who have joined since September 9 up to the time of going to Press—December 9:

ABDUL MATIN, Lieut., 16 Punjab Regiment.

ACHREJA, F/O. S. S., R. I. A. F.

AHMAD, Major M. I., R.I.A.

AJIT SINGH SODHI, Lt.-Colonel, F. F. Rifles.

ANAND, F/Lieut. J. N., R.I.A.F.

ANDREW, Major R. T., R.A.S.C.

*AYRE, Captain A. L., R.E.

BAMFORD, Lieut.-Colonel P. G., 1st Bn., The Sikh Regiment.

BAYFIELD-DAVIES, Lieut. M. F. H., 2/2 Goorkhas.

BHABHA, Hon. Mr. C. H., Member, Works, Mines & Power, Govt. of India.

BHAG CHAND MALIK, Lieut., I. G. S. C.

BHAWNANI, F/Lieut. A. S., R.I.A.F.

*BIRDI, Captain J. P., 3rd Bn., The Dogra Regiment.

BONARJEE, S/Ldr. V. S. C., R.I.A.F.

*BOSE, Lieut.-Colonel, S. K., R.I.E.

BUTT, F/Lieut. M. A., R.I.A.F.

CADELL, Col. Sir Patrick R.
 CAMPBELL, Major P. E., 2nd Bn., The Baluch Regiment.
 CELESTINE, Lieut. F. X., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 CHHACHI, Lieut. S. S., R.I.E.
 CHARAN SINGH, Captain, 16 Punjab Regiment.
 CHAWLA, F/Lieut. K. N., R.I.A.F.
 COLLINS, Major J. H., 14 Punjab Regiment.
 COORLAWALA, Major K. R., R.I.A.
 CROFT, Major J. A., M.C., 16 Punjab Regiment.

DANG, Lieut. B. K., R.I.N.
 DARSHAN SINGH, Major., R. I. A. S. C.
 DAS GUPTA, Lieut. R. N., R. I. N.
 DATTA, Sub. Lieut. N. P., R. I. N.
 DATTA, Captain O. P., R. I. E.
 DAVE, Lt. Surg. C. M., R. I. N.
 DAVIDSON, Captain W. R., R. E. M. E.
 DESHPANDE, Professor C. D.
 DEEXIT, Captain A. P., Cooch Behar State Forces.
 DHADWAL, Major L. D., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 *DHANANI, F/Lieut. H. J., R. I. A. F.
 DOGRA, F/O B. S., R. I. A. F.
 DUTT, Lieut. A. R., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 DUTT, S/Ldr. RANJAN, R. I. A. F.

FANN, Captain T. A. O., R. E.

GANDA Singh, 2/Lieut., Punjab U. O. T. C.
 GAREWAL, Major K. S., Indian Signal Corps.
 GAUR, Captain J. N. P., 10th Bn., The Rajputana Rifles.
 GHULAM HAIDER, Lieut., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 GOVIND RAM, Captain, M. C., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 GRANT, Captain N. B., R. I. E.
 GREIG, Captain D., 2nd Goorkhas.

HARCHAND SINGH, Captain, 16 Punjab Regiment.
 HAYMAN, Officer Cadet N. A.
 HAYAT, Major S. M., R. I. A.
 HUSAIN, F/Lieut. ASGHAR, R. I. A. F.
 HUTCHINSON, Colonel D. B. W., I. A.
 HYTTEN, Lieut. F., R. I. N.

IYENGAR, Captain R. K., I. A. O. C.

JONES, Captain G. F.
 JOSEPH, Major C. H., M. B. E., R. I. A. S. C.
 JOSEPH, F/O T. T., R. I. A. F.

*KARIM DAD KHAN, Major, Madras Regiment.
 KARNAIL SINGH, Lieut., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 KARTAR SINGH BHANDARI, Esq., Mily. Accts. Department.
 *KAZI, Captain MUSTAFA, 2nd Hyderabad I. S. Lancers.
 KEHAR SINGH, Major, 16 Punjab Regiment.

* Life Members

KHAN, F/Lieut. J. R., R. I. A. F.
 KHAN, F/O M. H., R. I. A. F.
 KHANNA, Major A. N., I. A. M. C.
 KOCHHAR, Captain A. L., R. I. E.
 KOTHAVAL, Major H. R., O. B. E., M. V. O.
 KRISHNA RAO, F/Lieut. B. S., R. I. A. F.
 LANSEBRI-BROWN, Major H. L. L., The East Surrey Regiment.
 LOOMBA, Major L. A., R. I. E.
 MAJUMDAR, Captain B. N., R. I. A. S. C.
 MALHOTRA, F/Lieut. M. M., R. I. A. F.
 MALONE, Major, G. M., 5th R. Gurkha Rifles, F. F.
 MANMOHAN SINGH, Major, R. I. A. S. C.
 MARTIN, Lieut.-General H. G.
 MATHUR, Major L. S., 2 Punjab Regiment.
 MAYADAS, F/O H. C. F., R. I. A. F.
 MEHTA, Captain F. S. B., R. I. Arty.
 MEHTA, Major P. R., R. I. E.
 MIDDLETON, Lt.-Col. P. C., The Mahar Regiment.
 MILKHA SINGH MANN, Lieut., The Sikh Regiment.
 MITCHELL, Captain B., 9 Gurkha Rif.
 MOHAMMED MUSA, Major, F. F. Rif.
 *MOHINDRA SINGH VERDI, Major, 6 Kumaon Regiment.
 MURRAY, Lt.-Col. E. D., 4/10 Gurkha Rifles.
 NAIR, F/Lieut. K. V., R. I. A. F.
 NARAYANA SWAMI, Lieut. K. S., R. I. A. S. C.
 NARESH PRASAD, Major, R. I. E.
 NAUNIHAL SINGH, Captain, 1 Bihar Regiment.
 NAVEEN CHAND RAWLLEY, Major, F. F. Regiment.
 NARANJAN PRASAD, Major, F. F. Regiment.
 NOYES, Lady Violet.
 OKA, F/Lieut. D. M., R. I. A. F.
 PATANKAR, Captain G. V., R. I. A.
 PATEL, F/O H. K., R. I. A. F.
 PAHLAJANI, Major S. M., 6th Bn., The Jat Regiment.
 PETTY, Major W. W., 3rd Bn., The Dogra Regiment.
 PINCKNEY, Officer Cadet C. J.
 PURVIS, Lt.-Col. R. G., The Ind. Grs.
 RANDHAWA, Lieut. S. S., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 RAJAGOPALACHARI, Hon. Mr. C., Member, Industries and Supplies,
 Government of India.
 RAMAN, P/O R. V., R. I. A. F.
 RANJIT SINGH SIDHOO, Lieut., I. A. V. C.
 *RAWLINS, Major D. B. W., 10 Gurkha Rifles.
 RISHI, F/Lieut. N. A., R. I. A. F.
 RIZWANI, F/Lieut. M. A., R. I. A. F.
 *ROY, Major V. P., M. B. E., R. I. A. S. C.
 SAHEBZADA, F/Lieut. M. H., R. I. A. F.
 SAMUEL, Captain G. V., The M. L. I.

- SAPRE, F/Lieut. S. D., R. I. A. F.
 SERDAR KHAN, Major, 15 Punjab Regiment.
 *SAWA SINGH MEHTA, F/Lieut., R. I. A. F.
 SHAIKH, P/O A. A., R. I. A. F.
 SHARIFF, Major A. M., R. I. E.
 SHARIFF, Major M., 2 Punjab Regiment.
 *SHARMA, Captain D. N., R. I. E.
 SHEPHERD, Lieut. H. K., The F. F. Regiment.
 SHER SINGH, Captain, 16 Punjab Regiment.
 SHER ULLAH BEG, Captain, Madras Regiment.
 SHITOLEY, F/O N. K., R. I. A. F.
 SIHOTA, Major G. S., R. I. E.
 SPEECHLEY, 2/Lieut. C. J., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 STRACHAN, Lt.-Col. R. G., Devon Regiment.
 *SUNDER SINGH KALRA, Captain, R. I. A. S. C.
 *SURI, Captain D. R., R. I. A. S. C.
 TANEJA, F/O P. N., R. I. A. F.
 TAYLOR, Brigadier J. N. C., R. A.
 TEGANATHAN, Captain T. V., R. I. E.
 *TEJA SINGH, Captain, 16 Punjab Regiment.
 TRUSS, Captain D. A., 1 Gurkha Rifles.
 *WALLACE, Major J. L., 3/3 Q. A. O. Gurkha Rifles.
 Walmsley, Air Marshal H. S. P., C. B., C. B. E., M. C., D. F. C.,
 WHITE, Major J. R. B., The Dogra Regiment.
 WIJAYENDRAN, F/O M. P. G., R. I. A. F.
 WILDING, Major F. H. B. E., F. F. Regiment.
 Subscribing members who have been enrolled during the past quarter include:—

- C. E. O., H. Q., Allied Land Forces, S. E. A.
 P. M. C., 2/1 K. G. V's. Gurkha Rifles.
 P. M. C., Madras Regimental Centre.
 P. M. C., 1st Bn., The Indian Grenadiers.
 P. M. C., 4/16th Punjab Regiment.
 P. M. C., 1st Bn., The Dogra Regiment.
 O. C., S. & M. Dett., 2 (U.P.) Bn., U. O. T. C., I. T. F.
 V. A. T., Soviet Embassy, London.
 Comdt., Malabar Special Police, Malappuram.
 Chief of Military Staff, Gwalior Army.
 Bde. Major, 1st Hyderabad Infantry Brigade.
 Comdt., 1st Hyderabad Infantry.
 Mess Secretary, 5th Bn., Hyderabad Infantry.
 O. C., 6th Bn., Hyderabad Infantry.
 Mess Secretary, Officers' Mess, 7 Hyderabad Infantry.
 Principal Medical Officer, The Nizam's Regular Forces.
 Trg. Adjutant, H. Q., C. T. C., Kairatabad, Hyderabad (Dn.)
 O. C., 1st Hyderabad Lancers.
 Comd., 3rd (N. O.) Golconda Lancers.
 O. C., J. & K. Transport Corps.
 O. C., 4 J. & K. Infantry.

O. C., 6 J. & K. Infantry.
 O. C., 8 J. & K. Infantry.
 O. C., 1st Jaipur Infantry.
 Mess Secretary, Rajendra Hazari Guards, Jaipur.
 O. C., Jaipur M. T. Coy.
 Hony. Secretary, Bikaner Army Officers' Mess.
 P. M. C., Officers' Mess, Alwar State Forces.
 O. C., Nabha Akal Infantry.
 Secretary, Jagatjit Infantry Officers' Mess, Kapurthala.
 Mess Secretary, Kapurthala Training Centre.
 Sadiq Brigade Officers' Mess, Palace, Bahawalpur.
 Mess Secretary, Kotah State Forces.
 Secretary, Officers' Mess, Cooch Behar State Forces.
 Officers' Mess, 1st Patiala Lancers.
 Officers' Mess, Infantry Training Unit, Patiala.
 Comdt., 2nd Baroda Infantry.
 Comdt., Sirmur State Forces.
 Comdt., Faridkot State Forces (2 copies).
 Home Minister, Suket State Forces.
 Military Secretary, Tehri Garhwal.
 O. C., Mandi State Forces.
 Comdr., Malerkotla State Forces.

Council:

On his appointment as A. O. C.-in-C., India, Air Marshal H. S. P. Walmsley has accepted the office of Vice-President of the United Service Institution of India, in succession to Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr. Air Marshal Walmsley was first commissioned in the British Army in December, 1915, transferred to the R. F. C. in the following year, and was awarded his pilot's wings. After World War I, in which he served in France, he was a flying instructor and later commanded a Flight in No. 55 Squadron in Mosul and No. 8 Squadron in Aden.

On the outbreak of World War II he commanded No. 71 Wing of the Advanced Air Striking Force, returned to Britain after Dunkirk, and served in Bomber Command successively as a Station Commander, Group Commander and finally as Senior Air Staff Officer, H. Q. He was mentioned in dispatches five times.

From May, 1945 to May, 1946 he served as A.O. Commanding No. 4 (Transport) Group in Britain, and then as A. O. C. No. 232 (Transport) Group in Singapore.

It is with regret that we have received the resignation from the Council of Lieut-General Sir Noel Beresford-Peirse, on his retirement from India. Apart from his excellent war record in the Middle East and his fine work as Welfare General in India, "B. P." has always been one of this Institution's most active supporters, and we have reason to be grateful to him for the keen interest he took in its progress. His wide circle of friends will join with us in wishing him and Lady Beresford-Peirse many happy years of retirement.

The Council of the U. S. I. of India will hold its annual meeting as usual in May next, when the Council for 1947-48 will meet. Members of the Institution who are willing to serve on the Council during 1947-48 are invited to write to the Headquarters of the Institution in Simla. At the same time it would be

appreciated if they would suggest the names of other members whom they would like to see serving on the Council. For practical purposes, Members serving on the Council should live or be stationed within reasonable distance of Delhi or Simla.

Press.

Now that the Journal is much bigger and many more copies have to be produced, our printers naturally need more time to prepare it, and as a result we are endeavouring to "put it to bed" on the first day of the month preceding publication. This January issue, therefore, is going to Press soon after December 1; the April issue early in March, and so on. I mention this so that contributors who have a topical article may know when to send it in. Even when it reaches us much work has to be done before it appears in print, so the earlier such contributions arrive the better.

An Appeal.

Would any member who has a copy of the October, 1934 issue care to present it to the Institution, for transmission to some one who needs it? Unfortunately we have no copy of that issue in stock—hence this appeal.

Advertisers.

If you will glance through the advertisement pages of this issue you will see many new advertisers, and it would be a great help to us if, in dealing with them, you would mention that you had seen their announcement in the columns of the *U. S. I. Journal*.

Yours sincerely,
THE SECRETARY.

MacGregor Memorial Medal

Recommendations for the award of the MacGregor Memorial Medal should be submitted by May 1 of each year.

The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, who founded the United Service Institution of India. It is awarded for the best military reconnaissance or journey of exploration of the year.

The awards are made in June, and are: (a) For officers, British or Indian, silver medal, and (b) for soldiers, British or Indian, a silver medal with Rs. 100 as gratuity. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. The Council may also award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity to a soldier for specially good work.

The award of the medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

Eligibility for the award is open to: (a) Officers and other ranks of all forces of the British Commonwealth of Nations while serving with the India Establishment, or with South Asia Command. (b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Royal Indian Air Force and of

the Indian States Forces, wherever serving. (The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Militray Corps under local governments).

Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal: but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal. Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla.

Gold Medal Essay Competition

The subject set for the competition which closes on June 30, 1947 is: "MAN MANAGEMENT". Full details of the competition and the rules will be found in the front section of this issue.

Library

An extensive library is available for members of the Institution at the headquarters in Simla. Books may be loaned to members resident in India, and those borrowing works in person must enter particulars in the book provided. Members stationed outside Simla may receive books on application; they will be sent post-free by registered parcel post, and must be returned within two months, or immediately on recall. No more than three volumes may be issued at any one time. Reference books and works marked "Confidential" may not be removed from the library.

Members wishing to retain a work for more than two months should notify the Secretary to that effect. If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled. Should a book not be returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, the cost of lost or defaced books being refunded by the member to whom they were issued. Such volumes which have become out of print will be valued by the Executive Committee, the members being required to pay the cost so fixed.

The issue of a book to any member under the above rules implies the latter's agreement with the regulations.

ANSWERS TO QUIZ ON PAGE—70.*Military*

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia.
2. British India Element Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia.
3. British Commonwealth Occupation Forces.
4. Overseas Central-Coordination Committee of Supplies.
5. Allied Land Forces, South East Asia.
6. South East Asia Command.
7. Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia.
8. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
9. British Army of Occupation of the Rhine.
10. Middle East Land Forces.
11. Allied Land Forces, Netherland East Indies.
12. British Troops, Iraq.
13. Special "end of war" leave.
14. Leave in advance of Python.
15. Two months leave.
16. Short Leave in United Kingdom.*
17. Leave in Lieu of Python.
18. Leave from Far East.
19. Leave in Dominions and Colonies of such personnel.
20. Repatriation.
21. Equipment Table Revision Committee.
22. Director of Warlike Equipment.
23. Inter-Services Demobilisation Planning Section.
24. Land Forces, Greece.
25. Director of Services Kinematography.
26. Petroleum Officer, War Department.
27. Director-General of Indian Medical Services.
28. British Liberation Army.
29. Popskis Private Army.
30. Joint Operation Intelligence Room.
31. Combined Services Entertainment Unit.


*A little poetic license here!

Unofficial.

1. Extra Leave Disguised As Duty.
2. Lots of Local Leave In Place of Python.
3. Whitehall System Of Filing.

Political.

1. Left Wing Organisation (trans from Greek).
2. Right Wing Organisation (trans from Greek):
3. Group of Spanish Clandestine Republican Armed Forces.
4. Anti-Fascist League (Burma).
5. United Nations Organisation.
6. *Militaire Republique Populaire*.
7. Union of Soviet and Socialist Republics.
8. A Croat Gunman.
9. Croat Fascist Organisation.
10. Federal Agricultural Organisation.
11. Entertainments National Service Association.
12. Ministry of Food.
13. First Aid Post.
14. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association.
15. United States of Indonesia.
16. Netherlands Indonesia Union.
17. Now replaced by NOF.
18. Yugoslav Controlled Popular Liberation Front (Greece).
19. United Liberation Youth Movement (Greece).
20. Anti-Fascist Women's Front (Greece).
21. Greek Communist Party.
22. Supreme Commander Allied Powers.





GENERAL THE RT. HON. LORD ISMAY,

G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.

General Ismay, whose elevation to the peerage is referred to in "Matters of Moment", recently arrived in New Delhi as chief of the new Viceroy's staff. He is 60 years of age, and was first commissioned in 1905. The above picture is reproduced from a painting by Mr. Oswald Birley.

The Journal

of the

United Service Institution of India

Vol. LXXVIII

APRIL, 1947

No. 327

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

MATTERS OF MOMENT

WITH THE departure of Field Marshal Lord Wavell we lose a great and sincere Viceroy, who has discharged his responsibilities to India with integrity, impartiality and judgment through periods of exceptional difficulty such as only a man of his calibre could surmount. His firm grasp of realities, depth of vision, and vast experience have combined to exert a beneficent influence on the peoples of this land. In politics, in the constitutional field, and in the economic sphere he has been unfailing in his help, and there is no denying that his enlightened policies have in no small measure been the driving force behind many of the advances which have occurred in this country during recent years. His appointment as Viceroy followed a great career as a soldier. In the Middle East his campaigns, fought with too few troops and inadequate arms, had been crowned with success; in the Far East, again against great odds, he had been called upon to hold or redeem a difficult situation. He embarked on his Viceregal career in June, 1943, at a time when delicate problems awaited solution, and to them he brought his forceful qualities of mind and realistic outlook. He has always shown a practical sympathy with India's political aspirations, and it is a matter of sorrow that his efforts to reconcile the opposing political parties in this country have not borne the fruit they deserved. He has served India well, has guided her to the utmost of his skill, patiently, painstakingly and with an honesty of purpose which has always deeply impressed those in whose hands now lie its destiny. In bidding him God-speed millions of Indians will wish him and Lady

Wavell all happiness. Soldiers particularly, who admired him for so readily responding to the call of duty in 1943, will have learned with great pleasure that the dignity of an Earldom has been conferred on Lord Wavell by His Majesty.

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Viscount Mountbatten, who has become probably the last of the long and honourable line of British Viceroys of India, has proved himself a skilful leader in peace as well as in war. He brings with him a quick and receptive mind and personal gifts which will stand him in good stead in the days which lie ahead. Of his brilliant career we need add little to that which the world already knows. His character and talents brought him high commands during the late War, first as Commodore, Combined Operations; then Chief of Combined Operations; later as a member of the Chief of Staffs Committee; and on to the task allotted to him as Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia. For three years he held that arduous post over an area in which some of the major Allied campaigns in the late War were carried out. The weight on his shoulders now is greater, and everyone will extend to him their heartfelt wishes for success in his new sphere. Two senior members of his staff have long personal experience of India—General Lord Ismay and Sir Eric Mieville. The former we refer to later in connection with the honour bestowed upon him in the New Year Honours List; while Sir Eric Mieville was secretary to the Viceroy from 1931 to 1936 and also held the office of secretary to the Executive Council over the same period.

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HAVING had to go to Press with the January issue of this Journal early in December, it was not possible to refer in that number to those honoured by His Majesty on New Year's Day, 1947. The barony then conferred on General Sir Hastings Ismay, however, was a signal reward for the Indian Army, for it is practically unprecedented for a serving Indian Army officer to be elevated to the peerage. The most recent case was in 1938, when Sir William Birdwood was created a baron; he, by virtue of his rank of Field Marshal was and still is technically on the active list. Numerous peers by succession have, of course, served in the Indian Army; but General Ismay's elevation is a thing apart, upon which all his brother officers will offer their special congratulations. For the past twenty years he has been closely associated with higher direction of national policy in Great Britain; in 1926 he was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and after service in India, which included being military secretary to Lord Willingdon, he returned to the Committee as secretary in 1938. When Mr. Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940 General Ismay became his staff officer and an additional member

The New Year Honours

of the Chief of Staffs Committee, and later additional secretary (military) to the Cabinet. For five years he held the delicate post of liaison between the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff, accompanying Mr. Churchill on nearly all his wartime journeys.

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Other honours which were conferred on members of this Institution on January 1 included the C.B. awarded to Major-General E. N. Goddard,

Other

C.I.E., C.B.E., M.V.O., M.C., to Major-General S. F. Irwin,

U.S.I.

C.B.E., to Major-General B. W. Key, D.S.O., M.C., and to

Members

Major-General T. Scott. The Adjutant General in India,

Honoured

Lieut. General Sir Reginald A. Savory, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,

was awarded the K.C.I.E.—an honour which members of the United Service Institution of India will have warmly welcomed, for General Savory has for the past year been Chairman of our Executive Committee, and has always taken a deep and practical interest in the progress of the Institution. The C.I.E. was conferred on Brigadier J. H. Wilkinson, former Director of Resettlement, on Brigadier J. R. Reynolds, O.B.E., of the 15 Punjab Regiment, and on Brigadier C. Southgate, M.C. Colonel R. A. Briggs, of the 5 Royal Garhwal Rifles, was awarded the O.B.E.

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A NEW office of wide interest to the Armed Forces in India was recently created, when Air Vice Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C. took up his appointment as Chief of Inter-Services Administration at G.H.Q. Before the late War responsibility for the administration

**Chief
of**

tion of the Army lay, under the Commander-in-Chief, with three Principal Staff Officers of equal status. Naval

Inter-Services and Air Headquarters had their own Administrative Administration Officers. During the War the Administrative Service of the Army grew enormously, and it became necessary to co-ordinate their activities, both for efficiency and for the sake of economy. A Principal Administrative Officer for the Army was therefore appointed to co-ordinate its various Branches. General Sir Wilfred Lindsell, who proved himself a brilliant administrator, was the first holder of that office, being succeeded by General Sir Reade Godwin-Austen, who brought to his task a personal charm and knowledge which proved him to be well fitted for that appointment. Experience during the War confirmed the efficacy of such a post, and when the composition of the Post-War Army was being considered, it was decided that the responsibilities of the P.A.O. should be extended to include the Administrative Services of the Navy and Air Force. The C.I.S.A., unlike the P.A.O., belongs to no special Service; he can be appointed either from the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. Though the Army is numerically the largest of the Armed Forces, it is worthy of note that the first C.I.S.A. is an airman.

The new C.I.S.A. is not an executive officer in sole charge of the combined administration of the three Services, for the existing P.S.Os. of the

Navy and Air Force remain responsible to their own Commanders-in-Chief for the efficiency of their own Services. He is super-imposed to co-ordinate the administrative of the three Services, to increase efficiency and economy by ensuring an evenness in policy between them, and to explore in what directions the integration of inter-Service administrative services can be effected with advantage to the Armed Forces as a whole, and to each of the Services in particular. He represents Armed Forces Headquarters in discussions on important Inter-Service administrative policy with other departments of the Government of India concerned, especially in regard to meeting the administrative requirements of the Armed Forces in peace, and in preparation for war. Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst thus acts as adviser to the Commander-in-Chief on all administrative matters concerning the three Services.

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“WHERE IS KEREN?” Believe it or not, the question was asked the other day by a seemingly intelligent person in Delhi in all seriousness. It is a timely reminder to critics who decry the importance of the efforts of those who are sorting, sifting and analysing the fine work done by Indian troops during the late War in order that

**A
Worth-while
Task**

the world may not forget what they accomplished. That Keren, where Indian soldiers achieved undying fame, should be forgotten after five short years is evidence, if evidence were needed, that India owes it to herself to ensure that the deeds of her countrymen are set down in black and white for all time. To reduce to writing all that occurred on the battlefields of the Western Desert, in Italy, Burma and Malaya and other places, is a task which will cover many years, for if those records are to be of permanent value they must be accurate to the highest degree. It is good to know that in this task India will be no whit behind other countries, for records of a country's achievements form part of her national heritage, and India, with its intensified national consciousness, is rightly ensuring that the subject receives the attention it deserves.

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WORLD WAR II proved the vital importance of the Air Arm in modern war. It is also patent to every student of military strategy that its scope in any future war will increase. These facts are of great import to many officers of the Royal Indian Air Force, who have before them a splendid opportunity not merely to secure their own personal careers, but to assist in strengthening the defence organisation of their country. Some officers have been granted permanent commissions, but at the

**Opportunities
in the
R.I.A.F.**

moment it is not possible to grant such commissions against every officer establishment vacancy for several reasons. Permanent officers must be ensured a reasonable career, with steady advancement at the right age; there must be a constant intake of young officers for the operation of modern aircraft of increasing speed and complexity; and there must be created a reserve of officers young enough to take their place as effective operational pilots in the event of war. To achieve those objectives the number of permanent officers must be limited; the remainder must be on some form of Short Service basis. Two new types of the latter category have been introduced: the Extended Service commission for those serving on Emergency Commissions and the Short Service commission for new entrants. The former is essentially for officers who do not wish to leave the Service when they become due for release; while many who will fall in the latter category want permanent commissions but cannot get them until the peace establishment of the R.I.A.F. is decided upon and the exact number of officers who will be required is known.

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Nevertheless, the establishment of the R.I.A.F. is increasing and will continue to do so for some years to come; as the establishment increases, so will the number of vacancies available for permanent officers; and a high proportion of those vacancies may then be granted to officers who accept Extended Commissions; moreover, some officers may be selected in anticipation of future increases in the establishment. It follows, therefore, that although selections will necessarily have to be staggered, the proportion of officers accepting Extended Service commissions who will later be granted permanent commissions will be high. Very soon 75 permanent commissions will be granted to General Duties officers who have accepted Extended Service commissions, but further selections will necessarily have to be postponed until further vacancies occur. For a few years, however, the field of selection will be restricted to Extended Service officers. Clearly, those who apply for these commissions first will be the first to benefit either in the immediate or near future, when permanent commissions are available in greater numbers. It is not in every branch of public service that officers have such an attractive proposition placed before them, and it will be surprising if they do not seize it with avidity.

An Attractive Proposition

INDIAN ARMY BOYS' UNITS

BY FIELD MARSHAL SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK,
G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., A.D.C.

Commander-in-Chief, India.

INDIA'S need for potential leaders was never so pressing as it is to-day. What follows is a short description of one way in which the Indian Army is helping to meet that need.

Dotted over the length and breadth of India are more than fifty Corps and Regimental Training Centres, representing all branches of the Service, in each of which are Boys' Units engaged in training boys of between fifteen and seventeen years of age. There are about thirteen thousand of these carefully selected youngsters, and the primary object of all these Boys' Units is the same—the bringing out in the boys of those qualities which go to make a real man and a leader.

A visit to any Boys' Unit is a most encouraging and exhilarating experience. The spirit and alertness of the lads strike a visitor the moment he arrives; but what is still more impressive is to watch them running their own training and managing their own affairs with the very minimum of assistance from officers or N.C.Os. This "home rule" is a feature of all well-run boys' units. All boys in turn shoulder progressively increasing responsibilities, but are taught that no man can lead until he himself has learnt to obey.

The standard of discipline is commendably high, probably because it rests upon self-respect and sound "public opinion". This is not to say that boyish pranks never occur. Something would be very wrong if they did not.

About half of the instructional periods is devoted to education, and the minimum standard a boy has to reach while still a "boy" is that of the Indian Army 2nd Class and English 3rd Class Certificates. Great care is, however, taken to see that he does not develop into a mere bookworm, and his educational periods include many activities designed to broaden his mind and develop his character. It is the aim of the system that a boy, while he is a boy, remains a boy and does not become a precocious prig.

Games are played at least five times a week, and boys get useful experience in organizing and controlling various forms of sport. All boys, and not just a selected few, have to box; and in many units a high standard has already been reached. Those who have had the good fortune to see the All India Boys' Boxing Tournament will have realised this.

The "military" side of the instruction is run broadly on Scout lines, and the aim is the development of soldierly qualities (particularly those required in a leader) and not the acquiring of highly specialised military skill. Camps, run to a great extent by the boys themselves, form a most useful and popular part of the training.

All boys, whether belonging to technical or non-technical arms, work on substantially the same programme. No trade specialisation is permitted, but where necessary boys begin simple technical instruction during their second year.

The boys in each unit have their own club and take a major part in its management. They are justly proud of these clubs, which are not only the "show pieces" of their units, but also real centres of recreation and of cultural development. In many of them can be seen the greatly prized boys' "flag", inspiring the young trainees to loyalty and high endeavour.

On reaching man's age, successful trainees are called "ex-Boys." They then work under the same conditions as the normal recruit, receiving no preferential treatment. As, however, they have already done many of the lessons included in the normal recruit syllabus, they work in separate squads with a special allotment of time for education and leadership training.

A detailed report is sent with each ex-Boy when he joins his active unit; but in that unit he stands or falls entirely on his own merits. If, however, he is the right type and his training has been sound, he should not have to wait long for advancement. To ensure that normally enlisted men do not find their prospects unduly affected, the number of ex-Boys entering the Service each year is carefully regulated.

This, then, in very broad outline is the boys' training scheme. If its success depended solely on the quality of the trainees, the future would be assured. But something more is required; we must have officers and instructors fired with enthusiasm for this splendid venture. Employment with boys' units is no military backwater. It is an unparalleled opportunity of playing an effective part in moulding the whole "shape of things to come".

N. C. C. Sub-Committee to tour U.K.

Four members of a sub-committee of the National Cadet Corps Organisation Committee are visiting the United Kingdom. The members are: Professor M. Haida, M.B.E., Muslim University, Aligarh; Lt.-Col. Altaf Qadir, M.B.E., Indian Army; Dr. G.S. Mahajani, Fergusson College Poona; and Lt.-Col. L.P. Sen, D.S.O., Secretary of the Committee.

During their stay in the United Kingdom, the sub-committee will study the workings of the Army, Sea and Air Cadet Corps, youth movements, boys' clubs and the Boy Scout and Girl Guides organisations.

Other questions on which the committee want fuller information are how cadet corps are financed, what percentage of university candidates were given regular commissions before the late war, how schools are selected for cadet training, how officers are obtained and trained for cadet units, whether universities have Officers' Training Corps and the system employed by them.

The Committee, of which the Hon'ble Pandit H.N. Kunzru is Chairman, was set up in August, 1946, to advise the Government of India on the formation of a National Cadet Corps. When formed, the N.C.C. will, it is envisaged, consist of two divisions, a senior division in the universities and colleges and a junior division in the high schools, with similar divisions for girls.

The aims of the Corps are to develop leadership, character and comradeship among India's youth and to stimulate an interest in the defence of the country.

WHAT IS COURAGE ?

BY GENERAL SIR WILLIAM SLIM, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.*

I DO NOT believe there is any man who, in his heart of hearts, would not rather be called brave than have any other virtue attributed to him. And this elemental, if you like unreasoning, male attitude is a sound one, because courage is not merely *a* virtue; it is *the* virtue. Without it there *are* no other virtues. Faith, hope, charity, all the rest don't become virtues until it takes courage to exercise them. Courage isn't only the basis of all virtue; it is its expression. True, you may be bad and brave, but you cannot be good without being brave.

Courage is a mental state—an affair of the spirit—and so it gets its strength from spiritual and intellectual sources. The way in which these spiritual and intellectual elements are blended, I think, produces roughly two types of courage. The first, an emotional state which urges a man to risk injury or death—physical courage. The second, a more reasoning attitude which enables him coolly to stake career, happiness his whole future on his judgment of what he thinks either right or worth while—moral courage.

Now these two types of courage, physical and moral, are very distinct. I have known many men who had marked physical courage, but lacked moral courage. Some of them were in high places, but they failed to be great in themselves because they lacked it. On the other hand, I have seen men who undoubtedly possessed moral courage very cautious about taking physical risks. But I have never met a man with moral courage who would not, when it was really necessary, face bodily danger. Moral courage is a higher and a rarer virtue than physical courage.

To be really great, a man or a nation must possess both kinds of courage. In this the Japanese were an interesting study. No other army has ever possessed massed physical courage as the Japanese did. Its whole strength lay in the emotional bravery of the individual soldier. The Japanese Generals shared their men's physical bravery to the full, but they lacked, to a man, moral courage. They hadn't the moral courage to admit when their plans had failed and ought to have been changed; to tell their superiors that their orders couldn't be carried out, and retreat while there was still time. We played on this weakness, and by it the Japanese commanders lost their battles and destroyed their armies.

All men have some degree of physical courage—its surprising how much. Courage is like having money in the bank. We start with a certain capital of courage, some large, some small, and we proceed to draw on our balance, for don't forget courage is an expendable quality. We can use it up. If there are heavy, and, what is more serious, if there are continuous calls on our courage, we begin to overdraw. If we go on overdrawing we go bankrupt—we break down.

You can see this overdraft mounting clearly in the men who endure the most prolonged strains in war: the submarine complement, the infantry platoon, the bomber crew. First there comes a growing impatience and irritability; then a hint of recklessness, a sort of "Oh, to hell with it chaps, we'll attack" spirit; next, real foolhardiness, what the soldier calls "asking for it"; and last, sudden changes of mood from false hilarity to black moroseness. If before that stage is reached the man's commander has spotted what's happening and pulled him

* In a B.B.C. broadcast.

out for a rest, he'll recover, and in a few months be back again as brave and a balanced as ever. The capital in his bank of courage will have built up and he can start spending again.

There are, of course, some people whose capital is so small that it is not worth while employing them in peace or war in any job requiring courage—they overdraw too quickly. With us these types are surprisingly few. Complete cowards are almost non-existent. Another matter for astonishment is the large number of men and women in any group who will behave in emergency with extreme gallantry. Who they will be you can't tell until they're tested.

Long ago I gave up trying to spot potential V. C.'s by their looks, but from experience I should say that those who perform individual acts of the highest physical courage are usually drawn from one of two categories. Either those with quick intelligence and vivid imagination, or those without imagination and with minds fixed on the practical business of living. You might almost say, I suppose, those who live on their nerves and those who haven't got any nerves. The one suddenly sees the crisis, his imagination flashes the opportunity, and he acts. The other meets the situation, without finding it so very unusual, and deals with it in a matter-of-fact way.

In the First World War, when I was a bit more irresponsible, I served under an officer of vivid imagination. He was always fussing about dangers that usually didn't exist. Once, after a day and half a night of his constant alarms I was so fed up that I disconnected the telephone in the advanced post I was holding. I wanted some sleep. I didn't get it. Within half-an-hour his imagination had painted the most frightful pictures of my position over-run by the enemy. He arrived with the reserve company to retake it. As he was my commanding officer I had some rather difficult explaining to do! I thought he was just windy. A few days later he won the V. C. by a superb example of leadership and courage.

In this last war in Burma a young Gurkha won the V. C. At a critical moment when Japanese medium tanks had broken through our forward positions, he took his "Piat"—an anti-tank grenade discharger—and leaving cover moved forward over the open towards the tanks. He was shot in the hand, the shoulder and again badly in the leg, but he got to within thirty yards of the tanks and bumped off two of them. Later, when I saw him in hospital, I asked him why he had walked forward in the open like that. He replied: "I'd been trained not to fire the Piat until I was certain of hitting. I knew I could hit at thirty yards, so I went to thirty yards!" He had had only one thought in his head—to get to thirty yards. Quite simple if you aren't bothered by imagination.

Can courage be taught? I am sure in one sense physical courage can. What in effect you must do is train the man not to draw too heavily on his stock of courage. Teach him what to expect, not to be frightened by bogeys—by the unknown. If you send an untrained British soldier on patrol in the jungle, every time a branch creaks, every time there's a rustle in the undergrowth, when an animal slinks across the track, when a bush moves in the wind, he'll draw heavily and unnecessarily on his stock of courage. And he'll come back a shaken man, with a report of no value. But if you train that man beforehand, let him live in the jungle, teach him its craft, then send him on patrol, he'll come back with his balance of courage unimpaired and probably a couple of Jap helmets as well.

To teach moral courage is another matter—and it has to be taught because so few, if any, have it naturally. The young can learn it from their parents,

in their homes, from school and university, from religion, from other early influences, but to inculcate it in a grown-up who lacks it requires not so much teaching as some striking emotional experience—something that suddenly bursts upon him, something in the nature of a vision. That happens rarely—and that is why you will find that most men with moral courage learnt it by precept and example in their youth.

Now, I suppose because I'm a soldier, I've talked most of courage in men at war, but the fighting man is the last to claim a monopoly in courage. Many a soldier in this last war has steeled himself in battle with the thought of what his civilian fellow-countrymen and women were enduring and how they were enduring it. Whether women are braver than men I don't know, but I have always found them, when really tested, at least equally brave.

In the retreat from Burma in 1942, I was deeply proud of the troops who staggered into India, exhausted, ragged, reduced to a remnant, but carrying their weapons and ready to turn again and face the enemy. Yet the outstanding impression of courage I carried away from that desperate campaign was from the Indian women refugees. Day after day, mile after mile, they plodded on, through dust or mud, their babies in their arms, children clinging to their skirts, harried by ruthless enemies, strafed from the air, shelterless, caught between the lines in every battle, yet patient, uncomplaining, devoted, thinking only of their families—so very brave.

Now, without talking any nonsense about Master Races, as the Japanese and Germans did, it is a fact that races do vary in courage. Some are braver than others—and you jolly soon find out which they are when you fight them. At a guess I should say it depends mostly on where they've lived for the past five or six hundred years. If it's been in a land where it didn't take much effort to get enough food, clothing and shelter for an easy life, they won't be conspicuously brave. If they've lived where life is so hard that it's a terrible struggle against nature to keep any standard of living at all, then they'll be brave in a few things—dangers to which they are enured—but not at all brave in others.

It's in the lands where nature is neither too easy nor too cruel, where a man must work hard to live, but where his efforts and his enterprise can bring him great rewards, those are the lands that breed courage and where it becomes a natural tradition. And don't run away with the idea that this limits courage to Northern Europe and North America. Believe me—and I've fought both with and against them—some of the bravest races in the world aren't white at all.

And while nations vary in the amount of their courage, they vary too in its type. We, the British, have our own special kind of courage—the courage that goes on. And endurance is the very essence of courage. Courage is a long term virtue. Anyone can be brave for a little while. The British are no braver than the Germans, the French, the Italians or anybody else, but they are brave for a bit longer. This going on being brave when most others would have given up has been the racial characteristic of our courage.

It is interesting to speculate how we have developed this particularly practical and effective kind of courage. I'm inclined to think that like so much in the world it's been a matter of geography and history. We draw our racial stock almost wholly from Northern Europe, one of the good areas for natural courage, and our intellectual and cultural heritage almost entirely from the Mediterranean, the great source of enlightened thought. At any rate, in the great moments of our history, we have based our natural courage on a faith—a belief that we worked or fought for the things that mattered—a decent life, the freedom of the spirit. That has been our strength.

HOW IT SHOULD BE DONE

"Per mare, per terram, ad astra"

BY MAJOR-GENERAL T. SCOTT, C.B.

I.

THE preoccupations of World War II distracted us from all other events. We lost sight of countries not involved in the struggle, and had lost interest in their affairs. The significance of the defeat of Brobdingaea by Lilliputia had consequently escaped notice.

So when I was ordered to join a mission to Lilliputia, I thought that it was the final step towards the bowler hat. Our reception was markedly different to that of Gulliver. We were indeed guests of honour, and no honours and no effort of the Lilliputians was considered by them as sufficient.

The task of the Mission was to study the Lilliputian war organisation, and to find out the methods by which they had achieved their surprisingly quick success. Brobdingaea had been deemed a first-class military power by any standard, and Lilliputia had been ignored by all the experts. Yet their war lasted less than three months against the seven years of World War II. In spite of this phenomenon it still seemed small beer to us after the Battle of Britain, North Africa, Italy, D Day and Burma.

During a week we were feasted and feted and worn out by kindness and hospitality; then we were left to our own devices and given complete rest. At last we had time to ruminate on what we had seen and heard. Impressions began to take shape. My first was that we had met no one distinctively dressed as sailor, soldier or airman. All wore the same light grey uniform and the same badges of rank.

There was only one apparent difference—the cap badges of some bore the letters SBAF and of others LBAF. When asked what he was, a man would say "Armed Forces, Infantry" or "Armed Forces, Battleships" and so on. Ship or Regiment meant nothing to these men. Their pride was in being first Lilliputians and second Armed Forces. While we knew that the Lilliputians had no equivalent to our Admiralty, or War Office, or Air Ministry, we had not anticipated this degree of integration.

After a few days' rest, the senior member of the staff attached to the Mission intimated that, from then onwards, we would be at the disposal of the Chief of the Armed Forces (COAF) and his staff. We were to spend the whole of the next day with the great man himself.

II.

The COAF welcomed us with a generous tribute to the "indomitable spirit" of the British race. He said that it had inspired us to defend the weak in 1939, to stand defiant when all else accepted defeat in 1940, and to persevere through years of reverses and suffering until we had achieved victory. He could find no words to express his admiration.

He continued that we had accomplished this in spite of a defence organization which was archaic, unrealistic, and illogical. We had three Fighting Services which were essentially individualistic; competed continually against each other for the available men and material; and which, in spite of the publicity given to the newly-created Ministry of Defence, would continue to

fight each other so long as they had a separate existence. By creating the Ministry of Defence we had merely shifted the responsibility for setting inter-Service squabbles from one Cabinet to one individual man.

He noted that in India the Defence Member controlled the three Indian Services, which were under a single Commander-in-Chief. In this case, however, the Army in the past had been a colossus, while the Navy and the Air Force had been only Services in embryo. When they reached full stature he had no doubt that they would develop the individualistic tendencies of their British counterparts.

After a close study of our system he had come to the conclusion that our success was due to our genius for compromise, *i.e.*, the Army and the Air Force acquiesced in the views of "their Lordships at the Admiralty"! He had noted that the latter had taken care to place their own man as the first Minister for Defence.

Lilliputia was small and weak. She was not blessed with the material assets of the British Commonwealth. It was essential, therefore, that every particle of her power should be fully employed and co-ordinated for war. The individual had his place in the machine and he had to fill that place. Every cause of friction or distraction had to be eliminated. Consequently Lilliputia had only one Fighting Service, the Armed Forces. The members of these Forces wore the same uniform and did the same basic training.

There were two branches of the Armed Forces however, *i.e.*, Sea Based and Land Based. The former comprised what we called the Navy and the Coastal Command Air Force. The latter was the equivalent of our Army and Air Force less the Coastal Command. Thus a Commander-in-Chief had all the weapons which he required directly under his control, and was not beholden to any independent authority for assistance.

Of course, the Sea Based Armed Forces (SBAF) helped the Land Based Armed Forces (LBAF) in transport, and by bombardment from the sea when necessary, while the latter responded by securing sea bases or by heavy air bombardment. All staffs down to and including Command Headquarters were completely integrated, thereby ensuring understanding and co-operation in all major operations. The COAF asked us to consider his position and compare it with that of the Minister of Defence in the United Kingdom.

There was another fundamental difference between the Armed Forces of Lilliputia and those of the major World Powers. He was appalled by the ghastly weapons we used—high explosive, poison gas, etc., and now atomic bombs, bacteriological projectiles and so on. Our object seemed to be destruction, destruction everywhere, and in its wake came fear, hate, and the causes of fresh wars. Until quite recently Lilliputia had followed the same policy. Under the threat of war from Brobdingagea, however, they had appreciated that they could achieve nothing with their puny conventional weapons.

Scientists and engineers had then been given a free hand, and the chemists and psychiatrists had evolved three non-poisonous gases. For convenience these had been named "Love", "Hope" and "Charity". "Love" and "Hope" were non-persistent smokes and, for obvious reasons, were sparingly used. Their employment had to be psychologically timed to induce a frame of mind in the enemy which would make him susceptible to the persistent "Charity". When affected by it the enemy invariably surrendered without resistance.

All three gases were used as fillings for shells, bombs and grenades. In addition "Charity" was used as a spray. Their introduction had markedly reduced the horrors of war; the casualties they caused required no medical treatment; and their effect was such that resistance was not worth while. Naturally the gases were closely guarded secrets of Lilliputia, and she did not propose to disclose them, even to the UNO, at the present time.

A further point of difference between Lilliputia and other Powers was that all "common use" supplies, stores, and services were provided for the Armed Forces by the Service of Supply. This was a semi-military organization which catered for all Government Departments in food, clothing, motor vehicles, except those of specialized design, and many other things too numerous to mention. The Service of Supply procured, stored, moved, and supplied all "common user" articles down to and including main depots from which units drew direct. It also provided works services, signal communications, and motor transport for and between static formations and establishments.

In war its responsibility extended to base depots in expeditionary force theatres. Even the COAF had been astounded by the economies which had resulted from this rational measure. The savings in money, material and manpower were staggering. Moreover, the Armed Forces thus became fighting "teeth", and non-combatant "tails" had almost disappeared. It was the story of the evolution of man from monkey.

The discussions and explanations continued through the day. The more we heard the more we realized the revolutionary nature of the Lilliputian system. In the light of the explanations we began to wonder why we ourselves had not long since adopted their organization. It may be that it is the old story of vested interests and all that the term covers. Man took a long time to evolve from the monkey.

III.

Our next session was with the SBAF and lasted several days, during which we visited dockyards, schools, ships and air bases. In this case it was the ships which were of outstanding interest to a soldier. Our visits included one to a task force, which on our arrival, appeared to be only one ship moored alongside. She was similar in appearance to one of our submarines, but lacked the conning-tower and was broader in the beam. The Force Commander explained that she was a "projector ship", the functions of which would be demonstrated. We then put to sea.

It was a pleasant morning with warm sunshine and unruffled sea, but there was no sign of the task force. Then suddenly we were in the middle of a dozen ships (similar in appearance to our projector ship) which rose quietly to the surface. Ours was the leader of four, with a division on the starboard bow and another on the port bow.

The task force commander smiled and asked us to look carefully at the ships. He explained that we were the leader of a division of projector ships. Their role was to attack enemy bases, industrial centres or major establishments with rockets. Each rocket weighed about two tons and had an accurate range of five hundred miles. Four projectors were built into the hull, their vents or muzzles being protected by flush hatch covers when the ship was submerged. Projector ships had no part in fleet *versus* fleet action and, in the event of either ship or air attack developing, they submerged and withdrew.

The remaining ships of the task force were "battleships" equipped with aircraft and guided missiles. Their primary role was attack on enemy seaborne forces, but they could also be used against bases, etc., at ranges of up to two hundred miles with a fair degree of accuracy. These ships carried only a few aircraft which were used for fighter cover and reconnaissance, and to vector the guided missiles on to the target. They provided protection for the projector ships on their missions.

Projector ships and battleships were the only types of major fighting ships included in the SBAF. Their dimensions, hull design and propulsion were identical, which simplified training, operation and maintenance. The aircraft used required no flight deck because they were fitted with vertical suction gas turbines for lift, as well as with jet engines for horizontal flight. The former made it possible to take off and land vertically, suction turbines counter-acting gravity to the extent desired.

We were shown specimen rockets, each about twice the size of the standard 21-inch torpedo and with a sharper nose. They were painted pink for "love", pure white for "Charity" and sky blue for "Hope", to indicate the nature of the filling. For our special benefit one "Hope" rocket was fired with reduced charge at an uninhabited island at a range of ten miles.

A battleship then closed up to about half a mile, where she took a parallel course. A cigar shaped object appeared on her deck, rose slowly to a hundred feet or so, and turned to join us. It was a miniature Zeppelin minus cabins and engine nacelles, with a cut-off tail, and a rudder and elevators fitted above its stern. This aircraft circled slowly round us, hissing quietly, and stopped close in so that it was almost possible to lean out and touch it.

A window opened in its nose and the captain talked to the task force commander. The window snapped shut and the aircraft rose vertically, but still on a level keel, with a harsh scream. It reached 1,000 feet in a flash and there set off on a level course, turning and twisting as no winged aircraft ever did.

Our attention was brought back to other things by an infernal whistle and rush of hot air which sent us all flat on the deck. The force commander remained standing and pointed to a white bullet, the size of a 25-pdr. shell, now slowly circling the ship. It was the guided missile, engined in the same way as the aircraft vectoring it by radar from above. Having shown itself off, the missile returned quietly to the battleship, sat down gently on its deck and disappeared. This was a dummy run.

The force commander explained that the maximum speed of both aircraft and missile exceeded 1,000 miles per hour. He regretted that he could not get us over to the battleship, but assured us that we would be shown these weapons during our stay with the LBAF.

IV.

Our round of visits to the LBAF commenced with a lecture by the Chief of Staff (Cos). Incidentally he belonged to the SBAF. He explained that the primary task of the LBAF in war was to secure ground whence rocket and/or guided missile attack could be launched against strategic targets.

The entire conception of land based operations had been changed by the development of what he called "solid fuel" for aero-engines. This, in turn, had made it possible to fit vertical suction gas turbines as well as jet engines in aircraft. Moreover, it had increased endurance to something in excess of the longest range petrol piston-engined types. Aircraft could now rise straight off

and settle down on the ground, and no runway was required. This eliminated engineer works and made unnecessary all the paraphernalia of parachutes, gliders, etc., still used by other Powers. The problem of turning the enemy's top flank had been greatly simplified.

He gave a theoretical example of a major land-based operation. "X" was an important base and centre of communications in enemy territory. If it could be denied to them, they would be unable to maintain their forces in the theatre. "X" lay, however, more than eight hundred miles from our nearest positions, and thus was beyond rocket range. Consequently, it was necessary to secure a position in enemy territory not more than five hundred miles from "X".

"Y" area having been chosen as suitable for the position, was treated with "Love" and "Charity" by air or rocket bombardment, the amounts used depending on the enemy forces there. If it was known that "Y" area was not held there was no preliminary bombardment. The gases were given time to take effect when necessary, and a task force was flown in. Reconnaissance units or infantry went first, followed by artillery and ancillary units. When they were firmly established the rocket batteries followed. All maintenance, including rocket supply, was by air. As soon as "X" had been softened, it was assaulted in the same way.

In reply to a question, the Cos said that troops wore no respirators or protective clothing when they entered an area which had been treated with any of the gases. Special tablets were taken as protection against the effects of "Love" and "Charity". No antidote to "Hope" was required.

In consequence of these developments, the Cos explained, the organization of the LBAF bore little resemblance to that of either our Army or RAF. It comprised the following main Corps:—

Reconnaissance Corps, including both ground and air units.

Artillery Corps, also including both ground and air units.

Field Engineer Corps.

Signal Corps } of ground units only.
Infantry Corps }

Supply Corps, responsible for equipment and stores as well as food and fuel, also of ground units only.

Transport Corps, including both ground and air units.

Medical Corps, of ground units only.

Workshop Engineer Corps, responsible for the repair and maintenance of all equipment, ground vehicles and aircraft, also of ground units only.

The intention was that eventually the Reconnaissance Corps would contain only air units. So far, however, it had not been possible to armour the "scout" aircraft sufficiently to enable it to carry out detailed reconnaissance close to the ground. At present, therefore, the task had to be carried out by ground units equipped with armoured vehicles.

The Lilliputians had no equivalent to our Armoured Corps, because they considered that the Infantry was the assault arm, and the Artillery was responsible for giving them close support in battle. Consequently tanks were Artillery equipment. The Artillery also manned "ground attack" and light and heavy bomber aircraft. Thus the Corps comprised these main branches:—

Field, *i.e.*, tank and SP gun units and ground attack air units. The SP guns were dual purpose AA/ground fire.

Medium, *i.e.*, light bomber air units and guided missile parent units.

Heavy, *i.e.*, rocket batteries and heavy bomber air units.

AA/ground units for air defence of static establishments.

In the Transport Corps, what we called 3rd line, and a proportion of 2nd line transport, consisted of air units. Ultimately all 2nd line would be in the air. All 1st line transport was, and would remain, equipped with small light ground vehicles, of which twenty could be carried in the existing type 2nd line transport aircraft.

V.

From the HQ LBAF we went to a Task Force to enable us to see the theory put into practice. In strength the Force was considerably smaller than one of our divisions, but its operational role was roughly the equivalent of the latter. It consisted of a HQ Group and three Fighting Groups, of which the basic composition was:—

HQ Group.

HQ Task Force.
Ground Reconnaissance unit.
Ground attack air unit.
SP gun unit.
Field Engineer unit.
Signal unit.
One Light Infantry unit.
2nd line transport ground unit.
Supply unit.
Field Hospital.
Light Workshop Engineer unit.

Fighting Group (each).

HQ Fighting Group.
Signal unit.
Three Light Infantry units.
Two Field Artillery units, (*i.e.*, one tank and one SP gun).
Light Field Engineer unit.
Light Field Hospital.

Additional Fighting Groups were added to a Task Force for specific operations, but the total was never allowed to exceed five. Air units of the Reconnaissance Corps, light, heavy and AA units of the Artillery Corps, and air units of the Transport Corps were treated as "Army troops" and were usually controlled by the Theatre Commander or HQ LBAF. If a Task Force operated alone in a theatre, of course, such "Army troops" were added as the situation demanded. The reason for this centralization was that, because of the range of action of the types of units in question, their full effect could only be obtained by co-ordination under the Commander responsible for the theatre, or for a set of complementary operations.

The problem of securing ground gained by Task Forces was raised, and the Commander's view was that this presented no great difficulty. Except in the areas of bases or those occupied by Task Forces, transport had the choice

of the skies for routes. Moreover, the high speeds at which it operated made interception almost impossible. In the late war with Brobdingage, Task Forces had leap-frogged each others objectives until enemy opposition collapsed. They were, therefore, controlling the important strategical localities of a belt some five hundred miles deep in the heart of the enemy territory.

It mattered little what the enemy did between that belt and the bases or, for that matter, between the localities in the belt, because they were hamstrung. All troops in the belt belonged to the Task Forces, or to "Army troops" operating from the localities which they held. The bases could then be adequately protected by AA units of the Artillery Corps and garrison units consisting of elderly reservists of the Infantry Corps.

VI.

I have now described the high-lights of our visit to the Armed Forces of Lilliputia. Some remarks of the COAF when he bade us farewell are of still greater import. After apologising for his inability to accompany us on our various tours he said that he hoped that, when we made our reports to our respective Heads of Services, they would not be treated as "boloney" and imagination run riot.

He told us how, when the Lilliputian scientists and engineers had first put forward their proposals, vested interests and faint hearts had risen in opposition. They had been condemned as beyond the realms of possibility. Because of the critical situation at the time it had been necessary to adopt a course unknown in the United Kingdom. The vested interests and faint hearts had been liquidated.

He reminded us that our race stood for sanity and fair treatment for everyone, no matter how humble he might be. Consequently it was mainly our responsibility to prevent the next War, and if that proved impossible, to ensure that the aggressors were destroyed at super "blitz-krieg" speed. We must, therefore, stop thinking about World War II and "all that" and prepare for the future, be it peace or war. He reminded us that science moves fast, and that engineers and other executives follow hard on its heels. We needed the most and the best they could give us if we were to fulfil our destiny.

He trusted that he had sown seeds which would germinate. The cost of research and the instruments which would result from it would be great. It would, however, be infinitesimal compared with the bill if we were again caught unprepared. He trusted that two World Wars had taught some sense to our illogical race.

"Then strike up, drums! God, and Saint George, for us!"

12,500 Jangi Inams Awarded

The 12,500 *Jangi Inams* which were sanctioned by the Government of India for the Royal Indian Navy, the Indian Army and the Royal Indian Air Force some time ago have now been awarded.

These rewards have been granted to Viceroy's Commissioned Officers, Indian warrant officers, Indian other ranks and non-combatants (enrolled) in recognition of meritorious services during World War II. The rate of *Jangi Inam* is Rs. 20 per month for Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and Indian warrant officers and Rs. 10 per month for others.

The reward is payable for life. A number of these have been granted to the next-of-kin of deceased personnel.

THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA, 1800—1859

BY BRIGADIER H. BULLOCK, O.B.E., F.R. HIST. S.

SINCE the Crown took over the government of India there have been twenty Commanders-in-Chief, of whom eleven were then or had been officers of the Indian Army. But in the earlier period, which we now have in view, that of John Company, not one of the Company's officers got the supreme command. All the Commanders-in-Chief after Stringer Lawrence in 1766 till the appointment of Stewart in 1881 were in the King's service.*

Here are their names and basic dates—a full and formal list is set out at the end of this article.

Name	Born	First Commis- sion.	Became C.-in-C.	Died
Clarke†	.. (?)1745	1759	1798	1832
Lake	.. 1744	1758	1801	1808
Cornwallis	.. 1738	1756	1805	1805
Lake (again)	.. 1744	1758	1805	1808
Hewett	.. 1750	1762	1807	1840
Nugent	.. 1757	1773	1812	1849
Moir	.. 1754	1771	1813	1826
Paget	.. 1775	1792	1823	1849
Combermere	.. 1773	1790	1825	1865
Dalhousie	.. 1770	1789	1830	1838
Barnes	.. 1776	1792	1832	1838
Bentinck	.. 1774	1791	1833	1839
Fane	.. 1778	1792	1835	1840
Nicolls	.. 1778	1793	1839	1849
Gough	.. 1779	1794‡	1843	1869
Napier	.. 1782	1794	1849	1853
Gomm	.. 1784	1794	1850	1875
Anson	.. 1797	1814	1856	1857
Campbell	.. 1792	1808	1857	1863

Some are forgotten, perhaps undeservedly: ask the first dozen officers whom you meet what they know of Fane or Barnes: others must always be remembered.

Three Commanders-in-Chief were Governors-General as well: Cornwallis, Moir (better known as the Marquess of Hastings, but under that title much

*See articles by the present writer: *The Early Commanders-in-Chief in India*. (JOURNAL, Jan. 1947); *The Commanders-in-Chief in India since 1860* (JOURNAL, Oct. 1946); and *Field-Marshal of the Indian Army* (JOURNAL, April 1946).

†His parentage and date of birth are not known; see *Dictionary of National Biography*.

‡Previously commissioned in Militia, 1793.

confused with Warren, to whom he was not related though Warren liked to think he was), and Bentinck. These three, like Field-Marshal Lord Wavell in our own day, were great leaders in the field before they came to the head of affairs in Hindustan. Cornwallis was a Major-General before he had twenty years' service. Moira became a lieutenant-general after twenty-seven years in the army, but Bentinck got the same high rank (though it was temporary, not substantive) seven years earlier. It would be folly to pretend that politics, patronage and purchase had nothing to do with this rapid advancement, yet it would be equally wrong to ignore that leadership in the field and fortitude in adversity were potent causes of final success.

Cornwallis was, and is, unique. He had more bad luck than he or any leader deserved, and his reputation has long suffered from a wide misunderstanding of his generalship.* He was made Governor-General of India no less than three times. His first term (September 1786 to October 1793) included such historical landmarks as the defeat of Tipu and the permanent settlement of Bengal. It was a great reign but it does not come within our present scope. The second instance is little known. He was actually sworn in again as Governor-General on the 1st February 1797, but never came out, being sent instead as Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief to Ireland to quell the rebellion of 'Ninety-Eight, which he did with decisive success, though the ground was prepared by Lake. On this second occasion he was not formally made Commander-in-Chief in India as he was (short of assuming office) made Governor-General, but had the major appointment not proved abortive he would certainly have insisted upon having its military adjunct, which he deemed a vital one.

His third and last term was the one with which we now deal. It was sadly short. Taking office on 30th July 1805 at Calcutta, he was soon overcome by climate and years but, bravely setting out on an errand of peace, died at Ghazipur on the 5th October following. He had held his dual office for seventy-three days, a shorter term than any other C.-in-C. except Sir Alan Hartley in 1942, whose forty-nine days lasted from 17th January till 6th March.

Of the other Governors-General who were at the same time Commanders-in-Chief, Moira held the double reins for over nine years, and was thus C.-in-C. even longer than Lord Roberts was in the 'nineties; but Bentinck was in the saddle for less than two years. Another C.-in-C., Clarke, was acting Governor-General on the resignation of Sir John Shore, in March 1798, till the arrival of Lord Mornington (later Marquess of Wellesley) in May. Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General from 1847 to 1856, was son of the Lord Dalhousie who was Commander-in-Chief from 1830 to 1832. The span between the father's departure as C.-in-C. and the son's arrival as Governor-General—fifteen years—was remarkably short.

Some later Governors-General have, like Lord Wavell, been military men. One was a Field-Marshal, Viscount Hardinge of Lahore, who after vacating office in India in 1848 became Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in 1852 and received a baton a year before his death in 1856. He took an active but latterly controversial share in the campaigns of his time in India.

The Earl of Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General from 1905 to 1910, though his regular army career only covered three or four years as a subaltern in the Scots Guards, saw a great deal of active service thereafter, sometimes

* He was unjustly disparaged in Sir John Fortescue's *History of the British Army*. For an informed vindication of his actions at Yorktown, see the paper by Lieut.-Col. A.H. Burne, D.S.O., in the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. XVII (1938), page 71.

in the guise of a war correspondent but usually "just for the hell of it." In Paris during the Commune, he then accompanied the Carlist Forces in Spain and the Turks in 1877; and he was on Roberts' staff in the Second Afghan War, and with the Mounted Infantry in Egypt where he was wounded and commanded a regiment. His last active service was as chief of staff in the quelling of the second Riel rebellion in Canada three years later; and afterwards he became a brigadier-general of volunteers in Scotland, by virtue of which he sported a general's uniform when he was Viceroy. Having previously broken his neck in the Grand National, in which he rode four times and once finished fourth,* he turned to the comparative peace of the Governor-Generalship of Canada (1898-1904), whence he came to India where his great-grandfather had been Governor-General nearly a century before. (His maternal grandfather was Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army and of the "Army of the Deccan", and victor of Mahidpur).

As to Minto's ultimate quality as a proconsul later opinions have varied, but he was ever an admirer and steadfast friend of the Indian soldier, and was the first to propose the complete nationalisation of the officer cadre of an Indian regiment and the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst. This was in 1908, and had the Secretary of State (Morley) had some insight into the military side of Indian aspirations, the progress made in 1920-30 might have come to pass nearly a generation earlier.

There was not much show of democracy in the early days. Of our eighteen Chiefs, six were sons of peers, three more were grandsons of peers, and one was the son of a baronet. (Bentinck was a duke's son; the fathers of Cornwallis, Moira, Paget and Dalhousie were earls; and Anson's father was a viscount. Nugent (though illegitimate), Fane and Napier were grandsons of peers). But the last on our list, Colin Campbell (Lord Clyde) was the son of a Glasgow carpenter named Donald MacLiver, and took his mother's name on being commissioned. Of those who were the sons of commoners, it is odd that the four very eminent Chiefs who were created peers for their military services—Lake, Cotton (Combermere), Gough and Campbell (Clyde) were all civilians' sons, while some of the less famous Commanders-in-Chief—Hewett, Nicolls and Gomm—were the sons of soldiers.

Their titles proclaim their victories. Viscount Lake of Delhi and Leswarree and of Aston Clinton in Buckinghamshire; Viscount Combermere of Bhurtpore in the East Indies, and of Combermere in the County Palatine of Chester; Baron Gough of Chin-Kang-Foo in China and of Maharajpore and the Sutlej in the East Indies; Viscount Gough of Goojerat in the Punjab and of the City of Limerick. But Colin Campbell chose to be plain Lord Clyde of Clydesdale.†

The Lower House of Parliament was represented even more strongly, and to us to-day not the least surprising thing in the careers of these past Commanders-in-Chief was their activity in the Commons. Cornwallis (under his courtesy title as Viscount Brome), Combermere (as Sir Stapleton Cotton), Bentinck, Nugent, Barnes, Fane and Anson were all Members: and as Lake,‡ Cornwallis, Moira, Combermere, Dalhousie, Gough and Campbell (when Lord Clyde) belonged to the House of Lords, thirteen out of the eighteen were legislators. Some had long careers in the House. Nugent was M.P. for

*He won the French Grand National on his own horse.

†He hovered rather over this. First he said that he did not want to be Baron Clyde "of Lucknow": too late, he said that he did.

‡Lake was at one time also Member for Armagh in the Irish Parliament.

Buckingham from 1790 to 1800 and again from 1819 to 1832, and M.P. for Aylesbury in 1806-07—about 24 years in all. Fane was Member for Lyme Regis (a family borough) from 1796 to 1818. Anson was in the House for an even longer period—as member for Great Yarmouth 1818-35, for Stoke-on-Trent 1836-37, and for South Staffordshire 1837-53—about 35 years. The last had done no real soldiering since Waterloo, when he was a lad of seventeen, and his appointment as C.-in-C. must have been predominantly political.

In the early 'fifties, when the respective merits of government by Company or Crown were briskly discussed, the Company came in for criticism because the Commander-in-Chief in India (Gomm) and the Cs.-in-C. of the Madras and Bombay Armies had none of them "ever been in the country or seen a sepoy" when they had been appointed to commands in India, whereas there were seven thousand Company's officers who were not even thought of for these high appointments. Another grievance was the alleged decrepitude or senility of these importations. It was said that Sir Richard Armstrong, Commander-in-Chief at Madras, had to be carried about in an easy chair; and that Sir John Grey, the C.-in-C. of the Bombay Army, who was seventy, did not remember the names of his own aides-de-camp and could not be made to understand which documents require to be signed by him and which had to be initialled only. But it was conceded that Gomm was an able man, and he had indeed been at the bottom of the list of lieutenant-generals when he was selected for the chief command in India.*

There was cause for complaint, for older and older men had been put in. The average age at appointment of Paget, Combermere and Dalhousie was 52; that of the next three was 57; and that of the next four (down to Gomm) was 65. Gomm, aged 66, was much the oldest chief since Cornwallis (also 66) forty-five years before, though Cornwallis was only 47 on his first assumption of his dual offices in 1786. Whether by accident or design Gomm's successor Anson was only 58 and a mere major-general, and had some Indian experience too; but this final tribute by John Company to youth was discounted by the fact that since he was a boy he had spent most of his time in politics and not in real soldiering. His substantive rank was, as we have said, major-general, and he was the only Commander-in-Chief since Stringer Lawrence who never rose above that rank and was never awarded any degree of any order. He was not even a C.B. *Sed ante diem perit*.....

No summary of their military careers can be given here. Most had rendered distinguished service in the American and French wars. Their records glitter with famous names such as Waterloo and Minden; and the Peninsula, the East and West Indies and the Low Countries knew nearly all of them in their middle years. Most commanded an army in the field, or had governed a colony. Their deeds may be read at large in the pages of the *Royal Military Calendar*, Fortescue, and the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

Nor can we set out the regiments with which they were associated. All, of course, belonged to Horse or Foot, Guards or Line: the "scientific" or "Ordnance" corps of engineers and artillery had not yet established a claim to high command, still less did they have any title to the plum, which carried pay at £8,000 a year with an extra solatium of £10,000 for being a Member of Council. Indeed, there would have been no hope of a sapper or gunner getting even the chief command in Madras or Bombay, though these were worth only £9,000 a year, half the all-India rate.

* Pamphlet *Indian Reform*, 1835, quoted in *Bengal: Past and Present*. Vol. xxxii, p. 194.

The regiments to which they belonged often changed with kaleidoscopic rapidity, for most of these young aristocrats or their fathers were in a position to lay down the money for a judicious step by purchase at the right moment; and when purchase led to an adroit and timely transfer to a corps which was then in some peculiar position as to its officers, the going could be very good indeed. Thus did Arthur Wellesley move upwards, through seven infantry and cavalry regiments in $6\frac{1}{2}$ years, to the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

Of our present subjects, Paget purchased promotion most rapidly—from first commission to regimental command in two years one month (23rd March 1792 to 30th April 1794) which is believed to be a record; but Combermere ran him close, attaining the rank of regimental lieutenant-colonel in 1794 at the age of 20*. Above that rank there was no purchase: promotion was by seniority alone, but employment went by selection. Once you became a major-general, every penny spent on purchase—and it might have been over £25,000—was a complete “write-off”.

There were exceptions to the fitting from regiment to regiment. Lake stuck to the First Guards throughout his regimental service, from ensign in 1758 to captain and lieutenant-colonel (the Guards had double rank, regimental and army, at this time and for long afterwards) in 1776, and regimental lieutenant-colonel in 1792 (by which time his army rank had been major-general for a couple of years). And Fane seems to have been in the 6th Dragoon Guards during all his brisk run up the regimental ladder, from cornet in 1792 to lieutenant-colonel in 1797.

Notable instances of longevity were Nugent and Combermere, who both lived to the great age of 91 $\frac{1}{2}$: Nugent, born on 10th June 1757, died on 10th March 1849; Combermere, born on 14th November 1773, died on 21st February 1865. Close came Gomm (born on 10th November 1784, died on 15th March 1875, aged 90 $\frac{1}{2}$) and Hewett and Gough, who were both 89 $\frac{3}{4}$ when they died. (Hewett, born on 11th June, 1750, died on 21st March 1840; Gough, born on 3rd November 1779, died on 2nd March 1869). The average of these five Commanders-in-Chief was over 90 $\frac{1}{2}$. The nearest approaches in later days were Haines, who lived to 89 $\frac{3}{4}$, and Rose, aged 84 $\frac{1}{2}$. Colin Campbell saw fighting first at the battle of Vimiera, 21st August 1808, and last in Oudh in 1859, more than half a century later.

Two of the eighteen died while still holding office—Cornwallis at Ghazipur in 1805, aged 66, and Anson of cholera at Karnal in 1857, aged 59 $\frac{1}{2}$. Fane, who broke down in health and had to retire, died off the Azores on the voyage home in 1840, aged 61 $\frac{1}{2}$. Dalhousie was never fit in India, and had to go after two years as Chief. Two earlier and two later Commanders-in-Chief, Clavering and Coote, Lockhart and Rawlinson, also died during their tenure.

The rank of Field-Marshal was often given to mark a coronation, royal birthday or similar occasion for an honours list, to one or more generals who were at the top of the roll and necessarily very old men. Thus Alured Clarke and Sir Samuel Hulse as the two senior generals were made Field-M Marshals on the accession of William IV, and Sir George Nugent and Thomas Grosvenor were likewise promoted on the Prince of Wales' birthday in 1846. Colin Campbell was promoted on 9th November 1862, together with Blakeney, Gough and the Duke of Cambridge, on the twenty-first birthday of the Prince of Wales.

*Born 14 Nov. 1773, promoted 9 Mch. 1794.

Gomm's life presents some features which are remarkable and probably unique. Commissioned at nine years of age in recognition of the services of his father who had just been killed in action, it is on record that when he was promoted Field-Marshal on 1st January 1868, Press commentators who looked him up in the Army List could not believe their eyes when they saw the date of his first commission, 24th May 1794. When he died he had eighty-one years' service, and had been a K. C. B. since he was thirty. There is a good compilation of his letters and journals up to Waterloo; but no proper account of his life exists, and the *Dictionary of National Biography* unpardonably dismisses his five years in command in India with no more than the remark that they were comparatively uneventful and that he and his wife were extremely popular.*

He was twice married. His first wife was a grand-daughter of William Penn, the Quaker founder of Pennsylvania; and his second, a niece of General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert, Bart., G. C. B., the distinguished commander in the Sikh Wars, in his time possibly the foremost officer of John Company's service and certainly India's leading sportsman. Gomm had no children by either wife, but his Lordship of the Manor of Rotherhithe still appertains to his relatives. Like Roberts, he was a little wiry man; and as a trained staff officer he had long experience in the Peninsula. Brought up on Homer, he was also a great lover of music, and (like a Commander-in-Chief in very recent times) he composed occasional verse. Here are the lines which Gomm wrote in his diary on the day of his last visit to Waterloo in 1865, fifty years after he had fought there:—

Of have I passed thy bounds, thou haunted field!
 Since strife that made thee such hath shook the world;
 And ever as I mused, a plenteous yield
 Of rapt emotion hath its flag unfurled,
 As o'er no second spot on earth for me.
 And now the fervour passed that wakens up
 Aye, for such theme as thine on memory,
 The moisture gathers on its trembling cup,
 Approaching thee, fair triumph's proudest goal!
 What is it that can thus unnerve the soul?
 Is it the judgement on time-stricken men?
 Or breathes a voice a-field of power intense;
 Humanity's more earnest call than when
 Rang out the trumpets on my dreaming sense?

His name is still borne by five "Field-Marshal Gomm" scholarships at Keble College, Oxford, and at Rotherhithe by the Sir William and Lady Gomm Charity, the St. Barnabas (Gomm) School, Maynard and Gomm roads, and last but not least the "Sir William Gomm" inn.

Nearly all these Chiefs were married and had sizeable families; but four of the seven peerages have died out, and there is today no Marquess of Hastings, Marquess Cornwallis, Viscount Lake or Baron Clyde. Some relationships may be of interest. Sir Charles Napier's cousin the eighth Lord Napier of Merchistoun married the elder daughter of a much earlier C.-in-C., Clavering—the same lady that Barwell loved and lost after fighting a duel

*The original letter notifying him that he had been appointed C.-in-C. in India now hangs on the staircase of the United Service Institution, Simla, having been presented some years ago by Sir John Perronet Thompson.

with her father, as told in my article on the early Commanders-in-Chief. Her grandson was the tenth Baron Napier who was Governor of Madras (1866-1872) and acted as Viceroy when Lord Mayo was assassinated in the Andamans. Anson's nephew was Lord Rosebery, Prime Minister; and Cornwallis's uncle was Archbishop of Canterbury. Gough's daughter married Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant.

A nickname known and used by the man in the street is almost as certain a hallmark of greatness as having a public house named after one; but few Commanders-in-Chief in India seem to have had familiar sobriquets. Boscawen, the first on the list, was called "Old Dreadnought" by those who admired him and "Wry-necked Dick" by those who didn't. Nicknames indeed have a way of going towards extremes and are often terms either of affection or opprobrium: examples of the former type are "Bobs" and the abbreviation of the present Chief's surname. Colin Campbell was called "Old Khabardar" by the troops under his command in Oudh, who did not always appreciate his maxim *festina lente*; and Gomm was known in the Governor-General's family circle as "Gummidge", but this was a private appellation, not used to his face.

The armorial bearings of several Commanders-in-Chief record their connexion with India. Thus Hewett's arms are supported by a tiger and a buffalo, and Gough's by a dragon and a lion secured by "dog-collars" marked "China" and "Punjab"—the heraldic expression is "gorged with an Eastern Crown, gules, the rim of the Crown inscribed "China" [or "Punjab", as the case may be] in letters also gold". Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde, was granted dexter "a soldier of the 42nd (The Royal Highland) Regiment of Foot, and sinister a soldier of the 93rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot, both habited, accoutred and holding in the exterior hand a musket proper".

Compare the supporters of a later Chief, Lord Napier of Magdala—"dexter, a soldier of the Royal Engineers; sinister, a Sikh sirdar, both habited, and each holding in his exterior hand a musket, all proper". Though a very distinguished officer of the Indian Army, General Sir James Hills-Johnes, V. C., G. C. B., had dexter and sinister respectively an officer and a soldier of the Bengal Horse Artillery, his fellow-gunner Field-Marshal Earl Roberts forsook his old corps for "dexter, a highlander of the 92nd Regiment; sinister, a Gurkha, both habited, and holding in their exterior hands a rifle, all proper".

Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener went to the jungle for his supporters, a camel and a gun, with an elephant's head as a crest of augmentation; and Outram had a brace of Bengal tigers. One learned in the herald's art could supply other specimens, but we may add a final Indian Army example—the supporters of Lord Lawrence of the Punjab and of Grately in the County of Southampton are, dexter, "an officer of the Guide cavalry (irregular), of the Pathan tribe, in the province of Peshawar, habited, and accoutred, proper; and sinister, an officer of the Sikh irregular cavalry, also habited and accoutred, proper".

LIST OF COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA,—1800-1859.

Showing date of assuming office ; rank, title and dignities (if any) at that date ; highest rank subsequently attained, with dignities later conferred ; date and place of death, and place of burial if ascertained.

17th May 1798.—Lieutenant-General Sir Alured CLARKE, K.B. Afterwards Field-Marshal (1830); G.C.B. (1815). Died 16 Sept. 1832 at the Vicarage, Llangollen, Co. Denbigh.

14th March 1801.—Lieutenant-General Gerard LAKE. Afterwards General (1802); created Baron Lake (1804); created Viscount Lake of Delhi and Leswarree and of Aston Clinton in Buckinghamshire (1807). Died 20 Feb. 1808, in London.

30th July 1805.—(second term) (also Governor-General). General Sir Charles CORNWALLIS, Marquess CORNWALLIS, K.G. Died 5 Oct. 1805 at Ghazipur; buried there.

10th Oct. 1805.—(second term). General Baron LAKE.

17th Oct. 1807.—Lieutenant-General Sir George HEWETT. Afterwards General (4 June 1813); created Baronet (6 Nov. 1813); G.C.B. (16 May 1820); P.C. Ireland (c. 1813). Died 21 March 1840 at his seat Fremantle Park, near Southampton; buried in Shirley church.

14th January 1812.—Lieutenant-General Sir George NUGENT, Bart. Afterwards Field-Marshal (1846); G.C.B. (1815). Died 10 March 1849 at his seat, Waddesdon House, Little Marlow, Berkshire.

4th October 1813. (also Governor-General)—General Sir Francis RAWDON-HASTINGS, Earl of MOIRA, K.G., P.C. Afterwards created Marquess of Hastings (13 Feb. 1817); G.C.B. (1818); G.C.H. (1818). Died 28 Nov. 1826, at sea, on board H.M.S. *Revenge* in Baia Bay, off Naples; buried at sea. By a letter found among his papers he directed that his right hand should be cut off and preserved till the death of his wife and then buried in her coffin. She died 9 January 1840 and was buried in the mausoleum at Loudoun Castle.

13th January 1823.—Lieutenant-General Hon. Sir Edward PAGET, G.C.B. Afterwards General (1825). Died 13 May 1849 at Cowes Castle (of which he was Captain), Isle of Wight; buried in the cemetery of the Royal Hospital, Chelsea (of which he was Governor.)

7th October 1825.—General Sir Stapleton COTTON, Baron COMBERMERE, G.C.B., G.C.H., P.C. (Ireland). Assumed the additional name of Stapleton, when his full name became Stapleton-Cotton, by Royal Licence dated 21 Nov. 1827. Afterwards Field-Marshal (2 Oct. 1855); created Viscount Combermere of Bhurtpore in the East Indies and of Combermere in the County Palatine of Chester (8 Feb. 1827); K.S.I. (19 Aug. 1861). Died 21 February 1865 at Colchester House, Clifton, near Bristol; buried in the church at Wrenbury, co. Chester.

1st January 1830.—General Sir George RAMSAY, Earl of DALHOUSIE, G.C.B. Died 21 March 1838.

10th January 1832.—Lieutenant-General Sir Edward BARNES, G.C.B. Died 19 March 1838 in Piccadilly, London.

15th October 1833 (also Governor-General) Major-General Lord William Cavendish BENTINCK, G.C.B., G.C.H., P.C. Died 17 June 1839 in Paris.

5th September 1835.—Lieutenant-General Sir Henry FANE, G.C.B. Died 24 March 1840, at sea, on board the *Malabar*, on his voyage home from India, off St. Michael's Island in the Azores; buried at sea.

7th December 1839.—Lieutenant-General Sir Jasper NICOLLS, K.C.B. Died 4 May 1849, at his residence near Reading, Berkshire.

8th August 1843.—Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh GOUGH, Bart., G.C.B. Afterwards Field-Marshal (1862); created Baron Gough of Chin-Kang Foo in China and of Maharajpore and the Sutlej in the East Indies (25 April 1846); created Viscount Gough of Goojerat in the Punjab and of the City of Limerick (15 June 1849); K.P. (1857); P.C. (1859); K.S.I. (1861). Died 2 March 1869 at his seat St. Helens, near Booterstown, Co. Dublin, Ireland.

7th May 1849.—General Sir Charles James NAPIER, G.C.B. Died 29 August 1853 at Oaklands, Hampshire; buried in the churchyard of the Garrison chapel, Portsmouth.

6th December 1850.—Lieutenant-General Sir William Maynard GOMM, K. C. B. Afterwards Field-Marshal (1 January 1868); G.C.B. (1859). Died 15 March 1875; buried in the churchyard of Christ Church, Rotherhithe, Kent.

23rd January 1856.—Major-General (local General) Hon. George ANSON. Died 27 May 1857 at Karnal, Punjab, of cholera; buried there; remains removed to England in 1860 and reinterred at Kensal Green cemetery, London.

13th August 1857.—Lieutenant-General Sir Colin CAMPBELL, G.C.B. Afterwards Field Marshal (1862); created Baron Clyde of Clydesdale (3 July 1858). Died 14 August 1863 at Chatham; buried in the nave of Westminster Abbey.

Notes.

(1) Foreign orders have not been shown, though during the earlier part of the period they—if of sufficient degree—carried by usage or courtesy the status of knighthood in England.

(2) The Hanoverian Guelphic Order was not a "foreign" order until the Crown of Hanover was by the operation of the Salic Law separated from that of Great Britain in 1837 on the accession to the latter of Queen Victoria.

(3) Till 1815 there was only one class—"K.B."—of the Order of the Bath. Thereafter, on its expansion and division into three classes, we find "C.B.", "K.C.B." and "G.C.B."

(4) The Order of the Star of India, when instituted in 1861, consisted of a single class, "K.S.I.". In 1866 it was enlarged and divided into three classes, "C.S.I.", "K.C.S.I." and "G.C.S.I."

(5) The lives of the above officers extend from 1738 (when Cornwallis was born) to 1875 (when Gomm died), a span of 137 years, though they were appointed within a period of 60 years. Nugent lived for 37 years after he was made C.-in-C.: the nearest approach is Field-Marshal Sir F.P. Haines, who was appointed in 1876 and died in 1909.

NEW WEAPONS FOR OLD

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR KENNETH LOCH, K.C.I.E., C.B., M.C.*

MY SUBJECT is the genesis of new weapons, and all that goes to ensure the maintenance of the technical initiative, without which we can hardly hope in the future to prevail against our enemies. I do not propose to advocate this or that type of weapon or, for that matter, any particular brew of atomic bomb, or, indeed, to suggest any very revolutionary ideas. Rather would I prefer to indicate the lines of approach, whereby we can hope to select our new weapons to advantage.

Let me start with two quotations—one from a recent Government White Paper, and the other from that old classic, *Alice Through The Looking Glass*. The quotation from the White Paper runs:

“Development has proceeded in a series of short, nervous little steps, each of which has been sufficient to disrupt production; but no one so far has had the courage or been able to assess the battle requirements sufficiently in advance to make this technical jump that is going to put us ahead of our enemies.”

That quotation expresses vividly that lack of vision and infirmity of purpose which is apt to prevail, and which we must avoid at all costs in this matter of weapon development. For these negative qualities we must substitute disciplined imagination to tell us what to do, and determination to see that we get the fruits of this imagination.

I need not emphasise the need for determination in these matters. It is axiomatic in military circles that in all that is anathema, lack of determination is usually bracketed first with the absence of a sense of humour. Imagination is a more subtle affair. In its inception it may partake of genius, which is not given to us all, but in its handling and interpretation we can, I think, evolve a technique of thinking, which will help us whether we are possessed of genius or not.

Let us develop this theme of technique of thought in its application to our problems of new weapons. In this particular sphere of investigation we are fortunate enough to have available a wealth of recent war experience on which to look back—but we must also look forward to the promise—nay, the virtual necessity—of great and rapid developments in the field of science and technology from which to pick and choose.

To project past experience into future action, to grasp the significance of what the expanding field of science can contribute to the solution of our difficulties—that is the problem of our Staffs, and no easy one, in this matter of weapons and their design.

Now for my second quotation. It is from *Alice Through The Looking Glass*. It is not an exact quotation, but rather the sense of a conversation between Alice and the White Knight, who had just finished his battle with the Red Knight. They are walking through a wood. Appropriately enough, the White Knight is in full battle order, and the conversation hinges round equipment:

*In a lecture in Delhi.

Alice : "Why do you carry a beehive and a mouse trap ?"

White Knight : "It is a very good beehive, but no bees have come near it. It must be the mice".

Alice : "But it isn't very likely that there would be any mice on a horse's back".

White Knight : "Not very likely perhaps, but if they do come, I don't want them running all over the place. By the same token those anklets round the horses' feet are to guard against shark bites. It is as well to be prepared for everything".

You may well say : How absurd ? What has this to do with me ? But I put it to you : Do we never think like the White Knight in the matter of equipment ? *Let us add this or that*—something which is overburdening the infantryman, something which overcrowds a tank, something which overweights an aeroplane—and all on the plea that "it is as well to be prepared for everything".

And now to my main theme—this technique of thought as applied to new weapons and equipment. Call it what you will—the Scientific, the Analytical, or even the Philosophic approach—it amounts to the same thing. In this technique I suggest there is one firm departure point, and that is a clear expression of the "needs" of the Forces. By "needs" I imply that we have a military problem to solve—we "need" to do something in certain conditions.

That is what we must first define in the greatest clarity possible. Thereafter, and only thereafter, should we attempt to define our "wants", meaning thereby : "In order to satisfy our needs we want a tank, an aeroplane or gun of this or that performance". Our mistakes often derive from jumping to our wants before we are clear as to our needs.

To re-equip an army with a new weapon is in practice a matter of years, perhaps even of a decade, so the "needs", which it is so essential for us to express, are not the needs of to-day but those of some years or more hence. In these days of rapid scientific development it may be that a year or so hence the satisfaction of our future needs may be in terms of something quite different to the conventional weapons of to-day—atomic energy, guided projectiles, and so on may emerge from that witches caldron of scientific progress which in its application has such vast potentialities for good and for evil.

Assume we have a military problem or need which on reflection can properly be satisfied only in terms of the weapons we know, or from improvements of those same weapons. We are confronted with two problems : first, the evolution of the optimum type of weapon, gun, aeroplane or tank to meet our need, and secondly, to determine the proportions of each item we want in order to produce a balanced force. This investigation inevitably must lead us to new conceptions of organisation, even of our basic units—the battalion, the battery, and so on.

We can now develop our theme by a series of simple examples. First, you will accept the fact that our land forces of the future must have expanded mobility and radius of action if they are to remain an offensive as opposed to a purely defensive element in our effort. Implicit in this is the fact that they cannot be based on an elaborate system of maintenance or rely on vast expenditure of ammunition. At the same time they must retain the hitting power capable of fulfilling their task. If they cannot, their mobility and radius of action will be in vain, since however much we can achieve by manoeuvre in its widest sense, in the last resort we must be able to face up to the ordeal by battle.

How, then, can we strike a balance in all these conflicting considerations? First, let us take out of our series of factors this ordeal of battle, since on reflection all the others hinge round it. Consider a small scale battle of sufficient scope to introduce the factors we wish to examine. In passing, I would point out that we have heard a good deal about how the David-versus-Goliath idea is outmoded—and that the problem of to-morrow partakes more of David-versus-David. That may well be so, but a word of caution. We must not evolve a race of Davids who want several industrial, economic and technical Goliaths to carry their clubs.

Be that as it may, let us assume a Force faced with the necessity of ousting an enemy from a defended position in conditions where manoeuvre in itself will not answer the problem. What sort of a Force do we want to produce the requisite power of attack? In terms of conventional formations there must clearly be an infantry element to break into and to occupy the position. A further such element might reasonably be supposed to have been absorbed in probing the position, and yet a further one might well be required to exploit the fruits of victory.

What, then, would be the nature of this basic infantry element? It may be the battalion as we know it, or it may not. After all, we have seen vast changes in infantry organisation in the last ten years or so, and in such matters there can hardly be finality. From what do these changes derive? In this case perhaps not so much a change in the need to be satisfied by the infantry, as in the conditions in which this need has to be satisfied.

So far we have outlined three main roles for our infantry: proving, breaking in and occupation, and finally exploitation. I take it that of these, breaking in and occupation is the highest expression of infantry activities. If that is so, we must see that the basic infantry element is suited to give expression to this role. This logically brings us to ask: What is the nature of defence? What is the nut we have to crack? I am, however, more concerned at the moment with processes of thought than with conclusions.

Broadly speaking, we have a conception of an infantry nucleus whose impetus against opposition must be maintained either from its own resources, or from those exterior to it or more probably, from both. Obviously the development of a new weapon of great handiness and fire-power suited to the infantry, not only will influence the composition of the nucleus itself, but also its dependence on exterior aid, of which more anon.

We have now got to the point where we begin to be interested in weapons, both interior to our nucleus, and exterior to it, and all the while in the background we are worried with the composition of these elements. It is only when we are clear on this matter of weapons that the logical answer will emerge as to our organisations. Do not let us be content with regarding organisation as sacrosanct, into which new concepts of weapons must somehow or other be fitted. There is a very old saying about not putting new wine into old bottles.

To come back to our argument. We can, I think, accept it as axiomatic that our infantry nucleus, whatever its interior make-up, will want covering fire from exterior sources. The point is: how much? And of what nature? Following up our general line of reasoning, there are two sorts of covering fire: first, that derived from a distance, as exemplified by artillery and, indeed, air support, and secondly, that of an accompanying nature, as exemplified by the tank, *i.e.*, fire, the origin of which is brought into the combat itself. We have to relate these two possibilities to the needs of our infantry nucleus.

The problem which requires analysis as regards covering fire can be expressed thus : (a) Should we rely entirely on fire derived from a distance, *i.e.*, artillery, long-range mortars, etc., and if so, what are the conditions of its successful application ? (b) Alternatively, should we rely entirely on covering fire of accompaniment, as exemplified by the tank ? Moreover, what are the conditions of its successful application ?

In all probability, we shall want a proportion of both, but that is not all. Yet a further conception logically arises in our thought processes: perhaps the role of the fire derived from a distance should not be a direct contribution to the infantry, but rather to assist our tanks into the positions from which they can cover the infantry nucleus to advantage.

Once we have cleared our minds on these points, our recent war experiences provide a good index of what should be done. We have sound and reliable data as to the effect of shell fire, and, indeed, can predict with some confidence the results of discharging a given weight of projectiles on a given front and in a given time. I am merely illustrating a process of thought—I do not pretend to give the answer. What I want to emphasise is that it is only when we have developed some such processes of thought to their logical conclusion, the facts which must influence our decisions as to weapons and organisation in order to produce a balanced force begin to emerge out of what I believe must otherwise be, relatively speaking, chaos.

Let us apply our technique of reasoning to the selection of a weapon. Consider for our purposes a tank ; in this case, not this or that type of tank, or indeed with any preconceived notion of what a tank should be. At this stage let our definition of a tank merely be something to satisfy the infantry for covering fire to accompany them into the combat zone.

Obviously, the whole argument must build up round the type of weapon required to fill this role. We would therefore ask our infantry experts to expand their requirements—fire which can be brought down at very short notice, fire which can destroy strong points, and so on. From this expanded “user” specification we could then easily say : “You want this and that type of gun”. Incidentally, of course, we should arrive at the gun through the projectile we require. Fire power, after all, is based on projectile power. The gun is merely the launching site.

We have now taken the first step in the matter of tanks, but it is clearly not all. The tank must have certain protection to enable it to survive. This can be of two types—passive, in the form of armour, or active, in the form of a weapon to hit back with. In the matter of armour we are at once faced with the old race of gun-versus-armour, which in these conditions the gun will always win. There is one important proviso, namely that the gun can hit.

This carries our line of thought in the direction of how to prevent our tanks being hit, rather than towards a solution by adding more and more slabs of armour. How do we prevent the tank being hit ? There are two possibilities : first, being to blind enemy observation, and second, to evolve superior fire technique, so that we can hit the enemy before he hits us.

We have wide experience of blinding enemy observation, with its advantages and disadvantages. As regards improved fire technique, this is clearly going to help us both in our main role and in that of self-protection, so the problem, merits careful investigation. We should logically pursue what we can hope to

derive from superior fire technique in considerably more detail, but space does not allow.

Meanwhile, our conception of armour has veered round more to a sufficiency of armour to keep out the general nuisances which invest a battlefield, rather than to the hope of getting complete protection from anti-tank missiles. We now get our first idea of what form our tank is likely to take, the whole being centred round a gun capable of filling the role of both covering the infantry, and adequate for self-protection. We hope a single weapon will fulfil both roles, each without detriment to the other.

Implicit in the requirements of either role is fire technique, which will enable the destruction of the target to be achieved with the minimum delay and ammunition expenditure. For the rest it is just a matter of fitting the gun, plus a certain amount of armour, into a chassis of sufficient mobility and performance. There are, of course, all sorts of other factors which need consideration before we order our tank, and when we get down to earth I assure you, that what we want is often not what we can get. In passing, I would revert to my second quotation—our old friend, the White Knight. Beware of over-insurance, beehives, mouse traps and anti-shark devices.

However, for the moment we are concerned only with processes of thought—not with what type of tank we actually should have. Argument, in my experience, arouses considerable emotion, and emotionalism should generally be divorced from our processes of reasoning, except in one important respect. I mean morale. After all, in human affairs we cannot entirely solve our problems on the material plane. Morale must be taken into account.

Although it is a somewhat imponderable subject, it is only right that we should attempt to analyze it. We have enough experience of it to go quite a long way in this analysis. For example, bad morale, as instanced by exaggerated views as to the performance of enemy weapons, is sometimes based on a complete fallacy—a frustration which can be eliminated by the dissemination of knowledge.

Sometimes, however, the causes of good and bad morale lie deep in the springs of human behaviour. There we have a factor we cannot but take into account, although we may thereby seem to flout all reason and logic. I am inclined to think that a new specification for the human ego is long overdue—but as long as we are what we are, then our strange actions and even stranger reactions to circumstances must be taken into account.

* * * * *

We now come more directly in contact with the world of “wants”—a gun, a tank, a rifle, and, indeed, to the stage when we consult the technician for the answer. I will illustrate my argument with a little play, in which there are two characters, Mr. U., (the user having a need), and Mr. T., (the technician charged with meeting the need of Mr. U. in terms of a weapon). The title of the play is “Duck Shooting” and we can imagine the dialogue developing somewhat on these lines:

MR. U.: Good morning, Mr. T. I want something to kill duck.

MR. T.: Good morning, Mr. U. What about an atomic bomb?

MR. U.: No, I want to eat the duck.

MR. T.: Well, perhaps you would give me a little more detail of what you want, and the conditions in which you propose killing the duck.

Mr. U. : I and my friends like to get out of the office into the country, and if we can get some duck we combine amusement and exercise, not to speak of food values.

Mr. T. : I see. So the weapon you want must be such that you can carry it round all day without it tiring you unduly—I suppose over pretty rough country ?

Mr. U. : That is so.

Mr. T. : What, then, do you think would be the limit of weight ?

Mr. U. : I'm glad you mentioned that. I humped a rifle round in the last War. It weighed about 9 lb.—far too heavy for comfort. Not much over 5 lb. for me.*

Mr. T. : About these duck—how close do you expect to get to them ?

Mr. U. : With any luck say 40 yards before they get up.

Mr. T. : Oh ! you wait till they fly ? That makes it technically much more difficult. How fast do they fly ?

Mr. U. : I imagine about 40 miles an hour. Some go quicker than others. (*N.B. This question of speed of flying might call for observational trials*).

Mr. T. : Do you expect results with a rifle, i.e., with a single shot ?

Mr. U. : No. Moreover, a rifle bullet goes a long way, and it might hit someone when it lands.

Mr. T. : What do you reckon to be your accuracy of aim ?

Mr. U. : I don't really know. (*N.B.—We should now have to carry out extensive user trials with clay pigeon traps, etc. Let us assume that it is found that Mr. U. and his friends, by user trials, get the aim right reasonably often within a radius of 18 inches*).

Mr. T. : (*Having studied those trials*). I see. You want a spread of shot of about 18" radius, and of course, these shot must be lethal to duck. (*Mr. T. having carried out trials as to size of shot and remaining velocities for duck lethality obtains facts which he expresses as follows*) : Well, I've carried out trials on what you told me, and I've come to the conclusion that I can give you a weapon which, limited to 5 lb. in weight, will give you a lethal radius of 18" up to 75 yards range. I could get you a bit more, but I imagine you will want to fire from the shoulder, and I don't quite know what shock of recoil you could stand comfortably.

Mr. U. : I don't quite know either, but my old rifle wasn't too bad.

Mr. T. : Ah ! but that weighed 9 lbs., and you fired very deliberately, mostly lying down—a different condition. I don't recommend increasing the charge if you are firing from the shoulder.

Mr. U. : I agree. So what it comes to is that I can hope to kill only up to 75 yards ?

Mr. T. : Yes, and in view of the speed of the duck, you won't have many seconds in which to open fire, or to continue fire, so I recommend a weapon which will give you two shots—no more. Don't try to let off lots of shots like a machine gun. It would inevitably involve too much weight.

*Mr. U. apparently knew what weight he could carry without discomfort. He might not have known, in which case a trial would have been necessary. Translating our little play into the wider military world, assuming we had no data on the subject, this is the sort of problem which an operational research group might undertake in conjunction with user trials.

MR. U.: I daresay you're right, but it does limit me a bit. Perhaps you could help me with some mechanical aids to laying, and so being a bit more accurate. I could get a little more range by not wanting such a spread of shot.

MR. T.: Well, there it is. I've enough to work on now to produce what you want.

* * * *

So we come to our curtain for Act I. We can then imagine Act II, in which the curtain rises after an interval of perhaps one year—not much less if we are to be realistic in these matters of weapon development. Act II would be very brief, but nevertheless, dramatic, merely showing Mr. T. handing Mr. U. a 12-bore, or perhaps taking into account all the facts adduced in Act I, a 16-bore. If we could impose on our public yet further Acts in this drama, again with some years' interval between them, it would merely be to bring home the modifications to the 12 or 16-bore which became necessary from the experiences of Mr. U and his friends after duck.

Out of this simple illustration I hope to have brought out the essential interplay of ideas between "user" and "technician" charged with getting what the user wants. I would emphasise the little asides—whereby the need for trials both of user and a technical nature emerged.

Actually, the evolution of the present shot gun has been a matter of some 300 years, and the trials and experiments which must have gone to its evolution in the form we know it to-day are frequently overlooked. In practice, it will be rare for a major equipment to be produced without involving a lot of trials of a user and technical nature, and that is one of the main reasons why production takes so long. In war pressure of events may force us to skimp these trials, but to do so is fraught with all sorts of dangers.

I have illustrated my point in a little play with two characters. I will develop the analogy a little further. The military drama whereby equipments are evolved has four characters. First, the user, *i.e.*, the troops in the field; secondly, the technician-cum-scientist, *i.e.*, the interpreter; thirdly, the manufacturer—by no means a minor part in the drama; and lastly, but not least, the financier or economist, from whom alone can derive our sinews of war.

* * * *

Ahead of us lies an expanding universe of scientific possibilities with sinister bearing on the arts of war. Some are remote, and others, such as the atomic bomb and projectiles with vast ranges, already conspire to play upon our fears. That these new weapons can strike at the heart, and perhaps even destroy the very structure of society, is a disturbing thought. We in the Armed Forces have grave responsibilities in these matters, since through the prescribed channels we must advise our Governments, and further, we must evolve military organisations to utilise these new weapons, and to protect ourselves against them.

I have suggested a reasoned line of approach to these disturbing matters—a design for thought, which I believe to be lacking in many of our deliberations. Slightly to misquote from a very famous play:

*"The times are out of joint, accursed spite,
that we were ever born to put them right".*

Yet if we are to survive, we *must* set them right, and nowhere perhaps so, than in our own military sphere. It is no easy matter, but, however hard the task let there be no defeatism. Do not let us neglect any processes which may lighten our task, and of these aids I feel one of the most important is this technique of thought, which I have tried to analyze in particular relation to new weapons.

It is not a new technique—rather the reverse. I think it has been common to the thought-processes of many eminent men. In essence it consists of a habit of thought, whereby a problem at all its stages is continuously broken down into its components, and the unessential elements discarded, so that from the residue emerges a clear-cut design for action.

You will doubtless recall Marshal Foch who, when confronted with a problem, would say :—*De quoi S'agit-il ?*—What is it all about ? I suggest that in this matter of new weapons for old we must also say to ourselves : “What is it all about ?” When we are clear as to what it is all about—hence, when our needs show up in clear perspective—then we will know what we want, and then is the time to go shopping down Science Street. And we shall not be disappointed.

Frontier Posts Supplied By Air

Nearly 200 tons of supplies are now being dropped by parachute on 11 outposts guarding India's north-east frontier. In carrying out this task over some of the most difficult country in the world, Dakotas of No. 31 Squadron of India Command are repeating a feat which they accomplished in November last year, when they dropped more than 300 tons of provisions over these areas.

Air supply in these regions is by no means an easy assignment. Owing to the rapid build up of cumulus cloud, the unpredictable advent of winds of gale force and the very severe monsoon periods, the only suitable months in the year to attempt this operation are November and February. During these months the task may be accomplished with reasonable safety, the first sortie taking off at dawn and the last sortie finishing at 11 o'clock in the morning, thereby avoiding the winds which invariably spring up in the valleys and as often as not reach gale force.

Wing Commander J. K. M. Cooke, D.S.O., D.F.C., who has had previous experience of flying in the East Himalayan range, is at present officer commanding No. 31 Squadron.

7th Indian Division Reformed


India's Seventh (“Golden Arrow”) Division has been reformed at Rawalpindi from elements of its own, combined with others from the late 10th Indian Division.

Mobilised for war in 1942, the Division's first major operation against the enemy in World War II was an advance on the Mayu Peninsula in Burma, in conjunction with the 5th Indian Division. This was followed by the battle of the famous “Admin Box”, at the foot of the Ngakyedauk Pass, where it held out against the Japanese onslaught for three weeks.

The Division's further exploits in Burma were those of complete mastery over the Japs. After fighting successful actions at Kohima, Imphal and Ukhrul, it led the 4 Corps advance and established a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy to enable the 17th Indian Division to force its way to Meiktila—decisive operation of the Burma War.

After taking part in the final mopping up of the Japanese in Burma, the Division was flown into Siam, where it disarmed and concentrated 1,103,000 Japanese troops and rescued about 20,000 Allied prisoners of war. The Division then moved to Malaya, where it helped to rehabilitate the country.

ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, U.S.A.





HOW AMERICA ORGANISES HER ARMED FORCES

BY COLONEL NAWABZADA MOHAMMAD SHEER ALI KHAN*

IT is astonishing how little the average officer of an Army knows of the organisation of armies of other nations. Apart from it being an interesting study it can be eminently useful, for thus an officer gains ideas, widens his outlook, and becomes more valuable to his Service and to his country.

Since I have been in America I have learnt much of the working of their Armed Forces, and of the very high standard they have achieved in their schools and training establishments. If I give the impression of overlooking the good points in our own system I crave indulgence, for no matter how well we think of other countries and their methods, never must we forget that we have our own good points—and a good few, too, even though they may not be in terms of atomic energy!

First, then, my impressions after visiting some American Ground Forces' schools of instruction and academies. I was struck by the multiplicity of training aids they use. Training films, demonstrations, plastic working models, in fact enough models of everything to enable every man to be able to handle the subject he is dealing with. During a "Driving and Maintenance" course, for instance, there was one working model between every five men. Extravagant? No, for it was an assured inducement for the student to put his whole mind on the subject.

Speech recording machines are available at schools to enable the men to improve their powers of expression and command. A student, be he cadet or NCO., talks into the microphone for two or three minutes, and it is then played back for him to listen and criticise. Straightaway he can correct his errors and apply them when next he gives orders.

How often have you listened to lecturers who just failed to hold your attention? Cadets in America have themselves to blame if they fail to grasp what is being taught them, for the instructors at most schools and academies can "try out" their lectures on sound recording machines. At the Staff College, Leavenworth, they even keep a library of recorded lectures and speeches, so that if an instructor wishes to refer to a previous lecture he asks the Librarian, who gives him a very thin and light gramophone record. It is placed on the gramophone—and there you are!

Everyone has heard how vast America is. It is one-third larger even than India. They "think big". Their schools are big places—one, for instance, at Fort Benning covers no less than about 250 square miles. Everything is done in a big way. When I went to the Artillery School at Fort Sill I saw all the artillery pieces used in the U.S. Armed Forces fired on the one range. It was the most impressive sight I have ever seen. On the left was the smallest calibre gun; on the right the largest. Behind each gun was its team. We went to each gun in turn, the characteristics of each were explained, and a few rounds were fired.

Don't think this was mere "window-dressing". Wherever I went in the States there was an impression of immensity and thoroughness, and it gives the American Forces that indefinable advantage over others—a superiority

*Military Attache to the Indian Embassy in Washington.

This article is based on a lecture recently given by Colonel Sher Ali Khan in Delhi.

complex. The human factor may be important, but everyone will admit that even the bravest of men can do but little when he is not equipped with modern equipment.

Take West Point and Annapolis—two of America's finest military institutions. Their architecture, their massive grandeur, the thoroughness with which everything is done all prove to the visitor that nothing is spared to give those fortunate enough to become cadets the very best there is to give. Pictures of West Point which appeared in the January issue of the *U. S. I. Journal* gave an admirable impression of the fineness of West Point.

Being a bit of a dreamer (not always a very wise quality!) I dream of the National War Academy that Indian is going to make. I hope and I ask all those who may be responsible for its creation—which also includes the physical form—that they should let it be of a calibre of which all those who pass through it will be proud. So that when an Indian officer stands next to a West Pointer or a Sandhurst chap he will also be able to throw out his chest and be proud of talking of the institution that moulded him.

We in India who know the Imperial Secretariat in New Delhi take pride in what we feel is the immensity and symmetrical impressive grandeur of those buildings. But we could hardly compare the G. H. Q. buildings and offices to the War Department building at Penlagon in Washington. It is so vast that messengers cycle from office to office through its wide corridors. It used to house 60,000 workers. It has its own hair-dressing saloons, drugstores and department stores. It cost millions of dollars, but it saved the country wasting money in expensive and hurriedly build temporary offices when the call came to expand. Then the vision of its creators enabled the Department to work under one roof, with a great saving in time and efficiency.

The Indian Army has throughout prided itself on sport, and of recent years it has been increasingly realised that sport plays a very important part in the fitness of the men, and in building up confidence in their individual abilities—to say nothing of confidence in their leaders. Until the late War, Indian battalions even bought their own sports gear to stimulate more and more interest in the subject. America, too, realises the value of sport—combined games and individual exercise—and it is a remarkable fact, but true, that she spends the equivalent of six lakhs of rupees every year on fees for *civilian coaches* at West Point Academy alone!

ORGANISATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT.


Now for some notes on the general organisation of the War Department in Washington. At its head is the Secretary of War, who is responsible to the President of the United States for all matters concerning the Army and Air Force, of which the President himself is Commander-in-Chief. (Incidentally, he is also Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy). Under the Secretary of War is the Assistant Secretary of War, who handles all items of general policy, while an Administrative Assistant of War deals with the administrative side. He, by the way, is the only permanent non-Service member of War Department, and in that capacity holds a position corresponding to that held by the Permanent Secretary of State to the Secretary of State for War in the British system.

Next we have the Under Secretary of War, who covers specialist subjects such as procurement and the obtaining of supplies for the Services from the American industrial field; naturally, he is very closely in touch with the Division of Service Supplies and Procurement.

In contrast to our system of two distinct land and air forces, America combines the two, and as a result they have an Assistant Secretary of War for Air. He came in just before the 1939-45 War, when it was appreciated that aerial warfare would be a prominent feature of any future conflict. This Assistant Secretary handles all air matters, and is primarily concerned with the Army Air Force.

Armed Forces must be kept up-to-date in equipment — but even more so in knowledge, and to that end the American War Department has its Advisory Council for Research and Development. If I may digress for a moment, I would emphasise the importance America attaches to this question of scientific research. They are developing it on a national and military level. On the former they have the National Scientific Foundation and the National Science Board, members of the latter being appointed by the President of the United States. Major-General H. G. S. Aurand is its first Director. In the military sphere, research and engineering agencies of the War and Navy Departments are directing much of the work of publicly-owned laboratories, and also of research and engineering staffs of educational establishments and industries.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT



These two organisations are linked by the Joint Research and Development Board, the Chairman of which is a distinguished scientist. General Eisenhower recently epitomised the five policies of this Board in the following words :

- (i) "The Army must have civilian assistance in military planning, as well as for the production of weapons".
- (ii) "Scientists and industrialists must be given the greatest freedom to carry out their research".
- (iii) "The possibility of utilising some of our industrial and technological resources as organic parts of our military structure in time of emergency should be carefully examined."
- (iv) "Within the Army we must separate responsibility for research and development from the functions of procurement and distribution."

- (e) "Officers of all arms and Services must become fully aware of the advantages which the Army can derive from the close integration of civilian talent with military plans and development."

The Chief of Staff, principal military adviser to the President and to the Secretary of War on the conduct of war, is responsible for the direction of all military establishments. He commands all components of the United States Army and of the operational forces, which comprise the Army ground forces, the Army air forces, the Army Areas Overseas Departments, Task Forces, Base Commands, Defence Commands, Commands and Theatres of operation in all other Commands, as well as the relative Supply of Service establishments of the Army. He it is who is responsible for their use in War, and their plans and preparations for readiness in war.

He has a General Staff Committee on National Guard and Reserve Policy, headed by a National Guard General, who is on active duty, and an Advisory Group composed of civilians and military personnel, as well as a Deputy Chief of staff. The latter has directly under him the Chief of Public Information, who advises on matters of policy regarding to public relations, and acts in liaison with the Public Relations Division, Legislature and Liaison Division, and Information and Education Division of War Department Special Staff.

The War Department General Staff is responsible for the development of the Army, and ensures the existence of a well-balanced and efficient military team, providing broad basic policies for Commanders-in-Chief of lower formations to prepare their detailed programmes. It issues directives to implement those plans, and in performing its duties it follows the principle of decentralization to the fullest degree. Its six divisions and their work are :

Director of Personnel Administration. He is the military personnel manager, and is solely responsible for obtaining, allocating and re-allocating personnel in bulk, posting them in accordance with requirements. In other words, he is a Director of Man Power Planning.

Director of Intelligence. He collates information and disseminates "Intelligence" concerning foreign countries, their war potential and their military forces, and keeps an ever-watchful eye on individuals who may be dangerous for the preservation of military establishments in America. On the other side of the picture he has to obtain as much information as he can of the set-up of military matters in other countries. He has to meet the requirements of the American forces for "intelligence"; and liaise with other Departments on intelligence matters. He has under him three Divisions; the first deals with codes and courier services, and other such matters; the second with Military Attaches accredited to the United States; and the third with American Military Attaches in foreign capitals.

The work of the four main sections of the General Staff is self-explanatory; the Director of Service, Supply and Procurement obtains supplies for the Forces; the Director of Plans and Operations formulates strategic and operational plans; the Director of Research and Development, apart from co-ordinating research work, watches over the introduction of new weapons, changes in equipment and techniques.


In the Special Staff you have ten divisions, each of which reports directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff. (Their names are shown in the double-page chart). To comment on them briefly: the Public Relations Division is like the Director

of Public Relations in India; the Legislative and Division formulates the War Department legislative programme; Information and Education Division looks after the educational side of military personnel; the National Guard Bureau keeps in touch with the National Guard in the forty-eight States, in the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico States, which comprise the U.S.A. The National Guard, by the way, is equivalent to the British Territorial Service. It is a volunteer force, and its members are paid a small fee for attending drills. They usually parade about once a week—48 parades a year, with a yearly summer camp of two weeks, when they work by units. This Force is available to the State, (the individual State) for the aid of administration if the situation gets beyond the powers of police.

The office of the Inspector General is responsible for seeing that inspections are carried out in accordance with the regulations; the Historical Division prepares records of historical matters concerning the Forces, other than those regarding current topics. The Manpower Board surveys military and civilian personnel employed on interior installations; the Budgetary Division controls budgetary matters; the Civil Affairs Division is the liaison Division on civil affairs—military matters.

We may now come to the relation of subordinate Commands with Major Commands. Directions or instructions are issued to the subordinate commands of the major commands through the appropriate channels of Command and not directly from one technical staff officer to the corresponding staff officer in the subordinate command.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES



The chain of command in the Army Ground forces is clear from the Chart which appears on the following page.

The United States is divided into areas, in all of which is a specified Army, as shown on the coloured map facing page 226.

Note :— Technical Schools :

Sig.— Ft MONMOUTH
Eng.— Ft BELVOIR

Chemical Warfare and Ord. — HOLABIRD

CHAIN OF COMMAND - ARMY GROUND FORCES

H.Q. ARMY GROUND FORCES

LIAISON GROUP

Link between HQ AGF and other Services
(Technical and Administrative)

ARMY GROUND FORCE BOARDS

Board 1
Ft. Bragg

Board 2
Ft. Knox

Board 3
Ft. Benning

(Airborne and Art'y)

(Armd)

(Inf)

First Army

Second Army

Fourth Army

Fifth Army

Sixth Army

Seventh Army

AA RTC
Ft. Bliss

ARMED RTC
Fort Knox

ARTY RTC
Fort Bragg

INF RTC
Ft. McClellan
Camp Robinson
Ft. Ord


INF TNG CENTRE
Ft. Benning
Inf. Sch.
Airborne Sch.

ARMED TNG CENTRE
Ft. Knox
Armd. Sch.
Armd Cav Sch.

ARTY TNG CENTRE
Ft. Sill
Fld. Art'y
AA. Art'y
Coast Art'y

GROUND GENERAL SCHOOL
Ft. Riley
Cav. Sch.
Inf. Sch.

America has come to the conclusion that all the Armed Forces should be unified under one organisation, and a plan to put this into effect is about to be considered by Congress. Though it has not yet been passed, the following chart will show what the general lay-out will be when the proposal comes into effect. I should add that the names given to the appointments are, at the moment, only tentative.



With India about to enter a new sphere in world relations it might be fitting for me to refer to my own duties as Military Attache to the Indian Embassy in Washington. My work is in accordance with directives issued from G. H. Q., India. Hitherto liaison with the U.S.A. Forces has come *via* the Joint British Army Staff in Washington, and in this connection it is only right to add that that position is subject to change if India decides to go out of the British Commonwealth, or if the U.S.A. considers that India is likely to do so. Will, for instance, the U.S.A. agree to a continuation of the present system, whereby India freely receives liaison letters, etc., from the above Staff because of her close association with Britain?

The duties of the Military Attache cover many subjects. He has to build up the right contacts, attend social functions—and let me add that they lose their charm a bit when one has to clean one's own buttons and shine one's own shoes in preparing for them! And another thing—the washing up of *your own* dishes after a function at your own apartment is more likely than not the aftermath of a party! As the representative of the Indian Armed Forces, the Military Attache has direct access to the War and Navy Departments. If India desires any information from those departments the Military Attache is expected to get it, which he does through the Foreign Liaison Section of both the departments.

India, its customs and its peoples, are not generally as well-known in other countries as we should like them to be, and every Indian who leaves this country must realise that, in greater or lesser degree, he is an ambassador. It is the same on the other side. We in India know very little of America. Cars

do not drop off trees there ; you have to buy in the "black market" and pay heavily ; and despite the impression often conveyed by the movies, a beauty blonde does not meet you at Pennsylvania Station as you step off the train in New York !


I remember when I first went to Washington being taken up an elevator, operated by a Negro. He asked if I was British. I replied that I was an Indian. "Are you a General ?" was the next question. "Not yet", I said quite unconsciously. His next remark was significant. "How far is your home town from Dunkirk ?" The story shows that in acquainting the population in America with facts about India we have a good deal of leeway to make up.

Yes, America may have much to learn from us and of us, but we can learn much from her. There is no end to learning, and if America and other countries have some good points which we can emulate, let us learn from them in a spirit of friendship and sincerity. We have learned much from Britain in the past. It will do us no harm, but an immense amount of good, if we now begin to widen our sphere, passing our newly-gained knowledge on to our people, and showing the world that at heart we are a great nation.

If we realize that we have lots to learn then we are not so ignorant—for it is only when one has learnt a certain amount that one realizes how little one really knows. So let us learn all that there is to learn, and then let us teach our own folk and become self-contained and independent in the real sense of the word.

ARMY OF
OCCUPATION
JAPAN

0 50 100 150 200
MILES





A FEW WORDS ABOUT BRITISH COLUMBIA

By W. A. McADAM, C.M.G.*

AT a moment when the imminence of constitutional change is bringing before British officers in the Indian Forces a prospect of early retirement, and prescribing the expediency of formulating plans for the future, the following necessarily brief account of what British Columbia has to offer as a home-making country may not be without interest.

From its earliest days this Pacific Coast province of Canada has always been greatly favoured by retired officers, naval and military, and among its predominantly British population the proportion of families drawn from or associated with the Fighting Services has been relatively high.

There are several well-founded reasons for this popularity. To begin with, British Columbia is essentially an open-air country. It has a genial and yet invigorating climate, it provides some of the best hunting and fishing to be found on the North American continent, it is a land of superb natural beauty, and it affords perhaps a greater diversity of more easily enjoyed outdoor pursuits, from all-the-year-round golf to skiing and mountaineering, than is ordinarily obtainable within the limits of a single domain.

To these attractions may be added the advantages of a not-too-burdensome taxation, good schools and good roads, excellent transportation facilities, a high standard of living, and the full enjoyment of social amenities such as are common to all overseas communities founded on the British way of life. It is therefore easy to understand why so many retired officers, faced with the necessity of making the most of restricted means, and commendably desirous of getting the very best they can out of life, have elected to make their homes in British Columbia.

It is a young country, with plenty of scope for enterprise, and it is a large country—there are over 366,000 sq. miles of it. On the mainland of the continent it occupies a huge quadrangle, contained on the east by the Rocky Mountains, on the south by the International Boundary, on the north by the frontiers of Alaska, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, and on the west, where it has an indented coastline of some 7,000 miles, by the Pacific Ocean.

Here, outside the quadrangle, but forming an integral part of the province, is a great offshore archipelago of many hundreds of islands, of which Vancouver Island, where Victoria, the capital of the province, is situated, and the Queen Charlotte group are the chief. Three mighty mountain chains—the Rockies, the Columbia Mountain System and the Coast Range—trend northwesterly across the province and confer upon it a grandeur which has earned for the country the description of “fifty Switzerlands rolled into one”.

Jagged ranges, remote snow-clad peaks, rolling foothills, wide fertile valleys, park-like plateaus, forest upon forest of giant trees, great lakes, deep fiords and impetuous rivers—such is a composite picture of the British Columbian scene, suggestive rather of a playground than of industrial activity. Nevertheless, the activity is there, for although the province has the lowest density of population—less than three persons to the sq. mile—of any other in Canada it leads all

* Agent General for the Province in London.

Canada in *per capita* production, purchasing-power and wealth. The scenic beauty is, in fact, the background to an exceedingly rich diversity of natural resources—timber, minerals, fisheries, agriculture and water powers. A word about them in their order.

Climatic and soil conditions on the Pacific Coast are peculiarly favourable to the growth of large trees, and the forests of the province abound in magnificent stands of Douglas Fir, Cedar, Spruce and Hemlock. They constitute the largest reserves of softwoods in the British Empire, and, together with the manufacture of pulp and paper, yield today an annual return of well over \$100,000,000.

The phrase, "there's gold in them thar hills" would seem to have a particular application to the mountainous regions of British Columbia. As a matter of fact, there is scarcely a single district which does not contain mineral deposits of one kind or another, and although some sixty-nine minerals and rare earths have so far been discovered, much of the province, from the point of view of its mineral resources, still remains unexplored. As it is, the mines produce 98 per cent. of the lead and zinc, 66 per cent. of the copper, and 20 per cent. of the gold and silver mined in all Canada. During the past ten years the average value of production has been in the neighbourhood of some \$65,000,000.

The fisheries of the province account for more than one-half of Canada's total harvest from sea and river. Salmon is perhaps the fish with which the name of British Columbia is usually associated, but the waters of the province, inland, estuarian and ocean, are extraordinarily prolific, and the produce ranges from clams to whales, from fish-oil and fish-fertilizer to a share in the fur-seal fisheries of the Pribilof Islands. An instance of the possibilities of development is seen north of the province, at Prince Rupert, which in recent years has become the centre of the halibut fishery, the output of which is today hauled in refrigerator express cars three thousand miles across the continent to the Atlantic seaboard. Fisheries yield on an average some \$35,000,000.

All the above-named—lumbering, mining, fishing—are, it must be remembered, highly capitalised and highly arduous industries. It is in agriculture that individual effort finds its freest and most promising expression. This is not to say that it can be entered upon, even at its simplest, without some experience, but it does afford the readiest means at a moderate outlay of supplementing income. There are some 26,000 farms in the province, and nearly 90 per cent. of them are owned by the occupants. They range in size from five to several hundred acres, according to the type of farming carried on. Returns from agriculture, under which heading is included everything from the raising of sheep and cattle to grain and fodder crops, from fruit-growing to dairying, had a gross value in 1944 of over \$97,000,000.


The most successful farmers are those engaged in mixed farming. The small mixed farm, consisting of a few acres of root and forage crops, a small dairy herd, a few sheep and pigs, and a team of horses, is probably the most attractive for the man of modest means, so long as he does not allow an undue proportion of his capital to be frozen in land, buildings and machinery. Specialized farms, such as the dairy farms, require the largest investment; fruit trees can be established on less, and small fruits and poultry on less still. But to purchase a farm of any sort calls for a considerable outlay on land, buildings, fences, stock and equipment, and, above all, demands experience.

Agriculturally, the province divides itself naturally into zones. The Lower Coast (which includes Vancouver Island and the Fraser Valley) specializes



↑ Parliament Buildings and Inner Harbour,
Victoria, B.C.

Oak Bay Golf Links, Victoria, British
Columbia, ↓



Trout Fishing in Thompson river
near Walhachin, British Columbia



In a sea of mountains on the way
to Dunn Peak, in the interior of
British Columbia

in dairy products, small fruits and field crops. The Southern Interior, notably the Okanagan and Kootenay Valleys, confines itself largely to fruit and vegetables. In the Central Interior is a huge tract devoted to cattle-raising, while northward in the section traversed by the Canadian National Railways, along the Nechako and Bulkley Valleys, there is mixed farming.

Small holdings, berry and poultry farms of from 3 to 10 acres, are popular around the larger centres, where intensive cultivation is practised, and 10 acres is a usual size for orchards in the Okanagan and West Kootenay. Successful dairy-farms in the Lower Fraser Valley run from 75 to 150 acres; and the cattle ranches of the Central Interior from 640 acres to as many as 50,000 acres, and even more. Cultivation under glass is strongly featured, especially around Victoria and Vancouver, and among other specialized branches may be mentioned bulb growing. British Columbia is the only province in Canada with a climate suitable for the production of tulip, daffodil, narcissus, iris and other autumn-planted bulbs, and the industry presents possibilities for a small holding; but here again experience is a prime essential.

An immense amount of land classification still remains to be done, but present estimates indicate that of British Columbia's 234,000,000 acres about 5,000,000 could be brought under intensive and successful cultivation. As it is, not more than 25 per cent. of it is being cultivated. Of the arable land, 500,000 acres are adapted to the growing of fruit; but, while a considerable portion is open or bears only a light growth, much of it is timbered—heavily on the Coast, moderately in other parts, and lightly in the northern and Peace River regions—and the cost of clearing must always be borne in mind where unimproved land is concerned.

Land with more than a certain amount of timber on it per acre is reserved, but large areas are available for pre-emption or purchase quite suitable for farming. Apart from these, the Provincial Government has acquired and improved certain areas for land settlement, where acreage is offered at low rates on long-term purchase. There are also some highly-developed sections in the Lower Fraser Valley and the South Okanagan where land is still available.

Naturally, the low-priced land is found in regions more or less remote, though generally within reach of a railway. The land-settlement areas are mostly in the sections traversed by the Canadian National and the Pacific Great Eastern Railways, and have been improved and made ready for the plough. In the really choice portions of Vancouver Island, the Lower Fraser Valley, the Okanagan and the Kootenays, land is expensive—the most expensive in all Canada—and is only purchasable by those with considerable capital at command.

At this point it will possibly be asked: What does the land cost, and what capital is necessary? To such questions, dependent as they are on a variety of individual considerations, no less than on local conditions, no more than a general answer can be given. Totally raw tillable land can be had from \$5 an acre—and may cost anything from three to sixty times that amount to clear. In well-established farming areas the values will range from \$50 to \$150 an acre, and even higher. Raw orchard land under irrigation will run from \$200 an acre up. As for capital required, this is largely contingent upon the particular kind of farming selected, and the amount of experience brought to it. Fruit growing would need a minimum of, say, \$10,000; a small, established farm might conceivably be purchased for half this amount.

The water powers of the province, which have a potential of some 7,000,000 h.p., of which a little more than 10 per cent. has been developed, make the use of electricity universal in all the urban districts, a convenience which the Government-owned B.C. Power Commission is now rapidly extending to the rural areas. Electrical appliances are in general use, and there are few homes without a telephone.

Allied with the growth of hydro-electric energy is industrial development, and the province, for all its small population, is the third largest in Canada in manufacturing capacity. The leading industries are sawmilling, fish curing and packing, pulp and paper, slaughtering and meat-packing, sheet-metal products, breweries, planing-mills, castings and forgings, ship-building, distilleries, flour and feed mills, clothing, boots and shoes, paints and varnishes, and furniture and upholstery. During the war the province became one of the main arsenals, notably in shipbuilding and in the making of aircraft. It produced 70 per cent. of all the cargo ships built in Canada: one yard alone turned out over one hundred 10,000-ton freighters.

British Columbia is served by two transcontinental railways—the Canadian Pacific and the Canadian National—and its publicly-owned Pacific Great Eastern Railway. It has air-service connections with Britain, the United States and Australia; an excellent system of lake and river transport, and its 20,000 miles of highway are used by the owners of over 100,000 motor cars. Broadly speaking, the highway system covers the entire settled portion of the province; and links up, a few miles away from New Westminster, at Blaine on the U. S. Boundary, with the famous Highway 99, which runs over 1,700 miles south to Mexico.

The educational facilities are remarkably comprehensive, and embrace high schools, junior high, superior, elementary and assisted schools to the number of 1,200. Apart from these there are two normal schools for the training of student teachers, and the University of British Columbia, which not only gives a liberal education and special instruction in the branches most closely identified with the life and industries of the province, but is also inaugurating faculties in law and medicine. The University has just opened its winter session with a record enrolment of some 9,000 students. In addition to the Government schools, there are a number of private establishments modelled on the English public school.

Of the cities, all without exception are located amid picturesque surroundings. The commercial metropolis is the city and port of Vancouver, on the mainland. Less than seventy years ago it was no more than a congregation of shacks set in a forest clearing. Today it has a population of some 300,000 souls, and is the largest winter-shipping grain port in the world. Something of its growth in late years has been due to the existence of the Panama Canal, which has had the effect of placing the province at one of the cross-roads of world traffic. The capital of the province, Victoria, on Vancouver Island, has been called "a bit of Old England set down on the shores of the Pacific", and is in many respects unique. There is no other city on the North American continent that can match it for the urbanity of its climate, the beauty of its situation, the wealth of its gardens, and the charm of its leisurely air. Other cities are New Westminster, a flourishing freshwater port on the Fraser; Prince Rupert, Canada's most northerly port, which has already been referred to; Vernon, Kelowna and Penticton, in the heart of the fruit-growing valley of the Okanagan; Nanaimo, the centre of the coalmining industry; Prince George, at the gateway

of the Peace River country, an area of almost incredible fertility, and Kamloops, the hub of an extensive road system in a great ranching and farming district.

British Columbia is supremely a land of matchless game. No country offers keener thrills or richer rewards, and the big-game hunter, whose marksmanship, lungs and legs are equal to the test which the sport imposes, is certain of magnificent trophies. The big-horned sheep, wapiti and caribou; the moose, tall and rangy; the giant grizzly, largest of all the carnivora; goat, deer, black and brown bear, wolves and cougars—all are free to the gun of the resident hunter for a nominal fee of \$6 a year. The fishing, too, is wonderful; all the best lakes and streams are easily accessible, and can be fished by residents for an annual fee of \$1. Five species of salmon are native to the province, but only two will take a fly—the Spring and the Cohoe. Of trout there are three main varieties—the Steelhead, the Rainbow and the Cut-throat. Salmon run up to 60 lb. and trout to as high as 20 lb.

It is not surprising that with all its advantages British Columbia should make a strong appeal to those who wish to settle themselves abroad. Intensely British in sentiment—70 per cent. of the people are of British stock—it has a homelike atmosphere, and its uncompromising attitude towards lawlessness and crime, and the wide range of its activities and opportunities, make it particularly attractive to those who desire to settle down in a country immune from disturbance and unrest. The cost of living is not unduly high, having regard to the general rise in world prices, and a man with a small income and a love of life in the open can certainly get more out of existence than if he lived in the crowded and competitive centres of the European world.

British Columbia is the most westerly of the nine provinces of the Dominion of Canada, which is organized on much the same basis as Britain, with an Upper Chamber (the Senate) and a House of Commons. The King is represented by the Governor-General. For purely provincial affairs, each of the provinces has its own Provincial Government, where the King is represented by a Lieutenant-Governor. British Columbia has its Legislative Assembly, consisting of 48 members elected on a franchise which extends to both sexes. In the Dominion Parliament the province has six Senators and sixteen members.

It is to be regretted that under present conditions it is impossible in an article of this kind to do more than give the merest outline. It would no doubt be useful in the highest degree to speak of such things as taxation, cost of living and so forth in exact terms of dollars and cents; but we are living in a quick-changing world, and in the endeavour to be exact it is only too easy unwittingly to mislead. The writer prefers to advise the interested reader who desires this kind of information to address himself to the London Office of the Government at British Columbia House, 1-3, Regent Street, S. W. 1. where every effort will be made to reply to whatever points he may raise.

Similarly, as Canada is outside the sterling area, there is always the question of the transfer of funds, not only in the matter of capital but also with regard to pensions. Those who are regarded as resident in the United Kingdom for the purpose of the Defence (Finance) Regulations, and are immigrating to a country outside the sterling area, are allowed to have for their use during the first four years of their arrival, not more than £5,000 of their total assets drawn in annual instalments. Enquiries on these matters, and they are of prime importance, should be addressed through a Bank to the Foreign Exchange Control Department of the Bank of England in London.

CHAPLAINS IN INDIA—THE STORY OF THE I.E.E.

BY THE REVEREND BASIL STRATTON, C.F., I.E.E.

BISHOP Eyre Chatterton in publishing a history of the Church of England in India dedicated it to "that great body of Chaplains past and present who have borne the burden and heat of the long, long, Indian day while faithfully serving the Church of England in India". Few people realise that "that great body" will, when the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment comes to an end, have completed three hundred and forty years of service in this country, and it seems fitting that now, when that service is almost done, something of the story of that body should be told in the *U.S.I. Journal*.

The first Chaplain to come out to India, the Reverend John Hall, accompanied Sir Thomas Roe, British Ambassador, at the Court of the great Moghul Emperor, Jehangir, in 1607. Little is known of him, for he died in India soon after he came out, but he is referred to by Sir Thomas as "a man of most gentle and mild nature, religious and unspotted from the world." In applying for a successor to follow Hall, the Ambassador enunciated the principle which in the 300 years that followed has been the keystone of the Government policy with regard to Chaplains. "Here", he said, "I cannot live the life of an atheist. Let me desire you endeavour me supply, for I cannot abide in this place destitute of God's word and Holy Sacrament".

In 1858, when Queen Victoria assumed by Royal Proclamation the direct government of India, and the Hon'ble East India Company's Chaplains became "Her Majesty's Chaplains in India", this principle was accepted. Against the argument that it was unjust to tax Indians to maintain Chaplains it was asserted that Indians were taxed for the sustentation of the Government, a Government which considered that without the spiritual ministration of the Church it could not fulfil its purpose—the welfare and prosperity of the Indian Empire.

It was in the factory, or trading post, at Surat that the first of the Company's Chaplains was stationed, and it is to Terry, one of the first Chaplains to be posted there, and incidentally the first of a long line of literary Chaplains, that we are indebted for a fascinating description of the manner of life that those early pioneers led. Life was conducted on the collegiate principle; all lived together, dined together at the common table, attended Chapel morning and evening, and were subjected to severe penalties for "swearing, brawling, drunkenness or lying out at night". The Chaplain was ranked as third in this little community and was paid £50 a year, and granted a bonus of a further £50 dependent "on his good behaviour".

Contemporary travellers from Europe frequently remarked on the respect in which the Chaplains were held, though it is to be confessed that all of them did not come up to the standard of Sir Thomas Roe's Chaplain, in that one at any rate could hardly be described as remaining unspotted from the world. This was a certain John Evans, referred to in the Madras records. It appears that on his application for an increase of £3 a year, in addition to his beggarly £50, being turned down, he ventured to indulge in private trading. For this he was dismissed the Company's Service. However, it later transpired that he had "shaken the pagoda tree" to such good effect that he returned a wealthy man to England, became Bishop of Bangor, and took his seat in the House of Lords.

It is only fair to add that he became one of the founders of the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel and the Society of the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, both of which societies have done untold good in India, and when he died he left most of his money to the Church.

One occasionally, too, reads of Chaplains who apparently failed in being men of peace and were sent home as a result, but reading between the lines one may conclude that it was not always the Chaplain's fault. For instance, it would have been a poor spirited Chaplain who did not make a nuisance of himself by his protestations when compelled to live in a community of nineteen, who between them in one year could drink "seventy-four dozen bottles of wine, fifty dozen of French Claret, twenty-four dozen of Burton, two pipes and forty-two gallons of Madeira, 274 bottles of Toddy and 164 gallons of Goa Arach". One may even sympathise with the two Chaplains who were described as "the tenderest chickens we ever met".

But then, as always, there were Chaplains who could fit in, and there were many who in spite of all the difficulties were like a Reverend Mr. Fuller, whose confidential report said of him: "We doubt not a man of his quality and demeanour will draw a blessing upon our labours surpassing the Company's Charge by his detention". They more than earned their pay! Of another Chaplain it was written "He hath lived among us peacefully without any touch of spleen or faction. His function he hath ever observed conformably, and his life no way deserving of public reproach, though not free from imbecilities, as in all of us might be wished a bettering". The rest of the letter shows how loved this Chaplain was, but one cannot help but wonder as to what form his particular imbecilities took.

In those early days of the 17th century there was considerable friction between the English and Dutch traders, and a certain amount of blood was shed; indeed, it is probable that had it not been for the Company's Chaplains matters might have been worse, for many of them worked most zealously to produce a spirit of harmony between the rival traders. We are told how one Chaplain held services regularly for the Dutch, though he complains that their Chapels were "more like fort than Church", and of another who, taking no sides in the dispute, but with fine Christian spirit, expostulated with the Dutch for their unfriendliness and jealousy, and then in a sermon preached on board a British ship was bold enough to blame the English Commanders for quarrelling with the Dutch.

For this indiscretion, if such Christian impartiality may be so described, he was accused of imperilling the fighting spirit of the crew and was eventually dismissed. His name, the Reverend Patrick Copeland, deserves to be remembered, for he made several voyages to India and in spite of his dismissal was held in great esteem. To him also belongs the honour of being amongst the first Church of England Chaplains to prepare an Indian for baptism. Such importance was attached to this by the Company that the Archbishop of Canterbury's approval was sought, and this having been gained, King James named the youth, who having accompanied Copeland to England, was duly baptised in one of the old city Churches in the presence of some members of the Privy Council and the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London.

At last Dutch competition became so keen, and the fleets of pirates so menacing on the West Coast that the Company decided to establish on the East Coast, and so we have the beginnings of Madras as a great port and centre of commerce. It was here in Madras that the first English Church in India was

built, St. Mary's, in Fort St. George, in the year 1680. It was, too, in Madras that the first Chaplain, to become a Bishop in India, the Reverend Daniel Corrie, was enthroned, though that did not take place until St. Mary's Church had been standing for a hundred and fifty-five years.

Corrie may be taken as the representative of those many Chaplains who throughout the history of the Service have not been content with merely performing the duties for which they are paid, for he had a deep sense of duty towards Indians and India. It was his efforts in the early years of the nineteenth century in the bazaars of Agra and Cawnpore that laid the foundations from which have sprung Christian Colleges of University standing that do such great work in those same cities for Indians of all castes and creeds. It was he who prepared the first Indian for ordination into the Church of England, and now we Chaplains are proud to know and to serve under Indian Bishops of the Church of India.

It is not perhaps generally realised that it was the experiences of Chaplains in India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and their constant writing to the Church authorities in England, that brought into being the Church Missionary Society, which now spends throughout the world a half-million sterling a year in evangelistic, medical and educational work.

Throughout the story of the Chaplaincy Service in India one sees this sense of duty to the inhabitants of the country in which they served, in building schools in cantonments for Indian children as in Kirkee, Belgaum and Colaba, pressing for hospitals and in supporting from their funds poorer congregations, and last but by no means least in ministering to Indian Christian soldiers in all theatres of war. It has been granted to few Chaplains to see the results of their labours, few Chaplains have come into the limelight, yet if we examine the records of many of what are India's finest institutions we shall find that some Chaplain or other was working hard in the background to bring them into being.

Until 1858 it may be said that while most Chaplains were chiefly occupied in ministering to the servants and troops of the East India Company, there were many who undertook active missionary work in addition to their normal duties; men like Henry Martyn, Archdeacon Corrie, Claudius and Buchanan (the last named having the honour of first suggesting a regular Ecclesiastical Establishment) whose motto was, like that of Francis Xavier, "Now let me burn out for God". But after 1858, the year in which they became Crown Servants, or as they were referred to in official documents of the time "Her Majesty's Chaplains in India", they in the nature of the case ceased to take an active part in proselytization, for that would have been altogether contrary to the policy of the British Government, which has always been very sensitive to accusations of interference with the religious sentiment of its subjects.

In the early days, so afraid was the Government of giving offence in this respect, that missionaries were actually forbidden to land in India, and even after a more tolerant view had obtained in official circles both in England and in India, it is interesting to note that, lest any occasion of offence be given, the first Bishop to come to India was consecrated in private, and the sermon preached on the occasion of his consecration was forbidden to be published in India. That the fears lay more in the mind of the Government than in the inhabitants of India is rather delightfully, if ironically, expressed by a historian of the times who wrote thus of the arrival of India's first Anglican Bishop:

"There was no commotion, no excitement at its dawn; offended Hinduism did not start up in arms, nor indignant Mohammedanism raise a war-cry of death

to the infidel. English gentlemen asked each other, on the course or at the dinner table, if they had seen the Bishop; officious sircars pressed their services upon the Lord Padre Sahib; but the heart of Hindu society beat calmly as was its wont; Brahminism stood not aghast at the sight of the lawn sleeves of the Bishop. No one looked differently, no one felt differently; and it really seemed probable after all that British dominion in the East would survive the episcopal blow!"

Most Chaplains would agree that one of the joys, as well as one of the responsibilities of service in India, is that they are treated by responsible people of all creeds as "Men of God" rather than as "Crown Servants" and this was particularly noticeable in one's service with the Army on the active fronts during the War.

It is recorded that on a certain occasion a young Chaplain was talking rather scornfully of missionary work before the Duke of Wellington, and the Duke, rounding on him, quoted the last two verses of St. Matthew's Gospel, adding the comment "Your orders, young man".

Now, lest it be said that by taking "Crown orders", the Chaplains have since 1858 disobeyed their "heavenly" orders, it should be realised that they have since the inception of the Service as a Crown Service been selected on the score of their vocation for work amongst troops and Crown servants, and that a Chaplain's job is a specialised piece of work which properly performed leaves him little time for anything else, however interested he might be in other spheres of service.

In fact, of course, many Chaplains have voluntarily learnt the language of the provinces in which they work, and have always been ready to conduct occasional services in the established Mission Churches; but it is to serve Crown Servants and British troops that they are in India, and taking them by and large they have performed a notable service in this respect.

Because in the first place Chaplains were recruited to minister to the servants of the East India Company, they have remained civilians themselves, and though in the last hundred years their duties have increasingly been with British troops in India, they have still a duty towards Crown servants brought out from England. There has always been a close bond between Chaplains and civil servants, and one has only to read the stories of the great administrators of India or to study their memorials in the Churches to realise how many of these were devout God-fearing men who, like the first Ambassador, could not have carried on without the Minister of God's Word and Sacraments.

It is of interest that in the year 1800, when a college was started in Calcutta under the advices of the Governor-General Marquis Wellesley for the training of civil servants, a Chaplain, the Reverend David Brown, was appointed Provost and acted in that capacity for seven years. In a report on Brown's provostship it was stated that it was "undoubtedly true that a striking improvement took place in the moral deportment of the students of the College; that the unprincipled tide of debt was likewise stemmed, and the culture of talent became the prevailing taste", and that the rules were such that "in some of the students were laid the groundwork of a serious and consistent profession of the Christian Faith". It is naturally impossible to calculate the good that has been done in India by administrators who have come under the spiritual influence of men of God, and it is probably in this way, rather than by direct action, that Chaplains have served India best.

Chaplains, too, have played a great part in the history of the Anglo-Indians. In origin they are the result of the settled policy of the East India

Company, who expected both their servants and soldiers to live and die in India. Englishwomen were few, and actually during a period of fifty years in the 17th century were forbidden to come to India. The Company encouraged for a long period "mixed" marriages, and though nowadays such marriages are comparatively few, Church registers of the 18th century show them to have been very frequent indeed.

Wherever civil servants and soldiers were concentrated Chaplains opened schools under the direction of the Company for the children of such marriages, and ever since Government has been generous in its help, but it is to succeeding Chaplains for a hundred and twenty years that must go a share of the credit that to-day, educationally, the Anglo-Indian child is certainly as well provided for, and in many cases better provided for, than the child of any other country. One of the great supports of a Chaplain in his work in the average station is the Anglo-Indian community, and such has been the appreciation and affection of Chaplains for this hard-trying community, that many of them have retired in India in order to continue to serve it.

But though part of their duties consists in ministering to Crown servants in India, for the most part a Chaplain's life is bound up with that of the troops, and such has been the case ever since British troops first landed in India. It is probably in this sphere of work that most Chaplains have experienced their greatest happiness and the feeling that their work has been most rewarded.

In the Garrison station of pre-war days a Chaplain had a wonderful parish. There was the Army school in which to teach the soldiers' children; the "band boys" to keep a fatherly eye on and prepare for confirmation; the Church Institute to meet the men over a game of billiards, or whist-drive; the families to visit; the hospital in which one had a real opportunity of getting to know a man; the barrack-room visits, not always very easy; the days on manoeuvres; and always in every large unit that band of really faithful churchmen to encourage, lead on, and build up.

Last but not least there was the Church parade, which as long as it was a battalion parade in which the whole battalion went to church as a Christian unit to witness to its faith, never failed to be an inspiring experience. It was surely only when the parade was reduced to the level of a fatigue party of "a hundred men and a boy" that it ceased to be a living force and became an irksome duty, and the source of ill-feeling.

Wherever British troops have been in India, whether in the Honourable East India Company's service or in the service of His Majesty's Government, whether in Garrison Station or in Frontier war, the Chaplains have been with them. Indeed it has been said that it was the influence of wars such as the Carnatic wars, that determined the direction along which the Church developed and the way in which progress was made, simply because wherever the troops were stationed, there a Chaplain built his Church and preached the Gospel first to the troops and then to such as cared to hear him.

During the last hundred years, however, the British Army in India has tended to concentrate more and more in the Punjab and United Provinces, until just prior to the War over two-thirds of the Chaplains were at work in the area covered by the dioceses of Lahore and Lucknow, and there are few stations of importance in this part of India where Soldier's Homes or Institutes are not provided, whether by the Church or Miss Sandes, "the soldier's friend". But Chaplains have not only served in Garrison Stations, for few British columns have marched far beyond the Frontier without a Chaplain.

A most interesting account of the work of a Chaplain on such a column was written by the Reverend I. N. Allen who accompanied a column in the Afghan war in 1842. Like all Chaplains he was faced by the eternal transport problem, but Chaplains of to-day may count themselves fortunate in that they at least do not have the daily maintenance of nine camels to worry about! It must have been a tremendous sight to see such an army as he accompanied on the march, for apart from the fighting troops there were "ten thousand public and private camels besides bullocks, asses, mules, and 'tattoos'" and he reckoned that there must have been about fifteen thousand followers.

He speaks of the distress that wretched cultivators who lived on the line of march suffered, and likens their plight to Israel: "and so it was, when Israel had sown, that the Midianites came up and the Amalakites and destroyed the increase of the earth, for they came up with their cattle and their tents, and they came as grasshoppers, for multitude, for both they and their camels were without number and they entered into the land to destroy it."

On the other hand, the invading host did not have it all their own way, for however vigilant the outriders and rearguard, the tribesman could always be certain of separating a camel or two from the cavalcade and making away with the loot. This particular Chaplain suffered twice in this way, first losing three camels and then two, together with a driver whose throat was cut. His lament over the loss is most aptly expressed when he likens himself to Job and quotes, "The Chaldeans made out three bands, and fell upon the camels, yea, and slain the servants, with the edge of the sword, and I only am escaped to tell thee".

This Chaplain obviously had a great regard for the British soldier, and in his repeated references to his qualities and his bearing under hardship expresses the sentiments of Chaplains who have served the soldier in desert, mountain and jungle ever since. He was greatly gratified by being awarded a medal in recognition of his services, but had hard work in retaining it, for on his return to Bombay, the military authorities refused to confirm the award on the ground that "Chaplains were not entitled to such a distinction".

On appeal to the Metropolitan, the latter considered "that it is an ornament unknown to the ecclesiastical service", to which Allen replied: "I do not regard it as a distinctive badge of war, but as a token of the approbation of the Government whose servant I am, for arduous services faithfully performed, as a memorial of providential preservation, and as a bond of union with the brave men of whom I was companion and minister". In the end he got his medal, and may all Chaplains regard their medals in a similar light.

To those who imagine that education and welfare in the Army are new things the following extract from Allen's diary may be of interest. "On my visit to the 40th Regiment I inspected the schools, both of adults and boys, and examined the latter in the Scriptures and the Church Catechism, and was delighted to find that even in the field, and under all the harassing service through which they had passed, the schools were as efficiently kept up, as they could have been in barracks at Bombay or Poona. The Officers were most kindly attentive to the comforts and real interests of the men; the men as a natural consequence, were attached to their officers, and general good feeling prevailed from the highest to the lowest". That was a hundred years ago, and took place in one of the most arduous campaigns of the 19th century in India.

Indeed, it seems that they fully understood the creative value of welfare in war in those days, for what little there was, was positive, constructive, and compulsory, and was never escapist.

During the Great War of 1914-18 I.E.E. chaplains served in France, Egypt, Palestine, the Dardanelles, Mesopotamia, Persia, the North-West Frontier and on Hospital Ships, and those in Aden (for I.E.E. Chaplains always served the troops in Aden until it was separated from the Indian Government) were involved in the local hostilities with Turkey. Something of the task that was given to those who remained behind will be understood when it is realised that two and a quarter million troops crossed the quays of Bombay either going out or coming in. But, as a Chaplain of the period wrote, "they were days of happy service for the Chaplains, for on the whole they represented glorified opportunities in the very work they had come to India to do".

At the outbreak of the 1939-45 War a number of Chaplains of the I.E.E. were mobilised and went to the Western Desert with the Fourth and Fifth Indian Divisions; others followed and served with the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Indian Divisions in Iraq and Persia. In May 1942, in view of the great shortage of Chaplains in India and the new commitment on the Burma front, all I.E.E. Chaplains were recalled from the Middle East, and many of them were posted immediately either to Divisions in Burma or to training establishments and formations in India.

Every Indian Division in Burma had at least one I.E.E. Chaplain with it. Of the twenty or so I.E.E. Chaplains who had the honour of being mobilised, nearly half appeared in the Honours and Awards Lists, the names of two Chaplains appearing three times. But here again it was the Chaplains who remained behind in the Garrison Stations that had a tremendous task set before them. Many of them were nearing retirement, and had to stay on in stations swollen to four times their pre-war strength. Populations were shifting, and so few had the reward of seeing any result of their labours. They were complimented by Government by being gazetted as Honorary Chaplains to the Forces for life. It was the Chaplains who were mobilised, and had the inestimable privilege of serving continuously with a unit or formation on a campaign, that had the easier part to play.

It was the experience of all of us who had this good fortune that on an actual campaign there is a readiness, and at times almost an eagerness, for men to listen to the message of the Gospel; everyone seems to go all out to help the Padre, and he seems naturally to assume an assured position in the scheme of things. One experience of the writer will show clearly how much the ministrations of the Church were counted on. In an advance of over twelve hundred miles lasting thirteen months, not a single Sunday passed without a little house of God, complete with Altar, Sanctuary, roof and seating being erected in the middle of the camp of the Headquarters on which he served, and all done with the greatest goodwill by men of all ranks.

Within a year or so it is expected that the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment will, after three and a half centuries of service, cease to exist, and looking back over his own minute fraction of this service, and thinking of the kindnesses received, the wonderful opportunities granted, the friendships made, the writer believes that there must have been many hundreds of Chaplains who, if they were asked what they would do if they could begin their ministerial service all over again, would reply as he did without a moment's hesitation "The same again".

ON QUITTING INDIA

When I have quitted India
 I'll count no loss, but gain.
 I shall not dwell on ugly things
 Nor brood in hate or pain.

In the treasure house of memory
 I know that I shall find
 These savings of a lifetime
 In retrospect refined.

The magic of the moonlight,
 The smell of coming rain,
 Across the mountain valley
 The distant flute's refrain.

Misty plains from hilltops,
 The silence of the snow,
 The kaleidoscope at sundown
 Of Frontier hills aglow.

The frozen waiting at the jheel,
 The fighting duck at dawn,
 The yodel of a persian-wheel,
 Parties on the lawn.

The flame of the forest,
 The jungle's eery spell,
 The hungry, prowling jackal's
 Maniacal yell.

At ease, outside the tented door
 The day's work done,
 The friendly, trusting country folk,
 The comfort of the sun.

These are the joy of living
 By which our minds are free
 Of sordid, mundane striving
 and the chains of enmity.

Sad, I view the parting
 With which our chapter ends,
 Where else in all the world
 Shall I find so many friends?

Oh! Land of fascination
 Deep that calls to deep,
 Responsive to our longing
 May you ever keep

A corner of your heart for us,
 Who counted not the cost
 To serve our Mistress India,
 That we have wooed, and lost.

W. L. A.

A FRANK SURVEY OF INDIA'S DEFENCE PROBLEMS

BY LIEUT. S. G. CHAPHEKAR.

THE WORLD is watching India's Constituent Assembly, on which the best brains of the country are framing the constitution for the Free India of to-morrow. But the problem of defending the country after its freedom has been achieved, is as important as gaining that freedom. Let us then review this important problem of India's defence.

For more than 2,000 years all attempts to invade India have been from the North-west or Western side of the country. Only two routes have been used by invaders of the past—the Khyber and Bolan passes. The ancient Aryans came through them; Alexander, the Sakas, the Huns, Scythians, Mohamed Ghorī, Changiz Khan, Tamerlane, Baber, Abdali, and Nadirshah—all of them used these passes to enter and invade India.

The Moghuls, anxious to keep Afghanistan and the Frontier province in their hands, established military posts there to stop the invader. More recently, Ranjitsingh built a chain of fortresses there. During the last century endeavours were made to maintain a puppet ruler at Kabul to act as a buffer between Russia and India, and the first two Afghan wars were the result of this policy. Similarly, interference in Iran was also dictated with the same object. In modern times nearly half the strength of the Indian Army has been concentrated in the North-west corner of the country, where the British have maintained a chain of forts and outposts.

Until recently the Eastern land frontier of India was Thailand, but since the separation of Burma from India, Assam and East Bengal have formed the eastern frontier of the country. No one paid any heed to this eastern frontier, as it was believed that no potential enemy existed in the Far East. But the Far Eastern war and capture of Burma brought home to Indians the importance of this eastern frontier. Moreover, until 1925 Britain and Japan were allies, China was divided and torn by civil wars, and Thailand was too weak to attempt an invasion of Burma or India.

Who are the potential invaders of India? Where should our first line of defence be? In visualising the answers to these questions we must take into account the fact that modern wars are very mobile, scientific and mechanical. Distances are not insurmountable obstacles. They can be covered by transport planes, gliders and parachute troops. Defence lines on the model of the Maginot Line will be useless in future wars.

During the late War parachute troops were landed several hundred miles behind enemy lines; gliders and transport planes carried German troops to Crete, and British troops to Holland. If, therefore, such troops were carried 200 or 300 miles in this late War, it may well be that in the next they will be able to be sent 1,000 or maybe 2,000 miles. Moreover, by that time radio-directed planes and rockets will be perfected, and distant objectives may be bombed without the risk of loss of pilots.

In considering potential invaders, therefore, distance must not prompt us to exclude any country. India, being in the centre of Asia, may be attacked from west, east, north, and in certain circumstances from the south. Consider our neighbours in these directions.

On the west there are Iran and Afghanistan. Politically, educationally, economically, industrially and militarily neither of these countries is in a position to invade India. But they can be used as bases by other Powers; themselves they are not strong enough to resist a first-class Power for more than a few days or weeks.

Looking further west we have Iraq, Transjordan, Arabia, Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Egypt. Iraq and Transjordan are no larger than a couple of districts in India; their combined population does not exceed two millions. Palestine is mandated under the British Government, which is not likely to invade India. Arabia can also be eliminated, but its eastern coast might be used as an air base; similarly, the coasts of Iran, Iraq and Arabia might be used for submarine bases by hostile Powers.

Turkey is not yet completely recovered from the effects of the first World War; moreover, her population and resources are too limited to undertake an invasion of India. But the Turks are good fighters and might join some stronger hostile Power. She would, however, have to cross Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan before reaching the Indian Frontier.

These countries being all Islamic, Iran and Afghanistan might give all facilities to Turkey. Before World War II there existed a treaty of friendship and mutual help between Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (the Sadabad treaty), but Turkey was unable to do anything when British and Russian troops occupied Iran in 1941.

India should cultivate friendship with these western Asiatic Powers. Racially, Indians are near to Turks, Persians and Afghans. Persia's language and culture have left a mark on India, and it should not be difficult to establish ties of culture and friendship with them. Thousands of Indians learn Persian; quite a few distinguished scholars have written works in Persian.

Much of the foreign trade of these countries is with India. Though they are not strong militarily, their countries are mountainous; roads are few; inhabitants are warlike. True, in modern wars mountains, deserts, rivers and jungles are not formidable obstacles, but the progress of an invading army is slowed up to a certain extent by these natural obstacles.

Air bases in the Punjab and on the Frontier could effectively aid armies fighting in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the resultant delay would enable India to rush troops and materials to aid those countries, giving us breathing time to improve our own defences. Moreover, those countries are rich in petroleum resources.

Now look at Russia. In reading the following comments, I would emphasise that I am not a warmonger, nor do I wish to prophesy a war with Russia. I write purely theoretically, for like millions of Indians, I devoutly hope Russia and India will never be enemies. Let me trace in brief Russia's history during the last century.

During the latter half of the 18th century Russia began to emerge from her lethargy. Education spread; industries began to thrive—but she had no outlet to the open seas, except in the north. She cast covetous eyes on Constantinople; Turkey's power was on the wane. The Balkan people are Slavs, like the Russians, and belonged to the orthodox Greek Church, of which the Czar was the head.

Britain and France grew alarmed; Russian entry into the Mediterranean was a menace to their interests in the Near and Middle East, and with the

construction of the Suez Canal British interests were still more increased. Britain thereupon decided to help Turkey, "the sick old man of Europe". Russia was also trying to get a footing in Afghanistan, and the absorption of the sultanates of Khiva and Bokhara brought Russia to the very gates of India. British help to Turkey against Mohamed Ali of Egypt, the Crimean War, the Berlin Conference, and the two Afghan Wars were the result of this growing menace of Russia.

The Czarist regime in Russia ended with the Communist Revolution of 1917. Communists there began to take an interest in workers' movements all over the world. It was alleged that they paid to maintain Communist agitators in other countries. Communist organisations were started in India; Left-Wing Unions were begun in several Indian cities. Suspecting the existence of a Communist conspiracy, the Indian Government arrested a number of labour leaders, and the famous Meerut conspiracy case was started. It was then alleged that some Indian labour leaders were in the pay of Russia.

Circumstances changed with the second World War. Britain and Russia became allies, and Russia has declared that she is not interested in other countries. Nevertheless, in an objective survey of India's defence position, we cannot ignore the possibilities of a Russian invasion of India. Russia and Afghanistan have a common frontier; to the north of Kashmir, Russia practically touches India. She can make a thrust from two directions: through Gilgit, in Kashmir, or through the North-west. I will not enlarge on other aspects of the problem, except to suggest that Indian frontier defences on the north-west must be fundamentally strong.

Next we must consider the Dutch East Indies and South Africa. The former are rich in resources but weak in power; they would not be in a position to launch an attack for the parent country is too far away, and the indigenous inhabitants not militaristic; moreover, the Dutch do not possess the necessary mastery of the seas, and if Britain stands by India she can attack Holland.

Single-handed, South Africa cannot wage a war against India. In that country there is, however, an anti-Indian feeling, which has come to a head by the anti-Indian measures their Parliament has introduced. On the other side of the picture there is the fact that UNO recently passed a resolution protesting against racial discrimination in South Africa. Facing it frankly, however, South African ports could be used as naval, submarine and air bases, while air bases on the east coast of Africa could be established.

Turning to the east, we see three Powers—Siam, China and Japan. The first is too small to attack India, though it could be used as a base by a potential enemy. As to the second, China was at one time the most civilised country in the world, but the wheels of fortune are always turning, and since the 18th century she has gone downhill. European trading houses became entrenched in trade in the country, and Japan did not lag behind in taking advantage of China's weakness.

The twentieth century brought about a partial awakening in China. The Manchu dynasty was overthrown, the present Chinese Republic was born, but the efforts of men like Sun-Yat-Sen appeared to be wasted. War Lords refused to obey the Central Government, and an era of cruel civil wars followed. In 1928 Chiang-kai-Shek succeeded in bringing some order out of chaos, but Communism

raised its head, and was followed by the Manchurian war. China was powerless; the League of Nations would or could not do anything; and, finally, the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937.

After eight years of War in China, Japan was defeated in 1945, but the old civil war between the Communists and the Central Government has again broken out, and nobody can predict how long it will last. China is exhausted. She will require another thirty to fifty years to recover, but given time and peace she is destined to become a great Power.

A strong and powerful China, if controlled by military expansionists, *might* become a menace to Asia and Europe. She has a population of between four and five hundred millions; an almost unlimited supply of man power; vast mineral and food resources; a population capable of bearing great privations and used to hard work. She is likely to have a surplus population and may look round for room for expansion.

There are nearly ten million Chinese in Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. They form about 40% of the total population of Malaya. Trade in those countries is mainly in Chinese hands. These overseas Chinese, too, sent several hundred million Chinese dollars to aid China during the War.

It would not be beyond the bounds of possibility for China to extend her political influence among those countries mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Burma, Siam, Indo-China are Buddhist countries; racially, too, they are similar. Tibet is nominally under Chinese rule, and the new Dalai Lama is a Chinaman by birth. If China makes rapid progress industrially, she may control trade throughout South East Asia through her nationals, who already control local trade there.

True, China is at present on friendly terms with Britain and India. She will require time to recover from the ravages of war—but Germany recovered quickly from the ravages of the first World War. I am not for a moment imputing aggressive designs on the part of China—I am only discussing the problem of Indian defence from an academic viewpoint.

The last potential enemy is Japan—who, though her wings have been clipped, is an extraordinary nation. Her tradition, literature, home life and intense nationalism may enable her to recover quickly from the disasters of war. We must beware of Japan, and ensure, through UNO, that her armed forces are as small as possible. The Japanese are a regimented people, and may well rise again and constitute a threat. We must watch them.

Those, then, are (from an academic point of view), our potential enemies. What of our defence lines? Frontier defences on the Northern frontier and in the north-east will have to be maintained, and in many places strengthened. But we cannot sit secure behind defence lines—we shall have to resort to defence in depth. Our outer lines of defence will lie outside our frontiers. We can co-operate with Burma in the defence of the Sino-Burmese and Burmese-Thai frontiers.

Look to the East. There we must select our outer or first defence line. The strategic importance of the Andaman and Nicobar groups of islands has up till now been ignored; their capture by Japan opened our eyes to their value. These islands may not be successful colonising projects, but they will provide

excellent jumping-off grounds. Aerodromes, wireless stations, bases for surface and submarines and advance bases for counter attacks can all be established there. The future Indian Government must insist on retaining them. People laughed nearly fifty years ago when Germany acquired Heligoland—but two World Wars showed how valuable it was to Germany.

Further south lies Singapore—not an Indian possession, but in a sense the gateway of India. People are apt to under-estimate its value after the event of 1942 when it fell, but that fall was mainly due to want of adequate sea and air support. Malaya, too, is a valuable source of rubber and tin—two important raw materials. I hope for an Indo-British alliance for joint defence, as Singapore will play a vital role in the defence of other British Far Eastern possessions.

Another strategically important place is Ceylon, which Japan coveted as a jumping-off place for her invasion of India. Naval and air bases are necessary there to prevent any possible invasion of this country. India has many cultural ties with Ceylon, and there should be no difficulty in forming a defence alliance with her. India has no desire to possess Ceylon politically.

Coming to India itself, we shall have to construct naval and air bases on our east coast, apart from Calcutta, Chittagong, Vizagapatam and Madras. Many secondary ports and satellite landing grounds will have to be established.

We must now turn to the West. There we have, first of all, the Laccadive and Maldive islands, which, like the Andamans, will prove of great use as coaling stations, submarine bases, air and wireless stations. We must ensure that the Persian Gulf and Arabian coast are not used by a foreign Power, to do which we must enter into a defensive alliance with Iran and Iraq.

Our next point is Aden, the value of which from the viewpoint of the defence of India cannot be over-estimated. Aden, if firmly held, can prevent the passage of troops and materials into the Indian Ocean from Europe. Britain has retained possession of Aden for the defence of India and the Suez Canal, so that it is obviously important from our angle.

Here again we shall have to co-operate with the British, with whom I strongly advocate the maintenance of friendly relations. India is ringed on all sides by British possessions and British spheres of influence, and it is up to our politicians and diplomats to maintain good relations with Britain. We must not allow the past to endanger the future.

Critics may look upon the writer as a pessimist and a war-monger. I have served as a soldier for five years, and like thousands of others, I hate war. But hating it will not stop war. What are the facts? Mankind has through history been engaged in wars, after each one of which people have talked of abolishing wars for the future. After World War I people talked of world peace and human brotherhood. The League of Nations was born. Nations were exhausted. Famine, disease and demoralisation occurred. Countries thousands of miles from the theatres of war suffered privations. Victors and vanquished suffered equally. Through the ages millions have died to satisfy the whims of militarists. Yet victories won over ignorance and disease have been more glorious and beneficial than dozens of Tannenbergs, Stalingrads and Saipans.

Think of famous figures who have benefited mankind. Harvey, Pasteur, Curie, Shakespeare, Wagner, Tagore—and even Charlie Chaplin. All have rendered greater services to mankind than the Kaiser, Napoleon or Hitler. What therefore is the lesson we must learn? It is that wars must be abolished if civilisation is to advance, for the ultimate aim of civilisation is to establish the brotherhood of man.

We must live in reality. Plain facts tell us that abolition of war is not possible for a considerable time to come, and in the circumstances it will be suicidal to remain inactive and make no preparations for our own defence. India does not want to go to war with anyone—she wants to be left to work out her own destiny. Nations who are feared are respected. India must become sufficiently strong to make other nations stop casting greedy eyes upon her.

Our freedom is at hand. We want peace to build up our nation—but we do not want to lose our freedom. It is therefore necessary that we should be prepared to defend our freedom.

(In the second instalment of this article, the writer will deal with India's armed forces of the future.—*Ed.*)

Great Improvement In Army's Health During 1946

Although the relevant figures are not yet fully complete, it is already evident that there was a remarkable improvement in the health of the army in India during the year 1946 compared with 1945. The yearly hospital admission rates per 1,000 for all causes for B.O.Rs and I.O.Rs were approximately 657.1 and 480.9 respectively as against 863.3 and 583.3 during 1945.

Of outstanding interest was the decrease in hospital admissions for malaria, the incidence of which for both British and Indian troops was the lowest ever recorded for the Army in India. In 1937, satisfaction was expressed at the very low incidence of malaria as compared with previous years. The following comparative table shows that these low figures have been almost halved in the case of British and more than halved in the case of Indian troops.

Malaria incidence rate per 1,000 of strength.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>B.T.</i>	<i>I.T.</i>
1937	44.5	97.9
1945	130.7	76.1
1946	28.2	41.8

These statistics are all the more noteworthy when it is remembered that a large number of troops were still housed under field conditions in 1946 and not in permanent barracks as in 1937.

Great credit for this achievement is due to the Medical Services of the Army, which exploited to the full the latest advance in general Mosquito control and the use of the latest insecticides such as D. D. T. and improved repellents. Much experimental work towards improving insecticides both in composition and methods of dispersal have been continuously carried out. These efforts, it is emphasised, would have been completely negative had not all ranks of the Army in India co-operated in carrying out all instructions issued and strictly observing the necessary precautions, which at times may have appeared irksome.

THINGS PEOPLE SAY AND WRITE

"In future ships may develop a speed of 63 knots by the use of atomic energy".—*Sir Amos Eyre.*

"The cost of living in France is about 800% above the level in 1939".—*Commander Stephen King-Hall.*

"Within a year it should be possible to have safe air travel at 650 miles an hour".—*Group Captain Donaldson.*

"Under the soil of Great Britain there is enough coal to last the country for 200 years".—*Mr. George Darling, B. B. C.*

"Democracy is not a question of saying: 'I'm as good as you are', but 'You're as good as I am' ".—*Mr. Frank Birch.*

"The amount of British overseas investments sold for the conduct of the War was £1,118,000,000".—*Dr. Hugh Dalton, M.P.*

"Nationalisation of industry seeks to cure partial monopoly by creating complete monopoly".—*Mr. Harold MacMillan, M.P.*

"A twelve-engined flying boat, weighing 130 tons, is being developed in Britain".—*Sir Henry Self, Secretary of Civil Aviation, London.*

"Hardship and privation are the school of the good soldier. Idleness and luxury are his enemies".—*Field Marshal Lord Montgomery.*

"The British Overseas Airways Corporation has fifty aircraft captains who have each flown more than a million miles".—*Viscount Knollys.*

"The British taxpayer is being called upon to pay more than £80,000,000 a year to feed and supply the Germans in the British zone".—*Chancellor of the Exchequer.*

"Democracy works well only on the basis that having elected a Government with enthusiasm we should then attack it with the utmost ferocity".—*Mr. W. J. Brown, M.P.*

"I put my foot through the sheet every time I get into bed".—*Sir Stafford Cripps, M.P., President of the Board of Trade in the U. K. (The B. of T. is closely interested in the rationing of materials.)*

"A plan for the construction of a modern airport in Hong Kong, costing between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000, has been submitted by the Colonial authorities to the British Government".—*U. K. Publicity Services.*

"Our actions in India, Burma and the Colonial Empire and elsewhere refute the contentions that the British Commonwealth and Empire is animated by Imperialism".—*Mr. Clement Attlee, M.P., Prime Minister.*

"The Siam-Burma railway should be maintained if only as an eternal memorial to Japanese brutality and to the sorrows of their unhappy victims".—*Mr. Gerald Samson, addressing the China Society in London.*

"While in 1931 one in ten of the British population were of pensionable age (60 for women and 65 for men), by 1961 it is estimated that the pensionable total will have risen to one in six of the population".—*Mr. Eric Williams.*

"During the late War nearly 5,000 vessels, of 21,000,000 gross tons, were sunk. Two-thirds were lost in the Atlantic; over half of the total in all areas were British—2,566 ships of over 11,000,000 tons."—*The Daily Telegraph, London.*

"Dr. Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, says that when he looks at the financial position of Britain he has a song in his heart. When we look at our own personal financial position we have a pain in the neck".—*The Bishop of Chelmsford.*

"During last year 5,256 people were killed on the roads of Britain, and 133,042 were injured. Most dangerous years of age of those who suffered were from three to seven years; the most dangerous times of day between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m."—*Mr. John Snowden.*

"The R. A. F. military transport aircraft, recently christened *Hastings*, can be used as a freighter, paratrooper, ambulance, troop of passenger transport and leading a glider. Jeeps, 25-pounder guns and 15 cwt. trucks can be carried; jeeps and 6-pounder guns can be dropped from it by parachute."—*B. B. C.*

"'Pluto', the Channel pipe line between Great Britain and France, is being broken up. It is expected that the lead it contains (about 10,000 tons) will be used to help in the building of houses in the U. K. The lead is expected to be sufficient to assist in the construction of 50,000 houses".—*Mr. Cyril Ray, B. B. C.*

"To find the smartest member of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force the Air Ministry inspected hundreds of photographs of girls serving with the Force. The number has been brought down to six, who are to go to Whitehall for the final choice. Photographs of the winner are to be used in a recruiting campaign".—*B. B. C.*

"Hirohito is an anaemic, uninspiring little man, completely lacking in personality and apparently in character. His word and wishes are sacred law, and at this stage his presence and continued sovereignty are of the utmost importance to the success or otherwise of Allied intentions in Japan".—*Mr. John Profumo, of the British Mission to Japan.*

"Officers and men of the British Navy (except those under the age of 17½) are no longer required to attend divine service. The Board of Admiralty expresses a conviction, however, of the value and importance of the practice of corporate divine worship, both to the individual and to the Service as a whole".—*Mr. J. Dugdale, Financial Secretary to the Admiralty.*

"At the Royal Military Academy to open at Sandhurst in January it is hoped to turn out 850 officers a year. Less than half of the curriculum will be devoted to military studies, in which special emphasis will be placed on man management and the psychology of the soldier. Fifty-six per cent. of the cadets' time will be applied to general education".—*Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery.*

"The Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI) had a net revenue for the twelve months ended September, 1945 of £8,045,833. It was disposed of as follows: Ensa entertainments, £4,864,734; grants to Forces welfare funds, £2,742,000; combined Services entertainment, £400,000; balance, £39,099. The turnover for the year was the record figure of £182,000,000".—*The Council of the Institutes.*

"There are 11 national morning newspapers in Great Britain with a sale of 15,000,000 copies each day; 34 Provincial morning newspapers with a sale of 3,000,000 copies daily; three London evening newspapers with a combined sale of 3,350,000; and 80 Provincial evening newspapers with a total 7,000,000 copies. Sixteen Sunday newspapers in Britain sell altogether 26,000,000 copies".—*Mr. Max Aitken, M. P., speaking in London.*

"An 'Aircraft Position Indicator' has been invented by Wing Commander C. Hole. It is operated by a clockwork motor, can be fitted to the wall of the passenger compartment of an aeroplane. In the centre of the instrument is displayed a strip map of the route and across the map moves a model aircraft. The speed of the model is set at the take-off point to the known ground speed of the craft, and the speed range of the instrument is from 100 m.p.h. to 400 m.p.h."—*P. I. B.*

"Sir William Jones, whose bi-centenary has just been celebrated, was master of twenty-eight languages before he was 40 years of age. He had mastered Sanskrit and Chinese, been knighted, and achieved a world reputation as the greatest of living Orientalists. He died in 1794 at the age of 48. He was a Christian, not a Hindu, yet his nine hymns to Hindu deities, notably the glorious 'Hymn of Rama' might well have been written by some Hindu saint."—*Professor A. J. Arberry, addressing the Royal India Society in London.*

"In spite of all that happened at Hamburg, our bombing proved a comparatively humane method. For one thing it saved the flower of the youth of Britain and the Allies from being mown down by the military in the field. But the point is often made that bombing is specially wicked because it causes casualties among civilians. True, but then all wars have caused casualties among civilians. It was estimated that the blockade of Germany during World War I caused nearly 800,000 deaths, mainly of women and children and old people. It is not easy to calculate the casualties caused by Allied bombing of Germany, but the Americans have put the number of deaths at 305,000."—*Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur Harris, in "Bomber Offensive".*

"A new type of bicycle now being produced in Britain enables the cyclist to tune in to a miniature radio while he pedals, signal his approach by pressing an electric bell button, break with a twist of the handle-bars, and operate the built-in lights in the mudguard by pulling a switch. A Yale type anti-theft lock and a concealed parking stand are part of the fittings, but the most remarkable feature is the unique combination of pedal and electric power. The machine employs shaft propulsion instead of chain drive and a battery concealed in the framework gives power to the cyclist going up-hill; he can free-wheel a thousand yards up a one-in-ten gradient. The bicycle is 15% lighter, and will be appreciably cheaper than present-day machines".—*U. K. Publicity Services.*

A LONG-TERM ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN FOR INDIA*

BY "ROLAND" AND "OLIVER".

III.—AIR TRANSPORT.

FUTURE developments in atomic energy and its application to productive, in addition to destructive purposes, may completely revolutionise transport, and the day may come when rockets, propelled by atomic power, provide an important method of transport. But that day has not yet arrived, and while it is necessary to watch all developments closely and keep an open and flexible mind, we cannot at this stage consider atomic propulsion as a transport agency from the practical planning angle.

With regard to air transport however, the situation is very different. It is clear that in an age of atomic bombs, an army to be of value must be able to strike quickly and deep into enemy territory. It must be independent of land communications which can only be constructed slowly and laboriously, and which are vulnerable to atomic attack. This can only be the case when armies are maintained by air.

Aircraft in the future may therefore be required to replace or supplement existing ground and sea communications where these exist, and to maintain or transport armies when they advance beyond these communications. There are three possible circumstances under which the Field Army may have to be maintained by air when it has advanced beyond the limits of good ground or sea communications:

- (a) Air maintenance of a force which moves overland, with mechanical or animal transport.
- (b) Transport and subsequent maintenance of a force which moves by air to the theatre of operations.
- (c) A combination of (a) and (b)—*i.e.*, the mechanical or animal transport portion of the force moves overland and the remainder is air transported, the two elements linking up at destination.

Any or all of these methods may be adopted in a future war and may even be applied when ground communications exist, if for reasons of urgency or economy, the use of air transport is advisable. Where armoured vehicles are used in numbers, (a) or (c) would appear unavoidable. As the financial aspect will loom large in the early stages of planning, it is emphasised that it can be proved that air transport over long lines of communication is altogether more economical than road transport, which involves an elaborate organisation of workshops, staging posts, medical staging posts, fuel, supply, engineer effort and the building of depots at intervals along the L of C. This road organisation would not, of course, be required in the case of an air maintained force or its transport moving to the theatre of operations.

The strategical advantages of an all-air move are obvious, but against this must be remembered the difficulty of keeping the force tactically mobile at its destination. Further, the preparation of air strips to receive a large force may present such difficulties that a move overland with air maintenance may be preferable, even if there is a risk of loss of surprise. It should be noted that

* The first instalment of this article appeared in our January 1947 issue.

the main difficulty in moving a large force by air is the transport of its vehicles and other heavy equipment, including guns. If that can be reduced the problem becomes easier.

TYPES OF AIRCRAFT REQUIRED

From a consideration of the roles the air is likely to be called upon to fill it is not difficult to forecast the main types of aircraft likely to be required.

(a) *Heavy Freight plane.*—This may be used in rear areas to replace or supplement rail, road, sea or I.W.T. It should carry the largest economic load which can land on the type of airfields which exist in rear areas. Judging from the trend of commercial development its size is likely to be limited by considerations of airfield construction only, and in the future freighters capable of carrying from 10 to 30 tons or from 100 to 300 men may be in service. It is unlikely that the Army will be able to afford these in peace, but those in use on commercial air lines can be taken over in war.

(b) *Medium Freight plane.*—This is likely to be a plane with a 5-ton pay load at ranges up to a radius of 600 miles, and may fill the role played by the Dakota in the Burma campaign. It is likely to follow commercial practice closely, but may require modifications in certain respects to conform to military requirements. It should be able to land and take off on short and rough strips, it should be adapted for speedy and accurate supply dropping, be suitable for para-troop jumping, for troop carrying and the carriage of casualties. It may also require some means of defence.

The fusilage should be designed to permit speedy loading, particularly of vehicles and guns and for this purpose end loading—i.e., from nose or tail—is desirable. This plane should, it is suggested, become the main army transport aircraft and would replace L. of C. and formation 2nd line transport to a great extent.

(c) *Light Operational Freight plane.*—This might be an improved type of helicopter with a pay load of from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 tons, suitable also for the carriage of personnel and casualties. It should be capable of landing on very small areas, and should therefore be able to meet the situations where unit 1st line transport is unable to reach the medium freighter strips or dropping zones. It might also be adapted for supply dropping, since its ability to hover in the air would permit accurate dropping on very small and difficult targets.

(d) *Intercommunication Light plane.*—This might be a smaller helicopter than (c), capable of flying very close to the ground to avoid enemy fighters. It would replace staff cars, jeeps and intercommunication trucks in the forward areas and might also prove a useful plane for artillery aerial O. Ps. A faster plane of the normal type, 3 or 4 seater, might be required for intercommunication in the rear areas.

(e) *Gliders.*—These have been used with some success in airborne operations, and may be of value for similar operations in the future where the initial air lift required far exceeds the subsequent maintenance lift. As at present constructed they have many disadvantages. They are very vulnerable in the air to weather, and to enemy action, and since they must land on separate strips to those used by the towing aircraft they are not easily manoeuvrable on the ground. They are thus unlikely to be of any great use for normal maintenance purposes, and there is at the moment no sign of the glider train being developed for commercial purposes.

Their great advantage is that they can land on strips smaller and rougher than those which would be required for the medium freight plane, and they can thus be used for landing heavy machinery required for the construction of the larger strips. On the other hand, once landed they cannot be recovered until the large strip has been completed. This may be a serious disadvantage if it is decided to pull out a force carried in by gliders. Improved helicopters, moreover, may prove suitable for this purpose or new methods of dropping heavy equipment may render such landings unnecessary.

(f) *Specialist aircraft*.—Though it is desirable to avoid specialist aircraft as far as possible, it may be necessary to have a limited number to speed up operations and avoid the necessity of specialist road vehicles. Aircraft fitted as command posts, signal offices, workshops or surgical operation theatres may well prove desirable. Alternatively it may prove more advisable to equip gliders for these purposes. Specialist planes or gliders for the carriage of medium tanks or other extra heavy equipment may prove essential.

With the development of the types of aircraft mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, it should be possible to replace all 2nd line transport in the forward areas. There remains the problem of unit or 1st line transport. Some means of carrying heavy equipment and weapons, ammunition, water, cooking pots and the day's rations are essential unless the mobility of the troops, once they are on the ground, is to be restricted very severely.

Transport is also required to collect from the medium freighter strips, or dropping zones and from points at which the light freighters put down their loads. It is essential, however, that this transport is reduced to the minimum, should be easily air portable, and should have an excellent cross-country performance.

Further developments of helicopters should be closely watched as it is possible they might solve the unit transport problem. A helicopter of a better power-to-load ratio, capable of landing anywhere and of travelling a few feet above the ground could replace unit transport entirely and would also obviate the necessity of supply dropping from freight planes.

QUANTITY OF AIRCRAFT REQUIRED

One of the greatest advantages of air transport is its flexibility. It can be employed on widely differing tasks at very short notice, and it can be concentrated rapidly for any special task. It is therefore unnecessary to provide air transport on a formation basis, though it is necessary to consider what formations will require in order that probable requirements of aircraft, rear and forward air strips, and administrative units to operate these, may be calculated. We will therefore, consider the case of one division.

(a) *Maintenance*.—This is not affected by the method used by the force to reach its destination, but will depend upon its size, armament and equipment, and the type of opposition encountered. It is not within the scope of this paper to consider the most suitable type of division for the future, but it appears likely that the effect of the increased use of air transport will be to cut down the mechanical transport tail of the division, and hence reduce both the size of the division and its fuel consumption.

It is possible, therefore, that the maintenance tonnage will not exceed that required for a standard division in Burma, which was 130 tons per day or, allowing for a proportion to be dropped by parachute, about 150 tons gross.

If standard 5-ton freight planes are used this will require 30 sorties or 15 aircraft for distances up to 300 miles and 30 aircraft for distances from 300 to 600 miles. If we allow a margin of 33% for maintenance and repair and assume that squadrons of the future will consist of 20 freighters, this is equivalent of one and two squadrons respectively.

(b) *Operational maintenance.*—These planes would pick up loads at forward freighter strips, and deliver to units in cases where unit 1st line transport is unable to reach these strips or where it is not possible or convenient for freighter planes to drop on D. Zs. close to troops. As the distances would be short, these light operational planes might do from four to six sorties a day, depending upon whether or not they have to return to rear maintenance areas for their own maintenance.

As it would be seldom that a complete division would be cut off from its forward freighter strips or D. Zs, an allotment to carry 33% of the divisional maintenance lift should be adequate. This would require $\frac{5.0}{1.5}$ or 33 sorties if $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton freighters were used. Allowing for aircraft repair and maintenance, some 12 aircraft per division should be adequate. This could be supplemented from corps resources when required. As each of these planes would probably be capable of carrying 8 to 10 casualties this allotment should be adequate to meet medical ambulance requirements.

(c) *Intercommunications.*—One flight of L5s was normally allotted per corps in Burma for inter-communication between corps and divisions. Additional planes were allotted for medical evacuation. In future these would not be required for medical evacuation, the larger helicopter doing this, but light helicopters would be required on a more liberal scale for inter-communication forward to brigades and occasionally battalions. One flight per division might be the minimum required. Additional planes would of course have to be provided for artillery aerial O. Ps.

(d) *Troop carrying.*—No consideration has yet been given to the carriage of personnel. The 5-ton freighter should, however, be capable of carrying 50 men per sortie, so that the requirements for reinforcements and returning leave personnel should not be great. On the other hand, in future wars it is very possible that an air transported force might be required to fly in, perform a task, and then either come out or be carried on elsewhere. The ability to do this will obviously increase the power of an Army enormously.

A reserve of aircraft under army control would probably be retained for this purpose, and when not employed on troop-carrying would, of course, be available for other maintenance tasks, such as building up reserves forward. Heavier aircraft, carrying from 100 to 300 men, would be invaluable for this purpose, and, as soon as strips in enemy country capable of taking planes of this size had been captured, they would undoubtedly be used.

ORGANISATION OF THE REAR AIRFIELDS

It is useless considering the replacement of road transport by aircraft as a means to cope with conditions of atomic warfare, unless we also consider whether it will be possible to operate and maintain the aircraft when obtained. Airfields, particularly rear maintenance airfields, are likely targets for enemy attack either with guided projectiles or atomic bombs. Dispersion of aircraft and maintenance installations on the ground will be of no use against the atom bomb.

Groups of airfields with their kindred installations will make it more difficult for all of these to be knocked out at once, and the system of widely separated groups must obviously be adopted. But this by itself is not enough. Measures must be taken to make these rear maintenance airfields proof against atomic attack. Until reliable information on the subject is available it will not be possible to assess the full effects of atomic blast and radio activity, but it appears likely that it may be possible to counteract their effects, at least to some extent by going underground or into hill sides.

On this assumption we must consider the requirements of the rear airfields of the future. We must first consider the object of this rear maintenance airfield. As mentioned earlier, the Army to be of value must be able to strike deep into enemy territory and be maintained while there. The rear maintenance airfields are the airfields from which the "fly-in" is likely to take place, if the force goes in by air, and are the airfields from which it will be maintained by air when in.

To enable the army to strike deep and to take advantage of the maximum range of transport aircraft when being maintained subsequently, the rear airfields should therefore be as far forward as the limits of good road, rail or sea communications with the main bases will permit. They are therefore likely to remain in use throughout the campaign. A rear airfield is likely to consist of a group of at least three freighter strips each, with a take off and landing strip. In addition, possibly adjacent, in order not to be too far from the ammunition and aviation fuel depots, will be the bomber and fighter strips.

Loading bays, hangars, workshops, air despatch company sheds, and the various supply, P.O.L., ordnance, ammunition, engineer, medical and other depots forming part of the advanced base and associated with the rear maintenance airfield are likely to be underground, or tunnelled into hill sides where these exist. Aircraft will land, taxi down ramps into servicing, refuelling or loading bays and then taxi out on to the take-off strip when loaded.

But if all aircraft and their maintenance installations are to be underground it will obviously be of the utmost importance to reduce the numbers of these required in the rear maintenance areas. This can be done by accepting the principle of intensive operation for all forms of transport, both air and road, additional crews and maintenance gangs being provided for the purpose. Replacement aircraft should be stored in secure shelters in the main base areas, possibly 1,000 miles in rear, from where they can be brought forward in a matter of hours when required. All major repairs, other than those necessary to make the aircraft airworthy, should also be carried out in the main base.

Road transport within the immediate vicinity of the airfield and its underground installations should be replaced almost entirely by mechanical conveyors or rail trolleys, which will be easier to put down and maintain than roads and lorries and which will be more suitable to underground conditions. Fuel, not petrol (for most aircraft will be driven by gas turbines with or without jet propulsion), should be pumped from underground storage tanks to the aircraft refuelling point.

The whole airfield and its subsidiary installations should be organised for continuous work on a 24-hour a day basis, and should be laid out to ensure rapid handling and loading of aircraft. Only in this way will it be possible to reduce labour, transport and constructional work to the minimum.

It is likely that in the initial stages the resources may not be available to put all installations underground. A compromise may be necessary, only the most vital, and those stores most difficult to replace, being stored underground. It is suggested, however, that we should plan for complete underground installations, as total atomic war is likely to be an expensive procedure anyway and we cannot count the cost when the whole life of a nation is at stake. Full advantage should be taken of the lessons learnt from the study of underground installations in Germany, and if planning is done in time the provision of the latest and best modern tunnelling and mining equipment should not prove an insuperable obstacle.

It is possible that the type of freighter strip described in the preceding paragraphs would be able to cater for two medium freighter squadrons, provide maintenance facilities for helicopter squadrons operating from the forward strips, and also receive a certain number of heavy freighters from the main base areas. A layout for a force equivalent to 12 divisions or 240,000 men might consist of four separate rear maintenance areas, each consisting of a group of three freighter strips. A R.A.M.O. for each group and an air despatch company, reorganised to conform to the use of modern mechanised equipment, for each strip would be required.

FORWARD AIRFIELDS

In view of the importance of maintaining the mobility of the striking force, and remembering that the big limiting factor may be the time taken in the preparation of fresh forward airstrips; it is suggested that development should proceed along two lines.

First, every effort should be made to improve the landing and take-off performances of planes to enable them to use short and imperfect strips. The importance of the helicopter in this respect needs no stressing. On the other hand, every effort must be made to produce light, easily air portable, and very efficient equipment for the speedy construction of air strips. Occasions may arise when it is necessary to use the same forward strip for some time, so that improvement and development of the strip may be justified, but it is unlikely that anything approximating to the elaborate constructional works on the rear airstrips will be either necessary or possible.

As in the case of the rear strips, it will be important to reduce the number necessary by speeding up the turnaround of aircraft. Any aids to this, such as mechanical equipment, gravity conveyors and the like should be used when at all practicable.

CO-ORDINATION WITH FIGHTER AND BOMBER SQUADRONS

This paper is concerned only with the maintenance problems, but certain tactical and strategical problems affecting maintenance must be referred to. It is obvious that unless a considerable degree of air superiority has been obtained, the maintenance of a large force by air at a distance from its base is likely to prove a hazardous undertaking.

It must be remembered, however, that the maintenance of a force at the end of a long ground L. of C. without air superiority is likely to prove equally hazardous. Freight convoys escorted by fighters would be extremely difficult to handle at forward strips, and might prove more vulnerable than single planes, and the arming of individual freighters may have to be considered.

A further point which may affect air maintenance, and particularly the transport of striking forces by air, is the extent to which close support from the air can reduce the quantity of artillery required to be taken in.

ORGANISATION, OPERATION AND CONTROL OF ARMY AIR TRANSPORT.

The term "army air transport" has been used in this paper to describe that air transport which would be used entirely for the maintenance and transport of the Army, and which would replace other means of army transport to a great extent. The question whether that transport would best be operated by the Army; by the Air Force; by an air transport corps catering for Air Force and Army; partly by Army and partly by Air Force; or whether some form of integration between the Army and Air Force would be necessary is a big question, and is beyond the scope of this paper.

For efficient operation of rear maintenance airfields on the lines laid down, however, some central control over the freighter squadrons using the strips and all the subsidiary installations would appear essential, and that control could only be exercised by the G. H. Q. controlling the operations in the theatre, or by a detached echelon of that G. H. Q. if the G. H. Q. itself were too far away.

From "Singles" to "Twins"

Flying nearly 500 hours in under two months, Indian aircrews of No. 12 Squadron of the R.I.A.F. have successfully completed the first part of their training on transport type aircraft. This is the first squadron of the R.I.A.F. to undergo a specialised conversion course from single-engined fighters to the twin-engined Dakota.

Formed in December 1945 at Kohat, No. 12 Squadron was originally equipped with Spitfires and is the youngest squadron in the Royal Indian Air Force. In January this year the squadron trained on twin-engined Oxford aircraft at Bhopal, and on completion of this initial course moved to Mauripur airfield, Karachi, for the final conversion to Dakotas.

The latest methods in navigation, including radio and Radar aids, as used on civil airlines, are being taught by experienced instructors of Nos. 10 and 31 R.A.F. Squadrons. Ground lectures, which form an integral part of the course, include a thorough knowledge of aero-engines and airframes and also loading of aircraft, passenger handling, and weather conditions.

Passenger and freight runs have been flown by 12 Squadron aircrews from Karachi to Poona and from Karachi to Jiwani on the Arabian Sea coastline, carrying supplies of urgently needed water when the wells had dried up.

BEHIND THE SCENES ON A TROOPSHIP

By MAJOR N. GRESLEY

SUNDAY, Armistice Day, fine and cold with a light frost on the fields as we pulled out of Euston, half an hour late, on our way to Liverpool. Rugby—Stafford—Crewe, where the weary, beery voice of a soldier on the platform kept on declaring his intention of buying a paper doll which he could call his own.... Two young men in the opposite seat carried on a highly technical conversation on the hull design of small sailing boats. Finally, the grimness of Lime Street Station, the building of the Liver birds and the Movement Control office on Princes Landing Stage, which I had last seen on arrival in the M. V. GEORGIC* from the Far East a couple of months before.

I was about to re-embark in that same troopship and travel back again to Bombay as Executive Officer. This appointment on the Permanent Staff of Troopships, was on first consideration one suitable for a veteran of the 1914-18 War and not to be undertaken by one who had missed that war by a matter of three years. Family illness and the consequent need to keep in touch with England for the next few months was my main reason for taking the job in preference to one in the Middle East.

The Permanent Staff in one of H.M.'s Troopships of the size, well over 25,000 tons, of the GEORGIC consisted of a Lt.-Colonel, who was O.C. Troops on board, a Ships' Adjutant, whose job is one of the most difficult and thankless imaginable, either one or two Service doctors, an Executive Officer and an Orderly Room and Medical Staff of about 50.

The GEORGIC was lying in the Docks loading her stores, preparatory to moving down in a couple of days to embark her passengers at the Princes Landing Stage, and my first impressions of the City during one or two trips ashore were not very favourable. It seemed to be a place of damp and fog, trams and cobblestones and misdirections on the part of Liverpoolians whenever one asked them the way. I naturally except the Police.

It was cold, with heavy river mist, and the ship seemed very empty—a contrast to what most of the next six weeks would be. I made myself acquainted with many parts and personnel of the ship, and scrounged as many amenities as possible, from library books and tombola to a mandolin, out of the excellent stocks held under the Lord Mayor of Liverpool's Fund, and inspected the quartermaster's lists of training books, sports requisites, etc., which were supplied by the army to relieve the monotony of the voyage.

All troopships are of necessity overcrowded and uncomfortable for the passengers, but, as I heard from numerous sources, the GEORGIC seems generally to be regarded as being as good as, or better than any other, and food was always

* The salvaging of the GEORGIC was one of the most remarkable stories of the late war. She was bombed at Suez by July 1st, 1941 by an Italian plane, the bomb going down a lift-shaft. The vessel, badly damaged by the bomb and by fire, was beached, and was later towed to Port Sudan. After temporary repairs the boat was successfully towed to India, but Bombay docks being heavily congested, she was diverted to Karachi. There the GEORGIC underwent repair, her engines were reconditioned, temporary accommodation was built for the crew, and she finally set sail for England via the Cape. After arrival in Britain she was taken to Belfast, and converted into a troopship.

excellent. So few passengers on the homeward voyage realised that it would probably be years before they again saw eggs and meat and fruit in such quantities, nor, of course, would they be able to get cigarettes, tobacco and sweets at such prices.

Canteens were dry. Probably the main reason was the difficulty of storing sufficient beer, etc., to supply 6,000 passengers, and it is significant that when on the return voyage from Bombay to Liverpool, 5,000 bottles of NAAFI beer were taken on in Egypt, so that each man should have one if we couldn't make port by Christmas, only a few hundred were actually sold, the men either preferring to save their money, or arguing that one bottle of beer did not constitute a Christmas celebration.

There were over twenty troop-decks, containing from 57 to over 350 men each. Meals were taken on the cafeteria system, and the cafeterias also provided between meals considerable space for reading, writing, etc., the two large ones being used nightly for the ship's tombola. Otherwise there was only one recreation room, which was used for the ship's cinema every afternoon and evening, and also at times for concert party rehearsals, and two writing rooms, in one of which was housed the troops' library. The deck space available was, of course, extremely packed and had it been a voyage of Biscay weather throughout conditions would have been almost unbearable.

Warrant Officers, who ranked as second-class passengers, had their own lounge and better sleeping accommodation, and also their own mess, and on the whole fared comparatively better for space than anyone.

First-class passengers had the one lounge, seating just over 200, which was not particularly comfortable when, as had happened several times, they numbered from 800 to 1,000. Their meals were taken in two, or even three sittings, and the disadvantage of lunching at midday and dining at six was offset by the increased chance of being able to bag a seat in the lounge while the second session was on. Otherwise there was part of the promenade deck for them to sit on and a space of about ten by twenty yards on the top deck with various ventilators, stanchions, etc., to make life more interesting.

There were always too, on the top deck, two games each of shuffleboard and quoits going and later a deck tennis court was squeezed in. Small gymnastic classes by P.T. instructors were sometimes held in the early morning, or in the changing hour before dinner, when the top deck was fairly empty. In fact, most of the seating on board was done on the hard deck and on the life-jackets, which everyone had to carry at all times. There were, of course, the usual few grumbles at this rule, but it was generally realised that stray mines give little or no warning.

It was often very difficult to find room for all the many "extra" activities on board, but we usually managed to fit in most people and their needs. A Catholic priest wanted a quiet place to hear confessions or be available for interviews; or a chaplain wanted to hold evening prayers or a Bible class or both; a corner must be found for an I.A. Colonel, who had nobly volunteered to hold a daily class in Urdu; or an audition must be held for two or three prospective stars of the Concert Party; and, most important from the E.O.'s point of view, accommodation must be organised for a training programme for troops outward bound and organised, too, so that no room was wasted. Naturally enough, no training was carried out on the homeward journey.

The ironing room was a great stand-by for all sorts of small uses. Hours when it could be occupied for its normal functions had to be strictly divided and were somewhat limited, but it was in use from morning till night. It held about 30 people—not for ironing—and the only time I found it could not be used was when a certain Minister of the Church of Scotland wanted it for an hour every evening in order to instruct a class in Modern Greek. Permission was refused when it was discovered that he had only one pupil.

An Executive Officer's duties vary from days when there is very little to do, to days which never let up, from seeing, before breakfast, that the boat-deckman had put ready the deck games to checking the tombola receipts and payments after lights out. Generally speaking, the E.O. has to supervise all training, welfare, entertainments, sports, etc.,—in particular, the troops tombola—to find accommodation for one and all and to contact and liaise with those members of the Ship's Staff who can help him best to run things smoothly. These particularly were the carpenter, joiner, bosun, master-at-arms and several of the ship's officers—and all, let it be recorded, were a most excellent and helpful crowd of men.

The E.O. has also, of course, to work in constantly with the rest of the permanent staff, except perhaps the medical men, with whom his interest is confined to such small matters as arranging for a doctor to examine competitors before a boxing tournament, or borrowing a few sheets and oddments—to be re-couped later to Medical Stores from shops ashore—and to help out the few "props" of the Concert Party. The R.S.M. must be contacted for a fatigue to help rig a stage or ring; the Q.M. for more boxing gloves or dartboards or gym. mats; the Ship's Police to provide men to prevent any gate-crashing at a popular cinema number; and, of course, the O. C. Troops to present some request from a passenger that only he can grant.

Although I had the greatest will in the world to decentralise, I found, after one experiment, that it was easier and better in the long run to scrap the idea of a big Sports Committee and, roughly speaking, run the whole show myself with one or two officers and men to help in each of the various branches of entertainment. In fact, men who were keen on the job, whether it was boxing, concert party, bridge drives, or ship's librarians, (this last a very popular one for obvious reasons), and who volunteered to help, produced far better results than members of a rather large and self-important general committee who were "coerced" into looking after some particular sport.

The exception to all this was the Tombola, which was run by a committee of two officers and eight Warrant Officers who were responsible to me, as I was to the O.C. Troops, for the way it was run to everyone's satisfaction and, of course, for the 5% charity percentages taken, which were given to the S.S.A.F.A. Benevolent Fund.

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After two days in the Dock we moved down to the Landing Stage and lay out one more night in the stream, lest, it was darkly rumoured, any of the crew, mostly Liverpoolians, should be lost to us before sailing. Next day was one of strenuous work for the Orderly Room staff, as we embarked over 5,000 troops, including about 2,000 R.A.F., and several hundreds of officers, Women's Services and civilian passengers.

I have mentioned above the difficulties of a Ship's Adjutant's job and it is at its worst at the beginning or end of a voyage. For a Ship's Adjutant is not

comparable to an adjutant of a battalion or camp. He has to handle a very mixed Services crowd, including the various grades and denominations of Service ladies and he also has frequently to deal with civilian passengers of both sexes. He has also to work in well with the Ship's Staff. And he is probably asked more tomfool and time-wasting questions than anyone else on board, and is often regarded as a sort of dogsbody and registry of complaints.

I can imagine no better Adjutant than the one we had with us. It was only his second voyage in this job, after returning from years in prison camps in Italy and Germany and he had got the whole routine taped. In addition to this, his authority was perfect and he worked in equally well with the O.C. Troops, his Orderly Room staff and the Ship's staff. It was good to hear how often passengers *did* realise how well he was doing his despised job.

The O. C. Troops was the doyen of his corps; he never worried nor flapped; his excellent discipline was tempered with the most lively and kindly North Irish humour; and after four years of this job he knew all the answers. The two most important jobs in the Orderly Room, those of the S.Q.M.S., and the Troops' Decks Sergeant-Major, were filled by first-rate men and altogether the permanent staff was a pretty cheerful family.

Of the Ship's Officers, the Doctor was a quiet but memorable type. Like many of his kind, he had travelled extensively, particularly in Africa; he looked ten years younger than his 70 years; and he was one of the keenest and, at the same time, the least boring bridge players I have known. He played for penny points and good player himself, never worried if his guests were good or bad, provided they were keen themselves. A man who could discourse wisely on most subjects and also be it said, a man of fairly considerable leisure in his job on board.

The Chief Engineer, one of the most senior of the line, and as usual a Scot, was another good friend. Conducted tours of his engine-room were booked up days ahead, and presumably years of usage had inured him to understanding of the young R.A.F. Officer's genuinely anxious remark on seeing a little moisture seeping round the shaft, "I say, is that all right, shouldn't we tell the engineers?" On the Chief's instructions I once had to represent to the wife of an Indian student that she could not be allowed in the engine-room in a *sari* because of the danger of tripping—she immediately went and changed, rather surprisingly, into pyjamas.

The Purser, too—a most helpful type—who was always pretending to worry me to let him have a larger sum than we allowed him for his Seamen's Charities, and comparing what we gave him with the hundreds he used once to be able to show in his books for a ten-day round trip in the "Berengaria", or some other monster liner. I liked his story of the ex-world champion heavy-weight boxer on a transatlantic voyage. It appears that this champion had just had his much battered and twisted nose re-modelled, preparatory to entering the glittering world of fashion and night-clubs, and this much-enduring organ was still in a soft and plastic state when its owner offered to spar for charity with the ship's butcher, a notorious bruiser, but hardly in the same class. The first blow of the match did two thousand dollars' worth of damage and the second knocked out the valiant but tactless butcher.

Mac, the second steward, was a gay little man, never tired of talking of his farm and horses and rough shooting in North Devon, where he spent his short leaves. I remember his pride in the beautifully painted horses' name-boards, which he had had done on board for his looseboxes, and he was always

ready to get tea and sandwiches provided at the end of the evening for the tired members of the concert party.

There was also the Staff Captain, an elderly officer, whose job as far as we were concerned, was mainly liaison between the Ship's Staff and ourselves, and I found him most helpful in arranging for the services of such men as the carpenter or bosun. He was famous for his small tea parties to passengers and for his inaccurate forecasts of our time of arrival at various ports.

Nearly all the troops on this first trip, including their officers, were very young and inexperienced. Considering that the lack of room made normal training impossible, I decided that, except in cases where draft conducting officers particularly wanted to discuss specific subjects with their men, the best way we could use our limited time and space was to lay on a panel of "old hands" to give these youngsters some general idea of the countries and peoples they were, or might be, going to. Most of them had already had a lot of the usual elementary training.

Fortunately we had a few good lecturers who struck just the right note. We had a unit of 40 R.A.M.C. doctors on board and a number of them were likewise raked in to give short commonsense talks. I knew that all the men had had the usual lectures on V.D. etc., but possibly had not been told that it is sometimes better to go thirsty for a bit longer rather than drink attractively coloured liquids in bazaars, nor that one's tummy is liable to be more vulnerable in India than in Southend.

The Tannoy—the broadcasting system on board—was at first a great if necessary evil, but its working hours were later cut down with no apparent loss of efficiency to, except for urgent calls, a period of 5 minutes before each hour, with complete "wireless silence" in the afternoon. After tea it was used for gramophone records of every sort of music. Passengers could put down on a list the day before the records they wanted played, and it was a complete coincidence that the choice, in strict sequence, of three W.A.A.F.'s was found one evening to be "Temptation", "I Can't Get Started" and "Never in a Million Years".

It is well-known that often a sea voyage seems to have an extraordinary psychological effect on some people, and two days out from Liverpool I was wondering what some of the passengers would be like later in the voyage if they found each other so attractive in the Bay of Biscay on a cold and rough November evening. Later on it had to be pointed out to one or two couples that demonstrations of passionate affection in the alley-way outside the Captain's cabin would not be encouraged by that gentleman should he suddenly open his door, and might well lead to the top deck being put out of bounds after dark to everyone for the rest of the voyage.

The troops naturally had precedence over the first-class on the question of any sharing of entertainment. As only about 250 men could comfortably see the cinema at a sitting, it meant that during the 16 days to Bombay, few troop decks got the chance of seeing more than one picture and the first-class were given only one or two shows on the voyage. On the homeward journey we found that most of the pictures provided by the Army Film Unit had been seen by the men in India, especially by Naval Units. It appears that many American pictures are shown in India before they reach England.

Besides the cinema, there were two main sources of amusement in the evening before lights out at 10 o'clock—tombola, which 500 men could enjoy

at a sitting, and community singing on the aft promenade deck, which was generally supported by up to about 1,000 men, though how they all squeezed in was a mystery. It was usually a spontaneous show, with a piano, piano-accordion and saxophone in the hands of a few artists on the hatch. I had many requests for permission to run a private tombola, but, considering the way a tombola can be run by an unscrupulous man, none was allowed except the ship's one, run properly by a committee.

On the way out two young officers threw themselves into raising a concert party with such vigour that in a very short time their main difficulty was elimination and not recruitment. Any hour of the day one could see a motley and expectant procession outside John's cabin of female impersonators, red-hot poker lickers, or razor blade swallows, and the final cast numbered well over 40, which was, of course, somewhat top-heavy. However, it went over well and nearly everyone who wanted to do so saw it, although it meant intense preparations over five nights with the ship's police, ropes, etc., to avoid overcrowding, gate-crashing and the apparently would-be suicides, who, to get a better view, like to hang on to some raft, rail or stay with three-quarters of their anatomies over the sea.

Boxing seems to go very well on an outward but not on a homeward voyage. Presumably, the reason for this is the desire not to arrive home with split lips or black eyes, but probably sheer apathy and the will to rest is the real cause. This trip out we had an excellent competition with about forty acceptances. A certain Corporal, well-known in Manchester professional boxing circles, proved himself ideal as a trainer and matcher-up of entries, and he was helped considerably by a young Scots officer, a fine boxer himself, who, I happened to know, ruled his rather turbulent draft with sheer force and that not only of character. They knew him as he did them, and each accepted the other in as good a relationship as I've seen between officer and man.

The mock all-in wrestling match, which followed the boxing, was a surprise item and will not easily be forgotten by those who saw it. The actors were an all-in wrestler of champion class and a lad whom he had trained in under a fortnight to co-opt with him in a glorious burlesque, which must have deceived many who never before had seen this queer sport. The referee was the Ship's Q.M.—a good wrestler himself—who entered into the rag and found himself frequently in positions which were both undignified and popular.

Incredible though it may seem, there was room on board for only half-a-dozen dart-boards and a couple of table tennis tables, but both games were in good demand and the open competitions produced big entries. Table tennis balls were a difficulty and the darker ones to be obtained in Bombay were generally slightly better than those got in Liverpool. We also had a tug-of-war tournament, which included five ladies' teams, a treasure hunt and the usual indoor games of chess, draughts, etc.

It certainly seems a pity to send out only about a thousand library books for nearly six thousand passengers. Many of these books were of the early 20th century vintage and almost unreadable nowadays, and, at least, one case of Dutch books was shipped for which the demand was nil. At Bombay the Yacht Club very kindly made me up a large parcel of books from their library, and they were most welcome.

There were many requests from first-class passengers for permission to have a dance on the top deck, but the idea of other ranks watching their officers dancing while they could not do so did not appeal and except for St. Andrew's

Night, when the exhibition of reels given by the Scottish on board was excellent, there was no organised dancing. But as one said and all felt, "Half the fun of St. Andrew's Night is lost in a dry ship".

At Bombay we cleared our passengers and waited six days before sailing again. Main features of those six days were the comfort and hospitality of the Yacht Club compared with the expensive and unsatisfactory hotels, the amazing capacity for providing and consuming Scotch of certain kind Indian hosts at the Cricket Club of India and, on a personal note, the action of the well-known General in charge of the Red Cross, who insisted on spending quite half an hour of his time hunting through his stores to get me a rubber ball, unprocurable in England, to replace one lost by an old terrier. The Red Cross generally were most kind in providing all the amenities they could, such as tombola books, of which we got through huge quantities, ordinary books and children's games.

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We took on a further five thousand men, mostly of the 14th Army going home on repatriation, and a few civilians. Included among the passengers was an Army Commander, with his wife, daughter and dog, and if his reception on the troop decks, where he spent much of his time, was any criterion, he was obviously one of the most popular—and deservedly so—generals we have.

Throughout the voyage speculation was intense as to whether we should get home for Christmas, and the most serious and easily the best-believed rumour out of very many, was that the General would disembark in Egypt and fly home in order to coerce the Secretary of State for War to order the GEORGIC's Captain to get his ship back by Christmas under pain of instant dismissal.

The difference between the troops we brought out and the returning 14th Army was very marked. These men were as hard as nails, black with sun, tough, experienced and disciplined soldiers and naturally full of anticipation and happiness.

The voyage passed, as they say, without incident. A Corporal won £22 for a shilling ticket on the Ship's daily run and the dazed expression on his face as he was told it was all for him and no sharers was something worth travelling miles to see. He had the sense at least to bank it in the Orderly Room safe until we arrived Home.

All through the voyage I was inundated with questions regarding civilian life after demobilisation, with particular reference to emigration to Australia and New Zealand. There was also a number of enquiries from men hoping to learn a trade different to the one they had just started before joining the Forces. Unfortunately, very little literary information was available before sailing, and I was unable to help them as much as I wanted.

We did not arrive at the Mersey bar until Christmas morning and, missing the morning tide, berthed at 4 o'clock on Christmas afternoon, flying the 14th Army flag. Very few of the men could have reached their homes that night in spite of the record speed at which they were disembarked, but, probably, the week's extra leave which they were granted on arrival more than made up for this disappointment.

The next voyage of the *GEORGIC* was also from Liverpool to Bombay and back. We had originally been booked to take five thousand Italian P.O.W.s back to Naples and return, but after some changes of plans and delay, it was decided that we should continue on to Malta and Bombay before coming home.

After delay in Liverpool due to fog, we finally left in the middle of January with the 5,000 Italians, about 170 Naval Officers and Wrens and a number of Service wives going out to rejoin their husbands in Italy and Middle East.

Except for the permanent staff, there were no soldiers on board, and naturally some English-speaking Italians were drafted into the Orderly Room as clerks and interpreters. They were quite efficient and useful in making their compatriots realise, *inter alia*, that in a troopship those who live in troop-decks are responsible for cleaning them and keeping them clean. Speaking generally and allowing for their recent captivity, I could not form a high opinion of these men. They struck me as no more possible to be smartened up than for certain boots and belts to "take a polish".

We disembarked them at Naples in the space of two hours, but I saw absolutely no sign at all of joy at being back again. Perhaps they had guessed or heard of the conditions they could expect, and certainly Naples itself looked depressed and dull and very poor. I noticed that the children seemed to be well clothed and looked after, but the general atmosphere of the Neapolitans suggested neither knowledge nor hope of their future.

Next day we took on a small New Zealand unit which was an advance force on its way to Japan, and a few Nursing Sisters. The ship was now nearly empty and in extraordinary contrast to the previous voyage. Passing through the first-class lounge, you looked twice to see whether anyone was there, instead of having to worm your way through packed chairs and bodies sitting on their "water-wings" on the floor.

Malta was the next port of call and coming in we fouled a screw with a hawser. A diver was sent down to clear it, but we could not leave for 24 hours and were by then emptier of passengers than ever. I had not been to Malta before, and was given a good illustration of the difficulty of manoeuvring out of Valetta harbour with a ship the size of the *GEORGIC* and in a heavy swell. We could nearly have flipped a cigarette end on to the sea wall as we went out.

In Egypt we dropped more N.O.s and took on a large Punjabi unit, a smart lot, but the smell of their cooking *ghee* pervaded the ship. With them were their Indian baker and his wife, who, as she could be accommodated neither in troop decks nor in a big cabin with Nursing Sisters, got a two-berth cabin to herself—and a stewardess! She wore a perpetually surprised look on her face until we reached Bombay.

We went through the Canal by day, but were held up three hours to let nine ships pass, of which the French battleship *RICHELIEU* brought up the rear. She was a most impressive sight viewed from our top deck at about 20 yards distance. It was cool enough to wear battledress or serge until we were far down the Red Sea and life was very lazy. What with first Italians and now Indians in the troop-decks there was no tombola to run, nor training programmes (as most men were on fatigues) nor games competitions nor a concert party, and in fact I had practically nothing to do.

Another six days in Bombay, much warmer than two months ago, and after seeing old friends and backing five of the shortest priced winners imaginable—tips of one of the friends—at the races, and collecting more books, etc., we left for home with another five thousand Army and R.A.F., a large batch of Naval Officers, a Royal Marine Unit and a few civilians.

The great attraction for the troops this trip, besides the usual tombola, sing-songs and the most successful concert party I have ever seen on board ship, was the daily sparring of two well-known boxers, both R.A.F., one a present champion in preparation for a big fight when he got home. It was impossible to get up a boxing competition on board even though the sparring partner, a magnificent boxer and figure of a man and one of the most unassuming of fellows, offered to help all he could, but the daily practice between the two of them was a great draw.

Going up to our berth at Liverpool on a brilliant spring day, we passed the still burning ex-"MILWAUKEE". The blow then fell. A case of suspected smallpox was discovered and back we had to go to midstream, leaving worried parents and women-folk waiting on the landing stage. The most depressing rumours buzzed. Six thousand people were vaccinated that night, but it was no good—on our return to the shore next morning we were informed that all personnel had to go to an isolation camp, possibly for weeks, except the ship's crew and for some reason, the permanent staff, who were also reprieved. We were glad to get away, but it did seem extremely inconsistent not only that we should be allowed to go while the passengers stayed, but also that reporters, agents, messengers, etc., should be permitted to come aboard and return to the shore while we were waiting to learn our fate; if we were unclean, would not they become so too?

However, in a day or two's time, the suspect was pronounced a case of chickenpox and all was well. I could not help feeling slightly pleased that our own young Army Doctor on board had from the start insisted against the united and weighty judgment of the Port Medical Authorities that it was as it turned out to be and not smallpox at all.

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Happy days to the old GEORGIC! She is a good ship, and her many thousands of wartime passengers will, I hope, always have pleasant memories of their voyage in a grand though badly scarred-veteran of the seas.

Money Gifts for Service Sports

Three more donations, totalling Rs. 1,20,000, have been received by the Commander-in-Chief in India, Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, for the promotion of sport within the three fighting Services in India. His Excellency the Governor of the Punjab has given Rs. 1,00,000 and Their Excellencies the Governors of Sind and of the North-West Frontier Province Rs. 10,000 each.

These donations have been made from the respective War Purposes Funds of the provinces concerned. The gifts are in addition to one of Re. 1 lakh just made by the Victory Thanksgiving Fund of Bombay.

"FROM SEPOY TO SUBADAR"—FACT OR FICTION?*

BY COLONEL SIR PATRICK CADELL.

THE value of memoirs written by men of "other ranks" has been increasingly recognised by modern military historians. Such recollections mention incidents which are ignored in dispatches, and neglected in accounts written by commissioned officers. They illustrate the feelings of the rank and file which are unknown to, or only imperfectly appreciated by, those in a higher position.

The British Army has been exceptionally fortunate in the number and quality of such reminiscences of the lower ranks. No such wealth of material could be expected from the ranks of the old Indian Army. The absence of education, the difficulty of obtaining writing material, the fact that the home vernacular of most of the soldiers had not reached a literary standard, and the difficulty of publication combined to make any such record exceedingly rare.

When, therefore, we find a connected story written by an Indian who had risen from the ranks, and translated into English by a British Officer who knew the writer personally, its value as a record of the experiences and feelings of an Indian soldier can hardly be overestimated. The little book with the title of this article fully realises expectations in the variety of the narrator's experiences and sufferings, and in the shrewdness of his comments on the administration and on his British Officers.

Obviously, however, the value of such a story must depend on the assurance that such a person as the narrator actually existed, and that his story has not been manipulated by his Editor. As doubts have been thrown on the Subadar's entire authenticity, it is necessary to examine the reasons for accepting it as honest and genuine, though not necessarily accurate in all its details.

The story purports to be that of an Oudh Brahman named Seetaram, who enlisted in a regiment of Bengal Infantry, in which his uncle was a Havildar. With that regiment he appears to claim to have served in both portions of the Nepal War, in the campaign against the Pindaris, and in the final stages of the Mahratta War which ended with the capture of Asirgarh in 1819. In consequence of the loss of his uncle and of almost the whole of his company at this siege, and also with the hope of quicker promotion, he joined a regiment that was being newly raised at Fatehgarh. With this battalion he was present at the siege and capture of Bhurtpore in 1826. How he lost his rank and sought a transfer will be explained later.

He joined a regiment of the Contingent which in 1838 was raised in India for Shah Shuja, the puppet king of Afghanistan. With this regiment he shared in the success of the first portion of the Afghan campaign and in the disasters which followed. He was captured and sold as a slave, in which condition he remained for about eighteen months, until he made an adventurous escape to India. He made his way to the Bengal regiment which he had left, was welcomed by his commanding officer, and found that his court martial had been forgotten.

With this regiment he served, according to his narrative, in both the Sikh campaigns and in the Sonthal Rising of 1854-58. He had returned on furlough

*"From Sepoy to Subadar" has for nearly forty years been the officially prescribed text-book for students for the Higher Standard examination in Urdu in the Indian Army.

to his home in Oudh when the Bengal Mutiny broke out, and his unshaken loyalty gave such offence to the many sepoys round him who had mutinied that he was being taken to Lucknow in fetters when the party he was with was scattered by a body of horsemen, who may be presumed to have been Barrow's Volunteer Cavalry in Havelock's force.

His loyalty being established, he later obtained a commission in one of the newly-formed regiments, but found the "Light Infantry Drill" too much for his years, and retired about 1860, when he must have been sixty-five years of age. He had many talks with his future Editor, the then Captain J. T. Norgate. With many misgivings, because he feared they might not be liked, and might therefore affect his pension, he entrusted his memoirs to Captain Norgate.

It may be convenient at this stage to state in what forms the book has been published. By 1873 Norgate had become a Lieutenant-Colonel and a Cantonment Magistrate in the Punjab. In that year he published the first edition of the book at Lahore. He tells us in a "Preface by Translator" of the Subadar's reluctance to part with his memoirs. Seetaram's own introductory words being dated "Tilowee, [i.e. Tiloi] Oude 1861", we may conclude that they were given to Norgate in that year. The latter tells us that the *Life and Adventures* had appeared "some years ago" in an "Indian Periodical since defunct", and at the time excited considerable interest. He adds that *The Times* made a reference to the book in 1863. I have not been able to trace either the defunct periodical or the reference in *The Times*.

Colonel Norgate published a second edition in 1880. This seems to differ from the first edition only in a few trifling corrections of spelling and in a short note on H. M.'s 24th Foot. The Editor, however, observes that "the old Subadar is now probably dead: his name no longer appears in the Army List", a curious remark as the name of a retired Subadar would not in any case have been found in that list. The third edition was edited by Lt.-Col. D. C. Phillott and was published in Calcutta in 1911 with a preface dated September 1910.

At the same time Colonel Phillott printed the book as part of the *Khwab-o-Khayal*, a text-book for the Higher Standard Examination. Both books so published were called the third edition. Colonel Phillott published the *Khwab-o-Khayal* volume, with some trifling omissions, as a fourth edition in 1914. A fifth edition, stated to be a reprint of the fourth, was published in 1921. The sixth edition, published in 1942 without any preface, was also a reprint of the fourth.

The history of the book in Indian languages should also be recorded. In his preface to the third edition, Colonel Phillott says that the memoirs of Seetaram were originally written in Hindi. His authority for this statement is not given. All the vernacular words that appear in the English text appear to be known in Urdu.

Seetaram was clearly a comparatively well-educated man, who knew Persian fairly well, and had a good deal of clerical work in the course of his duties. It seems more probable that he would use Urdu rather than Hindi in preparing his memoirs, especially as he presented them to a British Officer. If he wrote in Hindi at all, it would probably, as he came from Tiloi in the Rae Bareilly district, have been in the form of that language known as Awadhi, which is, I believe, very similar to Urdu.

I am, however, informed by Sir Richard Burn that an Indian Member of the Civil Service, who has since attained high eminence, while he was a probationer for that Service in England told the distinguished philologist, the late

Sir George Grierson, that he had, as a boy, seen Seetaram's memoirs in Hindi. In consequence of this statement Sir George, about the year 1911, asked Sir Richard Burn, who was then serving in the United Provinces to make enquiries. No trace of any Hindi version was found, nor indeed any memory of Seetaram in his native town. The latter fact is hardly surprising, as Seetaram had by then probably been dead about forty years, and, as will subsequently appear, the name under which the memoirs were published may have been an assumed one.

Even if there had ever been a Hindi version, it may have been a translation, in part or in whole, of Norgate's English version, or of its Urdu translation. This translation had been published at Lahore in 1873, the year of Norgate's first edition, under the title of *Tawarikh-i-Yadgar-i-Subahdar*, and purported to be a translation of Norgate's book. A copy of the translation, which was lithographed, is shown in the British Museum (1889) Catalogue of Hindustani Books, p. 318.

Phillott must have been unaware of this translation, as in the Preface to the third English Edition, he wrote, "Unable to trace the original, I determined to translate the Memoirs into simple colloquial Urdu, for the use of students. This was accomplished with the efficient help of Mawlavi Raza Ali Wahshat. This Urdu translation is now (*i.e.*, September 1910), running in the *Fauji-Akhbar*. As it has been decided to make this translation part of the new text-book for the Higher Standard in Hindustani, I am publishing Lt.-Col. Norgate's original translation for the use of candidates."

Having traced the provenance of the publication of the memoirs, the more important task remains of testing their contents. The old Subadar gives so many details of his campaigns, within some cases the names of his British Officers, at least in the earlier years of his memoirs, that it would appear an easy task to follow his career. Unfortunately, the details of his story cannot always be reconciled with actual history, while the officers of his own Regiments cannot be identified with any certainty.

When he begins his story by saying that he was born in 1797, he should almost certainly have said 1795, since he tells us that he was seventeen when he enlisted. This could hardly have been later than 1812 as he was serving near Nepal early in 1814, and the year 1812 fits in with the 48 years service which he later claims.

His first regiment seems to be identified with the 2nd Battalion of the 15th N. I., which later became the 31st, by the loss of a company of that battalion, through the explosion of a magazine, at the siege of Asirgarh. This explosion, which Seetaram wrongly ascribes to an enemy's mine, killed his uncle and a great part of his company, and no other battalion at Asirgarh suffered in this way.

This battalion, however, was not with Gillespie in the first portion of the Nepal War in the unsuccessful attack at Kalunga. Nor was it with Martindell at the equally unsuccessful action at Jaithak, where, it would appear from the narrative, Seetaram's uncle was wounded. It was, however, with Marley, whom Seetaram calls Mauley, and suffered severely when three companies of the regiment were cut up at Parsa on 1 January, 1815. It was also, as Seetaram says, in Ochterlony's victorious army in the second phase of the war.

Seetaram's account cannot in any case be altogether accurate since no one battalion of the Bengal Army was present at all the actions claimed by him for his regiment. It may well be, however, that he was himself confused in his memories

of a confused campaign, and that he did not remember on which occasion his regiment suffered so severely. In the action at Parsa, the three companies of the 2/15th, numbering only 150 men, had 45 killed and 60 wounded. It can scarcely be a coincidence that Seetaram says that 48 men of his regiment were killed in the action which he describes, though he is incorrect in implying that a European regiment was present.

Another statement of Seetaram's may be quoted as indicating accuracy in details. He says that the column he was with fell back, and halted for four or five days till the big guns came up from Delhi under Captain Hallow Sahib. It is certainly curious that the column under Colonel Mawbey fell back to Dera and halted there till it was joined by a train of heavy guns and mortars. It is true that this train was commanded by Captain Lieutenant W. Battine. In the same passage, however, Stubbs tells us that Lieutenant Edward Hall had been ordered up a short time before with some small mortars and howitzers. It seems at least probable that the name Hall stuck in Seetaram's memory as a re-inforcing Artillery Officer.

It is unfortunately difficult to identify the officers of Seetaram's own regiment. His first C. O. was a great *shikari*, and seems to be the officer whom Seetaram calls Estuart Saheb. The only officer of any similar name would be Lieut.-Col. Benjamin Stuart, but he commanded a battalion of the 26th Regiment, which was not, with the exception of its Light Company, engaged in the Nepal War. Seetaram's great hero among his own officers was Burrumpeel Saheb. There was never any other officer like him, and Seetaram, in the way of old soldiers, compared the young officers of his last years very unfavourably with his hero.

His first Editor, Norgate, suggests that Burrumpeel might stand for Blomfield. There was, however, no officer of that name, or anything like it, in the Bengal Army of the time. Many will remember that "Burrumpeel" was formerly used as the Hindustani form of "Dalrymple;" but again there was at that time no Dalrymple in the Bengal Army. Everyone knows, however, in what curious forms British names used to be transliterated by the sepoys, and how the same Hindustani version, if it became at all familiar, might be used for different British names. It appears to me possible that "Burrumpeel" represents William Pickersgill, who served with the 2/15th at this period, and during the Nepal War, in which his brother, Joshua Pickersgill, greatly distinguished himself.

Seetaram says that his Burrumpeel was seriously wounded in the chest by an arrow. Major V. C. P. Hodson, to whose help I am greatly indebted, informs me that there is no record of William Pickersgill being wounded in this way, though William Fraser, the well-known Bengal civilian, who held a local commission as Major in Skinner's Horse and served as a Political Officer in the campaign, was wounded in the throat by an arrow at Kalunga. The casualty returns in this campaign, however, were mostly given after regular engagements only, and I have not myself found Fraser's name in them.

Wounds in smaller engagements may not have been reported. John Hearsey, for example, received three wounds in one engagement, including one from an arrow, but did not report them as they were slight. Some corroboration for Seetaram's story, and for the identification of Burrumpeel with Pickersgill, may be found in the fact that Seetaram says that Burrumpeel was sent to England, (he probably used the word *Vilavat*, after the Nepal War but returned to the Regiment for the Mahratta War and the capture of Asigarh. This agrees with Pickersgill's record of going on sick leave to Mauritius but returning in time for

the Mahratta War. Seetaram tells us that "Burrumpeel" was 6 feet 3 inches in height, and his strength enormous, and no sepoy could ever overcome him. It is perhaps not fanciful to suggest that the change of Pickersgill's name into Burrumpeel might have been facilitated by the fact that the last syllable of the latter word means "elephant".

In the Pindari War, Seetaram was desperately wounded and was left on the ground, only being saved from the Pindaris by a *fakir* who concealed him in a tomb. His journey to rejoin his regiment after his recovery affords another example of Seetaram's tenacious memory in small matters. At Jaipur he saw a giraffe which had been presented to the Raja by "Nassir-ul-Deen", the Nawab of Surat, to which place it had been brought from Africa on a trading vessel. Now the British Government had assumed entire control of Surat since 1800, and the Nawab had become a pensioner : yet the titular dignity was held from that date till 1821 by Nasir-ud-din, a piece of knowledge involving some research, and beyond any but the most exceptional faker.

Seetaram rejoined his regiment in time for what he calls the siege of "Hasser" : neither of his editors recognises this as Asirgarh ; another proof that Norgate did not fake the narrative. Seetaram mentions that Colonel "Frasun" commanded the attack on the "pettah" or lower town, but was killed two or three days later in a sortie by the enemy. This is entirely correct as regards Colonel Fraser of the Royal Scots. Then followed the magazine explosion already referred to, which destroyed his company. Seetaram slightly exaggerates the destruction caused by it. He says that 47 men were killed, and only three men survived beside himself. The returns show that 34 men of the 2/15th were killed and 65 wounded.

Seetaram was himself wounded in four places. Another instance of his somewhat wayward accuracy on small points is found in his statement that the officers gave up their tents for the wounded sepoys, and that Captain Burma Saheb was in the same tent with him, also severely wounded. This must be Captain F. L. Burman, of the 1/7th Madras N.I., who was severely wounded during the siege. No one faking the story would have thought of using the name of an unknown officer, belonging to another Presidency.

For the reasons already indicated, Seetaram decided in 1820 to leave his old regiment and to join a new one being raised at Fatehgarh. This can only have been the battalion known at first as the 1/32nd, which became the 63rd N.I., in 1824. Here again it is not possible to identify the C. O. Seetaram calls him Major Gardeen Saheb and says that he was intensely unpopular both with the officers and the sepoys of his regiment, and was killed by one of the former in a duel which Seetaram claims to have witnessed. Major Hodson informs me that there is no record of any such duel, but this is not conclusive, as such a fatality may have been hushed up.

Gardeen was succeeded by a Colonel Hamilteen Saheb, who was very popular. It is difficult to identify this officer. The Hon. William Hamilton was posted to the 1/32nd in 1824, but only as a Lieutenant. The officer may possibly have been C. W. Hamilton, who became Lt.-Colonel of the 64th, which had been the 2/32nd. With the 63rd Seetaram was present at the siege and capture of Bhurtpore.

In the years of peace that followed he rose to be Pay Havildar of his Company. Unfortunately, he lent some of the money in his charge, as he says was not unusual, to one of the British Officers. The latter being unable promptly to repay the money in full, Seetaram was court martialled and was reduced to the rank of a Naik. Having thus lost the prospect of promotion in his own regiment, he accept-

ed the offer of a Havildar's post in the Force that in 1838 was being raised in India for Shah Shuja, the Indian Government's nominee for the Afghan throne.

Seetaram joined this force, he tells us, at the express desire of one of the officers. It is not possible to say with certainty which of the Shah's Infantry Regiments he joined. He tells us that his regiment was engaged, and behaved very badly, at Bemaru in November, 1842. The regiment so engaged was the 6th Infantry Regiment, but at the outset there seem to have been only five such regiments.

With his new Corps, Seetaram was present at the capture of Ghuznee, where, as perhaps elsewhere, he seems to attribute a greater share to his own unit than was actually the case. He states that the storming party consisted of the 13th "Goras", the 16th N. I., and two companies of his regiment. In fact, the storming party was entirely composed of companies from several European Regiments, of which the 13th Foot was one. The 16th N. I. suffered casualties and entered the fortress in support of the Storming Party, but did not form part of it; while there is no record of any of Shah Shuja's Levy taking part in the assault, though some may have been in the reserve, the Ghuznee medal was issued to the Contingent.

Seetaram's whole account of the campaign in Afghanistan and the ultimate disaster is excellent. When his regiment was destroyed or melted away during the retreat from Kabul, he attached himself to the remnant of H. M. 44th Foot, but was rendered unconscious by a bullet wound. He was carried off and sold as a slave. He got into touch with the captured British Officers, and mentions one whose name he thinks was Wallan. He may with confidence be identified with Robert Waller, Bengal Artillery.

Seetaram's Afghan master removed him to a distance when the British recaptured Kabul, and he remained a captive for eighteen months before his escape to India with an Afghan Kafilā. He rejoined his old regiment at Delhi and was welcomed by his Colonel, without any reference to his court martial.

With his regiment, presumably the 63rd, he took part in the 1st Punjab War. He does not claim to have been present at Mudki, but he gives a vivid account of Ferozshahr. Yet his regiment was not present at that battle, having been left by Littler to hold Ferozepore while he pushed on with the rest of the Division. At Ferozepore, only ten miles from the battlefield, the gunfire of the contest could be plainly heard, and the 63rd doubtless heard all about it when they rejoined the Division. The regiment was at Sobraon where Seetaram received his seventh severe wound, counting those inflicted by the explosion at Asirgarh as four.

A similar difficulty recurs in the 2nd Punjab War. Seetaram gives apparently an eye-witness account of Chillianwalla. Yet it is certain, if we are correct in identifying it with the 63rd N. I., that his regiment was not present. It is possible, though unlikely, that he described the experience of his original regiment, the 31st, and was misunderstood. He does not claim to have been present at the battle of Goojerat. He says his regiment was in charge of the baggage; actually, the 63rd was in a Reserve Division, at some distance from the battle.

Seetaram, who had become a Jemadar in 1847, next tells us of the Sonthal rising of 1854-55, in which the 63rd was engaged. It was still in the Lower Provinces at Berhampur when the Mutiny broke out: but Seetaram had gone on furlough to his home in April, 1857.

There is no reason to doubt the account of his loyalty, and of his being laden with chains and being taken to Lucknow for probable execution when he was rescued by a body of Horse who must have been Barrow's Volunteer Cavalry

If he had not given such striking proof of loyalty, he would not have been given a Jemadarship with a Punjab Regiment. Probably he was temporarily attached to such a regiment during the fighting round Lucknow.

It seems likely that he was later posted to the 12th Punjab Infantry, of which his future editor and translator, Norgate, was second in command. Norgate commanded the regiment for three months in 1859 in Bundelkhand and on the borders of Nepal, where Seetaram tells us he saw his last fighting, Subadar in 1860, but the activity necessary for the Light Infantry Drill was too great for his age, and he went on pension, probably in that year.

The 12th Punjab Infantry was one of the Corps raised in 1857, but it only lasted till 1861. Seetaram's other two regiments, presuming them to have been correctly identified as the 31st and 63rd, were among the very few of the old Bengal line regiments which survived the Mutiny.

Perhaps the most moving story in the book is the incident of Seetaram's finding his own son in a batch of mutineers condemned to death, whose firing party he was to command. With difficulty he got himself excused from this duty, and with even greater trouble obtained permission to perform the last funeral rites over his son.

The possible discrepancies in the historical portion of Seetaram's story have been examined in detail, as they affect the question of his reliability. To my mind they do not detract from the authenticity of the narrative. A clever impostor would have avoided them, and certainly a dishonest editor, if we can imagine Norgate to have been such, would have been careful to make his story consistent.

It should be remembered that, though Norgate received memoirs from Seetaram which he translated, he tells us that he had also had numerous conversations with him. This may account for the story being so well-knit together, and also for some expressions which one would hardly expect from a man of Seetaram's position.

On the other hand, Norgate may not have fully understood all that was said, or that was placed before him in writing. There appear far more points, such as acquaintance with Hindu social customs, Seetaram's little prejudices, and his hits at Muslims and Punjabis, his occasional *naivete*, which no one could have maintained unless he had the brain and the pen of a Morier or a Kipling, and there is no reason to think that Norgate had either.

Perhaps a word may be said about Seetaram Pandey's names. The combination is a very common one in Oudh, and, in view of his fear lest the publication of his memoirs should affect his interests, it is possible that the name may be a pseudonym, though the surname of Pandey would not have been expected to be popular so soon after the Mutiny.

Curiously enough, a pamphlet was published in English during 1946, entitled "Human Equality in Western Civilisation", over the name of "Seetaram Pandey". The author, a Bengali gentleman, has courteously informed me that he has never heard of the old Subadar, nor of Norgate's book. His own pamphlet was intended to attract the notice of English and American readers, and he used the pen name of Seetaram Pandey, somewhat on the analogy of Tristram Shandy, as being catchy and easily remembered. If, however, it was thus adopted in one case it may similarly have been chosen many years ago.

It appears to me likely that Seetaram, in recalling actions with whose story he was well acquainted, may have come to believe that he was present at them, in addition to the numerous engagements in which he undoubtedly took part. The classic instance of such a fond illusion is, of course, George IV and the Battle of Waterloo, but most of us have known of more modest beliefs of the kind among humbler men.

To my mind, at least, this weakness, if it exists, does not affect the genuineness and the general truth of the picture drawn. There are innumerable touches which ring so true as to make fiction seem almost impossible. It is the consistency, as well as the fine quality, of the character displayed, that gives continued vitality to the story of the old Subadar.

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“ADHA GHANTA P. T.—ADHA GHANTA DRILL”

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. I. MOBERLEY, O.B.E.

BASICALLY, all instruction is a combination of facts to be absorbed and “skills” to be practised. “Skills” can be loosely defined as the actions, or the handling of, the weapons or tools connected with the facts.

The main difficulty of peacetime instruction in the post-war army is going to be to find sufficient time to cover all the ground of Infantry training. With the numbers and complexity of weapons and jobs required to be handled by the Infantry; the varieties of Infantry battle tactics and methods which have emerged as a result of experiences in the late war in various types of terrain; with the demands on time made by the increased importance of morale—such as building subjects, education, welfare and resettlement training, discipline, pride in ceremonial drill, physical hardening, sports, and with the more than partial return to the Sinbad’s burden of the peacetime system of administration—with all these and more, all jostling for places on the daily time-table, there just will not be sufficient time to continue with the sequence and detail of training as dictated by the manuals.

To achieve economy in time requires planning. In the Indian battalion the detail of this planning, inside the framework of the Battalion Commander’s directive, is the Company Commander’s responsibility, and it can rarely be decentralised. As in any other military planning, a plan for training will evolve best from an appreciation.

The Company Commander’s object is obviously to organise the collective time of the men in his Company into a balanced blend of work, recreation, and leisure that will produce the maximum degree of efficiency and contentment. The factors to be considered, listed in order of consideration, are:

The time available and the various calls on it.

The subjects required to be included, and their relative importance.

The standard of training already reached, and the efficiency of available instructors, with particular reference to their knowledge of the technique of “revisional instruction”.

The equipment and accommodation available.

The various methods of imparting instruction.

The result of this appreciation is, of course, a plan, which should consist of two main parts: the organisation for training and the programme or programmes.

Consider the first three of the above factors. In the present situation, few units are likely to be in a position in which they can plan training in detail for any long period ahead. Similarly, few units, after prolonged immersion in active operations and the subsequent compulsory “banting” to reduce to establishment, can be even partially trained by pre-war standards. These two facts combine to dismiss the necessity at present of planning beyond the stage previously labelled “individual training”.

The need of planning, directed at the complicated detail of dovetailing availabilities in men and facilities into progressive training, remains, with emphasis on economy in time. First things first, and non-essentials not at all.

Individual training periods must *not* be regarded as glorious pauses in the activity of the Company Commander. "*Adha ghanta P.T., adha ghanta drill and Havildar Major chalo, ji*". Individual training periods requires a flexible programme, capable of adjustment to meet unexpected interruptions by means of spare periods and days, and avoiding at all costs boring repetition by a nicely balanced mixture of subjects and methods—talks, demonstrations, practice, tests, competitions and discussions.

There is no reason however why the theory, and to some extent, the practice of the old collective training should not be applied to officers and senior N. C. Os in their training as individuals, to a sufficient degree to give them confidence when they are eventually required to handle their commands in operations. Opportunities must also be afforded them, by attachments, to enable them to co-operate with real understanding with units of other arms.

Given the opportunity to maintain an efficient standard of individual training, and given a high unit morale—that little something which carries men on to an objective and keeps them there—the experience of the Indian Divisions in C.M.F. was that a unit can still function most successfully in battle, even when continuous battling has practically obliterated the originally collectively-trained nucleus.

Battle experience, however, is an expensive substitute for training, unless the basic individual efficiency is there. For the soldier this basic efficiency consists of the ability to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy, combined with the ability to conduct himself under fire with the minimum danger to his own person and that of his comrades. This involves a high degree of proficiency in the use of ground and of his weapons.

Nevertheless, it cannot be over-stressed that this alone will avail him little without the impetus of individual morale—the inspiration to display guts and gallantry in aid of his unit's good name. This is not just a rhetorical panegyric. The late War showed again and again beyond argument that there is no substitute for the Battalion spirit in the fighting make-up of the Indian *jawan* or the British pre-war regimental Atkins.

Battling for the front-line soldier is often a lonely business. It must be if a high rate of casualties is to be avoided. A soldier's morale must be established on *individual* confidence in himself, his weapons and his leader. Similarly, the self-confidence of the N. C. O. and officer must be belief in his own ability to lead, and in those who dictate where he is to lead. At all levels this two-way confidence can have only one foundation—knowing; and one structure—competence to display knowledge in teaching and getting results.

There is an automatic handicap to attaining this level of ability in an immediate post-war period. It is a truism that the quality of phlegmatic courage, which is at the root of most long-standing battle reputations among N. C. Os, is often the natural product of a slow imagination. This will be a handicap to instructional aptitude. Added to this, most of the leaders produced by war conditions have had little or none of the grounding, and supervised practice, of the pre-war N.C.O. But in peacetime a leader, unless he is of outstanding reputation, must also be an efficient instructor if he is to inspire confidence.

From all this theorising the following deductions emerge :

Time allotted to battle training subjects must be balanced against those which build unit and sub-unit spirit and pride.

This spirit must be made to spring from the self-confidence and contentment of each individual in each battle team.

Weapon skill, an eye for ground, the habit of precautionary alertness, and physical hardness, all developed to the point of being semi-instinctive, are a minimum that will suffice to make an efficient soldier if time allows of no more.

For officers, V. C. Os and senior N. C. Os the most important aspects of individual training are to learn to supervise instruction,—that is, to acquire an acute critical faculty combined with tact in exercising it; to organise training; to inspire leadership; and to acquire the technique of command and administration.

The elements of the technique of command are two: First, a framework of knowledge of normal principles and procedures on which any situation, normal or abnormal, can be hung, and then adjusted. And secondly, knowledge of the functions and capabilities of the arms who can support him in battle.

For everyone the primary task is to tread heavily on the fleeting feet of Father Time until he is prepared to dance to our tune.

So far we have been concerned with only the aims and scope of the training required for the post-war Infantry soldier in a Rifle Company. Now for some detail as to how this training is to be organised, and of some methods of applying the theory.

In the preliminary stage, training will probably require to concentrate on cadre teaching at least a nucleus of instructors—a sound basis of the technique of revisional instruction. The interest of this cadre will, initially, have to override everything else, and it may leave the Company largely denuded of N.C.Os. This handicap, however, need not prejudice the general sequence of training for the Company, as the early stages include two basic preliminaries, which can be carried on with the lesser number of available N. C. Os, without the need of revisional training technique. These two basic preliminaries are (i) to get the men physically hard and mentally alert; and (ii) to test their intelligence and the standard of training already reached, with a view to "squadding".

"Squadding" is the corner stone of all organisation for individual training, other than for precision subjects, such as ceremonial drill and marching. It consists merely of grouping men, either within the platoon or on a Company basis, according to their ability to absorb instruction or according to what they already know. It is at once a basis of incentive to individual efficiency, and an antidote to the boredom of repetitive or haphazard instruction.

"Squadding" can normally be limited to three standards: Backward, Average, Flyer. The corollary to "squadding" is "potting"—that is, the reduction of the facts and skills of each subject, again to three grades:

Basic essentials, which a soldier must know to avoid being a menace to himself and to his fellows in battle;

Trimmings, i.e., useful facts and skills which the efficient trained soldier should know; and

Frills, i.e., the matters which complete the knowledge of the subject to the standard which a Course-trained instructor is expected to reach.

A title for these grades easily grasped by Indian soldiers is "Bones; Muscle; Fat"—on the analogy of the elements of the human body. The relation between "Squadding" and "Potting" should be obvious.

"Backward squads" are kept refreshed in, or taught if necessary, the potted bones of essential subjects, and no more. This diet in large doses is unpalatable and monotonous to all but the completely dull-witted. And when they appreciate that the menus served upstairs are both more appetising and more varied, there is some incentive to want to move towards the stairs. There the average squads are served with the bones with meat on them—that is to say, less repetitive monotony, more breaking for fresh ground into more attractive subjects and more rewards for good work in the shape of occasional early releases from parades, and so on.

On the top storey the "Flyers", irrespective of length of service, are treated as potential N. C. Os. They re-learn the subjects they already know from the angle of the Instructor, practising on the backward and average squads. A proportion train on to become the Company specialists, and junior Courses reserve, in normal weapons and ground skill subjects.

When used as instructors these latter, and all Army course-trained N. C. Os, must be watched to ensure that they can adjust their own complete knowledge down to the two degrees of essential instruction required for backward and average squads. This is necessary because most Schools of Instruction appear to lay insufficient stress on the widely different techniques required for teaching a subject, for a new recruit or a new subject, and for revisional instruction for the trained or partially trained soldier.

So much for organisation within the Company and the need for at least two separate programmes. Now for the instruction to be given on these programmes. An essential background to instructional ability is some appreciation of how the human memory works. In general the instructor needs to know about, and to allow for, both "rote" memory and "logical" memory; to know how to use the memory's five senses in combination, and the relative efficiency of each, and to be aware of the relation between time—attention—absorption as a factor in "one-way" instruction. To enlarge on this a little.

"Rote" memory is the type that learns more easily by heart, either by direct visual or oral memory, or by what amounts to an efficient filing system in the brain. It is assisted by visual aids, word summaries, diagrams, demonstrations, pictures and colours. It has, however, been found that the majority of people, at any rate in Britain and America, remember mainly by logic, assisted by touch and vision—that is, by following up a sequence of connected reasons leading to facts.

While it is probable that the majority of Indian soldiers, by reason of their basic illiteracy, start with a rote type of memory, they can learn by simple logic. Facts and skills once learnt by logic are less liable to breakdowns in the memory filing system.

The five senses of the memory are those of sound, sight, touch, taste and smell. There is no other way by which a message can reach the brain. Figures of the comparative efficiency of these senses in absorbing information, worked out in the British Army in Great Britain and in the C. M. F., are:

Hearing alone	10%
Hearing plus seeing	35%—50%
Hearing and seeing, plus touching, <i>e.g.</i> "doing"	80%—90%

Here again, figures relating to the Indian soldier would probably be higher for the first two categories, owing to the greater aptitude for concentration of a mind that has virtually lain fallow for years, and to his greater keenness on soldiering. The point remains that neither hearing nor seeing can ever be a satisfactory substitute for doing.

The Americans have by typically thorough analysis, reduced to a graph the time/attention/absorption factor of 45-minute periods of one-way instruction. These results were borne out by tests carried out by the C.M.F. "Methods of Instruction" mobile teams. The curve of the graph rises steeply to a peak between the 2nd and 12th minutes; gradually declines to a trough of inefficiency by the 20th minute, where it remains until the 35th minute. The final 10 minutes show a gradual climb again to approximately half the height of the original peak. Once again these results are probably liable to modification owing to the Indian's higher capacity for concentration on the spoken word.

The lesson, however, remains. It is to reduce one-way instruction to a minimum; to insist on a quick and concise sequence for the vital opening quarter of an hour; to fill in the doldrums in the middle of the period with "squad activity work"; and to make use of the quickening of interest towards the end to hammer home again, by test questions and by summary, the main facts.

Included in the opening sequence will be revision by test questions of the previous instruction in the subject, known as "testing foundation"; a quick and if possible original introducing of the scope of the current lesson; and the putting over of the essential "musts"—that is, the bones, or the bones and meat, according to whether the squad is backward or average.

The main difference in technique between teaching and revising can be brought out best by a tabled summary of the procedure dictated by the time-interest-absorption factor for any one period:

	<i>Teaching.</i>	<i>Revising.</i>
First quarter of an hour.	Approach to the subject including revision of previous lesson.	Approach, including quick revision of previous instruction.
	Explanation by Instructor.	Test foundation by Q. and A., e.g., what is already known of the subject.
	Demonstration by instructor.	Demonstration and criticism both by individuals pulled out of the squad at random, <i>not</i> by the instructor.
	Demonstration of main points to note by instructor.	Bringing out of points to note by Q. and A. during the demonstration-criticism stage.
Last Ten minutes.	Further demonstration where necessary. Imitation by the squad.	Practise in pairs or groups with mutual criticism; instructor concentrates on weaker men.
	Practise individually under the instructor.	
	Revision and summary.	Revision and summary

The key to the difference is one of attitude. The instructor of a trained soldier should regard himself as a supervisor rather than a teacher, with the main job of finding out what requires brushing up, and of drawing the answers out of the squad. He should rely almost entirely on questions, a beam of questioning flickering to and fro over the squad and lighting up not the facts but the reasons behind them. Questioning technique must involve the whole squad, checking and cross-checking that the original answer is or is not agreed with.

When the facts have been dealt with, the standard of skills must be checked similarly, demonstrations by individuals at random taking the place of the normal sequence of the instructors' demonstration and squad imitation. In the same way criticism of demonstrations is called for from individuals in the squad, and cross-checked in the same way as the answers to questions.

There is a type of soldier in every Army who is almost impervious to criticism by an N. C. O., but who will react sharply to being taken up by his equals or juniors. Normally the critic, particularly if his strictures have been severe, should be called on to justify his comments by giving a better demonstration himself. Only when the instructor runs up against a general level of ignorance or inability in his squad does he revert to explanation or demonstration himself.

That is the outline of the difference between teaching and revising. The saving of time is considerable. Furthermore, it is a most suitable technique for the war leader-turned instructor, in that basically he need only be "sequence-perfect" in the subject. His own memory of the detail will be refreshed by the answers he extracts from the squad, sufficiently for him to be able to arbitrate effectively as to which is the correct answer.

We have now dealt with the aims, scope and organisation of individual training for Infantry, and with the technique of revisional training. It remains to enlarge on the earlier mention of the need for Officers and senior N. C. Os to acquire the art of a critical faculty. There are two degrees of this.

One can be loosely termed "cultivation of the instructors' eye": the ability to spot faults in skills as they are committed. It can be acquired initially by learning to use the eyes systematically, and at the same time by knowing what faults commonly occur. Its efficiency accumulates with practice to a point where it functions almost automatically—the standard of the Guards' Drill-Colour Sergeant who can pick out a minute fault in detail committed by No. 23 in the rear rank.

The advanced degree is concerned with ability to appraise the worth of an instructor. A start can be made by considering what combination of ability and aptitude makes up an efficient instructor. Instruction is a combination of knowledge, technique (which includes local organisation and covers the making of the best use of knowledge and time), and personality.

Fairly to judge an instructor's worth involves studying his performance in all these aspects, and over a range of time and subjects. Some mental queries for officers embarking on a conscientious assessment of an instructor's competences are suggested below. They are given at some length because in these questions is the material for building up the training of the war leader into a genuine instructor in any subject.

Knowledge.—Is the sequence perfect? Does he appreciate the dividing line between the bones, meat and fat of the subject, and sell the correct quality and amount according to the grading of his squad? Does he know how to look

at a squad when fault checking? Does he know what common faults to watch for?

Technique, Voice and Verbiage.—Is his word of command good? Does he appreciate the three portions of any command—explanatory, cautionary, and executive, and modulate his voice accordingly? Does he make the pause between cautionary and executive fit the time of the motions he requires? Does he vary his voice according to the severity of his censure when checking faults? Can he if, and only if, necessary, shock his squad into energy by the emphasis either of his voice or of his vocabulary, or both?

Does he instruct normally in an easy natural conversational manner? Does he avoid the common fault of parrot-like adherence to the verbiage of the manuals? Does he substitute friendly normal speech and original examples from everyday life—both suited to the mentality of his squad? Does he avoid boring repetition and waffle?

Question and Answer.—Are his questions clearly worded and explicit? Does he put his questions to the squad in general, pause, and then pick on a man by name at random? Does he cross-check the reply in such a way as to test satisfactorily that all his men know, or have grasped, the fact? Does he avoid subconscious memory replies, such as: "This rifle is accurate up to 1000 yards. Poop Singh, how far is this rifle accurate?"

Does he frame his questions to avoid successful guessing, *e.g.*, avoiding questions to which the answer is either "Yes" or "No" or a choice of only two alternatives? Above all, is his every second or third question the single word "Why?" Does he, when supervising "skills", use questions to make the man see, or work out, for himself the fault he is making? How does he react to awkward questions—does he bluff and bluster, or is he honest and prepared to admit sometimes that "he'll have to find out about that one"? And, finally, does he know when to stop and not go on asking questions just to fill in time?

Approaches and Summaries.—Does he get off the mark quickly, and leave no doubt in his squads' mind as to exactly what the period is concerned with? Has he the knack of finding an apt heading for a lesson, avoiding the prosaic title that the men have heard so often before?

Does he start subsequent lessons of a sequence with a rapid concise summary of the essentials already learnt? Does he sum up in the same way at the end of the period, in the mentally-receptive last ten minutes?

Testing.—Does he keep his finger on the pulse of his squads' progress by frequent testing? Does he frame his tests to cater for both rote and logical memory? Does he make use of the quickest type of written test, the four alternative answer quiz? Does he use purposely incorrect demonstrations or diagrams as a quick means of testing, especially for potential or young N.C.Os?

Visual Aids.—Does he make the maximum use of visual aids, both to assist memory and to save time in explanation? Does he present them only at the moment when they are relevant, not leaving them displayed as distractions to the squads' attention? Are they of a size that the smallest parts are visible to the whole squad?

Are his diagrams, models, etc., simple, attractive and clear? Are they stripped of all unessential detail, and self-explanatory enough to require no

lettering? Does he appreciate that size in an instructional diagram should depend more on relative importance than on scale accuracy? Does he understand the use of colour, not only for effect but to show purpose, *e.g.*, solid blocks of colour to differentiate, say, between moving and stationary parts, between the different motions of a sequence, or to stress the similarity, or importance, of individual parts?

Does he understand how to use a blackboard? Does he achieve organised clarity, and avoid illegible and haphazard scribbles? Does he prepare a complicated diagram beforehand with lead pencil, to save time later? Does he address the squad and not the blackboard?

Note-taking.—Does he stamp on the misguided fatuity of the student who tries to act the stenog? Does he encourage the habit of concentrating on the instruction by allowing set pauses for note-taking, or for memory-copying of blackboard summaries and diagrams? Does he test the substance of the notes made by the class, by promoting mutual criticism of them, encouraging brevity and single-word aids to logical memory?

Demonstrating.—Can he demonstrate with perfect detail himself? Does he normally "pair-demonstrate", wrong and right in that order, and without reducing the wrong to absurdity? Can he organise a larger demonstration on the same lines as any other visual aid, and still keep it simple? Does he appreciate the importance of rehearsal and timing?

Personality.—Has he normally a friendly manner with his squad, without any suggestion of patrony or unctuousness? Is he successful in selling the attitude that the instructor's job is to help, not to badger, and that he is personally interested in the progress of every individual in his squad?

Is he prepared to work out of hours to bring on a backward man? Does he balance encouragement and praise, where due, against check and censure? Is he alert to reward good work with an occasional early release from parade? Can he be severe and stand no nonsense from a recalcitrant or bloody-minded soldier, irrespective of his age or length of service? Can he relax off parade without promoting over-familiarity? Is he confident without being bumptious?

Can he hold the interest of his squad? Does he use his imagination? Does he balance one-way instruction with squad activity? Does he make use of the stimulus of the minor rivalry and competitive interest innate in all learners? Is he a salesman, with the salesman's combination of enthusiasm and showmanship? Most important of all, has he the drive and energy that makes his own enthusiasm infectious?

Organising Ability.—Does his drive include capacity to plan and organise in detail? Is he considerate in making the best use of available equipment, accommodation and light, bearing in mind the effect of the comparative comfort of his squad on their receptivity? Does he make use of those who show up as above the average of his squad to assist in the instruction of the average folk, leaving himself free to concentrate on the weaker ones?

Does he thereby avoid the boring monotony of the majority doing nothing during spasms of individual checking—unsupervised practice being a sure way of inculcating faults and bad habits? Does he either keep his whole squad occupied or else let some of them relax? Does he know the importance of frequent rests and stand easies, especially in precision subjects where steadiness is demanded?

In short, does he make the best use of his knowledge, and of the time allotted, to concentrate on the essentials, and thereby produce practical and useful results towards the object of the instruction?

If an instructor can emerge with credit from this severe analysis of his competence, then he is a paragon indeed. But no lesser standard can be acceptable by every trainer of instructors in a peace-time army—not only because time is all-important in the peace-time training of an army, which is required to be trained as jack and master of all the complexity of modern infantry soldiering, but because if and when the threat of another war becomes too menacing to be ignored, from the peace-time nucleus there must be immediately obtainable a training organisation as efficient as that of a modern high-speed factory.

Thus from its assembly lines will pour the output of the war-time expansion, finished products, fit to stand the test and strain of battle. In two Wars the process has been achieved, gradually but adequately. In a third war it is beyond argument that survival will depend on having the military factory potential of production even more highly geared. This potential will depend largely on the general level of efficiency of the Regular Army instructors.

"Tiger Head" Division Disbanded.

The "famous"—a title bestowed upon them by Tokyo Radio—26th Indian ("Tiger Head") Division has been disbanded. This formation is the eighth of India's great divisions to stand down, others being the 6th, 8th, 14th, 19th, 20th, 25th and 39th Indian Divisions.

The "Tiger Heads" first raised their standard on Arakan terrain in the concluding stages of the 1942-43 campaign, when the Japanese after being thrust back to Donbaik were reasserting themselves. By May of 1943 the Division had stabilised the front and resisted all the enemy's efforts to push it back to Chittagong and the plains of Bengal.

On the completion of this task, the Division was withdrawn, in the winter of 1943-44, for rest and training. Early in 1944 the Japs launched their long-planned drive on India, and for the second time the "Tiger Heads" helped smash a Jap attempt to invade India by the Arakan route.

In the autumn of 1944 the "Tiger Heads" with the 25th Indian Division and the 82nd West African Division started preparations for the offensive in the new year—a series of swift leapfrog landings down the west coast of Burma. When the great advance started, the plan worked like clockwork and Akyab, Ramree, Letpan and Taungup were some of the prizes which the division secured.

Their greatest triumph—Rangoon—lay ahead. It is history now, but the men of the 26th Indian Division of 15th Corps will always remember with pardonable pride how they beat the 14th Army, advancing overland, in the race to liberate the capital of Burma.

After the Japanese capitulation the division went to Sumatra, from where they returned to India in December last.

Jap Poison Gas Destroyed.

Four thousand tons of liquid poison gas, 20,000 tons of poison gas in smoke form and 72,000 tons of all kinds of ammunition have been destroyed over a period of nearly a year by troops of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, in Japan. There are still some thousands of tons of Japanese ammunition to be destroyed.

BRITISH I. A. OFFICERS' VERSATILITY

By COLONEL B. J. AMIES.

“ALL work and no play makes Jack a dull boy” may not be very apt as an opening, but many British officers of the Indian Army have been men of parts—of how many parts it is the object of this article to show. There is practically no end to the tale of their accomplishments in fields other than the parade ground or the battle-arena.

Outside interests of these British officers were many and varied; geology, railways, public life, oriental languages, music, the Church, writing, science, meteorology—in all these subjects they contributed much, and in many cases attained well-deserved fame. The references to individual officers in this article are not the complete story, but it is only right that they should be recorded, if only that they serve as reminders of their service both to the Indian Army and to world knowledge.

Let us begin with those who found fame in the histrionic art, for it used to be said by the frivolous that an officer who made a hit in the Simla A.D.C. could be assured of a career in the then A.H.Q. Be that as it may, a famous amateur actor was Colonel Robert Baigrie, who after serving with the 3rd Bombay European Regiment (Leinster Regiment) for twelve years, transferred to the Bombay Staff Corps in 1860. On the analogy of the first part of this paragraph, it is not surprising that later still he became Q.M.G. of the Bombay Army.

Painting has been the hobby of many an officer, and not a few can claim fame as artists. Water colours were the hobby of General Sir James Caldwell, (1770-1863), who joined the Madras Engineers in 1789, was a well-known civil and military engineer in South India, and later Chief Engineer of the expedition to Mauritius in 1810-1811. There are other well-known artists of that older generation, but present-day officers are no whit behind them, for there are alive to-day some equally proficient. To mention but a few, we can call to mind Lieut.-General Sir Francis Tucker, of the 2nd K. G. O. Gurkha Rifles and now G. O. C.-in-C., Eastern Command (whom readers of this Journal will know also as a brilliant military writer); Major-General C. W. Toovey, late of the 1st Punjab Regiment; Colonel M. Tulloch, Poona Horse; Lieut.-General Sir Bertrand Moberly and Brigadier W. E. H. Condon, F. F. Rifles.

In the field of education one can quote William Delafield Arnold, who was a son of Dr. Arnold, famous headmaster of Rugby and brother of Matthew Arnold, the poet. Arnold joined a regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry in 1848, but as a young Ensign in a few years he turned to the civil service and became an Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab, rising to fame as one of the original organisers of the Department of Public Instruction in the Government of India. Another well-known figure in education was Major D. L. Richardson, who turned to education and literature after serving with the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry in 1819. Later, on the recommendation of Lord Macaulay, he became Principal of the Hindu College at Calcutta and Professor of English there.

Scientific progress can be said to have been assisted in no small degree in the latter part of the nineteenth century by an officer of the Indian Cavalry, for Lieut.-Colonel Alexander Strange (1818-1876), who joined the 7th Madras

Cavalry in 1834, developed a great natural ability for mechanical science and invention. He spent several years in the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India before being appointed to inspect scientific instruments for use in India. On retiring he was one of the prime advocates for a Royal Commission on scientific instruction and advancement.

Meteorology has, as far as I can find, not been an attractive hobby to many officers, but two at least found it interesting. One was Captain P. Gerrard, who joined a regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry in 1812, and the second was Captain W.S. Jacob, who having served in the Bombay Engineers from 1831 to 1845, established the Poona Observatory, and was the author of many authoritative papers on astronomy and meteorology. Botany claimed the interests of Lieut.-General Sir Henry Collet, K.C.B., of the Bengal Army, for he made it his special study during many years of service on the North-west and North-eastern frontiers, and later wrote a good book on the flora of Simla.

The foundation of archaeology in India can justifiably be credited to Col. Colin Mackenzie, C.B., F.R.S., who served with distinction as a Madras Engineer in the Mysore Wars, in Ceylon and in Java before becoming Surveyor-General of India in 1816. Another figure of archaeological renown was Major-General Sir Alex Cunningham, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., who joined the Bengal Engineers in 1833 and served as Archaeological Surveyor from 1861 to 1885. His other hobby, by the way, was numismatics.

St. Andrew's, Scottish home of golf, seems to have cause to be grateful to the Indian Army, though this might be put the other way round, for the town is the ancestral home of the Playfair family, whose careers were wide and varied. A George Playfair was a Surgeon-General in the I. M. S., while a kinsman of his, Sir Hugh Lyon Playfair, served in the Bengal Artillery for thirty years before retiring to St. Andrew's where he became Provost from 1842 to 1861. He gave new life to the famous golf club—and, indeed, his family must have been keen golfers, for two Playfairs were widely known as fine players about 1840, when the tall hat and swallow-tail coat were held to be adjuncts of the game.

The Church seems to have attracted some officers of past generations. Heading the list is Archbishop Maclagan, who became Archbishop of York in 1891. Commissioned Ensign on 20th February, 1847, he was appointed a few weeks later to the then 51st Regiment of Madras Native Infantry, with which he seems to have remained until 9th October, 1849, when he returned to Europe, apparently on furlough. His name disappeared from the Madras Army List after 1853. In a book review in the January 1947 issue of this *Journal* Archbishop Maclagan is stated to have remained in the Army and drawn half-pay as a cavalry subaltern until he died! I do not venture to dispute "H.R.B.'s" statement: he is literally a better judge of evidence than I am. But I have seen no proof that W. D. Maclagan ever served in Madras or any other cavalry.

There are others too who became country parsons in the British Isles after service in India. Captain W. D. Littlejohn, who went on furlough from the 71st Bengal Native Infantry on the 5th January, 1829, became Vicar of Sydenham, Oxon, from 1844 to 1879; and T. J. Tocke, another former Bengal Army officer, was Vicar of Littleham-with-Exmouth from 1843 to 1877. As to present-day clerics, I met two on board the "BRITANNIC" in Sept. 1939. They had taken Holy Orders while on the Special Unemployed List, but were recalled to their regiments in India on the outbreak of the Second World War of 1939-45.

Not often does one find an Infantry officer turning railwayman, but Colonel (hon. Major-General) S. A. Abbott, of the Bengal Army, was for many years Agent of the Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway. Writing of railways reminds one of General Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., who after joining the Bengal Engineers in 1857, transferred to the Royal Engineers in 1860, serving the Sind-Peshin Railway as Engineer-in-chief from 1883 to 1887. His nickname, it might be added, was "Buster". Later, he became Q.M.G. in India, and died in harness in 1896 as Chief Commissioner and Agent in Baluchistan.

Geology was the hobby of Colonel Sir Probyn Thomas Cautley. Entering the Bengal Army in 1819 he served only for four or five years when he became a canal engineer, and remained in Government service for 30 years. He explored the Siwaliks for fossils, and contributed many papers on geological subjects to the Geological Society. A distinguished officer of the Madras Native Infantry also gained fame in the realm of geology; he was Major-General C. A. McMahon, who left the Army in 1847 for civil service in the Punjab and later became President of the Geological Association. His son was also successful, for after a few years with the Frontier Force Regiment he entered the Political Department and rendered fine service as High Commissioner in Egypt during the first World War.

Army officers, by their very calling, have a deep sense of public spirit, and many British Officers of the Indian Army have in the past entered the political life of Britain after their retirement. It is not possible to give a complete list, but among them let us begin with Brigadier-General Sir Robert Barker, Bt., who joined the Madras Artillery in 1753 and raised the old 24th Madras Native Infantry in 1776. His career in India ended, however, when he quarrelled with Warren Hastings, but after his arrival Home he entered Parliament as member for Wallingford. Sir John Call, Bt., formerly of the Madras Army and Chief Engineer in Madras, was M.P. for Callington in 1784; Lt.-Col. Baillie, ex-Resident of Lucknow represented Hendon in 1820, and Inverness, Scotland, in 1830.

Launceston had for its M.P. in 1831-32 a famous officer of the Madras Army and an ex-Governor of Bombay: Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm, K.C.B.; in 1808 and in 1810 he undertook important diplomatic missions to Persia in order to further the interests of India's security in Asia. Another Madras Infantry officer to become an M. P. was Major Sir James Rivett-Carnac, Bt., who was elected in 1837 and later became a Governor of Bombay.

Two champions of Indian Army interests in Parliament were Colonel Sir Charles Yate, K.C.B., C.M.G., formerly of the Baluch Regiment and the Political Department, and Major-General Sir Alfred Knox, K.C.B., C.M.G., who served in the Indian Army (originally in the 5th Bn. Frontier Force Rifles), from 1898 to 1920, and after four years in retirement was elected M.P. for Wycombe, retaining his membership in Parliament for some twenty-one years. General Knox, by the way, served as Military Attache in Russia in 1911, and wrote a book entitled "With the Russian Army, 1914-1917". But of recent years few Indian Army officers have entered politics, and as two years ago Parliament deprived serving Indian Army officers of their rights as absentee voters, they are a little inclined to regard themselves as neglected exiles.

Service in foreign armies has attracted some British Officers from time to time. Many of the East India Company's officers headed units of Shah Shuja's contingents in the first Afghan War. In 1833 some went to Persia to instil discipline into soldiers of the Persian Army, the second-in-command of the party

being Captain Sheil, of the then 3rd Bengal Native Infantry. Later he became British Envoy and Minister in Persia (1844-54), and died in 1871 as Major-General Sir Justin Sheil, K.C.B.

Many British Officers of the I. A. served with the Turkish Army in the Russo-Turkish War of 1854. One was Captain W.H.R. Green, of the Scinde Horse; he was present at Balaclava, Inkerman and Sebastopol as a Turkish Colonel; and later became Adjutant-General of Bashi-Bazouks in Asia Minor and Bulgaria. He retired as a Major-General, K.C.S.I. and C.B., in 1874, after fifteen years' political service following the Mutiny. Several British Officers of the Indian Army served with the British-raised South Persian Rifles in the first World War, among them being Major-General E. F. Orton, of the 37th (later 15th) Lancers.

An institution which is seldom mentioned these days, but which played an important part in the life of British Officers in the old days, was the famous College of Fort William, founded in Calcutta in 1800 for the instruction in oriental languages of young "writers" on coming to India to join the Honourable East India Company. Its students included British Officers, both civil and military. For decades the College took a leading part in the evolution of Urdu and Hindi prose, besides undertaking many translations and adaptations from the Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit classics.

Of the College's first eight permanent secretaries, no fewer than six were East India Company military officers. In 1854 the College was reconstituted as the Board of Examiners. Since that year all its secretaries, except one, have been appointed from the Indian Army, despite the fact that the Board belonged to the Education Department of the Government of India. The sole exception was an officer of the I.M.S.

It may be well to set on record the holders of the appointment of Secretary to the Board, for each has contributed in large measure to wider knowledge of oriental languages. From 1853 to 1868 Ensign (afterwards Major-General) W. Nassau Lees, L.L.D., late 42nd Bengal Native Infantry was secretary; he was followed by Major E. St. George, late of the Bengal European Infantry, who occupied the post from 1868 to 1870; for the next twenty-four years Captain H. S. Jarrett (afterwards Colonel), late 3rd Bengal European Regiment and P.A.V.O. Cavalry was secretary, being followed by Surgeon-Major (later Lieut-Colonel) G. S. A. Ranking, I.M.S., who occupied the office for eleven years.

From 1905 to 1912 Major (later Lieut.-Colonel) D. C. Phillott, of P.A.V.O. Cavalry was secretary, to be followed by Captain (afterwards Colonel) C. L. Peart, C.I.E. of the Hazara Pioneers. He was followed by Major (later Colonel) C. A. Boyle, C.I.E., D.S.O., who belonged to Probyn's Horse, and was a triple gold-medallist.

Lieut.-Colonel F. R. Gifford, O.B.E., of the 10th Gurkha Rifles, has held the office since 1938, and now that he is retiring, it is not unlikely that he will be the last of a long line of British secretaries of the Board. His task has probably been the most interesting of them all, for to him fell the work of adjudicating on the papers submitted by thousands of British Officers during the War in the Elementary Urdu examination.

Oriental language study is a field in which many officers have shown high proficiency. Sir Richard Burton, who served for over ten years in the Bombay Army, became a famous explorer of Central Africa; he was equally famous for his multi-lingual attainments and for his annotation of the Arabian Nights. Another field for linguists in India is the study of Pashto, which was the speciality

of Major H. G. Raverty, who joined the 1st Bn. The Mahratta Light Infantry in 1843, of Lieut.-Colonel D.L.R. Lorimer, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides, and of Lieut.-Colonel Sir George Roos-Keppl, Frontier Force Regiment.

Few officers, however, can equal the attainments of Lieut.-Colonel Geoffrey Wheeler, C.I.E., who speaks at least five European languages (including Russian), as well as Turkish, Persian, Urdu and Hindi!

Reference must also be made to Sir Henry C. Rawlinson (father of "Rawly"), who served as a young Ensign in the Bombay Army in 1827. Later he became a political officer and an expert on Persia and Central Asia, but he is best renowned as the decipherer in 1846 of the Persian cuneiform inscription of Darius Hystaspes at Behistun.

How often does perchance turn the course of an officer's career! The late Lieut.-Colonel C. Kaye, 21st Punjabis (14 Punjab Regiment) would not have shone as a cipher genius if his name had not mistakenly come forward in talk at Lord Kitchener's dinner table in Simla.

At that time, somewhere about 1907, a certain cipher was generally regarded as unbreakable. It was an unknown fact that a decade or so earlier a cheeky young gentleman at Sandhurst, with very slight aid from young Kaye, who was a brother cadet, had succeeded in piercing its secret. Kaye related story to a senior officer in China some years after that happening, and it was that senior officer who, again after an interval of a few years, repeated a garbled version of the story to Lord Kitchener.

Kaye was with his regiment at Jhelum when a sealed envelope arrived with a message in cipher, attached to which were instructions to attempt to solve it. Owing to some latent bent for cryptography he was at once successful. He was called to Simla, where he gained a wonderful reputation as a decipherer during the first World War of 1914-18. As a reward for his services perhaps, he was selected after that war as Director of Central Intelligence under the Government of India, an appointment which had always been a close preserve for the Indian Civil Service.

A few men of letters have emerged from officers who served in the Indian Army. One was Sir James Abbott, of the Bengal Artillery, and founder of Abbottabad, who had time to be a poet, antiquarian and man of letters, besides being an able Frontier administrator. Sir John Kaye, K.C.S.I., who wrote the "History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-58", served in the Bengal Artillery in 1832-41, and Colonel G. B. Malleson, C.S.I., was a Bengal Infantry officer who wrote much on Indian history.

Other military historians include Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Burton, who retired from the Kumaon Regiment (94th Russell's Infantry) after the first World War, and Major-General Sir Charles M. MacGregor, who wrote the history of the Second Afghan War, and whose name is further commemorated by the MacGregor Memorial Medal, awarded annually by the United Service Institution of India for the best military reconnaissance or journey of exploration during each year.

Finally, I would refer to the late Major Yeats-Brown, whose "Bengal Lancer" won for him a world-wide reputation; he gained the material for his book from his service in the Indian Cavalry.

My tailpiece belongs to General Sir James Brind (1808-1888), an officer of the Bengal Artillery from 1827. He commanded a battery at the Siege of Delhi in 1857, when it was said that his bravery ought to have earned a full-length covering of Victoria Crosses. He appears to have been brave in other ways, for he was married five times.

HOW THE JAPANESE ARE FACING OCCUPATION

BY MAJOR KASHMIR SINGH KATOCH, M.C.

"In humble contentment and yielding pliancy are to be found real grandeur and strength."—Lao Tse, 600 B. C.

IT must have struck the majority of us, particularly those who fought the Jap in the jungles of Burma and Malaya, as to why the occupation of Japan has been so peaceful. A study of the Japanese reactions to occupation and the method of dealing with the many unusual problems with which the Occupation Army has been faced should therefore be worth while.

Though Japan surrendered in the middle of August, 1945, it cannot be said to have been occupied, except in small parts, until about October, the first units of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) arriving in late February, 1946. From what can be gathered, the attitude of the civilian population was much the same in February as it had been during the previous October. People were still feeling stunned as a result of defeat, and though the fear of Allied troops had been eradicated to a great extent in the cities, there was still an element of fear amongst the rural population, who had not come into contact with the Occupation Forces.

The troops to occupy Japan, though received outwardly with some degree of welcome by the Japanese, found that the majority of the population tried to keep out of their way as much as possible. Having been told during the War of the horrors that would follow were Japan to be occupied, they naturally were not too anxious to be seen by the Occupation Forces. When it became obvious, however, that those Forces were not going to rape and plunder, the people as a whole went about their ways with little outward sign of emotion, other than wonder at the equipment and appearance of the troops.

By October 1945 this state of affairs was just about to change. Cases were cropping up of a surly attitude, lacking in respect, being displayed mainly by younger male elements loitering at street corners in devastated cities. A number of these people were incorporated into labour gangs to work for the Occupation Forces. They, however, formed only a small part of the population with whom troops came in contact. In the rural areas, where the people were not too frightened to be approached, the inhabitants were always more friendly and willing to give assistance than those in towns. First signs of fear soon passed, and patrols in the hinterland were very soon welcomed both by villagers and village officials.

Minor thefts from Army installations were about this time reaching their peak. Practically all these thefts were carried out by individuals hiding the odd can or bag, usually of foodstuffs, in their clothing or, in some cases, breaking into Unit lines and taking away small quantities of supplies. Those apprehended were handed over to the Japanese police and, after a certain amount of delay, were tried by Provost Courts.

As time passed the situation changed little. There were fluctuations in the efficiency of labour, which could be traced almost invariably to the degree of efficiency of supervision. The action of the Provost Courts reduced thefts considerably, and from outward appearances, though the Japanese had lost even

more of their fear and showed perhaps a little less outward sign of respect to the Occupation Forces, the difference in their attitude to-day and that in October November, 1945 is almost imperceptible.

The standard of morals amongst the Japanese people fell noticeably during the war particularly, according to the Japanese Press, in the few months after the surrender. Newspapers, magazines, and public speakers deplore the change, but consider it a natural reaction to defeat and the acute shortages which followed. Thefts, intimidation and robbery with violence increased considerably, and the Japanese police were at that time most unsure of their power and could take little action. Having been reassured by the Occupation Forces that they would be backed when they took action against offenders, the morale of police rose considerably and positive action was taken to a greater degree. However, the incidence of crime is still considerably above pre-war averages, which is to be expected when present unemployment figures are remembered.

Threats against the Occupation Forces and speeches and pamphlets denouncing the Occupation have been encountered in one or two instances. But the vast majority of the people are apathetic, and many consider that the Occupation has, in fact, benefited the country in that it forced the new Government to take action where it may not have had the initiative to do so without the guidance of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP). Unprovoked attacks against Occupation Force personnel and cases of sabotage which would affect the Occupation Forces have been very rare and, in most parts, patrols have been welcomed as friends rather than ostracised as oppressors.

The officials, with their generally higher standard of education, have on occasions proved obstructive, and in a number of cases have had to be removed from their official positions. On the whole, however, when given direct orders they have co-operated to the letter. Some persons in public positions, including police, were involved between the date of the surrender and the occupation of their area in illicit deals connected with the disposal of ex-Army and Navy supplies and, when investigations were carried out, devoted themselves to confusing the issue. In the confusion then reigning, with records that had been lost, destroyed or had never existed, work of those investigating the cases was made extremely difficult, and it is known that a great many Japanese involved in these cases are at large to-day, and in many cases still hold official positions owing to the fact that evidence could not be brought to bear on them.

Japanese officialdom had to change completely at the time of the surrender from a totalitarian system to one which was expected to be even more democratic than that in power in England and America. They had no real conception of the meaning of the word Democracy, and its various interpretations confused them not a little. Those who had a desire to please the victorious Powers by attempting to democratize their own sections and departments often lost the power they had previously held, and increased the degree of confusion which was the natural aftermath of the surrender.

Others simply could not believe that a real change in the system was expected, and continued their previous autocratic methods, which eventually brought them up against the policies of SCAP and Military Government. In particular, this state of affairs affected the police, who were afraid to take action against any offenders as it might be considered undemocratic; consequently they lost their power over the more unruly elements in their areas.

Added to this was the fact that many of the senior police officials either resigned or were removed from their positions, and were replaced by youths with

no training and fundamentally unsuited for the work. Pay in the Police Force was too low to induce the better and more educated types of Japanese to enrol, and consequently it was necessary for a certain amount of guidance to be given the police by the Occupation Force and, on occasions, back them with Allied arms.

Though this brought about a closer and more co-operative relationship between the police and the Occupation Forces, it was marred to some extent by the resentment of the older policemen, who would have preferred to continue their previous practices. On the whole, however, good co-operation resulted and in most areas the police, who are probably the most important officials as far as the Occupation Forces themselves are concerned, are working in with the Occupation Forces to the best of their ability.

The attitude of the majority of the population of Japan towards their own Government is one of acute criticism, but the efforts of the Occupation Forces to restore the country to some measure of stability is, in most parts, much appreciated, and food shipments from the United States which have helped to alleviate the shortage in Japan have been received gratefully by all sections of the populace.

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The occupation of Japan, compared to that of Germany, raises far fewer problems, mainly owing to the fact that the whole country is under the control of one Organisation and, in fact, one man—General Douglas MacArthur, who of course is guided by the State Dept., the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Military Council. All directives to the Japanese Government and orders to the Occupation Forces originate and are co-ordinated by SCAP and all policy matters are referred to SCAP. This eliminates the clashing of various policies so noticeable in Occupied Germany and, though less publicised, even more noticeable in Occupied Korea.

Under SCAP directions the Allied Military Government (AMG) checks on the activities of the various Japanese Governmental Agencies, and is responsible for seeing that SCAP directives are carried out throughout the country. All direct contact with Japanese officialdom, with the exception of contacts on non-policy matters with the police, are handled by AMG, who have various regional Headquarters controlling Prefectural Military Government teams both in the American-occupied and BCOF areas.

The Japanese people, immediately after the surrender, were too stunned by the sudden knowledge that they had lost the War, which the majority thought up to the last moment would somehow be won, to take concerted action against the Occupation Force, even had they wished to do so. It became apparent as they came out of this coma that they, in fact, wished for nothing more than to return to normal conditions with or without an Occupation Force in the country. Their natural diligence and obedience to Government control was an important and deciding factor, and it is remarkable, when their wartime record is studied, how few Japanese are really antagonistic to the Occupation.

On the other hand, a study of the short history of the Occupation will show that the Japanese have, in fact, lost little, and the firm policy of SCAP in the earlier stages of the Occupation, with its guidance to the new Japanese Government, undoubtedly saved the country to some extent from the chaos which would have been the normal aftermath of a defeat which involved the overthrow of the Government, together with the majority of those who had ruled the country in the past.

This does not, of course, mean that conditions in the country are anything like good compared to pre-war standards; but starvation has been averted, small industries have been restarted and, though complaints have been made time and again that the country lacked a long-range policy, it is questionable whether its future is any more vague than that of the majority of countries in the world to-day.

As a result, Japan to-day is a country where there is no reason why anyone should starve to death, though there is acute shortage of food; a country where a proportion of its industries have been re-established and whose productive capacity is increasing daily, though it is not without its labour troubles and unemployment; a country which is surprisingly willing to learn of a new way of life, whether the majority of people really wish to follow it or not; in fact, a country which, compared to many to-day, has very little to complain about. All this makes the work of the Occupation Forces easier.

There are, however, certain problems which have to be dealt with regularly. The foreign nationals in Japan, particularly Koreans and a section of the Chinese populace who have very few ties with China, but who have long-standing connections throughout Japan and areas which were previously controlled by Japan, have given a certain amount of trouble from the start.

Koreans, most of whom were uneducated labourers, suddenly found that they were members of an independent nation under the protection of the Allied Powers, and promptly started to retaliate against the Japanese for treatment, real and imagined, which they had received in the past. This was immediately stopped. It was made clear to the Koreans that they came under Japanese law.

The end of the War meant unemployment to the majority of Koreans in the country, and they became the main operators in the black market. This again caused a clash between them and the Japanese police, and the Occupation Forces have, on several occasions, been forced to uphold the jurisdiction of the Japanese police when dealing with unruly mobs of Koreans.

To a lesser extent the Chinese present the same problem; many of these are not in fact really Chinese, but are citizens of Formosa, ruled for a long time by the Japanese. Most of the Chinese in the country to-day would be classed as "collaborators" for their activities during the War, and it is amazing when checking on certain characters who are advocating Freedom, Youth Movements, etc., and who are taking high-handed action against and denouncing all that is Japanese, to find that during the War these same people were Japanese air force pilots and, in some cases, suicide pilots.

Though the vast majority of Japanese are carrying on their normal peacetime work in a quiet and orderly manner, and are proving in most cases a help rather than a hindrance to the resettlement of the country, there have been a number of officials who, in small ways, obstruct the working of the Military Government. Many of these have been implicated in various illegal financial transactions, though the number brought to trial has been relatively small owing to the difficulty of producing concrete evidence of their activities which, in most cases, involve the illegal seizure and re-sale of Japanese Army goods immediately after the surrender. On the whole, however, both police and officials carry out orders given them, though few volunteer assistance of their own accord.

Demobilised Japanese soldiers were expected to create a further problem, but the majority of these have settled down to farm life and are causing no trouble

whatsoever. A few have joined the ranks of the unemployed, but are not outstanding trouble-makers. Remarkably few voice militaristic opinions or show any signs of ultra-national sentiment, and almost all as they return merge into their normal background, and are indistinguishable in any way from Japanese who spent the War years in Japan.

In some cases, the return of Japanese ex-soldiers was not looked upon with great favour, but it is felt, that this was because they were considered as potential trouble-makers and the Japanese themselves did not think that they would fit in with the normal lives of the populace. This having been disproved in the vast majority of cases, they appear to have been given a better welcome lately, and are not expected, in the rural areas anyhow, to present any serious problem.

In the urban areas, however, a number of them are finding it extremely difficult to make a living, and it is not unlikely that, with the sense of initiative gained in their Army experience, these will present a problem until they can find some legitimate work by which they can earn a living. Associations with a preponderance of ex-Army members or which are led by ex-servicemen, are being carefully watched.

To date, however, there have been virtually none which have advocated policies contrary to those laid down by SCAP, the majority being organisations to assist ex-service personnel in obtaining work and ideological societies with the avowed aim of democratising Japan and raising its moral standards. The Occupation Forces are not blind to the possibility of these aims being a mere cover for illegal secret societies but, as stated before, there is no reason to believe to date that the Societies are other than as they are represented.

The keeping of a constant check on individuals suspected of hindering Occupation policies, organisations which might be subversive, and officials suspected of misusing their status, is no light task. Local guards, guards on communications, particularly those dealing with the repatriation of non-Japanese Nationals, organisation of repatriation centres, training, and normal military activities, more than fill the programmes of Infantry Battalions, but there cannot be said to be any real harassing problems confronting the Occupation Forces with regard to their role in Japan. The work they do in most cases is interesting and sufficient in quantity to keep both officers and men fully occupied.

CONCLUSION.

An Occupational army can never be entirely welcome in the country which it is occupying. The lack of antagonism, however, and the co-operation by the Japanese who, being an extremely shrewd people, have realised that the only way to reconstruct their country is to be on the right side of the United Nations, have greatly facilitated matters. General MacArthur's work has further been made easy by the fact that the splitting of the country into zones of occupation, which has proved so unsatisfactory in Europe, has been avoided.

As time goes on, the resentment against the Occupation is liable to increase, but it is not felt that any great degree of positive action will be taken against the occupiers, though the Japanese, with their fanatical outlook on life, could make things unpleasant should they make up their mind to do so.

Up to now they appear to be following the famous Chinese saying quoted at the beginning of this article. What they will do once the Occupation Army leaves the country is a matter of conjecture.

THE N.E.I.: SOME LESSONS FROM OUR OCCUPATION

BY MAJOR-GENERAL J.F.R. FORMAN, C.B.E., D.S.O.*

IT is too early to produce anything approaching a carefully considered account of the operations of Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies in 1945-46. There are, however, certain lessons already apparent, and I think it is not a bad thing to record them while they are fresh in my memory, as jobs such as we have been doing in N.E.I. may well have to be carried out again as part of our contribution to the success of the U.N.O.

At the risk of boring those who know, I will recapitulate very briefly the course of events during our occupation of fourteen months from September 1945 to November 1946. Otherwise the reasons behind the lessons may not be clear.

The N.E.I. baby, which had been somewhat neglected by the Americans—its foster-parents—before the end of the Japanese War, was unceremoniously dumped in our lap within a few days of the war ending. To continue the simile, it was handed over without pram, cot, bottle, nappies, comforter or, in fact, any of the things essential for a baby's well-being. In consequence, our nursing of it in the early stages was not at all motherly; rather could it be likened to the efforts of an elderly, unmarried, well-meaning but blundering uncle, and the brat's resulting squawks echoed round the world.

In other words, we were short of shipping, we had no N.E.I. "experts" to help us, we had no clues about the behaviour of the 150,000 Japanese troops, we were vague regarding numbers, condition and whereabouts of A.P.W.I. (Allied prisoners of war and internees), and information was scanty and out-of-date about food-stocks, ports, communications and pretty well everything else we should have known. Worst of all, we thought that the Indonesians were pleasant, idle, amenable "natives", a very small and unimportant number of whom might be tainted with Jap-inspired, revolutionary ideals. In short, our "I" was shocking, though, in this case, the blame lay principally with the Americans.

And so we drifted into the main ports of the N.E.I. in dribs and drabs with the avowed object of disarming and removing the Japanese and of rescuing and succouring the A.P.W.I. In true British style, we embarked on this monumental project with one battalion here, one there and one somewhere else, and with this brave show of Might we proceeded to accept the surrender of tens of thousands of first-class, well-equipped and unbeaten Japanese troops and to set about carrying out our two tasks.

Luck was on our side for a time. Gradually we increased our numbers in Batavia (West Java), Medan (N. E. Sumatra) and Padang (West Sumatra) and, thereafter, spread out to Soerabaja (East Java), Semarang (Central Java) and Palembang (the oil town of South Sumatra) and moved inland from Batavia to Buitenzorg and Bandoeng. In the doing of it, however, we met resistance, not from the Japanese, but from the Indonesians themselves, whose organization, equipment and fighting prowess were far greater than we had expected. The Japanese, except for some formations in East and Central Java who handed over their arms, etc., to the Indonesians, behaved correctly, which was lucky for us.

The Indonesians, at first but loosely organized and ill-trained and owing sketchy allegiance to innumerable private armies, seemed to our surprise really to be inspired with the determination to achieve independence. Soekarno (the President) and his companions, many of them Japanese collaborators, had used the occupation and, more still, the lull between the end of the War and our arrival to good purpose.

Violent fighting took place at Soerabaja, where our leading brigade, not expecting anything but weak opposition, were somewhat dispersed in their efforts to afford protection to the R.A.P.W.I. ("recovered" A.P.W.I.) and, consequently, took heavy casualties. Elsewhere, too, there was heavy fighting of varying intensity. In Semarang the situation was saved at one time by a Japanese battalion which had marched fully armed and disciplined away from its formation, which was engaged at the time in handing over its arms to the Indonesians in the interior. Many Dutch people owe their lives to this unit—the Kidai Butai—which itself suffered some one hundred casualties from its "cobelligerency".

In addition to showing considerable bravery in action, the Indonesians showed some skill in handling modern weapons, particularly A.A. guns—though they besmirched their name by committing some peculiarly bestial atrocities, such as cold-blooded and brutal murder of individuals and prisoners of war. The butchery of the men who escaped from a crash-landed Dakota at Bekasi—near Batavia—led to particularly bitter feelings amongst our own troops and, subsequently, to the penal destruction of the village. There were similar foul and senseless crimes in Sumatra.

Gradually, however, the military situation was brought under control, though nowhere—except on the one hundred mile L. of C. from Batavia to Bandoeng—did our influence spread beyond the restricted confines of our bridge-heads at the principal ports. In these, perimeters were established and, in most cases, were slowly pushed out and extended in the interests of safety of those living in them.

Fighting of greater or lesser extent had flared up here and there at short intervals. After Soerabaja, Semarang; then came battles on the L. of C. to Bandoeng; then slight trouble at Padang and Palambang and Padang again; then Medan had its turn; and Soerabaja and Semarang and occasionally West Java had further spasms. Even the beautiful Bali—garrisoned from the start by Dutch troops—had its spot of bother, though luckily not sufficiently serious to prevent our making use of a small holiday centre in the island.

In April, 1946, the Dutch took over in Soerabaja and Semarang and later established themselves in Bandoeng, with H. Q. and a few units in Batavia. As I write—mid-November—we are in the process of being finally relieved by a new Dutch Division from Holland and we shall all be away by the end of the month. Reliefs by Dutch troops have usually led to a flare-up of military activity, but we are now holding thumbs and expecting a quiet hand-over of our final commitments, with a truce and, maybe, a full political settlement in sight.

The fighting has been intense at times—intense and bitter. Generally speaking the men have not wanted to fight; it has been forced upon them. We have had some 2,500 casualties in just over a year. The 23rd Indian Division have had, I believe, more casualties than they had in their spell of Assam fighting during the war. That is tough for a peace-time job undertaken principally on behalf of someone else! No, it has not been all beer and skittles, though,

in contrast, life in the big towns has been gay and almost hectic, and casualties from V. D. have far outnumbered battle casualties.

On the whole the Indian soldier likes and sympathizes with the Indonesians and does not like the Dutch, many of whom have treated him tactlessly and without gratitude for an unpleasant job well done for their benefit. The British soldier—a small minority—has no violent feelings one way or the other, and, when not fighting, has kept himself well-occupied with grouching about release and entertaining his most attractive Dutch girl-friend. The relations between British and Dutch at the top have been good. Lower down the scale, however, there have naturally been friction and differences of opinion. By and large I think we have done an unenviable job well and, now that we are off, there are signs that Dutch and Indonesians think so too.

This is—briefly—the story. I will not attempt to discuss the rights and wrongs of the situation nor where the blame lies for things that have gone wrong. We are still too much mixed up in it to have a detached, fully objective view. Faults there have been—political and military—on all sides. I shall only comment indirectly on ours by pointing the lessons, and I shall not presume to criticize the Dutch.

Well, here are the six main lessons as I see them.

1. INTELLIGENCE:—If one is to start off on the right foot, "I" must be up-to-date and accurate. There is too much emphasis on "flora and fauna" in our 'I' tomes and too little on real military intelligence. If I may be so presumptuous as to suggest reforms, I would recommend smaller 'I' staffs (too many officers leads to too much bumph) and more experienced, practical soldiers in the set-up. 'I' must also beware of the tendency to become too private-army-ish and "specialist". There's no black magic about it and the tendency to be very secretive and hush-hush really defeats the object of the whole thing. Some reform is needed.

2. TELLING THE TRUTH:—Even if it may cause initial temporary embarrassment, an army of occupation should be absolutely straight and open about its object. It was soon clear that, in addition to dealing with Japanese and A.P.W.I., we intended to stay in the N.E.I. until the Dutch had sufficient troops available to take over our commitments. We continued to deny hotly, however, that we were holding the fort for our allies long after it was patent to the wooliest Indonesian (or Russian) that that was exactly what we were doing!

This led to distrust of our intentions and veracity and made our (the soldiers') task far more difficult than it need have been. We are inherently too honest, and may be too stupid, to attempt to deceive Orientals. It is far better to come clean from the start; and that applies to what you tell your own troops as well as to what the political authorities tell the interested parties.

3. POLITICAL SET-UP:—A high-grade political adviser must be part of the Commander's staff from the word "go". He must have no other duties. He must be fully *au fait* with the problem and with the background. One would think this lesson was obvious, but our experience proves otherwise.

4. DON'T UNDER-ESTIMATE YOUR OPPONENT:—Whatever the situation may be and whatever pressure may be applied to the contrary, troops must be used as soldiers and not as police. Every normal military precaution must be taken *all the time*, and, when fighting starts, punches must not be pulled. Use every advantage you have. Never restrict the use of air or artillery. Strike quickly and strike hard. It will lead to quicker results and fewer casualties and less material damage *for both sides*.

Having used maximum force and taught the enemy his lesson, try to prevent a recurrence of trouble by consultation and discussion and practical remedies. Do not stir up more trouble by a policy of pin-pricking, *e.g.*, unnecessary patrolling, searches, arrests, restrictions, etc. In other words, hit only when you have to, but then hit hard with both fists; stop as soon as your opponent is down; pick him up again, dust him off and hand him his hat. Then sit down and talk it over, but never relax your precautions or allow yourself to be caught napping or out of training.

5. **GET BEHIND YOUR ENEMY:**—Exploit the ill-disciplined troops' well-known aversion from feeling surrounded or cut off from their base. In action, get behind them by flanking movements, and they will start looking over their shoulders and eventually bolt. In defence, quite small posts, well dug, wired-in and stocked up, placed on or near lines of approach to your perimeter, will prevent infiltration into the built-up areas within a bridgehead—not because they can stop the enemy's inward movement but because he hates to feel that his retreat may be cut off.

6. **DISCIPLINE:** Empire troops employed in occupational roles are very much in the limelight; what they do receives publicity and is very noticeable; to many people in the countries concerned, they are the only Empire representatives they have ever seen—they judge their countries of origin by the way they, the troops, behave. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that their behaviour should be good. But in the N.E.I. and, I believe, in other occupied countries, there have been numberless cases of disgraceful conduct on the part of our troops—looting, robbery, extortion, bribery, offences against women and soon. These have been alarmingly detrimental to the reputation of our troops and of our race as a whole.

This is very serious and is largely due to lack of easily-taken precautions and to a serious falling off in all Services of that essential to the success of any army (or navy or air force)—old-fashioned discipline. I need not stress this, as I am sure that every experienced officer realizes it and sees that discipline has got to be rigorously tightened up, however much ill-informed and noisy opinion may be against it.

In addition to this, troops must be carefully and continuously briefed on the importance of good behaviour and there must be exemplary punishment of the first offenders, unshackled by the legal quibblings that are allowed nowadays to delay and vitiate the full application of military law. Requisitioning drill must be prepared and fully understood and breaches of it heavily punished. Curfew must be imposed and rigidly enforced.

Provost, and F.S. Section personnel and all other officers and men engaged in disciplinary and investigating duties must be absolutely hand-picked and their work must be closely supervised by commanders and staff. Too often, I fear, have such personnel been engaged in dishonest ventures of one sort or another, resulting in complete collapse of the disciplinary edifice. "Private armies" of all sorts must be "floated" and turned into "public" concerns, and be susceptible to supervision by commanders and staffs, in the same way as any other units.

And, lastly, all troops, particularly those of smaller administrative units, must be kept busy at work and play, and pride must be fostered in their work by close attention to minor discipline—saluting, turn-out and personal bearing. Slack, slovenly, idle troops are ripe for trouble and are, in themselves, a bad advertisement for their unit, their Service and their nation.

A "HOME" NEWS-LETTER

By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DASHWOOD STRETTELL, K.C.I.E., C.B.

THE *U. S. I. Journal* seems to improve in its contents with every issue and must be very useful to the hundreds of young Indian Officers now joining the Services. Personally I would prefer a quieter cover*, with plain black or white lettering on a cream background with, probably, the coat of arms in colour. In the opinion of others whom I have consulted that would be better than the one now adopted.

In your October, 1946, issue I read with much interest the articles by "Mouse" and "Cecil Varcus", both of whom confirmed much that I have written you during the last two years. With so many who will be returning to England in the next year or so, I would like again to emphasise what should be brought home. People in India do not yet seem to realise that not only is there a shortage of things at Home, but even those articles which are in the shops can only be obtained on coupons or docketts.

Furniture, except second-hand, blankets, sheets, etc., are only obtainable on docketts which are strictly regulated, and generally only obtainable by those who have recently been married or were bombed out. The strictness of these allocations is exemplified by Sir Stafford Cripps's remark that his toe went through his sheets!

Clothing coupons are issued to last six or seven months, and number about thirty. Against this a suit of clothes means giving up 20 coupons, a greatcoat 18, a vest 3, a shirt (utility) 5, fully-fashioned 7, shoes 7, etc., etc. So it will be seen that there are not many to play with. The answer is to bring all your rugs, curtains, loose covers, dusters, dish cloths, men's underclothing, socks, soap and cooking pots—in fact, don't throw away anything.

Crockery, and glass are practically unobtainable, and when they are obtainable only at prohibitive prices. Furniture—excepting utility, which is not very nice to look at and is only obtainable on docket—can be bought by degrees at auctions. If you have time and can visit the country auctions, and store for some months the articles you buy, it is the best way to furnish. But even at those auction prices have risen lately.

We were lucky, as we were lent a house for eighteen months, and my wife went to a country sale, somewhere in the vicinity of our temporary home, *every week*, picking up things as best she could. That was two years ago, and we were able thus to furnish our large flat for £450. We had it valued for insurance last October. The furniture was valued at over £3,000, including our few rugs and one carpet which we had brought home.

Floor coverings are terribly difficult to get, so if you have any linoleum, floor felt, *numdahs*, rugs, carpets, etc., bring them with you. I cannot over-emphasise the points I have referred to. We had hoped that conditions would improve this year, but the coal crisis and the shutting down of factories will definitely postpone the appearance of consumer goods on the market.

Silver cups one used to be so proud of, teapots, salvers, etc., are a nuisance to keep clean—and being the "butler" I can testify to this! London air seems to discolour silver within twenty-four hours of cleaning. If, however, you have any extra mustard pots, salt-cellars, etc., they are useful as wedding presents, as such things are most costly to purchase.

* We are very glad the writer has referred to the cover, but we must in fairness admit that this is only the second adverse comment we have received.—*Ed., U.S.I. Journal.*

Husbands have their full share of housework. Let me illustrate this by an incident which occurred at a large party we attended a short time ago. We noticed an ex-Ambassador and a well-known diplomat deeply engrossed in conversation, and wondered what world-shaking secrets they were discussing. It was amusing to hear them say as we passed by: "Well, you really think that the best thing with which to clean the bath is 'Gumption'?" Maybe a few of you in India have heard of this cleaning material, but it is the sort of thing which, interspersed with remarks on the weather and the political situation, forms the subject of most of our conversation.

The cost of living rises steadily, and wages follow suit. It is all a vicious circle, and the burden falls very heavily on pensioners. Casual wages are terribly high. In London one pays half a crown an hour for a charwoman. Incidentally this is the wage of a first-class carpenter, unless it has been raised in the last few weeks! Those in the supertax class are all living on capital, and in the future few big houses will be occupied—a loss in many ways to the country.

Foreign *female* servants can now be obtained. The official application should get results within about three months, but there is no guarantee as to whether the individual you get is capable and hard-working. Passages, both ways, must be paid for beforehand. In the first instance, the employment is for one year, after which a fresh application must be made for the retention of the servant. Wages must not be less than those current for British employees.

Certainly the heroines of Britain are the housewives, and the palm must be awarded to those who belong to the upper middle class who, before the war, never cooked a meal and had little knowledge of housework. Now they are 'at it' all day long, either cooking, dusting, washing up—and added to all that two or three hours queueing. One dare not think of what would happen if the wife goes sick. Certainly she is more valued than ever before, and her health is a major anxiety—to the husband!

In the country, in some ways, things are better than in the towns; vegetables are more plentiful, and sometimes you can get a few eggs, while most shopkeepers deliver once a week. In London, unless you are a pre-war inhabitant, the only deliveries made to you are milk daily, and groceries once a week. As we have only been in our flat for twenty months the baker won't deliver bread. On the other hand, fish is plentiful in London, and often unobtainable in the country. As we have fish daily, it is a great help in the menu.

Some weeks ago the so-called "rebellion" among Labour M.Ps. took place in the debate on foreign affairs. It was ill-timed, however, and must have added considerably to Mr. Bevin's already difficult task. Even with the coal crisis coming to a head, results of by-elections have not shown any real swing-over to the Conservatives; though usually the latter's votes have increased slightly, it has had little effect on Labour majorities. Liberals still refuse to make common cause with the Conservatives against the Labour candidates, and that merely divide the Opposition votes.

A year ago there was a desire among young Conservatives to make a combined front against the Labour Party. It was suggested that a new name might help. The proposal was carried by a considerable majority at the Conservative Rally in Blackpool on the penultimate day. But the idea has faded away, and one can only suppose that it was cold-shouldered by the somewhat die-hard Conservative headquarters. Some argue that a change of name to the Conservative Party is impossible—yet it might be remembered that it was only in the middle

of the nineteenth century that that name was substituted for "Tory". Moreover, while there have been few Conservative ministries, there have been Liberal Unionists and Coalition governments. Except to the die-hards, the general impression among the masses of the people—and they are *the* important political factor, the term "Conservative" conveys little but "conservation of privilege"!

Three months ago I was told by several big men in business that there would certainly be an economic crisis by beginning of March, due mainly to production outstripping coal supply. The cold spell in February, which badly interfered with mine production of coal, accelerated the economic crisis. Criticism of Government was bitter. Why, people declared, if business men foresaw the crisis coming, did the Government not realise it? Such critics assert that either co-ordination was lacking, planning non-existent, or a gamble on pulling through was taken.

However, we are well in it now, and at last effective control has been taken, but output has been more than seriously interfered with and our economic future looks grim. Food supplies have, so far, not been greatly interrupted, but are threatened, and our austerity is indefinitely prolonged. An unofficial strike of transport workers caused great inconvenience—and their success led many to say that some more rapid way of dealing with disputes in this country is imperative.

Our Defence Ministry has not yet got into working order, but it has great possibilities, strategically, tactically and administratively.

We all watch the news we get from India with interest and sympathy, and pray that there will be a happy issue out of it all. All Service people are intensely interested in the future roles of the Units in the Indian Army and their composition. Can the Editor give us a line?

General Gracey Appointed Indian Signals Commandant

Lt.-Gen. D. D. Gracey, Commander of 1st Indian Corps, has been appointed Colonel Commandant of the Indian Signal Corps in succession to General Sir Robert Cassells, who has vacated this appointment of reaching the age limit.

General Gracey led the 20th Division in their triumphs against the Japanese in Burma. He was appointed to command 15th Corps in April last year, and shortly afterwards officiated as G. O. C.-in-C., Northern Command.

Majumdar Trophy for Best R.I.A.F. Pupil-Pilot

Presented to the Royal Indian Air Force by Mrs. K. K. Majumdar in memory of her late husband, Wing Commander Majumdar, a special trophy is being awarded for the first time to the best all-round pupil-pilot of the year at the Advanced Flying Training School, Ambala. The "Majumdar Trophy," as it is known, consists of a heavily chased eagle, nine inches in height, in old silver on a teakwood black polished plinth of three tiers.

Born in 1913 Wing Commander Majumdar, who lost his life in a flying accident during a display at Lahore in 1945, was one of the first Indian Cadet officers to attend the R.A.F. College at Cranwell. He saw service in two theatres of war, being awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross during the Burma campaign and a Bar to the decoration while operating from a base in Britain.

THE MOST HAUNTED HOUSE IN SIMLA

BY "HYDERABAD"

I HAVE three versions of this story—one of them at first-hand. Only one of them has previously been published, in *Nine-Fifteen from Victoria*, by Victor Bayley, C.I.E., C.B.E. (London, 1937, pp. 207-212). I will summarise Mr. Bayley's story first.

In October, 1913 he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Railway Board at Simla. Arriving there, he and his wife went in search of a house and, attracted by the low rent, took "Charleville", but soon learnt that it was afflicted by a poltergeist. The late occupant was an Army officer who afterwards rose to a high position in the service. When this officer and his wife had a friend, a lady who was psychic, to stay with them at "Charleville", strange things began to happen.

The officer put the matter to the test by sealing up the room where the poltergeist disturbances were most frequent, but before long there was a tremendous crash and it was found that everything in the room had been turned upside down. Then he—a devout Catholic—called in a priest, who is said to have ridiculed the whole affair and not to have tried to exorcize the "ghost". So the officer prayed himself, and as he did so a vessel of water was thrown over him. There was no other result, and the phenomena continued. He then vacated the house in despair, and the disturbances ceased at once.

The Bayleys occupied "Charleville" for a year. No poltergeist activity took place, but there was one abnormal event. One night a reliable Muslim servant waited up for the return of his employers from a dinner party, and as he did so he became aware that there was a *sahib* in the room. Rising to his feet, he asked what the *sahib* wanted. The European, without replying, slowly walked away through a closed door. The servant reported that he was in fancy dress, wearing clothes like his present employer's evening tail-coat but with a scarf round his neck—in fact, such a costume as was worn in the middle of the last century.

The next tenants, after the Bayleys, were a Sapper officer and his wife. (For convenience of reference I may here add that the officer who preceded the Bayleys was named P—, and the Sapper was H—. Bayley does not give any names or initials. I have the actual names but do not give them in full: the initials are the correct ones. H— died of wounds received in Gallipoli in 1915). The H—s had a daughter, five years old, and once she inquired why Mummy was always so unkind to the nice man who came and stood behind Mummy's chair. After tactful questioning, her father was satisfied that the little girl had actually seen the figure of a man, dressed in the style of eighty years before, standing behind her mother's chair, not once, but many times.

The H—s had no other unusual experiences, and lived in "Charleville" for the rest of their time in Simla. The next occupants were the Japanese Consul and his wife. The poltergeist came into play with such vigour that the Japs left the house after three weeks. It is said that it then stood empty for many years.

Mr. Bayley concludes by speculating whether there may have been some connexion between these occurrences and the fact that Simla's oldest Christian burial-ground adjoins the garden of "Charleville".

* * * * *

My next version has been given to me by Miss C——, who has lived at Simla for many years and was personally acquainted with many of the tenants, and at least one owner, of "Charleville". The following is summarised from a shorthand note of Miss C——'s story.

When Colonel and Mrs. P—— had the house their cousin Miss S—— came to stay with them. One night they all three returned from a party at Viceregal Lodge to find their old bearer and other servants sitting, as if on guard, outside the house, with lanterns. Colonel P—— inquired what the matter was. Had there been burglars?

"No, *sahib*, come with me," replied the bearer, "I will tell you, I do not want the *memsahib* to hear." He went aside with the bearer, and when he came back his wife asked him what the trouble was. He told her that the bearer had reported that he had seen a man—a European—go into Miss S——'s bedroom, but though the servants had searched the house they could find no trace of him.

Mrs. P—— asked her husband what he proposed to do, and it was agreed that their niece ought not to sleep in the room. They decided to put her in her aunt's room for the night, and it was suggested that Colonel P—— should occupy Miss S——'s bedroom and be prepared to tackle the intruder should he again put in an appearance. But he refused, and went to bed in the drawing-room.

A quiet night was had by all, and at 7.30 a.m. tea was brought. They all then felt that the bearer must have been dreaming. Miss S—— went into her room with a view to having a bath, and then Mrs. P—— heard loud shrieks from the bathroom. Rushing in, she found her niece standing up in the bath, wrapped in a towel and still screaming. Asked why she was behaving like this, Miss S—— replied, "Can't you see they are throwing cold water over me?" To which Mrs. P—— declared that she could not see anything of the sort, or even that the towel was wet, but the girl continued to behave as if water was being thrown at her.

From this time onward something odd was always happening at "Charleville". If the P——s were giving a party and Mrs. P—— went into the dining-room just before dinner to see that the table was in order, she would find the flowers taken from the vases and put before the guests' places; and so on. The whole of Simla was buzzing with these events. (At the time my informant Miss C—— was living at "Erneston", almost next door). The popular belief was that a majority of the servants was combining to exhibit a grievance against one of their number. A Major H—— of the Royal Engineers was particularly firm in this theory, and said that he would prove that it was correct.

H—— therefore asked the P——s to invite him to dinner, with his wife, and then suggested that they should make a complete inventory of the contents of the dining-room which was a centre of the phenomena. This was done, and the room was immediately sealed. In the morning the H——s came over to "Charleville" to examine the room, and found all seals intact, when H—— said, "I told you so—now you will find everything as it was last night." The seals were broken, they all entered the room, and they found that everything was disarranged and some small objects were missing. These were subsequently found in a godown.

H—— then abandoned his theory and declared that it must be a poltergeist. He was a Protestant, the P——s were Roman Catholics. A priest came

to exorcize the "ghost", sprinkled holy water, said the prescribed prayers, and affirmed that all would now be well, they would have no further trouble. Immediately satirical laughter was heard, coming from behind the priest. He whipped round but no one was there.

The P——s could stand it no longer, and moved to "Woodall Cottage", nearly three miles away from "Charleville". Amongst the last batch of their effects to be moved over to their new house was a planchette. When it arrived, they found that on it was written, "I am——[the name was given to Miss C——, but she cannot now remember it]. I murdered my wife in this house. I am buried in the cemetery above here. I am earthbound. Please pray for me".

A Mrs. C——y, who had taken much interest in the whole affair, went to the cemetery in an attempt to get to the truth of the matter. She could not find any inscription with the name which had been on the planchette. But as there were many nameless graves, she inspected the church registers, and there she found the name. This made her feel that there must be some truth in the story.

Meanwhile the P——s remained in "Woodall Cottage". Mrs. P—— is said to have been very psychic, and to have encountered many spirits in the roads. One day when passing the old cemetery just above "Charleville" she was joined by the spirit of that house, who walked beside her rickshaw, thanked her for having released him by her prayers, and said that he was that day passing on to another sphere.

Nothing more was seen or heard in the matter till the LeM——s took "Charleville". They had a daughter about six years old. One evening her mother was reading to her when the child quickly looked round to the door leading to the dining-room, as if she had heard someone. Her mother asked what the matter was, and the child said that a man was standing in the doorway. On her mother objecting that she could see nothing, the little girl said that it was a man wearing evening clothes "like Daddy's". When Mrs. LeM—— persisted that she could see nothing, her daughter said that she couldn't, either, as the figure had now passed out of the room.

This is the last incident reported from "Charleville". Perhaps it took place about 1914. The house was bought by a Mrs. A—— who lived in it for many years and experienced nothing. She is still in Simla in 1947. Some years ago she sold the house to an Indian gentleman, after telling him that it was supposed to be haunted. He observed that he did not think that the ghosts would trouble him, and as far as I know they have not done so. Under his ownership "Charleville" has been reconstructed and much enlarged, and now has little resemblance to its former shape.

* * *

My first instinct, when I learnt of the two stories which have been set out above, was to try to find out if there was any factual background to "the gentleman in evening dress", for he seemed to offer a better field for research than the poltergeist's tricks. The point of attack seemed to be his identity, which was alleged to have been disclosed (by himself) in the planchette message, and to have been verified by Mrs. C——y from the church register.

I thought that my luck was in, for Mrs. C——y's son is well-known to me, and I knew that I could get into touch with her in England. At my instance her son wrote to her, without prompting from me as to the details of the "Charleville" story. Here is her reply:—

"During 1913 and previously, it was inhabited by a Major P—— and his wife. A niece came out to stay with them, in their spare room. Then the trouble began. She complained that cold water would be thrown over her in her bath, or the contents of the clothes basket scattered on the floor, the pictures turned with faces to the wall, or the pillows thrown off the bed. She saw the ghost once or twice—a sad-faced man, in old-fashioned evening dress.

"Guests dining with the P——s were so interested that they used to get Mrs. P—— to lock up and seal the rooms before dinner, when everything was straight. When leaving the bungalow, Mrs. P——s would unlock the rooms, and they could see for themselves often (but not always) the pillows on the floor, and other manifestations.

"The P——s were Roman Catholics, and finally when things became so bad, they asked the priest to come up to the bungalow and exorcize the ghost. This he did before them, earnestly praying that its tortured soul might be at rest. After that, the manifestations ceased.

"Major P—— made inquiries, and found that a man who lived in the bungalow in the eighteen-forties (I think) had cut his throat in the bathroom. When the P——s left, Mr. and Mrs. Bayley lived in the house, and no ghostly manifestations occurred."

* * * * *

Both Mr. Bayley's and Miss C——'s narratives suggest a connexion between the phenomena and the fact that the garden of the house adjoins the oldest cemetery in Simla. Mr. Bayley merely observes that if there was any connexion it might be something to do with the Codrington graves, which will be described presently. In Miss C——'s version much more detail is given. We are told that the message on the planchette, after giving the writer's name, definitely stated that he had murdered his wife in the house, and that he was buried in the cemetery above it.

I have examined this cemetery, and its history, with some care. It contains some 35 graves or tombs. There may be another five unmarked graves, but there can scarcely be room for more. Existing epitaphs commemorate 28 persons. Some tombs lack any inscription, and one is a cenotaph commemorating a Captain Ford who died in Peshawar. There are thus inscriptions recording 27 burials in the cemetery, and from other sources I have recovered three additional names of persons who lie in unnamed graves. Thus the identity of 30 persons buried here is known, and there may have been half-dozen more.

The earliest date of death is 28th May, 1829, and the latest 27th May, 1842. But this graveyard went out of general use at the end of 1840. The Cart Road cemetery which superseded it was consecrated on 24th October, 1840, and was used for all interments in and after 1841, *except* for those of Mrs. Codrington and her four children who died in 1841-42 and are buried in this old cemetery. The reason for this exception being made for the Codrington's is not known: it is of course possible that the family lived very near the burial-ground, and that this was the cause of their being buried there. I return to this point later.

The burial register of Christ Church, Simla, only begins on 20th August, 1838, and even for some years after that there was no resident chaplain at the station. Earlier burials were no doubt conducted by laymen unless a clergyman happened to be in Simla on a visit. Thus the register only covers the last two years in which this cemetery was in general use, and records the burials of only nine out of the 27 persons named in existing epitaphs, as well as of two infant

children in respect of whom no epitaph can now be found. A search through the deaths announced in the *East India Register*, issued annually in the 1830's, has not disclosed any additional names of persons who died at Simla.

The first point that emerged from this examination of these names is that the 30 known persons do not include any husband and his wife, which goes against the planchette writing which is stated to have alleged that the husband after murdering his wife was buried in the old cemetery. (If he were buried there, his wife who died in Simla before him must also necessarily have been buried there too, for there was no other place at this period where she could have been interred in Simla). Ten of the 30 were adult males, and three were married women: all the rest were very young children.

It would be tedious to set out all the names, but a good deal is known of most of the adults, who alone are relevant. Seven of the ten men were officers of the Bengal Army, regarding whose careers and families much information is accessible. It is not in the least likely that any one of these murdered his wife. Moreover, at least two of them never married, and the wife of another survived her husband by forty years. The eighth man was a Major of the British Cavalry, to whom the same remarks apply. The ninth was a bombardier of the Bengal Artillery, aged 25, who even if he was married (as to which nothing is or probably ever will be known) is most unlikely to have been in occupation of the haunted house. The tenth man was a hardware merchant from Meerut, aged only 21, and equally unlikely to have been married or to have lived in the house. The probability is that he was merely on a business visit to Simla.

The three married women simply do not come into the picture. One, the wife of a Captain Wyllie, died in 1840: her husband retired in 1851 and died in 1872. Another was the first wife of Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, who was a captain when she died and who outlived her by nearly sixty years. The third was Mrs. Codrington, of whom more later. There is not the slightest reason for supposing that the husband or wife (if any) of any of these 13 adults also died in Simla. Most of the husbands and wives are definitely known to have died elsewhere. Thus the planchette writing, even if one disregards its most striking feature, the "murder", lacks all corroboration.

I will conclude by dealing with the faint suggestion that the Codrington family may have some connexion with the affair. Mrs. Codrington, who was a daughter of the Rector of Kilve in Somerset, died on 21st June, 1841. Three of her children, aged 4, 3, and nearly two years, had died in the preceding April and May, and the youngest child also died in Simla in May, 1842, aged about eighteen months. Her husband, a well-known staff officer, was severely wounded at the battle of Moodkee on 18th December, 1845, and eventually died of his wounds, on board the ship *WELLESLEY* at sea in the Indian Ocean, on 22nd January, 1847, while proceeding on sick leave to the Cape of Good Hope.

There is no evidence that the Codrington's ever occupied the haunted house. On the question why five members of the Codrington family—and they alone, so far as can be ascertained—were buried in the old cemetery in 1841-42, when the new Cart Road graveyard had been opened, it seems to me that only the burial of the first child to die is involved. For, once one child had been buried there, it would be natural for the other ones and for their mother, to be laid beside it.

I have met with more than one instance of a cemetery in India being kept open—especially in the Hills, where space is more confined—for the burial of

infants for many years after it had been closed for the interment of adults, for the practical reason that infants can be interred in small corner plots, or in between rows of earlier graves, where there would not be room for adult burials. I have known this done in Simla itself. If this is what happened, the burial of the first child to die would have no special significance, and as all the Codrington interments were in the far lower corner of the cemetery, the sloping ground may have been extended (if that were necessary) to make room for Mrs. Codrington's grave; or, of course, a vault may have been constructed by excavation. Indeed, the appearance of the tomb, which is curious and partly modern, for it now has a shelter-roof of galvanised iron, suggests that it may cover a vault.

* * * *

Thus I can find no substantiation for the alleged connexions of the Codrington's with the haunting, and I think it probable that the story owes its origin to the fact that their epitaphs—within a hundred yards or so of "Charleville", and only fifteen yards from the Simla Mall, in a position where they must have been seen by many hundreds of English people during the last century—proclaim a tragedy which overcame the family. But there is nothing to connect that tragedy with the house concerned, or to suggest that it had any sinister origin or influence.

The conclusion, on the available evidence, is that the cemetery cannot be linked with the phenomena. And it seems unlikely that any further evidence will come to light which will support the story that a husband and his wife are both buried here, and still less a husband who murdered that wife.

War Memorial For Royal Indian Engineers

Pensions to widows and children of Other Ranks in straitened circumstances who are not entitled to government pensions; schooling or scholarships for the children of V.C.Os. and Other Ranks; family hospitals and welfare centres—these are some of the objects and institutions on which the Corps of Royal Indian Engineers is spending over Rs. 83,000/- as part of their war memorial.

A sum of nearly one lakh has been subscribed by officers and men of the Royal Indian Engineers and the Military Engineer Services. Of this sum the Corps has decided to spend Rs. 10,000/- on the erection of a war memorial at the School of Military Engineering, which is moving in the near future from Roorkee to Poona.

The balance is being distributed between the three post-war groups of the Corps—Queen Victoria's Own Madras Group R.I.E. at Bangalore, King George V's Own Bengal Group R.I.E. at Roorkee and the Royal Bombay Group R.I.E. at Kirkee, in proportion to the peace and war-time peak strengths of these Groups, and the numbers of ex-soldiers of the war-time Groups whose records are now transferred to the post-war groups.

Where family hospitals and welfare centres do not exist, initial allotments will be made for their foundation. Thereafter, they will continue to be financed by voluntary subscriptions and by grants from Corps and Group funds.

Memorial funds are to be opened with the object of promoting the welfare of ex-wartime soldiers or their families in any way the Commandants consider best. Such ex-soldiers will be affiliated to the nearest Post-War Regimental Centre R.I.E. for these benefits.

THE JHAMP

*Extract from Barrack & Hospital Schedules (India) Section L
Schedule 26 for Garrison Dispensaries :*

"Jhamp-1 (for openings of outer verandhah")

The General's inspection is due,
The C. O's smooth brow is quite damp,
The Sisters are all in a stew,
They can't find the hospital's Jhamp.

Nobody knows in the least
If it's spittoon or Japanese lamp,
The Sapper won't tell them, the beast,
Or draw them a sketch of a Jhamp.

They tackled the Ordnance wallah,
A man of the most fearless stamp,
But he nervously fingered his collah,
And said "Never heard of a Jhamp".

The Principal Matrons were tried,
Whose grasp of their job's like a clamp,
But all of them simpered and sighed
"We haven't set eyes on a Jhamp."

The Q. M. put forth a suggestion
A Gunner once told him in camp.
That the best thing for bad indigestion
Was to massage your tum with a Jhamp.

An I. M. S. Captain said " No,
He must have been thinking of cramp,
For a splint for a disjointed too
Is this interesting thing called a Jhamp".

"I think it's a chair that's got wheels,"
Said a Sister, a dear little vamp,
"When a man convalescing eats meals
He goes to his food on a Jhamp."

The Registrar finally hissed
"I believe that the whole thing's a ramp
Let's cut it right out of the list
That damned silly object the Jhamp".

* * * * *

Epilogue (for hospital logue)

In fact they are baskets of wicker
And under them go stoves or lamps,
And clothes spread on top dry much quicker
With the aid of these wonderful Jhamps.

WILLING'UN SHAKSEBEER.

A GENTLEMAN'S GENTLEMAN

BY COLONEL W. H. PICKEN

DIVISIONAL Headquarters was preparing to carry out one of its test moves, and I happened to be in the room where surplus baggage was being stored making a few last minute additions to a suitcase. The Division was in Egypt at the time, waiting to move into the Western Desert to deal with the Italians who had just crossed the Egyptian border.

While bending over my suitcase I heard a discreet cough, followed by a second and yet a third. Anyone who has been in India will know that this is merely a polite way of beginning a conversation with a view to making a request. I looked round and saw Sikander Shah, a Lance-Naik in the Employment Platoon, a small unit which protected and did various odd jobs for Divisional Headquarters.

He was a tall, slim, Pathan from the Kohat District. With his bobbed hair he looked, at first sight, rather a ruffian, but on closer inspection one realized that he had delicate features and extraordinarily neat and well-shaped hands. In fact, he was quite good looking, and when I got to know him better I strongly suspected that Sikander was "a bit of a lad" in his village. He was well known to all the officers, chiefly on account of his terrific temper, and the fact that he was nearly always in "hot water".

The Camp Commandant who looked after the Employment Platoon had just made him a n.c.o., hoping that he would be less of a nuisance. One day, when he had been brought before me as a result of one of his misdeeds, I asked him why he had been allowed to leave his unit and come overseas with the Division. His answer was astonishingly frank. "Well, Sahib", he said, "I really am a bit of a 'bad hat' and my regiment was only too glad to be rid of me."

I asked him what he wanted, and was told that it was his ambition to become my batman. At that time we were replacing our private servants with military batmen. I wondered why he wanted the job, but discovered the reason only some months later. He was engaged to be married, and had just heard from his *fiancee's* father, who had said that if he did not come home quickly the engagement would be broken off and the girl given to another man. This was, quite naturally, a crisis in his life and Sikander's one ambition was to get home to his village and marry the girl. My servant had told him that I was likely to be posted to India and Sikander, with a view to the future, wanted to be in a position where he could go too. Little did he know that batmen are left behind when officers are posted away from a formation.

As he was an old soldier and seemed to know the ways of sahibs, I decided to give him a trial. My wife and I were staying in one of the peace-time luxury hotels which was close to the camp. I shall never forget the time when he came to pay his first respects to her. He put on his best uniform, oiled and combed his locks, and then literally barged his way through the *suffragis** guarding the entrance of the hotel into the lounge where she was sitting. This was the first of his many encounters with the hotel staff. He treated them all as beneath

* Egyptian waiters.

contempt and, as will be seen later, dealt with them in a particularly peremptory manner.

We wondered how he would take to valeting, but thought it best to leave him to my old servant for a day or two to learn the ropes. The first time he brought in our early morning cup of tea we realized that he had decided to go the "whole hog" and take the business of looking after us seriously. There was a bang on the door—made by his foot I fear—and in came Sikander with the tea tray balanced precariously on one hand held level with his shoulder. He had obviously been studying the technique of the European waiters in the hotel. After a few seconds of intense anxiety, during which we thought the tray with everything on it would come shooting through the mosquito net, he deposited it safely on the bedside table. The operation was made so much more difficult because he did not consider it proper to look at my wife while she was in bed.

For the next week or so my wife took him in hand and taught him to darn my socks, sew on buttons, and perform all the various other tasks which make so much difference to one's comfort on service. He became the most magnificent darning and soon rivalled my wife. From the day he arrived he was her devoted slave, and it was quite obvious that he had decided to adopt us both. His special delight was to clean her silver dressing table ornaments, brushes and combs. They had never been so well-cleaned before Sikander arrived. After cleaning them, with his military mind, he used to dress them by the right on the dressing table.

This little foible soon led to trouble. One day, when he had dressed them with infinite pains by the right, one of the hotel servants came in and bundled them all into a heap. This so enraged Sikander that the next moment he was standing over him with a table knife in his hand giving vent to his fury. Luckily my wife came in that moment and rescued the poor fellow. After this episode it was arranged that the dressing table should be sacred ground only to be touched by Sikander. As a result of this fracas he was in disgrace. He tried to retrieve the situation by garlanding the dressing table with flowers, stolen I regret to say, from the hotel garden.

The next outburst arose over my bed roll, which had to be kept ready for a sudden move. The room boy thought that the bathroom was the proper place for it, while Sikander had decided that it must be kept under the writing table. The Sahib's bedding could not possibly be kept in such a low place as a bathroom! My wife was downstairs at the time, and a most immediate message was sent to her asking if she would come up at once and deal with a maniac who was trying to murder one of the hotel servants.

Sikander was a moody person and had a very queer temper. He used to imagine all sorts of things, turning little incidents into affairs of the greatest importance. One morning while working in our room he suddenly said: "The Memsahib is annoyed with me to-day." My wife replied: "Why do you say that?" "Well, when I brought in your tea this morning you never said Salaam, and as you always say Salaam you must be annoyed with me." She explained that she was asleep and had not heard him come in. All was well and Sikander smiled once again.

We had our lighter moments too. One day my wife asked him in her best Hindustani to give her the newspaper which had been pushed under the door. Sikander knitted his brows and looked all round the room. Then a smile spread slowly across his face and, seizing my wife's pink silk knickers, he presented them to her on a tray.

Certain precious articles of her clothes my wife never entrusted to the hotel *dhobi*. Sikander soon discovered this and insisted on washing them himself whenever he got the chance. This was a pretty compliment, as it is very much beneath the dignity of any sepoy to do such menial work. However, she was not so keen on him handling some of her more intimate garments, and used to hide them when he was out of the way. We often found him looking round for them with a perplexed air and on one occasion caught him triumphantly washing her belt and knickers.

Soon after Sikander's arrival the Division was ordered to move into the desert. The day before we left, my wife thought she would give me a pleasant surprise for my birthday. She wrote a letter which Sikander was to deliver at my slit trench with my morning cup of tea the first day out. There was too much *finesse* in this for poor Sikander who, during the course of the day, pulled the letter out of his pocket and showed it to me at a distance. He then quickly put it back into his pocket and said: "But you cannot have it until tomorrow." My wife was so upset. However, the letter was duly delivered to me in my slit trench miles out in the desert.

After a short while in the desert Sikander found that the sand storms played havoc with his beautiful locks, and without any warning had them all cut off. One morning a strangely familiar face appeared with my cup of tea in the semi-darkness of my dugout. It took me quite a time to realize that it was Sikander minus his locks.

I soon learnt that Sikander was a real treasure, and in spite of his foul temper always seemed able to make friends with the right—or perhaps one should say—with the most useful people. Being friendly with the cook meant that he could sometimes sneak a little hot water, which in the desert was almost more valuable than petrol. It is amazing how much washing can be done with a mug and sponge provided, of course, one does not wash one's feet first. He was the best scrounger that I have ever met and if there was anything to be had, Sikander was always on the spot.

Being a Pathan, he had had to learn Hindustani, and consequently was not versed in the niceties of the language. *Tums* and *Aps* fell from his lips indiscriminately, and he was just as likely to use *Tum* as *Ap* when addressing the General. He looked after one General, a friend of mine, who came to stay with us in the desert. Much to his amusement *Tums* and *Aps* poured forth quite regardless of rank. When the General went away Sikander shook him warmly by the hand, a form of salutation usually reserved for V.C.Os. I should not have been surprised if he had patted the General on the back.

One day while I was working in my dugout Sikander came in and started to turn all the clothes out of my suitcase. When I asked him what he was doing he replied: "I have just received a letter from the Memsahib in which she says that she will be very annoyed if all your clothes are not in first-class condition when you go on leave." He used to be most coy when he received a letter from my wife. He would never ask me to read it, but would take it out to our interpreter to be translated. He then got the interpreter to write a reply, which was illuminated by exquisite little designs drawn in colour all round the edge of the notepaper. Perhaps it was the equivalent of a Pathan Valentine! Nevertheless, all my buttons were sewn on, and my clothes mended and socks darned by the time I went on leave. My wife was not allowed to forget her instructions, as she had to hold a kit inspection directly we arrived on leave.

After taking part in the first campaign against the Italians the Division moved out of the desert into Eritrea, where there were trees and scrub in plenty. Instead of sleeping out in the bare desert, each officer had his own tree under

which he could live and sleep. Every time we looked like staying in any spot for some time, Sikander used to start what he called organizing the tree site. First, he and the Staff car driver would dig the slit trenches—one for each person; then Sikander would rig up a piece of old waterproof sheet which he had looted from an Italian camp to keep off the sun and rain. Next, the bedding roll was laid out and improvements made to the tree. My tooth brush was hung up on one branch, my sponge squeezed into a suitable *niche*, and the rest of the kit put on various branches out of the reach of the white ants, which were prolific. When he had finished the tree looked like a Christmas tree.

Having a bath was always a great event. When we left the desert and water became more plentiful it was sometimes possible to get a bath before the evening meal. Sikander's method of announcing that my bath was ready was to appear at the office tent with my pullover, which he insisted on my wearing when it was getting cooler. (The Sahib must not be allowed to catch a cold). He then stood about obviously trying to attract my attention until in desperation I would retire to my tree to bath.

The etiquette to be observed at bath time varied with the brightness of the moon, for the bathroom consisted of a small camp canvas bath placed behind a bush, which did not always provide a great deal of cover from view. On really dark nights I would stand in the bath and hand my clothes to Sikander, who would then pass them back after I had washed and dried myself. As the moon got brighter, Sikander moved further and further away until on bright moonlit nights he would have to throw my clothes back to me. After all—the decencies had to be observed! On two occasions the Italians chose my bath night on which to carry out an air raid. When the alarm went I had to jump into my slit trench clothed in nothing. It is hard to look dignified sitting in a slit trench completely naked.

One night I had just got into my bath and sat down when I heard a loud hissing noise. As it was dark I could see only with difficulty, but when I looked over the edge of the bath I saw that the ground for about three feet around the bath was swarming with large black ants. It was a good thing for me that they found the hot water too much for them, but I was marooned in my bath until Sikander appeared from behind the nearest bush with a plank which he put down for me to walk over out of the danger area.

The Division took part in the final assault on Keren. The battle started in the early morning and was still raging by the evening. While I was sitting in the office tent, an aircraft came over and dropped a stick of bombs right into the middle of our Headquarters. I had just got up to look at a map when there was a terrific explosion outside. I felt something hot hit me in the head, and then did not remember much more until I regained consciousness a little later to find various clerks leaning over me making the usual inane remarks as to how badly I was wounded—none of which I was supposed to hear I am sure.

I remember someone shouting for Sikander in the distance, and thinking to myself that it was most unusual for him not to appear at once, for I knew he was sitting under my tree about a hundred yards away. I feared the worst, but in my state of semi-consciousness could not concentrate to think.

Eventually I was put into an ambulance and sent down to the Main Dressing Station, where I heard that both Sikander and my driver had been killed by the bomb which had so nearly ended my career. Alas! my fears were only too well-founded. He was killed while sitting under my tree sewing on a button—faithful to the end. Poor Sikander—his domestic difficulties had indeed been settled for him.

EDUCATION IN THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL N. V. BAL.

THROUGHOUT the ages knowledge, learning, erudition have been the advantages which have characterised the human race from the rest of the animal world. The process of education has, however, rarely been applied in a direct effort to improve the lot of the millions of ignorant, half-starved people who exist even in the modern civilised world.

Compulsory education, where introduced, has produced literates. But being literate is far from being educated in the true sense of the word. Education is training for life: an attempt towards creating better living conditions, better productivity and better socialibility amongst people.

On the other hand, many of the so-called "educated", particularly in India, prefer to remain aloof from their brethren. Little wonder, therefore, if the Forces recognised the need for educating their members only comparatively recently, with the result that schemes for education in the Forces today are hastily conceived, imperfectly understood, and indifferently carried out.

Fighting, in the old days, was synonymous with the exercise of brute force. Strength of muscle, actuated by fanaticism, was all that was necessary to produce an efficient fighting machine. The key to the machine was held by the few exceptionally brainy people, who as leaders claimed implicit obedience from their men. As, however, weapons of war multiplied, and scientific knowledge came to be used more freely in the successful prosecution of war, a growing need for knowledge of the three Rs among members of the Forces became apparent. Education was introduced to produce "better soldiers".

The "better soldier" was, however, still far from being an all-round better individual, mentally, intellectually, morally and socially. Conscription in the recent war, however, conclusively showed that an educated man generally made a good soldier in a shorter time, and was at the same time more efficient. A Wartime Education scheme was therefore introduced to give soldiers the background of the aims for which they were fighting; it gave them an opportunity to discuss current affairs, subjects such as citizenship, etc.

Before the end of the War it was realised that something had to be done for these soldiers if they were to return to civil life as responsible citizens. They had to be trained to take to suitable occupations and earn a decent standard of living. To exercise their privileges as enlightened citizens it was essential to ensure that they had sufficient facilities to earn money for their basic needs—food, clothing, housing, recreation, social amenities, etc. The need of training for citizenship therefore arose. But remember, this training for citizenship is not complete unless the individual is trained to take his part in the life of the community as a productive member.

Thus education in the Forces developed gradually by stages towards producing a better individual, a better soldier, and a better citizen. Wartime education had limited arms, and was restricted in scope by time and facilities available. If we are to learn from our failings of the past we must continue this education in the Post-War Armed Forces, and expand its scope. It is the

nation's responsibility to impart sound education to all, and therefore very necessary to ensure that men in the Services are not deprived of educational benefits because they have joined the Fighting Services.

It is a moral responsibility on the Services to see that their men about to leave the Service receive sufficient training to make their transition to civil life a smooth and happy affair. The men spend the best seven years of their lives in Service—a period which would otherwise be utilised in training for a life's career. Thus men who have enlisted should not be denied this opportunity of "education", but should instead be suitably trained to leave the Service better qualified for a career than they would have been had they remained in civil life.

Thus education in the Armed Forces should have three objects: (a) to produce a better individual, physically, mentally, morally and spiritually; (b) to produce a better soldier—highly trained and efficient in the art and science of waging a successful war; and (c) to produce a better citizen, confident of maintaining his economic integrity in the change-over to civil life.

Training to produce better individuals will aim at developing all the faculties of a person to a high degree of efficiency as an individual unit of the community. Each person must reach a minimum standard level of intelligence, of health, mind, body and spirit. Then alone will he acquire a receptive mind, ready to throw in his lot for the common weal.

Concerning the training to produce better soldiers, I will only mention that here we are more concerned with ensuring that the need for Service training does not lead to neglect of the other objects of education, which are equally vital.

Training for citizenship would entail giving the men a clear understanding of problems facing the country, and showing them how to play their part in improving social and economic conditions. This needs education on very broad lines; it should enable men in the Services to command respect, raise their morale, and should also make the Service sufficiently attractive to those of a suitable type.

Training in preparation for the change-over to civil life should enable the ex-Serviceman (i) to be readily absorbed in the general economy of the country, in suitable pursuits, such as agriculture or domestic industries; (ii) alternatively to pursue other walks of life with sufficient confidence of being able to find suitable employment without long periods of waiting, financial distress, and ultimate destitution. Such education for citizenship must be compulsory. But progress in education never ceases, and it should be the responsibility of the Armed Forces to give facilities for "Higher Education" to those qualified to benefit from them.

Once the necessity of introducing this type of education is accepted, it should take precedence over all activities, except military training. Education should begin when a man joins the Service. It will create his interest in matters affecting his post-release problems. Men can assimilate training better when it is given in stages than in a concentrated course towards the end of their service. The latter period is most unsuitable psychologically for carrying out any form of training of permanent benefit, as the man's whole attention is then focussed on early release and probably pre-occupied with the bogey of possible unemployment.

THE SCOPE OF EDUCATION.

The scope should be sufficiently wide and varied to meet the objects set out above. It should include; (a) citizenship education up to matriculation standard, and must be compulsory; this education will include general education, including literacy, and training in rural reconstruction and urban welfare; (b) higher education up to Diploma standard, to include training in agriculture and subsidiary industries, in technical subjects, in business—commercial and secretarial subjects.

The Sargent Report recommended an All-India education drive, and it can be expected that the future intake in the Services will have passed the literacy stage before their enrolment. It may, however, be necessary to give instruction in the common *lingua* for the Services to a proportion of the intake, and this should be provided for.

Academic education has the power to broaden peoples' outlook. Matriculation—or pre-entry examination for admission to colleges—has generally been accepted as a precise standard, and it should be the aim of the Forces' Education scheme to give facilities to all for working their way to matriculation. There should be an "intermediate examination" which is equivalent to the civil "middle school certificate."

General education should also include basic instruction in citizenship, which would be mainly theoretical. Citizenship is, however, an essentially practical subject, and students will find ample opportunity to apply their knowledge in practical ways. Modern life demands that every individual be fully instructed in his duties and responsibilities as a member of an organised community. In these days there is too much of expecting "some one else" to do this or that, and little appreciation of the fact that that "some one else" is every other member of the community. A proper understanding of ones' responsibilities as a citizen is a pre-requisite to success in life.

Many men in the post-war Services will come from rural areas and in all probability will return there. But an increasing number will come from urban areas. Problems of the countryside are not allied to those of town life, but there are some factors common to both. Rural economy has suffered because of the absence of any systematic planning to improve the lot of the cultivator; towns have sprung up haphazardly. In neither case was there any effort to control or regulate conditions in which people would have live and work.

The difficulties which are common to both communities are: Absence of full-time remunerative work; poor housing conditions; neglect of hygiene and sanitation; problems of nutrition and maternity services; inadequate medical and maternity services; lack of social amenities; and absence of local leadership.

Special problems in rural areas include: Improvement in agricultural methods; development of subsidiary industries; improvement in live-stock by scientific breeding; regulation of village life through village *Panchayats* by the villagers, for their own benefit; encouraging folk-lore as an essential part of community life; development of roads and other communications; and improvement in the economic condition of the cultivator.

Problems requiring immediate attention in urban areas are: Improvement in the social life, by forming associations, clubs, etc.; provision of recreational facilities within easy reach to cater for all ages—young, middle aged, and old; regulating conditions of work by healthy development of workers' unions; week-end excursions, rambles, etc.

Thus there is much work to be done in rural and urban areas for which ex-Servicemen, properly trained, will be well suited. Those men, acting as local leaders, can rejuvenate the whole outlook of the people by undertaking a comprehensive programme of physical, social, economic, cultural and spiritual development. The Services are thus in a unique position to make this important contribution to the national life of the country.

Here are some methods for giving training in rural reconstruction and urban welfare; Direct study by individuals; concentrated courses of instruction of short duration—a week; week-end sessions; encouragement of cultural activities in the unit—art, music, drama, etc.; hobbies and handicrafts; kitchen and flower gardens in unit lines; poultry and bee keeping, rabbit runs, etc.; and organised excursions to centres of interest.

HIGHER EDUCATION.

Higher education should be voluntary, and open to those who have passed the "intermediate examination." The sole object of higher education will be to give men additional training for the change-over to civil life. The cry throughout India to-day is for more and more facilities for technical and vocational training. Technical and vocational occupations of the past enjoyed only a secondary status, far below purely academic qualifications. That status cannot be raised unless those who practise the occupations are themselves highly qualified technically, and in addition receive an all-round citizenship education.

The scope of training for this higher education should, as I have said, be limited to the Diploma standard, as it is very unlikely that those aspiring for further qualifications will ever discontinue their studies in order to join the Services. It should be our aim to raise the status of the middle class craftsman.

Subjects taught in Higher Education are of a specialised nature. The training syllabus should generally follow the syllabus prescribed in civil institutions for equivalent training, and the certificates to be given should be recognised and accepted by Indian Universities as equivalent to those given by them. This training should be given in "Formation Colleges", described below.

EDUCATING FAMILIES OF SERVICEMEN.

The pace of progress cannot be maintained unless women march shoulder to shoulder with men as equal partners. Unfortunately in the India of to-day women are held back for want of education. The centre of the home is the housewife. "The wife is not the husband's bond-slave but his companion and help-mate, and an equal partner in all his joys and sorrows—as free as the husband to choose her own path".

If women are to enjoy this high status, they must be suitably educated along with men. Unit and station classes must be conducted for the Serviceman's children and families. Much has been said about the urgency of educating women. The need is too obvious to require further justification. It should be the privilege of the Services to spread knowledge of rural reconstruction and urban welfare among the mothers and families of Servicemen. Women should be provided with facilities and encouraged to participate in all organised activities.

ORGANISATION OF SERVICE EDUCATION.

Citizenship education should be carried out on a "unit basis". The O.C. will be directly responsible for conduct of education in his unit, with such assistance as may be required from the Educational Corps. That does not preclude

holding central classes in major stations or in field formations under the control of the I.A.E.C. That procedure would be followed wherever possible, as it would help smaller units and improve the quality of its instruction.

Recently the formation of the Indian Army Educational Corps was announced. I suggest that there should be an integrated Educational Corps for all three Services. It is stupid to imagine that the educational needs of the Services differ so radically that there should be three Educational Corps, conducting a triple range of educational certificates to be granted. It would be more advantageous to have one qualifying examination called the "Armed Forces Educational Certificate". That certificate should be accepted as equivalent to the Matriculation test of any Indian University.

It would, of course, be compatible to allow a wide range of alternative subjects, suitable to each of the three Services, which may be offered by a candidate for the Armed Forces Educational Certificate. That procedure would simplify the organisation of educational training by placing it on a uniform basis, and it would also help to bring about a better understanding between members of the three Services, and also between the Services and the Civil. Moreover, it would prove economical in man power and in expenditure.

Each unit should have in its peace establishment a separate education staff, found from unit personnel for the conduct of citizenship education. The normal period of tenure of members of this staff would be two to three years. The establishment should be: Officer in charge (Captain), though with units of less than 300 men he may be a Subedar; one V. C. O. instructor per 200 men or less; one N. C. O. instructor per 100 men or less. Suitable courses for unit instructors would be arranged at the Formation Colleges.

Every major station, and each Brigade or equivalent formation, should have on its establishment an Education Officer belonging to the I.A.E.C. to co-ordinate and supervise education in units, and to organise central classes. He should be provided with V.C.O./N.C.O. instructors belonging to the I.A.E.C. to assist him in taking central classes.

FORMATION COLLEGES.

Formation Colleges should be established in centres where the following courses would be organised: Unit Educational Instructors' course; Elementary Course in Higher Education; and Advanced course in Higher Education. It will be for the experts to decide on the lengths of these courses, but courses up to three months in each case would seem to meet the purpose.

Generally speaking, the Elementary Course in Higher Education should be given in the second-third year of a man's service, after he has passed the "Intermediate Examination"; and the Advanced Course in the sixth or final year. The latter course should qualify a man for a "Certificate" which would be equivalent to the "Diploma Certificate" in the civil.

Staff for these Formation Colleges should be found partly from the I.A.E.C and partly by secondment of suitable persons from the Civil Governments; this would ensure a very close liaison with Civil institutions. An Advisory Committee composed of heads of the Education Departments of the Central and Provincial Governments should be constituted to review education policy and visit Formation Colleges.

Citizenship education being conducted by units, a *per capita* grant should be given to each unit for this training, supplemented as necessary from unit funds. Accommodation, furniture, etc. should be provided in Accommodation Scales. Expenditure for central classes and on Higher Education should be included in the budget expenditure for the I.A.E.C.

We must not be side-tracked by arguments as to whether or not expenditure on education is a legitimate charge on the Defence Services' budget, or that as "education" is a provincial subject, training of members of the Armed Forces should be the responsibility of Provinces and that it should be given after a man's release from service in Provincial institutions.

Training for citizenship must begin early and must be given high priority. Once this is accepted, considerations as to who bears the cost need not overweigh the issue. As the Armed Forces are a central service, surely it is for that central service to accept responsibility for working out a detailed scheme and to implement it? Whether the money for such an undertaking comes from the Defence Services' budget or from civil sources is for the financial *pandits* to decide.

The scheme I have outlined may seem too ambitious. Yet it is the minimum that can be done, and ought to be done, for men who volunteer for limited periods in the Armed Forces. Those Forces are the backbone of the country. They contain the flower of the country's youth; and as its members are in those Forces for extended periods, it offers unlimited scope for the propagation of high ideals and aspirations among them.

No Government can afford to miss such an opportunity. It would indeed be a great pity if the men who are applauded as the pride of the country while in the Services, are allowed to return to the common fold in despair, and as forgotten men.

Nationalising The Indian Army

Figures now available at General Headquarters strikingly reveal the rate at which the Indian Army officer-ranks are being nationalised.

Apart from emergency commissioned officers, there are now some 1,600 regular Indian combatant officers (excluding those granted short service commissions) as opposed to just over 2,000 regular British combatant officers of the Indian Army, and it is hoped to increase the number of regular Indian officers to about 2,000 within a month or two. The pre-war figures were about 500 Indian and 3,000 British respectively.

Of the 2,000 regular British combatant officers 1,100 have under 20 years' service, of whom 700 will be absorbed into the British Army, such transfers starting in the near future. Many of the 900 with over 20 years' service are due to retire on pension shortly.

In addition to the above regular officers there are about 7,500 Indian emergency commissioned combatant officers, of whom about 700 have already been granted, or selected for, short service commissions of 3 years or 5 years and it is intended to increase the number granted such commissions to 2,000 in the near future. In contrast there are at present just over 5,000 British emergency commissioned combatant officers, many of whom will shortly leave the Army due to an accelerated release programme.


Serving with these officers of the Indian Army there are at present some 8,000 British officers of the British Army, who are being re-transferred to British units as fast as they can be spared.

GURKHAS CLIMB BORNEO'S HIGHEST MOUNTAIN

By MAJOR P. H. SPARKS

WHEN the ship carrying the 4th Battalion 2nd K.E. VII's Own Gurkha Rifles to British North Borneo dropped anchor in JESSELTON BAY on the morning of 31st December 1945, troop-deck reactions to the first sight of Borneo were unequivocally favourable, on the grounds that the appearance of the country exactly resembled that of Nepal. Even to non-Nepalese eyes it looked pleasing enough; steep jungle-clad hills reared up from the sea's edge and swept back into the interior in innumerable folds and ridges, culminating in a towering, precipitous mountain, Kinabalu, sixty miles inland from JESSELTON. It became clear at once that a closer inspection of Kinabalu would have to be made.

Throughout January the battalion was too busy taking over from the Australians, building itself new lines, guarding Japanese prisoners, and learning



that sea water is not fit for drinking to have time for expeditions into the interior, but during this period we amassed a certain amount of information about Kinabalu. Australian Army maps showed its height variously as 19,000 ft., 17,000 ft. and 13,455 ft. We afterwards discovered that the height of 13,455 ft. had been assessed by an American scientist who had spent a year on the slopes of the mountain collecting orchids and trapping local fauna. The Japanese, who appear to have taken great interest in the mountain, are said to have agreed that 13,455 ft. was the correct height.

We also learned that the mountain, though impossibly precipitous on three sides, presented no difficulties if approached from the South, and that it had been climbed several times already. Its highest point, Low's peak, is named after Sir Hugh Low, first Governor of British North Borneo, who climbed the mountain in 1851.

During January a rubber planter at TUARAN (20 miles inland from JESSELTON) put us in touch with one Daniel Hill, a former English teacher in the Mission School in JESSELTON. Daniel's father was Chinese and his mother was of the local Dusun stock. He spoke excellent English, was an extremely pleasant fellow and proved absolutely invaluable during the subsequent trip. After consultation with him it was decided that we would send an expedition to climb Kinabalu, starting on 5th February, 1946.

Our party consisted of myself and 24 Gurkhas, Captain R.C. Evans, R.A. M.C., and five Indians from the Field Ambulance.

As this was to be a climbing and shooting expedition and not a military exercise, we ordered as many coolies as were required to transport the men's personal kit as well as the necessary rations, leaving our men with the minimum to carry. Accordingly we carried only a water bottle and small haversack each; eight men of the party took rifles, as we were told that pig and deer might be found to make a welcome addition to the pot.

Leaving JESSELTON at 0900 hours on 5th February, we drove by lorry to TAMPARULI, a village 20 miles inland which was to be our roadhead. Arriving there, we found Daniel waiting for us, together with fifty Dusun coolies of all ages. Most of them were small boys with enlarged spleens and no apparent muscular development, and we felt rather brutal about putting our loads, some of which weighed 50 lbs., on to their backs and then expecting them to march 12 miles uphill behind a party of empty-handed Gurkhas. We need not have worried; they went quite as well as any of us. These Dusuns were extremely cheerful likeable little men, Mongoloid in feature but smaller in stature and paler in colouration than the Gurkhas. Their dress varied from ancient and ragged shirts and shorts to loin cloths and waistcoats made from the bark of trees. Their legs and feet were invariably bare. A number wore battered pork-pie hats, sometimes with the crown removed and their golliwog hair sticking through the top like a chimney sweep's brush. Evidently there had been a considerable import trade in trilby hats and cotton clothing before the war.

Loads were carried in a sort of elongated waste-paper basket made (often with great skill) from bamboo and rattan, and fitted with a lid to keep the rain out. The weight was carried by a harness of plaited rattan, consisting of a band across the forehead and a strap running over each shoulder and under the armpits. Evans thought it would be an excellent method of carrying one's kit when travelling by air.

After dividing out the loads and making a not entirely successful attempt to see that the more emaciated coolies got the lightest loads, we set off from Tamparuli walking delicately across the bamboo raft which spanned the gap (caused by Allied bombs) in the concrete bridge across the Tuaran river. On the far bank we turned right along a bridle path which runs from Tamparuli to Bundu Tuhan, 40 miles inland. The path had been built by forced local labour during the Jap occupation; for the first five or six miles it was good going and in most places it was broad enough to take a Jeep. For the first hour we were marching along a valley shut in by hills, still almost at sea-level and it was very hot.

Then we began to climb. The gradient was not excessive, but was sufficiently tiring to those of us who were not born in the hills. The party halted by a hill stream for a brew of tea, while the resourceful Daniel produced fresh pineapple and cucumbers. After lunch we plodded on and upward towards Kelawat. Clouds came down at 3-30 p.m. and it rained hard for two hours, making the path, which had now become narrow and overgrown, extremely slippery.

The country we went through was thick and shut in and any movement off the path would have been quite impossible. Apart from one or two small parties of Dusuns carrying tobacco down to the coastal plain for sale in Tuaran market, we did not see a living soul throughout the march. About half-way between Tamparuli and Kaung we saw a small collection of bamboo huts in a valley below. This was the village of Tagap, and was the only sign we saw that this part of Borneo had any inhabitants at all.

The rain continued steadily and we began to wonder what sort of shelter we should find at Kelawat. We arrived on top of the Kelawat ridge at 1800 hours and found there a large coolie hut in a reasonable state of repair. It was a tight fit, but the whole party just managed to squeeze in. A change of clothes and a huge meal of curry and rice washed down by tea soon made us feel that the long wet march had been well worth it. Just before dark the clouds lifted and we were given a magnificent view of the West face of Kinabalu, 30 miles away across the valley. All around and below us were blue-green forest-clad hills, stretching away ridge upon ridge as far as the eye could see, while opposite the granite upper slopes of Kinabalu streamed with waterfalls. After the rain it looked a distinctly formidable climb.

We left Kelawat ridge at 0900 hours on the following morning and began descending steadily. A bright sunny morning made it very pleasant going, especially now that the track was less shut in and we were given some tremendous views of the mountain. We had a long halt for lunch and a brew of tea by a waterfall at midday. The Gurkhas and Dusun coolies were already on excellent terms, and we were all charmed by a little old man who produced a curious musical instrument called a *sumpotan*, which made a very pleasing noise not unlike a tiny church organ.

After lunch we continued to descend, eventually entering a gorge with a roaring torrent running along the bottom, and where the sides of the valley opened out a little to make a flat space about 200 yards wide we found the village of KAUNG. This had been bombed fairly heavily by the Australian Air Force and the original rest-house had been destroyed. Hearing of our coming, the village headman had built us a new one, and very comfortable it was. We were soon in the stream, washing and fishing and the water was icy cold.

The village headman appeared, bringing chickens, eggs, cucumbers, and local tobacco, all of which we were very glad to buy. We were due to take on a fresh team of coolies here, but the headman informed us that we had arrived a day earlier than expected, and that the new lot of coolies would not be ready until the day after next. This suited us admirably as we were quite ready for a day's rest in this delightful spot. The headman said there were pig and barking deer in the surrounding hills and he undertook to send us a couple of *shikaris* early in the morning.

On the following day, the men were off into the jungle as soon as it was light and were out all day. The results were disappointing: two green pigeons. They reported plentiful pig and deer tracks, but said that the jungle was so thick it was almost impossible to move. Fishing with hook and line proved equally unproductive and groping with the hand under rocks showed the best results. During the afternoon it rained further up the valley and a spate came down, cutting off Evans and a party of bathers on the far bank. After various unsuccessful attempts to get across with the help of a climbing rope they had to plod a mile upstream, naked and barefooted and cross over by a bamboo bridge. Those on the nearside of the stream thought this highly amusing.

Later the new coolies assembled, together with a shifty-looking gentleman whom Daniel introduced as "The high priest of the mountain", and a frail toothless little man who was the guide, Labuan. We had been warned that there was a good deal of superstition attached to Kinabalu and that a cock would have to be sacrificed before we were allowed to start the climb. In

our desire not to offend local prejudice we let ourselves in for a good dose of priestcraft, as it appeared that not one but seven cocks would now have to be sacrificed at specific points during the climb. We of course were expected to pay for all this poultry (though the priest ate it) and to provide coolies to carry it and the priest's kit, as he proposed coming almost to the top with us. We began to suspect that during the Jap occupation, when business was naturally not brisk, the priest had thought up these new developments which he now proposed to try on us.

Labuan produced a few chits, and we read with bated breath how His Excellency the Governor "made the ascent" in 1933, his A.-D.-C. expressing himself entirely satisfied with the arrangements. We wondered whether we should find tattered bits of red carpet littered about the mountain side.

On the 8th of February we marched from KAUNG to BUNDU TUHAN (4,000 ft). It was a miserable morning's march ten miles uphill through damp and gloomy forest in continuous rain and drizzle. The path was narrow and slippery, and we kept having to cross and re-cross streams. We reached TENAMPOK pass (4,900 ft.) at 14-00 hours, and from then on it was easy going down to the valley which held the village of BUNDU TUHAN, a charming place. The hills enclosing the valley had been very largely cleared of forest, and their bare, down-like appearance afforded pleasing relief to the eye. The rest-house was roomy and comfortable, with a stone-built fireplace. Though it had stopped raining by the time we arrived, the clouds were still hanging on to the tops of the hills and a chilly wind blew up the valley; so we were glad of the fire.

In the evening we had a conference on the climb with Daniel, Labuan and the headman of Bundu Tuhan. While this was in progress Labuan suddenly produced a small pamphlet written by a Dr. Grisword, of Harvard University, describing his ascent of the mountain in the early thirties. This excellent account was illustrated with some remarkably good photographs, and enabled us to form a reasonably clear idea of what lay before us. It was evident from Dr. Grisword's account that our party was far too large, since the only place to make camp within climbing distance of the top was a cave (PAKA) at 10,000 ft., where accommodation was strictly limited. We decided therefore to leave most of the party down in BUNDU TUHAN, where they could pass the time in shooting and fishing while the following only made the climb:—

Two British Officers; one V.C.O. (a Garhwali; I.A.M.C.); six Gurkhas; one High Priest; one Coolie Master (Daniel); one Guide (Labuan); seventeen coolies; thus making a total of 29.

We spent the 9th February making up coolie loads, exploring Bundu Tuhan village, searching (unsuccessfully) for wild pig—and loafing. Daniel sent a party of coolies on ahead to cut a path through the jungle on the lower slopes of Kinabalu, and to build us some sorts of *basha* as protection from the elements at KAMBARUNGAH (8,000 ft.), a clearing where we were to spend our first night on the mountain. The clouds were right down to 4,000 ft, and it drizzled at intervals throughout the day, so this little advance party of half-naked Dusuns must have had a pretty miserable time.

10th February. BUNDU TUHAN to KAMBARUNGAH (8,000 ft.). We left Bundu Tuhan rest-house at 08-00 hours. The sky for once was clear and we had a magnificent view of the jagged peaks of Kinabalu towering above

us as we started to climb up the ridge leading on to the south face of the mountain.

- We regained TENAMPOK PASS after an hour's climb, and after a few moment's rest there we descended a few hundred yards along the bridle path leading to RANAO, before cutting off to the left up a very narrow, steep, slippery track. Evans, who had fallen behind while taking compass bearings, missed this track and continued a good mile towards Ranao before discovering his mistake.

We were to have our usual luck with the weather. By 10-30 hours the clouds were all about us and visibility was reduced to 20 yards. The track was now leading us over tangled masses of tree roots, covered with a thick carpet of wet moss. Beneath this framework of roots there was often nothing but empty space, and the path sprung like a dance floor beneath our feet. The track was almost perpendicular in places and required a good deal of handwork. We kept scrambling up a succession of hills only to descend equally steeply as soon as their tops were reached—an unsatisfactory method of climbing.

The coolies with their 40 lb. loads were miraculously agile. Before leaving Bundu Tuhan they had all rubbed their bare legs and feet with tobacco juice as protection against the leeches which abounded on this part of the climb. We trusted to long trousers, putties and ankle boots, but all got a few leech bites none the less.

At 11-00 hours we reached a small clearing about 20 ft. square, which Daniel informed us was where Dr. Grisword had spent ten days in camp, trapping animals. It was called LUMU LUMU ("Mossy Mossy") and was said to be 5,500 ft. high.

Here we all had to stop while the priest went off a little way into the forest and squatted down with his face about two feet away from the trunk of an enormous tree. He now placed on the ground an egg, a small betel nut, a small piece of pork, some grain, and various other delicacies calculated to appeal to the palates of his ancestors, whom he proceeded to invoke. He called for fine weather during our climb, for protection against accident and freedom from sickness.

He pulled two wing feathers out of a loudly protesting chicken handed to him by an acolyte and stuck them in the ground; but the actual sacrificing of the chicken was to come further up the mountain. The priest now indicated that we were now at liberty to proceed, and it promptly started to rain. The Gurkhas said this was quite understandable; what could be expected of a priest who did his *pūja* without first washing his hands?

We plodded on through the rain, and at 14-00 hours, reached our halting place, KAMBARUNGAH, another clearing in the middle of which were two small shacks made of twigs and leaves. We scrambled in out of the rain, soon had a couple of fires going, and after a change into dry clothes and a mug of tea we felt pretty comfortable. It was surprising to find that such a flimsy-looking roof kept practically all the rain out.

Later on we had an enormous meal of curry and rice, and were into bed by 6 p.m. for a tot of rum each before going to sleep. The rain stopped just before dark, and we got a glimpse of the summit, looking very grim in the fading light.

11th February 1946. KAMBARUNGAH to PAKA (9,700 ft.).—We left KAMBARUNGAH at 08-15 hours. As soon as we got out of camp it started raining, and we were promptly soaked to the skin. In addition a bitter wind sprang up, making it a cheerless climb. After half an hour we began to leave the enormous trees and pass into more open scrub country. The path became strewn with granite boulders, affording much easier going than the moss and tree roots we'd had the previous day. As the country became more open we had less protection from the wind, so we hurried on and found ourselves at PAKA sooner than we had expected.

Our camp at PAKA was a shallow cave in the hillside formed by a huge overhanging shelf of granite. It was not very big and we were thankful we'd limited our party to nine men. As it was we just managed to fit in, and once we'd got fires going and warmed the place up a bit we were extremely snug. Another convenient overhang about fifty yards away from our cave housed the coolies; though it was cramped they seemed contented enough, though all were blue with cold and perpetually shivering throughout our stay in this camp.

A tremendous waterfall rushed right by the mouth of our cave, solving the problem of water supply but making conversation difficult. We saw numerous flowering shrubs and trees; not being botanists our only formal identifications were rhododendrons and orchids, some of which were extraordinarily beautiful.

Bird life throughout the trip was surprisingly scarce, and even so we heard far more birds than we saw. Green pigeons, king crows, and a whistling thrush or two were seen; but there were several types which were commonly heard but which always managed to avoid our field glasses. Most of them produced whirring or tinkling sounds which were more curious than beautiful, but one bird which accompanied us from sea level to 5,000 ft. had a song of astonishing power and sweetness, something like the loud, clear call of a golden oriole, but far more varied and prolonged. Daniel told us it was a small, dull looking brown bird. We never saw it ourselves. On the higher slopes between Kamarungah and Paka we did see a few small tits, wrens and warblers, all difficult to identify with any precision.

The rain stopped as soon as we got into Paka, but the clouds did not lift for the rest of the day; and so the priest was told that he must produce a fine day tomorrow without fail.

12th February 1946.—PAKA.—We kept two fires going in the cave all night, and though almost asphyxiated by smoke we kept sufficiently warm—and awakened to find it pouring with rain. The torrent outside the cave mouth, which we would have to cross on our way to the top, appeared quite impassable.

As the morning wore on and it showed no signs of clearing up we began to feel distinctly gloomy over our chances of getting to the top that day, and we discussed the possibility of sending down everybody except the two British Officers and the guide on the 13th, and the pair of us staying up an extra day for a last attempt. The priest's name was absolute mud by this time.

We emerged from the cave at intervals to look at the weather; at 13-00 hours the clouds began to show signs of lifting, and we could see the peak, its granite side streaming with water. At 1400 hours the rain stopped, and at 14-05 hours we left Paka.

After half an hour's stiff climb through scrub, we at last came on to the granite slopes that run up to the top. By this time the granite had dried and

gave us wonderful going. The first two hundred feet were extremely steep, with a nasty looking abyss below, but once we had climbed this the angle of ascent decreased and it was just like walking up the roof of an enormous house. The Gurkhas even started running in one place.

The mountain had six peaks in a semi-circle forming a huge natural amphitheatre. We slogged on through the thin air up to the foot of Low's peak, the actual summit, where we found a small pool of water. Here the priest called on his ancestors again and beheaded his last cock while we scrambled to the summit. The clouds came down again as we reached the top, and we were prevented from looking down into Low's abyss or from getting a view of the country out towards the West coast.

The Japanese had been there before us, and had left a wooden post planted on the top of Low's peak and painted with an inscription unintelligible to us, together with a bottle containing a list of names. We added our list to the bottle, corked it up, and then began the climb down. After we had descended about a thousand feet the clouds cleared, and we got a magnificent view of the hills of North Borneo running blue into the distance as far as we could see.

The Gurkhas ran on down at a tremendous rate, but we dawdled along, resting at frequent intervals and stopping to examine the many attractive small flowers we found growing in the clefts of the granite. We could see the smoke coming from our cave far below. It was dark by the time we got in, very tired but pleased we had achieved our object. We celebrated by eating an enormous curry supper and giving ourselves a double issue of rum all round.

13th February 1946. PAKA—BUNDU TUHAN.—For once, we had a fine clear morning. From outside the cave we had a magnificent view of the foothills and West coast line of North Borneo. Almost due West of us lay Jesselton Bay, with its three islands and the line of casuarine trees running along the beach, where the battalion lived; even a spit of sand near the Officer's Mess was clearly visible in the morning sunlight, though it must have been at least 40 miles distant from where we were standing.

The first two hours of the descent were delightful. We dawdled down through the thyme-smelling scrub, stopping frequently to admire the view. Later on as we reached the switchback country of moss and tree roots and dank, gloomy forest, the charms of nature rather lost their appeal before the superior attractions of Bundu Tuhan rest-house—a place it began to seem we should never reach. However, we eventually arrived there at 16-00 hours, to find the base party all well and delighted to see our beards which we made haste to remove. The shooting had been a failure; in four days they had achieved nothing beyond a few green pigeons.

* * * *

And that is really all. We paid off Labuan and the priest before leaving Bundu Tuhan the next morning. Labuan was very grateful for his honorarium and for the woollen coat we gave him. The priest demanded an exorbitant sum for his services and appeared to be very disgruntled with what he received; though we considered it pretty generous. He went off in a huff, whereupon Daniel broke it to us that this man wasn't the real priest at all; apparently the hereditary priest of Kinabalu had died, leaving only an infant son, and so the

dead priest's brother had appointed himself to the post, which was entirely against the rules.

The journey back from Bundu Tuhan to Tamporuli was uneventful. We had a day's halt at KAUNG, mainly in order to get ourselves clean. No one of the mountain party had had sufficient zest for cleanliness to risk bathing in the icy water of Paka.

We reached TAMPORULI on the 17th February, the thirteenth day after leaving it—and returned to Jesselton by lorry the same day. It had rained hard and continuously during our absence (February is supposed to be a dry month) and our announcement that we had been successful created some surprise. Indeed we had been unlucky in our weather.

One of the Gurkhas carefully brought down with him a small chip of granite from the very top of the mountain. When asked what he was going to do with it, he replied that when he returned to his home in the hills of Nepal he would split it in two and place one piece in his fields and the other in his purse, so that he should be assured of a flow of grain and gold as unfailing as the water that streams from the granite slopes of Mount Kinabalu.

General Scoones Appointed to India Office.

Lt.-Gen. Sir Geoffrey A. P. Scoones, formerly G.O.C.-in-C, Central Command, has been appointed Principal Staff Officer and Secretary, Military Department, India Office. He succeeds General Sir Mosley Mayne, who has proceeded on leave pending retirement.

General Scoones was educated at Wellington and Sandhurst and was commissioned in 1912. Like his father he joined the Royal Fusiliers, at that time in India, and later transferred to 2/2 Gurkha Rifles, with whom he served in France during World War I. He also saw service in the Afghan War of 1919.

After various staff appointments and a spell of regimental duty he took over command of 2/8 Gurkha Rifles, whom he was commanding at the time of the Quetta earthquake in 1935. The work that he and his men accomplished on that occasion brought him the award of the C.B.E.

In the earlier years of World War II he held various appointments in Britain and then came to India, where in April 1942 he assumed command of the 19th Indian ("Dagger") Division. Three months later he assumed command of 4th Corps and was responsible for the transformation of Imphal from a defensive base into an offensive springboard in the face of the much-vaunted attack by the Japs in the early months of 1944. In the resultant decisive battles the Japs suffered heavily at the hands of 4th Corps troops; between March and July they lost more than 11,000 in killed alone. In 1944, Gen. Scoones was appointed G.O.C.-in-C, Central Command, which has since been abolished.

Jap Sword Presented to Princess Royal

A 15th Century Japanese sword has been presented to the Princess Royal on behalf of the Royal Corps of Signals and the Indian Signals Corps of South East Asia Command. The Princess is Colonel-in-Chief of both Corps. The sword was taken by the 25th Division when they landed in Malaya after the Japanese surrender.

THE CASE FOR A HIMALAYAN DIVISION

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. GREEN.

EVERYONE who has seen a battalion of the French *Chasseurs Alpine*, or the German equivalent, on the march knows the peculiar prestige and the bearing which characterise the mountain soldier. The Indian Army has never, hitherto, emulated the continental specialist in intensive mountain warfare. It has regarded mountain warfare as a straightforward task, suitable for maid-of-all-work formations, and not to be endowed with any glamour.

However, *autres jours, autres mœurs*—and, remembering the elementary lessons which members of the original expedition to Tibet learned, on waking up to find themselves covered in deep snow, yet withal cosy and warm, we must re-orientate our ideas. Thus, the object of this paper is to prove that, despite the excellence of Indian Army training acquired in Frontier warfare, there is much to be gained by a more ambitious and specialised approach to the subject of modern mountain warfare.

Far too long have we subscribed to platitudes about "India's impenetrable northern mountain barriers". Five years ago similar verdicts on the Indo-Burman Frontier appeared valid, yet to-day they would be nonsense. The world strategical picture has vastly changed and contracted.

We may well take a leaf from Canada's book. There "Exercise Musko" has been held recently, to gain data on defending the once "impenetrable" Arctic Wastes. We may also profit by the experience of the Russians, the Germans, and the Finns, that mountain troops more than held their own in normal plain warfare.

We should regard a Himalayan division as a normal infantry division, of which the establishment, equipment and training are so supplemented as to enable it to operate for prolonged periods and to a considerable range, in conditions of mountain and snow.

ESTABLISHMENT

(a) *Recce*.—This should be on the normal organisation. The foreign element in the mountain *recce* is that portion on skis. They are specialists, who call for careful selection and long training, particularly in this country, where skiing is yet in its infancy. They may be found by selection from the infantry of the *recce* regiment.

(b) *Engineers*.—The sapper in India has always had to face considerable mountain warfare problems, but in a modern mountain division he will need to have extra mechanical road-building power, as mountain roads lend themselves to demolition. Bridging and ropeway units will also be required on a generous scale. More perhaps than in any other type of work, the mountain engineer will need to be a master of the traditional British art of improvisation.

(c) *Artillery*.—Mountain artillery has held its own in modern extensive warfare, although there may be much to be said on both sides in the arguments "howitzer or mortar". Medium artillery, by reason of its ability to support flanking movements at greater range than field artillery is a valuable component in a mountain formation. Air O. P. will be of particular value and aptitude in mountainous terrain.

(d) *Infantry*.—These remain the same as the backbone of any other division, plus specialist ski troops and mountaineers, who should be selected from the units composing the division. In mountain warfare there appears to be a case for the "square" brigade of four infantry battalions. Experienced Frontier soldiers may be expected to expatiate on this topic.

(e) *Supplies and Transport*.—It is hard to foresee the time when mountain warfare will be able to dispense with animal transport, and the new establishment of an A.T. regiment of two companies is an improvement. It might be further improved by having a regiment of 1,200 animals, capable of lifting a brigade group, instead of the present regiment of 600 animals.

(f) *Medical*.—In a formation which fights nature as much as the enemy it is of vital importance that the establishment contain special units for evacuation of casualties, e.g., Air Ambulance, Field Ambulance Transport, A.T. Jeep or "Snowmobile", platoons.

EQUIPMENT.

(a) *Personal*.—The basis of the mountaineer's kit, be he military or civil, is the Rucksack. Clothing—woollen sweaters, Grenfell cloth windproofs and frost-proof boots, suitably studded for hill climbing, are equally important. (It is of passing interest to note that soldiers in the past five years have learned more about scientific clothing than the civilian had achieved since the Garden of Eden).

Tentage must be light, based on a small tent meeting the requirements of the infantry section, and suitable for snow or normal green camouflage. Cooking must be on an infantry section basis in forward units, and may best be done on a small primus. The whole technique of living in extreme cold depends on these items of personal equipment.

(b) *Engineer*.—The bulldozer and snow-plough come into their own again in mountain terrain. Snow and mountain defiles favour mine laying, and mine lifting becomes of proportionate importance.

(c) *Artillery*.—Mountain artillery should be capable of operating on animal or portee. Incidentally when will we see a new British mountain artillery piece to succeed the 3.7?

(d) *Infantry*.—Skis, climbing equipment, snow-camouflage clothing, sledge,—all are possibly specialist requirements in the Himalayan Division.

(e) *Supplies and Transport*.—The mountain ration must be generous in energy-producing sugars and fats. The divisional transport will need an alternative second-line of "snowmobiles" or "Weasels"—light, tracked, carriers, capable of operation on steep slopes and in deep snow. The new system of A. T. regiments will result in an economical and flexible use of animal transport.

(f) *Medical*.—An earlier reference has been made to the need for specialised apparatus for the evacuation of casualties. Their importance to morale cannot be overstressed.

TRAINING

Mountain Lore.—The technique of living, working, moving and fighting in mountains and snow is the lynch-pin of mountain warfare training. Familiarity with apparently hard conditions eventually engenders enthusiasm and pride, apart from physical fitness. This training constitutes the birth-pangs of a Himalayan Division. Only fit young soldiers will be acceptable.

The stages of training can be broken down to:—

- (i) Man pack—going on the hardest, lightest scales;
- (ii) Animal pack—slightly better scale, giving also longer range.
- (iii) M. T. basis—normal scales.

It is thus seen that such a formation can still be used in a normal infantry division role in suitable terrain. Moreover, the ability to move without lavish M. T. scales makes it an ideal air landing division. In fact, a far greater degree of air portability is practicable than can yet be achieved with the existing infantry division. It is believed that 52 (Lowland Scottish) Mountain Division would have been used in such a role at ARNHEIM, had sufficient aircraft been available. (The author must acknowledge his indebtedness to that division for much of this paper).

The use of this division is greatly simplified by the employment of air supply, which should be made a routine process in the training of the formation.

CONCLUSION.

The terrain of India's Northern frontier is such as to justify a specialised mountain division, which would be a *corps de élite*. The objection that airborne invasion would eliminate fighting in the Himalayas is not yet sustained, since maintenance would ultimately be required overland.

Good as existing formations may be, they are not of the standard and technique demanded by the terrain and the role in the higher mountains of Northern India. Given the necessary equipment, training and additional army units, an existing formation can be converted to and employed as a Himalayan Division, without prejudicing its use in a normal infantry role, but on the contrary with great improvement in its performance on the N. W. Frontier, or as an air landing division. The bulk of engineer and artillery specialist units being Army troops will not affect the layout of the division.

As ideal conditions for training exist, the major outlay for the conversion of such a division would be the somewhat expensive equipment. Furthermore, there are fields of recruitment among some of the hardest natural mountaineers in the world.

A military power of the magnitude of the future India with a Northern Frontier impinging on major Powers, cannot afford to be without a Himalayan Division, which, by reason of its technique, versatility, and *esprit de corps*, could be a great asset to the Indian Army.

New Honorary Colonels Appointed.

Lieut.-General H. H. Maharajadhiraja Sir Sadul Singhji Bahadur, G.C.I.E., C.V.O., Maharaja of Bikaner, has been appointed Honorary Colonel of the 2nd Royal Lancers.

Maj.-Gen. His Highness Nawab Sir Saiy Raza Ali Khan Bahadur, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., Ruler of Rampur, has been appointed Honorary Colonel of Hodson's Horse.

HOW A NATION MASSED FOR WAR

BY E. B. McGUIRE*

WITH its vast man-power India was able during the late war to build up a large volunteer army and set up a considerable war industry without seriously disrupting the lives of the majority of its people. If future events should, unfortunately, lead to another war involving India this happy position may not recur, and a much fuller mobilisation may be necessary. It may, therefore, be of some interest to readers in India to recapitulate the major steps in the mobilisation of the United Kingdom to undertake total war.

The building up of the British nation to strike the first of the final blows reached its culminating point on the 6th June 1944, when the first landings were made in France. On that day the United Kingdom was more highly organised for war in nearly every field, and particularly in the use of man and woman power, than any other country in the world, totalitarian or democratic.

When war started in 1939 there were 1,232,000 persons registered in the U. K. as unemployed. Some were sick, others had recently retired from industry, while some were in the process of moving from one job to another. Nevertheless, there was a very large number of persons able and willing to work but for whom no work was available. There was also a substantial number of persons able to work but not gainfully employed, such as students and leisured people.

By D-day this huge figure of unemployed was reduced to 73,092. Even this did not represent the entire story, for there must be added the large additions to the labour force from such sources as immigration from Eire, foreigners given sanctuary from Europe, and prisoners of war.

The statutory committee on Unemployment Insurance stated in its annual report for 1943 that expenditure on unemployment benefit dropped from £52,500,000 in 1938 to £2,750,000 in 1943, remarking that the figures showed how slow and difficult is the process of fully mobilising a nation, and what friction it is necessary to overcome.

While mobilisation for industry was going on there was also a constant call for men for the Forces and the various auxiliary forces, such as the National Fire Service. An idea of the extent of this demand on man and woman power can be gauged by official figures on expenditure for the year ending March 1944, which showed that pay and allowances in the Services had risen from £80,000,000 in 1939 to £1,086,000,000. This turnover from the uneasy peace of the late 1930's was not accomplished without difficulty. It involved a very large sacrifice of the freedom of the individual, though provision was made to avoid any abuse of power by officials through the machinery of such organisations as Appeal Boards.

The first and basic Act in mobilisation was the National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939, which rendered all men between the ages of 18 and 40 liable for service in the Armed Forces, and imposed on the Minister of Labour and National Service the duty to register, medically examine and call up these men as required for the Forces. At the beginning of the War every person in Great

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Britain had registered and received an Identity Number, and a card showing this and other essential facts about himself. Thus the National Registration could be linked with the requirements of the National Service Act, both from the point of view of the individual and that of the general statistics of man-power in the various age groups. The former was important to preserve morale, since any considerable evasion might easily have led to serious discontent, whilst the latter had a very considerable influence on the grand strategy of the War.

Call-up for the Forces was regulated by periodical proclamations covering the different age groups. In December 1941 the age under the National Service Act was raised by a further Act to 50, and in 1942 it was lowered to 17 years and 8 months. In actual practice, however, call-up of men born before 1st July 1900 was not proclaimed.

When men first registered under the National Service Acts they were given a registration number, and essential details of their qualifications were recorded by the Ministry of Labour and National Service. At the time of registration they were allowed to express a preference for the Royal Navy or Royal Air Force, but their wishes were subject to the exigencies of the Services at the time of their actual call-up.

After registration men were medically examined and graded into four classes. Those graded III or IV were not normally called up. Those in Grades I or II and not required in industry were allocated to the various branches of the Forces according to their age, physical or mental standards, or their past experience, so far as this was possible. Certain trades needed by the Forces were fed from corresponding kinds of skill in civilian life, so that registration and medical examination were not always closely followed by call-up.

At the beginning of the War a number of coal miners had gone into the Forces, particularly when the Territorial Force was embodied. By 1942 the labour position in the coal mines was causing anxiety, but return of miners from the Army was not deemed expedient. As an alternative, it was decided to permit men being called up the option of coal mining, instead of going into the Forces. This measure did not relieve the position sufficiently, so recourse was had to a ballot. Under this scheme numbers were drawn under most rigid conditions of fairness, and all those due for call-up who had registration numbers ending with the numbers drawn in the ballot were drafted into the coal mines. There was no option or escape, whatever the social standing of the individual.

The National Service Acts were used also for supplying the personnel of the various Civil Defence Services and for maintaining the strength of the Home Guard, though in none of these cases did service carry exemption from call-up to the regular Forces or coalmining.

Voluntary recruitment finally ceased for men early in 1944, though it had long been severely curtailed under other regulations which required the individual to obtain prior release from industry. Certain jobs in air crews and submarine artificer posts were, however, exempted and individuals could always volunteer irrespective of their position in civil life.

Corresponding to the needs of the Forces and Defence Services were the urgent needs of industry as the munitions industry expanded in a kind of geometrical progression. In fact, the intake of the Forces was conditioned by the rate at which equipment was supplied. Further, the expansion of the munitions industry was drawing heavily on the essential services necessary to maintain the civil population, as well as all on luxury and less essential production.

It is quite easy to see, therefore, how difficult it was to satisfy and to keep an even balance between competing demands and at the same time prevent pockets of surplus manpower occurring. This continuous problem was not helped by the time lags which had to be allowed. For example, the Army generally required six months from call-up before the men could be regarded as an effective addition to its fighting strength. Again, a new weapon on the drawing board was still a long way from its issue, but when prototypes had been made and tested, plans had to be prepared well ahead to man the production line after jigs had been made and the workshops tooled up.

During the early days of the War the problem of manning industry was not acute. In fact the early problem was how to restrain the expansion of the numbers in the Forces to keep them in step with the available equipment—at a time when voluntary enlistment was permitted, and patriotic fervour was encouraging young men to regard the Forces as their chief legitimate contribution to the needs of the time. It was very necessary, therefore, to keep in industry the key workers upon which the rapid manufacture of equipment depended.

At the same time it was foreseen that as the war progressed, and as fit men were drawn away from industry, there would be a pressing need for others to step in. Plans had therefore to be made for bringing in women, making better use of older and unfit men, training men and women from unskilled to semi-skilled or skilled occupations and spreading more thinly, but more widely, the existing skilled labour retained in industry.

Much ingenuity was also displayed in breaking down jobs to simpler operations, so that skilled workers were concentrated as much as possible on operations where their skill was fully utilised. One firm, for example, which manufactured certain high precision tools reduced the percentage of their skilled labour from over 70% to 30% between 1939 to 1944 without any reduction in the quality or accuracy of their machines, or the speed of production. Nor was their scrap any greater, a sure measure of their success in meeting their particular manpower problems.

The retention of fit men in industry was first regulated by a system of block reservation. A schedule of Reserved Occupations was drawn up, showing the ages in the various reserved occupations above which men would normally be reserved for industry. Changes in this schedule occurred from time to time to meet the changing needs of the Forces and industry.

Key workers below the reserved age were retained in industry by a system of deferments of call-up. A further refinement was later introduced by registering certain firms as Protected Establishments. The reserved age in these establishments was fixed at a lower, or younger point. Thus a man might have two reservation ages, one under the schedule of reserved occupations, and another younger age if he were employed in a Protected Establishment. In this way specially important firms could retain their key workers at a younger age.

These systems of block reservations were sufficient for the purpose while there existed a fair amount of slack in the labour position. As time went on, however, and munition firms rapidly expanded, as machine tools became more plentiful because of imports from U.S.A. as well as domestic production, it became increasingly difficult to man the new plant and also meet the insatiable demands of the Forces then receiving equipment in vast quantities. This was only partly mitigated by the release of labour from less essential and luxury production as a result of such measures as the limitation of supplies, whereby the use of materials in most industries was rigidly controlled.

By the end of 1941 it was evident that the system of block reservations was not enough. Moreover, the position in such things as the great retail trade, with its many thousands of small shopkeepers, was too vulnerable under such a system. It might have become depleted to a point at which the needs of the civil population would be so seriously affected as to damage the war effort. A new system was therefore introduced, under which a man's deferment of call-up no longer depended upon his occupation, but rather upon the work he was actually doing.

A fitter, for example, might not be deferred if he were engaged on the maintenance of machinery in a toy factory. Further, the continued deferment of a man depended not only on the fact that his skill was still needed in industry, but also his mobility. He could be required to move from job to job or firm to firm, according to the changing needs of the national interest. If he became redundant because of a dying contract in one firm and he was medically fit, he would be liable for transfer elsewhere or be called up. If not medically fit he might be used by transfer to replace another deferred man who would be called up instead.

Special arrangements were made for dealing with deferments in agriculture, coal mining, building and civil engineering and certain civil Defence Services. Medical, dental and veterinary practitioners were called up in their professional capacities through the machinery of their own organisations.

To cope with this new system of individual deferments, the Ministry of Labour and National Service set up forty-four Manpower Boards in Great Britain. In Northern Ireland there was no conscription, and consequently these arrangements did not apply. Each Board consisted of a chairman and four other members. They were all full-time paid civil servants, though many of them were drawn from outside. Many highly placed people considered this organisation within the Civil Service as a first essential for the success of the Boards.

One member on every Board was always a technical man, with many years' experience in some branch of engineering. Another was charged with the special problem of women in industry, and this member was usually a woman. The Chairman was also known as the District Manpower Officer. It was his duty to receive all applications for deferment from firms who wished to retain their workers. If the firm did not apply the worker himself could apply. His Board would then grant or reject applications according to local needs, and in conformity with the general policy received from higher levels.

Parallel to this machinery, each of the Supply Departments and other interested Departments, like the Board of Trade, had officers in each of the eleven Regions of the country whose duties included a special watch over the manpower position in connection with their contracts or other interests. They ensured that firms duly applied for deferments, and also acted as a liaison between the firms and the Manpower Boards.

The mobilisation of women was a more difficult matter than with men, not because they were any less willing, but because their problems were more complex. No other country made any attempt to mobilise its women to the extent undertaken in Great Britain. Women with children under 14 years living with them were exempted, but were encouraged to volunteer for war or other work, and very often it was possible to arrange for simple assembly work to be done at convenient centres near their homes at hours to suit them. If they wished to enter industry, their special problems were catered for by such things as the provision of day nurseries.

All women born between the years 1893 and 1925 inclusive were registered in groups from time to time under Registration of Employment Orders. This brought them into the industrial field. As well as this, the age groups between 1918 and 1923 inclusive were brought within the scope of the National Service Acts, and put on the same basis as men if their domestic arrangements were such that they were free to undertake duties away from home. They were termed mobile women, and were liable for service either in the Forces or in industry.

Every woman whose registration particulars showed that she might be able to do work outside her home was interviewed at the Employment Exchange, and her domestic status and qualifications recorded. Some were treated as available for part-time employment only; others were exempted, and the rest were required to do full-time work. Panels of unpaid local women were set up to decide cases of dispute, which were relatively few. Some idea of the extent of the influx of women into industry can be gained from figures published in the autumn of 1943, which showed that 65 % of the women registered were married; that 88 % of the single women and widows were employed; and that 27% of married women were also employed. It should be remembered that in most of the age groups registered, married women were likely to have small children.

The Ministry followed the policy throughout the War that persuasion must be tried to the limit before force was to be used, and it was therefore necessary to "sell" the idea of women in industry to employers in many cases. The Trade Unions also had to give up temporarily some of their restrictions on membership, dilution of skilled labour, and so on. Employers had to show considerable enterprise sometimes to fit into their production line a large number of women where there were none before.

Problems of management were difficult and not always understood, nor were the difficulties of the women themselves always appreciated. One woman working in dungarees in the dirt and heat of a large foundry in a much-bombed town in North East England, when questioned, turned from a core she was making, and said "I'm keeping the home and the job going for my Albert when he gets home again—and not a minute longer". This was the typical spirit, and the last phrase was something the employer had to learn if his workers were to be kept satisfied.

The Ministry of Labour and National Service made a large contribution to the solution of these problems by encouraging the appointment of special personnel officers in firms. The Supply Ministries also helped. More advanced firms had always had such officials, but the needs of the War gave a great stimulus to this highly specialised work.

Mobilisation of men and women, and sorting out those who must fight and those who must work, had to be supplemented by a rigid control over the movements of those in industry. At the beginning of the war, with the sudden rush of war contracts, there was severe unregulated competition amongst employers for the available labour, sometimes leading to fantastic wage rates. Chief measures taken to meet this position were the Restriction of Engagement Order applying to engineering, building and certain other industries, the various Essential Works Orders, the Control of Engagement Order applying to women, and the Notice of Termination of Employment Order.

Apart from the control over the movement of labour, these Orders had a very substantial influence in preventing prices and wages rushing upwards. In their general effect, it meant that no employer could engage a man except through an Employment Exchange; he could not discharge a man without permission; and he had to notify every case where a person ceased to be employed. The employee also had to get permission to leave a job. In the case of women, it became an offence even to offer or advertise jobs unless the women were outside certain ages or domestically tied by children. Provisions were made for appeals to independent tribunals if the National Service Officer, at the Employment Exchange decided against an employer or employee.

Parallel with all this flow of new labour into the munitions and other industries, there had to be systems of training, and the Ministry of Labour and National Service put large numbers of persons through their various Government Training Centres for all kinds of trades. Intensive training courses were given for tool fitters, draughtsmen and the like which were adequate for the purpose. It was never claimed that the graduates of these schools were the equal of the normal peacetime apprentice, but in many cases they were far more than a second best.

A certain young woman of 21 accepted dubiously by a very well-known firm as a draughtswoman, after ten months training was more than a match for the apprentices of some years standing, and this was not an exceptional case. But these Centres could not hope to cope with the whole problem, and training within the industry had to be done on a large scale, helped as much as possible by advice from technical officers in Regional Offices of the Ministry, and in Manpower Boards.

Despite all this training, the country was not in an easy position as regards the highest skill and experience, and as the war progressed the Forces themselves began to compete more and more with expanding industry for skilled men to maintain and service its huge technical equipment. Nor was this stringency confined to engineering. The Navy, for example, was drawing on seamen. Experienced seamen were also in demand to man new merchant ships and replace casualties. It became necessary therefore, to comb the nation and try and track down persons who had drifted into other occupations. To this end, there were a number of registrations of specified classes of occupations, such as seamen, miners, nurses, and engineers.

Nevertheless, throughout the War engineering was a major problem. The Forces demands had been very insistent, until in 1941 the Beveridge Committee investigated the use to which tradesmen already in the Forces were being used. As a consequence of their recommendations there was a considerable reduction in demands from the Forces. In March 1943 there was a registration of engineers, with a certain minimum qualification. The primary object was to provide a pool from which to supply the Forces with men suitable for technical commissions.

The future had to be catered for, however, and a system of State Bursaries at Universities was introduced as a long-term measure. To meet the short-term policy, intensive courses of six months at Universities were arranged through the machinery of a Central (Scientific and Technical) Register, set up by the Ministry of Labour and National Service. These arrangements were available to men and women free of cost, and were intended to supply persons both to the Forces and to industry. In addition, there was started a system of Engineering Cadetships exclusively for the Forces.

There were a number of special arrangements to meet what might be termed side-lines, though important side-lines, in the effort to get every possible person fitted into a job. Thus aliens were required to register under the International Labour Force Registration Orders of 1941 and 1943, and Special Employment Exchanges placed them in industry or into the military Pioneer Corps.

Organising man and woman power was not enough. It was essential to see that it was kept fully employed and transferred speedily as need arose. Hours worked were another important factor, and the general standard in this respect was 52 hours a week for industrial workers, and 46 hours a week for office workers, both exclusive of meal times, with holidays of two weeks a year. This standard was also applied in the Civil Service. Workshops and offices were subject to frequent inspection by Labour Supply Officers working under the Regional Offices of the Ministry or Manpower Boards. They would investigate methods as well as actual working arrangements, and suggest to managements improvements in technique or the breaking-down of jobs to simpler operations, all with a view to conserving labour. They also had power to report to their office any serious cases of inefficient management, and if the facts of the case seriously affected the war effort, such reports might go right up to the Government, which had drastic powers, including the power to supersede the management.

With a limited man and woman power, and an almost unlimited number of jobs to fill, some order of priority had to be instituted. The normal order started with bottleneck vacancies, wherein it was essential to find someone immediately with the requisite skill to prevent the hold-up of a number of workers; next came preference vacancies, which were usually associated with production of a more urgent character; and then ordinary vacancies. There were a number of refinements in the scheme, such as specially urgent vacancies to meet the production of some particularly essential war equipment or large project of a highly important character, like the building of the Mulberry Harbour for the Normandy landings or the manufacture of the special 22,000 lb. bombs.

A vacancy occurring in a works would normally be reported by the firm to the local Employment Exchange. If it were in a specialist occupation, such as precision fitter or turner, the details would be sent to the Manpower Board, who would investigate the case through its technical inspectors. The latter would try to have the vacancy cancelled by some re-arrangement in the works. If this were not possible, the vacancy would remain, and the inspector might be able, by other re-adjustments, to get a man or woman from another firm. If neither of these things could be done, details of the vacancy would be circulated throughout the Region to all Employment Exchanges and Manpower Boards. If the vacancy was still not filled and was really important, that is if the production had a high priority or if a Committee sitting at the Regional Headquarters accorded it a high preference, it might be referred to an adjoining Region or even circulated nationally.

To conserve still further the labour force in some basic industries, such as the iron and steel industry or chemical industry, workers were not allowed to transfer outside their industry, unless they become redundant at a time when there were no vacancies anywhere within their industry.

Friction will invariably occur in the movement of labour, especially if it is on a wholesale scale. Sometimes this could not be helped, as in the case of the dispersal of vital production such as ball-bearings. Also, the local use of labour had to be consistent with the higher policy of the War which emanated

from the War Cabinet. The Service and the Supply Departments had their own close contacts to keep the former abreast of improvements and inventions, and the latter in constant touch with the current and future needs of the Forces.

A Committee sat in London and considered the various demands of the Forces and industry in relation to future operations, and had before them the figures of the available manpower. The Ministry of Production would co-ordinate the demands of the Supply Departments and prevent overlapping. They would also have knowledge of those parts of the country where plant capacity was available.

From these high authorities there would emerge allocations between the Forces and industry, and so far as man-power was concerned allocations would be made to each of the eleven Regions. Contracts would be placed as far as possible in areas where the manpower position was least acute, and where suitable plant capacity was free. Of course, this ideal was not always reached, but preference was given as a rule to the movement of plant rather than labour, or adjustments made with existing contracts, so as to minimise the movement of labour.

At the Regional level there was a Regional Production Board under the Chairmanship of the Regional Controller of the Ministry of Production, and this Board had the duty of co-ordinating the placing of contracts with the labour position. Members of the Board included the Regional Controllers of the Ministry of Labour and National Service, and each of the Supply departments. Transport and other departments were co-opted as necessary. The Manpower Boards and Employment Exchanges got their general directions through this machinery.

And that, briefly is how a nation of 46,000,000 people organised itself for War; how tens of thousands of men were put to tasks to help win the war; how women, anxious to play their part, were drawn into the vast machine which became the biggest war-winning organisation in history.

Madras Scheme For Ex-Service Drivers.

To absorb about 5,000 ex-service drivers, the Government of Madras have sanctioned a scheme for the formation of 20 motor transport co-operative societies to operate in all the districts of the province except Ramnad, the Nilgiris, Cuddapah, Chingleput and South Kanara.

Each society will have a membership of about 250 men, with a registered share capital of Rs. 2½ lakhs divided into 5,000 shares of Rs. 50 each. The members have been divided into such categories as cleaners, drivers and fitters and the number of shares they may take initially has been fixed.

As it is not immediately possible to obtain the required number of vehicles, due to manufacturing conditions abroad, private enterprise has little chance of thriving. The Government of India have, however, agreed to allot surplus vehicles at concessional rates to these societies. Considering the success of existing transport services, good results are assured for the success of this scheme.

In addition to transport of goods it is proposed to start a public taxi service initially with 100 jeeps fitted with suitable bodies.

The wages of the men will vary with their trade. It is proposed to pay drivers Rs. 60 per month. In addition to wages, profits will be divided among the shareholders, after contributing a share to the reserve fund.

RED TABS OR BOWLER HATS

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL RAJENDRA SINGH.

THOSE who have attended Staff College may remember that students who ignore fundamental principles in their appreciation of an attack are given the Bowler Hat. Does that always happen when the attack is real? The honest answer is that it does not, and that very fact must mar the efficiency of any organisation.

Efficient running of a fighting force depends on its staff, the system of organisation, and—most important of all—the calibre of men at the top. They must be the best the Force can get. Regarding the first, not only must the full quota be there but it must be of good quality. I dealt with that aspect in my article: "Is Scientific Selection Successful?" In "Warriors from Milkshops", I tried to explain the means through which the "quality" could be improved. Here I will confine myself to the solution of the remaining vexed problems of promotion, retention and elimination of officers who are not up to standard. To ensure that the right person gets to the top and the "would-be-failures" are eliminated as early as possible, we must have a scientific system, which must be based on "merit". What is merit?

A man once picked up a piece of shining crystal and showed it to three persons. One said it was a piece of stone, the other thought it was a piece of glass, while the third suggested that as it was useless it should be thrown away. When the others had dispersed the original finder put it in his pocket and made a fortune. It was a diamond. This little story brings out three important considerations: (a) the definition of merit; (b) the method of its recognition; (c) the human factor.

All three factors are of relative importance, but the first, being fundamental, is vital. It is a great handicap that we cannot define the qualities of an Army Officer as accurately as those of the diamond. When there is no exact measure there must remain the possibility of an error of judgment, unless we have a "connoisseur" who can pick out officers according to their appropriate value. There are a few. For the general benefit of the majority we must evolve a system which can clearly lay down the conditions considered necessary for selection of Army Officers.

There are certain qualities, which we may call "Basic", which every officer must possess and there are disqualifications which should not be there. For example, it is essential that every Army officer must be physically fit. If he is not, he must naturally be inferior to the one who is. What degree of physical fitness is necessary is a matter of detail. For considerations of Basic quality certain minimum standards must be laid down. It is not possible here to give a detailed analysis, but I have given a line on which it should be worked out in the Appendix. This scale will form the first basis for the elimination of the "N.B.G.'s", and will be the first indication about the comparative merits of the officers concerned. In addition to these qualities there are certain attributes which give character to the merit of an officer. These we would call "Supplementary". A good hockey player is not only physically fit, but also possesses a special qualification.

The two qualities must not only be judged individually, but in conjunction with each other. When tabulated separately they give an indication of the two different types of officers—the “Jack of all Trades” where the basic qualities are predominant, and the “Specialists”, where the “Supplementaries” have taken the lead. This distinction will later give us the officers for the various appointments. When seen together they would give the true picture of the individual as a whole.

To assist in the recognition of merit these qualities should be converted into equivalent mathematical figures. Take the unit of 10 for convenience. At present officers are divided into three categories: Outstanding, Above average, and Average. Considering the number of officers in the Army there must be a very large number in each grade, but there is no method by which to recognise the comparative merit of different individuals in a particular category; one is as good as the other.

“Merit” must have varied grades, because a general and a subaltern cannot be weighed on the same scale; moreover, there must be different standards for technical and non-technical officers. Further, the merit of an officer does not remain constant, but changes according to experience, circumstances and opportunities. The time factor plays an important part, but we must guard against the oft-repeated *cliche* that age and seniority are the sole criterion of merit. They are not, but still we cannot ignore their influence when tabulating the merit of officers. Our system must therefore consider merit in relation with age and seniority. See Appendix ‘A’.

For each year of service there would be ten maximum marks for Basic Qualities. The conditions to be fulfilled will be clearly laid down, and awards would be made according to the proficiency attained. For comparison, if necessary, the officer must be judged against an officer of the same age and seniority. In certain cases it may not be possible for an officer to fulfil the conditions in a year, so there would be groups for three years service. Thus each group will have 30 marks for Basic Qualities and 20 marks Bonus for the “Supplementaries”.

To fulfil the conditions laid down in the Group the Commanding Officer and the officers concerned have to play their part. While it is the duty of the former to arrange facilities for the fulfilment of the conditions, it is for the latter to make use of the opportunities offered. No officer should be penalised for not having a requisite qualification when no opportunity is provided. In such circumstances the “group period” can be extended, but this should be exceptional. The relative superiority of merit can only be judged when equal opportunities have been offered to all. In these democratic days we must ensure that all officers have equal chances. Those who do better than others must be suitably rewarded in the shape of merits for proficiency.

If an officer is properly labelled according to his merit proficiency, it is easy to recognise his merit. But the crux of the problem lies in the way the proficiency marks are allotted. In this the human factor is bound to come in. It cannot be avoided, and we must therefore ensure that both the “Initiator” and the “Reportee” understand how to recognise merit and how to show it. If merit, like a diamond, remains buried deep in the bowels of the earth it will have no value. It has to be dug out, cut, polished, and properly set in a golden ring before it can be admired. For an officer it is not only necessary that he must have merit, but also essential that it is recognised. Once a piece of art is recognised it can be appreciated by all.

It is easier to place an officer according to merits of proficiency than to define him in general terms. At present the merit, or whatever you may like to call it, of the individual is described in the form of an annual confidential report. Is it generally the true picture of the individual's merit, or the mirror of the personal prejudices of the "Initiator"? Both are possible but the latter is harmful. Human nature is inclined to take an exaggerated view of things, and where an appreciation or condemnation is done in general terms the impression created may be erroneous. We must lay down checks, and see that the "Initiator" takes into consideration all the factors before presenting his report. The annual confidential reports of the officers must therefore be more detailed, and I suggest a form on the following lines:—

ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT.

Basic marks for the year = 10.

Basic Marks =

Total Group Marks =

No.	Name	Regiment.		
Merit grading from last year	Age	Service	Rank	
Basic Qualifications	Bonus Qualifications	Group Proficiency.	General Report.	
Marks Allotted.	Marks Allotted.	Total Marks for the year.	Total Group Proficiency.	

The annual confidential reports will tabulate the achievements of the officer during the previous year, and will be the basis on which the proficiency merits for that year will be allotted. But, as previously explained, to judge the future potentiality of an officer it is essential not only to know his present but also his past, and the latest report must form part of a continuous picture. Annual confidential reports should be so arranged that when a third person looks at them he has at least three annual reports before him. One report may give a wrong impression. It will convey to the examiner no idea of the stability of the individual.

Present reports do not give the relative position of the individual in any group. Moreover, they give no indication about the degree of the merit attained in the past. The latest merit figures, however, when added to the previous total will give the "Net" value of the officer. Figures will speak for themselves, and a man of relative merit would be easily distinguished. True, an outstanding man can be always spotted; but we want to tabulate the great mass of Average Officers so that they can be easily recognised.

We must evolve a system by which real merit gets its proper reward. Three problems arise: (a) merits for promotion; (b) merits for appointments; (c) merits for elimination.

The last is the easiest, because elimination can be based on facts. Failures must be eliminated as early as possible before they really make a mess of things or as soon after they have given definite proof of their inefficiency, but this can only be determined over a period of time or for a given number of chances. Neither the period nor the chances can be unlimited. I suggest two groups of six years and three chances should be reasonable. If an officer in Group "C" (9 years service group) does not attain the maximum of Group "A" (3-year group) he should be eliminated. At present the method of detection of failures and the process of elimination is so faulty that unsuitable officers are not eliminated till they really become a beam in the eye; and then it becomes too late to remove the beam without removing the eye.

Officers of lower merit are usually retained to maintain the quota of officers; they generally walk into jobs for which they are the least suitable. We must find suitable officers and throw out those who are unfit. We have not taken this drastic step so far because we have either been too lenient or too afraid; we did not want to ruin the career of young men and frighten away prospective candidates. And at the back of the mind of many senior officers was there the impression that "we do not want brilliant officers for the Army"?

If we are going to base our system on merit, we must ensure that it is not hedged around with conditions which will stifle its very value. We should encourage young men of quality to join the Forces. Large number of good quality candidates do not come forward simply because they see no scope for their abilities, and know they will have to trudge on for years according to established rules of promotion.

We will presume that the "below average" will be removed and not retained in the Forces simply to provide them with jobs. This will definitely affect the careers of the officers thus thrown out, and schemes must be ready to arrange for their proper resettlement. According to the existing system these hangers-on get to the rank of major, when they become entitled to pension or gratuity, are placed on unemployed list or in many cases go still further and walk about with red tabs. What a mockery! It will remain so unless we give promotion and appointments according to merit, and nepotism is completely abolished. At present we are far from achieving this object, and are still working on the old school tie system of "He is so and so's so and so."

Promotion has to be graduated according to the scales laid down. What we have to do now is to correlate the time-scale with merit. An officer becomes a captain when he has six years service, but he must also have the minimum prescribed proficiency merits. If this officer has shown outstanding qualities and has obtained the marks of one group ahead of his own, he should be given the "Brevet" of the next senior rank. Service and merit combination should give us the required number of officers for appointments in senior ranks which are filled by selection. We must know our requirements by each rank, and the promotions to them must be regulated accordingly.

Merit for appointment is the most vexed problem, because in promotion and elimination there are only two parties, the Commanding Officer and the individual, but in appointment a third party creeps in. Some one else has to give the job, and that is why we find so many square pegs in round holes. This is what happens.

'X' wants an officer of a certain quality for a certain job. He informs 'Y', who is going to supply the body. 'Y' reduces the quality to the amount of service and availability and posts 'A'. Is that selection by merit? Is 'A' the best of the service group, or has been picked out of the hat? To ensure the first, officers in that group must be graduated according to their respective merit. If that is not done it becomes a sheer question of chance, and there will be cause for grouse. If there are two officers of more or less equal merit and one gets the job, there is nothing wrong. But when a person of no standing or merit gets in, it must lead to a lot of heartburning if nothing else.

The flexibility of the definition of merit, lack of a system, ignorance of 'Y' about what 'X' wants and what 'A' has, is bound to lead to misuse of power, nepotism and in some cases to corruption. This must obviously stop, and it can only be done if we have a system and can pin down 'Y'.


There are many channels through which nepotism makes inroads into the system of posting of officers. The most dangerous is where 'A' is himself the active agent. He keeps a look-out for a job, strikes a hole where he can get an advancement and finds out the means to instal himself there. How he does it requires no elaboration, but I will give an example.

There was an officer of doubtful merit but who had lots of contacts. If you consider this also merit, all my previous arguments have been sheer waste of time. He adopted a simple ruse. On first appointment he worked like a slave, and got a topping Confidential report. Within the next six months he made a complete nuisance of himself, and his Commanding Officer had no alternative but to get rid of him. Unless the C. O. was big enough, which very few are, he had to recommend his transfer for a higher appointment. And he always got it. I would not have believed this if I had not seen it happening in front of my eyes.

We must therefore have a system by which the right man gets the right job, or *vice versa* we give the right job to the right man. Some will say: "Why be so academic? The present system is working all right. When it breaks down we will find an answer." My answer that our present system is not scientific, and it would be foolish to try to find a solution when it is beyond solution. Let us start the post-war Army according to a scientific system where everyone has a fair chance and equal opportunities. There is nothing abstract in this desire.

I have already dealt with the methods for the tabulation of merit by the initiating authority and will now discuss the system of arranging that information so that the best use can be made of it. Remembering our previous analogy of the square peg for the square hole, some one must know the size of the hole and the dimensions of the peg, and he must have the knowledge and authority to put the right one in the right place. This can best be done by a Centralised Composite Directorate at the G.H.Q.

This Directorate must be under the Director of Manpower, who should come under the Adjutant General. A separate Branch must deal solely with the officer question in all stages. There will be a section dealing with procurement, (recruiting, publicity, and selection) another section dealing with training (cadets, junior officers, technical and senior officers) and the third section should deal with the organisation.



The *Merits Section* will be a statistical section, maintaining the lists of all officers on the 'Holarith' system, according to their arms of the Service and in order of their merit. Each Service section will have a "Live" and a "Dormant" register, i.e., an Infantry Officer posted to the Staff will remain on the "Dormant" register of Infantry, and on the "Live" register of the Special section.

The *Special Section* will deal with all those officers who have special qualifications, e.g., Staff College graduates, language and training experts, and officers with inter-Service experience, etc., etc.

Location Section will be a link between the *Merit* and *Placing Sections*. It may be possible to combine the two sections together, depending on the amount of work to be carried out, but it will be better to maintain two separate sections and combine the various sub-sections under one officer, thus cutting down the staff. One officer can deal with all technical reports, and one staff captain can deal with various appointments in that category in the *Appointment Section*.

All vacancies will be reported to the *Location Section*, which must also know all future requirements. When a demand is placed, this section will be responsible to demand from the Merit Section an officer of a "definite" merit, thus leading the Merit Section to draw out the names from the particular drawer and to take out the names with the particular "merit". If there is more than one name, the first five may be taken out and forwarded. The actual selection of the one out of the five should either be left to the Selection Board or to the person who has put in the demand. The alternative is to select the senior of the five for his experience, or the most junior for having more potential merit.

The *Posting Section* will carry out the routine work of the posting of officers, announcing promotions, transfers and removals. They will also have an Investigation Section, which will carry out research in various aspects of officers' questions and also an Inquiry Bureau to answer the queries of dissatisfied or visiting officers. No personal contact should be allowed with other sections, except through the Director of Organisation.

By having a good organisation and a scientific system we can thus remove any possibility of nepotism, and give the right men the Red Tabs and the N.B.G. the Bowler Hat.

Travancore Ruler welcomes National Academy Project

"I hope that the National War Academy will not only serve as a memorial of the last war but will also rank as the most up-to-date training ground for officers to fill the Indian Army of the future," says the Maharaja of Travancore in a letter to the Defence Department. This letter is characteristic of the interest shown by almost all States which were recently visited by Dr. Amaranatha Jha, Vice-Chairman of the National War Academy Working Committee.

"I am pleased to learn that the Academy will afford equal opportunities to young men from all parts of India and that no artificial discrimination will be made between the so-called martial and non-martial classes," the Maharaja of Travancore continues.

His Highness is keen that Travancore should take its full share in the defence of India and expresses the hope that "admission to the Academy will be available in fair and just proportion to subjects of Indian States, particularly States like Travancore."

New role of Royal Indian Artillery

After training and reorganising at Kamareddi, 60 miles north of Secunderabad in the Deccan plateau, 17 regiments of the Royal Indian Artillery, the largest concentration of gunners ever to be assembled in one area in India, are being posted to various formations.

The purpose of the concentration was to train R. I. A. gunners, to convert anti-aircraft regiments to anti-tank and field units, and to make the R. I. A. self-supporting and independent of the Royal Artillery.

All classes are represented in R. I. A. regiments, and conditions are ideal for sowing the seeds of tradition and *esprit de corps*. Before the late war the Indian Artillery, as it then was, consisted of seven regiments. By V.-J. Day the R. I. A. had grown to 64. Due to demobilisation, it now consists of 45 regiments of all types.

The new policy of the R. I. A. makes it second only to the Infantry in numbers. This opens up new possibilities to India's youth who wish to make the Army their career.

ANALYSIS OF MERIT OF A NON-TECHNICAL OFFICER (INFANTRY).

S.N.	GROUP				MERITS OF PROFICIENCY						Facilities available.	REMARKS.
	Classification	AGE		SERVICE		BASIC		BONUS	TOTAL			
		Min.	Max.	Min.	Max.	Min.	Max.		Min.	Max.		
1	A Subaltern Group.	19	25	..	3	..	30	20	..	50	Unit arrangement. Weapon training course. Retention examination.	All officers who have NOT passed the retention examina- tion and all those who secure less than 30 merit digits to be removed before being promoted to Captain.
2	B Retention Group	22	28	3	6	15	80	20	15	100	Unit arrangements. Technical course Junior Tactical course	
3	C Captain Group	25	31	6	9	30	140	20	30	150	Staff attachment. Promotion exami- nation.	
4	D Staff Group	28	34	9	12	30	180	20	30	200	Staff college. Techni- cal courses. GIII appointment. Unit appointment.	Officers with more than 150 profici- ency marks to be given the rank of Major.
5	E Major Group	31	37	12	15	80	200	20	30	250	Staff College Technical courses.	Officers before they are promoted Major to pass promotion exam. and obtain minimum of 80 marks for profici- ency.

6	F Command Group.	34	40	15	18	80	250	20	80	300	Senior Tactical course. Command of a Bn. 1st Gde. appointment. Special appointment.	Senior Tactical School. Services Staff College Technical courses.	
7	G Selection Group.	37	43	18	21	200	330	20	200	350	Command of a unit. 1st Gde. appointment. Static appointment as a Colonel.	Selection Board. Senior Tactical School. Inter Services College. I. Defence College.	<i>All majors who have not attained 200 merits or have not received promotion as Lt.-Col. before 43 birthday to be placed on S.U.L. List.</i>
8	H Red Tape	40	46	21	24	200	380	20	200	400	Command of a unit. Brigade Commander. Staff appointment as a Colonel.	Selection.	
9	I Brigade Group.	43	49	24	27	250	430	20	250	450	Command of a Bde. Command of a Div. or a Sub area. Staff appointment.	Selection.	All officers after 49 years who have finished command and are surplus to be retired.
10	J Generals.	49	52	27	30	250	480	20	250	500	Command of a divi- sion. Static appoint- ment as a Brigadier.	Selection.	All officers who have reached the age limit of 50 will not be considered for command of a Division.

ACK AND QUACK

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL H. A. PRINCE.

WHAT is so mysterious about the workings of "A", and "Q" that they cloak themselves in names reminiscent of the higher officers of the Inquisition?

"I was speaking to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master General about it only yesterday". To whom? A mere Major. But it gives the impression to the uninitiated that one had intended taking the matter up with a very high dignitary, only to discover that it was his day off and that his righthand man was answering for him.

A thrice-born staff officer must pause, pen in hand, whilst he wonders whether the chap who looks after his rations at Division calls himself the DAA and QMG, or the DAQMG, or even the DQMG. And have you ever tried to work out what two of the gentlemen who organise your feeding arrangements from Brigade HQ call themselves? No? Well, here are a few suggestions:

"We are two Deputy Assistant Adjutants and Quarter-Masters General". (Abbreviated title—DAA and QMGs). You don't like that? Well, let's try again.

"We are two Deputy Assistants Adjutant and Quarter-Master General". No? Well—(deep breath)—

"We are two Deputies Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master General". And so on. I can think of at least six more, all of which seem just as correct, and each more horrible than the last.

Let us for a moment turn to the "G" side of affairs. No complications here. A child can understand it. One GSO I, two GSOS II, three GSOS III. A Lieut-Colonel, two Majors and three Captains. Much too easy? Perhaps; but then they are simple chaps, and the errors of "G" are proverbially retrieved by the gallantry of the troops.

I suppose it would be considered a gross breach with tradition to suggest that, whilst we are reorganising the entire army, we simplify this side of the staff at the same time? It is so easy: as a glance at the table below will show.

The staff has three branches—"G", "A" and "Q", with MS thrown in for good measure. Let us then organise them on to the "G" system, and see what we shall get:

Lt.-Col.,	GSO I	ASO I	QSO I
Major,	GSO II	ASO II	QSO II
Captain,	GSO III	ASO III	QSO III

So far, so good. But there are certain more senior gentlemen to be catered for, and they also fall easily into line:

MGS	MGA	MGQ
BGS	Brig. A	Brig. Q
Col. GS	Col. A	Col. Q

Of course, the MGA already exists, but he stands for the "Major-General Administration", and it would be absurd to imagine that it would require one Major-General to look after "A", and another to look after "Q". So he must combine the two, to become the MGAQ. Similarly, the brigadiers combine into a BAQ.

These gentlemen give us our cue how to deal with those other trying people who are both "A" and Q"—the AA and QMG and our friend the DAA and QMG. They become the AQSO I, and the AQSO II respectively. What could be easier?

Let us look at the whole thing, comparing their present titles with our suggestions:

"G"	"A"	"Q"
MGGS		MGAQ (<i>MGA</i>)
BGS		BAQ (<i>DA and QMG</i>)
Col. GS		Col. AQ (<i>Col. Administration</i>).
GSO I		AQSO I (<i>AA and QMG</i>)
GSO II		AQSO II (<i>DAA and QMG</i>)
Col. GS	Col. A	Col. Q
GSO I	ASO I (<i>AAG</i>)	QSO I (<i>AQMG</i>)
GSO II	ASO II (<i>DAAG</i>)	QSO II (<i>DAQMG</i>)
GSO III	ASO III (<i>SC (A)</i>)	QSO III (<i>SC (Q)</i>)

Problem 1

You are a Major. You are visiting a large HQ. You are outside the office of the DAQMG. Do you knock, take your boots off and creep round the door? Or do you barge straight in?

Quick. No—I caught you looking at the table above—or else you left the Staff College a week ago, and you were an instructor at that.

Problem 2

You are a Lieut.-Colonel and you have to see the ASO I, and you walk straight in. That's all there is to problem 2. What is difficult about it? Nothing at all. It would help you and me; to say nothing of the Liaison Officer from the Ruritanian Army, which will be our Ally in the next war.

But, if you will excuse me now, I must be off to see the Under Deputy Assistant Mess and Wine Secretary (short title—UDAM and WS) about a bottle of beer.

OLD PENSIONERS MEET AGAIN*

BY CAPTAIN GANDA MALL.

FOR THE first time in 180 years our Battalion, the 69th Punjabis (now the 2/2 Punjab Regiment) has recently held a reunion, when about 150 of we old pensioners met together. There were no young ones amongst us; I enlisted thirty-two years ago, but another pensioner there enlisted as far back as 1902!

We celebrated two events. One was when our Regiment (then the 10 Battalion of Coast Sepoys) was raised in Madras in 1765. The other was the landing and assault at Kangaw in 1945, in which the battalion played a leading part. Naturally we were all proud to join in the celebrations, and to realise that the regimental motto of *Khushki wa Tarri*, granted to the battalion in the 1st Burma War of 1824-26, was being so well upheld.

The meeting of many old friends was a touching scene, and our Commandant, Lt.-Col. S. G. D. Jones, who knew most of us in pre-war days, helped us to refresh our memories and to compare present-day Service conditions with those of the past. Later, at a durbar held in the V.C.Os Club, he told us of the organisation of the post-War Indian Army, and listened to petitions made by pensioners. News that our Regimental Centre is going to be at Jullundur pleased us, for many of us live near there and we shall be able to visit it many times.

On Kangaw Day the salute at the Battalion ceremonial parade was taken by the Hon. Baldev Singh, Defence Member, and among those who were there were Major-General J. D. Bruce, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., and Brigadier C. P. Clarke. Major-General J. E. Hirst, D.S.O. who was formerly an officer in the Battalion, also came to join us in the celebrations. We all wondered if the drill was going to be as good as it used to be. But we need not have worried. It was. But we all agreed that the dress was not up to the standard of such ceremonial, especially the head-dress. It was not as good as the *pagris* of the old days.

The Defence Minister presented medals and awards won during the second World War, and in a speech he told us how well the British Officers had helped to build up a fine name for the regiment, and how he hoped their successors would follow their example. Then he was introduced to all of us pensioners, shook us by the hand and talked with us. In the evening of that day we attended a display of dancing and fireworks, and later had a *bara khana*, when we had dinner with all our old companies.

Next day the Battalion had their Sports Meeting. You can be sure we all cheered our old companies. And when "A" Company was seen to be the winners, all the old "A" Company pensioners cheered loudly and gave them a good *shabash*.

*This story was sent us by Lieut.-Colonel S. G. D. Jones, Commandant of the 2/2 Punjab Regiment, to whom it was related by Captain Ganda Mall and translated into English. Colonel Jones adds:—"An annual re-union of this nature will not only keep the regimental tradition alive; it may also have a profound effect on recruiting, for the continuance of the interest of these old pensioners will mean that they will always be on the look-out for recruits for their old Battalion. The unbroken military tradition of father to son and grandson is often a feature of the Indian Army; it is so particularly in this regiment. I can claim three generations of family service in the I. A.; many of our pensioners can claim even older associations with the 69 Punjabis".

On another day there were the matches in the Inter-Company Hockey finals, played between the HQ. and "D" Company. How surprised and amused we were to see that men in the HQ. team weren't wearing shirts or vests! It was the first time we had seen Indian soldiers playing a game in naked bodies. We thought it disgraceful. Then we learned that to fight in a malarious country like Burma it had been a good thing to let the sun shine on the body. It helped to harden the skin. But we told them that now the War was over they should return to the old peace-time custom and turn out in a smart and soldier-like manner on all occasions.

On the last day of the re-union we had with us Brigadier S. P. P. Thorat, D.S.O. who commanded the Battalion in Burma and Malaya. The best thing of the day was the drill competition, when two of the old Subedar Majors acted as Judges. Again we were very happy to see that the drill standard was very high. We always had a good name for drill, but then of course we had months of practice, whereas these lads had not long come back from active service. They have a lot more to learn than we had. In our young days we were only taught to use two weapons, the rifle and the Lewis Gun; now the sepoy has to learn all about quite a dozen weapons.

But times change. We always used to sit among our own castes and religions at meals, but imagine our amazement when we saw that this custom has gone too! At the lunch in the V.C.Os. Mess after the drill competitions, one of our older Subedars asked about the seating arrangements. He was told: "Sahib, in these days there are no classes or caste restrictions, and so the whole party will sit regardless of class or caste". I suppose it is a good thing, but many of us old pensioners do not think so, and for once the officers agreed to go back to the old days and let us all sit with our own castes together.

That ended a re-union which all of us will remember in our little out-of-the-way villages for a long time to come. And we hope it will not be long before there is another one.

10th Indian Division Disbanded

One of the famous trio of Indian Divisions which served in Italy, the Tenth, has been disbanded. In the course of five years, this great formation saw service from Teheran to Trieste, covering more than 4,000 miles of difficult territory in three little wars and two great campaigns.

Formed at Ahmednagar in February 1941, the Tenth's first "show" was to settle the Nazi-instigated revolt in Iraq. The Division was then despatched to Syria, where it was a major factor in the rapid collapse of Vichy resistance. Later, it was instrumental in removing the German threat to the oilfields of Iraq and Persia, thus securing the air route to India and the opening up of a new supply line to Russia.

The Division next went to North Africa in time to help in General (as he then was) Auchinleck's great battle which saved Egypt and the Suez Canal, in 1942. In August of that year the Tenth was ordered to Cyprus, where for nine months it trained for mountain warfare. Then the formation went to Syria.

Arriving in Italy in April, 1944, the Tenth was hurled against the Germans in the Adriatic sector and fought its way up the coast, capturing the ports of Ortona and Pescara. Next it was switched to the mountainous Central sector and heard the "cease fire" as it forced the stricken enemy back on Padua.

RECENT ADDITIONS TO THE U. S. I. LIBRARY

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

By Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. (Walker Trust Lectures on Leadership, No. 8, delivered before the University of St. Andrews). Oxford University Press, 2s. 6d.

IN this important address, delivered on 15th November, 1945, the gist of which we will try to give in his own words, Lord Montgomery's declared purpose was to equate the definition of military leadership, as he sees it, to the lessons of the past and to the experience of the present. He chooses three great commanders, Moses, Cromwell and Napoleon, and draws the lessons of the past from their lives. The experience of the present is principally his own.

As a definition of the word "leadership" he suggests : *the will to dominate, together with the character which inspires confidence.* He limited himself at St. Andrews to the discussion of higher leadership—"the command of armies or a group of armies"—saying that there are "certain differences in leadership at lower levels" which could not be discussed on that occasion.

"The measure of a man's ability to lead", Lord Montgomery continues, "is, I think, twofold. First, it lies in his will to dominate the men and events which surround him, the will to drive himself and his men to the limit of their powers for a specific purpose, and the refusal to allow anything to divert him from his aim. Secondly, it lies in the strength of his character, whether good or evil, to inspire others to place their complete trust and confidence in him and in his ability to lead them with success, and to enthuse his men for the task in hand. This ability.... is a spiritual quality (which) need not necessarily be for good."

On this basis he proceeds to sketch the significant features of the careers of his three chosen leaders, and having done so asks : "Now, what did these three men have in common without which they would not have achieved success ?" (Here, *military* success is to be understood, for none of them achieved *final* success). His conclusion is that "to win victories certain qualities are necessary, and I will mention four which were possessed in greater or less measure by all the great captains of history"—not only Moses, Cromwell and Bonaparte, but *all* the great captains. "These are :—

- (a) the knowledge of the technique of making war.
- (b) the ability to see clearly the few essentials that are important to success.
- (c) courage and mental robustness.
- (d) A well-balanced judgment."

Lord Montgomery proceeds to discuss and expatiate upon each of these attributes. As to (a) and (c), professional knowledge and strength of mind, there can surely be small dispute or doubt. It is more interesting to consider (b) and (d), and so we reproduce part of the lecturer's exposition of them.

"No man can be a great military leader unless he has the ability to cut through overlying difficulties, and to see clearly the few essentials in any problem

with which he is faced. These must be grasped out of the mass of details. . . . Every great commander has always concerned himself with certain of the details of his problems. . . .” As to (d), “a commander must have a well-balanced judgement. . . . he must instinctively know when to be rash and when to be cautious. . . . his desire to dominate his opponent must not outweigh his judgment of the actual possibilities of the situation. . . . He must choose his subordinates well. . . . he must be able to judge when to drive and when to persuade, when to be stern, and when to give praise”.

He passes to the age-long clash between statesmen and soldiers. The Big Three, Moses, Cromwell, and Napoleon, “succeeded as long as they kept in mind their clear military purpose, and were not deflected from it by other considerations. But there is always the danger that other, and specially political, considerations will force the hand of the soldier and lead him to some action which is militarily unwise.

“The soldier is the servant of the statesmen and is therefore bound to be subject to political pressure. He must be strong enough to resist such pressure whenever it conflicts with his clear military purpose. Few statesmen will force the hand of the soldier, if the soldier very bluntly says: ‘If I fight as you wish me to fight, I shall lose the battle; if I fight in my own way and in my own time, I shall win the battle’

“In history the military leader has frequently been tempted, and has frequently succumbed to the temptation, to aspire to political leadership. The whole training and experience of the soldier make him less rather than more fitted to be a politician”, which last opinion Lord Montgomery supports with an admirably clear summary of his reasons for holding it. “The qualities required by a soldier and a politician are in fact at almost opposite poles. There have not been many soldiers who have made good politicians, nor many politicians who have made great soldiers.”

In concluding his study of the past, he observes that “it is one of the phenomena of military history that events invariably produce the man. Age has little or nothing to do with it: the opportunity may come sooner to some, later to others”.

* * * * *

Before we pass to what the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had to say of the present, some comment may be offered, with respect, on his deductions from the lessons of history, which occupy about three-quarters of his address, for it is clear that they present to all who are interested in the study of leadership a lot to think about.

First, as to his definition of the word Leadership: “the will to dominate, together with the character which inspires confidence”. Rather than a definition of the word, as words are defined by lexicographers and lawyers, is not this a statement, upon analysis, of the essential qualities which (in Lord Montgomery’s view) a man must possess in order to make him a potentially successful leader? No definition of *military* leadership is given. Presumably this is because it is thought to be unnecessary, and can be arrived at simply by adding some such words as “when in high military command” before or after the description given of “leadership”.

Between two of the attributes, (b) and (d), which are stated to have been possessed in some measure by all the great captains of history, there may be some overlap. For (b), “the ability to see clearly the few essentials that are important

to success", necessitates the exercise of the "well-balanced judgment" which constitutes attribute (d). In (b) judgment has to be twice employed; first, in order to select a few essentials from the many factors, and then to assess the weight and place which each selected essential deserves in the plan. So, it would seem, the "ability" in (b) is coincident with the "judgment" in (d).

Further, (d) is not as simple as it seems, since an instinct is included under this heading: the commander "must instinctively know when to be rash and when to be cautious". But instinct cannot properly be classed as a part of judgment, for judgment is a quality exercised through the power to reason, whereas instinct is the gift by which animals are compensated for their inability to reason, and is a mere impulse to action. Instinct, though a quintessence of things experienced in the past by the individual or the race, cannot be consciously acquired; and thus if a military leader must "instinctively know when to be rash and when to be cautious", it seems to follow that commanders are born not made, though Lord Montgomery nowhere directly enunciates such a proposition.*

Doubt may also arise from the use of the word "rash", since that word is (we think) always used in a derogatory sense. Surely a commander, however bold, should not be deliberately rash? Circumstances may demand that he should be highly aggressive, or that he should embark upon a course of action which although clearly hazardous is in his view a "good gamble". But is not "rash" too strong an epithet for what the lecturer had in mind? Though, as has been said, "Rashness if it fails is madness, and if it succeeds it is the intuition of genius"; and perhaps Lord Montgomery had this very quotation in mind.

He concludes by setting forth "some of the things that have guided me in leading the armies which have been entrusted to my command". It is not possible even to summarise these important reflections in the space of this review. Those which their exponent stresses most are perhaps these two. Every wise commander must have a chief of staff, principally to tackle the details of the job; and, "finally, I do not believe that to-day a commander can inspire great armies, or single units, or even individual men, and lead them to achieve great victories, unless he has a proper sense of religious truth; and he must be prepared to acknowledge it, and to lead his troops in the light of that truth."

Y. K.

"THE TIGER TRIUMPHS"

(By H.M.S.O., 2s. 6d.)

INDIA'S part in the Italian campaign of 1943-45 has been effectively recorded in this latest of the "Tiger" series of booklets, for in Italy's plains and mountains, in climatic conditions which varied from extreme heat to arctic cold, sepoy from India fought unflinchingly some of Germany's finest troops.

It is well to recall how much they did. Indian units were present at the Sicily landings in July, 1943; they were present when the Fifth Army went ashore on the Salerno beaches in September of the same year. Thereafter three first-class Indian Divisions, with commanders who had already achieved fame for their skill and courage in North Africa, arrived in Italy at intervals of about three months.

* See Fowler, *Modern English Usage* s. v. "Intuition and instinct."

These Divisions, the 8th, 4th, and 10th respectively, slogged their way up the length of Italy in the face of three important disadvantages: they were up against some of the best German troops fighting a defensive battle; they were operating in extremes of climate, from wet, bitter cold to gruelling heat; and they fought across the grain of range upon range of high mountains. Near the northern plains of the Po Valley, the Divisions were joined by the independent 43rd Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade, composed of Gurkha battalions. Besides these four formations, there were eventually in Italy more than two hundred Indian units of numerous types.

The 8th Division's earliest and last battles involved the crossing of tough river obstacles. Between those operations the Division took to the mountains of the northern Appenines with considerable success. But casualties took a big toll of the 8th and 4th Divisions. After its tragedy at Cassino, however, the 4th Division ended on a high note at the Gothic Line, and was then transferred to Greece. The 10th Division, apart from its beginning at Ortona, and its ending in the Po Valley, generally fought in the mountains, always with dash, endurance, and with considerable success. The contribution of the 43rd Brigade was both gallant and praiseworthy.

The record of this grand chapter in the history of the Indian Army has been obtained largely from officers and men who fought the battles, and it is a story of sterling valour and endurance, of close co-operation and friendship, of careful planning and bold initiative. It cannot be the whole story. Its proximity to the events which it describes allows insufficient time for all material to be prepared or studied; restrictions on space, too, must have caused much to be omitted. It should, however, prompt those who experienced the campaign's triumphs and its setbacks to fill in the gaps, and thereby ensure the accurate recording of the official histories.

For those who were not present "The Tiger Triumphs" should certainly prove of enthralling interest for here are embodied widely varying types of warfare. Here, too, are applied the tactics and equipment evolved as a result of lessons learnt during the previous years of the war.

Presentation of the story geographically, rather than chronologically, should assist the reader in obtaining a clearer picture of battlefields where place names are numerous and frequently identical. It is unfortunate that the maps included in the booklet do not adequately illustrate the extreme difficulties of the terrain, but more elaborate maps and a stouter binding would have raised the price above the present very reasonable figure. The book is profusely illustrated with excellent pictures.

Altogether the book should have every chance of passing the excellent sales figures achieved by its predecessor "The Tiger Kills." A.E.C.

UNIT WAR RECORDS

Probyn's Horse Newsletter 1941 to 1946.

Central India Horse Newsletters 1-24.

7th Gurkha Rifles Regimental Journal. No. 1 (1939-1945), July, 1946.

The Dogra Quarterly: The War Years.

The Story of the Bn., The Madras Regiment in the Burma Campaign, 1943-45.

IT is good to find that war records of Indian units are already finding their way into print. The five examples now before us are well com-

piled and well produced, and will not only interest those who have served in or alongside the units concerned, but will provide valuable material which the official and other historians will in due course be able to collate with other sources.

Probyn's Horse went on service in 255 Indian Tank Brigade in September 1944, and first went into action towards the end of the following February, finishing up fifty miles from Rangoon at the beginning of May. Their record, which is in the form of a newsletter covering the whole period from 1941 to the end of the War, runs to 68 large pages, is well planned, and contains a variety of information as to all aspects of regimental life. Full lists of casualties, decorations, and officers past and present are given.

The *Central India Horse* have had the excellent idea of reprinting in a single handsome and handy volume the 24 newsletters which were issued by successive Commanding Officers between 1940 and 1946. They have not been edited in any way, though some maps have been added. Extending to over 220 sizable pages, the book tells in readable fashion the story of the first Indian cavalry regiment to go overseas: it was also the last to return. Most of its active service was with the famous 4th Indian Division. The list of gallantry awards includes two posthumous George Crosses, two Indian Orders of Merit, seven M. Cs. and nine I. D. S. Ms.

The first number of the regimental journal of the *7th Gurkha Rifles*, which replaces an earlier series of newsletters, is devoted to accounts of the activities during the war of the units which made up the regiment. These were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions; the Regimental Centre; and the 710th Gurkha Rifles, a composite training unit belonging to the all-Gurkha 115 Brigade. The Journal consists of about 70 pages, double-column, packed with details of the services of these units.

The 1st Bn. had 12 British and 12 Gurkha Officers killed; one havildar was shot through the spleen and had the back of his head hacked off with a *dah*, but walked 60 miles and caught up with the battalion retreating through Burma. He is now alive and well. The 2nd Bn. went into the bag in Tobruk, but many individual members subsequently made amazing escapes—a havildar-clerk, for instance, getting away through Poland and Odessa! The 3rd Bn. had such heavy casualties in its first month in Burma, in 1942, that it had to be amalgamated with the 1st Bn. for some time; it eventually became a parachute battalion. The 4th Bn. did not go overseas, but had a long spell of useful duty at Wana.

The record includes good sketch maps, with lists of casualties and honours, foremost of the latter being the Victoria Cross awarded to Rifleman Ganju Lama, M. M.

The *Dogra Quarterly* is the most elaborate of the five publications under review. It runs to 183 pages of smallish print, with a few illustrations, and takes the form of detailed narratives of the fortunes of each of the Dogra battalions—1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, M.G., 25th, 26th and Regimental Centre. Of these the 2nd and 3rd had the ill-fortune to be surrendered in Malaya; the 6th and 7th were formerly the 11th and 12th Territorial battalions; and the 25th and 26th were raised for garrison duties.

Lists of casualties (officers only) are given, as well as of honours and awards which include six Indian Orders of Merit. If the *Dogra Quarterly* keeps

up to this standard, other Indian regimental journals will have to look to their laurels, though doubtless the size of this first post-war number is quite exceptional in view of the long period which it covers. Presumably a list of "other rank" casualties will be given in a forthcoming number, or if space cannot be found, then a statistical summary of them.

The 4th Bn. of *The Madras Regiment* had not long been raised and trained when it moved to Imphal in October, 1943 and joined the 20th Indian Division. By the following spring it was in the thick of things and saw six months of hard fighting. After a period of rest it joined Brigadier "Moti" Dyer's 268th Bde., with which it had a pretty lively time pushing its way right down to past Allanmyo. The narrative is short—about 40 pages of large print—and dates are scanty, but mention should be made of several first-class illustrations. A list of casualties and decorations might have been provided. We notice that one I. C. O. received the M. C. and bar.

The Kumaon, magazine of the Kumaon Regiment, is a most readable little journal. From it we learn that its Record Office has one pensioner who for thirty years has claimed an imaginary medal for a skirmish in the wilds of Persia sometime at the beginning of the century! Other interesting items are that the Regiment lost 1,019 prisoners of war in Malaya, and one in Europe. They since have 110 prisoners of War who have not yet returned. During the War the Regiment had 19 separate units, 14 of which were raised after 3rd September, 1939.

The compilers of unit war records, or indeed of any other form of book, should note that a title-page *with a date* should always be furnished. Further, if the book is offered for sale to the public, the price and the address whence it can be obtained should be stated either on the dust-cover (if any) or on a slip enclosed in the front of the book. If the book is distributed for private circulation only, that fact should be made clear either on the title-page or on an enclosed slip.

THE STRANGERS AND OTHER POEMS

By M. J. Moynihan. (Sidgwick and Jackson, 5s.).

Much of Major Moynihan's book of verse has been written in or about India and Burma. It contains three sizable pieces; "The Sovereign", which has previously appeared in the *National Review*; "The Frontiers", being lines written in Shagai Fort in January, 1941; and "The Strangers", who make their first appearance here. The first and last of these are in rhymed couplets, a form which has its dangers as well as its advantages, for the boundary between dignity on the one hand and bathos or pantomime-rhyme on the other is sometimes perilously thin. The present author by no means descends as far as the Tennysonian

Across the wires th'electric message came,
 "He is no better, he is much the same".
 but comes near the danger-zone in "The Sovereign" with
 Think of the loss we feared, the fatal shock
 Before last Sunday struck eleven o'clock.

The writing is not in the modern manner, but is evocative, rather of Brooke and Flecker or even of Kipling. A sample, from "The Strangers", is on the Guides' church at Mardan:—

In cold most cold, in heat the hottest marl,
The road goes through Dargai towards Chitral
And in those lands of *lashkar* and *jihad*
Woe to the plains if no one stand on guard.
There, by the Afridi and the Mohmand sides,
Stands in Mardan the chapel of the Guides,
A tiny chancel and thereof each wall
Ensconced with many a carved and wooden stall
Whereon are written as in lines of gold
The names of all the commandants of old
Who sat there in, and put life to the touch—
Perilous sieges, if the world hold such,
If ever in an age of peace there came
Quest of adventure, call in duty's name.

Here the introduction of "marl" for the too obvious purpose of making a rhyme for "Chitral" has an effect of strain, and the same may be said of "the Afridi and Mohmand sides" and "Guides". Many who know this little church and graves around it have shared Major Moynihan's emotions, but will feel that he does not give them full poetic expression.

But there is much to give pleasure to readers who know the East and have a soft spot in their hearts for young poets who follow the old canons. We think that the author might do more convincing work with shorter verses of a less formal character, and we look forward to seeing a selection of such in due time. Poets, save for the immortal few, need to get their pens "run in" gradually, and are a little apt to embark upon too long a journey as a trial run.

H. B.

REVIEWS IN BRIEF

Secret Session Speeches delivered by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill to the House of Commons, compiled by Charles Eade. (Cassell, 6s.)—This seventh and final volume of Mr. Churchill's war speeches is in many respects the most interesting. In December, 1945, the House of Commons lifted the ban on disclosure of its proceedings in secret session during the war. In such sessions the Prime Minister had made five speeches of major importance, of which three have since appeared in the Press and are now reproduced in this volume together with the two hitherto undisclosed.

No verbatim records were made of them at the time of their delivery; and the present reports are based, in all instances except one, on Mr. Churchill's own notes of what he intended to say. The dates of the five speeches, and the occasions of their delivery, are: The Fall of France (20th June 1940); Parliament in the Air Raids (17th September 1940); The Battle of the Atlantic (25th June 1941); The Fall of Singapore (23rd April 1942); and Admiral Darlan and the North Africa Landings (10th December 1942). Interest is added to the collection by the facsimile reproduction of Mr. Churchill's typewritten notes, as amended by him in manuscript, of the first of these speeches.

The Story of the W.R.N.S. By Eileen Bigland. (Nicholson and Watson, 8s. 6d.)—Early in 1944 the author made an extensive tour of Wren establishments in the British Isles, under the auspices of the Wren welfare organisation. Her account, not published till 1946, is brightly written and gives a sufficient idea of the conditions in which officers and ratings lived and worked, but it is by no means the full story of the Wrens. Their set-up and methods of administration are not explained; there are no statistics; little is said about activities overseas; and much material which was still under security ban in 1944 might surely have been used in a book appearing some time after hostilities had ceased.

Onward from D-Day By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson. (Hutchinson, 16s.)—Messrs. Hutchinson often fail to date their books, as in this instance, but the author signed his introduction on 14th November, 1945. Having regard to that date, his achievement is remarkable. He has provided a reasonably critical and extremely lucid commentary on all aspects of the campaigns from D-Day to VJ-Day, and adds suggestive chapters on such present and future lessons and questions as strategy, tactics, "the scientist, the engineer and the weapon", the atom bomb, and security.

One does not know which to admire most, his industry or the rapid and adroit presentation of his material. What he modestly calls a collection of "interim judgments" is in fact a handy and valuable work of reference on the decisive final phases of the war. As such it is unlikely to be supplanted for some time to come. Our only criticism is that the type, though clear, is too small and mars the visual appeal of his pages. There are 14 very useful sketch maps.

Great Soldiers of the Second World War. By Major H. A. De Weerd. (Robert Hale, 15s.)—The author, six years ago, published a collection of twelve biographical sketches illustrating both World Wars. Four of those, revised, appear in his present volume, in which his subjects are Gamelin, De Gaulle, Churchill, Wavell, Montgomery, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Hitler, Rommel, Timoshenko, and Chiang Kai Shek. Though only published in England late in 1946, the book was evidently finished soon after VE-Day, and does not convey considered impressions of the final campaign in Europe, still less of that in Asia.

To those critics who would say that some of his subjects were not soldiers but statesmen, that naval or air leaders should have been included, and that he should have waited till after VJ-Day, the author has given disarming replies. Many will consider that such criticisms are nevertheless justified, but the book can be recommended as a serious contribution to the tale of World War II by a professional historian. Better books on the subject will come before long, but this is opportune and should be read.

Strategy as Exemplified in the World War: A Strategic Examination of the Land Operations, by Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Burne. (The Lees Knowles Lectures for 1946). (Cambridge University Press, 5s.)—Lieut.-Colonel Burne, who was chosen to deliver last year's Lees Knowles Lectures at Cambridge, is one of the foremost British exponents of strategical theory, and nothing could be better than the way he has expounded it in the first of the four chapters which make up this little book. A resume of the dicta of past experts on the science or art of making war, an exposure of their inconsistencies and the way they have shifted their ground, and a discussion of how the principles of war have at last been enunciated and accepted: all these and much more are compressed into thirty small pages.

They fill about one-third of the book, and the remainder consists of an examination of how the theoretical conclusions were borne out in practice in each of the theatres of the 1939-45 war on land. As to Russia, Lieut.-Colonel Burne enters a caveat: we are still in the dark regarding many essential points, particularly the real plans of the Russian commanders, and so the interpretation and exposition of the Soviet strategy is largely a matter of conjecture.

The conciseness and clarity of this study, and above all its outstanding commonsense and lack of "frills", make it more valuable than most books on strategy twenty times its size.

Customs of the Services, by Group-Captain A. H. Stradling. (Gale and Polden, 5s.).—This revised and much enlarged edition of a book that first appeared early in 1939 crystallises a good deal of the unwritten laws which should govern the conduct of an officer of one of the three British services, and there would seem to be room for a similar compilation to aid officers joining the Indian forces. But we must join issue with the author when he tells us that a chaplain should be addressed as "the Reverend Jones". We were brought up to regard this as a vulgarity to be avoided at all costs.

Where Men and Mountains Meet, by H. W. Tillman. (Cambridge University Press, 15s.).—Mr. Tillman, who took part in the expedition to Nanda Devi in 1936, here tells of his adventures as a member of two British military missions to partisans, first in Albania in 1943-44 and then in North Italy in 1944-45. He was parachuted into both countries, his local colleagues often being communists. His experiences throw an interesting light on a part of the war regarding which little of a personal nature has yet been published from the British angle.

The earlier part of the book consists of descriptions of mountaineering in Northern Assam in 1936 and 1939, which have little relevance to the rest of the volume. There are 54 photographic illustrations and 5 maps, mostly very good.

Goodbye India, by Sir Henry Sharp. (Oxford University Press, 12s. 6d.).—The author, who served many years in the I.C.S., starts his somewhat discursive memoirs in the traditional Anglo-Indian manner with a good dose of shikar stories, but the latter part of the book has two or three reflective chapters on India in retrospect and prospect.

Origins and Purpose: A Handbook on the British Commonwealth and Empire. (H. M. Stationery Office, 2s.).—A concise survey of the British territories throughout the world, chiefly from the historical and constitutional angles, with more than a dozen admirable maps, is remarkable value for a couple of shillings. The chapter on India has for the most part been written by Sir William Barton. The booklet is primarily intended for the use of teachers, club leaders, and organisers of discussion groups, who should find it useful and reliable. It is too short and condensed to have much appeal to the general reader, or as a work of reference for those in search of detail.

Life in Modern Turkey, by E.W.F. Tomlin. (Nelson, 5s.).—In less than a hundred small pages we are given a clearly written outline of Turkey as she stands to-day after a generation under a dictatorship. Daily life in city and village, food, dress, feasts and customs are depicted, in graphic detail. Mr. Tomlin is perhaps inclined to look on the sunny side of the Turkish Republic, for through an occasional chink in the scenery we catch glimpses which suggest a

less benevolent autocracy. Non-Moslem conscripts cannot bear arms and must serve in labour corps, and the foremost living poet is at present imprisoned on a political charge. But Ataturk's great experiment in Westernisation seems to have succeeded to an extent which no one who knew the old Ottoman Empire could have believed possible.

History of the Great War, 1914-1918. Order of Battle. Parts 3B and 4, by Major A.F. Becke. (H. M. Stationery Office, 10s. and 21s. respectively).—Part 3B gives details of the composition of the New Army Divisions numbered 30 to 41, with the 63rd Royal Naval Division; and Part 4 similarly deals with that of the Army Council, G.H.Q. of the Home Forces and in France, Egypt, Gallipoli, Salonika and Italy, also of the Armies and Corps. The battles and actions in which each Army and Corps fought, and the Divisions engaged on each occasion, are listed. The nature of the different types of artillery used in France in 1914 and 1918; the composition of the three Tank Corps Groups; the membership and organisation of the British Section of the Supreme War Council—these are amongst the many other matters recorded here in painstaking and precise form.

The two volumes conclude the series of the Official History which deals with the Orders of Battle. An immense amount of labour and knowledge has clearly gone into their making, and Major Becke, already well-known as a compiler of tactical and strategical maps which are second to none, has earned a further debt of gratitude from all who are concerned in military history by putting together these remarkable works of reference.

Letters of Field-Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, edited by Lieut.-Colonel Hon. H. D. Napier. 1936. (Jarrolds, 10s. 6d.).—As a pendant to his biography of his father, the Hon. H. D. Napier has compiled this collection of some of the old Field-Marshal's more interesting correspondence on Abyssinia, Egypt, India and South Africa, including also a selection from the Duke of Cambridge's letters to him. Most were written late in his career when he was Governor of Gibraltar, or afterwards when he held no active command. Amongst them are some of historical interest conveying his views on the security of the N. W. Frontier during and after the Second Afghan War. This is a welcome addition to the literature of one of India's most distinguished Commanders-in-Chief.

A Study of History, by Arnold J. Toynbee. Abridgement of volumes I-VI, by D. C. Somervell. (Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, by Oxford University Press, 25s.).—As a labour of love Mr. Somervell has compiled an abridgement of Mr. Toynbee's huge and as yet unfinished work on the philosophy of history. The latter already extends to six volumes containing over 3,000 pages and costing £4-10s. For those who wish to know what the present volume of 600 pages consists of, an abridgement of the abridgement is provided, but even that runs to 25 pages and cannot be further condensed here.

To put the matter very briefly, Mr. Toynbee's theme is that history must be studied not by nations or in periods but through "societies", and his purpose is to make intelligible the comparative study of civilizations. Without pretending that this makes light reading, one may recommend Mr. Somervell's book to amateur as well as to expert.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR**INDIAN REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATIONS IN ENGLAND**

From "LEDSAM", New Delhi :

The British Officers of the Indian Army are leaving in great numbers, and before many years are over, there will be none left at all.

It would be a great pity of those officers who have served in India (and served India) so many years, and who have been in such close contact with the Indian Army, should sever their connections with their old Regiments completely.

I cannot help feeling that associations may well be formed in England on a regimental basis with the object of keeping in touch with their comrades in India. Such associations need only be very simple affairs, and should exist for the giving and receiving of information about themselves and their friends of their old units. Of course, they may go further and arrange, where necessary, for the reception and, possibly, entertainment of Indian Officers of their own Regiments who may visit the United Kingdom on leave, courses, and so on.

This is just an idea which has occurred to me and I feel that, if you would agree to publish it in your *Journal*, it might catch on. In many cases, it is already being done by regimental dinner-clubs.

LT.-COL. SIR H. C. DE CRESPIGNY, M.C.

From Colonel C.E. Morris, of Merstham, Surrey:

The recent death of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Champion de Crespigny, sixth baronet, M.C. at Champion Lodge, Maldon, Essex at the age of 64 will come as great shock to his wide circle of friends in the Indian Army. The son of Lieutenant Philip Augustus Champion de Crespigny, R. N. the second son of the third baronet, he was born on 11th July 1882, and succeeded his cousin Brigadier-General Sir Claude Raul Champion de Crespigny, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., late Grenadier Guards, in 1941.

After attending Durham School and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst he was commissioned into the Northamptonshire Regiment in 1902, later transferring into the 56th Rifles, Frontier Force in 1907 and retiring with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, in 1930. He served on Lord Birdwood's staff during the Gallipoli campaign 1915, was mentioned in dispatches three times, and was awarded the Military Cross. Despite his age, he joined the R.A.F.V.R. during the 1939-45 war and retired with the rank of squadron leader in 1942. He was unmarried and the title passes to his brother, Commander Frederick Philip Champion de Crespigny, R.N. retired.

Essentially a regimental officer during his 28 years service, "Creeps" as he was affectionately known, endeared himself to officers and men alike with his kindness, generosity and unbounded sense of good humour. He was one of that very fine band of commanding officers who did so much to ensure the efficiency of the Frontier Force Rifles between the two World Wars, and much credit goes to them for the way in which all battalions of the regiment did so consistently well on all battle fronts in the recent conflict.

A man of humble and simple tastes, de Crespigny will be remembered for many years to come in his own battalion, the 2nd Frontier Force Rifles, for his loyalty and large-hearted generosity. A fine officer and a great Christian gentleman, as befitting the very great name which he bore.

"IN THE DUSK OF LIFE"

From Brigadier D. G. Ridgeway, Naivasha, Kenya :

"Mouse's" article, "Oh to be in Poona" in the October, 1946 *Journal* prompts me to offer my financial experience of settling in Kenya. May I first emphasise that I am out neither to boost nor to run down Kenya as a country in which to retire. The figures I give only purport to show what it has cost, and is now costing me to live in quiet comfort with a wife and daughter who are easily satisfied, and who both like a country life.

I came to Kenya on retirement with my wife and small daughter in 1936, buying twelve acres of good land 12 miles from Nairobi and building a small house with three bedrooms. The house cost £1,800; furnishing £300; and second-hand car £150. Prices have changed very much since then.


When war broke out I was called to Army service and sold that house at a small profit. I served until 1943, when I received my second bowler hat and had to find another home. I was serving in West Africa at the time, but my wife got down to it on her own, and did well to find what we wanted without delay a well-built, single storey house on the banks of Lake Naivasha.

It contains drawing, dining and games room, an office, three bedrooms, two bathrooms, two W.C.s and wide verandas. Kitchen, pantries, godowns, etc. are mostly in a detached block. All buildings are stone, with iron roofs. The house is wired for electric light, but the plant had been sold separately, and I am awaiting delivery of one which I have ordered.

The house, with ninety acres of land, cost £2,200 (the house was not for sale without the land). I am told I got a good bargain. Since the War ended the accommodation question has been as difficult as elsewhere. Small houses for sale or rent are hard to find, and expensive when they are found, especially if they are near a town. Building materials are at present in short supply, and skilled labour is expensive. My house is ten miles from a small country town, which is on the railway, and has a good Sports Club.


Before concluding purchase of this house I accepted a civilian war job, and so did not actually take up residence until January, 1946. My initial expenditure this time was :

House and land	£2,200
Reconditioning and re-decorating	100
Furnishing	500
Car (a Ford $\frac{3}{4}$ ton pick-up)	450
Electric light plant (on order) app.	100
			<hr/>
			£3,350



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Living expenses, based on the actuals of the first ten months of 1946, work out annually as follows:

Self, wife and daughter of 13 years	..	£900
School fees, boarding school at Nairobi	..	85
		<hr/>
		£985

These expenses cover everything except direct taxation. They include medical expenses, car and house insurance. Neither of us is a teetotaller, but the price of drink is so high that we are of necessity abstemious. We entertain very little, and our recreations outside our own home are golf, and tennis occasionally at the Sports Club. *No—repeat No—racin', huntin', or polo*, all of which are available for those who can afford it.

We keep poultry and rabbits and dogs; grow flowers, fruit and vegetables, also a few acres of maize for our servants' food (four indoor, eight outdoor servants). Although we market surplus eggs, fruit, etc., we do not reckon on any profit. It is, in fact, cheaper to buy, rather than grow, one's own requirements, but of course it is less interesting. Climate is excellent all the year round, though the rainfall in this area is less than one would like. It is a comfortable, healthy, out-of-door life, if a very quiet uneventful one.

As regards taxation: income-tax is graduated, the basic rate being Shs. 2, rising fairly quickly to Shs. 5, and there are additional forms of tax, such as personal tax and hospital contribution. On an income of £1,000 a year a married man would pay round about £80 a year in direct taxes. Indirect taxation is very high, particularly the Customs duty on most imported articles.

Government policy is to retain all taxation, direct and indirect, at war-time level permanently. This is being opposed by the European community, which considers that it hits its members unfairly. It is therefore possible that there may be some improvement in the taxation situation, though as Government has a permanent majority in the Legislative Council it is in a strong position. The cost of living has risen perceptibly this year (1946); price of meat, maize, petrol and oil has in each case been raised within the past few months.

As regards the question of augmenting one's income, my experience is that it is no easier to do so in Kenya than elsewhere. There is little scope for the man who has devoted the greater part of his life to soldiering to make money, unless he has special talents. Farming requires training, experience and capital, and even then is dependent on a certain amount of good fortune. There is very little to be made out of a small-holding, fruit, vegetables, or poultry. In the country most people have their own, and near to towns the African can under-sell, or as an alternative remove, by night, what you have grown.

The picture I have painted may seem rather a cheerless one, but is there any country in the world which offers a very attractive life on pension today? According to "Mouse", Colonel Blimp and Colonel Chinstrap are not exactly welcomed in a Socialised England.

I would advise anyone contemplating settling in Kenya to come to the Colony on a temporary basis first, without any definite commitment. Visitors should book hotel accommodation in advance or, better still, arrange for friends to put them up. I should be happy to answer any questions from my personal experience which any of your readers may care to send me.



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A MATTER OF LOGIC

From "DHOBI", H. Q., British Commonwealth Forces, Japan :

I want to draw attention to the absurdity of logic employed by some officers in the futile attempt to prove that two and two do not make four.

Recently an I.A.O. was published to the effect that those officers who attended the Staff College Course during the War would not be eligible to attend another course to qualify for *p.s.c.* The reason: for all purposes, the qualification of *s.c.* granted during the War would be considered equivalent to *p.s.c.* to be granted to the officers selected to attend the 1947 or later courses. So far, so good, but, the order went on; "though *s.c.* is equivalent to *p.s.c.* the officers who have got *s.c.* will not be entitled to *p.s.c.*" Is this logic?

Either *s.c.* is equivalent to *p.s.c.* or it is not. If it is, then why make the distinction? If there is a distinction and *p.s.c.* is considered a better classification, all officers should be given the opportunity to qualify for it. They should not be debarred for doing something good.

There seems to be no necessity to create distinction between the wartime graduates and those who will come out in future. Distinction is always a cause of dissatisfaction, and we must always try to remove differences rather than create them. In this case there is a cause for genuine grouse.

The I.A.O., as it is worded, leads one to believe that either the officers who graduated from the war courses were not of the right calibre or there is going to be a "magic trick" in the new course, which will make the new entrants better staff officers. I am not prepared to believe either. Officers for Staff College are, and should be, recommended and selected on their merit and efficiency; therefore, those officers who were selected earlier must have been better than their contemporaries. Most of those officers who graduated during the War have more experience than the new-comers will ever have, and still they are going to remain in an inferior category due to the sins of their Commanding Officers.

Those who are responsible should remove the distinction by either giving the graduates with *s.c.* the distinction of *p. s. c.* by gratis or by permitting them to attend an equalising course. They cannot have it both ways.

AN INTERESTING POSER FOR HISTORIANS

From Mr. Hurmuz Kaus, of Hyderabad, Deccan :—

In his History of India (Ch : XIX, page 4), J. C. Marshman says that during the close of the 18th century, the Hyderabad Army "carried the Colours of the French Republic, then at war with England, and wore the cap of liberty upon their buttons". This was probably a sequel to a happening, mentioned by Marshman (page 5), at Mysore, when French officers in the service of Tippu Sultan planted the Tree of Liberty surmounted by the Cap of Liberty, burned the Emblems of Royalty, and proclaimed the establishment of the Empire of the French Republic in India. The source of Marshman's information is not known, but some subsequent writers have given similar statements regarding the Hyderabad Army under the command of French officers.



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During this period the Hyderabad Army was under the command of J. Raymond, a Frenchman in the service of the Nizam. Raymond was faithful to his master, and from some of the relics of his time it is evident that he was an Imperialist and not a Republican. The big guns manufactured at the old French Gun-foundry at Hyderabad, built and supervised by Raymond, show inscriptions in Persian and French, surmounted by a Crown, an Impérial emblem, and not by the Cap of Liberty, the symbol of the then French Republic.

The Republican symbol is again conspicuous by its absence on a metal helmet in the Hyderabad Museum, which is labelled as one belonging to a Cavalry officer of Raymond's Force. The emblem upon this helmet is a Crescent, and as such it belongs to the middle of the 19th century, when the Hyderabad Army was reorganised and was for the first time put into uniform, during the minister-ship of Sir Salar Jung I, (1853/58). Buttons, badges and belt-buckles of this period, with Crescent or Crescent and Star, with inscription in English are known. The inscription on the helmet is also in English.

The rigmarole statement of Marshman is again refuted by the fact that no inscription or symbol of a republican nature is to be found on the tomb of Raymond at Hyderabad.

Nothing is known of the Colours of Raymond's Regiments. So far as my knowledge goes, no buttons of the Hyderabad Army with the Cap of Liberty upon them are known to exist in any collection, public or private, in India or in Great Britain. Relics of French arms in India, in the shape of appointments and accoutrements are not generally known. A type of button, showing a number within a wreath, surmounted by a dot, may belong to the European regiments of the French in India. From experience I gather that these buttons are found mostly in the Peninsular portion of India. I have a broken series of these buttons ranging from No. 1 to No. 49 in two sizes.

This letter is written with a hope that in the light of further material and information, Marshman's statement, quoted above, could be confirmed or refuted. Here I may mention that the Hyderabad Army must not be confused with "The Nizam's Army", a subsidiary force, raised in 1792, renamed "The Hyderabad Contingent" in 1853, and finally disbanded in 1902, of which much is known and recorded. Will readers interested in the subject kindly send their opinions and observations to the Editor, for publication in the *U.S.I. Journal*?


THE FOURTH INDIAN DIVISION

From Brigadier D. R. Bateman, Wana

In the issue of the *Journal* for last October, Secretary's Notes, you paid tribute to the D.P.R. for the excellence of the series of booklets concerning the exploits of the various Indian Divisions.

If it is the intention to produce a second edition of these booklets, may I suggest that far greater care is taken in editing. The booklet of the 4th Indian Division, for instance, of which I have personal knowledge, contains the following major mistakes:—

- (a) The badge of The Royal Welch Fusiliers is shown against the name of The Welch Regiment.



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(b) In two places in the text, actions by 1st Bn. The Rajputana Rifles are attributed wrongly to the 4th Bn. of that Regiment. In one case, in fact (pages 14 and 15), the 4th Bn. is shown to have been fighting at the same time in both Syria and the Western Desert.

(c) On page 9, an operation of 3rd Bn. 1st Punjab Regiment is attributed to 1st Bn. 2nd Punjab Regiment.

Within my knowledge, no battalion of the latter Regiment ever formed part of the Division; and so, presumably, the reproduction of its badge on page 21 is also an error.

As these booklets form such a very valuable "pocket history" of the doings of the Indian Army in the War, it seems to me a pity that their excellence should be marred by inaccuracies of this nature.

* * *

[We append hereto D.P.Rs. reply to the above letter:—

"The mistake pointed out in sub-para (b) of Brigadier Bateman's letter was due to a printing error.

"The script was checked by four senior officers before publication. We are grateful to Brigadier Bateman for pointing out the inaccuracies, which will of course, be amended if and when the booklet is republished."]

THE U. S. I. "JOURNAL"

From Captain C. V. Samuel, The Mahratta Light Infantry, c/o Embarkation H.Q., Kiamari:—

I have only recently joined the United Service Institution, and want to write to you to tell you that I feel the *U.S.I. Journal* is very good, and the articles of a high standard. The *Journal* should be to the soldier what the *Journal of the Medical Association* is to the doctor—a publication in which the officer can write freely but, of course, discreetly.

Serious study of the *Journal* will, I know, help many young officers, all of whom should be given a copy and an enrolment form, immediately they leave the Military Academy. Personally, I literally devour each issue as it arrives.

I like the 'get-up' of recent issues of the *Journal*. It catches the eye. One suggestion—why not add the names of the regiments of contributors?

* * *

[We are grateful to Captain Samuel for his letter. The suggestion contained in the last paragraph is a good one, and although it cannot be carried out immediately, as many articles have been set but have had to be held over for reasons of space, we will endeavour to adopt the suggestion in future. *Ed., U.S.I. Journal.*]

A LESSON FROM THE PAST

From Lieut-Colonel G. A. I. Sanders, Recruiting Officer, Bangalore.

May I remark on Colonel C. B. Ponnappa's excellent article *My Views on India's Post-War Forces*, which appeared in the January, 1947 issue of the *U.S.I. Journal*? The writer states: "I would strongly recommend that

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battalions be organised on a Provincial basis, rather than an all-India basis, to begin with.'

It is my humble opinion that the following of that advice would assist in the building up of the National Army that is desired. At the same time, though, I very earnestly entreat a recollection of the evils which grew, during the nineteenth century, out of the old system in India of the Presidency Armies.

Do not let that system be renewed. Battalions, and all units, *must* serve outside their own Province as well as in it. The personnel will thus gain the necessary experience of Frontier warfare and conditions, of varying climatic conditions, of other races and creeds in India, of other languages and customs. All of those things will broaden outlook and prevent stagnation—which will creep in if units are to be recruited and serve all their time in their own Province.

'The Admiral' in his article 'Training: Some Clues' which also appeared in the January, 1947 issue, bears out my point in his remarks: 'Why was the pre-war Army as good as it was?' There were several reasons: one was the constantly recurring Frontier tour, which kept us all alive."

TOWARDS BROTHERHOOD

From Captain A. M. Vohra, Gardai :—

Commenting on religion in Matters of Moment in the January *U.S.I. Journal* you say: 'Some may declare that less religion would sweep away many of India's troubles. Is it true?' Put that way, the answer may be No, but there is no denying the fact that mixing of religion with problems of the country is half the trouble.

As was rightly observed, we all worship the same God, only in different styles. The style I adopt should not be the concern of anyone else, and *vice versa*. Religion is a personal matter, and the less we refer to it in our social and political affairs the better. It is not "too much religion" that is the trouble with our country, but the fact that religion has been irreligiously used for nefarious purposes.

It is all very well to say that 'religion is fundamental in any army worthy of the name', but it seems to me that in our army it exists only in superficial forms, which stress the immaterial little differences between different styles of worship rather than promoting brotherhood.

One big step towards brotherhood would be to get various classes to eat from the same *langar*. There should be no difficulty in persuading Hindu and Musalman of, say, the pioneer of an Infantry battalion to do so. In the case of meat we may have to have *jhatka* and *halal* cooked separately (in the same *langar*—and it should not matter who cooks it). I am certain that men are not really particular about this, for they have often, when on detachment, and attached to another class, eaten their *langar* food, including meat, without thinking twice about it."

"NOTES ON THE SIKHS"

From Lieut. Ganda Singh, Punjab U.O.T.C., Khalsa College, Amritsar:—

I wonder if any reader of the *U.S.I. Journal* could kindly let me know where I could obtain a copy of "Notes On The Sikhs", by Rice, and also

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"Muzbee Sikhs", by Morgan? They are referred to in the "List of Some of the Principal Authorities Consulted" in Captain A. H. Bingley's 'Sikhs'.

I am anxious to consult these works in connection with my researches in the history of the Sikhs, and should be glad to purchase them if only I knew a source from which they might be obtained.

A CONTRIBUTOR CRITICISED—AND HIS REPLY

From Lieut.-Colonel A. B. M. Way, R.I.A.S.C., Dera Ismail Khan:

Philip Woodruff's short story, 'The Soldier' in your January number is a remarkable article in so far as it draws a real live character against a real and vivid background, and yet contains some inaccuracies in detail.

I enjoyed reading it, was even inspired and moved by it. But why should Philip Woodruff think that any real soldier, such as he aimed to portray, would ever come to think 'very little of a driver in the Supply Corps'?

The mule drivers and leaders of the R.I.A.S.C. are probably as fine soldiers as can be found in the world. They have served in every campaign, and on every front, since the Indian Army ever was the Indian Army.

Their bearing and morale on landing in England from the 'little ships' after the ordeal at Dunkirk struck all who saw them. Their valour under fire in the worst parts of the campaign in Italy won many awards. Our American allies were not necessarily free with their bouquets but I have seen a wonderful testimony from the Commander of a United States division on that front. The story of Burma is closer to us. Need I go on?

Perhaps if Philip Woodruff had entitled his story 'A Soldier' instead of 'The Soldier' he would have seen the matter in better perspective. As far as I know there are no soldiers who do not admire the mule man—in fact more than that, have a very warm affection for him.

* * *

[The author of the short story referred to, Philip Woodruff, writes:

"I am sure that everything Lieut.-Colonel Way says in praise of R.I.A.S.C. drivers is true, and that they have earned all the bouquets he mentions and more. I think Keshar Singh would have said the same if he had been asked what he thought of the men who brought him his food and ammunition; but I am sure that he also thought his own Regiment the best in the world, and in his heart of hearts felt that anyone not in a Rifle Regiment had gone into a poor second best. I have seldom met anyone, officer or man, in the Indian Army who did not believe his own Corps had something no one else had got, and it will be a bad day for the Army if that belief is ever lost. Lieut.-Colonel Way's own letter seems to me a confirmation of just what I mean.

"Had I been writing an essay about the Indian Army I should no doubt have said all this, but I was trying to write fiction, which deals with the emotion of the moment, not with the whole truth from the objective point of view of history. I used the expression 'Supply Corps' for the same reason as I say pancake instead of *chapatti*, because I prefer to find something intelligible for a non-specialist reader. But perhaps this particular phobia of mine is out of place in the *U. S. I Journal*. I should be glad to know what were the other inaccuracies to which Lieut.-Colonel Way refers."]

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From Lieut.-Colonel H. K. Blaber, Burma Regimental Centre, S.E.A.C.:—

For the past 29 years I have seen the above initials against a monthly deduction from my pay, but I have never until quite recently seen any published accounts. Throughout my service rumour had it that subscriptions were greatly in excess of the pensions granted to widows and orphans, and that the balance was purloined as "Revenue". However I have just received for the first time a statement of the accounts of the Indian Military Widows' and Orphans' Fund.

It is a truly remarkable document and proves that rumour was right—and wrong. In round figures it shows that the income of the fund in 1945 was £100,000 from subscriptions plus a further £50,000 from dividends, profits on sales of investments and Repayments of Income Tax, etc., while £27,000 was paid out as pensions to widows and orphans and by way of refunds of subscriptions. During the year approximately £100,000 was added to investments (so it doesn't go to "Revenue"!!!) which now stand at the imposing figure of £1½ million. The yield of these investments works out at slightly more than 3% and produces about £7,000 *MORE* than the pensions.

Please let it not be thought that I am running down the Administrators of the Fund—far from it; the costs of administration are negligible and the system of investment is beyond criticism. Moreover, some years ago when the announcement of the birth of my first child appeared in *The Times* they took the trouble to write me a personal letter of congratulation, pointing out that I should report the birth officially or else they would be obliged to fine me.

It appears to me to be obvious that either the subscriptions should be reduced or else that the pensions should be increased—preferably both. Here we have got this enormous sum building up year by year for what? A dying Service, fewer and fewer widows and orphans each year, until finally there will be a large sum of money and no claimants. Will it then, as we feared before, fall into ever-open pocket of the Treasury? Surely it will not be handed over to the future Indian Government for the benefit of widows not yet married and orphans not yet born? I suggest that the whole question of the future of this Fund should be considered by a small committee composed of its very human administrators and a few common or garden soldiers.

* * *

[We understand that an actuarial valuation of the monies of these funds has recently been undertaken by the Government Actuary in London, whose report is at present under consideration by the Government of India and the Secretary of State. The Government Actuary's recommendations will in due course doubtless be referred to subscribers for their views.

With reference to the last part of Colonel Blaber's letter, we have good authority for stating that, in accordance with Section 273 of the Government of India Act 1935, the balances of the Fund are transferred to the Fund Commissioners for investment in sterling securities in the names of the Commissioners, and it would not therefore be legally possible for such balances to be taken over either by H. M. Treasury or by the Government of India.—*Ed., U. S. I. Journal.*]

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NOTES BY THE SECRETARY

Simla.

Dear Reader,

Over more years than I care to remember I have always been taught to begin a letter on a cheerful note. In writing this month's Notes one hasn't to search for a cheerful subject, for the response of members to my appeal to bring in more members has, to use an overworked phrase, been most gratifying.

The Institution will progress in direct measure to the interest displayed by members, and for months past, if not for the past few years, the United Service Institution of India has gone forward because its members have made it more widely known. Its contributors, too, have made it what I believe is the finest Service Journal in the world.



The goal is to persuade every officer to become a member not merely for his own sake but for the good of the Service. To write to them all would just not be possible, and I have to rely on each member recommending the Journal and the Institution to one officer friend—as a start at any rate! So do please do your best to persuade at least one of your brother officers to come in. There is an enrolment form on the last page of the Journal, and if you would like more I shall be delighted to send them.

After the list of individual new members which follow you will see the list of messes who have become subscribing members. Among them are several who have increased their number of copies; the I. M. A. in Dehra Dun, for instance, has increased its order from two to ten copies.

Here, then, is the list of new members who have joined since December 10 up to the time of going to Press—March 22:—

AHMAD, 2/Lieut. S. D., Indian Signals Corps.
 AHMED, Captain M., I. A. O. C.
 AJIT SINGH, Major, R. I. A. S. C.
 ALI AHMED KHAN, Lieut., 8 Punjab
 AMEEN, 2/Lieut. H. M. I., Indian Signal
 APAR SINGH, Major, Indian Signal nCole
 ASKARI, F/Lieut. S.Z., R.I.A.F.
 ATMA SINGH RAI, F/O., R.I.A.F.
 BACHITTAR SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.S.C.
 BACKHOUSE, Commander K.S., R.N.
 BAJWA, Major B. S., Assam Regiment.
 BAKSHI, Captain Z.C., Baluch Regt.
 BALJIT SINGH, 2/Lieut., R.I.A.
 BALKAR SINGH, Lieut., Indian Signals Corps.
 BALRAJ SINGH, G. C. MASSON,
 BALI, Captain K.N., Royal Garhwal Rifles.
 BALWANT SINGH PHAGURA, F/O., R.I.A.F.
 *BAMFORD, Colonel P.G., D.S.O., Sikh Regiment.
 BASHMIR AHMED, Captain, M.C., Rajputana Rifles.
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 BHATNAGAR, Captain B. B., R.I.A.
 BICKERS, Lieut.-Colonel M.H.T., O.B.E., Army Postal Service.
 BIRDWOOD, Major C.H.L., 3rd Cavalry.
 BISHAMBER SINGH, Lieut., 1st J. & K. Infantry.
 *BOSE, Major N., R.I.A.S.C.
 BRAR, Major S.M.S., 8 Punjab Regiment.
 BRITTO, Major F.J., R.I.A.S.C.
 BROWN, Captain D. A. P., R.I.A.
 BRUCE, Lieut. A.E.R., A.I.R.O.
 BRUEN, Mrs. S.L.
 BRUNSKILL, Major-General G., C.B., M.C.
 BUELS, S/Ldr. J.S.J., R.A.F.
 BUSBY, Captain W.M., K.S.L.I.
 CALDWELL, Major E.C., South Wales Borderers.
 CAMA, 2/Lieut. B. D., Royal Deccan Horse.
 CHADHA, Captain Y. L., 1st Punjab Regiment.
 CHANDRAN, Lieut. G. E., Mahratta Light Infantry.
 CHAPHEKAR, Lieut. S. G., A.I.R.O.
 CHAPMAN, Lieut.-Colonel J.L., Royal Sussex Regiment.
 CHATTERJI, Lieut. J., R.I.N.
 CHERIAN, Lieut. K. V., R.I.N.V.R.
 CHOPRA, S/Ldr. M.K., R.I.A.F.
 CHOPRA, Captain S.P., Mahratta Light Infantry.
 CLOSE, Esq., H.M., M.C. (Ex. Major Raj. Rifles).
 CLUTTERBUCK, Lieut. E.W.C., Black Watch.
 COLLIS, Major A.A., King's Own Royal Regiment.
 DALJIT SINGH, Captain, 14 Punjab Regiment.
 DAVE, Captain P.K., Indian Signal Corps.
 DEAN, Lieut.-Colonel G. P. T., Jat Regiment.
 DESAI, Captain Y.S., Indian Signal Corps.
 DESOUZA, Captain V.K., I.A.O.C.
 DHALIWAL, Lieut. K. S., Rajputana Rifles.
 DIAS, 2/Lieut. H. E. M., R.I.E.
 *DOST MOHD KHAN, Major, Mahar Regiment.
 DUBAL, Major B., 5 Royal Mahrattas.
 EMERY, Major M.A., R.I.E.
 ENGINEER, GROUP/Captain A. M., D.F.C., R.A.F.
 FARUKI, Captain M.A., Scinde Hourse.
 FATEH KHAN, Captain, 8 Punjab Regiment.
 FATEH MOHAMED, Captain, Madras Regt.
 FAZL-UR-RAHMAN, Lieut, 3rd Cavalry.
 FERRIS, Major L. E. E. B., Madras Regiment
 FINNIMORE, Major H. L., Rajputana Rifles.
 FONSECA, Captain J., Mahar, M.G. Regt.
 GANJOO, F/Lieut. D.N., R.I.A.F.
 GARDINER, Lieut.-Colonel R.A., R.E.
 *GAY, Captain S.N., Skinner's Horse.
 GEAR, 2/Lieut. D. H. J., Kumaon Regiment.

THE KWANS OF CHINA...




In China, tea is not an informal pleasure, but an important and exacting ceremony. It is proffered to guests as they enter the house. It is taken from a cup with a lid but no handles, and tea leaves are infused in the cup itself. Milk and sugar are not served. It takes practice and skill to drink, raising the lid with one finger slightly. The offer of a second cup of tea is usually a polite hint that it is time the guest left. In China, land of indirect speech and eloquent gesture, tea serves not only as the chosen beverage of a great nation, but as a gracious vehicle for hints, compliments, negotiations and friendships. Forty crores of Chinese drink tea, from morning till night to their pleasure, comfort and refreshment.



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Wherever one turns in China, there is a Kwans (Chinese for tea house) round the corner. A centre of social life, each Kwans has its own fixed clientele. Different groups of customers attend at different hours and the kettle is constantly kept on the boil.




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
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
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 The Afghan General Staff, War Ministry, Kabul.

Gold Medal Competition.—Entries for this year's Gold Medal Essay competition are now coming in. Certainly the subject set—Man Management—is one that can be studied with advantage by every serving officer—and nothing stimulates thought as writing does. It clarifies your mind, helps you to put your thoughts in order, and leads to clear thinking. Apart from the obvious benefit to the writer, there is the more important effect on the men you command. I always remember the ending of an article we published on the subject some time ago:

“When your men subconsciously smile as they salute you, you have accomplished something great which the officer round the corner has not”.

You will find all the details of the Competition earlier in this issue.

Visitors to Simla.—If you, or a friend of yours, are coming to Simla during this hot weather, a visit to the U.S.I. building will assuredly repay itself. Without decrying the merits of other places in this delightful hill station, I am convinced that the U.S.I. building is well worth a call. Relics and trophies, books which are unobtainable elsewhere, and newspapers and periodicals of all shades of opinion are here for members and their wives.

The old Army lists (I do not suggest they are everybody's meat) are most interesting; one or two, for instance, are written by hand—at a time when people took a pride in clear, legible handwriting! Two or three years ago a General whose name is now a household word was in Simla for two or three days. Passing the U.S.I. building he went in, intending to pass away a

quarter of an hour. Instead he spent several hours, scrutinising these Army lists for details of his grandfather's career in the Indian Army. He was successful, and came away with the dates of his ancestor's promotions and appointments dating from 1830 to 1855!

The first Sam Browne belt is here, too, as well as other relics of General Sam Browne. Although your Secretary will be working "in another place" I hope all members visiting Simla will come along and spend an hour or two in the building.

Advertisers.—Sorry to wind up on a business note, but if you will glance through our advertisement pages you will find many new advertisers. If, in dealing with them and with those who have long supported us, you would mention that you saw their advertisement in the *U.S.I. Journal*, it will help us a great deal.

Yours sincerely,
THE SECRETARY.

MacGregor Memorial Medal

Recommendations for the award of the MacGregor Memorial Medal should be submitted by May 1 of each year.

The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, who founded the United Service Institution of India. It is awarded for the best military reconnaissance or journey of exploration of the year which, during the war, may have been achieved during an escape from a Far Eastern enemy country into, for instance, India.

The awards are made in June, and are: (a) for officers, British or Indian silver medal, and (b) for soldiers, British or Indian, a silver medal with Rs. 100 as gratuity. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. The Council may also award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for specially good work.

The award of the medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

Eligibility for the award is open to : (a) Officers and other ranks of all forces of the British Commonwealth of Nations while serving with the India Establishment, or with South East Asia Command, (b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Royal Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving. The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal. Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary United Service Institution of India, Simla.

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The Journal

of the

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Vol. LXXVIII

JULY, 1947

No. 328

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

MATTERS OF MOMENT

ONE OF the difficulties in producing a quarterly Journal is to present to readers up-to-the-minute news and views. As everyone will realise, the difficulty to do that at this time is infinitely greater than normally, for there hangs over the heads of men of the finest fighting

The Duty of Servicemen

Force in Asia—a Force which has been amazingly successful in overcoming the barriers of race and religion, in creating comradeship, and in fostering good relations between the British and Indian peoples—the

certainty of partition. In such circumstances one aspect, and one aspect only, can be touched on in this Journal. It is an aspect which any Serviceman worth his salt will understand, and is summed up in two words: loyalty and discipline. Individual feelings, individual careers, are naturally apt to predominate in peoples' minds just now, but a sailor, soldier, or airman has but one duty—loyalty to the Government of his country, and a determination to assist in maintaining law and order by adopting a tolerant attitude in his conversation and privately expressed thoughts. It may be unpleasant to assist in internal security measures (many a British officer has found it so in the past); it may be easy to point to the shortcomings of leaders, it is easy to criticise. But Servicemen are supposed to lead, and now they have a fine opportunity to do so.

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Ninety-nine per cent of our readers are officers of the Armed Forces; many have helped to build them, many are comparative newcomers. To all their duty is plain. It is to be loyal to their regi-

**Loyalty
and
Discipline**

ment, their leaders, their country; to keep their men well-informed, and, avoiding loose talk on the one hand and a morose silence on the other, to help, possibly in small measure, the peaceful transmission of power in India by a great nation to two others, who as Dominions, remain in the same great family. Such efforts do not earn medals; they do earn the gratifying feeling of having helped the country at probably the most momentous time in its long history. The Indian Armed Forces have all the conditions required for strength and greatness, tradition, tolerance and vigour; they are individual qualities as well as collective, and the nation and its leaders can be assured that, though partition may be a shock, it will not change the qualities of the Army. Thousands upon thousands of its officers and men of the past will be watching with profound sadness and regret the separation of one of the most admirably balanced military machines the world has seen. They will watch with equal joy when they see that the seeds they helped to sow have borne fruit, and that India's servicemen, who have set the example to India's people in the past, are again "showing the way" to them in the first stages of this new chapter in India's history.

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ANY MEMBER of this Institution who is concerned over his future when he leaves the Indian Army might read, learn and inwardly digest the article in this issue by G.B.S.—whose initials, by the way, do not hide the identity of the famous playwright, but of an officer who went

**Why
Be
Despondent**

Home for a short period last winter. He fastens attention on a problem which needs airing. Why are comparatively young officers despondent on being compulsorily retired? It is admittedly unfortunate to have to change one's career after toiling and mastering it to the best of one's ability; the prematurely-retired officer does suffer some disadvantages in a labour market in which specialised knowledge is essential. But such an officer has assets which tens of thousands have not, and rightly used they will assuredly help him along the road to success. Financially he may be better off than most people; intellectually he can hold his own with others; he has knowledge of how to handle men and, whatever walk of life he enters, he will be equipped with a flexible mind and understanding of other people—a quality not always possessed by those who have seen little of the outside world. One final point: in these modern times Government helps individuals to settle down in whatever business may attract them, but the Home-going officer must banish the thought that everything is going to be handed to him on a plate. At the present time, as in the past, it is a person's own enterprise which brings success, and ex-officers are

fortunate in possessing initiative and determination, as well as enterprise, in full measure.

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THERE IS a lamentable dearth of basic thinking in the modern world. Newspapers, the wireless, most systems of education all tend to search for the centre of gravity of problems and of their solution not in man himself, but in his political and economic environment. Mankind is doing essentially what the mother does when her child

Basic Thinking

bruises his head on the table: "Naughty table", says she, and smacks its oaken legs. Let us avoid humbug and

realise there is no solution to the difficulties of mankind until mankind recognises that, apart from what we call "acts of God", mankind is responsible for all that takes place in the world. The "external" world—the world of warships, rockets, atomic bombs—is merely a reflection of an "internal" world—a world of mind, of mind streaked with passion, covetousness, hatred and love of violence. The mind of man constitutes the basic problem. All action has as its creative source the mind of man. An intricate piece of machinery, a cathedral or the Taj Mahal were already existent in men's minds before the electrician wound his coils or the mason cut his stones. What starts as thinking ends up as deed. Until this simple truth is realised and acted upon universally, there is no possibility of peace on earth. Leaders of nations act as if they believe that peace and security can be assured by blanketing down upon peoples legislative, constitutional and economic formula. But the incredible folly and futility of merely "external" reforms have been demonstrated with such infinite multiplicity throughout history that commonsense is baffled by the value which statesmen the world over still attribute to them.

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Look back at Germany after World War I. The Weimar constitution imposed upon Germany did not even concern itself with the real problems of the German people—starvation, humiliation, frustration, bewilderment, sullen resentment and hopelessness. The

Germany and Japan

history of Germany between 1919 and 1939 was little more than the material expression of the ugly and dark mental pressures which vitiated German consciousness, especially their youth, as sequelae of their defeat. The frenzy of cruelty exhibited in the concentration camps resulted in the main from the release of a humiliated power-complex combined with the externalisation of a sense of guilt. There can to-day be no solution to the problems of Germany and Japan until the nationals of those countries undergo a change of heart. It is criminally *jejune* to believe that the Japanese and Germans can be re-educated into democracy by the Allies. However

justly Hamburg and Nagasaki were destroyed, there can be no doubt that their silent ruins will eloquently petrify all educative efforts extended to their owners by their destroyers. What dominates the thoughts of the Germans and the Japanese to-day? There is no trace of sorrow, of repentance; there is merely regret that they lost. They have not forsworn force; they rue their former inadequacy of it. All now has been taken from them except the will to violence and to conquest. The Allies can logically never leave either Japan or Germany. It is certain that both of them would concentrate upon the development of atomic energy. Pearl Harbour and Norway were surprise enough—in what terror would the world dwell if Japan and Germany were freed? The slightest disagreement raised by them at a World Conference of nations would cause a helter-skelter evacuation of the great cities of the two hemispheres. Japan considers herself to have been defeated by the atomic bomb. By the same token, her unmanifested will is to rise by it, and the dreadful irony is that the more Japan is held down, the greater will her will to power become.

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The peoples of the world, especially those of the defeated nations, need a mental clinic. Research into the mind distortions and prevailing currents of thought of nations should be undertaken immediately. The

**Control
The
World
Mind**

second step is the ethical re-education of mankind. A basic science of morals distilled from the great thought and revelation of the enlightened religions of mankind must be taught to all children and if possible adults throughout the world. The essential foundations of this ethical re-education of mankind should rest upon a reverence for human life; a love of humanity; a conviction that all problems can only be solved by applying reason and goodwill to them; and fourthly, conviction that a community or an individual has merit or demerit in proportion to the amount it or he gives to or takes from world society. Indeed, is this not the moment in this troubled century to begin the universal cultivation of the creed that before a man can take from society he must first give his best by his emulation of the brotherly spirit, by his condemnation and self-dismissal of greed, by his every effort to wipe out the selfishness, both personal and national, that is the root cause of the bitter and bloody struggles of recent decades? National and world problems will never be solved only on the material and physical plane. There is an inward and spiritual basis to life from which springs success. The shrivelling of the ethical spirit, the hysterical thirst for revenge, the fires of hate, the waiving of justice and the reason in the pursuit of minority ends—all these and more are the hell broth in the witches cauldron of the world mind. To control world events we must control world mind.

That is the greatest, most important, most difficult, most painstaking and patience-evoking task yet to be tackled by the well-wishers and would-be preservers of mankind.

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ONE OF the most hopeful signs in these otherwise frowning times is the interest which Indian leaders are taking in the Armed Forces. The recent visit of Pandit Nehru to the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun is a case in point. Cadets and staff alike were deeply gratified at the trouble which the Vice-President of the Interim Government had taken to inform himself of the objects of the I.M.A. In a speech in the famous Chetwode Hall he emphasised his complete endorsement of the objects of the Academy, and affirmed that if those objects were implemented one hundred per cent he was unable to suggest any improvement. Such a compliment coming from a great Indian leader about an Institution which aims at giving to the Indian Army its future leaders was warmly appreciated. After referring to the gallantry of Indian servicemen in the first and second World Wars, Pandit Nehru stressed the necessity not only of maintaining, but if possible, surpassing the standards of fitness, efficiency and courage which hitherto had rightly made the Indian Army illustrious throughout the world.

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What is an Army, Navy, or Air Force? asked Jawaharlal Nehru. It is the instrument of Government. What is a Government? It is the servant and representative of the people. It followed that the Armed Forces were of the people, should be one with the people, should belong to and be beloved by the people. The Army, he continued, should not look backwards. Success in war had normally gone to the people who evolved some new technique or exploited some new weapon. This was an age of invention, of scientific discovery, of the application of new and stupendous energies by man. A modern army to-day might be a Stone Age army in ten years time. Facilities for the military to keep in touch with scientific research were necessary if the Indian Forces were to be ready, efficient, and modern. India was now waking up from a long sleep; it had quickly to make up for lost time. But it had to develop along lines which were natural to it. National development, said the Vice-President of the Interim Government, must bind past, present and future into a unified whole. The dead-weight of bad traditions, customs and aspects of national life must be jettisoned, but whatever a people had discovered in the past which was firm, good and glorious, that they must develop from, add to, and thread into the present and future.

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Pandit Nehru struck a solemn note in his allusion to the nature of the period of history through which India was now passing. India was

devitalising, re-energising herself. Reborn energies were often of an explosive character, but they were a sign of life and not of death. The future would be stormy; events had a dynamic quality in them, whether one liked it or not. The present time did not favour a cotton-woolly, "safety-first" outlook upon life. Freedom was not won at one moment and secured for eternity. The solution of one problem often entailed the multiplication of others. In the I.M.A. cadets were living a sheltered life. They could look forward confidently to the future, but they should face it soberly as men who realise that it contained problems which would evoke all the powers of courage, determination, will and strenuous endeavour which they could summon to meet a great transitional period of human history.

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“REMEMBER, Indian soldiers have daughters as well as sons”. That remark made to us some years ago came to mind recently when we received a letter from a contributor who signs himself “Charles”, and whose letter appears elsewhere in this issue. It brings again to the fore the vital importance of educating the daughters of Indian servicemen as well as their sons. Such education must be of the practical kind—not only coaching girls to pass examinations. Soldiers’ daughters deserve more; they need practical education for their home, education to teach them to bring up their children properly; education to make a good home for their future husband. The problem is a big one, and in its accomplishment many deep-seated aversions will have to be overcome. Undoubtedly the time is ripe for a well-thought out scheme to be launched, and once under way, it will assuredly be warmly welcomed.

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EYEBROWS are sometimes raised when a touch of humour is introduced in official writings, but it is in fact no bad tendency, providing it is done with discretion. Summaries of a Directorate’s do not always lend themselves to a lightness of style, but they are meant to be read and inwardly digested, and if the humorous touch is used to point delicately to sins of commission and omission, it can certainly be relied upon to be a successful way of doing so. These thoughts sprang to mind recently when reading an Intelligence Summary of the Salvage Directorate. The writer obviously has a highly developed sense of humour as well as a keen psychological mind. For instance, he records that a buyer of a Mosquito aircraft at Santa Cruz aerodrome, who paid Rs. 1,000 for his machine, “went to examine his

**Humour
In
Official
Writing**

purchase, opened a trap door and released a swarm of hornets, which he eventually outdistanced over a length of runway. Despite the assurance of the Conducting Officer and the auctioneer, it was impossible to convince him that he had not been stung". And who can misunderstand the gentle hint in the following: "Four lots of salvage sold in at the end of 1945 have not yet been delivered, the reply at the end of a year being that the case was still *sub judice*. A.O.S. will approach the Archaeological Department with a view to the application of the Protected Monuments Act. There is no truth in the rumour that a wooden craft handed over to Salvage for sale in Karachi is either Noah's Ark or the Mayflower adapted for use as a water barge".

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Fire orders in G.H.Q. do not, it is to be regretted, receive as much attention as they should. The Salvage Directorate has a much better, and more effective method, for we read: "When individuals disregard

**Some
Examples**

'No Smoking' notices in Salvage installations action will be taken to put out the fire with the normal appliances, *i.e.*, trailer pumps, fire buckets, sand, fire hooks, and fire flaps. Salvage officers who are unable to go without

smoking for even short periods are advised to console themselves with chocolate cigarettes usually found in the nursey". Another item might appeal to a wider public: "When a theft of textiles at Depot happened, tracks were carefully safeguarded. Two days later the police with two dogs and dog police, followed the tracks to a village through the premises of the Reserve Supply Depot. Thirty-three suspects were rounded up and brought to the Depot, where the dog identified one individual as having made the tracks; in his enthusiasm for this clever bit of detective work, he most generously confessed to the crime. The Salvage Directorate Security Officer recently smelt a rat at a Depot—but so much for the sense of smell". Finally, the following is well worth quoting: "A Special List Q.M., in reply to his application for consideration as a possible Q.M. of his late Regiment in the U.K., was informed that the first Q.M. vacancy therein would not occur until October, 1963. He has now applied to find out what the exact date will be, so as to arrange for his Golden Wedding, which happens to fall in that particular month of 1963". For enterprise, delightful reading, directness and real value for money we commend the Controller of Salvage on a complete and readable review of work well done as we have seen for many a long day. Others might well emulate his example.

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INDIA'S BLINDED SOLDIERS LIKE ST. DUNSTAN'S

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR CLUTHA MACKENZIE.

IN the years since you printed my article on St. Dunstan's methods in England in July, 1943, we have had a chance of seeing how they worked out in India. Prognostications were almost entirely gloomy. Both British and Indian advisers shook their heads doubtfully. As a rule, they said, the Indian, when he suffers such a heavy physical blow, is so shattered in spirit that he won't react to training as the disabled men do in England. All the Indian wants to do, they added, is to get back to his village and sit about for the rest of his days. This didn't sound promising. However, we could but try.

The first hurdle was to get the men to come to a training centre. The early cases had already been discharged to their homes in remote and scattered villages, and early invitations to them to come brought the unanimous reply: "He firmly refuses to leave his home". We tried to tempt them with specific advantages—there would be Rs. 8 a month pocket-money, quarters for families, a gift of a Braille watch and a musical instrument at the end of training, as well as contributions towards the cost of marriage and housing—but the men remained stubbornly aloof.

We fell back on the ready co-operation of the Adjutant General, the Director of Medical Services and, when his office was created later, the Director of Resettlement, and instituted a system under which blinded men would be transferred to St. Dunstan's direct from hospital and their discharge delayed for a period of four months, to give us a chance of gaining their interest. It was no easy matter to get news of this system spread widely among the many officers, units and boards concerned, and here the newspapers lent a helpful hand, publishing articles and photographs about St. Dunstan's.

The first positive results showed themselves in January, 1943, when the C.O. of a Military Hospital at Kirkee telegraphed that half-a-dozen blinded men were being held there for me to see. I caught the next train. Luckily on arriving in Poona I ran into Brigadier Brayne, and he willingly agreed to translate my outpourings into vigorous Urdu.

The men stood stolidly in the C.O.'s office. They asked a few questions, but obviously the novel suggestion that they should train and be useful men, and earn money in addition to their disability pensions, was not taking on at all well. They appreciated our offer, they said, but their only desire was to return home and to receive a good pension from Government.

I was breakfasting rather dismally next morning, and, scarcely conscious of bacon and eggs, toast and coffee, was thinking that the pessimistic prophets had been right—the men wouldn't come to train and the only course was to use St. Dunstan's Indian Fund as we had used it in the first Great War, that was, to contract with the Government to take over a capital sum and to pay it out to the sightless men as an addition to their pension.

Then suddenly the great moment arrived which marked the end of months of frustration and depressing counsels and the beginning at last of success. A

chit arrived from the C.O. of the hospital. "The men have asked if they may see you again. I think they have been talking things over. Can you come to my office at ten?" So Brayne's fluent periods hadn't been wasted after all.

The little group stood less stolidly, and some of the dull acceptance of the decree of Fate had gone from their voices. The group included several 2nd Gurkhas, and it was they who took the lead. "We have spoken among ourselves of what the Colonel Sahib said to us yesterday. We think there is much good in what he told us, and we would like to say that we should be happy to take the training he has spoken of, if it can be given to us at Dehra Dun."

It was not until June, after various trials and tribulations, that quarters in Dehra Dun were allotted—three dilapidated bungalows and a collection of out-buildings which had been requisitioned to house Italian prisoners-of-war officers and then Burma refugees. Those were the strenuous war days of 1943. Staff was hard to come by. With a couple of Indian clerks and a rag-tag collection of servants and coolies we did our best to turn these decaying buildings and jungly compounds into a semblance of order.

First one and then another voluntary lady came to my rescue. The second one turned up out of the blue. "I am headmistress of an American Episcopal Methodist Mission High School for Girls", she wrote. "If my services for a month of my vacation can be of use, I offer them gladly." I stood in awe of the supposedly severe ladies of this unknown austere fraternity.

This one must, I thought, have a heart of pure gold to offer a month of her valuable holiday to labour in the heat when she could be resting in a cool hill station. I wired, "Many thanks. Can you come immediately?". No answer came, but next afternoon a tonga trotted up the drive emerging from the tall eucalyptus trees, and out hopped lovely and cheerful Miss Katherine Justen of Kansas, U.S.A.

"I came as soon as I could", she said, "And I am just ready to turn my hand to anything you want." Every morning she set off with her mile-long list of requirements, furnishings, stores, repairs, tools, employees and what not—walls to whitewash, floors to scrub, bats to get rid of. She would vanish for hours into grilling bazaars to re-appear when the shadows were lengthening with a string of bullock carts behind her with her day's catch. Calm and competent, she made that place habitable, and had it all in order when our first group of forlorn, travel-stained trainees arrived.

Those first days were rather sticky going. A good staff had to be found, trained and selected by a process of trial and error. The men's attitude was one of cynical pessimism. Most of them were men who had been back in their villages for a year or two, and had already accepted the traditional attitude towards blindness—that everyone in their villages knew that blind men could do nothing really useful, that it was the task of Government to give them a big pension and that it was not a proper idea of Government that they should be made to work.

The natural blunderings of an inexperienced staff, too, hurt their feelings, and occasionally crises arose which threatened to wreck our pioneer effort. Things brightened up, however, when we began to receive a steady flow of new men direct from hospitals, before they had had time to acquire the wrong outlook. They responded much more quickly, and gradually the whole place grasped the St. Dunstan's idea and decided it was good.

Cheerfulness replaced suspicion and reserve, a spirit of competition got abroad, and at length men came to the office to ask, "Colonel Sahib, I have now learnt to weave newar. Would Your Honour now allow me to learn to make blankets, and perhaps, too, some English and typewriting?" As the months went by, too, a group of solid, hard-working men began to dominate the life of the place, men who were now able, not only to be learners, but to take their places as instructors. This was an outstanding psychological milestone on the road to success.

Handicapped though I was by my ignorance of Indian languages and customs, I possessed one great advantage—I was myself a blinded soldier. A sighted C.O. is always up against the thought in the blinded men's minds, "It is all very well for him to say that we can and should do these things. How does he know? He's not blind." When the men found that their instructors were also themselves blinded soldiers of the late War, these doubts did not arise, and the timid beginner no longer questioned the possibility or otherwise of his power to learn.

There were occasions when luck helped us. A vigorous young Havildar from Malabar, blinded at Kohima, came into us from hospital with much less delay than usual and responded immediately to his training with the greatest keenness. A fortnight later an Instructor-Havildar from the same district arrived at about the last gasp of abject depression, too unhappy to show any glimmer of interest in either eating or speaking.

Poor beggar, he had had a dose of it—totally blind, three-quarters deaf and his left hand gone. Under great pressure he had reluctantly agreed to enter St. Dunstan's, but only on the condition that, if he did not like it at the end of his first twenty-four hours, he should be allowed to leave without any attempt at persuasion to stay. The job seemed hopeless.

"Chandra", I said to the fortnight-old trainee, "This is your task. You take Kuttan Pillai in hand, show him everything, tell him all about St. Dunstan's, show him what you have learnt in these two weeks, and say we can do things for him in spite of his grave handicaps. He can begin with typing." Chandra succeeded. The next afternoon Kuttan Pillai muttered his decision, "Send my orderly away. I will stay."

We put wax blobs on certain keys as a guide for Pillai's one hand, and on the thirteenth day he typed his first letter home. Today, with his hearing and sight partially restored, and he a brisk, cheerful, self-respecting man, we are helping to establish him in a small business in Trivandrum.

We were interested to read recently that in one of the Allied countries it is the practice to attach a sighted instructor to every blinded soldier. Our method is much more rough and ready, and is, indeed, the reverse. Our policy is to keep sighted staff to the minimum. Whenever a new man is helped from an ambulance, stumbling, uncertain, unhappy, into the office, we send for a blinded man from his regiment or from his own countryside and put the old hand in charge of the new. "You be his father and mother. Show him the way to barracks, bathrooms, dining room and workshops. Give him the next bed to yours. Look after him until he is on his feet." This helps both the old hand and the new. The new man at once develops the mental attitude: "If he can do it, I ought to be able to." The old hand thinks to himself: "The Colonel Sahib must be pleased with me to put me in charge of this new fellow. I shall have to go all out to show what I can do."

We have had a rare mixture of races, creeds, languages and types at Dehra Dun—all kinds of Indians, Burman Karens, Gurkhas, Pathans from beyond the frontier and several varieties of West Africans. In the early stages too we had a number of British troops going ahead with their training while they waited for hospital ships. It was amazing how well they all got on and how few our troubles were.

There was certainly a time, when, returning from tour, I found the place in a panic due to an invasion of ghosts. They made their presence felt by throwing pebbles on roofs between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m., by dropping pebbles inside the rooms when all windows and doors had been firmly battened to, by rattling door handles when no one was near the doors and, worst of all, by dragging a high-caste Hindu out of bed and beating him on the bare behind with a sweeper's broom.

The blinded men were thoroughly scared as they felt themselves utterly helpless against this uncanny menace. Chowkidars, coughing loudly, waving their hurricane lamps and beating their sticks against any resounding object, failed to find either ghosts or trespassers. The news was encouraged to go round that we had telephoned a request to Area, to post a piquet of men with live ammunition and fixed bayonets. This may have been the reason that after that no more was heard of the nuisance.

Our experience has led us to believe that if in the past the Indian surrendered to heavy physical blows, it was not for lack of innate spirit or capacity, but because tradition, the fatalistic outlook and the united opinion of his community compelled him to. The Indian in himself has the same capacity as the British or any other race to make good. Given the right lead we find him quick and cheerful. Some, it is true, still refuse to train and give in under the weight of tradition and belief, saying that their blindness is a punishment for sins of commission or omission in this or a past existence, and that it is not for them to do anything else but spend their lives in prayer and penitence.

The environmental factor gives us a good deal of concern when it comes to the men returning to their own homes. The rest of the family is apt to squeeze the blinded member out of his land and other rights, nor is he always likely to receive much encouragement from the village in following his trade. In some cases our men have been threatened with ostracism should they pursue the trade learnt at St. Dunstan's, it being considered menial and degrading to the family honour.

For these reasons we thought it best to offer the men a permanent colony as the best guarantee of their future wellbeing—a model village with land for their cattle and vegetables, a school, a dispensary and a workshop for the steady employment of the soldier. The call of their own countrysides and peoples and their own little shares of family land has been too strong, however. Many of the men will return to their homes with sufficient strength of character to defeat local discouragements, but others will find it difficult to hold their own against mass public opinion.

One afternoon I saw two men in my office. The first was a Punjabi who, after eighteen months of repeated refusals, had at last come for training. In the early twenties, he had already acquired the bent shuffling gait of the pitiable blind man, his voice had gone up two or three notes to the whine of helpless self-pity, and he bugged not one faltering step alone. The next caller, by way of contrast, was the first trainee to leave us, now back after a year to talk over a matter of business. He was happy, prosperous, confident. He reported that

he was firmly established and very busy. With his typewriter he did the village letter-writing, he wove newar and spun fibres into rope for the local cultivators. Now he planned to build a grinding mill on a stream which flowed past his house. I remembered the day when I had first come across him, a sad, quietly-sobbing bed patient, in a Karachi hospital.

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We grew too big for our first premises and a year ago, through the kindness of the Viceroy, we moved to the Bodyguard Lines, a beautiful site which meets our needs to perfection. The number in training continues round about the hundred mark, rising at one time to 120. New men are still entering and it is difficult to say just when the end of this, the late War's crop, will be reached. Actually St. Dunstan's at home still receives the occasional cases of new blindness, arising only now from wounds or hardships suffered in 1914-18.

About two-thirds of our men have been blinded by enemy action or in training accidents. The others result from medical causes aggravated by war service or of long standing, from nutritional deficiency as prisoners-of-war in Japanese hands, or from methal alcohol poisoning from bad gin, whisky or rum drunk in Malaya or Java. Provided a man has served as a soldier and puts the best into his task at St. Dunstan's we don't inquire too deeply into the actual cause of his blindness.

Over twenty of the men, sent to us as *bona fide* cases for St. Dunstan's, have, through the skill of the Army eye specialists attached to us, been restored to such a degree of useful vision that they no longer need special help.

Four of our men have had the tragic misfortune to lose both of their hands as well as their sight, leaving them terribly helpless. When each of these men had his own full-time attendant, they made only slow progress towards independence. We fitted out special bathrooms and lavatories so that they could do many tasks for themselves. St. Dunstan's at home sent out the latest artificial gadgets by which they managed to eat their meals without assistance. Then we reduced their attendants and persuaded them to take their first steps in the dark alone. After that their progress was rapid.

Two of them have learnt to typewrite on St. Dunstan's special typewriter for armless men. A single striker is attached to the men's artificial arm fitting. He runs it along a slotted frame, covering the key board, and drops it into the selected slot. It is rather slow, of course, but it does give such a heavily disabled man a deep sense of pleasure and mastery to find that he can again write his own letters. Two of them have found they can play the harmonium with their stumps; and altogether it is astonishing how happy and independent they have become.

We are now at the crest of the period when trained men are returning to their villages, and we are more than busy in building houses, setting up equipment for their trades, in arranging marriages, in settling children into schools and in ironing out minor domestic problems. On the whole it seems best that a blinded soldier should have his own house, rather than share the family one with brothers and other relatives, for he may thereby be better able to hold his own. Securing the men their full pensions is another task which takes much too much of our time. It is a long and tedious business to get the four different amounts making up the man's full pension.

Following the training period, and re-settlement phase, will come the long period of after-care, which may last thirty years or more. When St. Dunstan's training centre finally closes down, we propose to maintain an office under an After-Care Officer, and, perhaps, half-a-dozen or so quarters to which the blinded men may return occasionally while their affairs are gone into. It will be our aim to do all we can to keep the men independent, useful and happy throughout the years ahead.

We at St. Dunstan's appreciate more than we can say the trust our generous contributors, including many regiments, messes, and other Service units, have placed in us, and we shall do our best to see that a good job is done for the men. They are a gallant band, and they deserve the help given to them. Money alone will not make a blind man happy. He thirsts for occupation to fill the dark days; he yearns to hold his own in community affairs; he wants to maintain his pride and to occupy his rightful position in his family.

[Lieut.-Colonel Sir Clutha Mackenzie would warmly welcome any assistance—financial or otherwise—which members of this Institution may care to offer him in the fine work he is doing. Any donations sent to him c/o St. Dunstan's, Dehra Dun will we are sure, be thankfully received and faithfully applied. Moreover, any reader who knows of an opening for a trained blinded ex-soldier should write to the author of this article at St. Dunstan's, Dehra Dun.—*Ed., U. S. I. Journal.*]

Nursing Homes For Disabled Ex-Servicemen

For the benefit of totally disabled ex-Servicemen throughout India two Nursing homes, one at Sialkot and the other at Bangalore, have just been opened by the St. John's Ambulance Association.

From all over India, military hospitals are now transferring patients to these Homes where several types of cases including all forms of serious paralysis, tuberculosis, disablement from loss of limbs and nerve and brain injuries are attended to.

Many ex-Servicemen who have been discharged from service are encouraged to go to these Homes, which provide every possible facility to make the stay of the patients cheerful and interesting.

General Key Appointed Colonel of Sikh Regt.

Major-Gen. B. W. Key, D.S.O., M.C., until recently commanding Rawalpindi district, has been appointed Colonel of the Sikh Regiment. Commissioned in 1914, General Key saw service in Iraq, on the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan, and won the M. C. He commanded the 2nd Sikh Regiment during 1936-37 Frontier operations, in which he won the D. S. O. During World War II General Key took over command of the 11th Indian Division and was reported missing after the Singapore debacle. Later, however, he was listed a prisoner of war in Japanese hands and released on the liberation of Malaya.

RELIANCE ON U.N.O.

SOME QUESTIONS ON THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.

BY BRIGADIER W. L. ALSTON, O.B.E.

COMplete independence, rather than continued membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations, attracts a very large proportion of Indian politicians and others for two main reasons. The first is one of "*amour propre*"—that by complete independence India will obtain equality with other nations, including Britain, whereas by remaining a member of the Commonwealth, they fear that Britain will still dominate their international field, and that they will be eternally relegated to second place.

This paper does not discuss that question, though it is relevant, but proposes to deal with the second reason—that of defence—in which it is argued that by becoming an independent member of U. N. O., the whole of the organised resources for defence against aggression belonging to that organisation would be available to assist her, whereas, by remaining within the Commonwealth, India would have at her disposal only the comparatively limited resources of one member of U.N.O.—Britain.

The logic of the latter view is, of course, open to question on the grounds that, in the event of aggression, the total resources of U. N. O. would be forthcoming for India equally whether she were independent or were to be attacked while a member of the Commonwealth—a member state. Nevertheless, these two "reasons" taken together must be accepted as justifying, from the Indian political point of view, the evolution of a defence policy for India based on support by U. N. O.

It would be very dangerous to assume too quickly, however, that, by the adoption of that policy, the problem of the defence of India has automatically been solved. To do so would lead Indians "up the garden path" to complacency about things as they are. The object of this paper is, accordingly, to examine the implications of that policy, and to stimulate thought as how best to compete with its repercussions. The writer's aim is to convince those who may think that India will be defended by other people, or by some organisation of nations, without the necessity of doing anything to defend herself, that they must think again.

This is a subject requiring plain thinking and plain speaking. That being the case, and knowing how difficult it is to put "plain speech" into the written word without causing offence to someone, the writer has taken the precaution of consulting his Indian second-in-command to make sure that nothing has been said that might hurt the feelings of the reader. If, however, by ill chance anything remains in the text that may injure the susceptibilities of any reader the writer asks to be forgiven, for it is not his wish to wound anyone's feelings.

(One further word of explanation. The writer's Indian friend gathered from the original opening paragraph that the purpose of this paper was to persuade Indian readers, by indirect suggestion, of the advantages of remaining within the Commonwealth. That was all rather unfortunate, for such an idea could not

have been further from the writer's thoughts. Consequently, he has re-drafted that para. in such a way as will now, he hopes, leave no doubt in readers' minds that all that is to be considered is what has been clearly stated).

WHAT IS TO SUBSTITUTE THE UNIFIED ARMED FORCES?

At the present time, for a political whim, the leaders of both major political communities are seriously considering the partitioning of the Indian Armed Forces.* With the complete disintegration of their sole means of defence against outside aggression, what substitutes are going to be suggested in their defence policy?

Starting from rock-bottom to lay the foundations of any national defence, the first factor to be subjected to a frank, objective examination is the national "will to resist" aggression. The questions: "Does such a thing exist among the people?", and "Does it exist, even if only in the minds of the national leaders?", must be answered. It is possible that many members of the fighting forces may be rather shocked at asking such questions, but there are good grounds for doing so, and the necessity for doing so will become clear as this paper develops its thesis.

When one talks about resistance, what does one mean? There has already been a considerable amount of resistance to the British in the past quarter century by nationalist Indians, but it has been chiefly in the form of passive resistance or *satyagraha*. The present leaders of the country have fought shy of resistance by force—not so much through fear of consequences, but because, generally speaking, the use of force as an instrument of policy is repugnant to them. Generally speaking, there are three existing theories regarding resistance without the use of force:—

- (a) The normal pacifist theory which believes in the efficacy of *satyagraha* or civil disobedience and non-co-operation. There is a very strong body of such pacifists in India today.
- (b) The theory that the rest of the world will come to the rescue of India on humanitarian grounds alone.
- (c) The theory of the ability of India to absorb her conquerors.

There is widespread belief in this last theory among Indian Nationalists today and not without good reason.

During the centuries of the Moslem conquests, it was the Hindus who first applied this theory. Deprived of the weapons and means of active defence, other methods had to be evolved if the people were to continue to live, and their way of life were not to be extinguished. In the course of time, ways and means were found to suit the conditions. A study of the Mogul era, for example, provides plenty of evidence to prove that there is a very great deal to be said for this theory. Witness the extent to which Hindu men of education and ability filled the administrative hierarchy, often in posts of great influence; became leading statesmen and ministers; and even commanded Mogul armies.

In our own times, we have seen the same methods adopted, this time by Nationalists—both Hindu and Moslem against their erstwhile British conquerors. Here again, we cannot gainsay them when they claim success, with some justification, for a system or method whereby the British have been evicted from their

* This article was written before the official announcement concerning the separation of the Forces was made.

country without firing a shot! They take the view—a very long view—that although the early phases during conquest may prove very unpleasant to those who live through them, nevertheless with patient and unflagging effort, the ruled can one day again become the rulers.

The protagonists of this theory, having grown up in that tradition for the reasons given rely therefore on the methods of diplomacy, intrigue, and a powerful propaganda, and *not* on the use of force, as the instrument of defence policy. There is danger in the future if they assume that methods that “worked” in one particular set of circumstances are applicable in all circumstances. They may prove successful against a people like the British or the Americans, who do not go in for massacre “in a big way”, and who do not hold life cheap. The number of such nations in the world even today is still small.

Civilisation is a pretty thin veneer over most. It still takes comparatively little to bring out the latent savagery that lies hidden about the world, often in the most unsuspected places, nonetheless savage for being in pursuit of fanatical doctrinaire aims than in satisfying a lust for power. Surely no one who has experienced the first half of this century would be so rash as to assert that the lust for power, or the savagery of the beast is dead for ever. The question is whether the methods described would succeed against other would-be conquerors, who are not so squeamish as the British; who have all the modern mechanised means for wholesale massacre; and will stop at nothing to cow and regiment the country.

So much for the outlook of today’s political leaders and intelligentsia. What, then, is the attitude of the common man—the peasant and the worker who form the vast majority? How would they view the certainty of aggression, for it is against the background of the common men and women of the country that its leaders must decide how they are to face an aggressor.

It is true to say, in general, that successive centuries of conquest before the British era, left the ordinary folk of India apathetic and fatalistic. The internecine disputes that scourged them from time to time were not their affair. Their best policy, if they were to lead any reasonable kind of existence at all, was to adjust their lives so as to be in favour with whoever held the power, neither “kicking against the pricks” nor “starting anything they couldn’t finish”. The methods of their leaders, already described, though possibly wise and far-seeing, was hardly conducive to producing fighting captains to stimulate popular revolts.

With the exception of Shivaji’s wars of liberation for his own people, the Mahrattas, the revolts were few and far between, and their impulse, so far as is known, did not come from popular movements but from ambitious or discontented individual rebel officials or princes. From the common man’s point of view, the position was hopeless. He was deprived of means of self-protection, let alone of successful revolt. It was only to be expected that the ordinary people of India should view the rise and fall of conquerors and despots with fatalistic detachment. What is termed today a national “will to resist” did not exist.

To say so is to cast no aspersions on the personal courage of the people. That would be monstrous and untrue, when one thinks of the physical hardships they lived through; the “guts” with which unarmed villagers, for example, deal with tiger and panther who molest their homes; and the bravery of today’s soldiers. However much the past may have affected their outlook on resisting

aggression, it has not affected their "guts"—*No!* That was the one and only policy they could adopt in those circumstances.

Under British rule, other causes have been at work that again did not foster the popular growth of a national consciousness towards defence. The common folk of the country became accustomed for generations to living at peace, and to going about their legitimate day-to-day avocations without let or hindrance. They relied on the distant, unseen "shield" of British protection to keep war far away from their homes.

It is only natural that they should have developed a feeling that there was *no need* for the common man, himself, to build up a "will to resist" so long as the British Government did its duty by him and prevented external aggression, as it has done successfully hitherto. Defence, he thought, was the job of the professional armed forces.

Nevertheless, although the "will to resist an aggressor *by force*" cannot yet be said to exist today among the masses, the British era has prepared the way to creating one. Never before in her history has the whole of India been united under a single rule and now, if ever, is the opportunity to foster it if only selfish and communal interests can be subordinated to the common cause.

With the impending withdrawal of the British "shield" how would India react to the threat of aggression? Having exhausted the possibilities of accommodation, bribery, and "appeasement" of an adversary of the ruthless type; realising that the traditional weapons cannot prevent the act of aggression; and being faced with the application of naked force, will the leaders of the nation:

- (a) accept aggression and rely on the long-term "resurgence" theory? If they do, the fact must be squarely faced that, on this occasion, with the modern means available to the aggressor, resurgence by an unarmed populace is now a hundred times more difficult, if not impossible;
- (b) appeal to U. N. O. for armed assistance? (It is assumed, of course, that U. N. O. has already been involved, assisting this member state by more long-range indirect means.);
- (c) resist aggression—by opposing force with force? To do so the "will to resist by force" of the leaders must be reinforced by a nation with *the will and the means to use force*.

It is very much to be feared that the temptation to follow the first course will be very strong, in view of the inborn instinct and teaching of "ahinsa" which, as described, has developed as a political force in the absence of the means of self-defence. The method of "ahinsa" can no longer be relied on, and India, face to face with other nations of the world, must learn the methods of force in order to apply them if she is to stand on her own feet equally with them. This will require a much more widespread study and understanding of defence and strategy than has hitherto been deemed necessary, and a universal acceptance of a more widespread participation in defence measures by the people themselves, as this is an era of totalitarian warfare.

The object of the above rather odd dissertation is to make the point that before we go into any consideration of methods of carrying out any particular defence policy, the matter of the national "will to resist aggression by the use of force" must be cleared up. World organisations formed for mutual support in the

event of external aggression will not support those who do not support themselves. Other members of U. N. O. will require to be re-assured that its members have the will to resist and will not commit their valuable fighting forces and resources to a land that does not exhibit any visible signs of preparation to defend itself.

Not only that, they will ask how far India can reasonably expect other countries to come to her assistance unless she contributes her fair share to the organisation. If other countries are expected to send armed forces to help India, they will want to know what armed forces India is prepared to send them if they are attacked. As General Durnford, in a recent article to *The Statesman*, has so aptly put it : "*U. N. O. can only give what it receives.*"

Then what can India contribute ?

We must assume that India, as a member state of U. N. O. is prepared, as a normal civilised state, to resist an aggressor by the use of force, and to contribute its fair share to the organisation to which it belongs. What is her fair share ?

From the outsider's point of view, one might suggest that, as India possesses one quarter of the population of the globe ; is a big producer of valuable raw materials ; and is now one of the biggest creditor nations of the world, it would be fair to expect *prima facie*, that India contribute (say) one quarter of the war potential (in its various forms) required by U. N. O. We know, however, that vast population yields comparatively few fighting men. We know that Indian industrial development has yet to come, and that that industry cannot for a long time to come render India self-sufficient for a major war. A better idea of her "fair share" would therefore be that India's contribution should be the preservation of her territories with a view to contributing to U. N. O. as a "lease-lender"—both in money, manufactures, and raw materials.

From the opposite extreme, or *bania* point of view that wants everything for nothing, he might claim that it is the human duty of other members of U. N. O. to come to the rescue of "India's helpless millions" for nothing, virtue being its own reward. Even if U. N. O. were "soft-hearted and soft-headed" enough to swallow such a proposition, and even if India were admitted to membership without any liability to provide armed forces for external use by U. N. O., there are some conditions that *must* be fulfilled if any active, armed assistance to India by U. N. O. is to be possible.

First of all, there must be a "secure base", "bridgehead", or "beachhead" of adequate size available in India to act as a springboard and to which allies could bring their forces. If the whole of India has fallen under the heel of an aggressor and there is no foothold available for those who wish to assist her, the difficulties of mounting a relief operation would be almost insurmountable. With all India in the hands of a modern Power with a good air force, landings similar to those on the west coast of North Africa and the Normandy beaches would be virtually impossible. Geography is against it.

Of course, it is possible that the deliverance of India may equally well, or more easily, be achieved by exerting the pressure of U. N. O. allies at other places more accessible or more vulnerable to her aggressor. It might never be necessary to land forces in India at all, or not till after the aggressor's capitulation in order to enforce withdrawal and generally to mop up.

But is U. N. O. going to go to war solely to deliver India from bondage in that fashion ?—a bondage that has come about very largely because India has not done enough to ensure its own reinforcement? Would Britain or the U. S. A., for example, mobilise its armed forces at once on a war footing the moment they hear (say) that Afghanistan (supported by an ally with a good air force) had invaded and occupied a substantial portion of India ? Supposing that they did, how long would it be before those forces had been fully trained, put in ships, or aircraft, and arrived at the Indian

ports or airfields? Would they go to war in Europe, we'll say against a European aggressor, solely to liberate an India in Asia that has not lifted a finger to stay its own submission?

It should be obvious, from what has been said above, to the most reluctant contributor to U. N. O. (or whatever other defence organisation India may join) that however little he is prepared to give to that organisation, there are the following minimum number of conditions that **MUST BE COMPLIED WITH** before India can get help from outside. They are:—

- (a) A firm bridgehead of sufficient size to give "elbow room" for the "build-up" and manoeuvre of the relieving armed forces. Preferably there should be more than one such bridgehead. The term "bridge-head" includes the guaranteeing of (at least) air superiority over the bridgehead for it to be of any use.
- (b) The maximum delay must be imposed on the aggressor in order to gain time for India's allies to arrive and become effective.
- (c) The ultimate withdrawal, when that is forced on India, to the "bridge-head" zones, must be very carefully planned and phased so that relief operations are facilitated and not hampered by a vast refugee problem.

If these theories are accepted, the minimum effort that can be contributed by the Indian Government is to provide the necessary defence means:—

- (a) to secure the bases, and
- (b) to ensure the requisite delay.

How is this to be done?

Operations in India will obviously entail consideration of the conduct, as a last resort, of a withdrawal to the ultimate secure bases. In order to co-ordinate and carry out the withdrawal, the government must be in a position to exercise control throughout. We know how long and difficult a job it is to move a government. On the other hand, the government cannot clear out to its "last ditch" location somewhere (say) in Madras or Calcutta and hope to exercise much effective day-to-day control over so vast a country.

Should not government, like a big Army headquarters, be organised into two or more echelons—with its "main" headquarters in its "last ditch" location, and its "Tac" headquarters as far forward as may be desirable? Again, how is it going to retain some element of control over those tracts of India that have been overrun? Through whom is it going to exert control, and by means of what communications? These points require to be settled.

The Government will obviously do its utmost to prevent, for as long as possible, the major food-producing and manufacturing areas from falling into enemy hands. The difficulty of feeding the Indian population once the granary of India—the Punjab—has been overrun is obvious. India cannot count on getting shipments of food from overseas in war. Each major portion of India can do no more (except the Punjab and Sind) than just produce enough food to support life for its own population. It is again obvious that, therefore, populations cannot move *en masse*, otherwise starvation is inevitable. If the common people of India are not to starve during a war, they must not migrate, and the Government must prevent mass exodus through "fear" from one overrun tract into the next.

The population must be trained that the most patriotic thing for them to do is to "stay put": grow their own sustenance: and remain inactive—neither actively hindering nor helping the enemy in their midst. Their role is to keep alive and not be a burden on the rest of their country. This puts into practice methods understood for centuries, and it relies on the stoicism of the peasant, and the tenacity with which he clings to his own soil. But this method needs education and a high standard of discipline to carry out but only thus can mass exodus be prevented.

In adopting such measures, the questions will inevitably be asked : "How will the captive population fare ? Will a conqueror indulge in wholesale massacres ? Or will he seek the good-will of the conquered by good treatment ? Or a little of both ?" A great deal will depend on the aggressor's aim. If he is out solely for personal or national aggrandisement, anything might happen. If, on the other hand, he is pursuing the establishment of a new ideology, he may adopt for a time at any rate the "velvet glove" over his mailed fist. There will always be a big risk, but it is a lesser risk than that of wholesale starvation, pestilence and death, that is the inevitable alternative if the population flees *en masse* in terror.

The plan for the phased withdrawal should cater for each tract, as it is abandoned, to be taken over by its own regional government, probably an "underground" one, whose job is to remain unknown ; maintain the welfare of its own people ; and prevent movement.

If large tracts are progressively to be abandoned, what effect will this have on the "make up" of the Armed Forces ? Can we expect a Punjabi, for example, to continue fighting with his division withdrawing towards (say) Nagpur or Allahabad, when once his province, his home, and his family have been overrun by the enemy ? Is it better to have a theoretically efficient modern Army or Air Force recruited universally : trust to its innate loyalty and patriotism : and to risk the danger of wholesale desertions as and when the men's homes are overrun ? Or should the Armed Forces be organised on a territorial basis in such a way that, as soon as one tract is about to be abandoned, then, on an agreed plan, the territorial forces belonging to it "melt away" merging in the local population or re-emerging as "guerrillas", and the "strain is taken" by the territorial forces of the next tract ?

It is pretty obvious that although there is something in the idea of territorial forces, it is not possible to man and train the Armoured and Air Forces or the Navy in that manner. Those troops will have to be regulars, and, as they will be subjected to such possible strains as the total loss of all that they may hold dear, they require to be men of a very special brand of courage and devotion to their country. However, all freedom-loving nations, during their hour of trial, have found themselves possessed of such men, and India will surely not lack them either. Accordingly, whether India has territorial forces or not, she will need a "hard core", in the form of regular Armed Forces of a size commensurate with her needs.

Having formed some idea of the "civil" side of the problem, let us now examine a few questions relating to the action and composition of the Armed Forces.

The greatest threat on the initiation of aggression is the AIR threat. The domination of the air by the enemy, and the ability it confers on him to put down airborne forces at will, will take the initiative from the Indian defence forces. The primary need, therefore, and the way in which the greatest initial delay can be imposed on the enemy is, if :—

- (a) Indian air forces dominate the air ;
- (b) they prevent the use by the enemy of airborne forces or air supply, while enabling their own army airborne forces to operate ;
- (c) the land forces of the aggressor, moving by the difficult land or sea approaches to India are subjected to early and continuous air attack.

The quickest form of external support that can be provided by allies is probably air support—always supposing that they have a margin to spare over and above the air forces they themselves require to ensure freedom of action in the air over their own particular sphere. The more that India's defence organisation is developed to produce delay on the enemy by air forces of all kinds, together with the concomitant of a good sound ground organisation, the easier it will be to bring in air forces from outside to reinforce the Indian air forces.

The advantage that will accrue to the relieving forces, if on arrival they find that the Indian Air Forces have command of the air, and that they themselves do not have to expend a vast air effort to obtain it as a preliminary to everything else, will be incalculable. The moral is obvious. Air forces are, on the present showing, India's first line of defence against outside aggression, and inadequate provision for them will strike at the very roots of any defence policy dependent on U.N.O.

One essential factor in this theory is the retention of mobility by the air forces if, as is anticipated in this thesis, India were invaded and airfields were progressively overrun. Our experience in Malaya should help us in this. There it was found that the further the Japs advanced down the Malaya peninsula, the more airfields fell into their hands and the fewer the British had from which to operate. Consequently British air action was squeezed out of the country. In any such withdrawal in India, it must be ensured that, at least, an equal number of airfields are still available to the Indian and allied air forces, even when forced back to their "last ditch" positions as well be available to, and are operationally useable by the enemy at any one phase.

Emphasis is necessary at this stage to point out that air action alone will not impose all the delay required by India. Action by the Army on the ground will also be vital. Having now "cleared the air" in more ways than one, whereby the Army has been given liberty of action through possessing air superiority and freedom from a clogging "refugee" problem, one might proceed to consider at length the possible composition and method of using the Indian Army working in close collaboration with the Indian Air Forces and the Navy. That study would be too long for inclusion in one paper, but the purposes of this thesis will be served by what has already been said and by posing, so far as the Army is concerned, the following questions that arise from the theories propounded.

It is hoped that more value will be obtained by the reader from thinking out suitable answers, than by continuing to make lengthy dissertations. On the assumption that the object of the operations is to impose the maximum delay on an aggressor pending the arrival of help from U. N. O. :—

- (a) How does the layout of the communications—both in regard to the approaches to India and to the communications within the country—suggest, in general, the course that operations would take in the event of aggression, and of a withdrawal such as is contemplated?
 - (b) Can the sea approach be disregarded? Which of the land approaches constitutes the greatest danger? Do we look North-West or North-East?
 - (c) At what points on the approaches, must the "steps" be placed? What communications are vital to their operations?
 - (d) What is the size of the threat? Does the condition of their communications indicate the strength of the effort, air and ground, that the enemy can bring to bear at the head of these approaches? And, therefore, what do we assess as the strength and type of "stops" with which to oppose the enemy?
- In this connection, the tremendous advantage of India having air superiority against an enemy who has to operate at the head of exiguous communications, on which he has to be maintained in all the requirements of modern war, is obvious. The petrol problem for example would be made almost insurmountable for the enemy.
- (e) Where are the base areas? How large should they be in order that U.N.O. forces shall have the necessary security and elbow-room?
 - (f) At what stage in the proceedings shall we garrison the secure base areas? Shall it be by specially raised local troops, who are in occupation from the start? Or shall they be occupied by the forward troops as they come tumbling back from the withdrawal?

- (g) How much of the effort of the Armed Forces is to be expended far forward, and how much preserved so as to be able to guarantee the "bridge-head (s)" after withdrawal? For INDIA to throw away her best divisions in distant battles at the limit of her communications which leave her nothing to secure her bases would be folly. On the other hand, there will be many temporary advantages in maintaining her positions as far forward as possible, *though they may not be vital to the success of the U. N. O. plan.* Nevertheless, the answer would appear to be to impose the maximum delay possible without incurring disaster and total loss, and to retain the power of manoeuvre so that when forward positions are no longer tenable, it is possible to withdraw in good order to the next zone of operations.
- (h) What are the "bottlenecks" in the communications? How far do they indicate where the various "bounds" of the withdrawal might be, or where we should place our "fortress areas" astride the communications?
- (i) How can we best exploit the characteristics of the various components of the Army, *e.g.*, armour: artillery: infantry: etc., that we possess to the best advantage in the terrain of the operations? Does the terrain suggest how the various formations should be composed and located?
- (j) Having assessed the needs for the "stops" and for the security of the bases, how shall the reserves be formed: composed: located initially and moved? It can be presumed that their role will be to be used to the best advantage in one of the following ways:—
- i. To reinforce local success.
 - ii. To plug holes in the defence.
 - iii. To retrieve a failure.
 - iv. To provide reliefs to the battle formations. We must never plan on using our formations till they are "completely played-out" as we had perforce to do in Malaya in the late war.
 - v. To man the next "laybacks".


Various answers will suggest themselves to readers as they have to the writer, and an outline idea of his solution to these problems is shown on the map attached as a matter of interest.


This survey however, shows three things that India requires as a foundation for her defence policy, if she is to depend on U.N.O. for her support in the event of aggression. They are:—

- (a) The need for educating the national "will to resist by force".
- (b) More emphasis than exists today on the provision of an adequate, up-to-date and efficient air force.
- (c) A radical re-arrangement in the dispositions and the administrative layout of the Armed Forces in India to secure the bridgeheads and bases that are vital to the plan.

There is no doubt that, in the event of aggression, the best solution for India, had she the necessary resources, would be to carry the war to the enemy, and thus prevent the actual invasion of Indian territory. This paper is open to the criticism that almost no play has been made of that obvious alternative. If India is fortunate enough to possess those resources, then there would be little need to write a paper like this. It is because, *prima facie*, India has not got them that this paper has been written in order to face the facts of the worst situation under the conditions as they are. Throughout, it has never been forgotten that, though withdrawal may be necessary at the beginning of the War the object is to return to the offensive with the assistance of U.N.O. with ultimate victory the goal.

THE DEFENCE OF INDIA BASED ON SUPPORT BY U.N.O.





H. E. THE VICEROY'S BODYGUARD

BY MAJOR A. H. LITTLE.

AFTER some years' absence from Delhi I returned a short while ago to be impressed anew by the brilliant pageantry of India's State ceremonies, and to recapture from fleeting glimpses of H. E. The Viceroy's Bodyguard something of the thrill I always remember after seeing the Lord Mayor's Show in London. Fortunately, by the courtesy of the Commandant I have been able to photograph some impressive unit, and many of the pictures appear

In a country where are commonplace, symbolises a diffused epitomises this great stately warriors, as of old, discuss the respective spear-point and force; behind the

trooper's maroon beret tends the unit's herd of prize cattle; the State trumpets with their bullioned banners compete with R/T and W/T, and the smell of horses and stables woos you from the petrol of the garages.

Nowadays our lives tend to be prosaic, and it is well that as British rule in this vast land comes to a close, we place on record for all time some pictures of what has for long been one of India's most picturesque groups of soldiers—H. E. The Viceroy's Bodyguard.



in the following pages.

violent contrasts the Bodyguard mellow whole which nation. A group of garbed and panoplied with knightly court-merits of the armour-the airborne task lines a *sowar* in para-




Risaldar Major GUJJAR SINGH BAHADUR, O.B.I., Honorary A.D.C. to H. E. the
Viceroy and Risaldar Major of H. E. the Viceroy's Bodyguard.



↑ Sikh section and V.C.O. with Punjabi
Mussalman Trumpeter in full dress
Red, mounted,

Punjabi Mussalman section and
V.C.O. in full dress Red, dismounted. ↓







Trooper, 1847




V.C.O., 1947
Photo: Mrs. P. Massey




Trooper, 1815




Sikh in Service dress




Punjabi Mussalman in full dress Red.




Punjabi Mussalman



Galloper Gun 1800—1826




Bodyguard Guidon.



Officer's sabretache.

2-pounder in Daimler
Armoured Car—1947.






Bareback Equitation Parade.

Photo ; Capt. B. E. Sc



Maintenance—Armoured Cars.



W/T Cadre under instruction.




Photo : Mrs. P. Massey.

The Commandant's House, Dehra Dun.



Sentry.



Trumpeter.

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Major Little acknowledges with thanks the assistance and co-operation afforded to him in the preparation of this feature by all ranks of the Viceroy's Bodyguard.

A SHORT STORY.

THE CROOK

BY PHILIP WOODRUFF

HE HAD been badly knifed, and indeed when the police first found him, they thought he was dead. He was lying in the ditch by the side of the road that leads towards Cantonments, from the suburb where rich money-lenders and minor officials live, and it was by the merest chance that the patrol flashed a light on his limp body. When they put him on a stretcher to lift him into the police van, he stirred and they knew for the first time that he was alive. They got him to hospital as quickly as they could, and there he came to consciousness for a moment and spoke. He asked to see an officer from Military Intelligence.

The assistant surgeon who was the resident doctor at the hospital had been in the Army. He realised that his patient had not got long to live, and that what he had to say might be important; he rang up Area Headquarters at once. They got on to me, and I was at the hospital soon after three o'clock in the morning. He was unconscious when I arrived, and I waited by his bedside for a few minutes till the doctors were ready to give him something that would bring him back to consciousness and let him talk.

The electric light in the hospital was poor. There was one naked bulb in the room, and it must have been an old one and of low power. Its yellow light was depressing; so too was the hospital smell of disinfectant, ether and sickness. The man who had sent for me lay on his back as though he were dead. His face was white, drained of blood, even the lips; his black hair and eyebrows were harsh against the pallor. It was a clean well-cut face, sensitive and intelligent, the nose straight and sharp, the mouth finely-drawn, not a typically English face; south European, one would have said. It seemed vaguely familiar. I puzzled over the likeness for a few moments, and then suddenly I remembered who he was and where I had met him. Douglas Coates. That was who he was, Douglas Coates of the 159th.

* * * * *

I remembered the first time I had heard his name. The scene was in such vivid contrast with the poor bed in the hospital ward, in the light of that one cheap electric bulb, that I dwelt on the memory, lingering over the details, as I waited for the man on the bed to talk. We had been out shooting duck; I don't know that it had been different from other mornings, but I must for some reason have been more aware and impressionable than usual, because the memory was so unusually clear. We had waded into the water in the dark, and stood there waiting as the sky grew lighter.

We could hear the waterfowl stirring here and there among the reeds, and there was the rank smell of rotting sedge and mud and the marsh. Then suddenly the whisper of swift wings, and the guns were spurting flame in the half light. Speed, and the swift squadrons of the duck, swerving and dipping, quick as thought, and twisting away; the splash of a teal hitting the water, the soft feathers on the lovely limp body, drops of bright blood and bright water.

And then the sun, suddenly springing above the flat sky-line, glowing molten gold, turning the water to smooth ripples of liquid gold, lighting the white

and gold of the star-like lotus blossom, and with it all the swift rush of the birds' coming, dipping and diving and turning, and the rank smell of the marsh.

It came back to me very clearly. When we waded ashore to have breakfast, there had been some friendly argument about a bird that two of us claimed. I ended it by saying:—"All right, it's yours. There is a type that simply can't help being a crook." At that phrase, Mark Auden had looked up with a smile on his square humorous face, and said:—

"Talking of the type that can't help being a crook, did anyone here know Douglas Coates of the 159th? I see he's just been permitted to resign his commission at last. Lucky not to be doing ten years."

Two people did know him, and they began to tell tales of his surprising dishonesties and improprieties, and his still more surprising knack of avoiding the consequences that would have followed for anyone else. Perhaps the most remarkable thing of all was that he had managed to stay on so long in the 159th, a battalion who despised social accomplishments but were fiercely proud of their battle-honours, the red flashes worn on the shoulder straps which they had won at Assaye, their record of never having failed to reach their objective.

One story about Douglas stuck in my memory; it was typical of half a dozen that I heard that morning. He was a man who did everything well, and among other accomplishments he was a fine horseman and had the judgment and sympathy that wins races. And naturally racing appealed to the side of him that couldn't help being a crook; it presents many opportunities, even to people who are straight about other things.

The tale was that he had gone down to Bombay for the races and had stayed with an Australian trainer. He had ridden one or two winners, and partly because he was so good with the horses, and partly by sheer natural charm, he had completely won the old man's heart. When Douglas was sure he had his confidence, he had suggested that the trainer's horses were too well-known on the race-courses near Bombay to win much. They were handicapped out of the stakes; and you couldn't get odds on them either.

Why shouldn't Douglas take four of them on a tour of the northern race-meetings, where no one knew them, and they would win sensationally? Douglas and his host would share the profits, which were sure to be considerable. He painted so cheerful a picture that the trainer agreed without putting anything into writing. Douglas took the horses, and his tour in the North was as successful as he had foretold. He had a number of wins and made a good deal both in stakes and bets.

Finally he sold the horses quite well. But he never sent a penny to the trainer, who, he maintained, had given him the horses for love. It was one man's word against another's, and although no one who knew Douglas had the faintest doubt which of them was speaking the truth, the trainer never got any satisfaction.

"And yet," said Mark, when we had finished the stories about him, which was not till there was nothing left to eat, "if Douglas Coates walked round the corner of that bush now, we should offer him a drink, and before the end of the day, he would have tried to borrow money from each of us, and I think he'd have succeeded with most of us."

I could hardly believe this, but it turned out to be true that we could not say no to him, for Douglas Coates appeared that evening at Mark's house. It was one of those coincidences which are too improbable for fiction but happen in real life that we should have been talking about him only that morning. Mark had asked me to dinner; he told me to come early because we were both short of sleep, and he was going to send me home immediately after dinner and go straight to bed. We were sitting on the lawn as the light faded, enjoying one of the nearest approaches to satisfaction that a hedonist can achieve.

At least I know that I should put very high in my list of pleasures the relaxation of mind and body that comes from hard physical exercise, and it is better still if it is combined with a consciousness that you have done something well, or seen something beautiful. I was remembering the whisper of bird's wings, the gold ripples on the water, the smell of the rotting marsh; Mark, I expect, was thinking of difficult shots he had brought off; but I am sure neither of us was making much mental effort.

We were content to be silent and watch the change of colour in the clear sky above the trees at the bottom of the garden. A servant came out and said that someone had come to see Mark; it was someone he didn't know who wouldn't give a name. Strangers were rare; we turned in our long basket chairs towards the house and stood up to greet him as the visitor came nearer; and Mark introduced me to Douglas Coates.

He was wearing one of those cream-coloured suits that business people wear in Calcutta and Bombay, quite well cut, but even in the half light rather crumpled. You don't see those sort of clothes much in the small stations in the North of India, and it seemed to mark him off as a man who had left our community, the servants of telegraphic orders to proceed immediately somewhere else, and entered another about whose rules and habits neither Mark nor I knew anything. But I forgot that first impression as soon as he began to talk.

He talked very well indeed. He had charm and humour, and he knew how to sound the right note for his audience of the moment. To us he was the soldier, but the soldier with a little money of his own, leisured, intelligent, a man of the world to whom his profession is a pleasant background rather than the absorbing interest it is to some. He spoke as though he had left the Army entirely of his own choice, but he was wise enough not to belittle what he had lost.

He spoke with a regret that was quite moving of regimental life, the companionship, the silver in the mess, the ritual of guest nights, the bugles. He spoke too of the pride men feel in the record of their regiment and its tradition; he did it very well, in an inarticulate English way, a little ashamed of mentioning it. I thought as he talked that he had the true actor's temperament; he believed emotionally everything he said. At the moment he said them, his words became true for him, though he probably never gave the subject a thought when he was alone.

He was frank, amusing, self-deprecatory, about his present life. To any one brought up in the Services, he said, it was a shock to plunge into the cynicism and corruption of business life. He was an agent for a firm in Lahore, selling tractors, steam-rollers, agricultural machinery; without bribery, it was impossible to sell anything to a public body, and private persons don't buy steam-rollers. He had to shrug his shoulders, lower his standards, and bribe; there was no alternative, but it was a humiliating experience to a soldier.

In all he said, there was not the faintest hint, by the flicker of an eyelid, of the truth about himself of which he knew that Mark was perfectly aware; and even with the morning's conversation fresh in our minds, we were hypnotised into talking to him as though he were still unblemished in character, and almost into forgetting that he was not.

He was very good company. He knew everyone, he had been everywhere, he knew the most amusing stories about everyone worth telling stories about; and when he stood up to go, we were sorry. As we moved towards the house, Mark asked where he was staying. "As a matter of fact," he said, "I'm not exactly staying anywhere. There's been a slight miscarriage of my plans, but I don't want to bother you with all that. I shall get quite a good meal at the railway refreshment room."

Mark hesitated, but only for a second. He could not bear the thought of condemning to a solitary meal at the railway station someone who had been to a good school and belonged to a good regiment. He said:—"My dear fellow, we can't let you do that. You must stay and have something with us."

Douglas protested of course, but of course he stayed. He told us that he had been about to go back to Lahore, but had suddenly received a telegram from his employer, telling him to do some business in our city of Ramnagar. He had had no time to think beforehand where he was going to stay, but had taken the next train. He had been short of sleep, and dozed in the train whenever he could; and he had suddenly woken from one of these dozes to see the station of Ramnagar sliding past him as the train moved out. It was vital to him not to disregard his employer's instructions; he jumped out at once, as the train was gathering speed, and his servant and luggage were carried on to Lahore. He had been left with nothing but what he stood up in; but his business would only take him one day, so he decided to camp in the station. And going for a Sunday evening stroll through the cantonments, he had seen Mark's name on the gate.

It was not really one of his better efforts, because no man living could sleep in the afternoon through the din of a halt at an Indian railway station, and still less would a servant. The truth of the matter must be that he had neither servant nor luggage and was in much worse circumstances than he had previously let us see. Perhaps this was his way of explaining the truth.

But all through dinner he continued to talk in the same easy and amusing vein as before, about every subject in the world. It was only after dinner, when we settled down again in long basket chairs on the lawn, for a last half hour of talk in the starlight, that his tone changed completely and he told us what had really happened to him after he had been told to leave the Army. At least I felt at the time and always believed afterwards that this was what had really happened, though you could never tell with Douglas Coates.

* * * *

He had had a lot of debts, of course, and his colonel had made it a condition of letting his resignation appear voluntary that he should clear them. He had got through most of his private means already, and even when he had sold his ponies, his Sowter saddles, his guns by Churchill, his boots by Peel, his rods by Hardy, his uniforms, his gramophone, his books, there was barely enough to pay the debts his colonel knew of.

But he was left with a little, enough to live in comfort for a few months at least, and he had gone into a business partnership with a Hindu, some kind of tourist agency to Kashmir. This part of the story I accepted with more reserve than the rest, but what he said was that he had been double-crossed; his partner

had disappeared with the assets, and he was left to face the creditors. When they had finished with him, he was in Lahore at the beginning of May, with the clothes he stood up in, one spare shirt and two handkerchiefs, half a dozen old books, twenty-two rupees and a few annas.

He found a room that he could hire for a month for ten rupees. He had to pay in advance, and that left him twelve rupees. He found he could just live on four pennyworth of parched gram every day; and that meant that his food would cost him eight rupees for the month he had the room. With what was left, he bought a packet of Lux and a flat iron, because he reckoned that unless his clothes were clean he had no chance of getting a job. He used to wash his clothes every night, after eating the second half of his ration of gram, with the sweat running off his elbows and drying as it splashed on the floor.

He said he had never known what heat meant before. He had spent his hot weathers in big bungalows with trees, and watered lawns round them, with fans and iced drinks. That sordid room in Lahore bazaar was very different. There was not only the searing heat, but flies, and the smell of greasy cooking in cheap oil, all the noise of the street. All this on starvation rations; and he was a man who had the best of everything all his life. He thought of Dives in hell, and wished he had the amount of just one of the tips he had given the head waiter at the Berkeley. It would have meant another month of life.

For he had determined to kill himself if he didn't get a job by the end of the month. It would be better than dying of starvation in the blinding heat of June. He spent a good deal of time thinking how he would do it, when he wasn't tramping from office to office, interviewing hard-faced men who wanted to know about his past record. His ideas of the kind of job he would accept were less ambitious every day. None of the good firms would look at him; he had owed most of them money at one time or another and the rest had heard the rumour of his ways.

At last, on the twenty-seventh day, when he was beginning to feel that going from office to office was simply a wearisome task to be got through as quickly as possible and that it would be a relief when the thirtieth day came and he could end it all, he went to see a man called Charanjit Lal. A hard, evil man, he said, who when Douglas had finished speaking, looked at him with a slow smile and nodded. He drew out one hundred rupees and gave it to Douglas straight away. It was an advance of the first month's wages, and there would be a commission on sales.

Douglas said that in his half-starved state the relief was so great that he fainted. He caught hold of the table and sank on the floor. He must have come back to consciousness quickly, for when he did he was still holding the hundred rupees in his hand as he lay on the floor, and Charanjit Lal was still smiling that evil smile. Douglas knew that he had sold himself to the devil for good now, but he didn't mind much. He went and had a meal of bacon and eggs at a place that catered for British soldiers. He had whisky with his meal and coffee afterwards; and then he sat smoking a cheap cigarette, blissfully letting the smoke dribble through his nose and taking deep breaths of it. Nothing had ever tasted so good before. Then he went to arrange for somewhere a little less sordid to stay.

* * * * *

That was his tale, and I think it was true. Neither Mark nor I could help feeling sorry for him, in spite of all we knew, and when I stood up to go and Douglas also rose, Mark asked him to stay the night.

He stayed two nights, and left early on the third morning. I saw him again twice, for in those days I was always in and out of Mark's bungalow, and each time he was the easy, brilliant man of the world. He might have been the Military Secretary to a Governor; you felt he hadn't a care and found everyone as charming as himself. It was not till some ten days after he left that we found that he had spent his Monday in Ramnagar cashing cheques on a fictitious account at all the shops where Mark had credit.

* * * *

That was the Douglas Coates I remembered, and there he was, lying at the point of death in the public hospital in Lahore. The doctor came at last and told me he was sure Douglas had only an hour or two at the most before he died; he might be unconscious till he went unless he had an injection. The drug would bring him back, but he might use up his strength in talking, and go the quicker. Still, half an hour would not make much difference to him, and he had wanted to talk. So he gave him the drug.

A little colour came back to his lips, and they parted; Douglas opened his dark eyes; I saw that he recognised me. He whispered:—

"I know you."

I reminded him that I had been with Mark Auden in Ramnagar. He said:—

"Yes. Then you know about me. That will save time."

He asked if I was from Military Intelligence, and when he knew I was he began to talk. He was very weak, and it was a big effort; I had to bend close to hear his voice. But even so, I think he enjoyed telling his tale. He was an artist in his way and had the temperament that will always play up to an audience. He tried to choose his words and make his story telling, but he wandered a good deal and I had to keep bringing him back to the point.

He told me he had fallen utterly into the power of Charanjit Lal. He had worked for him on a commission basis, and at first he had gone straight. He was very frank; he wanted to size up the position before he tried anything crooked. But he had soon seen how he could swindle his employer; with the real necessity for bribing customers it had been too easy. And once he slipped into it, the amounts got bigger and bigger, till at last Charanjit Lal confronted him with proofs, inescapable proofs, which could be produced in a criminal court. He smiled the same slow smile as he put them before Douglas. He had known it would happen, and now he had him. He locked his documents carefully away, and now proceeded quietly and systematically to exploit his power over a man who dared not have scruples.

Douglas did not try to excuse himself to me. He said bitterly that he supposed I should be surprised to know there was anything he thought too dirty, but that in fact he did shrink from the tasks Charanjit Lal set him. He had taken money whenever he could, all his life, by running up debts he never meant to pay, by forgery, trickery, embezzlement, or plain theft; but money had just been something he had a use for and wanted, and the getting of it by dishonest means had been a kind of game for him. He had not robbed the poor and seen the results; he had not deliberately squeezed men dry and ruined them. There was no moral sense in his nature, but equally there was no deliberate cruelty and no hardness.

He hated acting as the moneylender's agent in jobs that grew steadily dirtier and dirtier; but whenever he showed signs of revolt the whip cracked over his back; and he gradually went in deeper. There were other henchmen

too, Indians, and he thought the same tactics were used with them all; once in their employer's power they were used in a series of transactions that got worse and worse, making it steadily more difficult to escape. He thought he was one of the elite who were kept for the really beastly jobs, and Charanjit Lal liked making him squirm at having to do them. He said there was practically nothing he hadn't done; more than once he had indirectly taken part in murder, and eventually Charanjit Lal had held evidence that could have hanged him.

He thought the War might save him, but he was over fifty now; they had refused his application for a commission in 1939 on the ground of his past record, and he was too old for the ranks. And so he had gone on during the War as before, except that Charanjit Lal was making thousands now where he had been making hundreds before. Douglas had never known much about the political side of the business, though he knew of course that a man with such wide business interests had to keep a finger in politics, and some of his odd jobs had been political. But he had never known until the day when he told me the story that Charanjit Lal was reckoning on the possibility of Japanese victory and actively insuring himself against it.

Last night he had been sent for, and Charanjit Lal had told him that next morning at eight o'clock he was to present himself in uniform at the gate of Lahore Jail and go to see a certain military prisoner. He had impersonated British officers once or twice before for his employer, but to gain a business advantage, not for any purpose that smacked of espionage. But this project, though a very simple one, fairly stank of it. He was to see a prisoner called Dip Chand and ask him if he knew what had happened to the rest of the party who had landed with him. That was all; it didn't sound very important.

I must have shown my interest when he mentioned Dip Chand. Through someone's folly, the news that we had caught this man had got into the Press; but we hoped that very few people indeed knew that we had captured the rest of the party who had been landed by a Japanese submarine at the same time. If the Japanese knew that, they would not pay the attention we should have liked to the news which those very men were supposed to be sending them. And Dip Chand knew that we had got them. A word from him to anyone in touch with the Japanese would spoil a very elaborate artifice. That they wanted to get confirmation from Dip Chand showed that they were already suspicious, and at once it occurred to me that here might be a chance to lull their suspicions.

If they thought Douglas was dead and sent someone else tomorrow morning instead, well, perhaps the bogus interrogating officer might be presented to a bogus Dip Chand, who would be positive that his companions had not been captured. And we should not lose sight of that bogus officer. No, it was almost interesting, but the training to silence had become instinctive and even though Douglas had only an hour to live, I did not want him to take all that I knew to another world. All I said was: "It's much more important than you think. And it is very helpful to us to know that they wanted to find out about that."

Douglas was too weak to smile, but I could see that he was pleased. He seemed clearer in his mind now and did not wander so much. He said:—

"It didn't sound important, but it had to be something dirty or Charanjit Lal wouldn't have told me to do it. I guessed there was more in it than there seemed to be. It was the first time I'd been told to do anything that could pos-

sibly help the Japanese. I felt it was too much. I thought I'd pretend to do it but really I'd come and tell you people. He must have seen what I thought about it, for he went to his safe. He kept copies there of all the evidence he had against me, only copies, the originals were somewhere else. He read me bits. There was no doubt he could have got me strung up, or a life sentence. I know what it's like in an Indian jail. I wasn't going to face that. And I was pretty bitter; I'd tried hard to get back into the Army and you wouldn't have me. None of my own kind would speak to me. I thought what the hell; it's too late to be fussy. I'll do it."

He stopped speaking and his eyes closed. His voice had been getting weaker and weaker, and in that yellow light it seemed there was no blood in his face at all. I thought he had gone; I looked at my watch and calculated how long it would take me to get things moving at the jail. It sounds callous, but I had got the information I wanted from a military point of view, and there wasn't likely to be any more. However, I saw that there was plenty of time, and I needn't rush away. I looked at Douglas again. His lips moved and he said something rather difficult to catch about not standing for the King. I didn't understand at the time, but I remembered later that the 159th drank the King's health sitting, because they had been raised as marines. Then he seemed to come back a little further. He opened his eyes and spoke again. He spoke very slowly, with long pauses between his words, but very clearly now. He said:—

"He gave me an identity card. I expect they've taken it away. It wasn't my name, but it was my own regiment. I was so bitter. And then he gave me red flashes to put on my shoulder straps. You know about them. We're proud of them. We won them at Assaye. And then I knew I couldn't. It was too much. Not my own regiment. It was no use trying to deceive Charanjit. I threw them back on the table. He looked at me with that smile. I knew I was done for. I thought I'd be arrested this morning. But they got me on the way. I was coming to tell you. I'm glad."

I never learnt why he was glad, for he closed his eyes for the last time on that word.

* * * *

When I left the hospital, I still had plenty of time; no one would be up for half an hour, and it was no use going to bed. I stopped the truck on the bridge over the river, and leaned over the parapet thinking of Douglas Coates and the one last rag of pride that had survived in him. There was a whisper of swift wings, and a wedge of teal passed over my head. The sun sprang suddenly above the sky-line, glowing molten gold, turning the water to smooth ripples of gold. It had all happened, it was over, nothing was changed.

I stayed sometime smoking a cigarette. I looked at the blue ribbon of smoke from the burning end and the grey smoke I breathed out. I had been watching death come, and perhaps it was for this reason, but perhaps only because I had not slept much that night and because I was hungry, that everything I saw seemed strangely significant, like the odd revealing phrase in a play which suddenly lays bare the meaning of a character or a situation. I spread out my fingers and looked at them curiously as they answered my will; I watched the ripples and pools of gold on the water. All seemed vivid with life, all new as though just created.

But it was time to go and arrange that there should be a suitable Dip Chand to be interrogated in case they had found a successor for Douglas; I turned back to the truck and told the driver to start.

TRADITIONAL TACTICS OF BRITISH INFANTRY

BY MAJOR-GENERAL C. H. BOUCHER, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A.

Comd., 2nd Airborne Division.

THE art of tactics consists of using the available weapons to the best advantage. Weapons keep changing, but human and national characteristics, like geography and the laws of war, change very little. In a Press conference reported in *The Times* in September 1946, Lord TEDDER said: "The firm basis which a ruthless examination of the last War would provide should lead to the discarding of traditions and methods which would not stand the test of real economy."

The object of this article is to deduce from history, not only of the last War but of British wars of each of the great periods of our military ascendancy, what tactics have been employed successfully by British infantry and how those tactics have been related to the British character. We shall then see whether these traditional tactical methods must be discarded or whether they still stand the test of modern war.

It is even more important to consider their application in warfare of the future, for the present of today is the past of tomorrow, and it is the future that matters. One of the main reasons for Nelson's success is given by Mr. ARTHUR BRYANT in his "Years of Endurance":

"Nelson possessed the imagination which can mobilise the lessons of the present and the past to predict the future."

If we fail to do these two difficult things correctly we shall be found unprepared when war comes again, a calamity which never overtook Lord NELSON.

The first of the three great periods of British pre-eminence on European battlefields was the period of the long-bow from Edward I to Henry IV, distinguished by the battles of Crecy 1346, Potiers 1356 and Agincourt 1415.

The second occurred when gunpowder had replaced the bow and arrow and bore the hall-mark of the genius of CROMWELL and MARLBOROUGH, and the third covered the great period of the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the last century and is the only one of the three in which the weapons used were at all comparable to those of the present day.

In the tremendous campaign in the Peninsula, British tactics as taught by Sir JOHN MOORE were practised and confirmed by WELLINGTON's genius. For a century after WATERLOO there was a complete standstill in tactical evolution, rudely shattered by the recent fourth great period, the German wars of the present century with the advent of two new and decisive weapons, aircraft and tanks. These German wars may be considered as "the present", for so far nothing has emerged in the tactical field to supersede the tactical teaching of 1944 and it is to be noted that the C.I.G.S.'s conferences at CAMBERLEY consider the tactics of the Normandy battles. The phase of the future will be governed by the weapons of the future, and these have not yet reached a stage of evolution in which it is possible to study them practically.

Of these four great periods Infantry was the predominant arm in two and Cavalry, in which is included its modern counterpart, the tank, in the other two. In the French wars of the 14th and 15th centuries the British bowmen were always the decisive factor. In the Peninsula again it was the new line formation of the British Infantry, with its concentrated fire, that defeated the French columns. In CROMWELL'S and MARLBOROUGH'S campaigns, however, Cavalry was the arm that decided the day. The musket with which the Infantry was armed was not yet sufficiently effective to settle the issue, and infantry tactics consisted in the adoption of static formations calculated to withstand the charge of cavalry, which alone possessed mobility.

Of the fourth and most recent period of the triumph of British arms it is true to say that the side won which could produce air superiority and the better tank. Infantry tactics, though more mobile, were almost as negative as in MARLBOROUGH'S time and consisted in accompanying armour and occupying ground which had been won by the combined action of all arms. These two periods, although glorious, are of less interest in the study of British Infantry tactics than those in which Infantry was the decisive factor and will accordingly be studied only very briefly.

FOURTEENTH CENTURY TACTICS

It was Edward I who first saw the great asset that England possessed in its yew trees and grey goose feathers. He brought the long bow into general use throughout the country, and its predominance lasted until science succeeded in chaining the forces of gunpowder to the purposes of battle and the musket was perfected sufficiently to oust it. From Edward I's time, the archers became more and more the mainstay of the English Army.

Under Edward's guidance the bow became the familiar and trusted weapon of the English, the instrument of their great and repeated victories. A bow shot was 400 yards, and the weapon was deadly and penetrated all but the very finest armour at a furlong. It was the combination of archers with men-at-arms that won FALKIRK for Edward in 1298 and made the English supreme in war for more than a century afterwards, until AGINCOURT in 1415 and after.

CRECY, 26 AUGUST 1346.—At CRECY Edward III divided his army, according to his usual custom, into three "battles", each of 2,000 archers, 800 men-at-arms and some Welsh billmen. He was at a hopeless numerical disadvantage to the French King, PHILLIP VI, and it was a case of victory or annihilation.

EDWARD produced tactics which were entirely new on the Continent. He dismounted his men-at-arms and parked the horses and baggage in the rear. The men-at-arms were to serve only as static spearmen to form a safe base from which the archers and billmen could operate. He chose positions on a hill where the French Cavalry would have difficulty in getting at his men. The French had nine battles, made up of Knights and men-at-arms, and a force of 15,000 Genoese cross-bowmen in addition. After these had failed in a preliminary duel with the English archers, possibly because a thundershower soaked their bowstrings, the Knights and men-at-arms attempted to break the British squares with cavalry charges.

The British bowmen waited until the dense French columns came to point blank range and then opened a withering and rapid fire. Between the repeated and gallant charges of the French, the Welsh billmen slipped out to kill and take prisoners. Over 4,000 French Knights and men-at-arms were slain and count-

less more of lower degree. Many were captured and held to ransom. The British victory was complete and decisive.

British Infantry tactics date from CRECY. The points to note are :—

- (a) A defensive battle, with careful choice of ground.
- (b) Holding fire until it was deadly.
- (c) Surprise caused by the rapidity of the fire and the penetration of armour by the arrows.
- (d) The mobility of the archers behind the men-at-arms and hence their ability to bring converging fire on to points where it was needed.
- (e) The follow-up by the billmen, but only local and near the protection of the squares.

POITIERS, 19th SEPTEMBER 1356.—Here, confronted by much the same problem as his father before him at Crecy, the Black Prince selected the strongest position available, fortified it to the best of his power and there awaited the attack of very superior numbers, entirely confident of victory. Like his father, too, the Black Prince possessed great tactical skill and coolness in battle. In choosing a position his requirements were three: ample scope for his archers, all possible impediments for the French horsemen, and some security against being attacked from all sides at once. As usual the English army was disposed in three battles, and as usual they were at a great disadvantage in numbers, under 10,000 men against King John's 40,000 and they had to conquer or perish.

The tactics were similar to those at Crecy; the men-at-arms were dismounted except for a small reserve of some few hundreds. The French had learnt nothing in ten years and they charged the English squares in the same disconnected way and with even more disastrous results. It was an even closer thing than at Crecy but the reserve just turned the scale. King John was captured, his army annihilated, and the British were able to capture CALAIS and take to their ships.

The lessons are the same as for Crecy.

AGINCOURT, 25th OCTOBER, 1415.—Henry V, cornered and at bay like his predecessors, again tried to fight on the defensive and again disposed his forces in three "battles". His tactics were the same as at Crecy and Poitiers; the men-at-arms were dismounted and the archers each carried a stake with which to form palisades. This time numbers did not admit of a reserve, for Henry had only 800-1,000 men-at-arms, 6,000 archers and 2,000-3,000 foot soldiers, and the position was more extensive.

The French were well-posted and this time refused to attack; this refusal placed the numerically very inferior English in a predicament, because they had no rations and had to move on to their base and their boats. Accordingly the King ordered an advance to within a bow-shot of the French, where the archers fixed their stakes in the ground and opened fire. Eventually the French, being unable to retaliate, were forced to attack, with disastrous results.

Shakespeare has immortalised the battle, but Drayton, 1563-1631, in his "Ballad of Agincourt" has given us a better description of the tactics employed—

"Well it thine age became,
Oh noble Erpingham,
Which did the signal aim
To our hid forces;
When from a meadow by,
Like a storm suddenly,
The English archery
Struck the French horses."

And later, when all their arrows were exhausted,

"When down their bows they threw
And forth their bilbows drew
And on the French they flew,
Not one was tardy".

LESSONS.

In all these three battles what was required of the infantry, the archers and the billmen, was the production of a withering fire at short range and a quick, limited follow-up with cold steel. In each battle the British generalship had placed the army in a hopeless position; each was a case of victory or complete and certain destruction.

In each battle the commander's tactics and conduct of the battle was brilliant. The national characteristics, on which the success of these tactics depended, were lack of the imagination to realise their disadvantages, sometimes called British phlegm; absolute confidence in their ability to beat any foreigner under any circumstances; the courage and tenacity necessary to wait for the decisive moment and the final rush which fixes the teeth in the adversary's jugular vein and never lets go.

CROMWELL AND MARLBOROUGH.

The archers and men-at-arms were succeeded by musketeers and pikemen, the latter being required to shield the former during the lengthy process of reloading and to assault when the musketry and cavalry had paved the way. In order to produce sufficient rapidity of fire, and to give enough depth to withstand cavalry, the line was formed three-deep. This was the state of affairs at the opening of the Civil War in 1642.

The perfect discipline of CROMWELL's horse was the main factor in the success of the Parliament forces, and the war was essentially one in which cavalry was the predominant arm, a struggle between CROMWELL and RUPERT.

"The stubborn spearmen still made good
The dark, impenetrable wood,
Each stepping where his comrade stood,
The instant that he fell."

The musket was still too primitive to drive the horse from the battlefield; artillery was of no account except for sieges. At Marston Moor the Parliament

forces had 8,000 horse and 19,000 foot; the King the same number of horsemen and 16,000 foot. The significance of these figures lies in the very high proportion of horse to foot.

Sixty years later, in MARLBOROUGH'S wars of 1704-09, neither artillery nor the musket had progressed sufficiently to oust the cavalry from their predominance. Infantry tactics were still designed mainly to beat off cavalry, and in consequence formations adopted were such that continuous fire could be maintained. Thus the six-deep line of FREDERICK THE GREAT was gradually reduced in depth as the weapon improved until a hundred years later the two-deep line of the British Infantry in the Peninsula was reached.

In 1704 the effect of Artillery was gradually increasing. The invention of the bayonet had made it possible to dispense with the pikemen. In order to obtain decisive effect the British Infantry waited to fire until they could see the whites of their opponents' eyes. This usually meant that the enemy fired first, but the interesting point is the traditional characteristic of holding fire until the range made it decisive. It was only British Infantry who could thus "take it".

This ability to stand punishment and skill in the use of weapons led to the adoption in the Peninsula of the British line against the French column. Because of the national characteristics of the French they must always attack, and they depend on the encouragement of the mass. From the beginning of English history, the physical strength and toughness of their infantry, their tenacity and lack of imagination have qualified them to bear the shock of battle well and individually.

Thus Harold's Carles stood in a single rank, the archers of Crecy in two; the dismounted men-at-arms were four-deep, because they had to withstand the shock of the charge of mailed horsemen. In addition, the British contempt for foreigners has engendered the confidence of superiority and they have acquired the habit of victory and a tradition of assured ultimate success.

All these assets led by the end of the 18th century to the adoption of a thinner line than other nations saw their way to employ. In this period, that of CROMWELL and MARLBOROUGH, what was required of the infantry was the same as under the Plantagenets, the holding of fire until the last possible moment, then the delivery of a concentrated and decisive fire, followed when the opportunity arose, by a short, local follow-up with cold steel. These requirements called for patience, tenacity, courage and skill at arms, and the successors of the Plantagenet Infantry proved that they had these essential qualities.

WELLINGTON'S INFANTRY.

I have touched very briefly on the above periods of very ancient history because they provide lessons only of basic principles and national characteristics, the conditions of battle being so different from the present. WELLINGTON'S battles, however, are worthy of fuller description, because by his time the development of infantry weapons had reached a stage which makes their tactical use of interest in comparison with those of the present day. The new Baker rifle could be used effectively at 300 yds. and the introduction of the shrapnel shell enabled artillery to intervene with decisive effect if it could deploy within range of a suitable target.

It is interesting to note how closely WELLINGTON's first three battles followed a single pattern, as did those of the great Plantagenets. These first three occurred at intervals of a year and were typical of WELLINGTON's tactics, so perfectly suited to the material at his disposal. Vimiero 1808 was the first, then Talavera 1809 and Bussaco 1810. The accounts of these actions which follow are taken from Mr. ARTHUR BRYANT's fascinating book "The Years of Victory", for which and its companion volume all soldiers will be grateful to him, and hopeful of a third to complete the series.

THE BATTLE OF VIMIERO—AUGUST 1808.—"Wellesley had placed his troops on the reverse slope of the ridge, so that instead of being decimated by the French skirmishers while the attacking columns moved up unscathed, it was the other way round....

"By this time the British artillery had opened fire at short range..... The greenjackets, operating in open, heathery, pine country, kept up a withering fire from behind every bush and stone on the flanks of the advance....

"The French, though suffering severely, closed their ranks and, like the veterans they were, pressed on. Meanwhile the British waited behind the ridge;..... Everywhere Junot's overconfident attacks broke on the patient discipline of WELLESLEY's scarlet lines.

"As Junot's columns, already frayed by the British shrapnel and sharpshooters, came into range, a terrible discharge of musketry broke from the array of poised barrels. Like the Macedonian phalanx when it encountered the open formation of the Roman legion, the French masses dissolved under that converging fire. Then the Redcoats, following up with the bayonet, bore down on them 'like a torrent breaking bounds' and the victors of Austerlitz and Jena broke and fled"... The casualties: British 700, French 2,000.

Points to note:—

- (a) The use of skirmishers well in advance of the main position to harass the enemy's advance. Today this should be done by L. M. Gs. and snipers; Edward I did it with long-range bowmen.
- (b) The artillery held its fire until the best effect was obtained, thereby achieving surprise and breaking up the enemy's formation still further.
- (c) Reverse slope position for the infantry so that they could engage the enemy with deadly fire and close quarter combat as soon as he appeared in the selected killing zone.
- (d) Quick follow-up with the bayonet when the fire had taken effect.

TALAVERA—28th JULY 1809.—"Shortly after daybreak a tremendous cannonade broke from 24 pieces of artillery opposite the British left. When the shot tore gaps in the ranks, WELLESLEY made the six battalions holding the Cerro de Medellin withdraw beyond the brow of the hill and lie down with their arms in their hands. At the same time the bugles sounded to call in the skirmishers before they became submerged by the advancing French.....

"As the French neared the summit with loud shouts, HILL's battalions rose as one man, doubled forward in perfect formation and taking the time from their officers, poured volley after volley into the surprised columns. Then Sir ARTHUR called to them to charge and, as the 29th and 48th rushed forward, the cries of *Vive l'Empereur* changed to *Sauve Qui Peut*..... By 8 a.m. it was all over."

Later in the day Victor renewed the attack.

"In the open ground farther north Lieut.-General SHERBROOKE's 1st Division of Guards and Hanoverians was not so well handled. Here, following a prolonged bombardment, two strong Divisions led by Generals Sebastiani and Lapisse moved forward at about 3 p.m. against the British centre. Sherbrooke's men, waiting in line, held their fire till the leading files of the enemy columns were within 50 yards and then followed up a devastating volley with a bayonet charge. The French were flung back in confusion, but the Guards and Germans, losing cohesion in their advance, pursued too far and were shattered in their turn....."

Points to Note:—

- (a) It would have been better to adopt the reverse slope position from the start, but when it was adopted, the results were the same as at Vimiero.
- (b) The same technique of getting to close quarters and then opening devastating fire at decisive range.
- (c) The evil results of following up too far.

BUSSACO—27th SEPTEMBER, 1810.—"The sharp edge of the ridge concealed the British regiments from Messena's eyes and its great height placed them beyond the range of his field guns.....That night the French bivouac fires twinkled from a thousand points in the foothills in front of the ridge.....The British concealed among the cedars and pinewoods of the Western slopes, encamped in darkness....."

"The one weakness in WELLINGTON's position was its extent; with the limited fire power of the time, a front of 9 miles was too much for 52,000 men. But the gaps were more apparent than real, for from their commanding heights the defenders had ample time to foresee where an attack was impending, while behind their lines a lateral track, running just below the sky-line, out of sight of the enemy, made it easy to transfer troops to any threatened point.

"This time it was not PICTON's division that cleared the ridge but LEITH's moving along the lateral track to strengthen the threatened centre and left. Scrambling up the crest, the 9th or East Norfolks, supported by the 38th and the Royals, appeared on the ridge in front of the French and deploying, opened a terrible fire from 100 yards. Then, with General LEITH riding beside and waving his plumed hat, the regiment bore down with fixed bayonets. Sooner than await that avalanche of steel the enemy turned about, raced for the slope and tumbling headlong down the hill, left it strewn with blue-clad bodies....."

"A few hundred yards to the left CRANFORD was standing on the edge of the hill watching the Rifles and the Portuguese contesting every foot of ground with LOISON's column. Yet it was not on the skirmishers of the 95th or 1st Cacadores among the heathery boulders below that CRANFORD was relying. Drawn up in the sunken roadway behind him, out of sight of the enemy, were the 1,800 bayonets of the 43rd and 52nd. Just as the French drums were beating for the final charge,.....CRANFORD turned to the two famous regiments behind him and shouted "Now 52nd, revenge the death of Sir JOHN MOORE!" With a great cheer, the men rushed forward and poured such a fire from the crest into the astonished French that the whole 6,000 were dashed in a few minutes to the bottom."

Points to Note:—

- (a) Once again, the advantages of the reverse slope position.
- (b) The same use of advanced troops, the Rifles and Cacadores.
- (c) Covered lateral communications, enabling concentration at the decisive time and place.
- (d) Surprise, achieved by holding fire until the decisive moment.
- (e) The immediate follow-up with the bayonet.

Note the remarkable resemblance to the British tactics of the Middle Ages.

THE GERMAN WARS OF THE 20TH CENTURY.

1914-19.—The conditions of battle had changed and, as in the 17th century, Infantry was not the predominant arm, although as A. P. Herbert wrote :

‘New men, new weapons, bear the brunt;
New slogans guild the ancient game :
The Infantry are still in front
And mud and dust are much ‘the same.’”

Fire power, applied by artillery and machine-guns, dominated the battle-field. Infantry tactics were numbered by the mud and blood of trench warfare, by the awful holocaust of slogging matches like the Somme. There was any amount of fire and very little movement, and the Infantry has hardly got over it yet. The essential requirements of Infantry remained unaltered : tenacity, the ability to take it ; skill-at-arms, involving the production of close-range rapid fire ; and toughness, to excel in close quarter fighting.

1939-45.—The domination of the battlefield by artillery and M. Gs., now reinforced by the air and armour, was greater than ever. The writing on the wall, faint after the Boer War, in heavy type after the First German War, remained generally unread. The few prophets who decyphered it went unheeded, and our Infantry went once again to France with substantially the same weapons as in 1914.

This time the knights in armour had it all their own way. That, however, did not alter the task of the Infantry, and nothing occurred to qualify their old traditional tactics. Although our lack of forethought and preparation saddled them with all sorts of tasks foreign to their nature, such as manning mortars and anti-tank artillery for the gunners, and laying and taking up mines for the Sappers, the essentials of Infantry employment remained the same, a short field of fire and rapid exploitation. The principles governing Infantry tactics were, and are still, offensive action, surprise and mobility.

THE PRESENT.

ORGANISATION AND ARMAMENT.—There is still the same need for the skirmishers, the Light Infantry and Rifles of the Peninsula, and, when they have been brushed aside, for the concentrated, close range, surprise fire and the immediate assault by the Infantry companies.

At present we have no organisation to provide the first of these requirements, and we are unsuitably and ultra-conservatively armed for the second. There is a need in an Infantry Battalion for a "light" Company, the task of which is to harass the enemy and break up his attack. In it should be a large number of snipers and of LMGs. This Light Company should normally do all patrolling required on the Battalion's front, thus absolving the Rifle Company's, better called Assault Company's, from this task, which in the last two German wars has always provided COs. with a virtually insoluble problem.

Thus there should be in the Infantry Battalion a Support Company, a Light Company and three Assault Companies. The Assault Companies should be suitably armed for their role. The rifle should be reserved for ceremonial drill, for which it is admirable, and for sniping. The weapons of the Assault Men-at-arms should be of the Tommy Gun type, with a range up to 200 yards as a maximum and a detachable bayonet. They should also carry grenades. As a personal protective weapon each man should carry his national equivalent of the Gurkha's *kukri*, and for the English, I suggest the battle-axe; the emergency axe carried in RAF aircraft is a most suitable weapon for the purpose.

THE FUTURE.

The conditions of the battlefield have changed much since Waterloo, 1815, and even more since Crecy, 1346. No doubt the recent phenomenal progress of science will change them still more in the future. Through it all, however, it has been shown that the principles on which the tactics of Infantry are based have remained unchanged. They are Offensive action, Surprise, and Mobility.

No two situations in war are ever the same and it is a fatal mistake to lay down rules and regulations for tactics. So long, however, as the principles governing the employment of Infantry are understood and their characteristics well known, the most important of Clausewitz's "means at hand" will be properly used for "the attainment of the object in view."

New Service Medal Authorised

A general service medal has been sanctioned for the Army and the Air Force in recognition of services rendered since the end of the late War.

The general service medal is that instituted in 1918 with clasps for "Iraq", "S. Persia" and "Palestine", among other areas. A new clasp, "South East Asia 1945-46", has now been authorised for this medal, which has the effigy of the King on the obverse and the winged figure of Victory on the reverse. The ribbon of the medal is the familiar purple-green-purple.

For the Army, qualifications for entitlement to the medal include "entry into" Java and Sumatra from September 3rd, 1945 to Nov. 30th, 1946, and into French Indo-China from Sept. 3rd, 1945 to Jan. 28th, 1946. Qualifications for the R. A. F. and R. I. A. F. include one operational sortie over these countries and flying in connection with the removal of internees and prisoners-of-war in South East Asia to Singapore or other parts between September 3rd and October 4th, 1945.

THINGS PEOPLE SAY AND WRITE

"Nine out of ten undergraduates at Oxford are ex-Servicemen".—*Mr. H. D. Ziman.*

"Money does not make you happy, but it enables you to be miserable in comfort".—*Professor C. E. M. Joad.*

"Since 1939 the people of Great Britain have been getting less and less of more and more".—*"Evening Standard," London.*

"The best way to co-operate with your fellows is to do your own business and mind your own business".—*Mr. G. L. Schwartz.*

"The invention of the atom bomb is probably less important than the invention of the steam engine".—*Professor P. B. Moon.*

"Leadership is the will to dominate, together with the character that inspires confidence".—*Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery.*

"The Chancellor of the Exchequer in London has a song in his heart. It must be something out of the Beggars' Opera".—*Lord Cherwell.*

"I would rather sink on a battleship with a few gentlemen than live on a barge with a gang of experimentalists".—*Sir Seymour Hicks.*

"Three German field marshals, 164 generals and 17 admirals are detained in Great Britain as prisoners of war".—*Mr. F. J. Bellenger, M. P.*

"The other day I saw a cowling on a pre-fabricated house described as 'an anti-downdraught flue terminal'. "—*"Chanticleer", Daily Herald, London.*

"The Indian Army has shown how all communities in India may work together to meet a common danger with comradeship and self-devotion".—*Lord Wavell.*

"Between June 18, 1945 and the end of November, 1946, some 4,207,070 men and women were released and discharged from the British Forces".—*British Government statement.*

"Great Britain may have to pay the United Nations more on account of debts incurred in winning the war than Germany will have to pay for harm done while losing it".—*Mr. Neville Orgel.*

"It is freedom to work, freedom to think, freedom to starve if you will, but at any rate the freedom to be the master of yourself, which constitutes the basis of happiness".—*Dr. Josiah Oldfield.*

"A new kind of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move to higher levels. Our defence is not in armaments or in going underground, but in law and order".—*Professor Einstein.*

"Demands for postal orders in the United Kingdom for football pools totalled 135,500,000 during the quarter ended December 31, 1946, compared with 83,750,000 in the corresponding quarter of 1945".—*Post Office announcement.*

"Passenger fatalities on scheduled flights by British air companies during 1946 numbered 8.2 per 100,000,000 miles. The figure for 1931-33 was 35.3, 1936-40 it was 15.3".—*Minister of Civil Aviation in London.*

"The word 'terrorist' will be banned from the vocabulary of the Army in Palestine. In future these people will be called 'murderers, thieves, and common thugs'."—*Lieut.-General G.H.A. Macmillan, G.O.C. British Forces in Palestine.*

"I regard the bomber as having had its day in the late War, when it was undoubtedly the predominant weapon, just as the U.—boat was the predominant weapon of the 1914—18 War".—*Marshal A. T. Harris, in "Bomber Offensive"*.

"Copper, the price of which averaged £40. 15s. a ton in 1938, is now around £127 a ton; lead, which sold for just over £15 in 1938, is now about £70 a ton; tin, which averaged £189 in 1938, now stands at £380. 10s. a ton".—*Sir Waldron Smithers, M.P.*

"To expect an average farmer to be not only a sower and a reaper, but an agricultural chemist, an accountant, a meteorologist, a veterinary expert, a merchant and financier, and a resident house-keeper is ridiculous. Collective farming is the remedy".—*Mr. G. Bernard Shaw.*

"I quite agree with the principle of co-operation, but only on the lines of abolishing all three Services and having only one defence force. It would probably have to be called the Defence Force, though I do not like the term 'defence'. 'Defence' is a gesture not of war but of inferiority".—*Marshal Harris, in "Bomber Offensive"*.

"It is in human nature for people to desire to see some visible results of their work in the form of increased leisure, increased benefits and increased wages. But if the profit motive becomes the one predominating motive, it will be unsocial. There must be the far higher motive of working for the whole community".—*The Archbishop of York.*

"Forty naval convoys to Russia during the late War carried £428,000,000 worth of material, including 5,000 tanks and over 7,000 aircraft from Britain, in addition to vast quantities from America. A total of 926% of the supplies dispatched arrived safely. Our shipping losses included 57 ships sunk out of 755 which sailed".—*Mr. W. Dugdale, M.P.*

"Great Britain's armed forces will be reduced by March 31, 1948 to 1,087,000, a reduction of 340,000. The number of men in training during their call-up period in 1954 will not exceed 300,000, and the number trained by that date and in the reserve for their five and a half year period will be 700,000".—*Mr. A. V. Alexander, M.P., Minister of Defence.*

"The word Pakistan is derived from the names of the five Muslim Provinces in the north-west of India: Panjab; North-West Frontier (of which the inhabitants are mainly Afghan); Kashmir; Sind; and Baluchistan. These territories were christened *Pakistan* by C. Rahmat Ali, founder of the Pakistan National Movement, in 1933". *From the "Encyclopaedia of Islam."*

"I cannot doubt that if there is a war within the next quarter of a century, it will certainly destroy a very great part of the civilised world, and disrupt it entirely. The only alternative to such otherwise inevitable destruction is world federation, a government of the world powerful enough to determine the policy of every country".—*Marshal A. T. Harris, in "Bomber Offensive"*.

"In the first twelve months after her defeat Japan's exports totalled over £40,000,000, giving her a favourable trade balance of £6,000,000. Raw silk accounted for nearly half her exports, but there were also electric bulbs, bicycle parts, vacuum tubes, rice paper and meteorological instruments. It has recently been announced that she will soon be allowed to export £10,000,000 worth of cotton textiles yarn to South East Asia countries".—*"The Observer," London.*

"The friendship which has characterised Canadian-America relations for many years is compounded of one part proximity and nine parts goodwill. We have had a number of problems, but they have all been settled by adjustment, by compromise, and by negotiations inspired by a spirit of mutual respect and a desire for justice on both sides. This is the peaceful way, the sensible way, and the fair way to settle problems. It is a way open to all."—*President Truman addressing the Canadian Parliament.*

"The atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the only two then in existence, and others could be produced only slowly, and in small number. Unless those two atomic bombs had brought the war to a definite conclusion, major fighting would not have ended before late 1946 at the earliest, with the expected cost of more than 1,000,000 casualties, and with the Japanese islands left even more thoroughly devastated than was the case in Germany".—*Mr. Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War, U. S. A.*

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THE GURKHA EXPANSION, 1765—1805

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL W. J. M. SPAIGHT.

THE expansion of the Kingdom of Gurkha in the years 1765—1805 was, when the difficulties of the country, the nature of the peoples conquered and the size of the Gurkha army are considered, a military feat of the first magnitude. Seldom, if ever, in the history of the world has such conquest been seen.

The history of the territorial expansion of the Gurkhas has several peculiar features. There appears to have been no co-ordinated plan, or in fact any detailed orders to the military commanders. The expansion progressed along the line of the Himalayas in both directions, and a check in the East did not mean that operations were retarded in the West. The country on the southern slopes of the Himalaya mountains is broken up by innumerable ridges and valleys. Most of the large mountains give off enormous ridges. This is very obvious in the cases of Nanda Devi (25,700 ft.), Dhaulagiri (26,826 ft.), Gosainthan (26,305 ft.) and Kanchenjunga (28,156 ft.). Yet it was against the grain of the country that the Gurkha forces advanced. It was not until a vast expanse of mountain and foothill country had been conquered that the Gurkhas turned North or South. This divergence from their original direction led to disaster. First in a defeat at the hands of the Imperial Chinese Army, which had come to the assistance of their province of Tibet, and finally in the war against the East India Company, which caused Nepal to be confined within its present limits.


It would appear that from time immemorial the hill country on the southern slopes of the Himalayas has been divided into many small kingdoms. Only in places where the hills spread out into open valleys—such as the Nepal valley, Dehra Dun and Kangra—has a state of any strength come into existence. These valleys have on occasion been attacked by plains rulers, but otherwise the hills have been left in peace. An example is that of Khalilullah Khan, one of the Emperor Shah Jehan's generals, who during the hot weather of 1654 led a raid into Garhwal. It is interesting to note that there is still a small colony of Mussalmans, surrounded on all sides by Hindus, just below Lansdowne Cantonment, who claim that their forefathers were converted by Shah Jehan. It is, however, doubtful if Khalilullah, who entered Garhwal via the Doon, passed that way.

HISTORICAL SEQUENCE

In 1764-5 Prithwi Narayan, the King of the small highland state of Gurkha, which lies some sixty miles to the west of Kathmandu, attacked the kingdoms of the Nepal valley. At this time the area of what is now Nepal was divided into many principalities. The exact number of these states is uncertain, but cannot have been far short of a hundred. The only powerful state was that of Nepal. At this moment, however, the Nepal valley was divided into three separate states, so it was possible for the Gurkhas to attack with hope of success. These three states were in reality city states built round the three principal valley cities of Patan, Bhatgaon and Kathmandu.

By 1769 Prithwi Narayan had completed the conquest of the Nepal valley. This had been accomplished by a strange combination of cunning, treachery, perseverance and fighting ability. The King of Gurkha then decided to be known

Sketch Map to illustrate Gurkha Expansion



as the King of Nepal. The acquirement of wealth and power appears to have made the wild hillmen lose their sense of proportion. Without plan, without knowledge of the probable consequences, without adequate means, the soldiers of Gurkha commenced an unlimited war of expansion against all their neighbours. The results are instructive in showing what can be accomplished by self-confidence and courage alone.

After the conquest of the Nepal valley a force under Kaje Kahar Sing, a Thakur general, was sent to subdue the surrounding country, from Bijayapur in the East to the Sapt Gandak in the west. Between 1770-72 Prithwi Narayan himself led the assault on the Chaubisi Rajas, the twenty-four kings who ruled the country of the Gandak basin. The Raja of Tanhu, however, repelled the Gurkhas. In 1775 Prithwi Narayan died and was succeeded by his son, Pratap Sing. Pratap Sing attempted to extend his territories to the East, and in the three years of his rule is said to have invaded Morang seventeen times; at last on the seventeenth attempt he defeated the Raja of Morang at the battle of Chainpur in 1778. Pratap Sing died a few months later and was succeeded by his infant son, Ran Bahadur.

Up to this time, while the Gurkha assaults on their neighbours had not always been successful, they had at least been directed and normally led by the King. This ensured that the national efforts were co-ordinated. On a minor ascending the throne this changed. Bahadur Shah, an uncle of the infant king, was appointed Regent; but the king's mother was jealous and rival political factions started to compete for power in the Gurkha state. From this time onwards it appears that the generals became more independent and tended to take matters into their own hands. In 1786 the Regent came to an agreement with Palpa, the most powerful of the twenty-four, to make common cause against the other Chaubisi Rajas. Damodhar Pande was sent with an army and the Chaubisi states were crushed. Three states, Gulmi, Argha and Kanchi were given to Palpa, and the remaining twenty states were annexed by Nepal. In 1787 another general, Sarup Singh, was sent East with an army. He succeeded in conquering the Kiranti and Limbuan, the home of the Rai and Limbu tribes. This general extended the Gurkha boundary as far as Sombeswara in the east. In 1788-89 Gurkha forces annexed most of Sikkim, then a tributary of the Tibetan government, and overran the country up to the line of the Teesta river.

In 1790 a Gurkha army, on the pretext that the Tibetans were circulating base coin, invaded Tibet. Many Tibetan villages and monasteries were laid waste, including the important centre of Shigatse. At this time Tibet was a province of the Chinese Empire and in 1792, as a reprisal, a large Chinese army, reputed to number 70,000, invaded Nepal.* Almost within sight of the capital, Kathmandu, they dictated terms to the Gurkhas. It is probable that these terms were less severe on account of the huge losses suffered by the Chinese, caused by battle and weather, in forcing the high Himalayan passes. The Gurkha armies of the west had not reached the capital before the Chinese withdrew.

Simultaneously Gurkha forces had been advancing to the west. Having either subdued or made treaties with the Baisi (22) States of western Nepal they conquered Dhoti in 1790 and invaded Kumaon, which was in a disorganised state owing to war with Garhwal. The invasion of Kumaon was carried out by two columns. The northern column, under Amar Sing Thapa, crossed the Kali river into Shor but suffered a reverse and moved to join the other column. The southern column entered Bisungpatti, north of Champawat, encountered a

*Sir Charles Bell, in his "Tibet, Past and Present," page 43, thinks that 12,000 is a more probable figure.

Kumaon force under Lal Sing in Kali Kumaon and dispersed it towards the plains with a loss of some 200. After a small engagement at Hawalbagh the Gurkhas occupied Almora. According to some accounts the Gurkha commander who conquered Kumaon was Jagajit, a brother of Damodhar Pande, though Amar Sing Thapa seems more probable.

Early in the next year the Gurkhas invaded Garhwal and by July 1791 had occupied the capital, Srinagar. Some Garhwal troops, however, retired to the hill fortress of Langurgarhi, some ten miles to the west of the present Lansdowne Cantonment. For over a year the Gurkhas besieged Langurgarhi but failed to take it. Raja Jagat Prakash, of Sirmoor Nahan, came to the assistance of Raja Pradyuman Shah of Garhwal, and a battle was fought in the Kotri Dun, in the vicinity of modern Kotdwara. The Gurkhas were victorious. Raja Jagat Prakash deserted the Garhwali cause and became a Gurkha ally. Raja Pradyuman Shah fled to the west. The Gurkha forces pursued and reached the Ganges in the vicinity of Hardwar. In 1792, on receiving news of the Chinese invasion of Nepal the Gurkha commander offered terms to the Garhwalis. These terms were accepted and Garhwal agreed to pay a yearly tribute of Rs. 25,000 to Nepal and to maintain a representative at Kathmandu. The Gurkha troops then withdrew from both Garhwal and Kumaon. On the conclusion of peace with China they again occupied Kumaon, which, during the few months since the Gurkha withdrawal, had been left in charge of one Harakh Deb, a Kumaoni who had assisted the Gurkhas.

For some eleven years an uneasy peace was maintained between Garhwal and Nepal, during which period small Gurkha raids frequently harried the eastern marches of Garhwal. In 1803 the Gurkhas again invaded Garhwal. One force, under Amar Sing Thapa, entered the north of Garhwal, crossed the Pindar River and reached Kedarnath. Another force occupied the capital, Srinagar. Having reached Deva-Prayag the Gurkhas descended on Gurdwar, the modern Dehra Dun. The Garhwali, Raja Pradyuman Shah, fled, and in October 1804 the Gurkhas occupied Dehra Dun. Raja Pradyuman Shah, having collected an army in the plains, returned to challenge the Gurkhas. The Raja was killed and his troops decisively defeated at the battle of Kharhara or Gurudhan near Dehra Dun. The Gurkha army that conquered Garhwal and the Doon is said to have included the following commanders: Amar Sing Thapa, Hastidal Chautariya and Bam Shah.

In 1797 Nepal annexed Jumla, the most powerful of the Baisi states. Until the rise of Gurkha, Jumla had been the leader of the Western states. The other Baisi states had already been absorbed, and this stroke made the Gurkhas masters of all, what is now, Western Nepal.

Soon after the Gurkha conquest of the Doon Raja Jagat Prakash of Sirmoor asked the Gurkhas to assist him to quell an insurrection among his own subjects. Amar Sing Thapa agreed and crossed the River Jumna. In a short time the Gurkhas conquered and annexed the country between the Jumna and Sutlej. Early in 1806 the Chief of Belaspur, or Kahlur, asked the Gurkhas to assist him against Sansar Chand of Katoch, the ruler of Kangra. Amar Sing Thapa crossed the Sutlej, defeated a Dogra army at Mahal Mori in May 1806, and laid siege to the great fort of Kangra. The Gurkha siege of Kangra lasted for some three years until 24th August, 1809.

In 1809 the Dogras asked Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, for help. McGregor in his "History of the Sikhs" says that Ranjit Singh entered

Kangra, via Wittala and Jwala Mookhee, with a large army, and that in August 1809 a fierce engagement was fought in which both sides suffered over 1,000 casualties. After the battle the Gurkhas "left the country carrying all their families along with them", and later the Sikhs occupied Kangra. Cunningham (a more reliable authority) in his "History of the Sikhs" states that there was no actual fighting between the Sikhs and Gurkhas but considerable intrigue, and that Ranjit Singh obtained Kangra fort by trickery.

Later, after the Gurkha withdrawal, he says that Amar Sing Thapa wrote a letter to Sir David Ochterlony suggesting that the British and Gurkhas make common cause against the Sikhs. The suggested partition of the Sikh empire was Kashmir, the hills for the Gurkhas and the Punjab for the British. The proposal was not accepted by Ochterlony, and the Gurkhas made no further attempt to expand in the west. The Gurkha fort at Bakloh, below Dalhousie, marks the western limit of Gurkha expansion.

After the invasion of Tibet had led to war with the Chinese empire the Gurkhas made no further effort to expand to the east. In 1805 the King of Palpa was lured to Kathmandu and imprisoned; in 1807 he was put to death and a force was sent to occupy Palpa. Thus the last of the Chaubisi states were absorbed, and the whole of what is now Nepal came under Gurkha rule. Between the years 1809 to 1814 the Gurkhas expanded to the south into the Indian plains. They encroached on almost every civil district bordering on Nepal, the Gorakhpur district being the one most affected. This, after some unsatisfactory negotiations, led to the Nepal War of 1814-16.

The East India Company, having waited for the end of the malaria season in the Terai, declared war on Nepal and launched four columns against the Gurkhas. These were directed towards Kathmandu, Tansing (Palpa), Dehra Dun and Arki (Simla Hills). Later another column was directed against Almora. In the initial offensive every one of the four columns was repulsed by the Gurkhas. After some delay, when superior forces had been assembled, the Gurkhas were defeated in detail at Almora, Malaun (Simla Hills) and, in 1816, on the road to Kathmandu. British forces forced the main passes towards Kathmandu and the Gurkhas asked for terms. Under the treaty of Segowli, Nepal was confined to the area within the Mechni and Maha Kali (Sardar) Rivers.

One or two points of interest are that after the Gurkhas evacuated Kalanga Fort near Dehra Dun—they withdrew the whole garrison by night after the British had failed to take it by storm—they withdrew towards Jythak, near Nahan, that is, towards the west and away from Nepal, to link up with another Gurkha force. Another is that Amar Sing Thapa, apparently had authority to surrender the whole of the Gurkha forces in the west. There is no mention of the terms being confirmed from Kathmandu when the Gurkha forces in the west surrendered. In this case it is, perhaps, of interest to note that the Prime Minister of Nepal, Bhim Sing Thapa, was the son of Amar Sing Thapa.

Gurkha Administration of Occupied Districts.

It would appear that much of the territory conquered by the Gurkhas was attacked at the personal whim of the local commander. Thus there was no co-ordinated plan of either aggression or administration for the conquered tracts.

Kumaon was, apparently, treated in a different way to conquests further west. This was probably due to the fact that Kumaon was under Gurkha rule for some twenty-five years, while the country further west—the Kingdom of Garhwal, the Doon and the Simla Hills—was only under Gurkha domination for a

short twelve years. Governors were appointed and changed with great frequency, the District Gazetteers giving long lists of names. In some cases it would appear that the Governor was not the commander of the troops.

The Gazetteer for Naini Tal District states that in 1793 the Subah of Kumaon was Kazi Nar Shah, who had Ramadatta Sahi in charge of Civil Administration and Kalu Pande as O.C. troops, though in many cases, no doubt, the administration would have been purely military. The troops were stationed throughout the provinces and each district was obliged to pay for a certain number of men in this army of occupation. Minor civil appointments were filled by military officers, with the title of 'Faujdar'. Taxes were raised on Agriculture, Houses, Looms, Forest Produce, Pasturage, Mines, Customs and Transit. In addition, duty was collected on the sale of children, by presents to officials, by a per capita tax and a tax on Doms. These taxes, as laid down by Kathmandu, were not harsh in comparison with the taxes of the deposed rajas. In the case of Garhwal, the taxes were assessed on the written report of a commission sent from Kathmandu, which actually inspected all villages.

The collection of taxes was, however, in the hands of the military commander, often junior, on the spot. The result was that in almost every case the people were forced to give all they had. In addition to these taxes the local military commanders made local rules. Failure to comply by the local inhabitants was punished by fines, which apparently went into the pocket of the officer concerned. Many of these prohibitions were clearly devised to raise money by fines. An example is that of the one imposed in Garhwal, which made it illegal for a woman to ascend to the top of a house. Failure or inability to pay a fine was punished by selling the whole family into slavery. It is said that some 20,000 persons were sold into slavery by the Gurkhas.

Such harsh methods caused the revenue to fall, through extreme poverty and depopulation. The revenue of the Dun under the Gurkhas was estimated at Rs. 25,000, while in 1760 it had been nearly a lakh of rupees. In spite of the behaviour of the junior military commanders, the provinces, when ruled by benign Governors started to regain their prosperity. Under Bam Shah and Haste Dall, Kumaon and the Dun, and even Garhwal, which had received the worst treatment, had by 1814 become comparatively prosperous, and the people had become reconciled to their new rulers.

Most authorities agree that the Gurkha soldiery treated the inhabitants of the conquered areas in a cruel manner. It must, however, be remembered that it is unusual for conquering armies to be kind to subject populations, that humanitarian standards were different 150 years ago, and that large numbers of the rank and file of the Gurkha armies were local enlistments. It is probable that the Gurkha military rule of Garhwal in 1804 would compare favourably with German military rule in Europe in 1944. An interesting account of conditions in the Simla Hills under Gurkha rule is said to be given in "Gurkha Conquest of Arki" by Kunwar Udhav Sing, but this is out of print and the writer has been unable to obtain a copy.

The Gurkha Army.

It is reasonable to suppose that the State of Gurkha covered the same area, approximately, as the present Zillah of Gurkha. In the census of 1920 the population of No. 2 West Tehsil, which includes the zillahs of both Gurkha and Lamjung, is given as 79,203. It is also to be assumed that the population has increased in the past hundred years, as it has all over India. At the present day

the population of Gurkha cannot be more than 50,000. In 1765 it is probable that the population of Gurkha was, at the most, some 30,000. On a calculation of 50% female and deducting the too old and too young males, it is unlikely that there were more than 5,000 males fit to bear arms. In the constant warfare from 1765 to 1816 there must have been many casualties.

At its peak the Gurkha dominion stretched some 900 miles across the most mountainous country in the world. This belt probably averaged 100 miles in width. Almost all this country had been recently conquered. Thus for some 90,000 square miles of conquered territory the Gurkhas had about 5,000 Gurkha soldiers, that is, one Gurkha soldier had to hold down 18 square miles of country, and be prepared to fight in the numerous expeditions. It is known that very considerable local levies were raised by the Gurkhas. As the official handbook on Garhwalis states: "In 1814 quite two-thirds of the Nepalese troops in the west were composed of men on the upper parganas of Kumaon and Garhwal. These levies were not, however, incorporated with the regular troops, but were considered as local militia, and as a rule under the orders of Gurkha officers, though Kumaonis occasionally were entrusted with small commands."

The garrison of Kalanga Fort, near Dehra Dun, is said to have been composed mostly of the Purano Gorakh regiment. The rank and file of the Purano Gorakh has always been composed of men of the Magar tribe. Very few Magars are to be found within the zillah of Gurkha, and it is probable that this regiment was raised from among the Chaubisi States. Thus it seems likely that regiments were raised from among the Chaubisi States and given the same status as the men of Gurkha. Without outside assistance it would have been impossible for the Gurkhas to have raised the manpower to make their conquests possible.

At the time of the outbreak of war with the East India Company in 1814, it is said that the Gurkha army numbered 12,000 men, but this is probably an under-estimate. Wheeler, in his "History of India," states: "The strength of the Gurkhas lay in their military organisation. They maintained three armies at the expense of one, each army numbering about twelve thousand men. About the end of every year the existing army returned to civil life, whilst a new army was enrolled, which generally consisted of old soldiers. Thus three trained armies could be brought into the field in cases of emergency, whilst only one army was kept on military duty, and drew military pay. The old army was disbanded and the new army was enlisted at a yearly festival known as the Panjani." The strength of Amar Sing Thapa's army in the west, which faced the British thrusts on Malaun, Dehra Dun and Almora, must have been almost 10,000 men, while considerable Gurkha forces guarded the approaches to Tansing and Kathmandu.

While the troops were mixed, it is certain that they were kept together by a percentage of men from Gurkha. All senior officers were Gurkha and all generals were from the aristocracy of the Kingdom of Gurkha. It is interesting to note the large part played by the present Maharaja's family. Ram Krishna, the great-grandfather of Jung Bahadur, was present in all the early engagements in the Nepal valley, and later commanded an expedition to the east that reached the river Mechni; in the west he also established Gurkha rule in Piuthan. His son, Ranjit, was Subah of Jumla, who also annexed Sombeswara as well as Upadrang. Later he led an assault on Kumaon and was killed leading a storming party to take the fort of Jhapabesar.

Though by 1814 they were in possession of a considerable number of matchlocks, the main weapon of the Gurkhas was the *khukri*; and their normal

tactics a vicious *khukri* charge, pressed home with ferocity. They had no weapons to deal with large fortifications, and their most notable failures were against the forts of Langurgarhi and Kangra. While the Gurkha forces at times suffered minor reverses, it appears that they won every pitched battle they fought until the failure of their counter-attacks against the British before Malaun, and at Hariharpur in front of Kathmandu in 1816. They were battles fought, with numerical inferiority, against such formidable opponents as the Kumaonis, Garhwalis and Dogras. Amar Sing with a force considerably less than half the British force under Ochterlony fought for six months in the Malaun area, before he was forced to surrender. Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler, was so impressed by their fighting ability that he enlisted a bodyguard composed entirely of Gurkhas. In all their early engagements with the East India Company's troops the Gurkhas were successful, inflicting considerable reverses on the three eastern columns. The Gurkha military doctrine appears to have been "When in doubt, or trouble—attack".

Effects of the Gurkha Expansion.

The Gurkha conquests of the hills affected both conquered and conqueror. Before the Gurkha invasion the hills were divided into innumerable petty states. After the Gurkhas had ceded their western conquests much of the land remained under British control. Many hill rajas and their families had been exterminated some were reinstated and in some cases land was given to new rulers. An instance of this is that of the Maharajah of Patiala, who acquired territory in the Simla area in return for assistance given to the British in their campaign there against the Gurkhas. Kumaon, the Doon and much of Garhwal came under British rule.

The effects of the conquests on the Gurkhas themselves were several. They raised the status of the army in Nepal to a height that, even to this day, it has never really lost. Nepal still retains a very large army for its size, and a large percentage of the revenue must be spent on its upkeep. All important officials in Nepal, whether civil or military, hold army rank, an official's importance being gauged by his army rank. One of the immediate effects of the military successes was to make the Nepalese government very difficult to negotiate with. A belief in the invulnerability of their army led military commanders lightly to challenge the might of the Chinese and British Empires, and caused high government officials to adopt an uncompromising attitude towards all other governments. This led to two major defeats, and the loss of much conquered territory.

Another effect of the conquests has been permanent, and that is the effect on the morale of the Gurkha people. The fame of the Gurkha as a fighting man is now world-wide and, in the opinion of the writer, this is based on the tradition of these early conquests. The fighting tradition handed down from these days has carried Gurkha troops through and helped them in their fighting career in the Indian Army. The individual inhabitant of Nepal is, generally, ignorant of details of the fighting history of his race, but he does know that it is a victorious one. The result is that he, as a Gurkha, is prepared to stand up to any foe on earth.

Conclusion.

The Gurkha expansion occupied a space of some 40 years, from 1765 to 1805, though their aggressive fighting continued for another ten years.* In that period a small hill state, with an area of about 600 square miles and a popula-

tion of some 5,000 males fit to bear arms, conquered some 90,000 square miles of country, with a population of millions. This achievement must rank with any military conquest in history. When it is remembered that this was carried out across some of the roughest country in the world, one realises the enormous effort that must have been put out by the state of Gurkha. Even to this day a man wishing to travel from one extremity of Nepal to the other will descend to the plains of India, take a train, and again ascend into the hills.

Unfortunately there is no history or record of the Gurkha conquests. The Nepal war of 1814-16 is well described in several works and the Palace feuds of the period are dealt with by Landon in his 'Nepal'; but in regard to the actual history of the advance and consolidation of the Gurkha armies to the east and west it is most difficult to glean any information. The District Gazetteers of the U. P. give some information but do not go into details. There are, no doubt, official records on the subject in Kathmandu, and it is to be hoped that they will, one day, be published.

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In addition, the author has been assisted in checking dates by some notes kindly sent to him by Major-General Brahma Shamsheer Jung Bahadur Rana.

A SEPOY IN CHERRY BLOSSOM LAND

By LIEUT.-COLONEL RAJENDRA SINGH

CHERRY Blossoms! It is the best time of the year in Japan. Trees are laden with white, light pink and pink blossoms. They make the beautiful landscape look ethereal just as a heavy fall of snow in a forest transforms it into fairyland. There is spring in the air in April. On "Cherry Blossom" Day Japan has a holiday, and young and old all dress in their Sunday best and go to the national shrines or to the nearest beauty spot to enjoy themselves.

Nasim, one of our Sepoys, was standing on a piece of high ground, from which he could look down on the crowd of merry-makers in the Nara Park. It was packed with thousands of people. The brightly coloured *kimonos* made it a picturesque scene, and the laughter and noise charged the atmosphere with the spirit of happiness.

Two things struck Nasim. One was the complete equality between the sexes; the other was the spirit of happiness which prevailed, despite the great national tragedy which had struck them comparatively recently. But Japanese people are practical, and they enjoy themselves when there is time to enjoy. They do not find any necessity to make distinctions between the sexes. Why, thought Nasim, shouldn't we in India do the same?

Being interested in the great things of the past, Nasim went to look around. Nara is the cradle of Japanese civilisation, and the shrines and other historical relics gave him some idea of Japanese culture. The most famous shrine there was that of the great Buddha. The shape of the figure was like many he had seen on the long route from Mandalay to Rangoon, but its size was greater. A notice nearby said it was the biggest statue in the world.

Inside the shrine there was no atmosphere of sanctity or worship. People were walking around, admiring the immensity of the statue. Nasim wondered how many Japanese knew that Buddha was born in India. From the similarity of many statues in Japan with monuments in India it was obvious that Indian culture, religion and art had been a great influence on Japanese civilisation. But Nasim knew little about such things.

He called a Japanese interpreter, who was keen to show him all there was to see. The Japanese go out of their way to help visitors if the visitor shows he is interested. In the national park of Nara, which covers over 3,000 acres, there are many shrines, but to Nasim they all looked alike. He was more interested in the spirit of the people; he wanted to know what they were thinking and feeling.

Nasim had never seen a rowdy scene in a street in Japan, nor a quarrel. Most wonderful of all, he had yet to pick up a crying child. He liked Japanese children; they were like dolls. As to the adults, they were strictly disciplined from the time they were born to the day they died. When I get back to India, he thought, one thing I will teach my people—how to stand patiently in a queue.

He wandered along the gravelled walks of the miniature gardens; young couples were sunbathing on the green lawns, or standing on the brightly red painted curved bridge to be photographed. He watched a baseball match for a few minutes. It is the national game; everybody plays it—in the park, in the roads, in gardens.

The Japanese are a hardworking race. The interpreter told Nasim they have to work hard, for Nature has not blessed them with a deep, rich soil; they have to scratch a living out of their land. Japan is a land of hills, of narrow valleys, of a long coast line. The flat parts of the country are covered with factories and houses; the hills are mostly terraced for agriculture.

There are two diametrically opposite sides to everything that is Japanese. They have tried to reconcile these opposites by self-discipline and force of character. A villager works in a field, very close to Nature, but lives in a highly-developed industrial community close by. It was hard for Nasim to reconcile these two aspects of Japanese character. He had fought against them in the Burma jungles; they acted like beasts. But in Japan he found them quite different; extremely polite and obedient.

Strolling on, Nasim took out his haversack lunch and started to eat. A few children were playing nearby. They all looked very young, and were amusing themselves with a top, which they passed from one to the other. He had a little bread left and offered it to the child nearest to him. At first she refused, but when the others told her to take it she did so and went away after saying "Thank you". The young one gave the bread to the eldest of the group, who divided it into equal parts and gave a piece to each. And then Nasim was surprised to find a little boy out of the party offering him the only orange he had.

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The holiday bus was to leave for Kyoto at 1 p.m., so Nasim made tracks for the motor stand. Kyoto was one of the places not bombed during the War, and it retains its pre-war charm and appearance. If nothing else, it gives the visitor a picture of what Japanese towns used to look like.

Nasim saw the Emperor's detached Palace, a conglomeration of wooden structures which were insignificant when compared with the great Gateway of the Red Fort in Delhi. But the layout of the gardens was perfect, and while he was admiring them a Japanese man asked Nasim if he might photograph him standing near the entrance of the Palace. Kyoto bazaar is full of marvellous things, but Nasim found them very expensive; nevertheless he was tempted to buy and finally purchased a lacquer cigarette case for a friend in the Punjabis.

An official guide was there, and he took Nasim round the various factories—not big factories, but small places, in which only a few persons were working. They were expert at their work and were producing marvellous things. He saw how lacquered articles were made, and inspected the intricate art of producing "closenet china". He was intrigued with the quickness of the fingers in twisting the bamboo into new shapes. Why cannot this be done in India, he thought? Japan has found the value of small cottage industries, which have brought much money to the agriculturist who has spare time in which to add to his income.

* * * * *

Nasim is one of the sepoys in Japan and he is learning a lot from his stay there. Everything is done to encourage him to do so. When he goes on leave from Eta Jima he finds all arrangements made at the Leave Hostel—one of the best hotels in Japan; he finds everything is free; and he has the opportunity of having the best time in his life.

Many like Nasim are seizing this opportunity of seeing how the Japanese do things; of learning how they live; and how they earn their living. All these things he is storing up in his mind, so that when he gets back to India he will not only be able to talk about his travels, but will be able to convince his fellow-villagers and fellow townsmen that they can live and work together happily if they do likewise.

Directorate of Resettlement Closes

The Directorate of Resettlement, G. H. Q. has closed down. Under its pre-release training scheme some 82,000 men were trained in agriculture, 93,000 in cottage industries, and 20,000 in various technical trades. The Directorate also formulated plans under which 34,000 ex-Servicemen, it is calculated, could be settled on land under its Land Colonisation Scheme. For the training of the disabled, the Directorate organised Services Convalescent Rehabilitation Centres in five places, and some 11,000 disabled men have passed through them.

A FRANK SURVEY OF INDIA'S DEFENCE PROBLEMS.—II*

BY LIEUTENANT S. G. CHAPHEKAR, A.I.R.O.

BEFORE the outbreak of World War II the peace-time Army in India numbered approximately 230,000, of whom about 50,000 were British troops. Officers totalled approximately 7,500, in addition to which were V. C. Os. Added to the above were the Gurkha units, Khassadars, Scouts and Guides.

The Indian Infantry consisted of 19 Regiments, each consisting of four to seven battalions; there were ten Gurkha Regiments of two battalions each, the total strength of Gurkhas being 20,000. Added to all were territorial units in the A.F.I., I.T.L., U.T.C., etc.

Will such an Army be sufficient for the future? The answer is plainly "No". For a country the size of India with its vast population, the numbers I have quoted above will be inadequate. It is not my task to paint a gloomy picture, but if the present situation is any index of the future, the Indian Army will, in the next few years, have to play an important part in maintaining law and order.

That work is not the work of the Army. It should fall to the lot of the police and Civil Government. Yet time and time again troops have to be called in to quell riots; they always co-operate with the Civil authorities. Nevertheless, the Army's business is to defend its country from aggression and fight its enemies. Its energy should not be wasted in suppressing riots. It must be remembered, moreover, that in future part of the Army will have to be kept on the Eastern frontier besides maintaining the N. W. F. defences. Troops may have to be stationed in Kashmir to guard the Gilgit pass.

Let us consider the peace-time Armies of the countries which fought in the late War. All were proportionately larger than the peace-time Army of India. Had India been attacked in 1939 by a first-class Power, the Indian Army could not have stopped the enemy for more than a few days.

Countries put enormous armies in the field during the 1939-45 War. Indeed, a nation should be able to put one-tenth of its population under arms. Great Britain's fighting forces numbered 5,000,000; the U.S.A. raised 11,000,000 men; on the Russo-German front each side flung over 5,000,000 in the field. Germany mobilised nearly 12,000,000 men.

Compare those figures with populations; Great Britain has under 50,000,000; Russia about 160,000,000; Germany 100,000,000; the U.S.A., 130,000,000. And India 400,000,000. Basing our calculations on the above figures India should be able to put in the field an army of 35,000,000 troops, whereas in fact she raised 2,500,000, or only one-sixteenth of her potential strength.

The mobilisation of a nation means the mobilisation of its total man and womanpower. It affects everybody in every walk of life. The soldier cannot fight unless the civilian keeps him supplied with food, clothing, munitions. India is more fortunate in this respect than, for instance, Great Britain. She need not put more than 5% of her population under arms, which means that industries and agriculture will have sufficient manpower; women need not be mobilised, at least not to the extent they were mobilised in Great Britain and

*The first instalment of this article appeared in our April, 1947 issue.

America. Be that as it may, if India is involved in another war she will have to introduce conscription.

For peace-time, however, I do not think we shall lack recruits for the Army. Some leading public figures have condemned it as a mercenary army, but in recent speeches we have our political leaders praising it. Yet the Army has not changed overnight; it is the same Army, unchanged in spirit and fighting ability.

People should bear in mind that it was this erstwhile much-abused army which saved India from foreign invasion; it saved India from falling into slavery. It was, is, and always will be loyal to the Government. If a country's soldiers are dragged into politics, then we can bid goodbye to democracy and civil liberties. In short, the Army of a nation has no concern with party politics or with changes in Government; its duty is to defend the freedom of its country, and if public leaders persuade the youth of the country to join up I doubt if there will be any dearth of recruits.

Many people, and I was among them, were concerned the other day when it was stated that the peace-time Army of India will be less than 300,000 strong. Is that enough? My opinion is that it is inadequate. The Allies in the late war were handicapped in its early stages by want of manpower; Britain could only send a small force to France because she had not enough men under arms. That is only one instance, but I feel it will be criminal if we refuse to learn a lesson from the past and allow ourselves to be caught napping in the future.

India should have a peace-time standing Army of 700,000, with the same number of Territorial and Reserve Forces, thus giving her a trained force of 2,100,000 men. Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities we could put a force of a million men in the field.

After six years' service a soldier would go into the Reserve; after eleven years' service he could retire or join the Territorials. The Territorials should be recruited independently and made to remain in the Reserve for five years after an initial service of five years. That would give India an additional 700,000 troops who could be used for garrison and home defence duties.

Regulars who complete 11 years in the Army, and Regular reservists, could be used as Instructors for the new Armies to be raised if and when war breaks out. At least 300,000 Instructors would thus be available to train 3,000,000 troops every six months. Within two years we should have a trained army of 13,000,000 men; at the end of the third year nearly 20,000,000. This problem of the lack of Instructors was one of the difficulties in the late War; the above scheme shows that it can be overcome.

Most important and difficult task is to find the officers to lead this huge Army. It is comparatively easy to get men, but difficult to get leaders of men. Officers will have to be very efficient. They must be grounded in the fundamentals of most sciences; possess courage, initiative, leadership, physical fitness; know psychology, history, geography, mathematics, physics and chemistry.

They will have to be drawn from our schools, colleges, universities. We can start from our High Schools. After Middle School, boys must be made to join the Cadet Training Corps; taught the elements of drill and physical training, and shown how to handle simple weapons, to read maps, to learn something of other peoples and countries, and if possible to learn a foreign language. Military instruction once a week, and an annual week under canvas will teach the boys a great deal.

Colleges are the next source. They have compulsory P. T.—why not compulsory military training? The cost would be low. Two parades a week should suffice, with an annual training camp of two weeks. After graduation, all students should be compelled to undergo an intensive training period of three months. They would make admirable officers in the Territorials and in the Reserve; while many could be commissioned in the Regular Army.

Turn back to the end of the first World War. The Indian people began to clamour for the Indianisation of the Army—and the Indian Government decided to send ten cadets annually to Sandhurst or Woolwich. It was decided to Indianise eight units as an experiment. But the process of Indianisation was ridiculously slow and by 1944 even there would have been only 200 Indian Officers.

Committees were appointed, but their recommendations were shelved. Then came the Round Table Conferences. And then in 1933 it was decided to start the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun, to which sixty cadets were to be admitted annually. It did not satisfy the critics. It would have meant that after twenty years India would have had 1,200 Indian Officers out of a total of 7,500. The late War changed everything. With the expansion of the Indian Army more and more Indians had to be commissioned.

India is now on the threshold of freedom. She wants her own Army, officered by Indians. The National War Academy near Poona will go a long way to supplying the officers for all three Fighting Services. But how are we to accomplish Indianisation in such a short period? I would advise: Hasten slowly. We cannot bring in several thousand new officers within a comparatively short time without marring the efficiency of the Army.

We should be able to completely nationalise the Indian Army from top to bottom within ten to fifteen years. Already we have a few Indian Brigadiers, but we should start Indianisation both from the top and the bottom. It will be easy to start the process from the bottom, but our difficulty will be to find suitable officers for the ranks above Major. We cannot give promotion too quickly. A period of ten years will be necessary before our present Captains and Majors can be made Lieut.-Colonels, Colonels and Brigadiers.

Let us assume that the new Academy will start work from 1950. From all we have heard the training and courses of study leave nothing to be desired. Whatever Government we have, it should not shelve this scheme, and I only hope that our public leaders will not interfere with it on economic or other grounds.

Brigadier Thorat has emphasised that merit alone will count in the selection of cadets for the Academy. Caste or creed will have no place in the Army, for our business will be to train a National Army. It is, however, difficult to get the right type of cadet. It is not that we do not have the right type; it is because the right type is not attracted to the Army. It may be that the attraction of a National Army will draw them, but the fact is that we must have young men in sufficient numbers to come forward and seek admission to the Academy.

As to V. C. Os, they were a necessity when all officers were British, but I feel that when all the officers are Indian, the V. C. O. will be unnecessary. It is only in the Indian Army that this type of officer is found.

One other point deserves mention. At present N. C. Os are promoted from the ranks by the O. C. of the unit. I suggest that this system should be stopped, and that promotion should be given only after passing an N. C. O's examination. If necessary N. C. Os could be recruited directly from candidates

who have completed their primary education, and given intensive training for two years after their recruit's training. A Havildar should be a capable man, having a general knowledge in arithmetic, history, geography and tactics.

Another matter which should be borne in mind is that, except in the technical units, no technical training is given to the ordinary soldier. A soldier, after he leaves the Army, should be able to stand on his own legs. He must be taught at least one or two trades during his service, so that when he enters civilian life he will be able to earn his own living.

But apart from the Army, we need our Navy, our Air Force and our Tank Corps. Within twenty years India must have at least as large a navy as Japan had in 1938. We have a huge coast line, and we shall have to maintain sea communications with other countries. In the air we need a peace-time strength of 10,000 planes, capable of being increased to 100,000 planes in war-time; we shall have to train about 10,000 pilots a year. As to the Tank Corps, we shall need at least 15,000 tanks in peace-time, and should be able to manufacture 25,000 tanks a year.

Science is going to play a big part in any future war. Results of researches by scientists will mean developments of the rocket bombs, atom bombs, faster planes, more destructive weapons. Unfortunately, India is far behind other countries in scientific progress, and the Indian Government and our Universities will have to encourage and subsidise scientific research. A country which is not aided by scientists will certainly not be able to fight successfully a country which has placed scientific research in the forefront of its programme.

This problem of scientific research and scientific weapons has indeed come to the fore in modern war. In the days gone by armies required only a few types of weapons. Modern armies want many and behind all those weapons must be the scientists, who apart from weapons, also influence other supplies for the soldier, such as food, clothes, medicines, etc.

Can India meet all the demands a first-class war might make on her? The answer is "No". Nations engaged in modern war must be as self-sufficient as possible. Is India? The fact is, of course, that we are far short of self-sufficiency, and it will be the first task of an Indian Government to aim at making the country self-sufficient in war-time. Peace-time industries must be able to change over to munition making quickly.

Let me quote one particular sphere: aeroplanes. Future wars will be air wars, but at present India has no aeroplane manufacturing industry at all. Yet we have seen what vast aeroplane industries had to be built up by the Allies during the late War. Here are some enlightening figures showing what other countries did: in 1943/45 America produced aircraft at the rate of 120,000 a year; Britain was producing over 30,000 annually; even Japan would have been turning out 25,000 a year in 1946.

Leading motor companies in other countries quickly changed over from motor car engine production to aeroplane engine production when war broke out. What did—what *could*—India do? India has yet to produce an all-India motor car, let alone an aeroplane or a tank. It is a field in which India has great scope, for we should be able to manufacture over a million motor cars a year.

We shall have to start hundreds of new industries, which can change over from tractors, cars, pipes and toys to tanks, planes and munitions in war-time.

It is opportune to remind our leaders of these facts, for they demand planning for the future. The Axis Powers at any rate learnt that lesson, for they were a decade ahead of the Democracies, and were able easily to transform their peace-time industries into war industries.

India's new industries must be dispersed over as wide an area as possible. Our steel industry, for instance, is concentrated in Bihar and Bengal; our cotton mills are crowded into half a dozen centres, and the successful bombing of Bombay, Ahmedabad, Sholapur and Madura would cripple our cloth industry. Munition making centres, motor car plants, etc., must be scattered over a large area; underground factories will have to be planned; power generating stations must be spread over the whole country, and arrangements made to transfer electric power from one region to another should one centre be bombed.

Not the least important thing we have to remember is that of co-operation with other countries in production in war-time. We must make sure of our Allies *now*, and plan with them for the future. A uniform type of ammunition and equipment is the first essential between Allies. Britain and America are contemplating the introduction of uniform bores and equipment for their armies, so that in the event of war those two items could be supplied one to the other. Those two countries are nearer to us than any other country; though we have differences with Britain, our ideas of democracy are the same as theirs, and I think we can co-operate with both Britain and America in this matter of uniform arms and equipment.

Yet despite all the arguments I have adduced, can we in India afford to maintain a large peace-time Army? Or put it another way: Can we afford not to maintain a large peace-time Army? We want freedom and we must pay the price. Pre-war Army budgets never exceeded 60,000,000 rupees; in war-time we spent nearly 4,000,000,000 rupees annually. Before the War our Army numbered less than 250,000; the strength of the Army I have suggested would cost about 350 crores of rupees a year.

I am a soldier, not an economist. Economists must find ways and means of raising money for the Army. One of our leading economists told me recently that we do need a large army, but that we could not afford to spend 300 crores of rupees annually on it. His view was that the Government should undertake long-term reconstruction plans, especially in regard to industries and agriculture. Those plans would increase national income, and concurrently with that increase in national wealth, the Army should be raised gradually. After a couple of five-year plans, he declared, we should be in a position to maintain a sufficiently large Army.

Finally, let me urge upon our public leaders that India must not be blinded by pacific theories. If we are caught napping, we shall lose our hard-won freedom. It is a melancholy thought, but despite the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Organisation, is there a real desire for peace in the world to-day? Of one thing we are certain: We do not want to conquer other countries; we merely want to defend our own. And a strong India—militarily, economically and industrially—will be a by no means small contribution to world peace.

WHAT ABOUT KENYA ?

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL W. M. NEWILL.

I HAVE recently paid a short visit to Kenya, and as that Colony may interest others who have or are considering it as a place of retirement this article may prove of interest. The advantages of Kenya are: a good climate; good food; cheap living; good educational facilities; good servants. Its disadvantages: bad communications, and possible communal trouble.

Like other places I have visited at different times, there was exceptional weather at the time of my stay there, according to the local inhabitants. It should have been a moderately dry season, but actually in every place I went to it rained. Even at Mombasa, where I stayed for a week on landing, it was too cold in August for bathing to be a pleasure. Actually, the rainy seasons vary east and west of the Rift Valley; generally speaking the west has a bigger and more regular rainfall than the east. At any rate, it always seemed cool there compared to India, the coolness was probably due to the height above sea level.

Nairobi, capital of the Colony, is 5,500 ft. above sea level; the Highlands, reserved for Europeans, vary between that height and 9,000 ft. Some people declare that living at such an altitude tends to make one a little queer, but I noticed no abnormal number of persons "round the bend"; probably residence at any place below 7,000 ft. and an annual holiday to the seaside would ensure good health.

The countryside, at any rate west of the Rift Valley, is grand. One does not notice the height above sea level, and much of the scenery is as at Home, especially around Turi, Molo and Mau Summit. Further north, near Eldoret, the scene is much as it is around Newmarket, *i.e.* an undulating plateau, with lots of trees planted as windbreaks. It really is a delightful country; the pasture land is very good, and a pleasure to walk on.

Food? Meat, vegetables, dairy produce, hams, and fruit are all easy to obtain, and if water is available, vegetables can be grown there all the year round. Most houses have their own garden, and all English vegetables flourish; such things as asparagus only take one year to establish themselves, compared with four or five years at Home. The only eatables rationed are sugar and flour products; fish is obtainable from the Coast or from the Great Lakes.

Living is cheap. Income-tax for a married man with two children on an income of £600 is £13 per annum; on an income of £700 a similarly placed married man pays £23. Servants' wages will probably rise, but a relation of mine living five miles out of Nairobi spends £15 a month on household expenses, *i.e.*, food, servants and petrol, but not rent. If one purchases a house and does not spend too much on alcohol and Clubs, it should be possible to live on £400 per annum. The standard of dress is low, even in Nairobi, so little need be spent on clothes. Servants are up to the average in India, and if they are treated as they should be, are cheerful and willing.

Education for young boys and girls up to about 14 or 15 years of age is good and cheap, in either Government schools or in private ones. In fact, girls can be "finished" in Kenya; boys, on the other hand, would be better if they are sent to an English public school. Girls will probably find it possible

to get employment, either in an office or in a shop, after leaving school. All shops are staffed by Europeans, except Indian shops.

Communications are poor. There is a metre gauge railway running right through the Colony, but except between Mombasa and Nairobi, trains only run on about three days each week. The coaches are mostly designed on the corridor system, and the compartments consequently rather cramped; opening a "Revelation" suit case in one is a major operation owing to the small space available between the seats. Except for 85 miles of road beyond Nairobi, which were graded and surfaced by Italian prisoners of war, the roads are awful. They are of red *murram*, have many pot holes and corrugations, and after a heavy rain it is difficult to stay on them, even when chains have been fitted to the back wheels of the car.

Many of us would like to settle in a country where there is no communal trouble. At present Kenya is all right in this respect, but some people fear difficulties in the future. From what settlers told me and from what I saw, Africans are backward and uneducated, and it will be many years before they are fit to govern themselves. While I was there Mr. Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited the Colony, and I gathered he went away with the impression that the White settler was necessary for the economic progress of Kenya. It was a view he had not held on arrival.

Even if the Highlands reserved for Europeans are de-restricted or partially so, and African reserves formed in them, there appeared to me to be plenty of land available for large numbers of European settlers. Some estates cover thousands of acres, most of which are undeveloped, so that subdivision of them would be a benefit to all. The average Indian in Kenya is a shop-keeper, railway official, or artisan, very willing to help, but with no desire to become a farmer. The African is not at present sufficiently wealthy to own a large farm, and is not likely to be so for at least three generations.

What is there to do for a person retiring to Kenya? If elderly, and not wishing to farm or augment his income with other employment, there are plots available for purchase near all the big towns, and occasionally a house comes on the market. It is difficult to give an estimate of prices for they vary with the locality, but land would probably cost not less than £20 per acre without a house. A rough estimate of building costs is 17s. per square foot, including architect's fees, but this would be considerably reduced if the settler supervised the work himself and employed local Indian artisans. More still would be saved if stone or brick could be obtained from his own land.

The above figures apply to a *pukka* house of stone or brick, but a very good house can be built of wood, or wood and mud, for very much less. If the land is close to a town, it may be possible for connection to be made to the municipal water and electric supply. If not, a pump or ram and a private electric plant would be required; the alternative is petrol lamps, which seem popular, but to me the idea of a house without electricity is not attractive. The only fuel is wood, which is cheap; most farms seemed to be able to provide sufficient for their own needs.

There are very good golf courses; tennis is available at Clubs in the towns. Small game shooting is bad, and even then only in the practically undeveloped areas; it is poor compared with India. Apart from the streams near Mount Kenya, fishing is generally poor, particularly with a fly. There are no first-class cricket or football matches to watch, though those games are played. There is no dog racing. Thus except for golf and tennis, the average retired person must largely depend on his gardening for recreation. Cinemas are to be found in all the towns.

For those interested in "horse sports", taking it by and large horses are good and cheap; a good hack costs about £40, and its keep should not amount to more than £5 a month. The Kenya bred horse is a better animal than the Indian bred, and has much better manners. I was lent a horse to ride about a farm, and thought I was riding a confidential hack, but it turned out to be a two-year old which had recently been raced. For ordinary hacking one wants to be on a farm.

Racing, as in India, is held under Jockey Club rules. Horses are good, but stakes small, and there are only fourteen days racing a year in Nairobi, and nine days annually in Nakuru. A trainer charges £8 per month, and travelling expenses are small as distances, compared with India, are short, while the railway allows a return journey free of cost. Gymkhana meetings are very popular, and attract large entries. Polo is played at several centres, but is of a low standard. Pigsticking is practically non-existent now, and there are only one or two packs of hounds, which hunt jackal and small deer.

For the younger folk and for those who want to earn their living or augment their income there is opportunity and scope, and varied forms of farming. Farming, however, demands capital, and without an income of about £500 per annum and a capital of £5,000 no one is recommended to take it up, unless he is prepared to be a real pioneer—that is, ready to purchase completely undeveloped land, clear it, build himself a wooden house and rough it for some time. Then, with a little capital to buy the land (which may be available at 30s. or £2 an acre) he might succeed.

The difficulty of finding capital can in some cases be met by taking advantage of the Government Settlement Schemes, details of which can be obtained from the Settlement Secretary, P.O. Box 825, Nairobi. But no one can make a success of farming on 100% borrowed money, so some private capital is essential. Settlers wishing to learn farming can be taken on a number of farms as paying guests. At present prices for agricultural products, particularly pyrethrum, farming can be made to show a good profit.

A good water supply for all types of farming is necessary. Though much of Kenya appears to get a decent rainfall, dry seasons do come, and the water seems to disappear very quickly. Dams are becoming more popular; for stock farms they are essential. In many parts of the Colony they can be constructed comparatively easily. The Soil Conservation Board will help, but demands on it are heavy and one might have to wait years before getting anything done by it.

Potential settlers might like to know something of the type of farming, so here are some notes which might be useful:

Dairy Produce.—Dairy produce has been the mainstay of Kenya settlers. By up-grading whatever form of dairy breed is selected a good milk yield can be obtained. Farmers generally separate their milk and send the cream to a Creamery run by the Kenya Co-operative Creameries, which turns it into excellent butter for export. Many forms of cheese are being made, among them Gorgonzola, Camembert and Cheddar.

Pyrethrum.—This is guaranteed a good selling price, and is at present the most valuable export. Some people fear that D.D.T. will prove too strong a rival, but as "Flit" and D.D.T. act in different ways, the market for pyrethrum may remain permanently. The flowers from which it is produced are dried on the farms in special driers and then sent to the local branch of the Kenya Farmers Association, which makes the powder and arranges the marketing. Pyrethrum is picked by hand, and labour shortage in some districts is limiting production. The best pyrethrum is grown at over 7,000 ft.

Wheat.—A price at which wheat can be profitably grown is guaranteed. But even if this subsidy is taken away, many farmers consider it will still be able to be grown at a profit when more mechanical implements are available—at any rate in districts like the Uasin Gishu plateau near Eldoret, where the land lends itself to the use of “combines”, etc. There is much undeveloped land in that area.

Tea and Coffee.—These are very specialised forms of farming, and no one is recommended to take them up without serving a long apprenticeship. Kenya coffee is so good that, given a decent rainfall, a good market should be assured.

Opinions vary as to the causes of labour shortages in the Colony, but the main reason is undoubtedly the African's dislike of work. If conditions for native labour are improved, more of it may become available, but the output per head may not increase. One or two farmers told me that they are now receiving more applications for work, and when commodities which the African likes become easier to get, they will be more willing to work in order to earn more money to spend.

Here are a few other points about Kenya which struck me as worth mentioning:

In Nairobi and other towns business starts much earlier than in India. Offices open at 8.30 a.m. and banks at 9 a.m. I found it much quicker to get a cheque cashed than in India, probably because the staff is largely European and more accustomed to take responsibility.

At all offices one seemed to be able to get business settled without a lot of waiting about, the only exception being the Government Immigration Branch. Petrol and Rationing offices were helpful. Before it is possible to obtain a driving licence a Certificate of Competency is necessary, but a driving licence issued in another country will be accepted for three months.

Permits are required to settle in Kenya. They can be obtained from the Immigration Officer, Law Courts, Nairobi.

There is a six month's quarantine for dogs, and restrictions on the import of plants.

The *lingua franca* is Ki-Swahili, the up-country version of which is easy to learn as there is little grammar.

Scotch whiskey is difficult to obtain, but it was expected that supplies might improve; English gin was also in short supply, but Uganda and South African beers are easy to buy.

There are at present restrictions on building, but these will be removed when materials (which generally speaking are not in very short supply, except for certain things like cement) and fittings, baths, etc. become more easily available.

To sum up, Kenya is certainly one of the places worth considering as a place to which to retire. To me the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. But unless one takes advantage of the Settler's scheme a certain amount of capital is required as well as a settled income. I think that for a non-farming settler £500 income and a capital of £4,000, and for a farmer settler £500 income and £7,000 are sufficient to give one a good start, including buying or building a home.

The best advice I can offer to a prospective settler, however, is that he should go and see the Colony before he commits himself.

MORE SIMLA GHOSTS

BY "HYDERABAD".

KIPLING, in *My Own True Ghost Story*, wrote that there were said to be two ghosts in Simla. I have told the story of one, and here are some more. And, of course, there is also the one at the foot of the little waterfall near the Marina Hotel (better known to the older generation as "Glenarm"), which the *jhampanis* are reputed to avoid by taking their rickshaws over to the further side of the road, and which was seen twice a few years ago by an officer, now serving as a brigadier in India,—once on the way back from a Masonic dinner so that cannot perhaps be allowed to count.

There must be many more tales of Simla apparitions. I have heard at least five others, but the details of some were scanty and I was not able to follow them up. The two which I give below have been printed before—one by a Viceroy, and the other by Simla's distinguished historian—and I have added some particulars which I have gathered locally.

MURDER ?

In the second volume (1937) of *Lord Halifax's Ghost Book*, published by his son, the former Viceroy of India, there is a story, "The Simla Bungalow" which is of some interest. It was sent to the late Lord Halifax by his sister, who had it from her granddaughter, the wife of a member of the I.C.S. and then at Simla.

She related that she had recently met there a Mrs. Giles, formerly a Miss Fordyce, who before her marriage in 1915 had lived in Simla with her mother and stepfather (who I have ascertained was a Mr. Barry), in a house which later, about 1925, was occupied by an American doctor. It was an old building, and before long there were complaints of disturbances at night. Two of their guests, a man and a girl, said that the most extraordinary noises prevented them from sleeping, and were somewhat indignant at the suggestion that rats were responsible.

Not long after this, Miss Fordyce and her mother, who was unwell, were alone in the house. One night the daughter was awakened by the agonised whimpers of her fox-terrier, which jumped on her bed and tried in a terrified manner to crawl under her eiderdown. A light was burning, and Miss Fordyce sat up in bed at once and looked to see what had alarmed her dog. The bedroom was an inner one with a dressing-room leading out of it. The door of the latter was open and through it she saw, standing on the step in the outer doorway, an old man leaning on a stick and staring at the floor. As she looked, he vanished. She experienced no feeling of alarm at this; on the contrary, she was able to lie down quietly and go to sleep again.

On the following day, however, thinking it over, she felt very frightened; but owing to her mother's illness she did not like to tell her or to change her bedroom. But the terrier would never enter that room again, and if it happened to get shut in it would howl terribly until released.

Long afterwards she chanced to find herself sitting, at a luncheon party, next to a young man. He told her that his parents had once lived in the house, which was haunted. An old man had lived in it with a young wife, and one night he had murdered her in a fit of jealousy. Many people since have heard noises in the bungalow: some have seen the young wife's ghost running along the verandah crying: but no one save Miss Fordyce is known to have seen the old man.

Old residents of Simla suggest that the house in which Miss Fordyce saw the apparition of the old man is none other than "B—", the erstwhile residence of the mysterious Syrian, Mr. Jacobs, who figures as "Mr. Lurgan" in Kipling's *Kim*, and as "Mr. Isaacs" in Marion Crawford's novel of that name. Certain it is that this old bungalow has the general reputation of being haunted, but I must admit that during the past two years I have passed by it twice a day, and fairly often by night, without seeing or hearing anything out of the way.

The story as told me by one who has lived in Simla for many years bears little if any resemblance to Miss Fordyce's version. It is this. A Miss C——m went down to "B——" about eight o'clock one evening, having occasion to telephone for a doctor. She was admitted by a servant of the tenant, "Sir R. G——", who said that his master was changing for dinner but would come shortly. As Miss C——m waited, she noticed a man in evening dress walking about outside the house; but supposed he was a dinner-guest waiting to be announced. She saw him walk up to the glazed door of the hall and look through it.

At this moment Sir R. G——came into the hall from his bedroom, apologised for keeping her waiting, and asked if he could help her. She said that she would like to use his telephone, and added: "But as your guest is waiting outside, don't let me keep you". "We are not expecting anyone to dinner", he replied. "But someone is waiting outside all the same", said Miss C——m. He then opened the hall door, looked through it, and walked out. She followed him, and they both saw the figure of the man, which turned and went towards the gate. Going after it, they saw it turn towards the small post-office which is almost opposite "B——", and then vanish into thin air!

My informant, who heard this story from Miss C——m, adds that this ghost has been seen many times, walking into "B——", walking out again and along the public road, and then absolutely disappearing.

I should add that I have failed to identify the old man who Miss Fordyce was told had murdered his young wife, and doubt if any such thing took place.

"ALICE"

The alleged haunting of "Alice Bower" is chiefly interesting, not for the story of Alice's ghost, but for the tale of Alice herself which lies behind it.

We must begin with her husband, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas David Colyear of the Bengal Cavalry. This officer, who was born in 1805, was a natural son of the fourth and last Earl of Portmore, Viscount Milsington. After serving in India with credit for some thirty years, he retired in 1851 and settled at Simla, where he acquired considerable property, including "Gorton Castle", "Portmore" (now a nursing home), "Milsington" (now part of St. Edward's School), and other well-known houses. He died at his house, "The Retreat", at Dukani, on the Mahasu ridge near Simla, on 8th August 1875.

His first wife, who was a Muslim lady and whom he is believed to have married by Muslim rites, died at Simla on 30th January, 1865 and, as Sir Edward Buck relates in his classic *Simla Past and Present*, was buried in the garden of

"Juba House" in Chota Simla, her grave being surmounted by a small marble mausoleum. Some years later, after the Colonel's death, the house was sold on condition that her remains were removed. A tale having gained currency that a quantity of jewellery had been buried with her, the grave was opened in the presence of the Deputy Commissioner, the Civil Surgeon, the Superintendent of Police, a solicitor, a representative of the family, and a few friends; but no valuables were found. Her coffin was thereupon removed to the cemetery and buried beside that of her husband.

This must have happened in the 'eighties, for a resident of Simla who was born in 1878 tells me that he can remember as a boy seeing the mausoleum at "Juba House". In 1929, when visiting this house, I was shown the tennis-court as being the former site of the Muslim Mrs. Colyer's grave.

It was not long before the Colonel took another wife. On 9th December 1865 there was baptised at Christ Church, Simla, one Alice, described as an Indian Christian born about 1842 or 1843, daughter of Jewtoo, a Hindu *zemindar* of Simolee village in the Bushair district and his wife Hurree. Two days later, at the same church, Alice married Colonel Colyear. For her he built "Alice Bower" at Mahasu, and by a will made shortly before his death he left her house and personal property including, evidently, the "Bower". The story goes that as soon as her relatives heard that she was an heiress they came in from the hills to share her wealth, and brought about her death. It is a fact that she did die on 9th May, 1878, rather less than three years after her husband.

Then, the story goes on, she haunted her "Bower", till one evening, when four young subalterns were occupying the house, the ghost was caught and never appeared again. In response to a recent inquiry, Sir Edward Buck kindly tells me that he is unable to supply any details of the incident, as it took place before he came to Simla in 1886.

A distorted version of part of this appears in Sir George MacMunn's *Rudyard Kipling, Craftsman* (London, 1937, pp. 166-167). He avers that Alice Colyear was the prototype of Kipling's "Lispeth of the Mission", and in doing so changes her name to Elizabeth, and the name of "Alice Bower" to "Elizabeth's Bower". He also confuses the first (Muslim) wife with the second (Alice, a Hindu, later a Christian), and makes the first one who was buried at "Juba House" to be the same as Alice who lived at and gave her name to "The Bower".

* * * * *

Other Simla ghosts are as nebulous as phantoms usually are. A house named "G—House", above the United Service Club on the slopes of Jakko, has the reputation of being haunted, and the occupier some years back used to relate that a ghostly figure, clothed in what looked like a gray robe and hood, passed through his bedroom on various occasions. He knew nothing of any story behind this apparition, and I have not been able to find out more about it.

Then there was the lady in early Victorian garb, with poke bonnet, who was twice seen on the road above "Morvyn", on the way from the main entrance of Viceregal Lodge to Summer Hill. The witnesses were Mrs. F—who was Postmistress at Summer Hill, and Mr. Charles R—who has since died. I have not been able to take this story any further, and my informant adds that he has walked this road thousands of times during the last 46 years, at all hours, and has never met the lady.

Last we have the Syree ghost, whose habitat is the dak bungalow at Sairi or Syree in Patiala State on the old bridle road down to the plains, beyond Jutogh. Kipling refers to this bungalow as being afflicted by a supernatural "old woman who blows the bellows", but nothing is now known of her and she may be a fictional creation. But a lady who spent her honeymoon at Syree many years ago states that the dak bungalow *khansama* told them that a *sahib* had once killed his *memsahib* there. The lady had tried to escape by running out of the back door and up a slope behind the bungalow, but her husband had overtaken and killed her there. The *khansama* went on to say that their ghosts are, or at least the lady's ghost is, still to be seen from time to time. But my informant and her husband saw and heard nothing of an unusual nature.

If the Simla ghost stories are true, it would seem that the *sahib-log* of the old days were a homicidal lot, for it will have been remarked that no less than three stories have as their basis the murder of a wife by her husband. I may say that in my searches into Simla's past I have not come across a single European murder case; though it is not impossible that there have been such.

Live Ammunition in Army Training

TWO points leap to notice about a demonstration I have attended at the School of Infantry at Warminster. The first is that the use of live ammunition in training transforms the whole nature of the exercise or demonstration. From being academic at best—and to the participants probably rather boring—it becomes intensely dramatic and exciting. The second point is that these weapons firing live ammunition—the 77mm. gun in the Comet tank, for example—need a great deal of space, otherwise the risk to those engaged and to neighbouring civilians would be too great. And that is one of the problems at the base of most discussions about training areas.

The School of Infantry has been holding a conference for infantry battalion and brigade commanders. This is an annual event, but this year there is a new feature—a generals' "convention," held from yesterday until to-morrow. This has been attended by representatives of all arms and services and by those of the Royal Navy, R.A.F., and Royal Marines, as well as of institutions such as the Imperial Defence College, Joint Services Staff College, Headquarters Combined Operations, the Staff College, and Headquarters Combined Airborne Establishments.

The biggest feature of the convention is the demonstration of a battalion in the attack with full supporting arms. This is given to all students of the Tactical Wing of the School of Infantry in their last week, and to-day was given for the benefit of the generals attending the convention. Here all the problems which had throughout the course been worked out separately were run together into a single operation to illustrate infantry and tank co-operation, infantry and air co-operation, the use of smoke and of flame-throwers, fire and movement of sub-units, and a number of other points.

On the frontage and in the phase which the exercise represented, a battalion was supported by a field regiment with 25-pounder guns, a medium troop with 5.5 in. guns, rocket projectors, a squadron of Comet tanks, and aircraft, besides the ordinary infantry supporting arms such as 4.2 in. and 3 in. mortars and medium machine guns.

Those whose earliest military exercise is further off than they care to remember cannot avoid astonishment at the extraordinary realism which can now be imparted to training of this kind. All the weapons and equipment mentioned went into action. In particular, a combat which took place round a pillbox and was brought to an end by an attack by flame-carrying Wasps, was so like the real thing that one was inclined to doubt one's eyes. The organizers of the exercise had succeeded in abolishing the element of fantasy probably as far as is humanly possible. But it was clear that this could be done only by careful and skilful planning.—*Military Correspondent of the London "Times"*.

EDUCATION IN THE INDIAN MILITARY ACADEMY

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL E. C. GOULD, R.A.E.C.

THE word education in derivation means simply to lead out from. The implication is that he who is educated is led out from darkness into light. The central problem for the educationist is to ascertain what light is, and then cause it to flood the minds of men. Any conception of education which is merely concerned with means is stunted and incomplete. It is not even according to nature. A potato plant does not merely proliferate potatoes underground; it throws up a stem and spreads leaves and blossoms in the air and sun. Its main function, that of reproduction, is dependent upon an ampler self-expression, striving after humble beauty and light.

Education worthy of its name must deal with man as a whole and not as a functional part. Any training designed to make man subserve machinery, masonry, accountancy, medicine or any other specialist branch of knowledge, in so far as it accepts functional limitations, only goes under the name of education by dint of the propaganda of a materialist world striving to idealize the necessity of earning a living. Specialist knowledge, whether of the doctor or of the electrician, is no more an education than the knowledge of the cannibal which guides him to cut off the juiciest joints from the human carcase.

A true education trains the complete man for a full life. It follows that a valid system of education cannot be determined without an illuminating conception of man's nature and destiny. Unless educative energies are directed within the framework of a philosophy of living, their results must ultimately be barren and sterile. They are like bricks lying uselessly about in heaps, unrelated to any programme of building. The function of a motor engine is to drive a car along a road; so much of what has passed itself off as modern education is similar to revving up the engine in the garage. Small wonder that society is poisoned with the fumes of frustration and neurasthenia!

It is accepted as axiomatic in the civilized parts of the world to-day that a society is judged by the quality of its members. What do we mean by the quality of a human being? The answer should provide the key to our educational system. The question, "What type of human being do you want?" will produce as many answers as the number of experts asked. The pious will see excellence in the religious mystic; the musician and artist in the composer and painter; the professional burglar in the Sicilian bandit.

SOME OBJECTS OF EDUCATION.

The question must be differently framed. What qualities would you like to see in the average man or woman? There are many on which most people would agree. Every well-wisher of mankind wants his fellows healthy, clean, physically tough and well-developed. Most educational institutions run courses in physical training and many of them, like the Greeks, relate this training to the rhythm of music. The whole world has paid homage to moral qualities whether in the form of fear, envy or admiration.

Most of them go under the heading of strength of character. The possession of courage, both physical and moral, is the pre-condition without

which no gain can be consolidated, no worthy enterprise undertaken, no virtues made effective, no personality made a force for good. Sincerity, free from the distortion of fanaticism, is the foundation of all spiritual progress. Tolerance, unenfeebled by indifference, is the recognition of the rights of others and is indispensable to social harmony. Goodness or charity is the gift of self, the well-spring of a sense of duty and conscientious service.

Cheerfulness begets optimism and at once makes all things possible and agreeable. Perseverance makes realities of dreams and galvanizes wishes into resolutions. Reason is the ability to think objectively and logically, to move on a mental plane from which valid judgments can be made : it kneads varieties of experience and knowledge into a pattern. Enthusiasm makes light of difficulties and fires hard endeavour with joy. A sense of usefulness, of purpose and of wonder proceeds from an elemental piety, the lack of which in the modern world has debased rationalism into an apologetic device for justifying selfishness. Unless man serves a cause higher than himself, he will either become self-indulgent and hence parasitic, or he will serve a cause which demeans himself.

These attributes and qualities, if generally pervasive, would make the world a more heroic, finer, happier and better place. How far they are within the reach of mankind ; how far nurture, that is education, can conquer and modify nature, are debateable points. This article seeks to point out that education must hold a clear object in view ; it must know where it is leading ; it must know what general type of being it is trying to develop. Education unrelated to a scale of values is like a car complete except for the steering wheel.

EDUCATION IN THE I. M. A.

A military institution has one great virtue above all others. It has a clear idea of its function and of the type of man it wishes to develop. In spite of the frequently derisive criticism against the Army and the Army mind, no section of society is more interested in the highest standards, physical and mental, amongst its members than the Army.

Both Britain and India embarked upon army educational schemes, which in scope and numbers involved, completely dwarfed any civilian adult educational parallels. The War Office and G.H.Q., India, in time of war, did more for general adult education in one year than all the boards, schools, universities and other interested bodies in twenty years of peace, and with far less propaganda, fuss and tittle-tattle. It has been emphasised that education must be related to an object. The official object of the I.M.A. is :

"To ensure that each cadet shall acquire the mental, moral and physical attributes essential to his progressive and continued development as an officer of the regular forces, and that he shall also gain the basic military knowledge and educational background essential to all officers, whatever their arm or branch of the Service may be."

The mental, moral and physical attributes of an officer, apart from technical knowledge and a more than average development of leadership qualities, are those we should wish to find in all our fellowmen. The system of education in force at the I.M.A is valid, in its general aspects, for the youth of any country since it underwrites the main object--the maximization of the good social and individual potentialities of man.

Naturally the conception of a worthy Indian officer is not founded on an abstraction of an idealized man. An Indian institution training Indian youth

for the Indian Army quite rightly emphasises a true and high sense of patriotism to India. A cadet at the I.M.A. is expected and given every facility to know the history of his own land. He is expected to draw his inspiration from the vast cultural heritage which 6,000 years of Indian civilization have made him heir to; he is expected to incorporate in himself the best that India has stood for and still stands for; he must as a representative of his country take as his models the great living and the greater dead of his home land; as a torch-bearer of his own culture, his knowledge of, and delight in, its customs, art and literature should exceed those he has for foreign peoples.

An exalted patriotism does not deny its possessor that development of mind entitling him to the membership of a universal society based upon an educated approach to life. Only in fascist countries has a distorted sense of patriotism entailed contempt for foreign lands. Love for one's own wife is not dependent upon hatred of other people's spouses. Where the mill is Indian, it follows that the bulk of the educational grist should be Indian too. Love underlies patriotism; hatred, a negative force, animates nationalism.

AN EXPERIMENT IN LARGE HISTORY

How does the academic side of life at the I.M.A. help to develop those attributes of a full man which were adumbrated in the earlier part of this paper? Consider certain subjects. The history syllabus, apart from the inclusion of the whole of Indian history in outline, starts with whirling nebulae in space and the births of worlds, outlines the course of evolution from energised carbon and water to the development of man, examines the ethical and spiritual contributions of the great seers and prophets of mankind, and leads up through man's primitive origins to his achievements in civilized living, and on to the movements which have formed the modern world. The great groups of the world, the Chinese, Russians, Americans, the British Commonwealth and the Japanese have their last 100 years of history covered in greater detail.

What values are there in such a course? Amongst the minor ones are these. History is taught under topics and not chronologies. Topics satisfy the craving of developed intelligence for knowledge which coheres and is logically associated. Chronologies represent a mass of incoherent detail unpresided over by mind, a series of accidents in time, a mere burden to the memory. Constructive and analytic is the adhesive in topical treatment; instructor and class take part in a mentally creative act; chronology dismisses imagination, deadens thought and constipates the mind.

Knowledge kneaded by mind can be assimilated into experience, it has power to enlarge outlook, strengthen reason and germinate original seeds of mental approach. Knowledge unarranged by thought and sucked in by memory is little more than the metamorphosis of a human soul into a text-book. The one is quick, the other is dead.

ETHICS AND EDUCATION

An original feature of this history course is its inclusion of the main ideas, ethical and religious, thrown up or crystallized by the profoundest minds of the ages. Why should the indices of man's groupings after perfection be excluded from secular education? Are our eyes too weak or downcast or cowardly to catch the rays that flood from the great sages and saints? Is a misguided sense of discretion to be allowed to switch out the lights which have irradiated the minds of men throughout the ages?

How is the history of India intelligible if Hinduism and Buddhism are not related to the essential thought which gave them birth? What feeling can a man have for the development of European history if its three inspirations, Greek thought, Christianity and Roman imperialism, are excised from a course on world history?

Wherever man has striven valiantly and brilliantly for perfection and for truth, it is the vital concern of all mankind to consider his works. Ethical gains are not passed on automatically from generation to generation. Nature knows no automatic law of progress; man can degenerate and has done so in history when the truths relating to human conduct and aspiration have become dim and moribund. Greatness leaves a people when it loses touch with great minds and life can again become nasty, brutish and short when the inheritors of an ethical way of life cut themselves away from its sources in thought and effort.

The catastrophe of civilization is involved in the catastrophe of an ethical world-view. Apart from this consideration, the study of the major views contained in the great religions, Hinduism, Taoism humanised and socially moralised by Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam can but result in tolerance and respect for the other person's point of view. Even such a rationalist as Professor A. E. Heath says: "No sympathetic understanding of peoples of other faiths would be possible without knowing something of their religious outlook upon the world, and what it means to them."

It must be emphasised that in the outline of world religions, religious training is not imparted; complete historical impartiality is maintained, and no attempt whatsoever is made, or desired, at proselytization. Treatment is confined to the outline of ideas contained in the great religious systems and to their contributions and repercussions in the history of mankind.

DEPTH TO CURRENT AFFAIRS

The study of the last hundred years of the history of the great Powers is designed to allow cadets to see current world affairs in historical perspective: to see them whole and as results of historical causes, growths and developments. Historical perspective lends calmness and depth to judgments and allows theories, ideal in conception and impeccable on paper, to be measured against the revealed practical experience of mankind. Theoretical experiments in government frequently shipwreck in confrontation with the obduracy of human customs and the "psyche" of racial groups. History indicates what is workable.

Most of the benefits alleged so far in this course would apply to the study of any particular period of history. Why is the course universal? Why does it stretch over the whole expanse of past time? The most immediate criticism asserts the invalidity of knowing little about much, rather than much about little. This criticism puts the premium upon knowledge. Its logical development would make education subserve the dust piles of the Doctor of Philosophy examination. Reason, an awakening interest in life and the world, are more important to the average man and higher in the scales of a humane education than detailed knowledge. The man of reason can use knowledge and can acquire it; how often does the specialist in knowledge lack common sense!

Such a course has a parallel in good poetry which rarely is exhaustive in description, but stimulates the imagination and arouses in the reader the desire to participate in the quest of the good, the true and the beautiful. Suggestionism

has far greater power than direct appeal. An instructor can be largely judged, not by what he inculcates in the lecture hall, but by what his students discuss and read about his subject outside it.

EDUCATION WITH A PURPOSE.

The essential factor of any system of education is that, like medicine, it should help nature. Education that runs counter to healthy instincts, to natural joy in living, to the optimism that looks forward to the morrow, the dynamic sense that life can be constructively fruitful, has the cold finger of death on it. Cynicism and blaseness, which characterized the so-called educated products of many American and European universities before the war, were an indication of some monstrous abomination in the system of youthful education in these countries.

Life is will to live. Undermine this will and the only education that is valid is that which supports a cowardly retreat from life, speciously aiming at inward perfection and the salvation of one's own soul. A life so lived, being without an active social ethic, lacks value. Periods of history in isolation, even the so-called glorious periods, must leave students of them with the misgiving of a Gibbon, that history is a record of man's crime and folly. It is not so surprising therefore that the history honours which schools or universities leave on the minds of those who pursue them a trail of slime and ineffectiveness which lead nowhere except possibly to an asylum for neurotics.

Wonder is the father of philosophy, says Plato; there is no philosophy without it. For philosophy read curiosity and the quotation is relevant. The spirit of wonder must be kept alive if science is to progress and knowledge to expand. But the sense of wonder is paralysed in the weaker third of the students who read the history of the schools.

Why? Because the infamies of the past are so glaring, continuous and ineradicable that no heroic endeavours of the present are considered likely to overcome them in the future. Man appears as an incorrigible backslider. His society is always dominated by power groups and power invariably corrupts. Before the student has confronted life, he has decided that it is not worth while bothering about. This seeming strangling of the future by the past is only plausible within a small area of temporal reference. Expand the area of reference in history and the path is cleared for a sense of purpose and of worth whileness.

The spiritual foundations of dynamic living are laid by history itself, but only in a great sweep in history that starts with man somehow involved in matter flying through space. The tale of the rise and fall of the Roman Empire may lend force to a cynical outlook upon man as of a being whose gains are never consolidated, whose triumphs are light in the balance against his failures, whose nature is bloodthirsty and contentious, whose law and thought however elevated on parchment, in reality are an expression of a vain love of power for its own sake. But the gradual rise of life from the deathly sleep of matter and the slow development of simple forms of life to the miracle of conscious mind—these are facts which if their implications are pondered upon, are so profoundly exciting that no normally developed intelligence can resist their power to fire and inspire.

Emperor succeeding emperor may be dull, but the silences of infinite space producing the song of the nightingale, dust rising from dust, mastering dust, knowing the dust from which it sprang and striving to be other than dust through the countless ages—these are in the nature of achievements that blow the cinders

of mind into a furnace. They represent a vertical thrust in life so magnificent, so vast that those who are made conscious of it are challenged to emulate its nature in their own lives. This history thus becomes dynamic and inspiring; it reinforces the student's natural instinct towards progress; it makes an ally of a universal movement, it makes the striving towards an ampler, finer, richer and more vital way of life fit into the pattern of a cosmic process.

The bogey man of science, the second law of thermo dynamics which ultimately condemns all life to a freezing death in eternal night, is so remote in its threat as not to affect the conclusions reached so far. In any case man might find some way of stoking up the fires of the universe, or alternatively, as Professor Alexander suggests, he might disembarass life from the laws of matter.

To sum up, this experiment in teaching large history allows a scale of values to develop from the subject-matter and constantly fosters a positive, dynamic and creative approach to the future. It has all the virtues of a great epic ensuing in its hearers a sense of purpose and a belief in the perfectibility of society. It gives meaning to the possession of purpose in life and engenders the resolve to fulfil it. Logical thought is the glue which throughout gives consistency.

THE OBJECT PLUS.

It is of interest to note that the military history course which presents a broad survey of the pattern of warfare throughout the ages, lays emphasis upon the exemplification of leadership qualities. Thus an academic subject is directly related to specific forms of military leadership training, such as fieldcraft and man management. The military side of the I.M.A. is primarily concerned with the development of leadership qualities in cadets. Academic and military instruction are integrated and both form of training underwrite the ends of the I.M.A.

One feature of all training is remarkably illuminative. Every period of instruction embodies not only subject-matter, but an "object plus." The "object plus" of a subject is the ray which is always focussed upon the ultimate purpose of all training—the development of those qualities of character and mental approach in a cadet which will enable him progressively to fulfil himself throughout life as an enlightened man and a serving officer.

Just as in war every single campaign fits into an overall strategy, the object of which is to win the war, so at the I.M.A. every single period, while complete in itself, adds a stone to the edifice of character which it is the chief aim of Academy instruction to strengthen, build up and perfect.

LITERATURE. The literature course is painted on a large canvas. While emphasis is laid chiefly upon Indian and English poets and authors who have written memorably, the net is spread to cover the great world figures, thrown up by France, Russia, Germany, China, Persia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Palestine and Arabia. What a joy it is for the instructor to range over the world of art and thought! How immeasurably more pleasing than to be confined to the prison walls of a syllabus whose goal is the gloomy portal of the examination room!

CITIZENSHIP. Citizenship is worthy of special mention since its immediate rapport with life is self-evident. The thesis of this article maintains that education must be related to an end. In India especially the ends of citizenship are garishly clear. In the U.S.A. civics can afford to slink unseen amongst the academic shadows; in India it must be practical and join issue with evils which

are obtrusively visible to all. Some of these evils are poverty illiteracy, bribery and corruption, bad farming, the backwardness of women the high death rate in childbirth, both maternal and infantile, soil erosion, the worst and most widespread enemy of the country at large, the stinking town and unhygienic villages.

These all constitute problems which it is the job of the good citizen to understand, study and, in so far as he can, solve. Any other course of citizenship in present-day India is either hypocrisy or fiddling while Rome burns. At the I. M. A. the problems are laid before the cadets, discussed by them and remedies suggested. Recently the I.M.A. has gained permission to adopt a village and in it the remedies are being applied. The cadets, who show a warm enthusiasm for the work, have formed themselves into committees, all of which have one specific commitment in the rural uplift plan. Thus one committee makes itself responsible for the provision of a pure water supply, another for medical treatment and so on. Except for expert and technical guidance where necessary, the whole work is in the hands of the cadets.

The educational value of this experiment is tremendous. It gives a practical outlet to the youthful idealism of patriotic young men. It brings verbal fervour and paper theory up against the hardness of facts and the encrusted idiosyncrasies of men. It evokes tact, compromise, initiative, determination, powers of organization and foresight all the time. It drives home the lesson that talk is easy but that the price of accomplishment is sweat.

Above all it levers the village into the classroom, rivets knowledge to an object and creates joy in achievement. Wherever a subject lends itself to dynamic and practical achievement, it is educationally valuable for it to do so. The more education can cover all that is socially good in men, the greater its power and value.

THE VALUE OF DISCUSSION.

The methods employed on the academic side of the I.M.A. aim chiefly at development of clear reasoning powers, a capacity for objective thought, calmness and soundness in decision. One important means to these ends is the discussion. The first essential of a successful discussion is freedom of speech. Any cadet in his discussion group of about fifteen members, may say exactly what he pleases without the slightest fear of official disapproval or intimidation—with these provisos—he must be relevant to the subject under consideration and he must be able to justify in reason any statement he makes.

These disciplines, which any trained mind always submits to, gradually raise the tone and quality of discussions from the status of volcanic ebullitions of personal prejudice to that of the calm deliberations of adult minds, dominated by reason. After some time the petty desire to score a debating point subsides; as nervousness declines, passion fades from the discussion circle; its members address themselves squarely to the subject-matter and pool their knowledge in a disinterested quest for the truth. When a cadet learns that a discussion is not a hall of contention, not a law court, but a method whereby each member sheds what light he can upon a problem or a subject, in positive collaboration with his fellows, he reproduces the quality of mind which it is the aim of the academy to develop.

His thought, his judgment, his approach become valid because he moves on a plane of reason; he has disengaged his ego from his considerations. His

attitude to a problem is not : How does this affect me ? How can I shine in this ? How can I make so and so look ridiculous ? But rather: What helpful contribution can I make ? What would an impartial and developed reason have to say about this ? His quest is no longer for argument but for the fullest discovery of truth. He becomes a rational and a moral being at the same time. Becoming a servant to reason, he also proves his worthiness to lead men.

SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS.

The teaching of science and of mathematics is conceived for the most part in terms of India's needs. The principle underlying them is usefulness. India generally, and the Army particularly, is short of technicians. Mathematics and science are the twin supports of a technical world and must in a national institution such as the I.M.A. be used with a functional end in view. Unless the shortage of technical experts is not to cause a crisis following upon the policy of speedy nationalization, mathematics and science must be directed more to their practical application than their theoretical understanding.

The higher aims of the sciences must at present be subordinate to the great need of the Army for armourers, mechanics, signallers, electricians, engineers and other technical officers. More emphasis is laid upon the application of a law than on its theoretical understanding. Physics, especially statics and dynamics, form the centre of gravity of the mathematics and science courses.

Higher mathematics students are given tutorial attention and are allowed a large measure of freedom to pursue lines of study which interest them most. The 'recitational' method of instruction has been found to work well in mathematics. A student is given a problem to solve in private study and later demonstrates its solution publicly on the blackboard. This is a valuable discipline in clarification of thought. It shows that a student not only understands but can make understandable to others the problem which he has tackled.

While the overriding needs of the Indian Army have been the chief determining factor in framing the science and mathematics *syllabi*, it is true to say that the normal cadet leaving the I.M.A. has a sufficient background in these subjects to enable him, if he so desires, to pursue them not only functionally but also as an enlightening and expanding mental interest.

TUTORIAL SYSTEM.

For approximately one hundred of the brighter cadets, a general tutorial system is in force at the I.M.A. This follows very closely the time-honoured and time-proved system used at Oxford. It allows the cadet to come into personal contact with a mind more comprehensive, better-stocked, more logical and mature than his own.

There is no better educational medium than the tutorial. Opinions are put to dialectic test, obscurities are clarified, the cadet is pinned to justification by reason. The tutor can concentrate upon remedying the weaknesses of a cadet's mental apparatus and meet, as he cannot in the lecture hall, the intellectual needs of individual cadets.

AN EXAMPLE TO INDIA.

The educational experiment at the I.M.A. has importance for the whole of India, especially during these times of transition and crisis. It could not be seriously maintained that many institutions are producing men either with the

intellectual or moral qualities required by the march of events. Indiscipline, emotionalism, opportunism, faith in a few text-books, a lack of restraint, all these sour and vitiate the mental atmosphere of some institutions which should be giving refined and high minds to the service of the Indian peoples.

How different is the mental atmosphere at the I.M.A. ! Cadets learn to look at problems not through the burning glass of rancour and hysteria, but steadily and objectively with the bright and reliable eye of reason. Instead of feverish and usually last minute memorizing of text-books which cushion the ugly idol of the degree examination, they develop a live intellectual curiosity towards life within the framework of a high scale of moral values. Far from exploiting a political situation in order to achieve mob notoriety, the cadets at the I.M.A. allow their patriotism to flood up purely from the vast well of India's great achievements in thought and culture, and express it, not in strife and disorder, but in social service and the determination to maximize their potentialities to India's advantage.

From the I.M.A., India can look for true leaders as men who put service before self, reason before feeling, right decision before personal end, and the good of their country before private ambitions. It is gratifying that the academic wing of the I.M.A. can, through a live and creative educational scheme, play its part in this inspiring and constructive task.

The "Forty Thieves"

The 40th Pathans, (nickname: The Forty Thieves) is among the battalions the Indian Army has recently lost by disbandment. For ninety years it has existed, for though there were battalions of the same number before 1857, the 40th originated when the Shajahanpur Levy was raised by Lieut. E. Dandridge (later General Dandridge) in 1857. Later it became the 40th Bengal Infantry, and in 1890 was reconstituted as an all-Pathan Regiment. Though it has been the 5th Bn. (Pathan) 14 Punjab Regiment since 1922, it was as the 40th Pathans that it gained its greatest laurels. Originally it was a class regiment of Pathans; but early this century Dogras and (P.M.s) were added, and after 1918 Sikhs also became members of the Battalion.

The Battalion has fought in Tibet, the N.W. Frontier, France, East Africa, the Middle East, Abyssinia, Burma, Malaya, New Britain, New Guinea and Bougainville. Since World War I it has celebrated 26th April each year as Ypres Day, for on that day in 1915 the Battalion first went into action against the Germans. The battle raged all day, and when it was relieved at nightfall it had lost 8 British Officers, 12 Indian Officers, and 300 I.O.R.s. It suffered a heavy loss, too, in the Malayan Campaign of 1942, when its Commanding Officer was killed at the battle of Slim River. In peace-time also it had its share of adventure, for the 40th formed the Legation Guard at Addis Ababa in the Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935-36.

Its active career came to an end in the Malayan Campaign of 1941-42 with the surrender of Singapore. Nevertheless some of its officers and men served with distinction with other Battalions of the Regiment in the Middle East, Abyssinia and Burma. Among those who returned from captivity and were drafted to the reconstituted 1st Bn. 14 Punjab Regiment was Subadar-Major Tor Khan, Sardar Bahadur, M.C., O.B.I., of the 40th. He was awarded the M.C. for gallantry in Malaya and the O.B.I. for his services as a prisoner of war.

There is a memorial at Attock to members of the 40th Pathans who gave their lives in the First World War. A plaque is to be added to commemorate men of 5th (Pathan) 14 Punjab Regiment who made the supreme sacrifice in the Second World War. The monument is a reminder that, though the old Forty Thieves have disappeared from the Order of Battle, they remain in spirit to wish Godspeed and "*Pah Makhe de kha*" to those who follow after.

A MEMORY OF DUNKIRK, 1940

By LIEUT.-COLONEL GEOFFREY NOAKES.*

SEVEN years ago this week-end I was sitting under the coastal gun emplacement at the shore end of Dunkirk mole, polishing my boots, and thanking God we had a Navy. The last 3,000 of the B.E.F. who had swept so confidently under Plan D up to the Dyle on May 10th were waiting to be taken across the Channel. All equipment had been lost, the French Empire brought to its knees, and over 300,000 men had already been snatched across the Channel from the very teeth of the German Army—all in three short weeks.

* * *

From the Petre force, Douai-Arras front, I had moved with 205 Fd. Battery R.A. due North to Steenvoorde, and so back to Dunkirk on the 29th. The men's spirit was wonderfully good. We were astonished to hear rumours that evacuation of the B.E.F. was in full spate from Dunkirk, and that many of the former occupants of the vehicles lying on their sides in the ditch had already crossed the Channel.

This sad news was confirmed by a liaison officer who met us at the bridge over the canal at Bergues. As we were shown our gun and O.P. areas, he told us that operation DYNAMO had been put into operation by Vice-Admiral Ramsey on Sunday evening, the 26th, and that already nearly 80,000 men had been evacuated by a vast armada of vessels of all shapes and sizes. This was stunning news and we set about the preparation of our gun positions with heavy hearts and some trepidation as to our chance with the rearguard. Dunkirk was in sight, and overhead the German bombers droned backwards and forwards, dropping their bombs and machine-gunning the beaches. They left our dispersed position alone. There were better targets in the harbour! The rain during the night further dulled our spirits, but the weather during the rest of the week was perfect.

We fired continually, and next day I was sent to Dunkirk to try and find some of our men who had missed the route back. It was no use going near Admiral Abrial's H.Q. in the bastion, so I went straight down to the end of the mole. An extraordinary spectacle spread itself before my eyes. The mole itself was packed with men who were clambering down planks or jumping over the side to the ships alongside. There was a destroyer, a cross-channel steamer, and what looked like a big lifeboat there. The mole was never intended for passenger traffic, and the narrow pile plankway had been broken in a number of places by bombs and gun-fire. Across these chasms stretched single planks but these were being safely negotiated by the steady stream of men without haste or panic.

The shore was like any beach in August, men sleeping, cooking meals, eating or just doing nothing. Out at sea stretched impromptu piers made of 3-ton lorries, and at intervals crocodiles of patiently waiting men stretched from the dunes into the sea until the leading men were in almost up to their chins. It

*The author of this article later served in India and Burma during the war. In our July, 1946 issue he contributed a valuable article entitled "Army Farmers in Bengal".

was a quiet period, but the blazing town and the dead, as well as the many wounded, told their tale of the constant raids. There had not then been much shell-fire, but overhead our huge naval shells whistled on their way, while at regular intervals the heavy French coastal gun battery with its guns turned inland shook the neighbourhood. I was told they had masses of ammunition and were determined to get as much off as possible. Certainly they fired steadily all the week.

In the bay itself were vessels varying from destroyers to fishing boats, mostly cruising around. The larger ships had to stand offshore and were fed by small motor and rowing boats which could get nearer the beach. There were at least three ships sunk; one just by the mole was on the bottom with her decks plainly visible about three feet below the surface. What with the bombs, machine-gunning, boats running into each other or sinking through overloading, there must have been fair losses during this loading; the wonder is there weren't more, especially as most of the men were worn out.

I reported to the Beach Master, Commander J. C. Clouston R.N., whom I found dressed in sea boots with a muffler round his neck, binoculars on his chest and smoking a large pipe. He looked the typical naval officer in action; quiet, courteous, but a man to be obeyed. He was sitting in a little hut talking to a man in a black suit with a bowler hat, who had brought a small motor boat over with the help of his son. Much of the orderly embarkation was due to Commander Clouston's efforts. He was drowned on the Sunday just before the end. Many have good cause to remember him.

I soon found my trip was a waste of time. There must have been 100,000 men in the town or on the beaches, so I returned to the Battery just in time to avoid an air raid. Before I left, I listened with a group of men to the B.B.C. news over an Army No. 11 set. Nearly half was about the exploits of the R.A.F., which caused growls from the men who hadn't seen an R.A.F. plane for days. They had evidently been busy elsewhere.

Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam, Commanding 3 Corps, had been given the job of organising the withdrawal and had allotted Bray Dunes, La Panne and Malo-las -Bains to each of the three Corps of the B.E.F. Food was very short; the B.E.F. had gone on half rations on the 23rd, but fresh water was brought over in 2-gallon petrol cans by the incoming ships.

Nearly 50,000 left on Thursday, and 60,000 on Friday. The mighty fleet, including all the little ships, was performing wonders, but the position on the perimeter had deteriorated. The defence of Calais by Brigadier Nicholson and the Rifle Brigade had held up two Panzer Divisions, but now the Germans were beginning to put in heavy attacks on our line, already weakened by thinning out. On the 31st La Panne was captured, leaving only the eight miles from the mole to Bray Dunes for evacuation. On the evening of the 31st of May, 3, 4, 5 Divisions and 2 Corps withdrew, and Major-General H. R. L. G. Alexander took over command from Lord Gort.

On 1st June the Germans put in heavy attacks on 46 Division, 1 Division, 126 Brigade of the 42 (East Lancs) Division and 50 Division, but these were beaten off. I saw a magnificent bayonet charge from 1 Loyals in Brigadier Usher's force, which put the Hun back on the other side of the canal with a bang. After so much withdrawal, it was a heartening sight to see Germans turn tail and run for their lives.

By the night of the Glorious First of June only about 3,000 men of the B.E.F. were left. There were some heart-rending scenes as the last passenger boats drew off to avoid the dawn bombing. Six days of rescue had passed, and few left behind there thought they had any chance. I talked to a man who had waited all night in the queue on the mole, and then had to turn back when he was within a yard of the end. Nevertheless 66,000 men got away on Saturday.

I spent Sunday in Dunkirk, cleaned my boots and shaved in a mug of salt water, so as to set a good example to the Guards, who were with us. A few small ships came in during the day, but there was very little activity or bombing. We received orders to embark along the mole beginning at 9-20 p.m. There were no aircraft about, and we were allotted to destroyers tied up against the mole. The tide must have been low as there was a fair jump down to the decks, but by midnight the last of us were embarked and the S.N.O., Captain Tennant, R.N. signalled "B.E.F. evacuated." Naval losses on Sunday were very low, only 2 trawlers, a hospital ship and a drifter. Those who got away at the end, as I did, undoubtedly had the easiest trip. Even after the B.E.F. had left, evacuation of 30,000 of the French Army went on, and it was not until 0340 hrs. on the 4th of June that H. M. S. SHIKARI left Dunkirk and the evacuation was over.

* * * * *

What a wonderful week it had been ! The thirty-eight British destroyers had lifted 90,000 men ; thirty-two British personnel ships 70,000, Fleet mine-sweepers and the paddle ships, 50,000 ; thirty Dutch Skoots, 20,000 ; and the 600 odd little ships the wonderful total of 90,000 ! The French Navy had accounted for 30,000. In all over 337,000 men got back to a wonderful welcome in England, and were moved away from the ports by the most efficient efforts of the Southern Railway.

To organise this unbelievable feat the Navy had cut all red-tape and had galvanised everyone into action. As a nation we have carried out sea evacuations before, such as Corunna of 20,000 men in 1808, and Gallipoli of 130,000 in 1915. But those were planned. Operation DYNAMO was a makeshift, organised originally in the hope that perhaps 30,000 might be got away ; but in the end it rescued the whole 337,000.

History books of the distant future may cut the account of the 1939/45 War to a page, but the miracle of Dunkirk will live for all time.

India's Auxiliary Nursing Service.

The Indian Auxiliary Nursing Service, which is gradually being wound up, was constituted as an emergency service during 1941. It aimed at producing a large number of partially trained nurses within the shortest possible time to help in the nursing of sick and wounded in Military Hospitals under the supervision of Nursing officers.

Nearly 3,000 women of India, Britain and Burma, and even from Canada and Hong Kong, joined the service and served in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Burma and Malaya, as well as on hospital ships.

To assist auxiliaries anxious to make nursing their career arrangements have been made to staff a few hospitals to function as affiliated training centres. In these centres many auxiliaries are receiving further training to enable them to sit for the preliminary examination of the Provincial Nursing Councils.

LESSONS OF AIR WARFARE, 1939—45

BY AIR MARSHAL SIR THOMAS W. ELMHIRST, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C.*

THE science of flying is still in its infancy, as also are the methods of conducting warfare in the air. Armies and navies have moved about the surface of the earth for thousands of years, and though their weapons have improved and their mobility has been stepped up, the science of their warfare has changed little. For example, a student of the military arts can still gain knowledge from reading the campaigns of Alexander, Caesar or Napoleon.

It was, however, only thirty odd years ago—in 1914—that the air weapon was first used. Its influence in the 1914—18 war was very small. It gave navies and armies some reconnaissance that they were otherwise unable to get. But the Air Forces of the Allies and Germans fought out a battle above the heads of the armies in the trenches, and the result of the War, the gaining of victory, was hardly influenced at all by these fights. Victory was won by a combination of the successful blockade of Germany by Naval forces and by the Allied Armies as a result of four years' hard fighting, in the main, in France and Flanders, resultant in the case of the American and British Armies of being landed on the continent by the Navy.

I propose to show the enormous differences in the methods of conducting warfare as a whole brought about by the advent of the flying machine, of the improved standard and with the vast numbers that were available and employed, in the 1939—45 war. I have said that I consider the air weapon had a negligible influence in the result of the 1914—18 war. I hope to show that the victory in the 1939—45 war was influenced to a very great extent, say over 50%, by the advent of the aeroplane. The effect of aircraft in any future war—and the advance of the science of aeronautics is still rapidly continuing—is something I shall leave to your thoughts.

*In a lecture delivered at the Staff College, Quetta, and before Staff officers of the three Services in New Delhi.

Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst, now Chief of Inter-Services Administration in India is unusually well-placed to discuss this vitally important subject. He was responsible for despatching the first R. A. F. Bomber Squadron to raid Germany on the first night of the 1939—45 war. From January to August, 1940, he was head of the Air Intelligence Section concerned with Germany at the Air Ministry, and at the same time was a member of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on the invasion of England.

During the Battle of Britain he was one of the three Air Commodores who were the executive officers on duty in Fighter Command's Operations Room. In 1941 he commanded the R. A. F. in Egypt, and throughout 1942 was with the Desert Air Force. In 1943 he went to Algeria to serve with the 18th Army Group and the 1st Tactical Air Force. In 1944 he was in London planning for the invasion of Europe and shaping the 2nd Tactical Air Force for its entry into Normandy, accompanying that Force through France, Belgium and Holland. For eighteen months after V. J. Day he was Director of Intelligence at the Air Ministry in London.

Let us begin by recalling some results of the German and Japanese air offensives in the first months of their campaigns in the 1939—45 War when they had the ascendancy, more or less complete, over the Air Forces of their enemies.

In Poland superiority in the air, after the first day, enabled the German dive-bomber to strike terror into any formed body of troops in that country. The German ground forces moved where and when they wanted. The Polish forces were soon in disorder, all their rear communications were blasted, control was gone, and movement by rail or road was only possible at night. The campaign was over in a month.

In the invasion of Norway complete local air superiority enabled air-borne forces to be put into key points in Southern Norway on the first day. Likewise this local air superiority prevented the Royal Navy from impeding the transport by sea of German forces crossing to Southern Norway from Germany and Denmark.

In Holland complete air superiority and lack of opposing A. A. artillery in the opening stage of the German advance into the low Countries enabled airborne forces to be put down at the outset into The Hague and across Belgian canals, where for 48 hours they caused the utmost confusion before they were joined by the following-up land forces, who consolidated the positions won.

The devastation by bombing of a section of Rotterdam ensured a quick armistice with the Dutch and the same threat held over Copenhagen, Brussels and Paris undoubtedly brought about quick armistices with those countries who by then had little, if any, aircraft or A. A. weapons to defend themselves with. Many will also remember the effect of almost unimpeded dive-bombers on the British troops during their retreat to Dunkirk.

One other example of German local air superiority. After the Battle of Britain, German air forces in some strength were despatched to Sicily and the Balkans. Once firmly established in Sicily, in Greece and Crete they closed the Mediterranean passage to Egypt except to submarines, causing the Cape route to be used by all shipping supplying the Middle East base. The amount of shipping then required was doubled and the length of passage trebled.

This local command by air forces of the Central Mediterranean area was held by the Germans for nearly two years. It was very gallantly disputed by the Royal Navy and Merchant Marine and the R. A. F. in Malta, in their efforts to supply that blockaded island. The occasional supply ship was got into Malta at very heavy cost. But the Malta siege was not raised until the 8th Army finally secured air bases in Cyrenaica, which allowed the R. A. F. to get back air superiority in the Eastern Mediterranean and escort convoys from Egypt to Malta. The through Mediterranean passage was only opened when air bases in Tunisia had been captured for the Allied Air Forces by the Allied troops advancing from Algeria.

Turning to the Japanese entry into the war. Within a few weeks they had air superiority in and around the Malaya Peninsula, with the result that a tiny force of 40 torpedo bombers could sink the *PRINCE OF WALES* and *REPULSE* with the consequent complete loss by us of control of sea communications in that area, and accordingly the loss of all we possessed in the S. W. Pacific.

A VITAL BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY.

Now let us turn over the page and consider the effect of the most vital single battle for air superiority that the war saw, and what were its results. In July 1940 on the continental shores of the North Sea from northern Norway to Brest were a ring of German air bases for the launching of the air attack on Britain. German superiority in the air had closed the Southern North Sea, the mouth of the Thames and the English Channel to our shipping—Naval or merchant. The German plan was to defeat the R. A. F. and thereafter to let their aircraft range where they liked *by day* over Great Britain, destroying any key points they so wished. Once the R. A. F. were defeated, for which the Germans allowed four days, the invasion was to be launched in the Channel under cover of their own air umbrella, which was to keep off the British Navy. And they had already had the experience on the coast of Norway that with local air superiority they could move their transports at will.

The Battle of Britain was won, with the consequence that England was not invaded and became a firm base for four years, in which armed forces could be built up at leisure for striking at the heart of Germany, for the return to the continent, and for the supply of our overseas forces. Air superiority fought for and won, allowed the Channel and Thames to be reopened to our shipping.

A few words about the Allied Tactical Air Forces in the field working with Allied Armies in Africa and Europe. The role of any Air Force working with an Army is first to ensure freedom of movement to its Army, and deny it to the opposing Army. Thereafter to put the whole of available striking power on to ground targets, the destruction of which will assist the advance of the military forces. The only way of ensuring the freedom of movement is by knocking out the opposing enemy air force either in the air or on the ground, and keeping it knocked out. The R. A. F. gave this freedom to the Desert Armies in the first Libyan campaign, but through lack of aircraft failed to give it in Greece and Crete with the consequent disaster to British land and naval forces.

The naval losses by German bombing alone in their gallant and magnificently successful efforts to evacuate British forces from Greece and Crete in the face of complete German air superiority are striking. The price paid was 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers sunk, 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer seriously damaged and 1 battleship, 4 cruisers and 6 destroyers in need of extensive repairs. Our Navy in the successful evacuation of approximately 50,000 troops had suffered the heaviest defeat it had had since the Dutch wars of the 17th century. The defeat was entirely due to local German air superiority, for the Italian fleet had been completely defeated a month before at Matapan by Admiral Cunningham. Our Armed Forces at that time in the Middle East were badly balanced. The R. A. F. had too little strength to give the necessary support to the land and sea forces.

In late 1941 and early 1942 in the Desert there was a very close fight for air superiority. It was won by the R. A. F. with the result that there was not an Army casualty by day due to air attack in the long retreat from Gazala to El Alamein. And at the first El Alamein battle R. A. F. bombers were enabled to exert a great stopping power. This superiority was never again lost in the Western Desert. It enabled the enormous build-up of the 8th Army to be made in peace behind the El Alamein lines, and it forbade any build-up by Rommel, whose supply lines were continuously cut by air

forces and submarines (based in Malta and Egypt), all the way back to Italy, until eventually his supplies ran dry and he had to make the best of a long retreat, leaving thousands of vehicles and many aircraft behind because their petrol tanks were empty.

In Tunisia in the early days the Germans had local air superiority and the Allied Armies were getting nowhere. Armies were far ahead of their air bases and suffered badly from German air attack. Eventually our air bases were pushed forward, air superiority won, and the Allied Air Force control extended all over Tunisia, with bombers and their escorting fighters ranging at will. All exits and entries to Tunis and Bizerta were blocked by air forces and submarines, the German communications were destroyed, and when the final push came from the 1st and 8th and U. S. Armies the Germans collapsed and 300,000 prisoners fell into our hands for a very small casualty list on the Allied side.

I can still see the rear areas behind the British and American lines the week before the final attack on Tunis. Perfect weather and the roads packed bumper to bumper with supply vehicles. In addition, a whole Corps moving round by day in lorries from the 8th Army front to the 1st Army front. There was no camouflage or spacing of vehicles in convoy required. It was the same on the long retreat to El Alamein. But on the other side of the line in Tunisia not one vehicle moved by day without bringing on itself an attack from the air.

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC.

I will now turn to another aspect of war—freedom of movement on the ocean. The British Empire was again in 1942-43, as in 1917, nearly defeated by having its Atlantic and other communications cut by German submarines. This campaign was countered and eventually defeated by the combined efforts of Naval convoy escort vessels and Air Forces. The final defeat came when long-range British and American Air Forces based in Iceland, Greenland, the British Isles, Newfoundland, Bermuda and the Azores could cover every spot in the North Atlantic. Aircraft radar appliances could find the enemy on or under the water. The enemy submarine got no peace night or day, suffered heavy casualties both from surface craft and aircraft, and gave up the unequal contest. German Admirals have said since the war that the main cause of the defeat of their submarine campaign was the long range bomber reconnaissance aircraft with its radar devices.

Regarding the final stages of the war—the assault on Europe—let me say a few words on the part the Strategic Air Forces played. I will not again mention the Tactical Air Forces, when they were based in Europe, except to say that they did as they had done in the latter stages of the African campaign. They gave complete freedom of movement to their own ground forces and completely denied it to the enemy land forces by road or rail, except at night (luckily for us the nights in northern Europe are very short in summer), and in bad weather such as the first four days of the Ardennes offensive.

The Strategic Air Forces of the R. A. F. Bomber Command and American 8th and 15th Air Forces, based in England and Italy for the last two years of the War, were no mean force. They ran into millions of men. What was their effect on the war? They had first to fight for superiority over Germany and its satellite countries, before they could range at will over the country and pick out their targets and utterly destroy them.

The R. A. F. Bomber Command had been fighting it out by night for four years over Germany. For four years they had been the only force to hit Germans in Germany. They were, further, the only force that, by sea-mining, could and did impede the vital German iron import trade in the Baltic. By their bombing they had caused the German Air Force to switch over aircraft production from bombers to night fighters. The German Air Force was thus forced on to the defensive, and German bombers ceased to worry the main Allied bases in England and the Middle East. The air battles took place over Germany instead.

R.A.F. bombers had gradually advanced bombing technique until they could hit an unseen target, and they had also caused a million Germans to be employed on active and passive air defence within the Reich. In 1943 the big American day bombers came along and, in 1944, that weapon which changed the aspect of the war—the long-range escort fighter. This American day-bombing force with its escort fighters had to fight for air superiority *by day* over Germany. They won it. It was not such a hard fight as the Air Battle over Britain or the *night* bomber battle over Germany. The best German pilots were dead and the new ones were not so well-trained.

Once the air superiority was won, both U. S. day bombers and R. A. F. night bombers based in England and Italy set about destroying the German petrol supplies. The campaign started in earnest in February 1944 and was completed in September 1944. In six months the factories producing fuel to the amount of 700,000 tons a month in February were all destroyed, and the passage up the Danube of little remaining oil from Rumania was blocked by airborne mines. The Germans, except for a few little reserves, were out of fuel and their Armed forces, both ground and air, nearly immobilised. The German rail communications were then set upon, and they likewise were impeded and broken in France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy and the Balkans, so that little movement was possible and what was possible was mainly by night.

As the Allied ground forces advanced through France and Italy so air bases were made closer to German soil, and so more fighter escorts could be provided for deep bomber penetration into German territory until finally there was no place under German occupation that bombers could not find, attack and damage.

BOMBER FORCES THE MOST FLEXIBLE WEAPON.

Bomber forces are the most flexible weapon of war yet produced. From the same base on one day they can destroy invasion barges, the next day sink a TIRPITZ, the next cause the submission of a fortress, such as Pantellaria or Rouen. Again, they can put down 7,000 tons of bombs as a carpet in an hour before advancing troops, such as they did at Caen. The following week they can reduce Hamburg docks to ruins or destroy the enormous LEUNA petrol refinery or a dozen "V. I." sites.

To turn to the invasion. What was the problem involved? Put simply it was this: Could we in a certain period of time put more forces on a stretch of beach than the Germans could bring up to push them back into the sea? The Allied Air Forces were, therefore, given two functions, one in conjunction with Allied Navies to ensure freedom of our own troops' movements to the beaches and, secondly, to deny the enemy's free movement by land to the beaches. To

ensure this latter function, within one month Allied Air Forces destroyed every road and rail bridge over the Seine and Loire between Paris and the sea. They likewise destroyed all rail centres in western Europe that might be employed by the Germans. A German division came from Paris to Normandy on bicycles, such was the disruption of communications.

General Runstedt made the following remarks when interrogated by British Military Officers on the conclusion of the war: "The main difficulties which arose for us at the time of the invasion were the systematic preparations by your Air Force, the smashing of the main lines of communication, particularly the railway junctions. We had prepared for various eventualities that all came to nothing, or were rendered impossible by the destruction of railway communications, railway stations, etc.

"The second thing was the attack on roads, on marching columns, etc. so that it was impossible to move anyone at all by day, whether a column or an individual, or transport fuel or ammunition. That also meant that the bringing up of the armoured divisions was also out of the question; it was quite impossible. And the third thing was this carpet bombing.....Those were the main causes of the general collapse."

General Omar Bradley has said that he took nearly a million prisoners on his advance from Paris to the Siegfried Line at little cost to his Army, because the Germans had neither rail nor petrol for road transport with which to get away.

Let us turn a moment to the final defeat of Japan. Nowhere was Tedder's 1941 dictum "This War is a war for airfields" so clearly proved true. The whole United States strategy had the object of constructing, step by step, island landing grounds across the Pacific, until the main islands of Japan were in range of shore-based bomber aircraft and their escorting fighters. Their naval and ground forces were used to capture these Pacific Island landing ground bases using carrier-borne aircraft to get freedom of movement. Once, however, the Okinawa and Iwojima final landing grounds south of Japan had been captured and brought into use the end was near.

A complete blockade of the Japanese mainland was established, by submarine and by air forces and the Japanese Air Force was knocked out of the air or destroyed on the ground. The U. S. Air Forces ranged at will over the country, sinking ships in harbour, destroying fuel supplies, factories and communications, with the result that Japan was left with the personnel of their Armed Forces but little material, food, and no communications with which to continue the war. The atom bomb when it came merely showed the further absurdity of any effort by Japan to continue the war.

AIRBORNE FORCES.

Before attempting to sum up these aspects of the recent air warfare, I should like to say a few words on airborne forces, their use and abuse in the late war, and their use in the future. It is a controversial subject, and naturally is of much interest to soldiers and also, of course, to airmen, so I shall go into it in a little more detail than the subject of this paper really warrants.

My experience of the work of Airborne Forces in the last war is general and not detailed. But in 1940 in my Intelligence capacity I had to interview escaped Poles, Norwegians and Dutchmen who had watched and attempted to deal with German airborne troops. In Cairo in 1941, I was able personally to

discuss with the senior R.A.F. Officer, Crete, his report on the capture of Crete by airborne forces. I have likewise read the detailed German report of these operations. I was at G.H.Q. in Tunis when airborne forces were despatched to Sicily, and at G.H.Q. in the field when they were used in Normandy and at Arnheim, and for the final crossing of the Rhine.

With regard to their employment, there is one first principle and prerequisite. That is that air superiority must have been fought for and obtained, to nearly 100%, before airborne forces can be launched. Military Commanders of probably the most highly-trained fighting soldiers are not wishful that this first-class material be destroyed in slow unarmoured aircraft before the soldiers put foot on the ground to fulfil their sole purpose—that of fighting troops on the ground.

A second principle regarding their employment is that their supply of ammunition and food shall be sufficient to enable them to fight until supplies by normal means can reach them. They can take little with them on a surprise drop, and once they are on the ground in enemy territory they must expect to be surrounded by armoured forces and artillery. Any further supply by air then becomes a suicidal policy.

Even if there is complete air superiority, unarmed and unarmoured aircraft flying in low—even by night—to drop supplies on a surrounded force are “cold meat” to an enemy supplied with mobile A. A. artillery. Goering stated that the attempt to re-supply and evacuate by air the surrounded forces at Stalingrad and Tunis was the death knell of the German Bomber force, whose aircrews were used and destroyed for that purpose. All last war-experience showed that parachutists’ lives were thrown away if their supply by normal land or sea forces was not functioning within two or three days.

If there is *no* opposition, either from air forces or A. A. guns, to the dropping of airborne troops, then it is hardly a “war operation” but a normal “movement by air”.

Another point that should be realised is that for a night drop in war to be a success, the most war-experienced and best-trained bomber crews must be used to man the transport aircraft. There is no more difficult and hazardous job than the piloting of relatively slow heavily-loaded aircraft, possibly towing a glider, across water, make a landing on a hostile and unrecognizable coast at night, and then navigating to an exact spot close to the ground under heavy A. A. fire.

Another aspect that must not be forgotten is the overall strategic plan of a war. Can a country afford to lock up, say a thousand heavy aircraft and their trained crews for a *possible* parachute operation, when that material might otherwise be used for furthering the main bomber campaign in hitting the enemy’s vitals a thousand miles within his frontiers? Likewise, can the Army afford to lock up for a *possible* operation a quantity of its most highly-trained troops?

If I may give my personal opinion on the subject of airborne forces, I would say that no modern Army should be without this weapon in its armoury, but that the number of troops so trained should be limited, having in view the possible occasions for their use, and the relative value of the aircraft and crews earmarked for training and carrying such troops.

It should be remembered that in peace-time, and in the early stages of a future war, material available to Armed Forces is limited, and a large

front-line strength of troop-carrying aircraft of necessity means a smaller bomber striking force. I would say, of course, that all troops should be trained in moving by air. The need for increased mobility of all forces is surely one of the lessons of the last war.

Do not let us forget that the very fruitful air supply organisation developed in the Burma campaign could not have so functioned if the air battle had not been previously won, and if the Japanese had not been woefully deficient in A. A. artillery. Can we hope for such a state of affairs in the early days of a future war?

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS.

If any country goes to war its object is to impose its will on the enemy in the speediest possible time and at the most economical cost. The object of a war must thus effect its conduct.

Before the advent of the air weapon the British method of waging a war was by the combined use of sea power and land armies. Sea power allowed us to transport our Armies overseas where and when we liked. Our Armies, after defeating the Armies of our enemies in the field, marched to the capital of the enemy country and there imposed our will on the enemy. In this last War, for the first time the aeroplane made its appearance in strength and, I suggest, showed that the age-old normal methods of conducting warfare were completely outdated.

Here is a new infant force which travels in a previously unused element, the air, and we must give thought to new methods of conducting war that are most economical both in time and material. One shudders to think of what would be left of industry and communications in India or England if in a future war we lost air superiority.

I suggest that if we had not had a competent Fighter Force in 1940, Britain would have been occupied that summer and we should have lost the war that year. If their base is in ruins, and no supplies forthcoming, Armed Forces cannot continue to function. The air weapon saved us from defeat in 1940. It did not give us victory, but it gave us time to build up Armed Forces of the three arms that, with the help of our Allies, were to give us victory later.

We needed and shall always need sea power to ensure that our firm base in Britain is supplied and fed, and that our land forces and their supplies, and supplies for Air Forces, can be shipped round the world to bases where they can best be used to impose our will on our enemy. The capturing and occupying of such bases is a matter for soldiers borne thence in ships; likewise the occupying of the enemy country for the final imposition of our will is a task for soldiers. The ensuring that forces on land or sea can move at will is one of the tasks for Air Forces.

But for the imposing of a will on an enemy at the beginning and throughout a war there is now a new weapon in a bomber striking force that, once air superiority has been gained, can go across sea and frontiers and, if it is in sufficient strength and has the range, can get at the heart of an enemy country, while ground and sea forces are still only touching the extremities of the limbs of that country.

The attacks of the strategic Air Forces on Germany in 1944 and 1945 sucked the German egg dry, and the empty egg-shell left at the end of 1944

only needed a concerted pressure from all sides for it to crack. And there were very few casualties (as compared with the Somme battles of 1916) to the Allied ground forces when exerting the final squeeze. The casualties of the British Army between Normandy and the Baltic were approximately the same as those of Bomber Command throughout the war. They were not light, but they were nothing compared to the million dead left in France in 1914-18.

On March 15th 1945, Speer (Hitler's Armament Chief) reported to Hitler that (due to the destruction of fuel and transportation by bombing): "The final collapse of German economy can therefore be counted upon certainly within four to eight weeks.....After this collapse even military continuation of the war will become impossible". Our ground forces were not then across the Rhine. In Japan the same situation arose a few months later, and there no invasion was even necessary to enforce our will.

But this air striking power could not have been brought to bear on either Germany or Japan unless bases had been secured at a convenient distance from the enemy's heart from which to exert the pressure. These bases, whether in France, Italy or the Pacific, were captured, secured and supplied (and in this latter case the English base as well) by seapower and soldiers, once freedom of movement by land and sea forces had been assured by air battles.

As I have said, the air weapon is still in its infancy. The type of missile it can carry has lately become 100% more destructive, and who can say what will be the pattern of future wars? But with our present experience of wars and looking ahead as far as we can see, all three arms of the Fighting Services are a requisite for victory in war. It is the decision on the relative strength of each of the three arms where the greatest wisdom is required.

Germany lost the war because the balance of their three Armed Forces was wrong. They stinted their Air Force as compared with their Army in 1942 and 1943, and, as a result, lost the air battle over Germany and so uncovered the heart of the country, which Air Forces destroyed, thus rendering their magnificent fighting troops deficient of resources and mobility to stop the final invasion of their country and the imposing of the Allied will upon it.

In peace-time, in democratic countries, the amount of a country's revenue that can be devoted to its Armed Forces is small. It is then up to all of us who have a say in the matter, to ensure that the Armed Forces we have in peace-time are *properly balanced*, equipped with the latest devices science has produced, and highly-trained. Only by so doing can we counter the first shock of an aggressor and immediately hit back at his heart. We are unlikely to be given four years, as we were given in the last two wars, wherein to build up our resources.

"YOU CAN'T KEEP A GOOD MAN DOWN!"

By G. B. S.

THE terms for British Officers whose careers in the Indian Army have been prematurely terminated, have been announced, and as a result a number of officers are considering what they are going to do when they leave the Army.

Listening to casual conversations, it seems that many officers take a pessimistic view of their chance in civil life, an attitude which to date has been fortified by such official advice as is available. The latter, well-intentioned though it is, tends mainly to catalogue jobs which retired soldiers will probably not get. It is because he believes any suggestion that a fit, young, or comparatively young man cannot make a living in civil life is complete nonsense, that the author is prompted to write this article. Let us examine this contention.

The first factor is—as in all other problems of this sort—the all-important one of morale. Let us be quite sure about this. Pessimism is often akin to low morale and that, rightly so, will never get anybody anywhere. "Over-optimism", the critic will immediately retort, "is just as bad as pessimism". Agreed; it is usually the outcome of stupidity, which also doesn't get one far. What then is the quality we are looking for? Surely it is determination. Every soldier knows what can be achieved with a little determination. It is a quality that has never let him down yet. Is there any reason to suppose, therefore, that it will fail him in his effort to make good in civil life?

If this is agreed, the next thing is to calculate one's liabilities and assets, as a retiring officer. Let us take the debit side first.

There are certain disadvantages which, to a greater or lesser extent, are shared by all retiring officers. The main one is that all his life a soldier has been learning the trade of soldiering. Now he has got to learn a completely new trade. Most trades nowadays are fairly specialised and the soldier, when he starts off in civil life, lacks the technical experience which the civilian has been building up all the time the soldier has been in the Army. This is undoubtedly a big disadvantage. Nevertheless, an officer retiring on the terms has, too, considerable advantages.

Certain of these assets are also shared by all officers. They are:—(a) Some capital; (b) a pension; (c) the majority of officers will be between the ages of 30 and 45 *i.e.*, they can reasonably expect to have from 35 to 20 years of active life before them. A lot can be done in that time; and (d) knowledge of men and the world. In any profession, a knowledge of men is a most important qualification, and the normal soldier should fairly be able to count himself "above average" in this respect.

Individual officers may have certain additional assets. For example, some officers have valuable language qualifications, which can be turned to good account. Others may have additional private capital or knowledge of engineering, animals, stamps, insects and so on. Practically everyone has some bent of his own.

At this stage our critic will be smiling superciliously and saying, how can "stamps" or "a knowledge of insects" get anyone anywhere. Nevertheless, the writer already knows of one ex-Indian Army officer who now owns a Stamp shop in Piccadilly, and another who, as a result of his knowledge of insects, is earning quite a good salary with an organisation which studies crop pests. The fact is that there are few qualifications which can't be turned to some advantage if one sets about it in the right way.

HOW TO SET ABOUT GETTING A JOB

Having got our mental attitude right and weighed our assets and liabilities, let us next consider how one should set about getting an actual job. The following are the main factors:—

(a) It is a great advantage if one knows what one wants to do. This is important. If one wants anything sufficiently and is determined, one can usually get it. In addition a man is more likely to succeed if he is doing the job he really wants to do, than if he isn't. A lot of officers feel an urge to do some particular thing. If they do, they will have a starting point. Others, on the other hand, may not have any particular urge and it may take them some time to decide what to go for first. There's no need to worry on that account.

(b) It is essential to remember that there are 95 opportunities in London or the other big towns, for every 5 in the country.

(c) It takes time to get a job. This factor is often overlooked. Time is required firstly for studying the form and thereafter for obtaining the necessary qualifications.

(d) The "Old Boy Net" still operates and always will. It is important to use every contact you have, and it is surprising how one thing leads to another. To disarm our lurking critic, it should be added that it is not essential to know members of the peerage or big business directors, although these should not be ignored if available. The writer was fortunate in knowing some of both these types, and also a judge. Nevertheless, he considers his most valuable introduction may well turn out to be the one he got from his tailor.

There is nothing ignominious in asking your friends to help you get a job. The average person at home will help you if he can, provided you don't expect too much, are duly grateful and show that, given half an opening, you will do the rest.

In this connection we must not be put off by the experiences of Army Officers who retired between the two World Wars. Many had very sad stories. Nevertheless, we can justly ask why they left the Army. If they were old, they presumably had reasonable pensions. If they were axed, the chances are they were no great shakes as soldiers. If they left voluntarily without any capital and then failed to make good, surely they must to some extent blame themselves? The fact is that a number of these officers weren't much good and they weren't prepared to get down to hard work.

It is perhaps true that idleness is tolerated more in Government Services than anywhere else. But it is not a quality on which anyone has any right to cash in. But let us forget these types. The situation is different now. The majority of officers leaving the Indian Army now are young, active men who, under normal conditions, would have had good careers before them in the Army.

(e) Compensation and pension. There are many ways of regarding these. One is to regard them as a miserable pittance on which to spend the rest of one's life. That is the worst way. Another is to regard the two in combination as a form of last ditch security. That is nearly as bad—and up go our critic's eyebrows. Certainly a little of that blessed commodity, security, is a good thing. But no more than a little. Is there anything more pitiable or contemptible than the spectacle of a young Englishman, whose only aim in life is security? If so, Heaven help the British race!

Another way is to calculate what the pension you have earned represents as interest on capital, add this capital to your compensation, and then ask yourself whether many civilians of your age have managed to acquire as much in the same time. That's quite a sensible thing to do.

Finally, one can say to oneself, "I will keep my little pension to give me a little security, and I will use my compensation to keep me and pay for my tuitional fees while I qualify myself for my new profession." That is very sensible indeed. The compensation and pension—however small they may seem—are, if used rightly, our most valuable asset. Many an enterprising young man at home would give his soul for just that much. Herein we have a bulge.

(f) Employment Agencies. Don't expect much from these. Although it is always worth a try and some officers may be lucky, the majority of officers who pin their hopes on any form of officers' employment bureau have "had it". This is said with all respect to the latter, but it is obvious that the scope of these agencies must be strictly limited and the average officer must stand or fall by his own efforts. What, after all, could be fairer?

PLAN.

With these thoughts in mind, we can begin making a plan. As most opportunities are in, or lead from, London, let us start there. (The writer has no knowledge of any other large town, but it is probable that the same principles will apply in most others).

London.—We have said that it takes time to get a job, so the first thing to realise is that, if one is going to find one in London, one has got to go and live there for at least three months, and preferably six. It will take every bit of that time, six days a week, to make and follow up all your contacts. Coming up from the country every now and then for a few days at a time will be useless. Up once again will go the critic's eyebrows as he murmurs "Cost of living in London" and "How is accommodation to be found?" The answer is determination and to spend, if necessary, a bit of that compensation. It is going to pay a handsome dividend; also if you are going to work in London you will want accommodation there in any case. So the sooner you get it the better.

Having got accommodation in London, the next requirement is to start studying the form. It is suggested that this should be done in two phases:—

General Form.—Before going for anything in particular, it will be a good thing to have a general look round. This will teach you a lot and will help the man who has no special urge to decide what he wants to do. A month or two can profitably be spent on this phase. It is a great mistake to hurry to the particular too quickly. The first job that offers itself will not, in all probability, be the best one, and many men have failed to get better ones because they have lacked either the patience or the confidence to do a proper reconnaissance.

During this phase it will be a good thing to try and assess what your initial earning capacity is likely to be. If, for instance, you are in the £500 per year scale, it is obviously a waste of time to float about in the £1,500 per year group. Conversely if you are in a higher group, it will be an even greater mistake to wander about amongst lower paid possibilities. Don't be too optimistic, but don't, until you have had practical proof to the contrary, under-rate your worth. In civil life, people are more inclined to accept you at your own valuation than one sometimes imagines. But no one in civil life gratuitously pops your value up for you. Throughout make as many contacts and get as much advice as you possibly can. You will be amazed how many ideas and possibilities will present themselves.

Form in Particular.—Having studied the general form as suggested above, some definite ideas or possibilities should be developing. Now is the time for action. These ideas or possibilities must be pursued relentlessly. By this method some one may offer you a job. If so, and you are satisfied with it, then go to it and good luck to you. Alternatively, you may have decided what to go for but before getting a job, you must acquire certain qualifications. In this event, waste no further time, get cracking on getting those qualifications. Most likely a year or two will be required—University, School, College, Course, what you will—but it must be done and bang will have to go a bit of that compensation. "Terrible", says the critic. "Nonsense" say we, bearing in mind that most decent jobs require these qualifications. The time you spend gaining them will be very useful in giving you further opportunities to study the form, but the aim should be to get yourself fixed up with some definite person or firm as soon as possible.

Country.—Unfortunately, though in the writer's opinion, naturally, a large proportion of officers want to live and work in the country. Mostly we all dream of having a farm. What could be nicer? Nothing, but it is no good us having day dreams about farming. It is a technical profession, it requires capital, there's not much money in it and one is at the mercy of the elements. An officer would probably be foolish to attempt it with less than at least £10,000 capital in addition to his pension and, even then, he must get himself fully qualified first—a matter of two years at the minimum.

However, there are other professions in the country. They are not nearly so numerous as in large towns and one must also remember that, unlike in the latter where one thing leads to another, there are probably only one or two jobs in each district and if those fail one has to start all over again in some other area. But if an officer is determined to try and make a living in the country, the same principles apply. Study the form in general first, then in particular, and don't shy off the necessity for obtaining the requisite technical qualifications..

Colonies and Dominions.—This article deals with life at Home. It is not proposed to discuss life in the Colonies or Dominions, except to suggest that it would be a mistake to think that the problem of getting a job in them is materially any different to what it is at Home. It is a question of taste rather than one of comparative ease or difficulty.

CONCLUSION.

Finally we must return once more to that stupid Critic:—

- (a) Of course, a man with a lot of capital has an advantage over one who hasn't.

- (b) Of course, a younger man has better chances than an older man; though an older man will have a better pension.
- (c) Of course, some people know more influential people than others.
- (d) Of course, if one pursues the plan recommended above, one may be dishied by ill-health. But in what profession doesn't this apply?
- (e) Of course, some officers have wives and children. If they hadn't what is all the fuss about?
- (f) Of course, some chaps have more personality than others. All power to them.
- (g) Etc.—etc.—in the popular refrains.

The point is that all the above are quite minor considerations, and they do not effect the main conclusion that any of us, who had reasonable careers before us in the Indian Army, if we set about it in the right way and don't take too great counsel of our fears, can and will get good jobs at Home.

Let us, therefore, go home with the thought in our minds (though we won't broadcast this to our prospective employers) that the problem is not "Will I get a job"? but "Which job shall I do?"

KIPLING AND THE U.S.I. JOURNAL

A CLAIM of the *U.S.I. Journal* to immortal memory lies in its mention by Rudyard Kipling in "The Man who would be King", considered by many to be his finest story. Barrie called it "the most audacious thing in fiction", and Gosse classed it amongst the best of his early work. Their judgment has been shared by tens of thousands of readers since.

When Peachey Taliaferro Carnehan and Daniel Dravot go to the *Backwoodsman* office in the middle of a hot-weather night and seek knowledge of Kafiristan from the sub-editor in charge—who is identifiable with Kipling himself—he shows them Survey maps, Wood on the *Sources of the Oxus*, and the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Then he tells them: "But all the information about the country is as sketchy and inaccurate as it can be. No one knows anything about it really. Here's the file of the *United Services' Institution*. Read what Bellew says."

Surgeon-Major H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., who thus shares the *Journal's* fame, is well-known to all who visit the Institution, for his marble bust, perched upon equally solid replicas of three of his books, stands half-way up the staircase. He was in the Indian Medical Service from 1855 to 1886, having previously served in the British Army Medical Department in the Crimea; wrote sixteen books, two on cholera and the rest on Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier and Central Asia, on which he was the foremost expert of his time. He died at Farnham Royal, Buckinghamshire, in 1892.

The "file of the *United Services' Institute*" reveals that Surgeon-Major Bellew delivered a lecture on "Kafiristan and the Kafirs" to the Institution in the autumn of 1879, the future Earl Roberts being in the chair, and it was printed in the issue of the *Journal* (vol. 8, no. 41) which appeared at the end of the year. We can picture the youthful Kipling consulting this number in the office of the *Civil and Military Gazette* at Lahore when he was planning "The Man who would be King".

The U.S.I. can take pride in yet another link with Kipling, for its late Patron, Field-Marshal Wavell, is also President of the Kipling Society.

H. B.

TABLES OF COMPENSATION

The following tables giving the scales of Compensation to be granted to Civil and Military officers whose appointments are terminated on account of the transfer of power in India are reprinted from the White Paper "India : Compensation for the Services", (H. M. S. O., Cmd 7116, 3d.).

TABLE I

SCALES OF COMPENSATION FOR CIVIL OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE.

For Officers of the Indian Civil Service		For Military and Police Officers in the Indian Political Service		For Officers of other Secretary of State's Service*	
Completed years of Service	Amount	Age last Birthday	Amount	Age last Birthday	Amount
	£		£		£
				24	375
				25	750
				26	1,125
				27	1,500
5	2,500	28	2,500	28	1,875
6	3,000	29	3,000	29	2,250
7	3,500	30	3,500	30	2,625
8	4,000	31	4,000	31	3,000
9	4,500	32	4,500	32	3,375
10	5,000	33	5,000	33	3,750
11	5,500	34	5,500	34	4,125
12	6,000	35	6,000	35	4,500
13	6,500	36	6,500	36	4,875
14	7,000	37	7,000	37	5,250
15	7,500	38	7,500	38	5,625
16	8,000	39	8,000	39	6,000
17	7,500	40	7,500	40	5,625
18	7,000	41	6,500	41	4,875
19	6,500	42	6,000	42	4,500
20	6,000	43	5,500	43	4,125
21	5,500	44	5,000	44	3,750
22	5,000	45	4,500	45	3,375
23	4,500	46	4,000	46	3,000
24	4,000	47	3,000	47	2,250
25	3,500	48	2,500	48	1,875
26	3,000	49	2,000	49	1,500
27	2,500	50	1,500	50	1,125
28	2,000	51	1,000	51	750
29	1,500	52	500	52	375
30	1,000	53 & over	Nil	53 & over	Nil
31	500				
32 & over	Nil				

* These Services include the Indian Police, the Indian Agricultural, Educational, Forest and Veterinary Services, the Indian Service of Engineers, the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment and the Railway Services (only as regards officers appointed by the Secretary of State),

TABLE II.

SCALES OF COMPENSATION FOR REGULAR OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY, THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE EXCLUDING OFFICERS OF THE SPECIAL LIST OF QUARTERMASTERS AND DEPARTMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE INDIA UNATTACHED LIST.

Age last Birthday Years	Amount	Age last Birthday Years	Amount
	£		£
19	37½	38	5,625
20	75	39	6,000
21	150	40	5,625
22	225	41	5,250
23	300	42	4,875
24	375	43	4,500
25	750	44	4,125
26	1,125	45	3,750
27	1,500	46	3,375
28	1,875	47	3,000
29	2,250	48	2,625
30	2,625	49	2,250
31	3,000	50	1,875
32	3,375	51	1,500
33	3,750	52	1,125
34	4,125	53	750
35	4,500	54	375
36	4,875	55	..
37	5,250		

Note.—Officers who transfer to the British Services will receive one-quarter of the rates laid down.

TABLE III.

SCALES OF COMPENSATION FOR REGULAR OFFICERS OF THE SPECIAL LIST OF QUARTERMASTERS (INDIAN ARMY) AND DEPARTMENTAL OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS OF THE PERMANENT LIST OF THE INDIA UNATTACHED LIST.

Age last Birthday Years	S.L.Q.Ms.	Officers I.U.L.	W.Os. I.U.L.
	£	£	£
24	250	187½	125
25	500	375	250
26	750	562½	375
27	1,000	750	500
28	1,250	937½	625
29	1,500	1,125	750
30	1,750	1,312½	875
31	2,000	1,500	1,000
32	2,250	1,687½	1,125
33	2,500	1,875	1,250
34	2,750	2,062½	1,375
35	3,000	2,250	1,500
36	3,250	2,437½	1,625
37	3,500	2,625	1,750
38	3,750	2,812½	1,875
39	4,000	3,000	2,000
40	3,750	2,812½	1,875
41	3,500	2,625	1,750
42	3,250	2,437½	1,625
43	3,000	2,250	1,500
44	2,750	2,062½	1,375
45	2,500	1,875	1,250
46	2,250	1,687½	1,125
47	2,000	1,500	1,000
48	1,750	1,312½	875
49	1,500	1,125	750
50	1,250	937½	625
51	1,000	750	500
52	750	562½	375
53	500	375	250
54	250	187½	125
55

Note.—Officers and Warrant Officers who transfer to the British Service will receive one-quarter of the rates laid down.

TABLE IV.

SCALES OF COMPENSATION FOR COMMISSIONED WARRANT OFFICERS AND
WARRANT OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY.

Age last Birthday Years	Commissioned W. Os.	W. Os.
	£	£
24	187½	125
25 ..	375	250
26 ..	562½	375
27 ..	750	500
28 ..	937½	625
29 ..	1,125	750
30 ..	1,312½	875
31 ..	1,500	1,000
32 ..	1,687½	1,125
33 ..	1,875	1,250
34 ..	2,062½	1,375
35 ..	2,250	1,500
36 ..	2,437½	1,625
37 ..	2,625	1,750
38 ..	2,812½	1,875
39 ..	3,000	2,000
40 ..	2,812½	1,875
41 ..	2,625	1,750
42 ..	2,437½	1,625
43 ..	2,250	1,500
44 ..	2,062½	1,375
45 ..	1,875	1,250
46 ..	1,687½	1,125
47 ..	1,500	1,000
48 ..	1,312½	875
49 ..	1,125	750
50 ..	937½	625
51 ..	750	500
52 ..	562½	375
53 ..	375	250
54 ..	187½	125
55

Note.—Commissioned Warrant Officers and Warrant Officers, Royal Indian Navy, who transfer to the Royal Navy will receive one-quarter of the rates laid down.

NAVAL OFFICER TRAINING IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA

By MIDSHIPMAN J. J. STREATFEILD-JAMES, R. N.

BEFORE comparing the training of officers in the United States and Royal Navies, it is essential that the education received by these officers before entering their respective training establishment be carefully examined.

In England a boy goes to a preparatory school at an early age, leaving for a public school when he is between the years of 13 and 14. From there, if he wishes, he may go either to a University or, by Special Entry into the Royal Navy. It is this Special Entry which comes closest to the American method of entry. I have purposely omitted Dartmouth, which provides a method of entry regarded with honour by American parents.

On the average, the American boy knows a great deal less than his English counterpart when taken age for age. He is treated as a king in the home and is, in many cases, badly spoiled. He does not go to school as early as he would in England, and once at school, the system of training is run on day school lines. High School in America, the equivalent to the English public school, takes boys from approximately 13 to 18 years, and after their time there they pass on to College or, as we would call it, the University. It is from High School that the competitors for the Navy Examination are largely drawn. A few enter the U. S. Navy from College, and some from the ranks of the enlisted men, but they are in the minority. In the main, then, the entry into the Royal Navy which most resembles that into the United States Navy, is Special, or Public School, Entry.

Naturally, the difference in age between an American Midshipman and his English equivalent, the Naval Cadet, is rather large. Taking the Dartmouth Entry, the average age of a term of new boys is 13½ years. After 11 terms at the College, the average age for a passing-out term is 17¼ years. At Annapolis, the United States Naval Academy, the average age of a new group is 19 years, and that of the graduating class is 23 years. Taking equivalent ranks, the American officer is older than the British. This is true despite the fact that some cadets enter the Royal Navy at 17 years.

The methods of entry correspond in that they both include a written and an oral examination. These examinations are definitely competitive. The subjects on which a prospective naval officer is examined are much the same in both Navies. They include mathematics, scientific subjects, naval history and English. Providing his educational standard is efficiently high, that he has passed an interview board and he is physically sound, he is entered as a midshipman and instructed to join the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis.

THE BRITISH SYSTEM.

An English Cadet joins Dartmouth in the same way, and allowing for the difference in age of the two entries, receives a training which is either wholly technical, as is the case for Special Entry Cadets, or a combination of scholastic and technical subjects, as given to the Dartmouth Entry. In the main these two systems are the same. Their real difference is that the 17 year old's have to learn as much about navigation, engineering and seamanship in three months, as the younger boys learn in three-and-a-half years.

A new group consisting of approximately 45 Dartmouth and 70 Special Entry Cadets, joins every four months. The Dartmouth Entry are at once placed in a Special Training House known as "Drake", where they remain for two terms before being split up between the five other houses of the college. The new Special Entries at once go to their own quarters, separated from the rest of the college, and become known as the Benbow Group, all houses being named after Admirals. Each contains roughly 80 boys under the care and supervision of a Lieutenant or Lieutenant-Commander drawn from the Royal Navy. The College at Dartmouth is under the Command of a Captain, Royal Navy, assisted by a Commander and the teaching staff of instructor officers and masters, under the Headmaster.

Each cadet has assigned to him a sea chest in which he keeps his clothes, and a bed in one of the dormitories. He also has a locker in his gunroom for books and any food that he may have brought from home. As he becomes more senior he passes into the Senior Gunroom and, eventually, rates the privilege of a cabin either as a Cadet Captain or a member of the eleventh and Senior Term.

An all-round education is provided in scholastic subjects (excluding the classics) and navigation, seamanship and engineering are all taught. The technical training provides a useful background for the real business of getting acquainted with every job in a ship, which is set about in earnest in the training cruiser. The training received at Dartmouth is definitely elementary.

Games are played and all forms of energetic entertainment are indulged in, foremost among them being yachting and sailing. After the sport is over a canteen, situated near its playing fields, is a great attraction.

And so the time comes for the cadet to leave. An examination is held in every subject, and providing he passes both scholastic and medical examinations, he goes to sea as a sea-going cadet in the training cruiser.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM.

Compared with Dartmouth the American Establishment seems gigantic. To equip a navy which is already the largest in the world the Americans are turning out officers at the rate of over 500 per annum, and even then they find that the numbers of regular officers must be supplemented by men from the Reserve. It is with this in mind that one examines the organisation and layout of Annapolis compared to Dartmouth.

The entrance examination for the Academy is held yearly and about 500 candidates pass and are rated midshipmen. They are then known as 4th class men or "Plebes" for one year. During that time they are the lowest form of animal life in the Academy and are treated as such. The reams of questions to which they must know the answers would fill a book, as would the punishments practised on them by seniors, or First class men, for any slip in their manners.

The Academy is organised into Companies and the whole is known as the Brigade of Midshipmen. To one of these Companies the "Plebe" is assigned, and that remains his Company throughout his stay at Annapolis. The Officer midshipmen chosen from the First class or senior year, are changed three times a year, and on these occasions they alter their insignia of rank accordingly. The senior midshipman is known as the Brigade Captain and he

corresponds to the Chief Cadet Captain of Dartmouth, though his insignia of rank, six stripes with a star above, outshines the single chevron of the C. C. C. The Officer midshipmen are responsible for the running of the Academy in much the same way as the Cadet Captains at Dartmouth.

The actual officers of the Academy are mainly Commanders and Captains, with a few Lieutenant-Commanders. The Officer-in-Charge of midshipmen, a Rear Admiral, is under the command of the Superintendent, another Rear Admiral. The teaching staff, too, are mainly senior officers, and an interesting instructional class is that devoted to leadership, when some problem which requires tactful handling is brought up by the instructor and discussed by the class as a whole, each midshipman first writing out his proposed method of tackling the situation. This is a scheme which might well be adopted at Dartmouth, for it not only provides the instructor with a good idea as to how much use each individual would be in an emergency, but also helps to prepare the would-be officer for his main duty in life-handling his men sympathetically, but firmly.

The instruction at Annapolis is wholly technical, and the standard reached is very much higher, on paper, than that of Dartmouth. Every officer in the United States Navy has to have a very good idea of the workings of every branch, as every officer has to be a specialist. The equipment provided for use by the Midshipmen is all of the latest type and the highest grade, unlike that provided for Cadets. The difference again exists that whereas a Cadet is allowed a certain amount of freedom from supervision in which to conduct experiments, and as practically always happens, to make mistakes, the midshipman is constantly watched and, if anything looks like going wrong, the instructor steps in to prevent any damage being done.

From the text-books and notes with which each United States midshipman is provided it would certainly seem that he knew a great deal more about his job than his equivalent in age in the Royal Navy. The fact seems to emphasise the vast amount of knowledge which is at the disposal of every officer *provided* he is supplied with the requisite books.

From questions asked and answers received, it seemed obvious in America that the average midshipman was not really clear as to what everything in the books was about. That does not mean that he did not know his stuff. He knew that a thing was so, but why it was so was not a matter which bothered him. In fact, the system of training did not appear to be based on the firm grounding of the elementary facts which the authorities are desperately keen to give to every cadet at Dartmouth. The training of a midshipman is highly technical, but through it all there seemed to be an obvious lack—the knowledge of ships and the sea.

A midshipman goes to sea for approximately six months in all, three months in his third year and three months in his fourth. During those months he sees a little of what goes on at sea, but does not actually carry out the various duties as is the case in the training cruiser of the Royal Navy. The ships used for these training cruises are not the antiquated types used in the British Royal Navy, but some of the most modern ships possessed by the United States, including Battleships and Aircraft Carriers.

In a way, this is a good thing, as it teaches the boys what a real warship is like, something of which our cadets are profoundly ignorant. On the other hand it is another example of the Americans tendency to start from

the middle instead of the bottom. The value of practical seamanship can hardly be over-estimated, yet they do not treat it as a serious subject at all—it is just something which comes into such things as combined operations.

Here lies the weakness of their training. They are meant to be sailors, yet their training is largely confined to the laboratory. They are awarded a B. Sc. if for some reason they do not enter the Navy, but the training which they receive leads one to suppose that the degree is going to be of more use to them than the commission for which they are training.

Games, too, play a large part in the life of every midshipman. The teams, of which there are sixteen, sit at special tables in the mess and have special food. Their training takes up a large part of their time, and the aim and object of every member of a team is to get the yellow "N" which signifies that he has played for the Academy. The Army Training College, West Point, is the Academy's Chief rival, and any team that can "Beat Army" is the subject of a great deal of publicity and praise.

The main event of the year in the sporting line is the Army and Navy Football Match, which is attended by well-nigh the whole Academy, and feelings both before and during the match run very high indeed. It is here that that American institution, the "Cheer Leader", comes into his own. He it is that decides which of the many "Yells" shall be used and throws himself around to encourage his supporters. After the somewhat half-hearted attendance and cheering at Dartmouth "Ship" matches, it was a relief to see the obvious team spirit which exists at the Academy.

A MESS HALL AN EIGHTH OF A MILE LONG !

A great difference between ours and the American Training College is the size. Vast halls are strewn around the grounds of the Academy each for a different purpose, from swimming pool to dance hall. The main building of the Academy, Bancroft Hall, contains over 30 miles of corridors. The mess hall itself is an eighth of a mile long—so long that on a cold day the condensation prevents one seeing the length of the hall. Each midshipman shares his room with a roommate or "Wife". The rooms are furnished with wash-basins, shower-bath, hanging cupboard or "closet", desk, spring mattress beds, tables, lamps and in nine cases out of ten gramophones and wireless sets.

All this seems slightly out of place in a college until one remembers that the people who use the cabins would otherwise be living in rooms at a University or College, such as Harvard. The accommodation at Annapolis can only be called magnificent when compared with Dartmouth, but the difference in age and greater difference in wealth between a cadet and the midshipman make it understandable, if a little difficult to bear at first sight.

The feeding arrangements at Dartmouth and Annapolis are very similar, even down to the ringing of a bell to allow different grades of midshipmen and cadets to leave the hall early. The food, of course, turns a visiting cadet green with envy, but with rationing cutting down both the amount and quality of food at Dartmouth, it is surprising that cadets feed as well as they do.

But the leave at Dartmouth does a great deal to make life bearable after hearing of all the luxuries of Annapolis. Once again it is the age factor which comes to the fore, and one must remember that the Academy is not really a school at all, but a branch of the Navy. At Dartmouth, leave is granted three times a year in two periods of four and one of seven weeks.

At Annapolis leave is given only twice a year, at Christmas and in the summer, and the breaks are nothing like as long as ours. Weekend leave is granted to first and second class men, but the number of weekends is strictly limited.

As is to be expected, entertainment at the Naval Academy is on a grand scale. "Hops" or dances are given at frequent intervals, and an Academy Orchestra provides excellent music for dancing. It is on occasions such as these that we realise how much we have missed during the war. Evening dress in America is not a thing to be kept hidden in a trunk surrounded by camphor. Whenever a dance is held, full regalia is the cry and in a country where rationing is practically unknown, the clothing has to be seen to be believed. Dances, shows, films and entertainments of all kinds are laid on for the midshipmen at weekends on a scale which we can never hope to equal with the country in its present state.

A great deal of freedom is given to midshipmen which is not allowed to cadets. The town of Annapolis, just through the gates of the Academy, is open to everyone, and the prosperity of the storekeepers and cinema owners is assured by the steady stream of visitors both from and to the Academy.

In a service which is overflowing with tradition we do not really consider tradition as a serious factor in our lives. To the American, however, tradition is a thing to be sought. Many of them sneer at our King and Queen, at our ceremonies and pageantry, but in their own country they are desperately trying to build up traditions for themselves. We have Lord Nelson, they have boosted John Paul Jones.

Many of our traditions have been adopted by Annapolis and altered to suit their taste, but not altered sufficiently to disguise their origin. In the system of putting the Plebes or fourth class midshipmen through a mill which would make even the toughest of our public school mills look ridiculous, they are combining the necessity of putting bumptious high school "Kings" in their place with an effort to make new traditions, many of which to us look ridiculous and unnecessary.

Such is Annapolis, training ground of officers for the United States Navy, self confessed "the greatest Navy the World has ever seen." Its size and grandeur are inclined to awe the would-be critic into feeling that it alone can produce officers worthy of the Navy. Yet, taken in its essentials, the training itself is very similar to that given to young officers at Dartmouth.

That there is a lot to be said for the training of every officer as a semi-specialist, cannot be doubted. The greatest weakness of the American system is over-stressing the technical side of an officer's training to the detriment of the fundamental fact that to be a sailor a man must first and foremost be a seaman.

THE KHYBER : WHAT THE VISITOR SELDOM SEES

BY MAJOR B. L. RAINA, I.A.M.C.

COME with me on a trip up the Khyber. Thousands upon thousands of people have been through this great international highway for centuries ; pilgrims, travellers, invaders have all wandered hurriedly or slowly through it, but comparatively few modern travellers know what a wealth of interest it contains. This, then, will not be the usual "tourist" article; it will, I hope, give the reader some knowledge which might be missed by a casual visitor.

First, a little of its history. The Pass has seen hordes of Aryans, Greeks, Sakas, Tartars, Yueh-Chis, Huns, Mongols and Persians. It has witnessed the splendour of the forces of Alexander, Kanishka, Tormana, Mahmud Ghaznavi, Babar, Nadir Shah, Ahmed Shah, Ranjit Singh and his great general, Hari Singh Nalwa. All have left their traces on these rugged hills and around the ruins which were once works of art and culture.

Patient archaeologists have toiled there since 1902, unearthing some of the glories of Gandhar. They have found relics at Shahibahol (near Mardan), Takht-i-Bahi, three miles from Shahibahol, Shah-Ji-Ki-Dheri, one mile from Peshawar City, and Jamal Garhi. Many of these treasures, which include precious stuccos, terracotta, clay filigree and numerous other items which, when pieced together, remind one of the fascinating past of Gandhar and its winter capital, *Purush Pura* (the present Peshawar).

Incidentally, a visit to the Peshawar Museum is well worth while. Most of the exhibits there tell the story of the life of Buddha and his teachings. The skill of the sculpturers is outstanding. You see statues showing half naked, toiling men, tired bleeding oxen, and Budhisattava Sidharratha sitting in ecstasy under a *jambun* tree—all examples showing the high standard the sculptors attained.

But let us begin our journey. If we go by rail we find the trains run up to Landi Kotal only on Tuesdays and Fridays, though the railway track goes yet further up the Pass to Landi Khana. The skill of the engineers in building this 26-miles long railway, with its 92 bridges and culverts and through 34 tunnels, is something to marvel at.

At one point those interested in railways—and who is not?—can find something unique in railway construction, for at one point there are two stations served by the same railway staff. It occurs between Changi and Mednak stations, where, to maintain its gradual climb, the engine has to reverse its direction. Although along the track the two stations are about a couple of miles apart, as the crow flies they are only a few moments' walk. The Stationmaster at Changi sees his train out; he returns to his office for a rest while the train reverses its direction and shunts up the hill. As it approaches Mednak the Stationmaster and his staff walk up to the station and meet the train as it comes in on the higher level.

All the stations on this Khyber Pass railway, as in many other parts of the North-West Frontier Province, are built like small forts, and can, if needs be, be entirely self-sufficient. The staff quarters, too, resemble fortified block houses.

As might be expected, the building of the railway was a great achievement. An interesting side of its construction was that each time the foundation of an important bridge was laid, ladies from Peshawar Club were given the privilege of laying the foundation stone. The completion of the railway was marked by another "human" story, for the last spike was hammered into position by the ten-year old daughter of Victor Bayley, who was responsible for building the whole line. Actually, it was Mrs. Bayley who drove the first train up to Landi Kotal, amid the laughter and cheers of the delighted tribesmen, the firing of fog signals, crackers and the shrieks of the engine whistle.

It is the road journey, however, which yields the traveller the most interest. We first meet our driver, a tall, well-built, brown oval-faced Pathan with broad forehead, aquiline nose, large cheerful eyes. The other passengers— young men, often clean shaven; and old men usually wearing long flowing beards, black or white or dyed deep red. In their long shirts, waistcoats, loose baggy trousers and *pagris* tied around plain or embroidered skull caps they appear a fine set of men.

The traveller in a hurry may choose the Royal Mail lorry, which, after collecting the mail, begins the journey. The Pathan passengers indulge in continuous gossip in Pushtu, which may sound harsh and jarring to the newcomer, but which the old hand knows is a language of great simplicity and frankness of expression.

From the beginning we get an insight into tribal life. Pathans on meeting a friend immediately say: *Starai mashai* (May you never be tired), to which the reply is: *Khwar mashai*, (May you never be poor). The introductory remarks over, there follow numerous inquiries about each other's welfare, and the conversation continues lustily as we go on the straight road west of Peshawar, through the Cantonment, past the barbed wire enclosure and into the expansive vale of Peshawar.

In the distance is the great defence wall of India. We pass through the orchards and playgrounds of Islamia College. The College itself is a beautiful collection of modern and Moghul architecture, with its domes, corridors and gardens; there are trained many of the tribesmen and local people. The mail delivered, our bus returns to the road and on into the barren countryside. We stop in front of an old mud building—Hari Singh Burj. Passengers get out. Police search the vehicle for any contraband, and a few minutes later we go on. The administrative border has been crossed and we enter tribal territory.

Vaguely in the distance is a ship-like structure, and as we get nearer we see Jamrud Fort, built by Hari Singh Nalwa, who occupied Peshawar in 1833 and reached Jamrud three years later. In April, 1837 Afghans attacked the Fort and the Sikh General was killed. We halt at the barrier—show our pass or permit to the Indian Army sentry and sign the register. More passengers arrive, armed with rifles and bandoliers, for there is no licence required for arms once the administrative border is crossed. Some passengers may be dressed in *choga* or a long coat; others may be carrying a revolver.

The passes checked and passengers again seated, the barrier is lifted and we go on. The mountain wall is soon approached, and a "V" shaped gap appears in the hills. Around one sees nothing but dry barren and rugged hills. Here and there are graves, some alone, in other places in large groups. They have no overhead masonry on them, since such are forbidden within Islam lest they may become places of worship. A few shrines, however, are more ornate,

with collections of flags and other relics around them; they are graves of holy men.

The road winds through a zig-zag course until Shagai, after which it is straighter until we get to Ali Masjid, a gorge with the Khyber stream and trees on either side. A small white mosque—a fortress on the hill—caves with smoke curling up at the entrance—children playing marbles in the sand—women cooking—and a few men with rifles slung on their shoulders bartering packages of coal. Such are a few of the things one sees as the bus rolls on.

We climb higher, passing near to collections of dwelling places. Each section of a tribe, by the way, lives in a *kandi* (a collection of dwelling places). The *kandi* is surrounded by a mud wall about ten feet high; in the centre of the *kandi* is the *burj*, or watch tower, and usually a very solid structure. Both the defence or watch tower and the wall have holes high enough to allow the barrel of a rifle to rest on, and the tower is usually sited so that fire can be directed effectively on any intruder.

Let us visit a *kandi*. As we approach we are greeted with cordial welcome salutations. Usually the Pathans say: *Salaam-ya-alaikum* ('Peace be on you), to which the reply is: *Ya-alaik-kum-es-salaam*. There follow a series of inquiries about the welfare of the visitor, his family and relations. If the visitor is an old friend he is embraced, each pressing alternately his right shoulder to the left breast of his host, and repeating the salutation in the reverse order.

We enter a big courtyard. In some of them there is a raised platform. The houses lie along one side of the wall, each having its own courtyard. A corn bin half full of maize can be seen near the cooking place; sheep or cattle may be tied in a corner of the courtyard. Broken down chairs from the nearby town are often seen.

The house of a *malik* reflects the owner's higher status; it is usually a *pakka* house, with two or three stories. In one *malik's* house in Landi Kotal can be seen a masonry well, with cement water reservoir. The reception room in the headman's house may have modern furniture, with sofa, cushioned chairs, and occasional high-backed Victorian chairs, with the floors covered with fine Persian rugs. Autographed photographs hang on the walls.

There are also the houses of the artisans—carpenters, dyers, potters and the like, who live under the protection of the Headman as *hamsaya* (neighbour under the same shade). To become a *hamsaya* all that is required is to approach and seek an elder's shelter. If the visitor is accepted it is an occasion for festivity; a sheep is slaughtered, cooked and eaten by all living in the *kandi*, and the visitor is told that from then on he is under the headman's protection. Any insult or injury to him is avenged. Many Sikhs and Hindus thus live side by side with their Moslem brethren.

But let us go on. Twenty-seven miles further on we see, crowning a hill feature on the right, a dome in ruins. It was once a Buddhist stupa, rises in its north-east corner to about 25 ft., and still shows marks of images of Buddha and his two attendants. It marks the scene of a tribal feud between Malik Allahdad Khan and Abdur Rauf Khan; the former while building a bunker covering his village on the site where the stupa stands accidentally found sixty gold coins; they were melted—and thus a vital link in the story of the stupa was lost.

Another three miles and we reach Landi Kotal, which, with its gardens trees, hospital, club, barracks and officers' messes looks like an oasis in a desert. It takes pride in its small bazaar, good roads, comfortable officers' messes with their radios and frigidaires—and also one other feature.

For Landi Kotal has probably the only cement concrete billiard table in the world. It was built in the summer of 1932 by Captain R. E. Dalby, R.E., and Sher Mohamed, stands in the Gunners' Mess, and was formally opened in 1932 by Major-General W. Dent, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. The table is 12 ft. long, 6 ft. broad, 18 inches in depth, and is supported on eight legs. Expanded metal provides the main skeleton over which cement slabs three-quarters of an inch have been used. It cost less than Rs. 1,000, and has had no repairs since it was built. Except for a little dust over the top, which is easily removed, the table is perfect, and in playing on it there is but little difference from playing on an ordinary table. Before some one asks, let me add that the cushions are rubber!

Buses usually stop at Landi Kotal, so we will go on by foot. The road descends. We see a notice board warning the traveller to leave the Pass before 6 p. m. Soon we get to the frontier of India at Torkham, the boundary between India and Afghanistan. A barbed wire marks the spot. An Afghan sentry on the further side, and a *Khassadar* on the nearer side guard the post. The Afghan sentry is alert and ensures that visitors do not set their feet, even for an instant, on Afghan territory.

The *Khassadars* are friendly folk, and are usually agriculturalists, their main crop being maize. The land itself has a very thin layer of earth, below which is stone. Water is scanty, and the farmer has to depend chiefly on rain for irrigation.

Trees are few. And even the patches of brush-wood are disappearing by the continuous cutting by inhabitants in search of firewood. The Pathans say that at one time the Khyber Hills were covered by thick forest and were very fertile. The gradual deforestation has, they say, reduced the rainfall. A glance round suggests that in days gone by terraced farming was practised.

The day for the peasant begins an hour before sunrise, for before the light of the sun breaks the horizon the *azan* calls the faithful to prayer. The men pray in the mosque; the women individually in their house. Women get busy with preparing food for the family immediately after prayers, and the first meal is eaten at 10 a.m. The second is taken in the evening about 8 p.m.

Pathan hospitality is proverbial. A guest is always offered a sumptuous tea. With a rich host a guest begins with a generous cup of tea with *kababs* (minced meat roasted on thick steel bars) and *pattadana* (smoked pieces of tender meat and liver encased in fat). Boiled eggs, fruits, either dried and fresh, follow. Often a *nan* (a loaf of bread about a foot or two in diameter) follows. A dinner is a much more elaborate affair. *Nan*, *kababs*, *pattadana* are there. In addition there will be a very rich pilau, with meat cooked in various forms as well.

The visitor cannot wait, however, for he must be out of the Pass by 6 p.m., and as we return to the barrier, the ruined wall of an old fort is seen on the summit of the hill right above Landi Kotal—the *Kafir Kot*, once a Buddhist monastery and later an observation and defence fort.

Before we leave we might take a look at the Caravan road, which runs almost parallel to the metalled road. It is usually deserted, but on Tuesdays and Fridays it springs to life. *Khassadars* armed with rifles appear; camels,

interspersed with goats and sheep and loaded with carpets, sheep-skins and other goods from Kabul and Central Asia file along, accompanied by tall, brown sturdy men and their families.

Women with trinkets round their necks; the newly-born infant or a young calf born on the way; fierce watch dogs; tents; pots and pans—all accompany the caravan on its long journey. For centuries they have roamed together. On some nights they may have the advantage of a caravan *serai*—which has a high mud wall surrounding mud huts and a large courtyard. It does not always shelter one caravan, for sometimes a caravan stretches for three miles.

Before we leave there is one side of the Pathan's life to which we might refer—that is, his love of gambling. He is an inveterate gambler. Go to any fair and you will see that cards and dice are prominent. The card games are simple. For one game nine cards are spread face upwards on a piece of cloth. Bets are laid on individual cards. The banker rattles the dice box and exhorts his audience to try their luck. The dice is thrown, and the winner gets double or treble the amount he bet. The rest goes to the "banker".

At the *Jhando mela* (Fair of flags) in Peshawar there is an added attraction. Crowds of Pathans gather together there to offer at the shrine red-coloured eggs. For their amusement you may see two persons gather together. They each produce an egg, holding it in the palm of the hand, with the sharper end protruding between the thumb and forefinger. Each then tries to strike the tip of the other man's egg with his own egg. The owner of the egg which shows the slightest crack loses. Onlookers gather round. They lay bets on their favourite. The game goes on and on for hours until either party has exhausted all his eggs or has no more money.

For all that, the average Pathan is a fine person; he has an acute sense of humour, an intense love for liberty, lives a democratic life, and belongs to one of the most hospitable races in the world.

So we leave the Khyber. I doubt whether any part of the world—certainly of India—is so full of fascination, has so much worthy of study, and can be so interesting to the traveller who is willing to bide his time and not rush through. Eight days before he was killed in Kabul in 1841, Lieut. Hamilton, V.C. was able to send out a poem, an extract from which ran;

Though all is changed, yet remnants of the past
Point to the scenes of bloodshed and, alas,
Of murders foul: and ruined houses cast
Their mournful shadows o'er the graves of grass.

The Khyber, however, is not a mournful place; it is majestic, mighty—and will remain so centuries hence.

Bikini Ships Still Unsafe

The target ships used in the Bikini atomic bomb experiment are still "unsafe for permanent occupancy", according to a recent announcement by the United States Navy Department. Most of the big ships which survived the blasts are to be towed without crews to Hawaii and the west coast of America for decontamination studies.

The American Navy statement added that the lingering radio-active effects of the bombs had necessitated a complete revision by the navy of ship design, navigation and fighting ideas. All exposed positions on decks of future battleships would be removed, and ships will be shaped like big submarines.

THE TRADITIONS OF A NEW REGIMENT

BY CAPTAIN M. T. ANDERSON

ON October the First 1941, a new Regiment was raised in Belgaum. It was not the first time that the Mahars' name had appeared in the Army List; for four short years between 1917 and 1921, the 111th Mahars, had formed the left wing of a composite battalion, the 71st-111th, of which two companies were Punjabi Christians and two Mahars. But the conception of a complete regiment of 100% Mahar composition was a new one; another instance of that bold break from recent tradition that had already led to the raising of the Mazbi and Ramdasias Sikhs (now the Sikh Light Infantry).

It is quite consciously that I have made that qualification "recent" tradition, for my whole purpose in writing is to show that the Mahars as a class have a military tradition—and a very strong and ancient one—even though, for the half-century preceding the raising of this regiment, they were not regarded as one of the martial races of India. But first, a little about the Mahars themselves, their background and their life in the villages.

It is impossible to attribute any derivation to the name, but all the evidence, inferential though much of it is, points to the Mahar being one of the oldest, if not the original, inhabitant of that area generally called the Maharashtra. Some, amongst them Wilson, the historian of the Madras Army, hold that they gave their name to the area where they are found, which would carry their history back to the third century, B.C., when use of that name was first made; others, more fanciful and less kind, see in them the descendants of those dark dwellers of the Forest of Dandaka who, led by Queen Surpanakha, first attempted the rape of Sita in mythological satya-yug.

Whatever may have been their ultimate origin, the fifty-odd exogamous tribal units that are now included in the term are undoubtedly the remnants of a powerful race who ruled the Maharashtra until dispossessed by succeeding waves of Aryan and post-Aryan invaders. Thus, though now included in the scheduled classes, they are not Hindus. They are outside the Hindu hierarchy altogether; an aboriginal people of no caste who, through long centuries of subjection to the Hindu Maharattas, have adopted a number of the most characteristic of the Hindu customs and beliefs and superimposed them upon their own religion.

Despite his subjection, the Mahar was still called upon to play an important part in the village economy, not only by the Mussalmans during their hegemony, but by the Mahrattas themselves in later years. There arises thus the anomalous situation of the Mahar being the guardian of certain deities and yet being forbidden the chief temple; of being the authority on boundary disputes and yet banished to a *wada* apart and down-wind from the Mahratta village; of being the trusted village servant, clerk or watchman whose touch or even presence is yet defilement to the twice-born. "He was considered the most trustworthy man in the village and, though his caste was low, he held a highly respected position among the village servants"*; and he was yet, in many respects, little better than a slave, indeed he was *atisudra*—less than a slave.

*Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XVII p. 438.

This contradictory picture is repeated in the religious life of the village. In certain districts the children of the chief Maharatta families are taken to the house of a Mahar when they are five days old and are there dedicated to the goddess Satwai, the guardian of children's health, whose mediators the Mahars are held to be by right. Similarly they are the guardians of Mariai—or Laxmi as she is often called—the goddess of cholera, and when an epidemic of that disease breaks out it is the Mahars who take the leading part in the propitiatory sacrifices that are performed before the seven red-smeared stones to the East of the village that represent the goddess, there being no image of her in human shape.

At the spring festival of Holi it is normally the fire in the Mahar *wada* that is the first to be lit and from there fire-brands are taken to kindle the great heap of fuel in the village square; and at Vijayadurg a sacrificial cock that is offered at the Holi fire is the honourable perquisite of the Mahars.

There are numerous traces of their original, animistic religion as, for instance, the power of exorcising disease spirits and the influence of the evil eye both from men and animals, that is attributed to them in Ratnagiri, and in this extract from the *Bombay Gazetteer* which, talking of the Mahars of the Ahmednagar district affirms that "they also hold an important part in all village religious ceremonies. Attached to every village temple is the shrine of the Mahar *deva* who is regularly worshipped by all classes including Brahmans, at the same time as the God of the chief temple"*.

It would be interesting to discover how far this worship of the Mahar *deva* is the result of a facile eclecticism of the higher castes and how far the fear of the devil, or whether in reality it be the remains of the original Mahar religion which not even centuries of subjection have managed finally to eradicate.

Though they are an indispensable factor in the life of the Mahratta village, playing their own unalienable part in all occasions of birth, life and death, they yet have their own social organisation, self-contained and self-sufficient, and their own rules of caste, against the breach of which they jealously guard. This social organisation is in essence, a loose confederation of villages grouped under the hegemony of a Mehtar or Kattamani, who directs the course of caste affairs and has acknowledged authority in the settlement of social disputes.

In all, spread over an area stretching from Betul to the South of Ratnagiri, and from Bhandra to the Indian Ocean, they number some three and a half million, of which the largest concentrations are around Nagpur, Bhandara, Satara and Ratnagiri, the last two, with male populations of some 47,000 and 44,000 respectively, being the best recruiting areas. It is a curious fact that, while in India as a whole the proportion of males is greater than that of females, successive censuses have shown the reverse to be the fact in the case of the Mahars.

Like every ancient people, the Mahars have their mythological heroes, the earliest examples of that courage and military prowess that was to be found again in the armies of Shivaji and in the service of the foreign Honourable East India Company's armies. According to tradition, Parsuram's Brahmans were driven out by two chiefs, one a Mogyar, or fisherman, and the other a Holayar, the term used for the Mahar in Mysore. It is also told that the Brahmans with whom Mayura Verma Kadamba colonised Kanara were driven out, about the year 700 A.D. by Nanda, a Holayar.

* *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. XVII, p. 172.

But while, down the centuries, there are countless examples of such leaders, together with deeds of more individual gallantry, data is too slight to produce any sort of continuity to the story of the Mahar as a warrior before the rise of Shivaji, an event that, within a few decades, conveniently coincides with the raising of the first bodies of sepoy troops by the East India Company for the defence of their factories, from which troops the later Bombay Army developed.

But there is another reason why the Mahratta revolt in the mid-seventeenth century is important in the history of the development of the great Presidency Army. This great resurgent movement against the rule of the Moguls was essentially a regional rather than a religious one and embraced all castes to an extent previously unknown in India. Though the true Mahrattas formed the bulk of the cavalry, the infantry, by far the greater body at the crucial outset of the revolt, was composed of every caste and subcaste of the Maharashtra—Mahar (or Parwari as they then were called), Purbia, Bedar and Ramoshi—as did the artillery train, baggage columns and fort garrisons.

This lack of caste discrimination may have been due in part to the fact that Shivaji—until he took the thread of the twice-born after the consolidation of his conquests—was himself accounted *sudra* (slave). Even now leaders of orthodox Brahmanical thoughts in the Maharashtra do not admit the right of his descendants to this symbol. Whatever may be the rights in this matter, the mixed armies of Shivaji initiated the tradition of the Hon'ble Company's Bombay Army that all classes and castes should be recruited—a tradition that persisted without mishap down to 1895.

Writing in the nineteenth century John Jacob could say that "in the Bombay Army the Bramin stands shoulder to shoulder in the ranks, nay, sleeps in the same tent with his *Purwaree* fellow-soldier, and dreams not of any objection to the arrangement. If this subject be mentioned to a Bombay Brahmin the ready answer is 'What do I care? Is he not a soldier?'.*"

Similarly, Sir John Malcolm writing in 1816 to the Secretary of the India Board says that the Bombay Army "has from its origin to the present day been indiscriminately composed of all classes; Mohammedans, Hindus, Jews and some few Christians. Among the Hindus were those of the lowest tribes of the Mahrattas and the *Purwaree*, Surtee and Frost (Farrashes, household menials) sects are much more numerous than the Rajpoots and higher castes"†. So much more numerous were they in fact that Richard Burton, himself an officer of a Bombay Regiment, took the *Parwari* as the typical sepoy. It was indeed only after the British had gained a foothold in the Deccan by the Treaty of Bassein (1802) that any large scale enlistment of Mahrattas and Deccani Mussalmans started.

"The first sepoys of the Company were raised and commanded by native officers, acting under the authority and directions of a European officer, but still exercising great influence and power over their men whom they had brought to the service. Those officers long continued to be the medium on which we relied for the fidelity and attachment of the sepoys"‡. Nor were all these Indian officers of high caste. Remarkable though it now seems, men of the untouchable classes attained to the rank of Subadar-Major in these regiments. Such officers must have been the military superiors of many men of higher caste than themselves and it is largely due to this subordination of caste prejudice

* Views and Opinions of General John Jacob 1858 p. 119.

† The Government of India 1833 Appendix "E".

‡ *Political History of India*, 1811, by Malcolm.

to regimental discipline that these sepoy troops reached a pitch of efficiency that put them in a class apart from the other armies in India.

Not that he received much in the way of training but "a jacket of English broadcloth.....the knowledge of his manual exercises and a few military evolutions" showed him to "possess an incalculable superiority over the other natives of India who, ignorant of the first principles of discipline, were easily defeated however great their numbers by a small corps of their brothers, armed, disciplined, and directed by the art, intelligence, and spirit of their European leaders."*

That quotation was written in 1811 after the Mysore and Malabar Wars, and its truth was again demonstrated in the Second and Third Mahratta Wars. While the Mahars certainly played their gallant part in the many wars that the Bombay Army fought during the troubled eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and must be given their share of the credit along with those other regiments who have an unbroken history of service such as the Mahratta Light Infantry, the Indian Grenadiers and the Rajputana Rifles, it is the memory of the battle at Koregaon that they most cherish and the name forms an integral part of the new regiment's badge.

Relations between the Peshwa, Bajirao II and the British had been strained ever since the Treaty of Bassein, at whose restrictions the Peshwa chafed, and it was obvious by the middle of 1817 that a further outbreak of war was inevitable. It was solely due to the personal cowardice of the Peshwa that a semblance of peace had been maintained so long, but the break finally came when, on November 5th 1817, a Mahratta force, immensely superior in numbers, attacked Colonel Burr's position near Kirkee. Despite the odds and the outstanding personal bravery of the Mahratta cavalry, Burr held the field at the end of the day and the Mahratta army, defeated but by no means broken, retired slowly to the North, eluded its pursuers and then doubled back to join issue once again.

Burr, meanwhile, had sent to Sirur, some 38 miles North-East of Poona, for reinforcements and thence, on the evening of 31 December, Captain Francis Staunton in command, the Second Battalion of the First Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry set out. After a night march of twenty-seven miles, Staunton's force reached the high ground North of the village of Koregaon on the banks of the Bhima.

Astride the river lay the whole of the Peshwa's army of 20,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry against which he could oppose only the 500 bayonets of his own Battalion, 250 of the untried Auxiliary Force and two six-pounder guns manned by twenty-four Europeans of the Madras Artillery. It was not only the local issue that had to be considered—throughout Central India forces were so disposed that the victory or defeat of however small a British force might make or mar the whole campaign. Staunton had to think not only of Colonel Burr in Poona, whose reinforcement was his immediate object, but of General Smith facing Scindia, Holkar and Bhonsle away to the North.

Against such odds, attack would have been suicidal, but nevertheless, Staunton marched boldly down from the high ground he was holding as if to ford the river, a manoeuvre that caused some 5,000 Maharatta infantry to rejoin the main army on the South Bank, and then wheeled suddenly to the East and occupied the small village of Koregaon, which was immediately surrounded by the enemy. The mud wall around the village was of little use as a defensive work, but the houses served to reduce the effect of the enemy's enormous superiority in cavalry and Staunton distributed his troops wherever the best cover

**Political History of India, 1811, by Malcolm.*

could be found, while for his two guns he secured relatively strong positions, one commanding the right bank of the river and the other the road to Sirur.

The first attack was delivered by three columns of picked Arabs each 600 strong, on the Eastern end of the village. Either from lack of reconnaissance, as Grant Duff says, or from lack of time, Staunton had failed to occupy a small square *ghadi* in the centre of the village, and this was seized by the Arabs in their first onslaught and thence they kept up a galling fire, concentrating especially upon the gunners. Repeated attacks failed to dislodge them but nor were the Arabs able to force back the defenders.

A further rush of the Arabs, during which Lieutenant Chisholm, the artillery officer was killed and decapitated, captured one of the guns. On hearing this, Lieutenant Paltinson, the adjutant of the Battalion, a giant of six-foot seven inches and of heroic courage, though lying mortally wounded, rose and seizing a musket by the muzzle charged at the head of his sepoys to recapture the gun before receiving another ball in the body that killed him.

Wearied after a long night march, without food or water and seeing no possible alternative to complete annihilation, it is small wonder that after six hours of continuous fighting the idea of surrender began to be canvassed amongst the survivors. Staunton would not countenance the suggestion and, supported by his only remaining officers, Lieutenant Jones and Surgeon Wylie, induced them to continue in their stubborn defence.

However, the Mahratta losses had not been light. In addition to the Arabs, a force of cavalry had charged the village and the Peshwa's correspondence shows that Mahrattas of high rank had fallen. At six in the evening, after a battle lasting some eight hours, the Arabs withdrew and the British force was able to get to the water for which it craved. At first light the following morning, Staunton again opened fire with his six-pounders but the Mahrattas, having heard of the approach of Smith's army, drew off. Staunton, believing them to be still between him and Poona, marched back to Sirur which he reached at noon on the 3rd of January, 1818, his men having been without food since the time they had set out, three nights before.

Thus ended the Indian Thermeopylae, what the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir John Abercromby described as "one of the most heroic and brilliant achievements recorded in the annals of the Army". The 2nd/1st Regiment had the honourable title of Grenadiers conferred upon them for the action and a commemorative obelisk was raised on the South bank of the river. But the price had been heavy; over a third of Staunton's force had been lost, including 49 killed and 105 wounded of his own Battalion. Of these 49, 22 were Mahars, 16 Mahrattas, 8 Rajputs and 3 Muhamadans.

But against these losses must be weighed the effect on the Peshwa's Army. An army of some 28,000 had failed to overwhelm a mixed force of 750 fellow Indians and 24 European gunners. Though the Mahratta forces took the field again to be beaten at Ashti and Sholapur later in the year, their real victors were those few men who, without food or water, held the crumbling walls of Koregaon against them for a whole day.

Throughout the turbulent history of the Bombay Army, Mahar names are constantly appearing, coupled with tales of outstanding bravery and loyalty. Havildar Mandnak Ennak of the Marine Battalion received promotion for his bravery aboard the *VIGILANT* during an action in the Gulf of Kutch in 1797; twelve other Mahars of the Marine Battalion were awarded a special medal in

1810 for bravery during captivity; 25 men under Havildar Ramji Shinde defeated 500 of the enemy at Kathiawar in 1826; Mahadeo Misser captured the enemy standard at the siege of Multan in 1849, in which same action another Mahar, Jannak Ramnak, was decorated; eight Mahars serving as Treasury Guard for a detachment of the Marine Battalion when the 26th Bengal Infantry mutinied in 1857, successfully protected their charge and killed twenty-six of the mutineers; Sepoy Sonnak Tannak won the Indian Order of Merit for gallantry at Dabrai during the Afghan War in 1880. But despite these examples there is too little evidence to allow any sort of continuous chronicle to be made of the Mahars' military history, the large part they played being indicated only by the regularity with which the Mahar names occur.

Before the opening of the nineteenth century they certainly provided something like one-half of the whole Bombay Army and even towards the end of the century their numbers were considerable. An entry in the Ratnagiri Gazetteer of 1880 stated that "large numbers enter the army and have always proved obedient, hardy and brave soldiers. There are 2,180 Ratnagiri Mahars on the Army Rolls." But their day was ending.

In 1895 the old Presidential Armies were abolished and at the same time the system of class companies was introduced. Partly an imitation of the Northern Regiments, where it had been adopted to achieve a greater safety, the introduction of this measure into the Bombay Regiments served only to close valuable sources of recruitment. For some time the Mahrattas had been growing increasingly caste-conscious; claiming a Kshatriya descent, they had been seeking to establish their superiority to other classes of the Maharashtra and this trend, coupled with the new admission of the validity of caste distinctions in the ranks resulted in the virtual exclusion of the Mahar from the Bombay Army they had served so well.

There was a contributory cause of this in the industrial development of Bombay and its call for the man power of the Deccan and Konkan, but the root cause lay in the destruction of the casteless tradition of the old Presidency Army, where a man's valour and loyalty had stood for more than his descent.

Disastrous though this measure was for the Mahars, who were debarred from service save as bandsmen or syces, there was no immediate adverse effect on the Army. During the following twenty years the annual requirement of some 1,200 recruits* was easily met; it was only with the heavy Mahratta casualties in Mesopotamia during 1915 that the system of recruiting was found to be inadequate. "Yet in spite of the crying need for men, the sanction to enlist from other classes was only obtained from Army Headquarters after delay and difficulty. The Mahars, for example, the Parwaris of the old Army, were anxious to enlist, yet when approval was obtained after much local pressure, the recruits were first ordered to join two Madras Battalions at St. Thomas's Mount. Ultimately a Battalion was formed at Bombay, which was given a place at the time as the 111th Mahars".† But by that time (June 1917) thousands of Mahars had enlisted in labour units where their identity was lost.

In 1920 the Battalion moved to the Frontier and thence, to Aden, after amalgamation with the 71st Punjabis. It returned to India, however, within a very short time and, since no place could be found in the Army for a single-class Battalion, especially one untried under the conditions of modern war, it was reduced in March 1921. And so, for another twenty years the Mahar, who

* Sir Patrick Cadell: *History of the Bombay Army*, p. 297

† *Ibid.*

had once formed the bulk of the old Presidential Army was to be denied the right of enlistment.

With the outbreak of the recent war the story was repeated. In the early months, thousands of Mahars disappeared into the Pioneer Corps and the Labour Battalions of the Engineers, before any answer was given to their petitions that a Mahar unit be raised.

The First Battalion of their own regiment was raised in October 1941; recruitment was good and within nine months (June 1942) despite the difficulties of providing experienced V.C.Os. and N.C.Os. the Second Battalion was raised and in May 1943 the Third. Serving on the Frontier, on I. D. duties in India and in Paiforce, yet no Battalion saw action during the war years. Despite this great disadvantage, the Regiment was not found wanting and, within a few weeks of V-J Day was accorded a place in the Post-war Army and in the middle of 1946 was chosen to be one of the Machine-Gun Regiments of the Indian Army, the other being the 15th Punjab Regiment.

Of recent times I have purposely said little. My intention has been to give some indication of the nature of the Mahar and his military background and to show that, while the name of the Mahar Machine-Gun Regiment is new to the Indian Army List, the wiry little peasants of the Konkan, Bombay and the Central Provinces who compose that regiment, are of the stock of some of the earliest and hardest of the Indian Army's soldiers.

Services Kinematography Unit Disbanded

Formerly responsible for the largest cinema circuit in the world, the Directorate of Services Kinematography and the Combined Kinema Service have been disbanded. In recent years the organisation, which was raised in May 1944, operated over a vast area stretching from the east coast of Palestine to the west coast of Japan, and provided what was probably the most popular form of amenity for both Indian and British troops.

Over the period July 1945 to December 1946 alone, the organisation's mobile cinemas gave nearly 130,000 shows, screening 280,000 miles of films for a total running time of 31 years to troops totalling 55,556,70. More than 50 instructional films were produced and the organisation's photographers took 42,225 negatives and 216,035 prints of "stills".

Chittagong U. S. Club's Generous Gift

On its closing down, the Chittagong United Services Officers Club, has made a generous gift of Rs. 77,781/8/- to the R. I. N., Army and R.I.A.F. in the proportion of 10%, 80% and 10%, respectively.

Acknowledging this gift, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief in India, in a personal letter addressed to the chairman of the Club, Brig. M. L. Hayne, thanked, on behalf of the three Services, the Committee and the members of the Chittagong United Services Officers Club for the donation.

The money is being devoted to the interests of the personnel and their dependents in the Services. The Army's share will be credited to the Indian Army Benevolent Fund.

ENVOI

We cannot leave our foster mother-land,
 And sing no hymn of praise at all to those
 Who followed us so faithfully, and stand
 Our living monument, when memory goes.

Whate'er the future holds, no mortal man
 Can rob us of the past. We shall recall
 The willingness and charm of the *jawan*
 With gratitude, till memory's curtain fall.

The enterprise and *elan* of the Sikhs,
 The tough and dour Punjabi Mussalman,
 Jat warrior descendants of the Greeks,
 The Rajput, still the pride of Hindustan.

They may be slow to take you for their friend,
 These stalwart yeomen of the countryside.
 But if they do, you know it's till the end—
 A priceless gift, that we received with pride.

The 'bearing' of the Rajput Mussalman,
 No years of peace begin to soften him.
 The quick, alert, experienced Pathan.
 Of broad and pithy humour, often grim.

No satisfying list of Gurkhas' praises
 So short a song as this could e'er compile.
 Whose tenacity in battle just amazes.
 His greatest boon—that ever-ready smile.

The muscular Mahratta's cheery way,
 By 'Lejam', Malkam,' and the wrestling-pit,
 Who'll challenge, always giving weight away,
 Prepared to try his luck, speed and wit.

The discipline and courage of Madrassis,
 No older soldiers of the "Raj" than these.
 The simple ways and 'guts' of Adibasis,
 Of Chins, Kachins, Karens, and Assamese.

The sturdy manliness of the Garhwali.
 Of the Dogra, and our hillmen of Kumaon.
 The quality is rich in hill and valley.
 Throughout our days it never let us down.

How true these friends, to whom we owe so much!
 How staunch when everything was going wrong;
 Prepared to put their fortune to our touch
 With all the fire and vigour of the strong.

How full of human-kindness to the weak!
 Who treat the sahib's children as their own;
 How, roused to anger, anything but meek,
 As their country's enemies have known!

Who match the panther's cunning on patrol.
 Whose bravery in war is platitude.
 And who, despite a cruel foe's control.
 Preserved unwavering their fortitude.

This brotherhood, where valour so abounds;
 Where fighting men and worthy sons are bred;
 Whose loyalty all base intrigue confounds;
 Stands ever ready, waiting to be led.

The glory of the past insures the future,
 As, turn by turn, each worker plays his part.
 Our worthy heirs embark upon the venture
 As we, the older artisans, depart.

We seek from none a farewell demonstration.
 We but desire that we should leave behind,
 With these our men—the real gold of the nation—
 The thought that we were happy, just, and kind.

The battle's won, if comradeship be bliss
 And self be sacrificed to noble ends.
 No greater love hath any man than this
 Than that he lay his life down for his friends.

W. L. ALSTON.

THE BOARD SCHOOL OR WHAT?

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL W. N. PETTIGREW.

THERE must be a number of Indian Army parents to whom the nightmare of school bills is a present or future evil. With so many of us about to retire on pension, these financial fears increase. The object of this article is to discuss to what extent we must be the victims of the future, or, by our own efforts help to shape it.

Although the nobility of schoolmastering as a profession is above dispute, those actively engaged in it are not pure altruists, nor are those who provide the capital on which a school operates and exists. These reasonable expectations of the workers and sponsors in the field of education find their expression in the modern school bills. A system which would dispense with the need for outside assistance, in other words a co-operative system, must result in reduced costs.

Before the foundation of a new school certain preliminary enquiries and arrangements are necessary. These are briefly—

- (a) A reasonable assurance that the need exists.
- (b) A board of Governors to appreciate this assurance and to make the necessary arrangements.
- (c) Sufficient capital to provide school buildings and amenities, and to cover initial running expenses.
- (d) Selection and purchase of a suitable building, and the carrying out of approved modification and additions. A scale of requirements would first be necessary.
- (e) Decision as to the final size of the school. This will have been roughly formulated under (a) above and will be confirmed or modified after (d) above.
- (f) Employment of staff and opening of the school.
- (g) Future finances.

Let us take these in turn.

(a) *A reasonable assurance that the need exists.*—The chief difficulties of any co-operative scheme are to bring together people interested in it, and to ensure that these people shall have the money necessary to pay their share towards the capital cost of its implementation. It is a supposition, but one that can easily be confirmed by enquiry, that British ex-Regular I.A. Officers will be interested in such a scheme. With the announced terms of compensation, finding the capital should present small difficulty and there, at once, the two essential requirements exist.

(b) *A Board of Governors.*—This should present no difficulties. The majority should be pensioned officers, but it will probably be an advantage to have an element of civilians with experience of the responsibilities involved. These appointments should be paid, as seldom does value derive from a "something for nothing" policy. In the light of following suggestions, a break from tradition may be necessary, and the controlling body be known as the Board of Directors.

(c) *Provision of capital.*—Assuming, purely for the sake of illustration, that capital requirements are £150,000, and that the capacity is estimated to be 300, the cost of one share to a parent for each child educated at the school will be £500.

(d) *Purchase of a suitable building.*—Large buildings, suitable with alterations for a school, are constantly advertised for sale. Rather will the difficulties lie in getting the sanction of local authorities to put in hand the work of renovation,

alteration and addition. If the special purpose of the foundation is properly represented, there is a strong claim to priority treatment.

(e) *Capacity and scope of school.*—These cannot be divorced from (c) and (d) which are themselves complementary. It has not up to now been considered whether the school should be for boys or for girls, for either or both, and if the latter, whether co-ed or segregated. It has not been considered whether the scheme should include a prep school. The popular wish in these matters can be determined at the same time as "demand" is verified.

(f) *The Staff.*—This will call for most careful selection and, to get the right staff, good salaries must be offered. The detailed system of finance, dealt with later, precludes Housemasters from making a "bit on the side" in catering. In fixing their salaries, this loss should be taken into account and be compensated. The appointment of non-teaching staff should be reserved for ex-I.A. officers, and in the case of matrons for their widows or wives, subject always to the demand for top efficiency. The lower staff should similarly, and with the same proviso, be drawn from ex-regular soldiers.

(g) *Future finances.*—As suggested in (c) above, share certificates should be issued to parents at par at a scale of one per child, within the estimated capacity. At the end of each term, the term's working should be costed and the cost per pupil determined. In this must be also included costs of maintenance during the preceding holidays. These costs (which must be truly inclusive) together with a surcharge will in fact be the school bill for the term. The surcharge will be fixed by the Board of Directors, but will be no more than the minimum necessary to keep the finances of the school healthy by the maintenance of a sinking fund, a building fund and a staff pensions fund.

When a child leaves the school, the shareholder's certificate must be returned to the Board for resale, and must not be disposed of privately. As time passes, and presuming that the school justifies itself, demands from the general public will result and, if sufficient potential Service shareholders are not forthcoming, recourse may be had to a general waiting list.

Thus it will be seen that the initially subscribed capital is in the nature of a share. Like any other shares these will be liable to fluctuate in value. The sale of a share will provide a very welcome windfall at a convenient time when the expenses of further education start. It must also be taken into account that by reducing school bills the original capital has been productive, but its indirect contribution will not be subject to income-tax.

The main difficulties will lie in stimulating the enthusiasm of parents and in getting quasi-official support. If G.H.Q. and the India Office interest themselves in the proposal, they can do much to help. Now is the time, without delay, to initiate the scheme, before we disperse to the four corners of the world, and before the sharks get their hands on compensation proceeds.

One final thought. Would it not be a fair decision to allow a part of Mess private funds, funds donated almost entirely by British Officers, to be devoted towards the establishment at this school of scholarships for orphans of I.A. officers? And why not call it The Sepoy's College, to perpetuate the name and memory of those whom we, one and all, grieve so much to leave behind us?

Earl Wavell.

The viscounty and earldom of the United Kingdom conferred on Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell and his heirs were recently gazetted by the name, style and title of VISCOUNT KEREN, of Eritrea and of Winchester in the County of Southampton, and EARL WAVELL.

ABOUT I. A. Os.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL R.J. SHEARCROFT, M. B. E.

“THE attention of all concerned is invited to India Army Order No. so and so”. A familiar phrase—but how many officers ponder on how I.A.Os came into existence, what they are, etc. A dry subject perhaps—but to run smoothly and efficiently an Army must run as an organisation runs on rules, and it might be useful to know how these Orders have developed since they were first published on August 3, 1903.

That first batch of India Army Orders (India, not Indian Army Orders) consisted of nine pages; 2,360 copies were printed. Before 1903 such orders were designated “General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief in India”. I have been able to trace copies of G.O.C.Cs back to January, 1860, but they must go back even before them. No “imprint” is given to show how many copies were printed in that year, but in 1890, when “the Adjutant General’s Office” (then in Simla throughout the year) was responsible for the printing of them, the printing number was static from January to December at 1,303.

I. A. O. No. 1 of 1903 was a very ordinary affair; it merely recorded the receipt of the *London Gazette* of the 10th and 14th July, 1903 at Army Headquarters. It gave no reason for the change from G. O. C. C. to I. A. O., and I can only surmise that the change was decided upon when the Army in India was re-organised in 1902, at the time when the late Lord Kitchener was Commander-in-Chief.

Some of these old G. Os. C. C. make interesting reading. In those days they were evidently as careful as they are now in regard to salvaging worn-out uniform. One order reads:

“The Commander-in-Chief is pleased to direct that all condemned hospital clothing shall in future be presented by Medical Officers in a clean washed state to Committees of Survey, which are required to have the articles found unserviceable counted over in their presence.....Committees are to be careful that pieces of clothing are not substituted for complete articles; and they are, moreover, to see that the several articles condemned are reduced to rags in the machine provided for that purpose.....The rags, after being weighed, are to be carefully locked up until required for manufacture into paper, a note being made in the report of their exact weight.”

In 1880 we read that “several instances have occurred in which serge frocks have been fitted too tight.....Serge frocks should have an allowance of 4” chest, and this is to be strictly adhered to. No reduction is to be made in the waist”. That might have revealed too close an attention to appearance but quite obviously they thought much of the physical standards in these days, for elsewhere we read that “The Commander-in-Chief desires that all weakly and worn-out men of the Native Infantry Corps proceeding to China be left in India”.

Some interesting sidelights emerge from a perusal of these old orders. It used to be the practice, for instance, of publishing in G. Os. C. C. the findings of all Courts Martial, whether the individuals charged were found

"Guilty" or "Not Guilty"; in another place we read that "Assistant Surgeon A. B. is posted to the 17th Punjab Regiment in the room of Assistant Surgeon C.D., removed to another situation". Promotions of B. O. Rs as well as those of officers were also published in G. Os. C. C. for in one Order we read that "Gunner Robert A and Private Thomas O' of the Commissariat Department, are promoted to the rank of Sergeant".

I pondered over one G. O. C. C. of 1891, which ran: "Under instructions from the Horse Guards, Colonel....., East Surrey Regiment, is directed to proceed to England *at his own expense*, and to join the 2nd Battalion of his Regiment, to which he has been removed". Following this order was a similar one relating to a Major.....but the words "*at his own expense*" were omitted. Why, I wonder, the discrimination?

The Anglicised spelling of Indian place names is a subject on which much has been written but I still find it amusing to see the curious way in which the names of some towns were spelled in these old Orders. Here are some:--

Peshawur Rawal Pindee.
Cashmere Umballa.
Sealkote Punjab.
Nynee Tal Rajpootana.
Rohilcund Goruckpore.
Nepaul Dhurmsala.
Goojranwala Hosheyarpore.
Ghazeepore Mynpoorie.
Furruckabad Seetapore.
Dhoolea Meean Meer (Lahore).

I cannot help feeling that many of the pronunciations used in those days were more pleasing to the ear than the present somewhat harsh sounds.

Present-day I.A. Os. have not varied much during the past quarter of a century, except that they have been made more brief and direct. Even so, many such orders could be still further condensed, for a brief, lucid order is more effective than a long, rambling one. Officers who draft them could, I suggest, make even greater efforts to see that I.A. Os. convey the sense of the order without the use of frills, etc. How often, for instance, does one see an order beginning, "It has been decided that....." Why use that phrase? An order is an order, and the words I have quoted are superfluous.

India Army Orders differ from Army Instructions (India) in that they convey administrative instructions to the Army in India on various matters affecting all arms. Army Instructions (India) on the other hand are what one might call financial instructions, as they contain matters concerning finance, and have the concurrence of the financial authorities before issue.

India Army Orders are now issued in three categories: Special, Part I and Part II. The first is used in very special cases only, i.e., in a case of urgency which cannot wait until the normal weekly batch is published, or whenever it is desired to draw the attention of all concerned to a particular matter. Part II. A. Os. are the normal administrative orders, and are issued in batches once a week (each Saturday). Part II are those orders which notify honours and awards, appointments, promotions, etc. These, too, are issued weekly, usually on Tuesdays.

Parts I and II I. A. Os. were up to a year or so ago issued as one batch, but as the War went on and paper became more scarce, it was decided to split them into two Parts as a paper economy measure, for many units and formations did not want as many copies of Part II as they did of Part I. Though the War has ended, this practice has continued with, I believe, benefit to all concerned.

As many officers know (but unfortunately some do not) an I. A. O. should be issued only when it affects the whole, or the majority, of the Army in India. As I. A. Os. are distributed down to the smallest units, such an order reaches them in the shortest possible time. An order which affects only one Branch of the Service, however, is out of place in I. A. Os., and should be promulgated by some other means. For instance, a directive to a particular Service should not find a place in India Army Orders, but should be sent round to that Service by G. H. Q. letter.

How are the contents of these Orders collated? Branches/Directorates of G.H.Q. draft them originally, and the approved draft is sent to the Co-ordinating Section of A.Gs. Branch. That Section collects them according to a time-table, numbers them, and sends them to Press for printing. As the Press also works to a time-table, it is well to remember that, unless the I. A. O. is of a nature to be classified "Special", it will take approximately a fortnight from the time it is sent to A.Gs. Branch to the time it is published.

To those who like their information in tabular form the following table showing the issue of I. A. Os. before and after World War I, and also before and after World War II may be of interest:

Date.		Copies Printed.	No. of pages, Weekly aver. in parenthesis.	No. of I. A. Os issued dur- ing year.
June, 1914	..	2,867	180 (7)	338
December, 1918	..	6,295	928 (18)	1,083
August, 1939	..	4,389	1,056 (32)	1,009
August, 1945	.	26,558 (Part I).	1,256 (37)	1,780

Roughly, during the late War years one ton of paper was used each week for the printing of all classes of India Army Orders. The print number is closely watched, as it necessarily relates to the Distribution List, but every effort is made to avoid an undue waste of paper.

The "Run-Down"

More than a million and a half men and women had been demobilised from the Indian Army up to the end of March last. During that month 1,017 Army units were disbanded. Altogether 8,173 Army units have been abolished, 61 Indian State Forces units have been returned to their States, and 11 Nepalese Contingent units have returned to Nepal.

MEDAL COLLECTING

BY MAJOR G. A. MACMUNN

5th Bn. (Q.V.O. Corps of Guides) The Frontier Force Regiment.

AS a recent convert to the hobby of medal collecting I would not presume to attempt a technical article on the subject. There are many collectors in India better qualified than myself to do so. My sole object herein is to try and stimulate interest amongst officers in a subject that not only contains the very essence of the history of the Fighting Services but is also, in my opinion, a most valuable means of preserving and fostering tradition.

India to-day is a fast changing country, and it is in the nature of things that changes should occur in her Fighting Forces. It would, however, be a tragedy were the necessary changes to become synonymous with the sweeping away of tradition. India's fighting men, and most particularly those of her Army, have earned fame on hundreds of battlefields both without and within her shores. The first duty of the armed forces of any country is to be loyal to the constituted government of the country. The many medals awarded to India's navy, army and air force are, therefore, the outward and visible tributes to their gallantry, loyalty and devotion to duty.

THE SCOPE AND INTEREST OF MEDAL COLLECTING

The history of fashioning metal pieces commemorating events or persons goes back certainly as far as the Greeks and Romans. In the fifteenth century A.D. this art was brought to a high level by the Italians. Such commemorative pieces were not, however, "medals" in the sense intended in this contribution; they are nowadays more generally known as "medallions". In this article I refer as medals to those pieces awarded to the armed forces for gallantry and meritorious service, or to commemorate their part in action, as well as to certain other commemorative medals permitted to be worn by the Fighting Services.

The British Government was singularly late in appreciating the value of medals as a means of rewarding bravery and of fostering pride and morale. True, Queen Elizabeth issued no less than three medals for the defeat of the Spanish Armada. They were, however, by no means general awards to all personnel taking part in the battle. They are extremely rare and are mostly in national collections. James I issued various medals which were not really military awards. Charles I not only issued several awards to individual commanders in the Army, but also issued a warrant instituting an award for gallantry. This was termed the "Forlorn Hope" medal. No rolls or undisputed specimens of the medal exist, and it appears very doubtful whether the King's intentions were put into effect.

It was not until the time of Cromwell in 1650 that a general award was made to all ranks of the Protector's army of 11,000 men who defeated a superior Royalist Force at Dunbar. Thereafter rather spasmodic awards were made, including the Culloden medal, which was the first to be issued with a "ribbon." This medal had a crimson ribbon with green edges, but only a few pieces were

struck. During the Napoleonic wars one or two naval pieces were issued by private persons. Whilst it is true that general awards were issued later for the Napoleonic wars, they were issued so late that many of the survivors had died.

It is of interest to note that the Honourable East India Company had adopted the policy of issuing regular campaign awards to her soldiers, and even to the regular British troops operating in her support, some years before the custom was regularly adopted by the British Government. It was finally the personal interest of Queen Victoria which put the matter on a sound footing.

Would-be collectors have a wide choice in which to interest themselves. A general collection of campaign awards is naturally the one with the widest interest and appeal. On the other hand, those of more limited means can confine themselves to a particular group of medals, for example those pieces issued for campaigns in India, or Africa. An interesting and by no means common group are the medals issued by the H.E.I.C. to which I have referred above. Others may prefer to collect medals awarded to one particular regiment, or group of regiments.

The group of British and Colonial pieces issued for long service and good conduct provide another basis for specialisation. Lastly there are the commemorative pieces, such as Durbar, Jubilee and Coronation medals.

SOME PRACTICAL POINTS FOR WOULD-BE COLLECTORS

Before trying to answer some of the questions which confront every would-be collector I will explain the words commonly used in describing medals. The front face of a medal is called the "obverse" and the rear face the "reverse". Below the main design on the reverse there is often a small space called the "exergue". This is commonly used to show the date of issue or theatre of operations of the award.

For the remaining portions of a medal and its attachments there are two somewhat confusing nomenclatures. Official orders, instructions, etc. usually refer to the device by which an award is attached to its ribbon as "the suspender". The small plates attached to the suspender to intimate awards of the same medal for various battles or campaigns are then termed "clasps", the word "bar" being reserved to denote the second or subsequent award of a particular decoration for gallantry to one individual. Clasps are attached by small eyes and rivets to each other, the present order of wearing being the earliest award at the bottom. In earlier days second and subsequent clasps were added below the first clasp.

Bars to decorations are placed half-way up the ribbon. For some reason, most collectors and dealers use the words "clasp" for the attachment of the medal to its ribbon, and "bar" to denote both campaign awards and subsequent awards of a gallantry decoration. To me the former system has always seemed both logical and clear.

Many non-collecting friends to whom I have shown my medals have said: "But how on earth do you get hold of them?" Generally speaking there are three methods open to collectors in India. The first is by contact with other collectors, who sometimes have duplicates or portions of their collections for disposal. The second method is through regular dealers. There are in England firms who specialize in this subject and have a great store of knowledge

at the collector's disposal. There are also dealers in India, but those with whom I have dealt have generally little knowledge beyond an exalted idea of the value of their goods! I append a short list of dealers in London and India which may be of help. There are doubtless many others.

The third method is "bazaar combing" which is great fun. It happens like this. After a soldier dies his family may be hard up, or there may be no one left who values the medals he leaves behind him. The inevitable result is that many medals find their way into the silver markets of the neighbouring towns, where they quickly go into the melting-pot. It is tragic that this should be so, but at least it offers the collector a chance of a lucky find, for usually medals picked up under these circumstances are obtained for little more than their silver value.

The most likely places are, of course, towns located in the traditional recruiting areas. I have seen medals in greater or smaller quantities in Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Delhi, Bombay, Ludhiana and Abbottabad. Those that I have seen in these silversmith's shops have included awards to both British and Indian troops; and Naval and Air Force as well as military awards.

There are other possibilities to be explored. Medals may sometimes be obtained through numismatic societies. Messrs. Glendining & Co., Ltd., of London, hold large sales of medals and coins approximately once a month. To the former I shall be referring again later. It is not, however, an entirely satisfactory source for collectors resident in India, because owing to time-lag one's requirements are often snapped up before one has had a chance to bid for them. If, however, one's collecting is sufficiently selective for one's likely requirements to be defined in advance, it is well worth employing a dealer to bid for one. This any of the big dealers will do for a very moderate commission on medals purchased.

What do medals cost? This is not a question that can be answered precisely, for there are many factors involved. Cost depends on rarity, condition, demand and local conditions of purchase. All these, with the exception of rarity, vary constantly. Rarity, in medal collecting, is itself a complex matter. For example, there are certain medals, or certain clasps, which are very rare because so few were issued. In other circumstances a medal may in itself be common enough, whilst the issues of that medal to the units chiefly concerned in some famous action may be very rare indeed. Medals to officers are naturally much scarcer, and therefore more expensive, than those awarded to the rank and file.

In the case of medals for which a large number of clasps have been awarded there are always certain clasps, or combinations of clasps, that are much rarer than others. A case in point is the India Medal for actions between 1799—1826, which was not, however, issued until 1851. This medal is somewhat scarce whatever clasp it may bear but, whilst the medal with the clasps for Ava or Bhurtpoor is comparatively easy to obtain, the medal with the clasp for Corygaum is very rare indeed.

When the same award has been made to the Army and Navy, the naval specimens are generally higher priced than the Army ones, since fewer naval issues are usually involved. An exception is the Baltic Medal of 1854-55, for which the military awards are scarcer. The same general rule probably applies to awards common to the air force and the army.

A pair or group of medals awarded to one individual are collectively considerably more valuable than single specimens of the same awards. Such pairs

and groups should never be split up. Any information regarding the service of an individual adds not only to the interest of his medals, but also to the sale value of them.

Groups of medals containing such treasures as the Gold Peninsular Cross will fetch at auction several hundred pounds. The Victoria Cross, whether single or in a group, is also rather beyond the purse of the small collector. But the commoner medals are a very different matter. Some two years ago London dealers would offer a single clasp specimen to a private soldier of such a medal for as little as 6s. 6d., whilst two clasp specimens might cost between 10s. and 12s. 6d., but even the cheapest officers' medals would cost between 30s. and £2-2-0.

Prices are now rather higher. In India only a few years ago medals could be picked up for Rs. 5 or even less. The rising price of silver has, however, now more than doubled those prices. In 1945 I bought a four-clasp specimen of the first George V issue of the I.G.S. Medal 1908 for Rs. 25. A single clasp specimen can be bought for about Rs. 10 to Rs. 12.

A coin collector has constantly to be on his guard against forgeries. It may well be asked whether the same vigilance is necessary for a medal collector. The answer is "Yes, but to a very much more limited extent." Medals themselves are not often forged, and the process of casting them from moulds made from the originals makes such forgeries easy to detect by a rough and spotty surface and slightly smaller diameter than the originals. The danger lies in the addition of spurious clasps, and before paying a lot of money for a rare combination of clasps the collector is well advised to seek confirmation from the official rolls which exist of all awards of medals.

It should here be noted that up to the World War of 1939-45 most of the campaign medals were inscribed with the recipient's name and corps, and it is by this means that verification of the authenticity of any piece can be obtained. Unnamed medals do exist. In certain cases they may be genuine awards to individuals; in others they may be surplus specimens, and as such are of very much less value than named specimens. For collectors of the future, the verification of medals of the last war will present a serious problem, as it is understood that they are to be issued unnamed.

Space does not permit of any detailed list of books dealing with medals. Most of the earlier works are either out of print or costly to buy. They can often be found in Service libraries. There are, however, two useful books of reference for the beginner which are quite easy to come by. They are: "The Medal Collector" by Dr. Stanley C. Johnson (Herbert Jenkins 7/6) and "Ribbons and Medals" by "Taffrail". The stock lists and sale catalogues of dealers contain a wealth of information, whilst regimental histories are also often of great value to the medal collector.

A FEW SUGGESTIONS

This article already grows long, but before ending it I would like to put forward one or two suggestions for furthering the interest taken by the Fighting Services in their medals.

Most pre-war messes contained cases of medals belonging to distinguished officers and V.C.O.s of the unit. I venture to think, however, that in very few units or Centres has any sustained attempt been made to collect the medals

awarded to all ranks of the corps. Yet such collections would assuredly be of the greatest value in fostering tradition and teaching regimental history. They would also go far towards saving the veterans medals from the melting-pot.

My next suggestion is connected with the **above**. On regimental holidays, particularly one commemorating a battle, an exhibition of medals awarded to men of the unit who fought in that battle would arouse the greatest interest amongst the men. In a small way I was able to try this out on Delhi Day last year when, at Retreat, I floodlit a case containing such Mutiny Medals as I possessed in my collection of regimental medals. To "make a show" the case was guarded by the two youngest recruits in the battalion. Under each group were explanatory notes written in Roman Urdu. For long after Retreat was finished there were men looking at and discussing the medals.

In most countries there are numismatic societies. The Numismatic Society of India has its Headquarters at the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay, and the annual subscription of Rs. 6 entitles members to receive the Journal and other papers published by the society free. But the hobby and science of numismatics embraces the collection, preservation and study of coins in all their aspects as well as of medals. Since the scope of the study and collecting of coins is so much wider than that of medals, and since there are many more coin collectors than medal collectors, it stands to reason that by far the greater part of a numismatic society's activities is devoted to coins.

It seems to me therefore that there is scope for an organisation which might be called "The Fighting Services Medal Society of India" and which could with advantage be affiliated to the United Service Institution of India. Whilst general meetings and exhibitions on an "All-India" basis might be difficult to arrange, such a society would be an admirable medium for exchanging information on medals and Command meetings should present no great obstacle. In the initial stages, the Editor of the *U. S. I. Journal* might be able to allot space for the literary matter of the society. Later, if membership warranted it the society could issue a periodical bulletin of its own.

Some Medal Dealers in England and India:

A. H. Baldwin & Sons Ltd.
Dealers in Coins and Medals,
3 Robert Street,
Adelphi,
London W.C.2.

Munshi Harbans Lal,
T/629 Bazaar Sorofiano,
Rawalpindi City,
Punjab.

Spink & Sons Ltd.
Medallists to H. M. the King,
5, 6, 7 King Street,
St. James,
London S.W.1.

Sharaf Thakar Dass,
Andar Sher,
Peshawar City, N.W.F.P.

B. A. Seaby Ltd.
Dealers in Coins and Medals,
65 Great Portland St.,
London W.1.

Mohd. Azam & Sons,
Military Outfitters,
Ludhiana,
Punjab.

INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1941-42 BURMA CAMPAIGN

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL P.E.C.J. GWYN.

THE BURMA campaign of 1941/42, now four and a half years old, has passed into history. There is, however, much to be learned from that campaign, which was both a failure and a success—a failure in so far as it was originally designed, and a success in its later development as the defence of India. “Intelligence” contributed to both failure and success—and it has its share of the lessons. This account of how “I” worked, under “Planning Intelligence”, “Operational Intelligence” and “Security Intelligence” may thus be of value.

Planning Intelligence.—Before the outbreak of the Far Eastern War, Burma was an independent military command, with an “I” staff of one G. 3, and one or two I.Os. sufficient merely for the revision of Route Books and other routine duties. The two principal “I” agencies dealing with Far Eastern Intelligence work were the War Office in the U.K. and the Far Eastern Combined Bureau (F.E.C.B.) in Singapore. The military members of the latter were experts in Japanese army and Far Eastern matters. I do not know the exact relationship between the F.E.C.B. and the Burma Command, but the former should have been, and perhaps was, recognised as the “I” Planning Staff for Burma.

That war was about to break out in the Far East was increasingly obvious in the autumn of 1941. The Japanese occupation of southern French Indo-China; the replacement of Prince Konoye as Premier by General Tojo (an appointment which was a sure harbinger of war); and the steady withdrawal of Japanese nationals and shipping from Allied areas were signs. A plan for Burma's defence was accordingly drawn up in late October 1941.

It was based on an appreciation, or assumption, that the main Japanese invasion into Burma from Siam would be through the southern Shan States along the LARPANG-KENTUNG-TAUNGVI road, and that there would be only a subsidiary force operating against Moulmein. It is believed that one of the main factors influencing this conclusion was the absence of any M.T. road from Siam into Burma *via* Moulmein; another factor was Siamese territorial aspirations towards the Shan States east of the Salween, and the affinity of the inhabitants there with those of northern Siam.

We all know that this appreciation was wrong. Why was it wrong, and what were the results of this wrong appreciation, and therefore wrong plan? It was obviously wrong because the appreciation neglected two factors of which there was ample evidence in War Office and F.E.C.B. files—evidence collected during the previous three or four years of Japanese training at home and campaigning in China.

One factor was the comparative scarcity, by modern standards, of M.T. in the Japanese Army, especially within the Division. The other was the use made by the Japanese Command of the magnificent endurance of the Japanese soldier to try and obtain surprise by operating through or over country less suitable for attack and therefore less well defended.

The effects of this faulty appreciation were varied. In the strictly military sphere the worst results were avoided, as delays east of the Sittang River enabled troops to be withdrawn from the Shan States area, except the Chinese forces, the first arrivals of which (two divisions) went to the Kengtung area and stayed there throughout the campaign. But there was considerable loss in administrative and engineer effort, in movement of stockpiles, and in the acute shortage of maps of Lower Burma—though there were literally truck-loads of unwanted maps of the Shan States. This meant the flying out of maps available in India, and this in turn meant the delayed despatch of other items of urgent priority.

But in two wider matters the worst results were far-reaching. One was the land route between India and Burma, constructed so hastily in the spring of 1942. A Japanese advance into Burma through the southern Shan States, instead of via Moulmein, gave a totally different slant on this question. With the main British forces still holding Lower Burma, or being evacuated by sea, its urgency was no longer so acute, and even its desirability doubtful.

The other matter was Rangoon. No Civil Government—least of all, one politically circumstanced as that of Burma in 1941—can change its plans and carry them out with the speed of a military organisation. A Japanese advance via the Shan States meant at the worst an evacuation of Rangoon by sea. It certainly did not mean an evacuation to Upper Burma by land, which was implied by a successful Japanese thrust from Moulmein. Probably much of the difficulties and delays experienced in the civil evacuation of Rangoon was due to the necessity of improvisation caused by this unexpected Japanese advance.

I have dealt with this aspect of Planning Intelligence in detail to show how far-reaching are the effects of ill-based plans. One other item of Planning Intelligence requires mention—the provision of "I" staffs. There was a very good case to be made out for increasing the "I" staff in Burma in mid-October, 1941, when Tojo took over in Japan. There was an overwhelming case for it to have been brought to full strength as soon as war broke out.

Yet it was only on 6th January, 1942 that a proper organisation was drawn up by D.M.I., India, and approved by the Government of Burma. Previous to that date a collection of "I" Staff had been begun, but there was a delay occasioned by the unfortunate illness of the officer first selected for the appointment of G.S.O.I., and I, appointed in his place, did not reach Rangoon until towards the end of January, while others arrived later still. The result of this lack of foresight in peace was that Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Hutton, then G.O.C., Burma, had no "I" staff to advise him during the critical period of the early Japanese moves and penetrations into Tenasserim.

Operational Intelligence.—This provides, of course, the basic detail for Planning Intelligence, but I differentiate it as signifying those items of Battle Intelligence which help to build up the picture of the enemy and his Order of Battle and dispositions, particularly in so far as they affect our own formation commanders and troops who may be in contact. Topographical Intelligence will thus also come under the same head.

Before the outbreak of War, Burma Command was responsible for all Operational Intelligence inside Burma, and F.E.C.B. for all intelligence on the Japanese Army and the countries adjacent to Burma. In neither case were

the results adequate, perhaps due in part to a conscious or sub-conscious belief in the impregnability of Singapore, and the lack of a sense of great urgency in consequence.

In Burma, moreover, in addition to the lack of energy in collecting information, there was a lack of realisation of the type of information to be gathered, and the Route Books were still confined to the principal M.T. and cart roads, and contained no reliable details of "tankability" of country, nor any matter on the possibilities of movement by water.

Information provided by F.E.C.B. on the Japanese Army was not nearly enough—partly due to the difficulty of collecting it and partly due to the lack of a receiving end in Burma. Had a G.I "I" been installed in Burma in mid-October, 1941, the necessity for further information and the details required would have been stressed, and F.E.C.B. would have known what was wanted. It may also be not unfairly assumed that F.E.C.B. looked on Burma as an "Intelligence" backwater.

The result? Nothing like a proper Japanese Order of Battle existed in Rangoon on the outbreak of War; nothing like adequate up-to-date information existed on Divisions of other Japanese War Establishments; and information was equally scanty on Japanese equipment. Add to all this the fact that many troops were new arrivals, all were trained to look to the Mid-East rather than Japan for their "I" background, many units were new or largely "new" and inexperienced in the essentials of unit "I" work in battle of capturing documents, prisoners, equipment, etc.—and it will be realised how unprepared our forces were from the "Intelligence" aspect.

In practice, what happened was that for the first month of his fighting, and for the previous month of Japanese concentration, General Hutton *had no knowledge at all* of the Japanese forces, and he may fairly claim that the assistance from "Intelligence" was negligible. The first real information came about mid-February, 1942 (Moulmein had been lost a fortnight before). It came in the form of a note-book and a company strength return, captured, I believe, by that fine battalion, the 4/12 Frontier Force Regiment.

I well remember translating these documents. The company strength return was of a Sapper unit, part of a regiment with men from a certain North Central area in Japan. Had we had a proper Japanese Order of Battle I could have identified the Division, which was in fact the 33rd. The note-book contained various notes on Central China (confirming, had I known it, that it was the 33rd Division); the usual lectures on devotion to the Emperor; and, all by itself, one startling phrase, dated Bangkok in early January: "Off to Burma with the 55th Division". (At that time the F.E.C.B. Order of Battle showed the 55th Division to be in Manchuria—an inaccuracy, as it went straight from Japan to Saigon in November/December, 1941).

From the point of view of documents and equipment, though not yet from that of prisoners, we were now in a much more satisfactory position, and though General Alexander who followed General Hutton as G. O. C., may well have rightly felt that, compared with standards at that time in England and the Middle East, our successes were meagre, they did enable us to see something of the other side of the hill.

Where they still fell down was in long-distance Intelligence (two new divisions, the 18th and the 56th, arrived in Rangoon a month after we left

but we only identified them by Chinese fighting in the Pyinmana area later), and in short-range topographical and local intelligence. In this latter respect 17th Division did organise a successful Yoma Intelligence lay-out for operations in the Pegu Yomas, but with so much against us in our military failure in Burma, it was difficult to ensure the co-operation of our Burmese helpers when the Japanese again started to push us back; and with our evacuation of the Prome area the Yoma lay-out necessarily steadily disintegrated.

Two other points may be noted. One is that, though our "I" successes were only partial and far from being entirely satisfactory to our Commanders and Operations Staff, "I" in Burma did produce results of value as regards the Japanese Order of Battle in Burma, which served as the foundation for a satisfactory expansion in years to come. We were also able to provide a good deal of data on other aspects of the Japanese Army, not least that of identifying the various code names and numbers then and subsequently in use.

The other point is that it might be argued that our results had little or no effect on the campaign. After the loss of Rangoon we had no reinforcements to come into the country, and even before that the flow was very limited and uncertain. Even if we had had the Japanese Order of Battle on a plate at that time, there was (it might be said) very little we could do about it. There is some truth in this, of course, and it was very certainly the case of the Japanese in Burma from mid-1944 onwards for they could get no reinforcements into Burma, and whether they credited us with five or fifty divisions, their dispositions had to be much the same.

But in our case we did have some power of manoeuvre, first with our own reinforcements, and later with the Chinese, and though "I" knowledge of the Burma front may not have helped the Commanders very much, it did help India to assess the degree of attack which might be anticipated. Furthermore, the psychological effect of not knowing anything about the enemy is highly demoralising; he is always credited with vast forces, magnificent equipment, an intimate knowledge of the country, and tremendous strategic skill. He shrinks to his normal size as experience in battle brings out his weaknesses as well as his strengths, and "I" definitely helped in this matter by providing a solid background of facts on which reasonable and sound conclusions could be based.

Security Intelligence.—Military Security Intelligence did not exist in Burma before the war, except for censorship, a mixed Civil Military organisation which was doing undoubted good work within the limitations forced on it by peace conditions and general political considerations. There were no Field Security Sections, nor any knowledge of how to use them had they been there; there was no system of passes or identity cards; no special protection of important HQs. Nor was the situation much improved when Headquarters of 17th Division, with a Divisional Field Security section, arrived, as the Field Security Section was used as an additional baggage guard.

Nothing really happened until the personnel to fill the vacancies in the organisation drawn up by D.M.I., India Command, in early January, 1942, began to arrive. From then on Field Security Sections were formed as rapidly as personnel could be found to fill them, and as was the case everywhere else in the war, the Sections found themselves doing the strangest jobs—from beating up looters to putting out fires, sinking Treasury silver, and shepherding thousands of refugees. The story, indeed, is the same as for Operational Intelligence—no previous training and ignorance of the work involved. Once

the organisation got going, results appeared at once, and if some of the results were not strictly military Security matters, they were none the less welcome for all that.

On the civil side something did exist before the war—a Burma Defence Bureau, manned by Police and Army under the excellent leadership of Mr. (later Colonel) C. G. Stewart of the Burma Police. This was affiliated to some extent—and perhaps “affiliated” is too strong a word—with F.E.C.B. in Singapore. Certainly this Bureau justified itself in peace by the watch it kept on the activities of Japanese and pro-Japanese in Burma, and as far as possible on the traffic across the Siamese frontier. It would doubtless have been equally valuable in war if the Burma war had not gone so disastrously against us. As it was, it was, so to speak, “over-run” before it could make arrangements for alternative sources of information, and as was the case in all other civil branches of the Burma Government, our military failure had an inevitable reaction on the steadfastness of the Burmese civil servants.

What of the Fifth Column activities in Burma in 1942? Of course, there were some, and these were the usual *goonda* lootings and killings. But the impression on me, as a newcomer to the country, was the quietness of the countryside. District after district, Tharawaddy, Shwebo and others, all stated to be highly inflammable, remained uninflamed. Perhaps the campaign passed over too quickly, and so plans for rising became unnecessary, but perhaps also the Burman was merely pro-Burman, and not so pro-Japanese as was sometimes thought.

LESSONS.

The “I” lessons from the campaign are as old as the hills, and have formed the staple of many a military criticism in the past. Is it too much to hope that they may be avoided in the future?

First, I suggest military “I” staffs in peace must remember that their job is military “I” first, and politico-military “I” second. There is a tendency to forget this in peace, when no particular enemy is in view. There is nothing like a knowledge of the enemy’s military machine, his military organisation, his military equipment, his W.E.s and W.E.T.s. and his Order of Battle. On this foundation reasonably firm appreciations can be built. Compared with this, the importance of War Minister or Prime Minister “A” replacing ditto ditto “B” is secondary—certainly for all the “I” staff except the No. 1. So often the reason for change is either so clear as to need no comment, or so obscure that comment is guess work.

Second lesson is that “I” must be thinking “high, wide and handsome”, and the higher the “I”, the handsomer its thought. I speak from experience, being aware of my own failings in this matter in the Burma campaign of 1941/42. It is not only thinking ahead that is required; it is flexibility of thought as well. Conclusions valid in the summer of 1941 were wrong by the autumn; and those valid in the autumn were wrong two months later. The same applies in war at an even higher *tempo* of change. The Japanese division that captured Hong Kong landed in N.E.I. a little later; one of the three divisions that took the Philippines also helped to take Java and one of the three that took Malaya moved on in some six weeks to Burma.

Third lesson is that Commanders must be in no doubt as to who their "I" advisers are, and must seek their advice and not try quack remedies from elsewhere. Equally, the "I" staff must know their responsibilities in the way of advice, and must give it, however unpalatable it may be, and even if unasked.

Fourth lesson is military unpreparedness. In peace "I", except in very high headquarters and in certain specialised appointments, is very difficult to keep alive. We are averse to selecting an obvious "enemy" or even from crediting any nations with such designs against us. "I", therefore, tends to lack an objective, and that destroys the interest of the ordinary soldier. But when war is imminent or existing, then "I" must come into its own, and to do this arrangements for greatly expanded organisations must exist in peace, awaiting the pressing of button "A". They did not exist in the Far East in 1941.

Nor is organisation the only problem. There is also the problem of training. It is certain that the troops in Burma in 1941—and highly probable that all the troops in the Far East—were quite untrained in their "I" duties, whether operational or security. This, again, is a thing almost impossible to teach adequately in peace. But it must be done as soon as war appears probable, and it must be well under way before war breaks out.

Delay in learning, as was shown in Burma, Malaya and elsewhere, means a breakdown in "Intelligence". This was particularly the case in Burma in 1942 when, with the absence of any air photography, captures on the battle-field represented 80% of the operational intelligence gained, and when Fifth Column reports, however exaggerated, showed the permanent necessity of being security-minded.

Indian State's Settlement Schemes.

Several settlement schemes for ex-soldiers have been announced recently by Indian States.

Mysore Government has decided to grant industrial loans to skilled workers from amongst demobilised men for the purchase of tools, implements and appliances to enable them to tide over the early stages of manufacture on a commercial scale.

Jaipur has three separate land schemes for the settlement of over 1,200 ex-Servicemen. Two of the schemes will be organised as a single model village, and the settlers selected will be so chosen to have affinity of service or place of domicile. Artisans for the economic life of the village will be selected from the same class as the settlers. Initially free grants of land will be made, no price being payable by the settlers. For the first ten years no land revenue will be levied.

Fifty ex-Servicemen of the Jhalawar State have each been allotted twenty acres of land near Brij Nagar, capital of the State. Already in existence in the area is a storage tank from which the settlers, with State assistance, will have to organise a proper irrigation system. An ex-Servicemen's Co-operative Farming colony is to be organised to take charge of the settlement, advance loans, market produce and generally assist in improving the standard of living of the settlers.

Rampur Durbar has offered over 20,000 acres of land in the Bilaspur Tehsil of the State for colonisation by ex-Servicemen. The area will be divided into twenty colonies, each covering about 1,000 acres of land and accommodating forty to fifty colonists. Headmen of the villages will be ex-V. C.Os or N.C.Os, who will receive 25 extra acres of land; and a multi-purpose Co-operative Society will be started in each village.

ABOUT THE WEST AFRICAN SOLDIER

BY BRIGADIER C. R. A. SWYNNERTON, D.S.O.

ALTOGETHER some 100,000 troops were despatched from West Africa to India and Burma during the late war and a large number of pioneer companies went to the Middle East. The West Africans were never organized as a Corps, but their expeditionary force consisted of two Divisions—the 81st and 82nd—with various corps troops' units such as Field Park and Artisan Works Companies, Field Dressing Stations and General Hospitals, Transport Companies, etc. In addition, a vast camp grew up at Comilla for the holding and training of reinforcements of all arms, and this for a long period held over 6,000 men.

Although the Royal West African Frontier Force had served in East Africa in two wars, this was the first occasion in its history that it left its native continent; for the first time in its history, too, troops of the force—81st Division—were commanded by an Indian Army Officer, Major-General F. J. Loftus-Tottenham, D.S.O. It may therefore be of interest to those who have served near formations or units of the R.W.A.F.F. to know something of these soldiers and the countries whence they are recruited.

The West African colonies of the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria became British by treaty or conquest in the recent centuries, Northern Nigeria having been comparatively lately acquired. The mistake of considering all West Africans to be homogeneous people is perhaps natural, but is none the less great. For not only does the Gambian differ in language, customs and characteristics from the Gold Coaster, but the northern Nigerian, generally known as the Hausaman, differs from his southern compatriot as much as the English differ from the Italians, or Pathans from Madrasis. As much, too, do the various peoples of Sierra Leone differ from each other, and that colony is a small one, about the size of Scotland, with as many tribes as Scotland has clans and with each tribe speaking its own language.

There are probably almost as many different languages—not dialects—spoken in West Africa as there are in India. Few of them have any orthography, but the educated northerners in all colonies use the Arabic script which has come to them with Islam. Hausa, the *lingua franca* of the north, is easy to learn and also to convert into Roman script, but the tongues spoken in the south are exceptionally difficult to master as the sounds they require are totally different from those in use in Europe as a whole. The ordinary European alphabet is now used when writing these languages, but many of the letters have to be given different values.

The boundaries of all these colonies are largely artificial, and therefore some tribes find themselves partly in British and partly in French or, in the case of Sierra Leone, Liberian territory. Thus the Gambia is a narrow sliver of land on either side of the river of that name, and the borders of both the Gold Coast and Nigeria are virtually straight lines. The Gambia and Sierra Leone are mostly jungle, or "bush" as it is termed in West Africa, but large expanses in both the Gold Coast and Nigeria are completely open.

In these two colonies there is a belt, 60 to 100 miles deep along the coast, which is dense rain-forest and it is from here that much valuable timber such as mahogany and ebony is extracted. Experiments in growing teak have been highly successful, and the many wild rubber trees were much tapped to cope with the shortages of rubber after we had lost Malaya. Cocoa grows profusely in extensive plantations in both these bigger colonies.

As the traveller goes north the rain-forest gives way to what is termed "orchard bush", consisting mostly of relatively small trees and without so much undergrowth as is found in the rain-forest. Further north again, this orchard bush gives way to flat open savannah country, broken here and there by hilly outcrops of rock, the trees becoming more and more scarce until, over the French border, the Sahara is reached. The northern areas are almost entirely free from tsetse fly, as indeed is much of the south also, and horses up to 15 hands are plentiful and cheap. These make excellent polo ponies, and officers have been known, in the remoter areas, to buy them for 30s., though £25 to £30 is the average price in the towns.

The population of these colonies is largely agricultural, the most important products being groundnuts (monkey or pea nuts) and palm oil and palm kernels, all most valuable for their edible oil and fat content. Ore with a very high percentage of tin is mined in Central Nigeria, while the Gold Coast produces ores, gold and manganese and Sierra Leone diamonds. Coal is also mined in Nigeria.

To one who knows the West Africans, the various tribes are vastly different. Southerners are not nearly so black as the northerners and have a distinctly brown texture in their skin, caused no doubt by being protected to a large extent from the direct rays of the sun by the rain-forest in which they live. They are also on the whole smaller than the northerners. Christianity has made far more progress in the south than in the north, partly because those regions have been open to European trading for a much longer period and partly because Islam has for a long time been firmly planted in the north. In Northern Nigeria the Sultan of Sokoto, known as the *Sarikin Musalmi* (Commander of the Faithful), holds religious sway not only over millions of Africans in Nigeria but also over many in French territory and beyond the northern limits of the Gold Coast.

Thanks to Arabic and Mohammedan influence the northerners have always been more closely knit in a governmental system than the southerners. From the day they are born, children are taught to respect and defer to the elders of their family, to the village headman, to the district head and finally to their Emir or senior chief. In the south things aren't quite so orderly, and hence it is that the northerner takes so much more readily and unquestioningly to army discipline.

Possibly another factor in this is that the longer duration of European influence and the incomparably more state and mission schools in the south have to some extent weaned the African there from his tribal beliefs and customs, and even gone some way towards his detribalisation. Hence one gets the state of affairs in a tribe when some have university degrees and the rest occupy intermediate stages between that standard and illiterate paganism, steeped in the superstitions known universally as "juju".

Between the Moslem northerners and the partially educated southerners in Nigeria there is the great tribe known as the Tivs, or Munshis. They are almost 100% pagan and inhabit the jungles south of the Benue River. Their language is extremely difficult to learn and they themselves show little interest in learning either English or Hausa. Therefore, before the war they were little

recruited; but their excellence as carriers made them much in favour for the Auxiliary Groups, of which more anon.

Juju in its many forms is by no means a matter for non-Africans to dismiss with contempt, for although it may not affect them, it is, to the African, a most serious reality. If Private Okon hires a medicine man to put a curse on Private Okocha, the latter will suffer until the medicine man removes it or until he hires another to produce a stronger countervailing *juju*. Doctors will tell you how they have been quite unable to discover why a man is suddenly incapable of standing upright, or of standing up at all, or why he is visibly wasting away, etc. The M.O. new to Africa will probably charge the patient with malingering, but if the Unit Commander knows his business he tells the local chief, and the sick man is sent to his best medicine man. Then, after the requisite fee has been paid by the patient, he comes back cured.

On one occasion my Brigade was camped in a *kola* nut grove in the south, and from each tree there hung the dry shoulder and skin bones of oxen. On each bone was some writing in Arabic script and, to protect the writing from the rain, the string tying the bone to a branch passed through the centre of an inverted half-gourd which acted as an umbrella. This contraption was the *juju* which protected the nuts from thieves. One day on seeing a mess "boy" picking a windfall nut off the ground and eating it, I asked him if he wasn't being a fool. No, he replied, the owner had said that they could eat as many nuts in the grove as they liked, but they took them out and sold them at their peril.

A month or two later we returned to our normal camp before sailing to India, and within three days one of the mess "boys" was suddenly stricken—he was quite incapable of walking more than two or three paces without collapsing. He was a contankerous individual, and it was thought at first that he was trying to "work his ticket". Doctors found nothing wrong with him, and so the local chief was asked to produce his best medicine man. That worthy said the "boy" was beyond his skill, and in two or three days the victim died and a post-mortem revealed nothing. The senior mess "boy", who had grown old in the service of the R.W.A.F.F., told us that this particular "boy", having brought a kit bag full of *kola* nuts back with him, had sold them in the town and so the *juju* had unerringly killed him.

Practically all the troops, before coming to India, procured amulets to ward off danger and death. If one was killed and you asked his comrades how it was they could still believe in this type of *juju*, their reply was invariably that the dead man couldn't have paid enough money for it—an argument impossible to upset. On the other hand, as happened at least once to my certain knowledge, when one of these charms was struck by and deflected a bullet, the owner's confidence in his own security was enormously increased.

Juju can also be put to other uses. A "boy" of mine once brought me a ten-shilling note and asked me to send it in a letter to an apparently famous medicine man far away in the north. The letter I was to write was to enquire of the sage the names of the winners at the forthcoming race meeting. I expostulated with the "boy", but he was adamant and so I wrote the letter. The days passed but the long hoped-for tips didn't arrive and the race meeting was getting uncomfortably close. Would Master send the medicine man a telegram? Master did, a "reply paid" one at that. Back came the answer on the morning of the races, "Send another five shillings". The medicine man had won.

Facial markings of the various tribes have created much interest amongst strangers to the West Africans. This custom of cicatrisation is slowly dying out and may be compared with the old European system of coats-of-arms. Tribal battles were hand-to-hand affairs in which uniform was unknown. Therefore, amongst other reasons, to recognize friend from foe there grew up this system of cutting deep scars on the face, neck and head, frequently extended as ornamentation over the chest and back.

The method of cicatrisation is as follows. A baby has the tribal marks scored in its face with a sharp knife, after which charcoal or some other substance is rubbed into the cuts to make certain that they do not heal in such a way as to become invisible. Some tribal marks, *e.g.*, the broad triple scars on both cheeks of the Yorubas are easy to identify, but others are more difficult. For cicatrisation went the same way as coats-of-arms. In the same way as a knight sometimes quartered his arms with those of the family from which he took his bride, so a child of West African parents, if they were of different tribes, frequently carried the markings of both tribes on his or her face. As there was no College of Heralds to regulate this practice, it follows that some markings, quartered and quartered again, are quite undecipherable to the non-African.

Filing teeth is another custom in some tribes; occasionally one comes across a man with all his front teeth filed to the shape of incisors, and all the Tivs file an inverted U where the two middle front teeth of the upper jaw meet. Strangely enough this doesn't seem to have any adverse effect on the condition of the teeth, and dentists with West African troops find that the few Europeans gives them far more work than the Africans. Cicatrisation and filing teeth are both now falling into disuse as civilisation spreads throughout all colonies.

The number of wives a man may possess depends upon his religion and his purse, for taking a wife means payment of a dowry to her parents. The size of this varies with the girls' tribe and her social standing therein. The West African is intensely fond of children, but in the vast hinterland wives are chattels who are there to tend to the comfort of the males of the house, to cook, to produce children, to market the crops and to be sacked if they fail to give satisfaction. There is seldom any jealousy where there is more than one wife, for where polygamy exists it is hallowed by long tradition, and indeed the senior wife welcomes another who will assist her in the many tasks which fall to her lot. The more wives a man has the greater is his prestige and therefore the greater, too, is that of his wives.

The foregoing is a necessarily brief summary of West Africa and the customs of its peoples. Only one more thing must be said in this connection and that is to counter the widespread belief, originally inspired by the Japanese, that West Africans are cannibals. They are quite definitely not, and though some tribes eat what may seem to us peculiar dishes, let us remember that many of the white population of Florida eat rattlesnake fillets.

The R.W.A.F.F. in peace-time was a relatively small force and consisted of the following:—

- NIGERIA .. Three infantry battalions at full strength, two cadre battalions, one light battery, and one signal section.
- GOLD COAST .. One infantry battalion, one light battery, one signal section.
- SIERRA LEONE One infantry battalion.
- GAMBIA .. One infantry company.

An Inspector-General, with his H.Q. in the Colonial Office was responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the efficiency of both the R.W.A.F.F. and the King's African Rifles in East Africa.

The Europeans for the R.W.A.F.F. were drawn entirely from British Service Officers and N.C.Os. seconded from their Regiments. The officer establishment was much the same as in British units and the British N.C.Os. comprised an R.S.M., one C.S.M. and C.Q.M.S. per company or equivalent unit, and one Sergeant per platoon as well as staff for the orderly room and specialist platoons. Owing to the climate, a tour of duty lasted eighteen months, at the end of which the European got eighteen weeks leave. He was also free to return to the R.W.A.F.F. or to revert to his British unit.

The Africans in Nigeria and the Gold Coast were drawn mainly from the northerners, but as these were almost entirely illiterate, southerners were recruited for such tasks as signallers, intelligence sections, etc. On the outbreak of war a Brigade Group was raised in Nigeria and one in the Gold Coast, and sent in 1940 to East Africa, where they took a prominent part in the advance to Addis Ababa. Field companies of Engineers, Field Ambulances, Survey Sections, etc. were raised from local resources.

They had not been gone very long when France collapsed, and it looked as if the Vichy Government would turn hostile. This was serious, for the French maintain large and efficient colonial forces in their West African territories, and were they to over-run our now almost defenceless colonies, vital supplies of oil for edible fats, tin, etc., would be lost to Great Britain. Worse still though, Freetown, the great port of Sierra Leone, would not be available for our convoys or the Royal Navy, and at that time, although the war could not have been won at Freetown, it could very possibly be lost if we were to be denied the use of that port.

Lt.-General G. J. Giffard, D.S.O. (now General Sir George J. Giffard, G.C.B., D.S.O.), a previous Inspector-General, was accordingly sent to West Africa to organise the defence of our colonies there. This entailed raising four complete new Brigade Groups, the 3rd and 4th in Nigeria, the 5th in the Gold Coast and the 6th in Sierra Leone, the last incorporating Gambian and Nigerian troops as well as men from Sierra Leone. To do this Infantry, Artillery, Engineer, Signals, M.T., etc. training centres had to be started, the necessary accommodation built and staffs brought out from the U.K. to start the machine and keep it running.

The magnitude of the task will be appreciated when it is realised that in peace-time there was no R.A.S.C., no R.E., no Ordnance, no Medical services (except the civilian medical service), etc. But steadily the edifice was built until finally, after the Vichy threat was removed, two Divisions of West African troops complete with Corps troops and familiar with the jungle, were available for employment in Burma. It says a great deal for the ability of the African that he can be, and was, trained to do anything.

81st (WA) Division, consisting of the 3rd, 5th and 6th Brigades, was the first to be sent overseas, followed later by 82nd (WA) Division consisting of the 1st and 4th (Nigeria) and 2nd (Gold Coast) Brigades. 81st Division fought two campaigns in the Kaladan Valley as a two-brigade Division, joined the Chindits, and operated in Northern Burma. 82nd Division took part in the final campaign and marched from Buthidaung to the area Taungup-Sandoway, 4th Brigade covering, all on foot, 428 miles and the other two 300 miles each. As the paths of these brigades lay almost entirely in the trackless hinterland of

the Arakan and followed winding *chaung* beds, and climbed up and down hills densely clad in jungle, the real distances marched must have been greatly in excess of those figures. That it was possible for them to operate for so long at such a distance from roads was due to two factors—air supply and the presence of four Auxiliary Groups. These units each consisted of some 1,200 men, trained and disciplined, and were apportioned on the scale of one to each Brigade and one for Divisional troops.

They carried a rifle and the same equipment as the Infantry, but less personal ammunition, and their task was to carry on their heads the essential fighting stores required by the other units, *e.g.*, mortar bombs, S.A.A. of all calibres, grenades, picks and shovels, etc., etc. The mortars themselves were carried on the heads of men of the units owning them. Auxiliary Groups were not a liability as they could, and often did, defend themselves though they weren't used in attacks. The "normal" load was 40 lbs, but some items of equipment weighed much more, *e.g.*, charging sets for wireless batteries which tipped the scale at over 80 lbs.

However, whatever their load, these men were invariably able to go wherever infantry could, without having special tracks cut for them, and what is more, unlike mules, they didn't complicate the ration indents for they ate the same food as the rest of the troops. These Auxiliary Groups were also invaluable for cutting paths where none existed, for making and maintaining air-strips, for ferrying forward rations when the situation required it, and for acting as paddlers when the force had to cross the multitudinous *chaungs* and rivers encountered. In fact, there was scarcely anything for which they could not be used. They were not part of the pre-war R.W.A.F.F., but were raised from 1941 onwards and designed originally to enable units to operate away from roads and tracks in West Africa, long before the days of air supply.

* * *

So has ended a chapter in the history of the R.W.A.F.F. Its members did fine work in country and surroundings far removed from their own; many of them did not return; but none can doubt that all assisted in large degree to the success of the campaign in Burma.

General Slim Appointed A.D.C. to the King

General Sir William Slim, Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, has been appointed A.D.C. General to the King in succession to Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief in India, whose tenure as A.D.C. General has expired.

One of the Indian Army's most distinguished soldiers, General Slim during the late War first came into prominence by his skilful handling of 10th Indian Division in the Syrian and Iraq campaigns of 1941. Early in the following year he arrived in Burma to take over 1 Burma Corps. He commanded it throughout its fighting withdrawal during the ensuing three months, and then left for India to lead 15 Indian Corps.

In October, 1943, after the position in the Arakan had been stabilised, he became commander of the newly-formed 14th Army. The battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass, the sieges of Kohima and Imphal, the total eviction of the enemy from Indian soil, Mandalay, Meiktila and the final land drive on Rangoon—behind all these successes was the keen brain of General Slim.

He was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia in September, 1945, and Commandant, Imperial Defence College, shortly afterwards.

WAZIRISTAN : A PARTIAL PLAGIARISM.*

By "TOCHI".

ENGLISH fun fairs offer a very satisfactory form of entertainment known as a "bottle-shy". In Indian Clubs and Messes the political handling of Waziristan since 1919 seems to come in for much the same sort of handling. And the criticism thrown is generally as purely destructive as the bricks among the bottles. This article is merely an attempted re-arrangement of the old bottles.

Frontier policy in broad statement seems obvious enough. Primarily it is based on the need of maintaining the security of Northern India, while at the same time it aims at a loose control of the Tribes, and at assisting them, by promoting contact between them and their more civilized kinsmen, to adopt a more productive and less turbulent manner of living. The ultimate hope is presumably that the border may eventually take its place with the administered districts as part of an Indian national civilization.

Control and contacts are impeded by two main obstructions in the tribal "make-up": illiterate fanaticism, and the blood feud. The latter is a stranglehold on all private enterprise, and is the root cause of the much advertised main excuse for raiding—poverty. Contributing causes are the natural barrenness of the country, and the tribesman's lack of appreciation of the dignity of labour. A visit to parts of outer Kashmir, Baltistan and Ladakh, would show him what standard of unassisted living can be achieved in equally bleak hills, and under more difficult conditions of water and weather, when co-operation and the habit of hard-work exist together.

So far the tribes' fanatical readiness to defend their independence has largely precluded any schemes for the development of their land by Government assistance, which is thus limited to assistance in cash. Part of this money is undoubtedly wasted on more and better means of prosecuting feuds, (anti-Government feuds included), on guns, in fact, rather than butter.

The Government subsidy is disbursed through Maliks' allowances, a few tribal allowances, and through the pay of Khassadars. The system may appear to be plain bribery of the Maliks to control their sections, but it does also aim at increasing their ability to attend to tribal welfare. Moreover, the threat of withholding allowances is the main form of pressure applicable on them and their tribe to fulfil their own tribal custom of tribal responsibility for the actions of everyone "on the books" of the tribe.

This system does tend to concentrate the actual cash into the pockets of the few whose need of it is probably least. An ownership of a motor car by its head Malik cannot be said to benefit the tribe as a whole; or to increase his hold over those members of it whose total assets are probably knife, rifle and

*The reference is to Major Bromhead's article 'Trust begets Trust' in the *U. S. I. Journal*, October, 1939. This article was written in February, 1940, and sufficient of it still appears relevant enough to be of interest in 1947, even in spite of the intervening period of a major War.
—Ed., *U. S. I. Journal*.

bandolier. The universal illiteracy of the tribesmen generally, and the nature of their religion, make them anyway more ready to listen to the *mullah*, especially when the latter can offer concrete prospects in both worlds. Most of this century's uprisings on the border can be traced directly to the influence of a Mullah, Faqir, or Pir, whereas a head malik's name, and influence for good or evil, is hardly known outside political files.

Once a man is adrift from his malik's authority, and joined with similar irresponsibles 'agin the Government', and under the patronage of a malcontent ambitious, or genuinely *sharif* holy man, he becomes a *ghazi*, a crusader, and any attempt by a loyal malik to re-assert his authority cuts across the grain of tribal sympathy. One essential would seem to be to show up the *mullah* hostility for what it is—fundamentally more reactionary and anti-malik than anti-Government—with a view to removing the crusading glamour and sanctity which now camouflages the activities of tribal dacoits, and contributes to the general ineffectiveness of Khassadars as a working part of the frontier watch and ward. Khassadars, un-uniformed and at a distance indistinguishable from hostiles, are with notable exceptions distrusted by both the Army and the Scouts. As a result there is little incentive to them to put up any sort of a "show", especially when it may involve inheriting a blood feud which can result in retaliation against their homes.

Maliks, permanent hostiles, and Khassadars are, however, normally only a small proportion of each tribe. On the remainder practically the only impact of present policy is through the presence in their territories of Government's Regular and Irregular armed forces, and of the arrangements for maintaining them. Routine operations by regular columns are the supreme irritant, as they have always been. Retaliatory action by columns and garrisons tends to be indiscriminate, and is, judging by the experience of recent years, not offset by any civilizing or fraternising effect of prolonged occupation of camps. On the other hand, it appears that hostiles show less inclination to operate against Scouts patrols and Posts than against the Army and that Scouts seem to emerge from such operations with proportionately fewer casualties.

Since November 1936, by their frequent use in army roles, and in co-operation with the Army, it is arguable that Scouts have become if anything too closely identified with the Army in the eyes of those tribes in whose areas they have permanently to operate. Before then, Scouts patrols were "free" of the whole of their areas, and in most parts were received with co-operation and hospitality. Such contacts, even if not civilizing, at least did not disturb the peace in which more efficacious contacts can flourish.

Here then is an opinion, and a row of bottles to shy at; that for the routine policing of Waziristan the "regular" backing to Scouts could and should be removed to bases inside administered territory. It is not however suggested that the Scouts and "Air", as now organised and equipped, could replace the Army; or that the change-over should take place in such a hurry that might incur a drop in prestige. The transition period of Scouts expansion and re-armament would be expensive, but the savings in recurring abnormal expenditure and in costs of normal maintenance, should be sufficient to justify the initial expenditure as a long term investment.

Additional changes advocated are:—

1. Reorganisation of the methods of subsidising the tribes, and of the Khassadar system, to achieve a wider and more earned distribution of allowances.

2. Wider employment of the tribes in an expanded Corps of Scouts.
3. Normal control to be by co-operation of Political methods, the "Air" and Scouts, based on an expanded network of posts, roads, tactical tracks, and landing grounds.
4. Improvement in Scouts' equipment and armament.
5. The introduction of certain political measures, including increased expenditure on Intelligence, and wider prophylactic powers, both *cis* and *trans*-border, to enable Scouts and the "Air", to operate more effectively.
6. Concentration of the "regular" forces inside administered territory into a mobile column organisation for operations such as sealing the administered border, and as a reserve in hand for emergency.
7. Active propaganda to display Government's good intentions.

SUBSIDIES AND KHASHADARI.

The object is to increase the control potential of the Maliks. Tribal democracy would recognise no other system. The means suggested are, however, to assist the control to be enforced from the inside, and against incipient trouble, instead of as at present, by force applied from the edge. At present this force, whether exerted by Scouts or the Army, is generally delayed until the disturbance has gathered momentum.

To enforce *jirgah* decisions the Mahsuds used to employ tribal police, *Chalweshti*; the Marri Baluch had a similar force called *Rahzan*, and both, unlike Khashadars, were exempt from the blood feud. Similar tribal police paid for by the Government could hardly be less value for money than most of the present Khashadars. And in times of anti-Government hostility such tribal police, controlled by a friendly *jirgah*, would not incur the stigma of being in Government employ. Normally they would form a core for support to or by village *chigha* pursuit parties against anti-malik activity. Scouts assistance could be recognised as "at call" to support the tribal police at the request of a *jirgah*. *Jirgahs* would be free to appoint whom they liked to this employment.

Additionally there would be needed a *corps d'elite* of tribal *badragga* escorts. Part of an increase in maliks' allowances would be paid by employing their near relatives in this uniformed and highly paid corps. They would be located in piquets in the vicinity of all Scouts posts, and used for political and other escorts; for identification purposes with Scouts patrols; for garrisoning temporarily evacuated Scouts posts; and for special errands for information, such as to report on road conditions, and on rumours of gangs. For this latter they would need to be sufficiently influential to be of privileged standing in their own areas, able to move around freely. They would also act as contact links between Scouts and the Tribes.

These two employments would form allowed sources of income and prestige to maliks' families, but to enable the threat of stoppage of Government allowances to strike more deeply into the tribe, it is essential that part of the allowances should be direct income to individuals throughout the tribe. To achieve this condition it is suggested that permanently employed corps of road gangs, under their own overseers, should be formed in place of, but on the lines of, the present *khashadar* system. They would be used initially for constructing, and later for maintaining, an increased network of roads and tracks connecting Scouts posts;

and for converting overhead telephone lines into underground ones. They would also be required to provide early information of gang movements in the vicinity of their roads, but not necessarily to oppose them. All payments would be strictly by results, with bonuses for early information leading to successful Scouts action.

A further hold on the tribal pocket and behaviour would become possible by reopening enlistment in Scouts to Bhattani, Wazir, and Mahsud tribes. The opportunity lies in the expansion required by the larger Scouts role advocated. At least a Central Waziristan Scouts and a Bhattani Militia would be required to be raised. The experience of 1914 and 1919 will be quoted to refute this suggestion, but 1919 was a lesson well learnt by both sides. The Pathan has a sensitive conceit; he hates being fooled, and it is unlikely that he will again swallow the propaganda then put across him, unless Government displays an even greater appearance of weakness. Moreover, the Scouts have now thirty more years of experience and tradition, and in this respect approximate more nearly to the regular Indian Army than ever they did in 1919.

Certainly to start with, to lessen the danger of "incidents", careful organisation would be necessary to ensure that the new element should always be a small minority in a large mixed post. Whether the Wazir or Mahsud, if enlisted, should serve inside their own areas, as do the *Goumiers* of the French Moroccan Irregular levies, is a highly debatable question.

NORMAL CONTROL: POSTS AND ROADS.

For the new system a large additional number of Scouts posts would be required. Space does not allow of siting them on the map here, but the organisation would be of "main" posts on main roads, and "subsidiary" posts on occasional roads or M/T tracks. The subsidiary posts would be sited roughly in triangles, within patrolling distance of each other. The connecting roads would be designed to encircle all notorious areas, and to enable a Section, or Tribe to be isolated, both from its neighbours, and from the Afghan frontier.

Subsidiary posts would be sited as close as possible to positions commanding likely lines of retreat out of the triangles; and their siting and construction such as to make them easily defensible by a very few men. The remaining garrison would need to be sufficient to patrol in two directions, and to hold positions in a "stopping" role. In hill country numbers in position have a large advantage over far greater numbers on the move, and a gang inside the triangle being harried from the air, and by the main post patrol, is unlikely to have the time elaborately to plan its action against the "stopping" positions. A "harbour" for temporary occupation by visiting main patrols, and for convoys, would be necessary in addition to the strong keep in each subsidiary post.

The main obstacle to strategic siting of these smaller posts would probably be the need of a sure water supply; this difficulty could, however, be overcome by a system of local contract supply, backed by large stored reserves, and by air supply. Other reserves of medical supplies and essentials not supplyable by air dropping would be required against the possibility of investment by the enemy, or by the weather, and supply for the requirements of visiting main patrols. Other local contract supply of wood, meat and milk for posts; and lorry transport contracts for Scouts Contractors' fresh and non-essential supplies, would provide, at no cost to Government, further means of injecting money into the country, and of rewarding loyal services.

The proposed multiplication of posts has other advantages. It allows the present limited system of reserve storage of Army column rations to be expanded, by which punitive columns can be initiated without the common surprise-destroying period of organising their supply requirements. It would increase the radii of action of Scouts patrols, and enable the time spent on the protection of routine maintenance convoys to be reduced. Irregular running between posts would decrease the opportunities of ambush, and allow of smaller escorts.

Again, to save unnecessary deployment of the limited Scouts strength subsidiary posts would not be continuously occupied, nor occupied only as a preliminary to special activity. Frequent shifts of personnel between posts as a normal routine would tend to disarm the present tribal suspicion of impending action whenever any abnormal movement takes place between posts. To safeguard evacuated subsidiary posts the tribal *badragga* corps would find a garrison for the harbour area ; the main keep being inviolably locked, and items of overpowering temptation, such as ammunition, removed.

Based on this network of Post triangles and roads, Scouts would build up a real ascendancy over hostiles in their areas. As this was achieved, so would co-operation from the villages increase. Initially to achieve this ascendancy aids to striking harder and more suddenly are essential to overcome the handicaps under which Scouts now work. The distances between present posts make sudden co-operation or converging action difficult to combine with surprise. Means of achieving complete surprise from any single post are few. A gang anywhere in the vicinity of a post keeps continuous watch on it ; and both the warning and the gang itself can travel as fast as the patrol on its feet ; the range of the Scout rifle is no greater than that of the gang's. Scout transport, being limited in amount, and regularly fully employed on posts maintenance, is of necessity concentrated at Headquarters. Any unusual movement of empty transport destroys essential secrecy.

Requirements are simple, and should be available from obsolescent equipment. Each main post requires an M/T component. It should include a proportion of armoured lorries, sufficient to carry a small patrol of H.Qs. and three platoons. This would enable rapid counteraction to be taken against gangs interfering with traffic on the main roads : and would enable part of a larger patrol to obtain sufficient of a start to make contact with distant gangs, and possibly, aided by air co-operation, to pin them sufficiently for the main *gasht* to arrive. Included also should be a section of three fast light armoured cars, which would be invaluable for working with convoys, for road reconnaissance, and for post inspections ; and a section of armoured trucks, capable of some speed on tracks, and of limited cross-country performance. One of these would carry a light howitzer for distant support to patrols ; the others heavy machine guns for sealing off flank escape routes. Additionally they would be invaluable for replenishing *gasht* ammunition, and for evacuating casualties ; either to posts, or to emergency landing strips, which they could simultaneously protect for surprise landings. They would also form mobile pivots on which patrols could manoeuvre, or surprise stops against which the enemy could be manoeuvred.

Patrols themselves need weapons for inflicting casualties on a determined enemy ensconced in sangars, in village towers, or in the cover of distant *nalas*. A light manpack mortar, and some form of rocket-propelled projectile of an anti-tank nature are indicated here. Carriage of this increased armament does not present difficulties, as although the platoons of a *gasht* have to move consis-

tently fast between a series of positions, a part of the Headquarters can be moved at a slower pace between bounds, without greatly affecting the speed of the *gasht* as a whole. Experience with stretcher casualties bears this out.

To assist the effective use of this improved armament a clearer definition of friendly or hostile attitude in village areas is required. In the border-administered-villages, and in such places as Bannu and D.I.K., greater scope is required in dealing with subversive propaganda and its concrete forms of assistance given in money, rations, and information to raiding gangs. The Bruce-Handyside combination in Kohat is an example of method and success against peace raiding. In tribal territory a suitable distinction could be obtained by a form of day curfew.

Any area failing to fulfil its responsibilities would be formally declared as 'unfriendly'. Thereafter any movement of Scouts in the area would automatically impose a ban on the taking of a rifle outside village limits, and on all movement in parties of more than four men. Any opening of fire in an area whether previously declared unfriendly or not, would bring the curfew into immediate operation. Once in operation, all armed men would become liable to air and ground action without warning. To enable *badraggas* and *chalwesht* to escape this indiscriminatory action they could be issued with distinctive coloured head dress and flags. To avoid leakage to hostiles, sets of different colours could be issued and withdrawn at irregular intervals, and security of a month's pay held against loss.

Here also are the germs of a later scheme for gradual disarmament, when progress on both sides of the Durand Line shall have made it possible to attempt a beginning of this final solution. It was used successfully by Jacob on the Sind border in 1848, when Napier's total disarmament had failed. Jacob's system was one of protection by organised mobility along the border, combined with self-protection for villagers inside their villages by allowing them arms for use only in their houses.

Normal control would thus be by Political pressure, by the taking of securities, and hostages where necessary, and by withholding of allowances or by fines cut from them. Policing of this control would be by Scouts, with close support from the air. To intensify it the threat and application of air proscription would be available. This by itself has twice recently obtained the submission of a tribe—the Madda Khel Wazirs in 1939, and the Shobi Khel Mahsuds in 1939-40. Further pressure could be applied by a combination of air proscription and ground blockade for isolation of a tribe or section from its neighbours, and from contact with administered territory. Scouts and Frontier Constabulary working on roads designed to this end should be able to manage this on their own.

These measures should be sufficient to compete with most displays of truculence. For emergencies there would still be the Army in reserve, concentrated in border cantonments, from which both training for war proper, and in mountain warfare tactics could be carried out. Mechanised columns in support of the Frontier Constabulary, for sealing the border against the ingress or egress of raiding gangs would form good practice in both. Knowledge of the terrain of the transborder country could be more fully acquired against possible necessity by the attachment of Army officers to Scouts.

The basic essentials of mountain warfare training are simple enough, and any good Unit can become expert in a short time. Unfortunate incidents are generally due either to complete inexperience, or to the boredom of routine, such as unending "R. P." (Road Protection) duties. The deceptively peaceful atmosphere of the daily landscape, and the false feeling of security it promotes, soon removes the edge from the keenness and efficiency of inexperienced units. If the Army have the opportunity to train undisturbed, and are only used on definite missions, the excuse for both complete inexperience and for boredom should automatically disappear.

Other advantages are evident. Unity of control in the transborder area is achieved. The cost of Army maintenance is saved; not only of supply distant from railhead, of unit transfers, etc., but of the additional scales of winter extra issues essential to the Army but not provided for Scouts. There would also disappear, in N. Waziristan, the tribesman's *bete-noire*, Bagai convoys.

Most important of all, should Scouts ever suffer casualties amounting to a reverse, the repercussions should not reverberate among the tribes to the same extent as they do when an Army column has a bad day, such as on 25th November, 1936. The pickings of loot gleanable from Scouts would be known to be not comparable to the mule loads of blankets and ammunition which the tribes can be led, quite erroneously, to believe are to be had for the asking in the vicinity of Army columns.

Further, any failure of an Army column completely to achieve its object is a failure of all the force there is immediately available. Failure of Scouts and R.A.F. control would still leave the Political Agent armed with the threat to hand over to the Army, and to give them a free hand against the whole of the tribe concerned, and not as in 1937—39, for limited action against offending Sections only. One example of this free hand would probably prove necessary, sooner or later, and would probably suffice. The tribesman is appreciative of force applied with a strong hand, and so far there is little indication of his appreciating anything else.

The method is simple enough. It is designed to compete with the present handicap of distinguishing between friend, foe, and neutral all of identical appearance. The area for punitive operations is declared. Time, and opportunity in the shape of sanctuaries for evacuation is allowed. Thereafter anyone remaining in the declared area automatically qualifies as a hostile, and is liable to meet without further warning with the full force of arms of a modern army, unfettered by any 'no shooting until shot-at' restrictions.

The role of Scouts could be to co-operate as mobile advanced or flank elements, or for short penetrating operations without transport, based on Army camps or on air supply. On the other hand, policy might consider it undesirable to associate them at all with such punitive expeditions, except as guides and advisers to the Army; whereby their standing as policemen, and the essential difference between normal and abnormal conditions would not be impaired.

So much for control, and the goal of peaceful conditions. The maintenance of peace is, by itself, only a slow civilising process. And the slower the process the greater the chance and effect of setbacks, such as the period 1936—39. Active propaganda ideas, if they are to surmount the wall of tribal obstruction, will need to be powerfully charged, and with more than just enthusiasm. As always, the stumbling block of finance will need to be overcome.

One essential must be to increase the efficiency of the link between Government and the Tribes, and to decrease the influence of the middleman element. Assistant Political Agents need to be more numerous and more specialist. The French Moroccan '*Service des Affaires Indigènes*' is an example of successful inter-relations between the Tribes, the Political, and the Army.

Openings, at first confined to the lower non-confidential appointments in the ranks of these middlemen, and in the M.E.S. technical services, might be opened to the educated sons of leading families, as an incentive to them to give a lead in support of education. Subsidization of the necessary higher education and training would probably be required. Further opportunities for employment, and a line of approach already proven by Dr. Penwell as early as the end of the last century, would result from an expansion of the present civil medical services.

The linking-up of dispensaries with Scouts posts would increase contacts, and might even penetrate through the *purdah* to the Tribal womenfolk. Primary education already functions in a small way. Its expansion is another of the very limited number of approaches to the women, whose reactionary influence is second only to that of the mullahs.

Later, their co-operation might be enlisted, *via* the competitive pride innate in all females, towards normal uplift schemes. Initially this pill would need to be sugared, or disguised, in the jam of *tamashas*, fairs, agricultural shows, and connected free transport. These and travelling demonstrations of agricultural improvements, of cottage and village industries, of methods of fruit growing, marketing, and canning, etc., would need to be backed by loud advertisement of the Government assistance available to start and establish them.

All progress in these directions would tend to anchor the tribes more firmly to their land and homes, to make them less willing to expose them to the dislocation of senseless blood feuds, and of punitive action either from the air, or from an Army column; and more willing to accept the start of the large schemes of afforestation and irrigation, and of hydro-electric development which are necessary for any real prosperity in Waziristan.

The removal of the Army, and the measures of control and assistance suggested may appear as a policy of appeasement. Just now the word is an unpopular one, and at first sight unsuitable for dealing with the trans-frontier Pathan. But as the opposite practicality, the ruthless application of force, is now ethically ruled out, experiment with appeasement appears the only alternative to the present methods of implementing a long term policy. That the latter have not produced results comparable to the expenditure incurred cannot be denied. At present, when shortage of trained manpower is one of the gravest handicaps to our forces in the field, the locking up of large garrisons to maintain an uneasy peace on the Frontier is a diversion of effort which demands a solution.

New A. D. Cs. to the King

Two Auxiliary Force (India) officers— Lt.-Col. J. Turnbull, M.C., E. D., Commanding the Assam Valley Light Horse, and Lt.-Col. (Honorary Colonel) H. N. Brook, E. D., Commanding the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Regiment—have been appointed Aides-de-Camp (additional) to H. M. The King.

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND ITS LESSONS

BY CAPTAIN J. E. HEELIS.

GUERRILLA warfare played a far larger part in the defeat of the Germans and Japanese during the 1939-45 War than most people realise. We must take stock of what was achieved, and decide on the best forms of planning and training for such operations, so that lessons may not be forgotten, and principles may be studied.

It is of interest to note the opinions of certain Commanders in Europe and the Far East of the value of resistance movements to their plans. General Eisenhower, in his report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on operations in Europe, says: "Our headquarters estimated that at times the value of the French Forces of the Interior to the campaign amounted in manpower to the equivalent of 15 Divisions; their great assistance in facilitating the rapidity of our advance cross France bore this out."

General Stopford, reporting on the operations of the 12th Army in Burma testifies to the great help given by Force 136, "V" Force and other clandestine organisations. The Commander of the 34 Indian Corps, which was to have carried out the combined operations on Malaya in 1945, said: "The Malayan resistance movement would have been of the value of at least two Divisions to me in the attack."

As far as I can trace, the first support given on a large scale to an indigenous anti-German resistance movement was to the Maquis in France. Soon after the fall of France to the Germans, a "Cloak and Dagger" organisation came into being in England, which set up schools to train people of all nationalities, mostly British and French, in the work of liaison officers to the French resistance movement.

Means of entry into the country was the first essential. The methods employed were by small boats to deserted parts of the coast at night, by submarine in the same way, and by parachute. Of these, parachute was not only the easiest but the safest method, as it was not long before the Germans had a thorough system of coastal watchers at work, and having successfully landed on the coast, there was still the problem of crossing a large area of enemy-occupied territory before reaching the operation area.

An entry into a country by parachute, however, brought one as near as possible to one's eventual destination. But in order to achieve secrecy, it was essential to drop only at night, and for safety reasons during the full moon periods, which somewhat limited the times during which liaison teams could be dropped.

Training carried out consisted firstly of a parachute or submarine course. The latter usually entailed training in collapsible boats or *kyaks*, as there are few places where a submarine is able to get close enough into the coast to allow the party and stores to get ashore. The second essential was training in wireless, wireless procedure, and ciphers.

Obviously, especially in the early stages of building-up support to a resistance movement, the liaison officers who go in to contact them should have really reliable wireless sets and know how to use them, as information about the strengths and localities in which resistance movements are in being is essential before any sort of build-up can be organised by Base.

As regards ciphers, it was necessary to learn at least two or three different codes, in case one was compromised. It was also necessary to have some form of easily remembered code for use as a last resort—if all cipher books were lost.

In most cases it became the responsibility of the Liaison Officer, once he had contacted the Resistance forces, to teach them the use of weapons, methods of laying ambushes, how to carry out demolitions, elementary tactics, and the principles of cross-country movement. He therefore required thorough training in all these subjects himself, before he could be put into the field.

He was required to learn the standard method of laying out "Dropping Zones", for receiving both "live" and stores drops, together with a quick drill for clearing the stores to hide-outs, defence of the D. Z., and a system of recognition signals to the aircraft. In view of the fact that in most cases the Resistance forces were short of medical supplies, he was often required to act as an amateur doctor, and know how to use the drugs in the medicine chest which was either dropped in with him or was on his first supply drop.

Soon it became essential for all teams to be given a rigorous course in the best ways to deal with the German Gestapo's methods of trying to extract information if captured, which, as is well-known, often resorted to scientific torture. The story of Mrs. Odette Sansom, G.C., is one of the classic examples of the courage shown by many of those who were captured. Training in a variety of subjects is thus an essential before an entry is made into enemy territory.

One man obviously cannot carry out all these duties on his own. Wireless communication alone is really a full-time job, and therefore teams consisting of, say, one or two officers, two Sergeant wireless operators (one for communication, one for cipher work) and possibly an interpreter, should make up a liaison team. They should if possible train together, if only for a short time, before going into the field.

It is pointless at the last minute to team together people who will obviously not "hit it off" together in the Field. A prolonged period behind the enemy lines, especially of a small party on its own, is not at the best of times good for morale, and if members of the party get on each other's nerves the whole time, their work will be prejudiced accordingly. It is a point which at first sight appears obvious, but can be overlooked when one considers that each member of a party, before being teamed up, is really doing a specialist job.

So far I have touched on the training of liaison teams only. Guerrilla tactics, however, include many other types of team for carrying out special tasks, such as the blowing up of an important bridge, or a task such as the destruction of the German heavy-water plant in Norway—a task which was such a great success. Such parties were, of course, trained for the particular job in hand.

But the Briefing Officer has, perhaps, the most important duty in this form of warfare. He it is who has all the available information. He is more than likely a very busy man, but nevertheless the team commander must not only have every confidence in him, but should be allowed plenty of time and opportunity to ask as many questions as he likes.

This Briefing Officer is responsible for the issue of maps, and of a certain amount of money in the currency of the country he is going to. The Signals brief would naturally be carried out by a Signals Officer, and before the party leaves it is vital that he checks code books, identity cards and emergency codes with the team commander.

For security reasons, this briefing should be done one or two days only before the team leaves. Any officer who has worked as a Briefing Officer soon knows a great deal about the location of all guerrilla movements in any one country. It should be a firm principle that he should not go on active operations behind the enemy lines in that country, as he obviously knows too much. Similarly, no team commander at the briefing should be told about the work being done by other teams, except those with which he is likely to come in contact in the field.

Mr. Winston Churchill said, I think in 1940, that any group of people in any country who took up arms against the common enemy would receive the maximum support. He certainly kept his promise. As the War progressed, and the Germans over-ran country after country, so the organisations in England and the Middle East increased the scope of their activities. It is probably safe to say that every enemy-occupied country had a British-assisted Resistance movement, which undoubtedly caused the Germans to deploy many of their forces which they would have liked to employ elsewhere.

It is well-known on what scale we supported the Partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece. Most of the weapons and equipment received from America, although sorely needed for the defence of Britain at that time, were supplied to those countries through the liaison teams who had been dropped in by parachute to help, organise, equip and train them.

Assistance was also given on a fairly large scale to the Partisans in Holland, Italy, Crete, Albania and many other countries, and the results were highly successful. Other organisations, such as the Long-Range Desert Groups and the Special Air Services did great work in the Western Desert, inflicting casualties and damage on the enemy out of all proportion to the casualties they themselves received.

As to the Far East, it is I believe safe to say that every Japanese-occupied country had an indigenous resistance movement, which also received all the support in men and arms it was possible to give. Results proved the worth of backing such operations to the full.

In Malaya, for example, a special school was set up in Singapore many months before the Japanese attack on that country. It was commanded by the well-known Arctic explorer and mountaineer, Freddie Spencer-Chapman. Training was given in subversive operations, demolitions and weapons, and when Japan attacked over 300 Chinese had passed through the school. They became the nucleus of a guerrilla force stretching from one end of Malaya to the other.

Later they became known as the M.P.A.J.A. (Malay People's Anti-Japanese Army). When Japan surrendered they had a strength of over 5,000 armed men, apart from the many sympathisers who supplied food, money and information of Japanese movements to the "Army" in their jungle camps.

Colonel F. S. Chapman toured most of these camps during the Japanese occupation, encouraging and training the men, and himself undergoing the most incredible hardships. When eventually in late 1944 he was able to contact a party under the command of Colonel John Davies, of the Malaya Police (who had gone in by submarine nearly two years before), he was able to send out messages about the guerrilla organisation by wireless. On that information, liaison teams and Gurkha support groups were parachuted into all parts of Malaya ;

they organised the training and arming of the guerrillas in preparation for the invasion.

In Burma, too, liaison teams were to be found in the Naga Hills, the Chin Hills, and Kachin Hills, with the tribes of Central Burma, and in the Pegu Yomas. The damage these forces did to Japanese lines of communication, and the number of Japs they killed in ambushes, fully proved their worth. Interesting accounts of some of the activities of these bands were given in the April and October, 1946 issues of the *U. S. I. Journal*.

I feel, however, that one very great mistake was made, which luckily did not re-occur in Malaya. When Rangoon was captured the Army tried to enforce the immediate disarmament of the guerrilla forces. At that time by no means all the Japanese had been cleared from the country, and as a result a large number of the Burma Anti-Japanese forces did not hand back their weapons, but "went bush" with them.

Malaya was a different story. The chief liaison Officer with the guerrilla forces immediately contacted the Commander of the Army of Occupation, and asked him to allow the M.P.A.J.A. to keep their arms for at least three months, during which period they should be used as an additional Police force and be paid accordingly by the British Government. It was agreed to, and the M.P.A.J.A. assisted considerably in the concentration and guarding of the Japanese Army and in guarding important buildings and supply depots.

At the final disarmament parades in December, 1945, ceremonial parades were held, the men were inspected and thanked by high-ranking Army officers, and they were given a sum of money as a token of thanks for their services. All weapons which had been issued were handed back. This comparison between Burma and Malaya is well worth bearing in mind.

Apart from Burma and Malaya, however, there were active resistance movements in the Philippines, Timor, New Guinea, Borneo, Java, Indo-China and Siam. All helped to keep up the morale of the population, and they also inflicted many casualties on the Japanese.

Training for guerrilla operations in Eastern countries presented many problems which did not occur in Europe. First, there were the huge distances to cover, which presented not only problems of wireless communication with man-pack sets, but also in finding aircraft with sufficient range. In Europe, most of the supply drops could be done by short-ranged Dakota aircraft, and that also applied to Burma, but for Malaya and beyond it was a very different problem.

It is greatly to the credit of the planners in India and Ceylon, and more particularly to the R.A.F., that they were able to maintain a guerrilla army in Malaya with liaison teams and stores dropped by planes based in Ceylon. That was carried out by R.A.F. Liberators, specially fitted with extra petrol tanks, the whole trip being over the sea except for a short glimpse of the Japanese-occupied Andamans. From Ceylon to South Johore this entailed a 23½-hour round trip, an incredible strain on the aircrews, and at absolutely maximum range.

Much of the equipment which had been used in Europe had to be modified for use in the East. For example, a wireless set disguised in a neat little suitcase might look quite an ordinary sight on a road in France, but would hardly be appropriate in the hands of a "coolie" on a rubber plantation in Malaya.

Dropping zones were not as easy to find as they were in Europe, as the open paddy areas were also usually the most inhabited areas, and jungle clearings were for the most part not big enough for the purpose. Many of the teams dropped into Eastern countries landed in trees, some as much as 60 feet high; in the end most teams took in lengths of rope with which to let themselves down to the ground should they be unlucky enough to land on a tree.

In most Eastern countries the "amateur" doctor, too, had a very much busier time and a much longer sick list than in Europe. Owing to the shortage of clothing and lack of protection from mosquito bites, ticks and leeches, malaria and jungle sores were very common; malnutrition, too, took its toll. No medicines or drugs of any kind were available, and team commanders often had to spend most of their first few weeks trying to get their men into a reasonably healthy condition.

The jungle, although depressing to live in for any length of time, nevertheless provides one with ample building materials for waterproof and comparatively comfortable *bashas*, which prove ideal cover from view and a covered approach to ambush positions, as well as for reconnaissance patrols.

An important principle essential to bear in mind but not always easy to put into practice is that a guerrilla force must lie low. It must train and recce in secret, until either it is strong enough to operate on its own, or is about to be supported by the main thrust. It is a great temptation to start blowing up lightly guarded bridges, cutting the L. of C., and ambushing enemy convoys, but if it endangers giving away the location of the jungle camp and training areas too early, it can only have disastrous results.

The main task at that stage, and a very important one, too, is the supplying of information of enemy movements, dumps, troop concentrations and defences, unless specially asked to carry out some special task by Higher Command. Often more important than the blowing up of bridges is the prevention of the blowing up of bridges by the enemy, so as to assist the advance of the attacking forces.

Security, as has happened in the past, should not be allowed to go to such lengths as to keep back from the forward troops details of the organisation and strengths of guerrilla forces operating immediately ahead of them. It might appear obvious as it would avoid any awkward incidents of non-recognition at the time of link-up, yet I know that most of the troops arriving in Malaya on operation "Zipper" had no idea that there was any form of guerrilla movement in the country. That, I may add, was in spite of the fact that S.E.A.C. H. Q. had given an exact description of their distinctive uniform and badges, while liaison officers in the field had been told by signal that all troops would know these before they proceeded on the operation.

"Behind the enemy lines" operations are no longer glamorous expeditions. They have become a normal form of warfare. Brigadier Bernard Ferguson, in "The Wild Green Earth" says of the 1944 Chindit operations: "Before the

late war the expression behind the enemy lines conjured up the most delicious vision of adventure, beside which all other adventure was anaemia. But since 1940 it has been almost a routine affair. It would be idle to deny that the sensation of campaigning in that topsy-turvy way includes the element of especial excitement; but it is also exhilarating, so long as things are going well, in the knowledge that you and not the enemy, are setting the pace."

Whatever new and more powerful weapons may be invented, methods of guerrilla warfare will ever be destined to play an important part in any future war. It is to be hoped that the lessons it taught in the late war will not be forgotten.

Reunions

Those who served with the 20 Indian Division will be interested to read the names of those who recently attended the first reunion dinner of the Division, which was held in London on 17 May, 1947. Among those present were:

Lieut.-General D. D. Gracey; Brigadiers Hirst, James, Lupton, Woodford; Colonel Hayaud Din; Lieut.-Colonels Betts, Cockburn, Hope, Jenkins, Mukerji, Sweeny; Majors Allom, Brook, Ching, Causton, Cantopher, Edwards, Firth, Mail, Malins, Nicholls, Ogden, Paxton, Richardson, Sherlock, Stock, Vincent, Young; Captains Grime, Jones, Pile, Palmer, Robertson, Simmonds, Williams, and Young.

Another reunion dinner held in London recently was that of the 19th "Dagger" Division, over which Major-General T. W. Rees, formerly Commanding the Division, presided. General Rees said how pleased he was to be with so many friends, and to recollect the great deeds the Division had performed in Burma. Memories of the capture of Mandalay were revived at the dinner when Mr. Richard Sharp, of the B. B. C., played a recording of the battle for Burma's ancient capital.

Indian and British Officers of the 25th "Ace of Spades" Division were present at the Division's first reunion dinner in New Delhi. More than forty officers and their wives attended.

The regimental reunion dinner of the Mahratta Light Infantry was held at the Junior United Service Club in London recently. Major-General D. W. Reid presided.

The second reunion dinner of the 5th Indian Division was held at the May Fair Hotel, London on June 20. Major-General E. C. Mansergh presided, and General Sir William Slim was the guest of honour.

The first annual dinner of the 17th Indian Division was held at Simpson's in the Strand, London, on June 20. Major-General D. Tennant Cowan presided, and the guest of honour was General Sir Geoffrey Scoones.

The 14th Punjab Regiment Dinner Club held its annual reunion luncheon on June 20 at the Trocadero Restaurant, London. Major-General H. A. Cummins presided, and was supported by General Sir Brodie Haig.

ARMY-AIR CO-OPERATION.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. R. L. RUMSEY.

MANY aspects of Army/Air Co-operation, although well-known to Army/Air Staff officers and certain R.A.F. officers, are not recognised by the majority of the Army and the R.A.F., and it is with the object of studying the subject frankly that the writer submits this article. He hopes that by so doing, and consequent upon a frank and unbiassed discussion, certain shortcomings which at present exist may be overcome. It is but fair to add that the author has been an officer in both Services, and for the past two and a half years has worked as an Army/Air Staff officer, so that he is not biassed towards the Army or the R. A. F.

First, then, a brief history of Army/Air co-operation. Before and during the early stages of the late War the only elements in the R.A.F. provided to give close support to the Army were the Army Co-operation Squadrons which were basically equipped with Lysander aircraft. Their role was to carry out visual and photographic reconnaissance, bombing and strafing missions. It soon became apparent that those aircraft were unsuitable for their tasks; they lacked speed and armament, were easy prey of hostile fighters, and were unsuitable for carrying a really effective bomb load.

Largely as a result of the ineffectiveness of the Army Co-operation Squadrons, the Western Desert Air Force was formed, and worked initially with the Western Desert Force and later the Eighth Army. The Western Desert Air Force was in fact a composite R.A.F. Group which contained a number of light bomber and fighter squadrons, some specially trained in all types of reconnaissance. It soon became a powerful air component, capable of providing very efficient offensive support for the Army.

Co-ordination between air and ground forces was provided by two Army/Air Support Controls, with Air Liaison officers at all R.A.F. Wings or Squadrons. The Army/Air Support Controls provided "G" (Air) Staff officers and a special network of signals which worked forward, down to H. Qs. of brigades and back to airfields. The Eighth Army in Italy maintained that system, except that the Army/Air Support Controls became Air Support Signal Units, with the "G" (Air) Staff officers held on the establishment of Army H. Qs. The same system was also adopted by 21 Army Group in N.-W. Europe and later by the Fourteenth Army in Burma.

The only real use made of air supply, except for the supply of airborne formations, partisans and agents, was in Burma, where it was controlled by a joint Army/Air Headquarters known as the Army/Air Transport Organisation. This developed quickly, with the aid of the R. A. F. Transport Wings and Rear and Forward Airfield Maintenance organisations, into a very efficient arrangement.

Army/Air Staff Officers.—Army/Air Staff Officers are divided into two categories: the Air Liaison Officer and the "G" (Air) Staff Officer. Before and at the beginning of the recent war Air Liaison Officers were the only Army/Air Staff officers that existed; these appointments were not looked upon with much favour by ambitious regular soldiers. Later, the appointment of "G" (Air) Staff Officers was created at Army, Corps and other large H. Qs, and the Directorate of Air was formed at the War Office.

Any officer who has held an Army/Air staff appointment knows that, besides his own work, he has to deal with many matters which should be handled by the R.A.F.; he has also to compete with the lack of knowledge of most Army personnel in air matters and of most R.A.F. personnel in Army matters.

EARLY INTER-SERVICE DIFFICULTIES.

In the early days of Army/Air Co-operation both Services were touchy in their dealings with one another, and that strained atmosphere was to a certain extent calmed by the Army/Air Staff Officers, but by no means entirely. Among the causes of this tension was (a) the hesitancy of the soldiers to realise that the primary and by far the most important task of the R. A. F. was the winning of the air battle, i.e., to obtain and maintain air superiority; (b) the failure of the Army to understand the limitations of close support aircraft, and in particular the difficulties of locating targets in forward areas; and (c) the general lack of knowledge of the Army in the correct procedure for requesting air support, and the difficulties in providing such support as quickly as it was required.

Another reason was that the R.A.F., remembering the soldiers' ignorance of the proper use of air power, were afraid that the Army would succeed in compelling them to divert their efforts from the all-important task of winning the air battle, in favour of providing close support; while yet another reason was the general failure of the airman to understand why the Army was sometimes unable to bring its own weapons to bear on targets which it required to be neutralised or destroyed.

At the end of the late War the position of Army/Air co-operation was, in all theatres, generally satisfactory. Operationally experienced soldiers and airmen of the Tactical Air Force and Transport squadrons (engaged on Transport Support duties) were fully aware of the potentialities of air support. Unfortunately, the rest of the Army and the R.A.F. knew little of this important matter, and although lip-service was sometimes paid to the subject, it interested only the very few.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMY AND R.A.F. OFFICERS.

There are certain incompatibilities in the mental outlook of Army and R.A.F. officers which have caused great difficulties in the past. Take the Army Officer: he is a member of a Service which has far greater organisational and administrative problems than the R.A.F., and in consequence is generally competent in those matters; the Army, by virtue of its task, has the problem of controlling a large number of men over wide areas in the field, which necessitates a very high standard of discipline, without which no effective control can be exercised. That high standard of conduct is enforced primarily by the officers, who are well trained in leadership. Last but not least, some older Army officers are inclined to be pompous, which annoys any R.A.F. officers with whom they may come in contact.

What of the R.A.F. officer? If he is a member of an air crew, he looks down (in many cases unconsciously) on the other members of his Service who do not fly. He has no training whatsoever in organisation, administration or leadership on the ground, unless he happens to be a graduate of a R.A.F. Staff College, and even then his knowledge of leadership is still sadly lacking. If he

does not fly, he usually gets little respect from air crews, who regard him as of little account, unless he be an officer of really outstanding ability.

These remarks are in no way intended to be derogatory, but are simply factual statements known to the writer, who has the greatest respect for the very gallant work of the R.A.F. in the late War. Nevertheless, in the light of the foregoing paragraphs, it is obvious that there are grave inconsistencies in the outlook of officers of the two Services, which apply particularly to Staff Officers.

AN ARMY AIR FORCE.

There are certain elements in the Army which consider that the Army would be better served if it had its own air force. They contend that they have seen a number of cases of poor R.A.F. administration and organisation, and consider that the Army could do much better in these matters; they feel that a high priority should be given by the R.A.F. to the provision of air crews and aircraft for the Tactical Air Force than obtains at present; they feel particularly strongly about the constant lack of light intercommunication aircraft, which are so essential to senior Army officers and their Staffs.

Such people also consider that on Direct Support tasks, an Army officer pilot who understands the situation on the battlefield could provide more efficient support than an R.A.F. officer who has never been in action on the ground; they usually quote the example of the Royal Artillery Air Observation Post pilot. Finally, they consider that if they could order an Air Force to carry out tasks instead of being compelled to make requests, better results would be achieved.

The writer's first comment on the above is that, as has already been stated, the all-important and over-riding consideration of any air force is to win the air battle, but because the R.A.F. so ably carried out that task in the latter stages of the late War, it has passed almost unnoticed by the Army, who came to take air supremacy or superiority as a matter of course. In the next war we shall at best probably only start with air parity, and every aircraft will be required to fight the air battle, including the aircraft of the Tactical Air Force.

If the Army had its own air force, it is very probable that the pilots would be very highly trained in ground attack, to the detriment of their training in the primary task of aerial combat. Moreover, control of the air battle must be exercised at the highest possible R. A. F. level; this would, of course, entail placing all the fighter and bomber elements of any Army Air Force under the command of the R.A.F., which would inevitably cause difficulties.

The provision and maintenance of aircraft presents far greater problems than is generally realised by the Army; it is therefore considered best for one Service to handle these matters. For the above reasons, the writer considers the formation of an Army Air Force to be a most unsound proposition.

At present, War Officer/Air Ministry have agreed that the only soldiers who may fly aircraft are the Air Observation Post and glider pilots. This is considered necessary in the first case on account of the method used in the adjustment of field artillery fire, and in the second on account of the possible role which pilots may have to play subsequent to landing. This produces a hybrid organisation, which is always unsatisfactory and by no means absolutely necessary.

Why? Here are a few reasons. First, in Italy during the War R.A.F. pilots of Fighter Reconnaissance Squadrons very ably corrected the fire of medium

artillery; surely they could easily be trained to do the same for field artillery? Secondly, only in grave emergencies should glider pilots be used as infantry. It is considered therefore that a short infantry course for R.A.F. pilots engaged on glider pilot duties would suffice to fit them for this possible emergency.

From what has been written in the preceding paragraphs the following conclusions can be drawn:

(a) Much progress has been made during the last War in Army/Air co-operation after an indifferent start, and generally speaking a standard system was used in all theatres.

(b) All the operational experience of air supply of non-airborne troops was gained in Burma.

(c) The Army/Air Staff Officers, the majority of whom were non-regulars, played a vital part in linking up the Army and the R.A.F.

(d) There is in the Army a general lack of knowledge of air matters, and similarly in the R.A.F. there is a general lack of knowledge of Army matters.

(e) There are certain incompatibilities in the mental outlook of Army and R.A.F. officers which cause difficulties in effective co-operation between the two Services.

(f) An Army Air Force is a most unsatisfactory answer to the provision of offensive or air transport to the Army, and there is some doubt as to whether Air Observation Post and glider pilots should remain Army personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

Training.—Most of the difficulties experienced in the past in Army/Air co-operation can be attributed to lack of basic training on the subject in the Army and the R.A.F. To remedy this, the writer suggests that Army and R.A.F. cadets should be trained in colleges sited alongside each other; Army cadets should receive instructions in air matters, and *vice versa*; the ideal arrangement would be for all cadets to live and mess together.

Army field formations and units should be located alongside R.A.F. units of the Tactical Air Force, and be affiliated to them for training; difficulties over accommodation, etc., will have to be overcome. A third suggestion is that Army and R.A.F. officers should attend, periodically, courses at the School of Air Support suitable to their rank. Promotion examinations for Army and R.A.F. officers should include a few questions on both Services.

The Army and R.A.F. Staff Colleges should be sited alongside each other on the lines of the Staff College, Haifa, and the R.A.F. Staff College (Overseas) in Palestine. Specially selected Army and R.A.F. officers should attend the recently-formed Joint Services Staff College. The Imperial Defence College should provide the finishing touches of instruction on inter-Service co-operation.

Some of the above suggestions are already being carried out. They are, however, mentioned to show the whole system of progressive training of Army and R.A.F. officers throughout their Service careers.

R.A.F.—(a) The Army must realise that the winning of the air battle is by far the most important support which they receive from air forces. The R.A.F. must, however, in their turn realise that ultimate victory is only obtained

when ground troops finally occupy the objective, and to this end close support of the Army may at certain times be absolutely vital. The R.A.F. must be prepared to give this support at the temporary expense of effort which will produce more valuable results in the long run.

(b) R.A.F. officers of the General Duties branch must, in future, be trained not only to fly aircraft but also in administration and staff work. If this is not done, there is bound to be friction when they come in contact with Army officers who are properly trained in these matters.

The writer realises that it is not for an Army officer to criticise the R.A.F. particularly when the Army has many faults of its own, but he considers that unless the R.A.F. change their ideas on the above lines, any improvements made by the Army in their contribution towards Army/Air co-operation will be of little avail. The writer hopes that any R.A.F. officer who may read this article will realise that he is really keen to see this important matter put on a sound basis, and is not merely being rude.

If the recommendations contained in this article are put into effect, the majority, if not all, the present difficulties of Army/Air co-operation will disappear and there will be complete harmony and understanding between the Army and the R.A.F., with a consequent gain in efficiency to any joint operations they may carry out. As any major operation of future war will invariably be a joint Army/Air operation, it is of paramount importance that the two Services should work together as a highly organised team.

Armed Forces Benevolent and Reconstruction Funds

To promote the well-being of servicemen and women of the R. I. N., Army and R. I. A. F., two inter-services funds—the Armed Forces Benevolent Fund and the Armed Forces Reconstruction Fund—have just been set up at Armed Forces Headquarters, India.

* Primary object of the Armed Forces Benevolent Fund is the alleviation of distress amongst past and present members of the Indian Armed Forces and their dependents.

The Reconstruction Fund will be devoted to the welfare of serving men and women by making grants, for example, in aid of Family Welfare Centres in barracks and assisting the education of women and children, living in the lines. In special circumstances grants-in-aid may be given from this fund to certain institutions which care for disabled ex-servicemen. Demands for such help should be addressed to the Secretary, Reconstruction Fund, c/o Office of the Chief of Inter-Services Administration, G. H. Q., New Delhi.

Applications for assistance from these two funds will be made through the normal Service channels to the Naval, General and Air Headquarters, New Delhi.

The Funds are administered by a Committee of which the Commander-in-Chief in India is the Chairman; and the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Indian Navy; the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, India; and the Adjutant-General in India are members.

TRAINING COMBINED STAFF OFFICERS

BY COLONEL F. L. ROBERTS, M.B.E.

MUCH has been said and written about post-war reconstruction in the civil sphere, but if social security is to be assured for future generations, those whose profession lies in the Fighting Forces must see to it that the term "post-war reconstruction" is applied to the Fighting Services as well.

It should not have needed World War II to bring home to Britain's military leaders the fact that our Imperial geographic situation compels us to fight amphibious operations in a war. A study of history should have been sufficient to teach us that global warfare is no new thing—it has, indeed, been the rule rather than the exception for the British race.

Look back through the ages. From the time of Alfred the Great, the founder of the Royal Navy, and right through our history, all our successful wars have been directed by leaders who appreciated the advantages conferred on us by command of the sea—Queen Elizabeth and her Captains, Marlborough, Nelson, Wellington, and in our own time, Winston Churchill.

Now yet another vital element has been added—air power, which is now an integral part of any fighting force. Thus we can and must arrive at the conclusion that war for Britain will always in future be a triphibious operation. Occasions will arise where purely local geographic conditions will limit local activity to two of the three Fighting Services, with the third Service playing a supporting role. But always there will be at least two Services directly involved.

From this it follows that those who direct and plan future wars must be naval, land, and air-minded. Anything less than that may and probably will spell disaster. Thus our first aim must be to set up machinery and a system which will ensure that we have a Combined Staff. That does not by any means obviate the necessity for each Service having its own Commanders and Staff; they will be as necessary as ever.

What we must attain is a Staff organisation which co-ordinates the operations of the three Services as a whole; with an additional element in respect of each Service for the direction and administration of that Service. Having accepted that principle—and accept it we must—we are in a position to examine and reconstruct accordingly.

THE COMBINED STAFF.

Candidates for the Combined Staff must have had a period of basic training in one of the three Services. Having proved themselves satisfactory in their own Service, they can offer themselves for appointments on the Combined Staff. So the first point which needs decision is the length of service, in the candidate's own Arm, necessary to provide that basic training.

I suggest that the correct period is when the candidate has completed his first tenure of independent command. Before that he must have completed a course at the Staff School of his own Service. He will thus have received thorough instruction in the Staff duties of his own Arm, and will have undergone

the inestimable experience of command. That experience must come about at an earlier age than hitherto—I would suggest that in future it should be normal for an officer to be appointed to his first command between his 8th and 10th year of service. First entry to the Combined Staff would thus be in the rank of lieutenant commander for the Navy, major for the Army, or squadron leader for the R.A.F.

Let us now consider how to prepare them for taking their place in a new role, for each has hitherto had experience and training only in his own Service.

We have Combined Training Centres, where units attend courses and learn the basic principles of combined operations. Candidates for the Combined Staff must obviously attend such courses, and afterwards they will need additional training in Combined Staff work. To do that they must attend a course which, to all intents and purposes, would be a continuation of the Staff Course attended while they were with their respective Services. Candidates would then be ready for first appointment to the Combined Staff.


It has been suggested that when an officer joins the Combined Staff he should remain with it for the rest of his career. To my mind that would be a mistake. I suggest that after, say, four years' service on the Combined Staff an officer should revert to his own Service for a further period in command. He would, by virtue of having had some six years' service since his last command, be sufficiently senior to be appointed to a higher command than the one he last held before transferring to the Combined Staff.

If he returns to his own Service for two years, and holds a command throughout that time, he would gain extremely valuable experience which would fit him either for employment in a high-grade Staff appointment on the Combined Staff or for a junior command in a Combined Force.

By that time our Combined Staff officer would be due for his final period of individual training, which would be concerned with the higher direction of war—I refer to the courses at the Imperial Defence College. There he would learn how Policy and Strategy go hand-in-hand; and how a nation's War potential is organised and developed. Having completed that course, the Combined Staff officer's career is set fair for the highest grade employment as a Commander in his own Service, or as a Commander of a Combined Force, or as a Principal Staff Officer.

There is one category I have not touched on—the officer who does not transfer to the Combined Staff, but prefers to serve throughout in his own Arm. Such officers will provide commanders of the future in their own particular Service, and to prepare them for such high appointments they too should attend a course at the Imperial Defence College.

That, then, is a suggested system for the build-up of an Imperial Combined Staff, and for the training of officers who will eventually command or administer British Imperial forces. The attached diagram summarises my suggestions. The unbroken lines indicate the careers of officers who do not elect for service on the Combined Staff; the broken lines indicate the careers of the Combined Staff officers. Ultimately, higher commanders would of course be selected from either category.



RECENT ADDITIONS TO THE U.S.I. LIBRARY

COMPASS OF THE WORLD

A symposium on Political Geography, edited by Hans W. Weigart and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. Published by MacMillan Company; New York, 1945.

TWENTY-EIGHT leading authorities in the field of geography and international politics, including Sir Halford Mackinder, have contributed to this book of 460 pages, in which are numerous maps, charts, and perspective views of the globe. There are six chapters. They correct the basic misconceptions of political and strategic geography which muddle the thoughts of the Fighting Services, statesmen, and the general public alike.

Modern mastery of the air is recasting our maps, re-writing our geographies, and upsetting our sense of direction and proportion. The recent War should have taught us to picture the world globally. Our past education on Mercator's distorted projection was a great blunder.

Airborne movements in future wars will pass along Great Circle routes which the strategist must measure on a globe. Operational planners must therefore cultivate mobility of imagination. They should view the world not from a firmly fixed point such as New Delhi or somewhere else in the India Command, but from wherever the centres of vital military decisions in a world-wide war may be lying at a given moment.

From this follows the idea that it might have been an advantage in the recent War to have had maps of an uncommon setting. We might have had maps, for instance, to make us see the South East Asia theatre from the direction of Kandy, or the Indian sub-continent as it appeared to the Japanese naval and military commanders at Singapore.

The first chapter in the book has articles on the ideological aspects of geography in international politics, General Haushofer's pseudo-science of geopolitics, balance of power and international boundaries. The second chapter on airways is refreshing for any reader. "Reflections on the Heartland" is the title of the third chapter; two of its articles are by British geographers, Sir Halford Mackinder and James Fairgrieve, the other three being by American authorities.

Mackinder's "Heartland" may be roughly defined as south-eastern RUSSIA and Central ASIA north of PERSIA and west of CHINA. His ideas, made in a book he wrote at the close of the 1914-18 War, were that this "Heartland" area, beyond the reach of naval power, was as central to the Eurasian land mass as Germany is to West Europe. A united Russia and Germany could dominate the Eurasian land mass from this central location. The growth of air power over the past thirty years has not yet destroyed Mackinder's argument.

Nevertheless, it may be observed, as Mr. Fairgrieve shows on page 194, that the Russian "Heartland" might well be dominated eccentrically from Western EUROPE, INDIA and CHINA. INDIA, be it noted, is the nearest of the lands of the ocean border to the margin of the "heartland". It would be natural for her to take a foremost place in dominating that "heartland"; and yet from the dawn of history she has been many times invaded from that area. There has been no reverse movement, although MERV became a battle honour for the 14th Punjab Regiment after the 1914-18 War.

The fourth chapter stresses the role which the territories, air paths and sea lanes of the American north and its neighbouring Zones play in the U.S.A. strategy; but other regions of the Northern hemisphere are also considered in a global picture. An essay on "THE ALEUTIANS" makes the interesting point that the shortest approach from AMERICA to JAPAN, by sea and air, lies through these islands, while that through HAWAII is 1,400 miles longer. The writer (in 1942) thought it would be futile to contemplate an advance against JAPAN over a route 10,000 to 12,000 miles long from SAN FRANCISCO to SYDNEY, or the SOLOMONS, and thence north, as against a 5,000 mile movement from SEATTLE through the ALEUTIANS.

"Reflections on Asia" in the fifth chapter will naturally catch the interest of officers in India. The last chapter on "The Shifting Balance of Man Power" treats of population trends and their impact on international relations and politics.

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This book should certainly draw readers from India's Armed Forces, if not from her statesmen. One idea has strongly impressed this reviewer. It is that we must free ourselves from the chains of Mercator. His map may be perfect for navigation, but it cannot be used for studying world geography and therefore strategy, without causing serious misconceptions.

At the end of May, 1942 the Japanese sent a large force to attack the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, and a diversionary force to ALASKA. The latter was content to withdraw under light air attack from DUTCH HARBOUR to occupy KISKA and ATTU. Had the Japanese been less Mercator-minded, and more inclined to using global maps, these forces might have been reversed. They would have found the Americans still unprepared to stop a large force in ALASKA, and they might have been in BRITISH COLUMBIA by the autumn.

Japanese strategy in the Central and south-west Pacific was sound, and was skilfully executed while they held the advantages of surprise and superior preparation. A writer in the book under review remarks (on page 85) that it is perhaps more than a coincidence that the Mercator map, being centred along the equator, contains no serious distortion of this region. He goes on to say that in a voluminous collection of Japanese maps, eight were included which were either world maps or maps of Asia and of the Eastern Hemisphere. All these maps were Mercator projections.

To the reviewer, the vital lesson to be learned is that no map can equal a globe. It is impossible to represent the earth's surface truly on a flat map. Distortion cannot be avoided. In this air age only a globe can demonstrate properly the relationship between one place and another far distant.

Many people, for instance, will be surprised to learn that the shortest air route from CALCUTTA to OTTAWA goes 8,000 miles over TIBET, SINKIANG, west-central SIBERIA, SPITZBERGEN and GREENLAND!

For hundreds of years globes were made of *papier mache*, plaster or similar material. Such is the familiar school globe of usually 12" diameter. Last autumn, at the "Britain Can Make It" exhibition in London, I saw a new model of the globe made of translucent plastic material, which was particularly effective when lit up by an interior electric light. An even better model though more expensive was a 19" globe, rotating on ball bearings and made of the same translucent

material. The plastic meridian, which completely encircled the globe was illuminated by an independent switch. The cost of the former model would be about Rs. 320, and of the latter about Rs. 480, f. o. b. Bombay.

I should like to see globes in training establishments, operation and information rooms, and certainly in the future Indian War Memorial Academy. Unilluminated 12" globes are most likely to be favoured for their lower cost. Maps drawn on an equidistant Azimuthal Projection would be a useful addition. Maps of this type are now available with their centres on different places in the world.

B. J. A.

THE BURMA CAMPAIGN

"The Wild Green Earth", BY BRIGADIER B. FERGUSSON, D.S.O. (COLLINS, 10s. 6d.).

WHEN memories of the unpleasant sides of war fade it is possible that experiences of human friendship, courage and humour will still remain fresh. Brigadier Fergusson has committed to writing both the pleasant and unpleasant aspects of his second Chindit Expedition in 1944, but the unpleasant is dominated by the pleasant. His written introduction from General Stilwell to the latter's Chief of Staff read: "Help this guy. He looks like a dude, but I think he's a soldier".

His 16th Infantry Brigade, which had faced unpleasant duties in Palestine before the War began, had fought with the 4th Indian Division at Sidi Birrani in 1940, in Crete and Syria, and which ultimately as a part of the 70th Division took over from the Australians the defence of Tobruk, reappears in Burma.

Despite appalling difficulties, 16th Brigade marched from Ledo to its selected base within striking distance of Indaw and there, at Aberdeen, established a stronghold which included an airfield. Two other Chindit brigades were flown in, as they thought, to prepare the way for other Divisions. This time, they thought, they were to stay.

Unfortunately, the Japanese had also selected this time for offensive operations, and launched their advance against Imphal—Kohima. A dogged defence there defeated the Japanese intentions, their divisions recoiled, and left many of their troops to die of starvation along the lines of withdrawal. However, before this occurred the Chindit Force had been recalled to India and 16th Brigade was first to come out, by air.

As the author admits, the expedition thus ended in anti-climax. It is the second part of the book which will be of particular value to the soldier. In that part Brigadier Fergusson discusses, with a knowledge born of bitter experience, lessons to be drawn from the Chindit expeditions.

The description of the evening hour in bivouac between a day's march and a night's rest, of the few minutes waking at dawn before leaving one's blanket, and of the dream pictures which fill the gaps in an uneventful march, will recall pleasant memories to many of his readers. One chapter is devoted to the Japanese soldier as Brigadier Fergusson saw him and explodes the myth of the irresistible Japanese Army. Another eulogises that most faithful of all the soldier's friends—the mule.

The story has been plainly told in Brigadier Fergusson's attractive style, which unfailingly compels one to read on.

"Monsoon Victory" (illustrated), By Gerald Hanley, (Collins, Rs. 7/12).

As an addition to the growing library of books on the War in Burma, "Monsoon Victory" makes an interesting contrast to Fergusson's "Wild Green Earth". Gerald Hanley appears to be seeing the War through the eyes of a beginner. Many little details strike him as worth recording—equipment, dress, anti-malarial precautions, notice boards, the "K" ration. Time and again the story digresses, but throughout is the picture of the Japanese dead who died by the roadside in their retreat from Imphal and, inevitably, of the rain.

"Monsoon Victory" is the story of the 11th East African Division's advance into Burma along the Khabaw Valley to the Chindwin after the defeat of the Japanese on the borders of India, in the first half of 1944. The writer is fond of his *askaris*, and well versed in their history. Their exploits and behaviour make good reading.

A. E. C.

AUSTRALIA'S COAST WATCHING ORGANISATION

"The Coast Watchers", by (illustrated), Eric Felst, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Rs. 15/5).

ANOTHER of the excellent series of Australian books covering events in World War II, "The Coast Watchers" is a worthy companion to such as "Tobruk" and "Behind Bamboo". Its story is that of the Coast Watching Organisation in the islands north and north-east of Australia during the crucial period when the Japanese were advancing southwards, and also during that period when, the tide having turned, the Allies were on the offensive.

Australia had first planned her Coast Watching Organisation in 1919, and based it on the organisation of civilian volunteers in coastal areas. Their task was to be, in war-time, the reporting of any unusual or suspicious happenings off the coast. When war came they were absorbed in the Royal Australian Navy, and many of their peace-time difficulties, particularly in communications, were solved.

Their theatre of operations was the "North-East Area", which stretched from Dutch New Guinea eastwards to the New Hebrides, from the Equator to the shores of Australia. The Japanese moved against this area in January, 1942, and destroyed part of the C. W. O. Reorganised, the C. W. O. played a very important part in the collection and passing of information about the Japanese, often from enemy-held territory.

Now famous names such as Guadalcanal and Wewak, Bougainville and Buna, Lae and Salamaua, become familiar territory as the scenes of exploits by a small irregular force of courageous men, whose part in the defeat of the Japanese was out of all proportion to their numbers. They rank with the Long Range Desert Group and the Chindits, the S. A. S. Regiment, and all those unknowns who operated behind the enemy's lines in the theatres of war.

A. E. C.

A WAR CORRESPONDENT ON THE FAR EAST

*"Democracy with a Tommygun", Illustrated, by W. G. Burchett
(Messrs. Thacker & Co. Ltd., Bombay, Rs. 7/14.)*

MR. Burchett, author of "Wingate's Raiders", presents in this volume his observations recorded in various Eastern countries during the War with Japan. His publishers say that his readers will be "informed, stimulated and provoked" by this book. They will certainly be provoked.

In a rather sensational manner the author discusses China, Burma, India, Australia and the Philippines. China he deals with sternly and at length, and reveals the unhappy story of the Australian and British guerrillas in China. Burma, having been disposed of in an earlier book, gets little space.

In India, Mr. Burchett turns his pen against G. H. Q. Certain of his remarks will cause some readers to raise their eyebrows. His biography of General Wingate should be compared with those of others who also knew the Chindit leader. Was Wingate really "cold shouldered" after Abyssinia and again after the first Chindit Expedition?

A long chapter is devoted to the pathos of the Bengal famine, and its causes. India's political system is subjected to a close examination. After everything, the author asserts that his criticisms of the British Raj are without malice.

Australia receives more kindly treatment and considerable credit for her war effort. From Australia the writer goes to look at America's part in the Pacific War, and describes three most interesting actions—a land, a sea, and an air operation.

Ultimately, Mr. Burchett lands in Japan with the first of the sea-borne forces, goes to Hiroshima in the company of a train load of recently demobbed Japanese soldiers, and gets back the first story of the effects of the atom bomb on that city.

A miscellany of pen pictures which should be of particular interest to those studying the Eastern theatres of war.

A. E. C.

ATOMIC ENERGY

"Atomic Energy for Military Purposes," by Dr. Henry D. Smyth, Chairman, Department of Physics, (Princeton University, Princeton University Press, Rs. 10.15).

MR. J. B. Priestley, when introducing the series of seven talks on atomic energy, broadcast by the B. B. C. during March, 1947, said: "There is not a man or woman who is in a position to declare with truth: 'These talks are of no importance to me.' We are now living in the Atomic Age. There is no dodging the subject of atomic energy".

The possibility of a few atom bombs being decisive in winning the war for the side which first put them into use caused a cloak of secrecy to be drawn over the whole subject of atomic bombs during the first years of the War. Dr. Smyth's book (now in its sixth printing, and running to 115,000 copies) traces briefly the progress of research into the problem of atomic

energy between 1896 and the second World War. He proceeds to describe in detail the expansion in the U. S. A. of the organisation which there developed the atom bomb.

Appendices contain an account of the explosion of the first atom bomb in New Mexico on 16 July, 1945, together with statements on the parts played by Great Britain and Canada in its development. As the author writes, the book is intended to be intelligible to scientists and engineers generally, and to college graduates with a good grounding in physics and chemistry. Laymen, with elementary scientific knowledge, should understand the volume in general, but it is obviously not a book for light reading.

A. E. C.

REVIEWS IN BRIEF

The British In India, by P. J. Griffiths, C.I.E., (Robert Hale, Ltd., 10s. 6d.). Mr. Griffiths, former member of the Indian Civil Service and leader of the European Group in the Legislative Assembly, has written this book primarily for people in England, where he was impressed by the ignorance of normally well-informed people in regard to Indian history and policies.

He shows what England has done for India, and the mistakes that have been made. As a background he offers a brief and elementary survey of India's history and problems, her political parties and their leaders. In conclusion he answers his own questions as to Britain's having given India a square deal or not. It is a straightforward simple outline of the case in easily readable, clear type.

Caste In India, Its Nature, Function and Origin, by J. H. Hutton, C.I.E., M.A., D.Sc., (Cambridge University Press, 18s.). The author, who is William Wyse Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of Cambridge, has set out to produce for students and in a single volume of moderate size, a brief conspectus of the various aspects of caste.

He has achieved his object, and within 250 pages has covered very adequately the origins of caste in the different parts of India, its construction, rules and social aspect. Of added value to the student is the detailed bibliography, glossary and index. A useful book for those interested in the subject.

Boys Training, Indian Army, 1947.—General Staff, India. (Manager of Publications, Delhi). For the assistance of Commandants and others administering, training and educating Indian Army boys, here is a valuable *vade mecum* on an important subject, an aspect of training which must be new to many.

It is intended to serve all officers as a compact source of information regarding the role and methods of training of Boys' Units. A general directive by H. E. The Commander-in-Chief precedes twelve sections dealing with the different types of training considered essential to the production of a useful citizen and a man. Appendices contain some excellent examples of lessons and competitive games.

A Short History of Hodson's Horse, 1857—1940, (Gale and Polden, Rs. 2). Within the small scope of a pocket sized pamphlet, the unnamed editor has

produced an abridged version of the Regimental History of Hodson's Horse from its birth to the year when the Regiment changed its horses for tanks. Condensation has been achieved without detracting from the interest of a stirring story.

Soviet Russia.—An Introduction, by Kathleen Gibberd. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 5s.). When originally published as a pamphlet in 1942 for the education of men and women of the Services this paper ran into 26,000 copies. Since then the facts in it have been brought up to date, a chapter on Soviet Foreign Relations has been added, and the whole issued in book form. Geography, history since the Tsars, and the development of the State, its Government, its social life, and its resources are described briefly in very general terms.

Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs. "Australia and New Zealand", (No. 40, Oxford Univ. Press, Madras, As. 6), by T. K. Critchley, discusses very briefly and separately the geography, history, politics and industries of the two Dominions. It touches, too, on the ticklish problem of Australia's immigration policy.

Indian Parties and Politics, (No. 41), by S. Natarajan, traces the origins and growth of India's political parties from the first meeting of the Indian National Congress in Bombay in December, 1885 to the present Congress (and its offshoots), the Muslim League, Akali Sikhs, Hindu Mahasabha, the two organisations of the Scheduled Castes. All are given a quick and informative survey.

Defence Department Constabulary.

To afford a higher degree of protection to certain Armed Forces installations in India a new Corps, styled the Defence Department Constabulary, is being organised. Its members will be armed and will protect installations against minor sabotage and pilfering; they may be used as gate guards, searchers or checkers, or as mobile patrols by day or night.

The new Corps is intended to replace regular Navy, Army and Air Force personnel hitherto employed in the protection of Service installations. It will eventually absorb the Armed Forces Headquarters (India) Security Police, and possibly the Royal Indian Navy Dockyard Police.

General Sir Frank W. Messervy.

Lieut.-General Sir Frank W. Messervy, G.O.C.-in-C. Northern Command, has been appointed Colonel of the Jat Regiment.

Commissioned in 1913, he served with Hodson's Horse in France, Palestine and Syria during World War I; in 1938 he commanded the 13th D.C.O. Lancers, and in 1939 became G.S.O. I of the 5th Division. Two years later he became commander of the 4th ("Red Eagles") Division, and later commanded the 1st, 7th and 43rd Armoured Divisions.

While he was commanding the 7th Armoured Division in North Africa, General Messervy played a hoax on the Germans when he was forced to surrender to a German battle group. Tearing off his badges of rank, he posed as a private soldier and escaped from German hands within 18 hours.

He led the 7th Division in the Arakan campaign of 1943-44, and in the decisive battle for Central Burma his division made a secret 320-mile march down the Kabaw Valley to strike out from a bridgehead at Pakokku to Meiktila. He assumed command of the 4th Corps in December, 1944, and early in 1946 was appointed G.O.C.-in-C. Malaya Command.

A CHAPLAIN V. C.

From "Interested", Ambala:

That was a first-class article from the Rev. Basil Stratton in your last issue, and I am sure I am among many members who enjoyed it immensely.

Padres did some fine work both in the First and the Second World Wars, in doing which they were following the grand work which Padres have done in former campaigns "out East". One of the best instances I know was that of Padre J. W. Adams, who was Chaplain to Lord Roberts' force in Afghanistan in 1879, and who was awarded the V. C. for his gallantry. The story is told in Field-Marshal Lord Roberts' book "Forty-one Years in India", in which the author says:

"By this time the enemy were within a few hundred yards of Bhagwana, and the inhabitants had begun to fire at us from the roofs of their houses. I was endeavouring to help some men out of the ditch, when the headman of the village rushed at me with his knife, seeing which a Mahomedan (Mazr Ali, later awarded the Order of Merit) of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, who was following me on foot, having just had his horse shot under him, sprang at my assailant and, seizing him round the waist, threw him to the bottom of the ditch, thereby saving my life.

"Our Chaplain, Padre Adams, who had accompanied me throughout the day, behaved in this particular place with conspicuous gallantry. Seeing a wounded man of the 9th Lancers staggering towards him, Adams dismounted and tried to lift the man on to his own charger. Unfortunately, the mare, a very valuable animal, broke loose, and was never seen again. Adams, however, managed to support the Lancer until he was able to make him over to some of his own comrades.

"Adams rejoined me in time to assist two more of the 9th who were struggling under their horses at the bottom of the ditch. Without a moment's hesitation, Adams jumped into the ditch. He was an unusually powerful man, and by sheer strength dragged the Lancers clear of their horses. The Afghans meanwhile had reached Bhagwana, and were so close to the ditch that I thought my friend the Padre could not possibly escape. I called out to him to look after himself, but he paid no attention to my warnings until he had pulled the almost exhausted Lancers to the top of the slippery bank. Adams received the Victoria Cross for his conduct on this occasion".

INDIAN ARMED FORCES' FINE EXAMPLE

From Lt.-Col. C. R. Mangat-Rai, R.I.E., E-in-C's Branch, New Delhi:

With reconstitution and nationalisation looming on the horizon it is likely that the whole character of the Indian Armed Forces, and in particular the Indian Army, will undergo a change in the next year or so. I therefore think that it is opportune to draw the attention of my brother officers, British and Indian alike, to what I regard as the most remarkable feature of the Indian Army as it exists now, and as it was during the war years.

I contend that we who have served in the Indian Army are far in advance of our times in our ideas, especially in our ideas and knowledge of human relations. In present-day society there is a growing school of opinion that, where in a population you have two or more diverse elements, they cannot live and work amicably together, that you must separate them and enclose each in its own boundary.

We have seen this theory put into practice. In Czechoslovakia two million Sudeten Germans have been expelled from their homes and pushed out into the cold into the Fatherland; in Palestine the Jews are clamouring for an independent state



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of their own; in South Africa an attempt is being made to segregate Indians and Africans from British and Dutch; and here in India—well, we are in the throes of reconstitution.

Now in the Indian Army we know from experience that this theory is nonsense. We have worked together with a mixed team for many years; in the Engineers it has been a bigger mixture than in most arms. Our officers have been drawn from the RE and from the RIE, and they have come from all parts of the globe and have been of all shades of colour; in the ranks we have had Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and others.

As just one instance of the degree of mixture of contrasting types I will cite a personal example. During the war I commanded different units for four years, and in that time only one of my officers was of the same nationality as myself. What is more, this mixed team has been organised on democratic lines; service, except for some British officers, has been entirely voluntary.

We have found that this colourful hotch-potch not only worked effectively but that often a high standard of co-operation and *esprit de corps* has been attained. We have learnt from our experience that it is possible for men of diverse nationalities and creeds to live and work together happily and successfully as a family. We have taken it all very much for granted and have said little about it.

There are penalties attached to being in advance of one's generation. One is likely to meet with disappointments and frustrations. In the near future there are to be a series of divisions and separations in India, but we should not let the results of this remarkable experiment in sociology that has been worked out in the Indian Armed Forces be forgotten.

I am quite sure that if ever our present nation states are integrated into a world order, it will be by the functional approach through organisations like the Indian Army that it will be achieved.

"HOW IT SHOULD BE DONE"

From Air Marshal Sir Thomas W. Elmhirst, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., New Delhi:

I was interested to read the article "How it should be done" by Major-General Scott in the April number of the *Journal*.

I noted that Lilliputia had decided that a separate Air Force was of no value. I also noted that the Land Based Armed Forces were to go into battle without an aircraft "fighter" force. Shades of the retreat to Dunkirk and the evacuation of Greece!

How the task forces and fighting groups of this strange country's "land based armed forces" were to move in freedom, to be supplied by air or other means, to obtain reconnaissance, to operate their light and heavy air bomber units in face of an enemy equipped with a strong force of fighter aircraft is not mentioned!

Perhaps the Lilliputian Chief of Staff had not considered the point? I feel myself that if the "task" force in question was directed to carry out a task against an enemy equipped with a modern air force, it would not be a case of "How it should be done" but "Why it was not done"!

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I. M. W. & O. FUND

From Colonel H. R. Power, Commanding Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun :

With reference to Colonel Blaber's letter in the April number of the *Journal* regarding the Indian Military Widows and Orphans Fund, it may be of interest to your readers to know the purport of a reply I received from the Controller of Pension Funds to a letter which I addressed to him on this same subject.

I pointed out in my letter that according to the Statement of Accounts for the year ended 31st March 1945 and issued in June 1946, payments on account of pensions were covered more than four times by revenue derived from subscriptions and dividends, while income on account of dividends alone was sufficient to defray annual payments to beneficiaries, on the basis of the 1945 accounts.

I further pointed out that with no new subscribers to the fund, the approximate year of its ultimate liquidation could be foretold with some degree of accuracy.

In view of this I asked what the policy was with regard to reduced subscriptions or increased benefits: the reply was unexpected, and was to the effect that "it will be necessary to consider an increase in the rate of subscriptions or a reduction in the rate of future pensions", this being based on a recent valuation of the fund by the Government Actuary.

There are two questions, to which, I think, subscribers are entitled to know the answers. They are :

1. Do the capital assets of the fund belong to subscribers and beneficiaries ? and
2. What will happen to the capital assets of the fund, when the last beneficiary dies ?

The answer to the first question is presumably that the fund being a Trust Fund, beneficiaries are entitled to a share of the interest only: subscribers, as such, under the conditions governing the fund, are entitled to no benefits, though their dependents may be.

To whom, then, will the capital assets of the fund be ultimately distributed ?

From Colonel H. K. Blaber, The Burma Regimental Centre:

Since writing the letter that you published in the April issue of the *U. S. I. Journal* regarding the Indian Military Widows and Orphans Fund I have received a copy of the accounts for 1942-1943 which I had not previously seen. These accounts are accompanied by a letter (No. A. G. 61-23/44) which explains the financial structure of the Fund. The following extracts from that letter might be interesting to any other subscriber who, like myself did not receive a copy:

"The Indian Military Widows and Orphans' Fund like all funds established by the Secretary of State for the provision of pensions to dependents of officers of the Indian Services, is a mutual insurance fund: that is to say a fund on which there are no other claimants but the dependents of the subscribers, and which must, therefore, ultimately be paid over in its entirety for their benefit. There is not, as in the case for instance of a trust, any fixed capital distinct from income and reserved for some beneficiary or beneficiaries other than the



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pensioners. The entire resources of the fund, including both future subscriptions and accumulations of past subscriptions are available to provide pensions; and the accumulated balance at any moment is in fact no more than past income held in reserve, and invested at interest, in anticipation of the time when it will be required to meet claims for pensions.

"In order to appreciate the true nature of the balance at any moment it is useful to consider the progress of a new fund; and to confine attention in the first place to the entrants of a single year. These will, ordinarily, consist of young and unmarried officers. There will be no outgoings and their subscriptions will steadily accumulate. In course of time they will marry, children will be born, subscribers will die, and a pensionary charge will arise. The increase of the fund formed by the accumulated subscriptions will be retarded and finally, when the charge exceeds the income, it will begin to decrease. The decrease will continue progressively, until, if the assumptions as to mortality, marriage and interest made when the scale of premiums was fixed are exactly realised, and if those premiums were calculated to be exactly equal to the liabilities, the pension due on the death of the last pensioner will be met from the residue of the capital.

"Subject to the same proviso, that the assumptions are exactly realised the fund will always be in equilibrium. Throughout the whole period, both while income exceeds outgo and when expenditure outruns income, the resources available at any moment for the payment of benefits, that is to say, the accumulated balance and the future receipts from interest and subscriptions, will exactly equal the future payments of benefits. In practice, of course, the assumptions will never be precisely accurate, and the valuations made from time to time will show minor discrepancies between the resources and the anticipated charges. These discrepancies are the surpluses or deficits which, if of sufficient magnitude, call for variations in the scales of benefits or of contributions.

"An actual fund is of course fed by a succession of annual recruits. Each new contingent will make to the total fund a contribution of the type described above, rising to a peak and then decreasing. The aggregate of all these partial funds will show a steady rise for a long period. If the annual recruitment is fixed, the fund should in theory attain a stationary stage, when income equals outgo. In practice this stage is never reached because recruitment never remains stable. In the great majority of cases it happens that before equilibrium is attained the fund is closed, either because its field of recruitment disappears, or because, as in the case of the Indian Military Service Family Pension Fund, it is thought desirable to start a new fund on some revised basis. When that occurs the future progress of the fund will depend on its composition.

"In general it will continue to increase for a time, will attain a peak, and will then decrease until it is finally exhausted. The process of attrition is a lengthy one, and will not be complete until the death of the last surviving dependent, who may be a daughter born late in life to a subscriber who entered just before the closing of the fund. In this connection it is relevant to note that approximately £120,000 a year is still being paid to pensioners of the old Presidency Military Funds, which were closed to new entrants in 1860.

"The above remarks will, it is hoped, make it clear that no conclusion

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as to the stability of a fund can be drawn from a mere examination of its current receipts and payments. This fact does not seem to be generally appreciated. There is evidence of a widely held belief that the fund is in equilibrium if the pensions are covered, at the moment, by revenue from subscriptions and interest, and that the accumulated balance (which is frequently, but erroneously, referred to as the surplus) is of the nature of a general reserve, not earmarked for any specific purpose, but retained as a measure of safety to meet unforeseen expenses. The relation between current receipts and payments depends in fact, simply on the degree of maturity of the fund. If the fund is in the ascending stage receipts will exceed payments, and *vice versa*.

"In either case the true position can be ascertained only by actuarial valuation of the future receipts and payments. Except in the very early years, the latter will in the aggregate always exceed the former, and the excess, expressed as a present value at the valuation date, is usually referred to as the 'net liability.' As this is the liability which remains after taking credit for all future receipts, the only source from which it can be met is the accumulated fund built up during the period when current receipts are in excess of outgo. When the accumulated balance is greater than the net liability, the difference is the surplus, and conversely, when it is less, the result is a deficiency."

From this it is apparent that a comparison such as I made in my previous letter between the amounts of current revenue and expenditure can afford no guide to the rates of benefit which the Fund is capable of providing. These can only be determined by an actuarial valuation which I understand has recently been undertaken.

SCHOOLS FOR DAUGHTERS OF INDIAN SOLDIERS

"Charles", Market Harborough, England, writes:

I have just read the *Journal* for January, 1947 and was interested to read Colonel Cole's views on my suggestion for schools for daughters of Indian soldiers. The theme prevailing through the letters appears to be: The idea is difficult, therefore impossible.

It is quite natural that mission schools are not popular with Indian parents and never will be. They will always be regarded with a certain amount of suspicion by Indian parents especially when other children are boarders away from their home influences. It is also a well-known fact that the average mission school-teacher has not been selected for his or her teaching ability. The Army schools for sons of Indian soldiers at Jhelum, Jullundur, Ajmer, etc., were not popular at first, because the average Indian parent had never sent the son to live away from home, but having appreciated the value of such institutions, the parent does not hesitate to send his son now.

If the Indian Armed Forces had similar schools of their very own for their daughters, where they would learn, live, feed and play among their own race the schools would soon become popular and be patronised. This can never happen in "hostels for Indian girls affiliated to good existing schools", as suggested by Colonel Cole. Incidentally, which are the good schools of India, and why do British parents at great sacrifice and expense send their children to the U. K. for their education?

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BOMBAY — CALCUTTA — LAHORE — MADRAS

In 1933 a hospital for women and children of Indian soldiers was proposed at a Frontier station. The local committee considered it would have to be *purdah* and have a high wall all round, otherwise no Indian woman would come to it. Funds would not permit the high wall. The O. C., Indian Military Hospital was strong-minded enough to start to build and equip the hospital, and there were no funds left for the high wall.

Women and children began to use the hospital, and were attended by male I.M.S. of the Military Hospital adjoining, as funds at the time would not permit of a lady doctor. By 1935, a Punjabi Mussulman Subedar asked for special permission for his sister to be allowed admission to the hospital. The permission granted, the lady arrived from Jhelum district, was admitted, and operated on by a male surgeon in the operating theatre of the military hospital. This Hospital has since been expanded, but unfortunately after the departure of the first C. O. a high wall was added—a retrograde step.

Colonel Cole thinks the type of school advocated would give girls "ideas" if it was not cheap. Nothing good can be cheap. One must always pay for quality. Every good school should give "ideas" as long as they are the right kind of ideas to make good citizens.

Perhaps Colonel Cole has not seen recent advertisements in the *London Times* from various Provinces of India and Indian States for professors, doctors, engineers, teachers, etc. The value of such is appreciated by the East and always will be, if they are the right sort and the right sort will be forthcoming if they are paid adequately.

It is possible to educate and enlighten Indian mothers by the right propaganda and personality, in the same way as the fathers have been. I would invite Colonel Cole's attention to the last sentence of the last para. of "*Ham Victory Parade karne Wilayat Gae The*" in the January number of the *Journal*.

Having sampled the fences of Leicestershire, the walls of Galway, the banks of Kilkenny, Limerick and the P. V. H., I can assure Colonel Cole that these are formidable to those who do not throw their hearts over first.

*[This letter reached us just after our April issue had gone to Press.—Ed., *U. S. I. Journal*.]

A FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

From Lt.-Colonel C. C. R. Murphy, of Littlehampton :

In his article on the Commanders-in-Chief in India, which appeared in the April issue, Brigadier Bullock questions whether much is known of Barnes.

Barnes, however, was no less a personage than the Adjutant-General to the Anglo-Allied Army under the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo, where he was wounded. He was one of those invited to the famous Waterloo Ball, and was the real founder of the Army & Navy Club. During the Regency, and the reigns of George IV and William IV, he was a conspicuous figure in London society. He was far more widely known than some of his successors either at Barnes Court [(which bears his name) or at Snowden.

[We are most grateful to Colonel Murphy for these most interesting details of General Barnes career. As Brigadier Bullock pointed out, it is unlikely that they are generally known.—Ed., *U. S. I. Journal*.]

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THE BASIS OF PAKISTAN. By Nafis Ahmad, M.A., B.E.S., Professor of Geography, Islamia College, Calcutta. Nine Maps and Index. Rs. 7-8.

*A Geographic and Economic Survey of the lands claimed for Pakistan. The 9 specially drawn Maps are designed to illustrate various aspects of the problem.

OUT OF THE BURMA NIGHT. By Capt. R. H. Gribble, Burma Forest Service. Rs. 3.

*The story of the retreat from Burma through the Hukawng Valley and the forest clad mountains of the Naga country during the Japanese invasion.

MAMMALS AND REPTILES OF INDIA. New Edition. By F. Finn, F.Z.S. (late of the Indian Museum). Illustrated. Rs. 8-8.

†When ordering, please mention this Journal and ask for the new monthly record of "BOOKS TO COME" which will be sent free as issued.

WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE DRESS?

From "Dhobi," of H.Q., B.C.O.F., Japan :

A man is judged by his dress, and the quality of his garments generally gives an indication of his purse, if not of his character. Dress is an essential feature of the "soldiery". General Curtis wanted them to be "stripped" while "Tich" wants them to be "plumed".

We should have two dresses, one for ceremonial parades when there are pretty women at the saluting base, and the other for getting into the ditch when the bullets are flying around.

The "Utility" dress should be simple but not devoid of smartness. It should be universal for all Services and all ranks. For climatic reasons we should retain the Bush shirt. Should we have trousers or shorts? What should be the colour—green or khaki? We should leave it to the Dress Committee to decide, but once the choice is made no additional fads should be permitted.

Commanders should have ample scope to show their ingenuity and taste in arranging the "plumes". As we do not have ceremonial parades every day we should either have useful garments which could be displayed more often, or inexpensive plumes which could be added to the Utility dress.

The *pagri* should be a plume (except for the Sikhs). Instead of "utility" coloured *pagris* we should have ceremonial *Lungis*. In addition to the distinctive headgear we can have different coloured lanyards, buttons and Regimental badges, which could be added on to one of the Utility Bush shirts for ceremonial purposes only. The *Lungi* can also be used as part of the walking-out dress.

A "TERRITORIAL ARMY FOR INDIA"

From "Avtar," B.C.O.F., Japan :

Lieut.-Colonel Sutton has clearly stated why there should be a Territorial Army for India. Having served as adjutant of a Territorial unit in peace and war, I must emphasise the importance of the Regular staff for training the Territorials. They must not only be the best, but good instructors.

There is one factor which was very noticeable in pre-war territorial units; that was the cleavage between the "Regular" and "Territorial" officers. The Territorials resented, sometimes quite justly, the dumping of useless senior Regulars. In peace-time this reaction was not so conspicuous because the association was very limited, but in war it effected the efficiency of units. If we are going to retain and train Territorials on a unit basis, it will be necessary to regularise the position of Territorials *vis-a-vis* Regulars.

Here is a suggestion.

In peace-time the Territorial Officers should take seniority in their units according to their dates of commission. When an Emergency is declared, they should be placed on a common roster and count all time spent in training for seniority. The new date of commission should be ante-dated accordingly.

This may sound complex, but it is the simplest expedient to regularise the position without effecting efficiency and causing heart-burning.



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A PENSION QUERY UNANSWERED

From Brigadier D. Ridgeway, C.B., D.S.O., Naivasha, Kenya :

The mills of God grind slowly, but they are not the only ones that do so. On 15 April, 1946 an announcement was made in the House of Commons to the effect that a scheme *had been introduced* which provided that regular officers who were on retired pay or pension prior to the war would, if re-employed during the War, receive a proportionate increase in their retired pay or pension.

Hearing nothing on the subject, and feeling that any increase in a pre-war pension would be welcome, I wrote to the India Office asking whether the scheme applied to retired officers of the Indian Army. In due course I received a reply to the effect that the form in which the pensionary concessions approved for regular officers re-employed during the 1939-45 War will be applicable to Indian Service officers was under consideration, ending with a gentle hint that further inquiries on the subject were not desired.

That was in August, 1946, since when I have heard no more.

I personally would be interested to know what increase in pension I did in fact earn by being re-employed, and even more interested in receiving whatever is due to me. I daresay there are others similarly situated who feel the same.

A RECOMMENDATION FOR RAF OFFICERS

From Squadron Leader J. S. J. Buels, Simla :

May I send you my congratulations on the *U. S. I. Journal*, which is certainly the best Service Journal I have read.

Running through the fine list of new members in the April issue, I was disappointed to see no names of officers of the R. A. F. among them. If any R. A. F. officer reads this, I do hope he will lose no opportunity of telling his friends about the Journal; I do so whenever I can, and I know that those to whom I have recommended it are now just as enthusiastic about it as I am.

SOME SERVICE VOLUMES WANTED

From Lieut.-Col. E. C. W. Fowler, 7 Sikhs, British Forces in Iraq:



This Battalion is still overseas in an area where there are no Military Libraries, and I badly want some good books so that my officers may acquire a wider knowledge of military affairs.

Some units which have disbanded may have some good military volumes in their libraries which they could let me have. If any Officer Commanding such a unit reads this and would care to help us by sending some of such books I would be most grateful. The types of book we require are those usually found in the United Service Institution library, but unfortunately the rules of the Institution forbid their dispatch overseas.

Annual Council Meeting :

The annual meeting of the Council of the United Service Institution was held in New Delhi on July 28. A report of the proceedings will be included in the next issue of the *U. S. I. Journal*.

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THE SECRETARY'S LETTER

Dear Reader,

As a result of the recent annual election, the Council is now composed of Brigadier H. Bullock, O.B.E.; Brigadier G. S. Dhillon; Major-General S. Greeves, O.B.E., D.S.O., M. C.; Philip Mason, Esq., C.I.E., O.B.E., I.C.S.; Air Vice-Marshal A. L. A. Perry-Keene, C.B., O.B.E.; Lieut.-General Sir Reginald Savory, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.; Commander H. G. P. Taylor, R. I. N.; and Brigadier S. P. P. Thorat, D.S.O.

Brigadier Bullock needs little introduction to members, for his articles in the *Journal* have shown him to be particularly well-informed on India's past history; he revels in delving into events of the past, and in keeping his medal collection up-to-date. Brigadier G. S. Dhillon, now Deputy Director of Supplies and Transport Directorate (on whose recent promotion we offer our heartiest congratulations), has been a member of the Institution for fifteen years, and has always taken a practical interest in its progress.

Major-General S. Greeves, now D. A. G. II, has throughout his twenty-three years' membership of the Institution been one of its staunchest supporters. Mr. Philip Mason has been an elected member of the Council for six years, and his wide knowledge of the internal working of the Institution has been of very great help. Air Vice-Marshal A. L. A. Perry-Keene, our Air Force representative, was a member of the Council and the Executive Committee from 1938 continuously to 1942; he has for years done much to interest Air Force officers in the work the Institution is endeavouring to do.

Lieut.-General Sir Reginald Savory, now re-elected to the Council for the fourth successive year, has served on the Executive Committee for the past two years as Chairman, throughout which time his work for the Institution has been of very real value. Commander H. G. P. Taylor, R. I. N., who is representing the Navy on the Council, has been a member of the Institution for the past five years, and as we are keen to expand our influence among naval officers his help in this direction will be most useful. Brigadier S. P. P. Thorat, until lately secretary of the National War Memorial Academy Secretariat, is now commanding the 161 Infantry Brigade.

Obituary

Several former members of the United Service Institution of India have recently passed away at Home. Sir Frederick, W. Johnston, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., who has died at the age of 68, went to the Punjab when he joined I. C. S. in 1895, was transferred to the N.-W. F. P. at the beginning of this century, and later became secretary of the Finance Dept. In 1917 he went to Baluchistan, of which he became Chief Commissioner in 1923. Four years later he was appointed Resident in Bushire. He was a keen golfer, a director of the Woolwich Arsenal Football Club, and a fine tennis player.

Sir Thomas Holland, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., F.R.S., who has died at the age of 78, exerted a great influence on the industrial development of India by his great knowledge of geology. Coming to India in 1890, he became Director-General of Survey in 1903. His policy coincided with the then growing realisation of India's need for industrialisation. The creation of a Chair of Geology at the Presidency College, Calcutta, was largely due to his efforts, and he accepted the first appointment to the Chair. In the First World War he became head of the Board of Munitions and Industries, and in 1920 was appointed Member of Commerce in the Viceroy's Executive Council. He resigned in 1921 following a difference of opinion with the then Viceroy over the withdrawal of what was known as the Calcutta Munitions case.



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Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, G. C. B., K.B.E., formerly Chief of the Imperial General Staff, died suddenly at Lymington at the age of 72. First gazetted to the West Yorkshire Regiment in 1895, he served in West Africa and then came to India. In 1907 he secured a special nomination for the Staff College at Quetta, passed out a year later, and thereafter held a number of staff appointments in India. Following a distinguished career in France, he returned to India in 1921 and commanded the U. P. District, was appointed Q. M. G. in 1927 and C. G. S. in 1930. In the following year he was posted to the Home establishment, and in 1935 became C. I. G. S., being promoted field marshal in 1936. He retired towards the end of 1937.

Sir Philip Hartog, K.B.E., C.I.E., who has died at the age of 83, was a member of the commission, under the late Sir Michael Sadler, on Calcutta University, which was appointed in 1917 and issued a voluminous report in 1919. Far-reaching reforms in most of the Indian universities followed. Later, when Dacca University was created as a residential teaching foundation, Hartog was made its first Vice-Chancellor. He became a member of the Public Service Commission in 1926, and when the Indian Statutory Commission was set up in 1928 under Sir John (now Lord) Simon, he was appointed chairman of the Auxiliary Committee on Education. One of his outstanding services to India and the Eastern world in general was his large share in the formation of the School of Oriental Studies.

A Domestic Matter.

As many new members do not know of the connection between the United Service Institution of India and the United Service Club, Simla, it will save me some correspondence and may enlighten some members if I mention that the position until recently was that the Institution Headquarter building is situated on land leased by the U. S. I. from the Club. The U. S. Club has, however, offered to sell to the Institution the freehold of the plot of land hitherto leased, and the Council has accepted the offer.

Members of the U. S. I. who are also members of the U. S. Club may like to know that Major-General J. B. Dalison (whose wide circle of friends will have learned with great pleasure of the C. B. recently bestowed upon him), is now President of the Club, and that Major-General J. N. Thompson, (ret'd.), has succeeded Colonel Grant ("Granto") as secretary.

Elsewhere in this issue is an announcement by the Club asking that permanent members of the United Service Club should communicate their address without delay to the Secretary, United Service Club, Simla.



Smoking.

It seems that many Home-going British officers are trying to cut down their smoking. Many people at Home are doing so, too, and the subject led to some interesting correspondence in the *London Times*. Lord Morton, who has been a heavy smoker for 35 years and has now given it up, said in a letter to *The Times* that the only disadvantage of becoming a non-smoker is that, for a short time, one feels a sense of irritation, but it quickly disappears if one has formed a real resolve never to smoke again. He continued:

"On the other hand, he who gives up smoking will find that his general health steadily improves; he plays his favourite game with greater skill and less fatigue; his enjoyment of food and drink is keener; his sense of smell is more acute; he no longer has that tiresome cough and his mouth feels cleaner; he saves a lot of money; he has a joyous feeling of independence while others are seeking for cigarettes and matches; and he enjoys plays and concerts more because he is not longing for a smoke."

Mr. Alfred H. Dunhill, well-known in the smoking world, wrote:

"Englishmen have been 'smoking furiously' for three and a half centuries, and the habit has not impaired either their physique or their courage. Roundheads



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"Wolfe's men—smokers all—climbed the Heights of Abraham and at Quebec won the battle which gave Canada to England. Wellington's smokers drove the French from the Spanish peninsula and crushed Napoleon (a non-smoker) at Waterloo.

"To come to modern instances, the men of El Alamein smoked, but did not suffer from the tiresome cough which Lord Morton deplures. The men in Normandy, although smokers, too, had enough energy to push Jerry across the Rhine."

Finally let me quote an extract from a London paper, which attributed to a Harley Street doctor the following statement:

"One cure for smoking is to take an occasional mouthwash of thoroughly diluted silver nitrate solution. This will make cigarettes taste so horrible for eight hours or more that you will not want to smoke".

Birthday Honours List.

Among those on whom His Majesty conferred honours in the Birthday Honours list were the following members of the United Service Institution of India:

C. B.—Major-General, J. B. Dalison, O.B.E.; Major-General M. Glover, O.B.E., Major-General R. E. le Fleming, O.B.E., M.C.; Ai. Vice-Marshal A. L. A. Perry-Keene, O.B.E., and Major-General H. R. Swinburn, M.C.

K. C. S. I.—Lieut.-General Sir Frank W. Messervy, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C.-in-C., Northern Command.

C. I. E.—Major-General J. E. Hirst, D.S.O.; Brigadier R. C. Herron, O.B.E., Colonel D. H. Currie, O.B.E., M.C., D.C.M.

Knighthood.—M. R. Coburn, Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E., O.B.E., Add. Financial Adviser, Military Finance Department.

K. B. E.—Lieut.-General Ernest Wood, C.B., C.I.E., M.C., Quartermaster-General in India.

C. B. E.—J. Chettle, Esq., D.I.G. Police, Burma; Major-General F. J. Loftus-Tottenham, D.S.O., Commanding Force 401, Iraq.

O. B. E.—Major H. J. Curran, I.M.S., Lieut-Colonel D. R. Venning; Brigadier Desmond Young, M.C.

Other Honours.

The following honours have also been conferred on the following members of the United Service Institution for gallant and distinguished services in South East Asia:


D. S. O.—Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Venning, Madras Regiment.

O. B. E.—Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Scott, Madras Regiment.

M. C.—Major R. E. G. Twelvetees, 9 Gurkha Rifles Major Sheodan Singh, Royal Deccan Horse.


An Apology.

In referring in the April issue of the *Journal* to the honours conferred on members in the New Year Honours List we inadvertently referred to Colonel R. A. Briggs as belonging to the 5th Royal Garhwal Rifles, whereas we should of course have written 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (F. F.). Our apologies are due to Colonel Briggs for the error.



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
Reunions.

If organisers of regimental reunions either in India or in Great Britain would care to send us the names of the officers present, we shall be delighted to include their names in the *Journal*.

New Members

Herewith is a list of new members who have joined the Institution since March 23 up to the time of going to Press—July 9:—

- AHLAWAT, Major R. S., Madras Regiment.
 AHMAD, 2nd/Lieut. Z. D., 18th Cavalry.
 AKHTAR, Lieut. M. A., R.I.A.S.C.
 AMAR JIT SINGH, 2/Lieut., 6th Lancers.
 AMARANATHA JHA, Dr.
 ANDERSON, Captain, Mahar Regiment.
 *AVTAR SINGH MANN, Captain, 14 Punjab Regiment.
 BACHINT SINGH, Lieut., Rajput Regiment.
 BAGSHAW, Captain R. D., Madras Regiment.
 BALBIR SINGH SANDHU, Captain, R.I.A.
 BALWANT SINGH, Captain, Sikh Regiment.
 BARAR, Captain M. S., R.I.A.
 BEDI, Major A. S., 7th Cavalry.
 BHALLA, 2/Lieut. B. P., R.I.A.
 BHARADWAJ, F/Lieut. O. P., R.I.A.F.
 BHARADWAJA, 2/Lieut. K., I.E.M.E.
 BHARTENDRA SINGH, Captain, Rajputana Rifles.
 BHASKAR, F/Lieut. T. P., R.I.A.F.
 BHATIA, Captain O. P., Dogra Regiment.
 *BLACKFORD, Lieut. S. T., F.F. Rifles.
 BRUEN, Major D. L.
 BUKHARI, Captain B. S., F.F. Rifles.
 *CHAND, Captain, P.K.H., Dogra Regiment.
 CHARANJIT SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.
 CHHACHHI, 2/Lieut. H. S., R.I.A.
 CHACHRA, Lieut. O. P., 8th Punjab Regiment.
 CHADHA, Captain R. K., 1st Punjab Regiment.
 CHAND, Major B. S., Kumaon Rifles.
 CHATTERJEE, W/Cdr. H. N., R.I.A.F.
 CHAUDHRI, Lieut. M. S., Rajputana Rifles.
 CHOWDHURY, Lieut. N., I.A.O.C.
 COGE, Captain S. A., 1 Punjab Regiment.
 CROMBIE, Major J. C., Royal Garhwal Rifles.
 *DEANE, Captain D. A., 23 Air Liaison Section.
 DHALIWAL, Major G.S., IMS/IAMC.
 DHARMA MOHAE, Captain C., Madras Regiment.
 DHILLON, 2/Lieut. I. S., 15 Punjab Regiment.
 DIDAR SINGH TIWANA, Captain, Jat Regiment.
 DUDMAN, Captain G. W., I.A.O.C.
 DUTT, Captain B. S., I.A.O.C.



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*GOYAL, W/C S. N., R.I.A.F.

GULATI, Captain H. S.

GULSHER KHAN, Captain M., F.F. Rifles.

GURBACHAN SINGH, Captain, 19 Lancers.

GURDIAL SINGH, Captain, 8 Punjab Regiment.

HAFAEEZ-IMAM, Captain S. ALI, Indian Grenadiers.

HAIDER, Captain S. H., I.A.O.C.

HAIDER JANG, Captain, 53 S.S.B.

HAMILTON ASH, Major R. P., I.E.M.E.

HAQ NAWAZ, Captain, I.A.O.C.

HAQUE, Captain M. A., R.I.A.

HARBANS SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.S.C.

HARBANS SINGH, 2/Lieut., 15 Punjab Regiment.

HARBHAJAN SINGH KULLAR, 2/Lieut., 2 Punjab Regiment.

HARTLEY, Major J. C., M.C., Sikh Regiment.

HASSAN, Lieut. GHULAM, 8 Punjab Regiment.

HENDERSON, Captain D. G., Gordons.

HICKS, Captain A. H., R.A.O.C.

HIRAN, Captain C. S., Dogra Regiment.

HOOKE, F/Lieut. L. G., R.I.A.F.

HUMAYUNE, Major N., R.I.E.

HYDARI, H. E. Sir AKBAR, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S., Governor of Assam.

HYDER ALVI, Captain M. N., 101 Composite Platoon.

ISAACS, 2/Lieut. S. G., R.I.E.

JAFRI, 2/Lieut. M. H., R.I.A.

JAGJIT SINGH, 2/Lieut., R.I.A.

JAN MOHAMMAD, Lieut., F.F. Rifles.

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
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
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THE MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

FOUNDED IN 1888, THIS SILVER MEDAL IS AWARDED ANNUALLY BY H. E. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE COUNCIL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA FOR THE BEST MILITARY RECOGNITION OF JOURNEY OF EXPLORATION DURING THE YEAR

The Journal

of the

United Service Institution of India

Vol. LXXVIII

OCTOBER, 1947

No. 329

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MATTERS OF MOMENT

FOR TWO CENTURIES a great Army has guarded India. Composed of a variety of colours, castes and creeds, it has been an example to the country as a whole—an example of how men of differing religious beliefs, differing temperaments and differing racial characteristics can live in happiness and harmony. On the fighting field they fought shoulder to shoulder; on the playing fields they developed a fine team spirit; traditions helped to mould regiments, battalions, ships' companies and aerial squadrons. With the division of India into two Dominions the fighting forces have been separated, but the spirit which fortified this unity of effort, of living, cannot be separated or swept away. That unity of mind was not skin deep, though recent events may temporarily have disturbed the friendly co-operation existing before August 15, 1947. Temporary though this effect may be, every endeavour must be made to lift the Fighting Forces of both Dominions back to their former eminence among armies, navies and air forces of the world. Such endeavours must come primarily from all officers. Personal feelings must give way to the larger and finer concept of duty to the common cause. Such problems as mutual economic stability, the securing of food supplies for all, the protection of minorities are all everybody's concern, irrespective of creed. Officers, trained and able to lead in war, can and must lead also in peace, and now is the time to prove their mettle and show the world that they can lead men not only in battle but, what may be of far greater worth, in the principles of citizenship.

**A
Deep-Seated
Unity.**

The immensity of the work India's fighting men have achieved cannot be adequately covered in a brief editorial, but it is worth while casting one's mind back to the origins of the Indian Army in the days of the Hon. East India Company. That company had to establish an armed force to guard its trading areas, and as they expanded, so did the Armies.

Traditions of the Past.

Throughout those long years, and on and past the time when Great Britain took over the forces, India's sepoys endured hardships and fought with high gallantry. They were soldiers of no mean order. It was, however, the 1914—18 War which brought their prowess to the notice of the world. Nearly a million men went overseas from this great land to fight and over 100,000 became casualties. But with the coming of the 1939—45 War India made an even greater contribution. Over 2,500,000 voluntarily offered themselves in all India's fighting forces. In the Middle East, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, Burma, Malaya, they fought and builded for themselves a fame which will remain for all time. More than 6,000 Indian soldiers, sailors and airmen were awarded decorations for gallantry and meritorious service. There is little need to remind the present-day soldier of these achievements; little need, indeed, to remind the world. That this proud record will remain unsullied is the fervent hope of their well-wishers in the two Dominions. It would also be the hope of the British Officers who through these past two centuries have had the honour of leading them. The spirit of some, many of them famous men, lives on in lonely graves in India and in Britain. Thousands, too, who have led the Indian Forces in recent years and have worked untiringly and vigorously for an Army of which they could be proud are watching their successors with sympathetic interest. Is all their work to count for nothing? The present-day officer whose heart and soul and pride is in his regiment will reply an emphatic No. Whatever he is, Sikh, Hindu, Muslim or Christian, he will show the world that he can and will do his duty, train his men, and determine to merit the approbation of all who with warm sincerity wish well of India and Pakistan.

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DURING THE past few weeks many lessons learned during the late War might well have been applied by the Services. Among them was the lesson, rammed home as the Indian Army expanded: "Stop the rumour monger!" Anywhere in the world will be found the man who sees disaster looming ahead; the man who, to impress his hearers with a sense of his own importance, tells of what so and so told him. Spreading rumours, voicing defeatist views, looking for the bad news and not the good—indeed doing anything that promotes friction of any sort are actions both unmanly and unsoldierly. In this matter alone the Serviceman can be of material help in restoring normal conditions. Many officers realise this to the full; others cannot resist the temptation

The Serviceman's Duty

to become arm-chair critics, little realising the damage they do—not to themselves, be it noted, but to their Service and their country. In these matters soldiers, sailors and airmen must set an example to all classes. By their actions, by their words, the civil population can be helped to gain confidence; anxiety and apprehension will give way to assurance and a feeling of security. Inspired by those lofty ideals, unshaken firmness and constancy, soldiers can and must lessen the troubles which have affected so many of the people they have tacitly agreed to serve.

** ** ** **

AT ONE TIME in the Army it might have been difficult to decide which of the trinity of adjectives; "mad, married and methodist" carried the greatest opprobrium. The Iron Duke himself would probably have condoned a degree of madness in his officers; he might even have overlooked their marriage provided it was as much in the background as his own,

**New
Methods of
Instruction**

--but methodism! "Damme, a disgrace and a calamity!" Methodism, however, in the Duke's army was highly different from methods in the modern army. By methods is meant the application of scientific and psychological principles to the art of instruction. The boost given to methods arose out of the War's necessities. Nations found themselves confronted with the stupendous task of teaching whole masses of the population techniques, social, industrial and military, to which they were complete strangers, often indifferent and sometimes hostile. The War revolutionised methods of instruction, not so much in the sense of finding out new ones, but in insisting upon applying those already known. The Armed Forces were naturally in the vanguard of the methods movement, not only to ensure the highest standards of military efficiency and knowledge but to increase the survival rate of its combatant troops. A soldier who had not learnt his weapons, nor his fieldcraft, well, stood ten times the chance of becoming a casualty than one who had. Good instructors mean a good army. The modern officer, especially the regimental officer, is above all an instructor. He must be a master of teaching technique. It is gratifying that already the quality and standards of instruction in Service academies and colleges are for the most part incomparably higher than those at universities and schools. There is not an officer at the splendidly progressive Indian Military Academy who would not be ashamed of teaching cadets in the casual, pedantic, stilted and unimaginative fashion in which he himself was taught at school.

* * * *

Methods of instruction, of course, do not start and end in the classroom. They cover the whole field of factors governing the ability to learn and to instruct. The modern instructor must not only know how to make his subject palatable and interesting by visual aids, dramatic effects, discursive interludes, motivating questions and the like; he must know exactly how much instruction can be imbibed in three-quarters of an hour;

**What The
Modern
Instructor
Must Know**

when in an instructional day, the students will reach a mental saturation point, at what *tempo* over a period, assimilation can be maintained; what part of the day is more suitable to a "mental" subject, what to a practical; how outdoor and indoor work should be divided to gain maximum advantage from both; what types of student react to one set of instructional stimuli, what types to a different kind, and what group structure of a class will allow maximum progress to be made by all. There can be no doubt that methods have come to stay, and that Field Marshal Montgomery's stricture: "There are no bad soldiers, only bad officers" may modify itself in future to something like: "Ignorance doesn't exist, only unmethodised instructors".

** ** ** **

THAT the moon may play a part in mapping the world by means of radar and that future battles may be fought by weapons operated by automatic remote control are only two of the fascinating possibilities discussed in later pages of this issue in an article on the growing science of electronics. The writer, an officer of the Indian Army who may himself contribute in years to come to the application of radio science to warfare, touches on many points which provide much food for thought. In recent

Future of a Modern Miracle

weeks we have heard of the successful flight across the Atlantic of a pilotless aircraft guided entirely by means of wireless equipment. Experiments with missiles directed by radio have already begun to reach an advanced stage of development. An electronic "brain," able to memorise and equipped with a capacity for computation far beyond the gifts of mathematical genius, is even now opening up enormous possibilities, both peaceful and militant. It is indeed true that the destructive utilisation of new ideas in radio, based on remarkable discoveries of World War II, may bring about an entirely new conception of warfare, and that such accomplishments as these are but a forerunner of things to come. With such progress, too, as the author says, will have to come a change of attitude on the part of officers and senior leaders in the Services. It is easy—but a manifestation of an escapist viewpoint—to adopt the policy of leaving technical problems to the specialist few.

* * * *

No longer will it be permissible, in a technical war, for an officer to observe blandly and with a candid admission of sheer ignorance, "I'm sorry, I don't understand technicalities; I'm not technically minded." He will have to know something at least of the workings of electronic apparatus; and most certainly he will have to know what it will do and how to make it act. Shortage of technical specialists has always been a problem in any country at war. In this country particularly that shortage has been

The Technical Mind

due to general backwardness of educational standards and absence of technical colleges and literature in the vernacular. To meet future demands for more and more technicians, these matters will require a remedy that will take some years to apply. The training of the officers of tomorrow will have to ensure that both broad outline and specialised knowledge of electronics are drilled home as thoroughly as the commoner lessons on tactics, logistics, and so forth.

* * * *

The need for such training years ago in India became apparent early in the last world conflict, when the country's system of telecommunications was found to be far too limited for the voracious demands of war. The department of the Posts and Telegraphs had to be augmented by the services of numerous British officers with special experience.

**War Aid
for India's
P. and T.**

Lack of indigenous research and manufacturing facilities made it imperative to produce plans with the aid of outside experts and to import much vital equipment from other countries. Because of the initial handicaps, it took something like two years to put those plans into effect, and three years more to bring them to fruition. After an expenditure of Rs. 40 crores and the combined exertions of Indian and British experts, there was in existence at the conclusion of hostilities a telecommunications system expanded many times the size of the original network, in itself a valuable legacy for the future. Big as it is, this system will have to develop still more to meet the demands of the Dominions as they settle down to the multitudinous affairs with which they are faced; and for this, more experts have yet to be produced, with a reserve against future war contingencies.

* * * *

Perhaps, as our contributor suggests, it will be a good thing to encourage wider scientific interest by holding "Services Weeks," with the object of enabling each specialist corps to show the others how it works and how science is applied in its organisation. It will not be enough for leaders of future armies to know that they are particular kinds of "cogs"

**Need for
"Services
Weeks"**

in a great machine; they must also know just what the other "cogs" do in more detail than hitherto, fully to appreciate their own functions. With the wider application of electronic control to offensive methods and to communications, such a policy requires the deepest consideration. It is essential to encourage the creation of new ideas. If ordinary men can see for themselves demonstrations of to-day's wonderful achievements, they will not require the imagination of such thinkers as H. G. Wells and Olaf Stapledon to suggest new fields for research and to prompt to-morrow's marvels. What they propose may well seem impossible and fantastic at the outset. But who can say what is unattainable in a world in which

strange dreams of not so many years back have become actual realities of the present time? No doubt, even less than half a century ago, the thought of measuring the moon's distance from the earth by radar reflections, and of charting the shape of land and sea by means of minute currents passing with the speed of light through unfamiliar instruments would have been received with mockery. Now, such things are within an ace of practical achievement and many new ideas stranger still will follow them if men are trained to understand a science the miracles of which, for good or ill, have only begun to be revealed.

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SINCE THE inception of this Journal over seventy years ago it has always been the endeavour that it should be guided by the objects of the Institution in "promoting and advancing the study of military knowledge." That purpose has always been borne in mind by those who

About Ourselves

have had the privilege of editing the Journal, for no one can doubt that the Services can gain immensely in efficiency and knowledge from a close study of articles appearing in our pages. That remark applies not only to officers in India and Pakistan, for in the last year or two other countries have shown a close interest in the Journal—a tribute due in large measure to the excellence and usefulness of articles sent in by members. It was, therefore, significant that, at the annual meeting of the Council of the Institution, those present emphasised unanimously their wish that both the Institution and the Journal should continue. The decision then arrived at is to be discussed in detail at a special Council meeting to be convened in New Delhi during November, when the future constitution of the U.S.I. will be worked out in the light of present circumstances.

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A Specialist Publication

Whether it was a good or bad thing to break up the Indian Army, or whether it was wise to divide India itself into two Dominions are matters entirely outside the scope of this Journal. The Journal is simply and solely a specialist publication for professional soldiers, sailors and airmen, who for a modest subscription can learn much that concerns them and their duties as officers. This country and its Armed Forces—and here we should add, we refer to India and Pakistan—is fortunate in having a Service Journal which can keep its officers well-informed, up-to-date, and zealous in their work. In short, the *U. S. I. Journal* can wield a strong influence for good among officers of all the Services in the two Dominions. But that influence must in greater or lesser degree, depend on the support it receives. Had not postal communications been disrupted, the Institution would this year have achieved a record increase in membership. That we

have achieved so much is due to the loyalty and assistance which has been forthcoming from official sources and from our members. May those happy circumstances long continue!

** ** ** **

THE END of the Indian Army on August 15 as it had existed for two hundred years brought to a close the careers of many officers, whose admiration and high regard of the Indian soldier, sailor and airman was measured by an affinity unique in military annals. That is fact. We could quote hundreds of officers whose work has been far beyond duty to their troops—officers whose very being was immersed in the task before them—leading, inspiring and working wholeheartedly for the welfare of their men. It would be difficult—nay, impossible—to attempt to refer to them by name, but we are impelled to refer to one outstanding figure in this regard. He is Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. No Commander-in-Chief in memory travelled so widely and so frequently to see things for himself; no C.-in-C. was known personally to so many of his troops; and few Cs.-in-C. have been so genuinely well-liked by those who have had the privilege of serving under him. To serve a country and Army faithfully and zealously for forty-four years is a record given to few, and we take special pleasure in mentioning the fact that, throughout, he has been a member of this Institution—indeed, he is now the senior member of the Institution in point of years of membership. His name will long remain one of the proudest memories of the erstwhile Indian Army, for as we wrote in 1946, in the July issue of this Journal: “Many rose to fame in the late War on the crest of the wave of success; the Auk, *our* Auk, belongs to the select few who throughout our history have helped to lead us out of the dark wood of our characteristic early disasters by steadfast courage and heroic decisions in the field, by elimination of self-interest, and by understanding patience and fortitude when beset by divided counsels and crippling handicaps.”

* * * *

Looking back on the War years, apart from his responsibility and genius in organising the vast base in India for the offensive against the Jap, we take leave to suggest that his foresight and determination on at least two occasions played a momentous part in the strategic pattern of the War and contributed in large measure to its success. The first occasion was when the Hun and the Italian armies attempted their mammoth pincer-hold on the Middle East, one arm reaching out to Egypt, the other (via, Stalingrad) to the priceless oilfields of Iraq, for Field Marshal Auchinleck's promptness and his insistence on moving to Iraq just in time, troops which

**His
Part in the
Late War**

India could ill spare was the action of a skilful military leader. The success of that move may well be revealed in history as one of the turning points of the War, for oil was soon to be our most valuable asset. The part he played at El Alamein is too well-known to enlarge upon here, but we make bold to say that his moral courage in deciding to make a stand so many miles behind the then front, well-knowing the criticism which would spring from a war-weary public, was outstanding. That, however, was only part of the story, for El Alamein was fought by him not only with the object of repulsing the enemy but of launching an immediate counter-offensive. Others, however, had the privilege of doing so, but there can be no denying that the subsequent victories would not have been possible but for the successful stand he made. Throughout his career he has set an example to officers by his kindness, tolerance and understanding, all of which have combined to earn for him a leading place among other distinguished soldiers who have served India and the Indian Army. Hundreds of thousands of Indian soldiers now living their lives in out of the way villages, and his many admirers among the public in the two new Dominions, in his homeland, and in many other countries, including a host of Indian and British officers, will wish him all prosperity and success in any new sphere of duty to which he may add the distinction of his talented energies.

In common with other British Officers of the Indian Army, the editor will shortly relinquish his commission in India, and thereafter intends to embark on a civilian newspaper enterprise in Australia. He does so with no little regret, for during the six years he has edited this Journal and conducted the affairs of the Institution he has made hundreds of friendships with officers, and especially with those who have desired a guiding hand in contributing articles. He will always remember, too, the unfailing assistance he has received from all members, high and low, of the Institution. The time is therefore approaching when another officer will take over and continue the useful work—for useful work it is in that it carries with it the privilege of assisting the Services in practical fashion. Though in these uncertain times it is difficult to say when his successor will be appointed, in the event of that happening before the January issue can be set up, the editor wishes all members God-speed, and a happy and successful future to the Institution.

A STORY OF HONOURABLE DEALING

BY MAJOR-GENERAL L. G. WHISTLER, C.B., D.S.O.*

ABOUT two hundred years ago the British came to India to trade. They came for no other reason. As you and everyone else knows, it is impossible to trade unless there is peace and security in the area in which the trade is going on. So right from the beginning those old Trading Companies were determined to have peace and security.

They took steps to keep their own districts quiet. They recruited soldiers, both British and local men, thus starting that long tradition of the maintenance of peace and security in India. Trade expanded, and so did the influence of the Companies. To secure their areas from outside aggression it was at times necessary to fight quite considerable campaigns. Not only did the soldiers have to fight the local aggressors, but they also had to fight the French and Portuguese, who, like us, were in the country to trade.

That situation continued until almost the whole of India was under the control of the Trading Companies. They had, in fact, private armies of their own, and from those Armies have descended many of the present Regiments of the British Army and the Armies of India's two new Dominions.

About a hundred years ago the British Government took over control of India from the Trading Companies, and the Indian Empire was born. It was governed by the Houses of Parliament in England and by the British Crown. A Viceroy was appointed to represent the King-Emperor in India.

In 1833 a man called Macaulay spoke in the House of Commons. Among other things he used these historic words:

"The object of the British in India is to train, educate and develop the peoples of India until, at some future date, they will be able to take over the control and government of their own country themselves. If it should so happen that the British are successful in bringing this about, they will have accomplished one of the greatest acts the British Empire can ever achieve."

Many other British statesmen have said the same sort of thing since 1833. And now Lord Macaulay's vision has proved to be true. On August 15, 1947, the Dominions of India and Pakistan come into being. On that day your duty to India is completed.

That duty, which you have carried out with honour, is the same duty which your fathers and grandfathers were called upon to perform. You and they have carried it out alongside units of the Indian Army from the very beginning. The duty has remained unchanged: the defence of the frontiers of the country from outside aggression, and the maintenance of peace and security within its borders.

I have travelled widely throughout India these last few months. Everywhere I see evidence of what the British soldier has done and the influence he has wielded. The early chapters of the story are written for all time in the

* In addresses to British troops in India during July and August, 1947.

churches and cemeteries, where on gravestones tarnished with age are written the names of either a famous or a humble soldier, or maybe a soldier's wife or a soldier's child.

The other day I was driving up the Khyber Pass. There, cut in the rocks at the side of the road, I saw the badges of units of the British Army—yours and mine. Those badges marked the spot where, at some time in the past, units of the British Army fought to defend the frontier from aggression.

And I saw alongside those badges of the British Army the badges of nearly all the Regiments of the Indian Army. They had fought alongside British soldiers then just as they fought shoulder to shoulder with us in 1914-18 and in 1939-45. They, with us, have defended both frontiers of this great country; with us, they have won two Great Wars; with us, they have played their part in maintaining the internal security of the country.

Think well of this Indian soldier. Without him we might well not have won the two Great Wars. Before your fighting lives are over—and I call your fighting lives until you are 45—you may perhaps want him again. And if you do you will want him very badly.

This Army of India used to be very different. In all Infantry Brigades there would be two Indian and the one British battalion. Not long ago there was no Indian Artillery; no Indian Armoured Corps. Now they are firmly established—a tribute to the British officers who built and organised them.

During the last eighteen months soldiers of this Indian Army have been serving under a great strain. Its units are composed of followers of various religious beliefs—Mohammadans, Hindus, Sikhs. During the recent rioting in the Punjab, whence the vast majority of these fighting men have come, there have been killings and burnings and looting. Soldiers have been sent to their homes on leave; many have had tragic and sorrowful homecomings. Yet, by and large, these men have returned from leave to continue to serve their unit and their Army faithfully alongside our British units.

That is a matter of great achievement. It prompts us to look upon our Indian comrades with pride, and to wish them well, both for what they have done for us in the past, and for what they may do for us in the future, if that should become necessary.

Let us also give our good wishes to the two Dominions which are becoming partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations. They become one of the family party. We wish them well, too, for a more selfish reason, for through our long association with India we have built up close ties in the sphere of trade. We stand in a privileged position, for without that trade we in England would find our standard of living going down. Thus for both reasons let us wish them well.

Not so long ago it looked as though India would leave the Empire once she was given independence. That it has not happened is in large measure due to the officer who was Supreme Commander of S.E.A.C., is now Viceroy, and in a few days will be the first Governor-General of the Dominion of India.

* * * * *

Your duty in India, and your service in India, is about to end. What are your obligations during the short time that remains before you leave? First you will fit yourselves for whatever task awaits you outside India. But your major duty now is to be sure that by your behaviour and by your bearing you

leave the impression on the India you have served that you are members of a great race—which you are. Time and again the British race has proved to the world that its watchword has been decency and freedom. We British came to India as a trading nation, anxious to train, educate and develop its peoples. We go, having accomplished a task. We do not scuttle out.

Many people in the world to-day say that the British Empire is going down, and that it is already a second-rate Power. Many hope that that is true. If it were true, many nations would be after us like pariah dogs after a bone; and we should be no more. But those people who think in those terms suffer under a delusion. A nation which but seven short years ago had the guts to stand alone and practically unarmed against the might of Hitler's Germany still has the spirit, the resolution and the fortitude which inspired it then.

You young soldiers may, in your fighting lives, have to stand again for decency and freedom in human relations. You are the youth of Britain, and to you will fall the task of insisting that what is right, shall be. Your duty is clear. It is to make quite sure that the inhabitants of these two new Dominions of India and Pakistan know that when we go, we go as a great people convinced that they should stay with us in the Commonwealth of Nations. If they think otherwise, they have complete freedom to leave that Commonwealth, and unless we show ourselves to be members of a great race, who will blame them for so doing?

Let me sum up this brief talk. First, wish well of the Indian and Pakistan Armies as a tribute to what they have done for us and with us over the past two centuries. Secondly, wish well to the two new Dominions, for they are part of our great Commonwealth. And thirdly, think well of yourselves and the race to which you belong. Remember your final duty as you prepare to leave India: Go with the firm determination that neither by word nor deed will you do any thing which will mar the high prestige of your Homeland.

OVER 8,000 ARMY UNITS DISBANDED

From V-J Day to the end of July, 1947 the net reduction in the strength of the Indian Army amounted to 1,687,910 men and women. Of these 32,185 were British and Indian officers; 12,577 were officers and auxiliaries of the W.A.C.(I); 46,676 were B. O. Rs serving with the Indian Army; and 1,525,898 were I.O. Rs, including 60,854 civilians attached to the Indian Army.

Altogether 8,524 Army units have now been disbanded.

FLAGS OF BOYS' UNITS OF THE INDIAN ARMY

BY H. E. FIELD MARSHAL SIR CLAUDE J. E. AUCHINLECK,

G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E.

Supreme Commander, India and Pakistan.

IN THE April, 1947 issue of the *U.S.I. Journal*, the Editor was good enough to include a short note by me on the Boys' Units of the Indian Army. The subject of the Flags presented to some of these units has aroused a good deal of interest among past and present officers, and the Editor has asked me to write something about them.

These Boys' Flags are not "Colours". They are just Flags and have no official standing or significance. To the boys they mean a lot. The Flag always has an honoured place in the Boys' club room, and is looked after with great care and pride.

So far, more than twenty of these Flags have been presented, and it has given me personally the greatest pride and pleasure to present them. A Flag presentation parade is worth seeing, as I think anyone who has had the privilege of watching one will agree. These parades—staged and commanded throughout by the boys themselves, under their own leaders, unaided by adult officers or N. C. Os,—are of a very high standard indeed.

The parade usually includes a general salute, an inspection in line, the presentation of the Flag to a very serious and dignified colour party, a march past, and an Advance in Review order—often done in slow time. The drill, handling of arms, turn-out and general precision and smartness would often do credit to His Majesty's Foot Guards, and are a real pleasure to watch.

Now as to the actual Flags. To a very large extent they are designed by the boys themselves, and the mottoes which are borne on many of them are chosen by the boys, usually after much discussion. Here, then are the descriptions of the flags of the Boys' Units of the following Regiments and Corps:

The Indian Armoured Corps, Lucknow.—This Flag in the scarlet and yellow of the colours of the Armoured Corps is in the shape of the old guidons carried by the horsed cavalry regiments of the past. The green and yellow of the lance pennons are the colours of the Boys' Regiment. The motto: *Socho, Chalo, Bahadur Bano* means "Think—Act—Become a Hero," or words to that effect!

The Prince of Wales's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners, Roorkee.—Scarlet and blue for the Sappers, this Flag bears the Prince of Wales's Feathers, which is the Corps' badge, as well as the universal Sapper grenade. The motto inscribed on an open book, for learning, resting on crossed rifles, for war, is *Jan Nisari*, or "Self-Sacrifice". This design, including the motto, was very much the invention of the boys themselves.

The Indian Signal Corps.—The colours and insignia of this Flag follow those of the Signal Corps. The well-known figure of Mercury setting a girdle

round the Earth, with the motto : *Tez-o-Sahih*—"Swift and Correct," or "Swift and Sure," need no explanation. This Flag is awaiting a suitable opportunity for presentation to the Boys' Regiment at Jubbulpore.

The 1st Punjab Regiment.—This, the senior regiment of the Infantry of the Indian Army, has an unbroken record of service since it was raised in Madras in 1759. The Flag displays the Regimental battle honours of the Elephant for Assaye and the Golden Dragon for the China War of 1842. The old full dress uniform colours are green facings on a scarlet coat—hence the colours in the Flag. The motto : *Maut tak Wafadar*, means "Faithful unto Death". The staff of the Flag is surmounted by a silver "Assaye" elephant.

The 2nd Punjab Regiment.—Like the 1st, the 2nd Punjab Regiment is directly descended from the old Madras Infantry, and its battalions were raised originally between the years 1751 and 1800. Scarlet and green are the old full dress uniform colours, and the silver "Galley" commemorates the part played by the 2nd Battalion, then the 9th Madras Infantry, in the overseas expedition to Burma in 1824. The motto : *Khushki-o-Tari* goes with the "Galley," and can be translated "By Land and Sea" like the *Per Mare Per Terram* of the Royal Marines.

The Madras Regiment.—Although this Regiment has a break of some years in its direct descent from the old Line Regiments of the Madras Infantry, due to the disbandment of the Madras battalions some years ago, it carries on their traditions and bears their battle honours on its Colours. The Regiment was raised in its present form in the early years of the last War, and has a very flourishing Boys' Company. Their Flag is the green of the facings of the old Madras Infantry, and the design is the badge of the new regiment—depicting the shield and swords used by the fighting men of Southern India in the old days.

The Indian Grenadiers.—This is the only Grenadier Regiment in the Indian Army and a very old one as Grenadiers go, having first come into being as far back as 1779, when they were known as the Bombay Grenadiers of the old Bombay Presidency Army.

The Boys' Flag is a very striking one, showing the scarlet of the old full dress tunic and the white of its facings. The Grenadiers wear to-day in their berets the distinctive white pom pom or tuft which adorned the shako of the Grenadier companies in the days of Waterloo. The motto : "Second to None" belongs to the Boys' Company and not officially to the Regiment. The boys live up to it very strenuously and impress it firmly on visiting officers, however senior in rank !

The Mahratta Light Infantry.—The black back-ground of the Flag is the facing colour of the Regiment, which is the only Indian Infantry Regiment to have black facings. The story of this famous Corps goes back to 1768, when the 2nd Bombay Sepoys were raised. The silver bugle horn marks the Light Infantry character of the Corps and the motto takes us back to the days of the Mahratta Wars—*Chhtrapati Shivaji Maharaj Ki Jai*—or "Victory to the mighty King—Shivaji," which is, to this day, the "shout" or war-cry of the men of the Regiment and of its boys—all Mahrattas.

The Rajput Regiment.—So far, this is the only yellow Flag presented to a Boys' Unit, and it displays the facing colour of the battalions of this old and well-known Corps. The Regiment dates from 1798, when the present 1st Battalion was raised as the 2nd Battalion 15th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry.

The device in the centre represents the Bailey Guard of the Lucknow Residency, which was defended by the "Regiment of Lucknow"—later to become the 16th Rajputs and eventually the present Regimental Centre. The scrolls show battle honours chosen from the many borne by the Regiment on its Colours and one for the last War—Kohima—not yet officially granted. The motto : *Mel Milap se Kam Karo* means "Work as a Team" or "Pull Together". On the top of the staff is a model of the *Kattar*, the Rajput dagger.

8th Punjab Regiment.—The old full dress of this Corps was drab with blue facings, hence the colour of the Flag, which was one of the first to be presented to a Boys' Company, before the days when mottoes were included in the design. The badge shows the "Chinthe"—the mythical dragon of Burma, and the arms of the Punjab—the sun rising over the five rivers.

The "Chinthe" marks the long connection of the battalions of the Regiment with Burma in the later part of the last century, when they were known as "Burma Infantry", though composed, as now, of Punjabis. The origin of the Regiment goes back to 1798, when the 1st Battalion was raised as 3rd Extra Battalion of Madras Native Infantry.

The Sikh Regiment.—Pale blue was the colour chosen by the Boys for this Flag, as it was the colour of their Company, and it has no special regimental significance. The badge on the Flag displays the quoit, a very real weapon of war in the hand of the Sikhs of the days of Ranjit Singh, and also the lion or "Singh," which is part of the name of every Sikh.

The colours of the scrolls are those of the various platoons, named after the famous battles of the Regiment. The motto selected by the boys is *Khud Karo, Khub Karo*, which may be translated as "Do it yourself and Do it well". The boys certainly live up to it. The pole is surmounted by the traditional Sikh quoit and dagger.

The Frontier Force Regiment.—This Flag embodies the buff or drab of the full dress tunic of the old Punjab Frontier Force Regiments, which were raised in 1846 after the Sikh Wars, and the scarlet of the facings of the "Corps of Guides" and also of the present 2nd Battalion—the old 2nd Sikhs. From the time of their raisings these battalions were always regarded as "Light Infantry", hence the silver "Bugle Horn" on the Flag. The motto : *Bahaduri wa Wafadari* means "Courage and Loyalty."

15th Punjab Regiment.—A typical Punjabi Regiment of four companies, each of a different class, the 15th date back to 1857, all the regular battalions having been raised in that year. At the close of the last Great War the Regiment was selected for conversion into a machine-gun corps, hence the machine-guns on the flag. The scarlet of the flag denotes the full dress of the majority of the battalions of the Regiment and the badge shows the Crescent of the Muslims and the Quoit of the Sikhs. The motto : *Takht ya Takhta* means literally "A Throne or a Coffin," or "Death or Glory."

The Royal Garhwal Rifles.—A very dark green Flag, with a typical "Rifle" badge, well befits the Boys' Company of this famous regiment of hillmen from the higher valleys of the Himalayas—all Rajputs, and inheriting to the full the Rajput fighting tradition.

This flag has no motto, being marked by its simplicity, perhaps because it was somewhat of a concession for the boys of a Rifle Regiment to carry a flag at all, as Rifle Regiments carry no Colours. The Regiment dates its origin back to 1887, and received its "Royal" title after the first World War in 1921. The flag pole is topped by the Trisul, or Trident, of the Hindu Goddess of Battle.

IMPORTANCE OF RADIO SCIENCE

By COLONEL B. D. KAPUR, A.M.I.R.E. (BRIT.).

AT the close of a Saturday morning lecture in Delhi, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, addressing officers of G.H.Q., remarked, in words to this effect: "The trend of modern science will change the concept of warfare in the next 5 to 10 years. I am no scientist, but I would impress on you all the necessity not only for keeping in touch with modern developments, but for studying how these developments will affect the technique of warfare."

Yet how many army officers show any interest in modern scientific developments? As laymen, anything technical they discard as beyond their understanding.

I will quote one example. During the late War officers had ample opportunities to learn the technique of other Arms. Among the most outstanding developments in the late war were in the field of electronic engineering. But how many officers have cared to understand the new communication system? If they can speak to Bombay or Karachi uninterrupted, if there is no unreasonable delay in the transmission of their messages, they care no more.

When given an explanation of the intricacies of the modern communication system, some officers say with childlike simplicity: "I had a telephone in 1939; I have one now through which I can talk to any place in India as I did before. The messages I used to write went through then; they go through now." Common reaction of an army officer to technical subjects may be summed up thus: "I have never understood these technicians, and I couldn't care less."

Yet a Commander who led formations in the late War, with technicians at his beck and call, swears by them. Unfortunately such Commanders are too few. The new technique of warfare will make full demands on Commanders with a technical bent. Let us probe a bit deeper and examine how training and production of such Commanders can be ensured in this country's Armed Forces.

WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE TRENDS

An impression of the part Radio played in the late War was given by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Victor Tait, K.B.E., C.B., then Director-General of Signals, Air Ministry, at the British Institute of Radio Engineers on 5th October, 1945. He said, *inter alia*:

"This has been a highly technical war, especially a radio technical war, and the demands of the Services and industry for radio personnel has created one of the greatest problems the United Kingdom has had to face—that of technical manpower.....The urgency and the size of this manpower demand for radio personnel can be realised when it is known that one time during the war the ground radar stations of the R.A.F. in the United Kingdom alone required the full-time employment of 1,600 officers and 20,000 other ranks.

"We had first to have the radar chains which gave us the vital information required when the *Luftwaffe* started their powerful attacks on Britain. The radar chain enabled us to win the Battle of Britain. These radar search equipments were essential in the hunt for the U-Boat trying to cut our supply life-line, and finally the blind bombing radio and radar devices had to be forced ahead to enable our bomber force to destroy the war factories and communication system of Germany, and thus allow the Allied Armies to invade Europe and overwhelm the German Armed Forces."

That is the story of the radio in R.A.F. successes over Europe. The achievements of radio in the communication field were no less outstanding. Battles in Burma were fought over the radio; radio formed the life-line of the far-flung solitary detachments in the thick jungles of Burma. The Normandy operation was co-ordinated and achieved entirely through a most up-to-date radio communication system.

Admiral the Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, in his presidential address delivered at the British Institute of Radio Engineers last year, whilst dilating on the great strides the science of electronics had made, said :

"In 1941, I found myself in charge of Combined Operations, one of whose principal tasks was to develop the technique and appliances needed for the large-scale amphibious assaults which would culminate in the Normandy invasion. It was clear that an operation like "Overlord," with its heavy concentration of a great diversity of fighting units, would not be possible without the highly integrated application of modern Radio Science.....

"First of all a Landing Ship Headquarters was devised to control an Army Division with the corresponding naval and air components during the assault and the early phases of the landing. The first headquarters ship fitted out was the *BULOLO*, with 20 transmitting and 60 receiving sets; several other British headquarters ships followed, and the Americans also followed this idea, putting even more transmitters and receivers into their ships than we had. These headquarters ships proved invaluable in amphibious operations in providing the commanders, jointly and individually, with an up-to-date picture of the situation, and for enabling them to give instantaneous directions to large forces in a rapidly changing situation.

"What were called Fighter Direction Ships were also devised; comparatively small ships, crammed with radio and radar equipment, which enabled the R.A.F. controller on board to form a complete picture of the fighting in the air, and to give instructions to our own aircraft, while they were actually fighting....."

In India the Posts and Telegraphs Department could not have coped, with their prehistoric instruments, with the tremendous signals traffic which developed within India when the country became the base for operations in South East Asia. Even the military inter-communication system was in its elementary stages at the beginning of war. It had to be expanded rapidly, and at its peak about 500 officers and 15,000 technicians were employed entirely on this static communication system in India.

G. H. Q. Signals, which forms part of the fixed communication organisation, handled more than 250,000 words a day. During the last 29 months of the War this unit dealt with over 215,000,000 words in 3,500,000 messages, about one-tenth of which were in cipher. Among the wireless circuits which carried these messages were those working to London, Singapore, Melbourne,

Nairobi, Rangoon, Singapore and Ceylon. The monthly wartime average of words received and despatched by the G.H.Q. Signal Office was just under 8,000,000.

To improve our trunk communications in India all the major towns of India had to be inter-linked on a multi-channel *carrier* system—the system which enables a number of speech and telegraph channels to be carried on a single cable simultaneously without any mutual interference. What is more, in the communication field the inventive genius is showing no signs of slackening. There is a general trend towards automatic devices.

Among the electronic developments of the late war are: teletype, carrier and radar. Let us elaborate on their uses and potentialities.

Teletype is the means of typing messages over wire or radio. Thus the present morse operator will disappear, and messages will be passed by automatic apparatus. The messages will be typed in the first instance by the operator, after which there will be no typing until they emerge typed at the destination, which may be shore, ship or aircraft, anywhere in the world. The intermediate stations will function automatically.

Another development in this line is the facsimile transmitter. The propagation through the intermediary stages will remain the same. A photo or a print will be reproduced at the destination automatically. A printed page could be taken on a frame of a film, and 108,000 such frames could be produced in an hour. Thus letter writing would not only become cheap, but the time period for transmission will be very largely reduced.

Carrier, as the word implies, is the means of carrying a number of speech or telegraph channels on different carrier frequencies over the same pair of wires. Carrier may be used over radio as well. At present the maximum number of circuits that may be employed are limited. Over the radio the range is restricted to visual range. Carrier over the line or radio, or both, however, presents great potentiality for future developments.

In the late war the line communications could not keep pace with the rapid advance of our armies. The use of ultra-short wave lengths for army communication purposes, and of employing radar-pulse technique for a multi-channel duplex telephony link, was developed to satisfy this new demand. The advance of 21 Army Group through France, Belgium, Holland and then into Germany was much too rapid for any line system to keep up with it. The No. 10 set, which was developed during the War, provided the multi-channel links and thus enabled communications to be maintained without break.

Research and development is being carried out to extend the range of ultra-short waves. A new radio device will soon permit the use of the moon as a reflector for short waves which will be picked up 2.4 seconds later at any point of the hemisphere, and may for the first time make possible long distance trans-oceanic television.

Radar augments to a remarkable degree our sense of sight. The use of radar during the War in detecting and locating bombers and ships, and in navigating ships through dense fogs is well known. Since the close of War, radar has been developed to measure vast distances. For the first time, radar echos from the moon have been received. A new precision radar capable of measuring vast distances around the globe by means of shooting out electronic "bullets" from airplanes in the stratosphere will soon be used to remap the entire world from somewhere above the United States.

These are only a few instances to indicate the trend of radio developments. Radio control will in future dominate all mechanical movements, and thus enable machinery to be controlled from large and convenient distances. For instance, here is a novel experiment recently carried out on a model battleship, 10 feet long, which forebodes extensive possibilities for development in the future :

1. The rudder of the model was controlled from the steering wheel at the transmitter.
2. Model's drive was controlled, providing instantaneous selection of forward, reverse and off.
3. The rotation of forward turrets was also controlled from the transmitter.
4. Circuits permitted firing of four of the model's secondary guns and all twelve turret guns.
5. Sirens and air-raid alarms could be sounded.
6. Speech could be transmitted to the battleship and orders issued.

RADIO A POWERFUL WEAPON

We are living through an engineering age. Radio has come to stay as a vital weapon of war. Its potentialities, left for the engineering genius to develop, are enormous. Unquestionably the Force equipped with the best radio system, and with the skilled radio personnel to enable them to use them in the best tactical and strategical manner, starts a battle with an advantage.

The development of most modern weapons such as missiles, flying bombs, rockets, radio planes, etc., all require radio systems in their offensive use to guide and control them on to their target. In the defence, extensive radio and radar warning systems are the saviours.

These are bare facts which face us in a country where the electronic industry is in its elementary stages, and where technical education, particularly in radio engineering, is only in the planning stage. It therefore behoves us to take a note of warning, and ensure that the requisite importance is given to science in the Army.

That every officer in the army must have an additional foundation of technical training is fully realised. This is all right for fundamental knowledge. But the army also needs specialists—specialists who should be able to prepare the specifications for the needs of the army, and suggest and make new devices to suit the type and technique of warfare. As mobility of the army increases, the trend would be to provide more and more automatic devices. It is in the research worker, closeted mostly in the laboratory, that the new army will find its means to keep up this momentum of advancement. We must therefore find these advanced technicians in the army. For the present we must send them to foreign institutions, but once the Science College is established in India we can concentrate their advanced training within our own shores under the lead of India's great scientists.

This, however, only limits modern instruction to the curriculum of the young officer. How is the knowledge of an average officer to be improved? Debates and lectures on modern scientific developments should be encouraged in all units. Scientists and lecturers from local colleges should be asked to give talks

to officers on the latest developments. Officers of infantry and other non-technical services should be seconded for a period of six months at least to such technical arms as Gunners, Engineers, Signals and I.E.M.E. Officers with advanced specialised technical knowledge should be seconded for a two-to-three-year duty with the Indian Research organisations.

ARMY RESEARCH ORGANISATION

This leads us on to the urgent need for a well-organised Research Directorate in the Armed Forces. When Dr. O. H. Wansborough Jones, Scientific Adviser to the War Office, visited India recently, he was shocked to see our present ideas of research in this country. The seeds for a well-balanced set-up for research have been sown. I am not so well informed as to comment on what shape the Army Research organisation will take. But this much need be said—that efficiency of a modern army is very much in the hands of a large and healthy research organisation.

Stressing the need for a Development Branch, and the necessity for close collaboration with the scientists in this direction, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Victor Tait (whom I have quoted before) said :

“The success achieved by radio was to a large extent due to the close co-operation developed in Britain between scientists, the radio engineer and the Fighting Services. You will note that I have put the radio engineer between the Scientist and the Fighting Services, which is his proper place. The radio engineer interprets into practical ideas the results of scientists’ research, and these practical ideas give the Services the equipment they require for fighting their battles.

“But the radio engineer must permeate both the scientists field and the Services field. He must work with the scientist and behind the scientist, so that he guides him on lines which will ensure that research results can be with and in the Services, to ensure that the Fighting Services can instal and maintain the equipment when they take it into use in the field. The success of this co-operation cannot be too strongly emphasised and should be continued in your peacetime activities.”

LIAISON WITH CIVIL RESEARCH ORGANISATION AND INDUSTRY

This brings us on to the close co-operation that must be maintained with the Civil Research organisation. Stressing the vital importance of continuous co-operation between civilian science and military agencies, General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said :

“As you well know, research is not a commodity that the Army can buy at a quoted price and have delivered to its warehouse in properly sized and marked parcels. A weapon already in existence can be ordered, but research is a technique where results cannot be predicted.

“Military training does not prepare an adequate number of men in that technique. Nor should the Army be forced to depend on its own efforts to develop the best guarantees of security, so long as we have at our door, within the democracy of which the Army is an essential part, the vast technical and scientific resources of civilian life. Co-operation between civilian and military agencies will assure us the finest in scientific research.”

The ideal would be for an army cell to be created in the Civil Research Organisation, which should be linked with the Army Research organisation. It has been realised that, if industry is to flourish, research must take the highest priority in the national build-up of the country. Our present research organisations have been set up satisfactorily, although one fails to see much interest in the electronic field.

ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY

As mentioned before, the electronic industry in this country is in its infancy, but efforts are being made to put it on a strong footing. Within the next five to ten years we may expect bewildering changes. In war the close co-operation between Industry and the Supply Department of the Government becomes most essential. Why should not therefore the Army maintain its touch with the Industry of the country in peacetime?

The Army should depute officers to industrial concerns, to study their problems, their production, their capacity. Guidance and encouragement from the Army will get Indian industry to function to meet the requirements of the Army. On the electronic side hardly anything is produced by Indian industrialists. A lot of items could be manufactured by Indian industry provided it is given guidance and encouragement. Even a short visit to the Post and Telegraph workshops opens one's eyes! Very few Army officers ever realise the potentiality of this source of production for tele-communication equipment such as telephones, exchanges, trunk boards, etc.

The lesson to draw is that we must break all barriers between the Army and the civil, and merge with each other to mutual advantage. The old ideas of army training for war in peacetime in their own areas of space and within their own sphere of thinking must die. We must train for war with a broad outlook. The whole country must be trained in peacetime for war, manpower, technicians, industry and the civilian in the street.

TRAINING OF OFFICERS IN SCIENCE

The prevalent idea in India that "duds" go to the Army must die. A modern army can only be successfully led by those gifted with brain. The training of Army officers has always been severe, but unfortunately the whole bias of training has been on physical endurance and military tactics. The outlook of the new Army officer must be broadened. The essential military stress required on junior leaders training cannot be ignored, but as the officer advances in his career he must be given new, broad training. Every officer is not expected to be a specialist technician. But specialist he must become in whatever career he pursues; he must take an intelligent interest in the activities of technicians as well.

Modern science therefore plays a very important part in an officer's career, not only in his curriculum in the early stages of his profession but throughout his life, as the developments in science emerge. Most officers in Britain and America are radio amateurs. An average Indian army officer looks up with admiration to an Indian amateur. He thinks he is superb, gifted with super knowledge. Unless the education and training of our officers has a scientific bias, not only in method but also technically, each arm or service will remain within its own water-tight compartment, Infantry, R.I.A.S.C., Gunners, Armoured Corps, Engineers, Signals and so forth. Let us break these bonds and indulge in a system of mutual teaching and learning.

I remember a successful Officers' Week organised by each major unit and Centre in Sialkot in 1943. The Signals Week was very popular. Officers were amazed to learn what Signals did and can do. This is what is required in peacetime—mutual teaching and learning between arms and services from which should accrue better understanding between arms thus keeping all our officers modern and up-to-date in scientific knowledge.

I have taken the liberty to make a direct approach to the reader. But I hope I have provided sufficient food for thought. I also hope that the "thought" once germinated will be translated into action. We have already too many committees being assembled by the Government. They all produce wonderful thoughts on paper, but these documents remain to be moth-eaten in the back cellars. Action by individual Commanders in the right direction would produce more results than any directives from G.H.Q. Let us write less and do more.

OCH ! TO BE IN IRELAND !

By "MOUSE."

MY recent articles on searching for a place to live in, as a retired Field Officer or field mouse, have been accepted as true. I have had many letters from chaps craving more information about Eire. I am very sorry to say that since I wrote my first article the prices of property in Ireland have—what is the correct term?—spiralled.

I have been lucky in being able to buy a small property, (a small Georgian house with no pretensions, no electricity, but a pull-plug and bathroom conveniently situated over the kitchen), and 43 acres of average land. I got it by a fluke. My wife was in a hotel in Kildare, when at lunch she shared a table with a house-hunting couple from England. During casual conversation it emerged that I had been partially responsible for their son's army education in India, and indeed had been mentioned in this young man's despatches, with the result that his parents were kind enough to recommend the house in which I am writing. They did not want so much land attached and had just acquired a more suitable house, with less land but at the same figure.

When I rejoined my wife after a poor week in a hospital in Northern Ireland, where conditions, incidentally, were much below Indian standards, she had surveyed two attractive properties in Kildare. They were both expensive and hideous. Fortified by most glowing descriptions of two other houses in Carlow from an auctioneer, whose letters were more enthusiastic than literate, we continued our explorations into these regions. There was a local petrol shortage and we had to kick our heels all day in a small hotel. As it was growing dusk the auctioneer arrived with the local schoolmaster and another bidder for the first house. We all crammed into a small Austin which the schoolmaster drove with great dexterity. Squeezed into the front seat with the auctioneer and driver I was able to keep an eye on the speedometer. The auctioneer had said the distance from the town was five miles; when the milometer registered nine miles I managed to ejaculate that the five miles seemed rather long. The auctioneer patted me on the neck and said "Irish miles, Colonel."

Feeling that I had probably hurt Mr. de Valera's feelings by my mild comment I remained quiet for the next few miles until we drew up at the gates of the house. We all climbed over the fence and staggered up a field to a house. It had a good façade. To my surprise the auctioneer had then the impudence to say that we could not go inside because there was no key and the top floor had fallen in. It had not been occupied for 40 years. It was in fact a ruin. His second house, which we explored in the dark, was a farmhouse on the side of the road of indescribable squalor and neglect. To my advertisement in *The Irish Times* these were two of the answers. I found out later that the auctioneer was incompetent.

I telephoned the same evening to the auctioneer recommended by my wife's acquaintances in Kildare. On his assurance we then travelled across country by bus to arrive in the market town of Bandon. We saw the house

liked it, and paid the one-quarter deposit pending the legal formalities. These were drawn out for some three months because my solicitor, a very shrewd man, insisted that I should have full legal entitlement from the Irish Land Commission, who had purchased the property originally for a political adherent, before I signed on the dotted line. The delay was tedious, but I lived in a good hotel at £4 a week and met many people in the vicinity who were able to advise me on every matter from buying turf to selling pigs.

During this period I also met many folk like myself, some who had bought and some who were searching for a house. The consensus of opinion among these exiles—known locally as the "Retreats from Moscow"—was that I was either a year too late in buying or, lucky devil, just in time. The house property situation in Eire is rather odd; during the War the most delightful houses with land attached were changing hands for £800 or £900. The land and farm-buildings, most commodious, and the avenues of fine trees were the attraction, as the upkeep of a mansion, when materials were impossible to get, was far beyond the scope or indeed interest of the tenant farmer who acquired the properties so cheaply. The result has been that the purchaser will now have to deal with three types of ordinary Gents' Resds:—

1. A nice, well appointed house, occupied by sahibs, who for various reasons, mostly cash, want to sell out when the market is at its peak. This house, if you have got your eye in for houses, is reasonable enough at 25% less the price asked for by the agents. The price will be from anything ranging from £4,000 to £7,000, and in such spheres the cost of a surveyor's report is possibly the dart that will prick the balloon. In Ireland it generally brings the roof down, literally.

2. The same type of house owned by a farmer anxious to make a 300% profit while the going is good. The land and fencing will probably be in good repair; most of the timber will have been cut; the annual repairs of the main building and out-houses will have been neglected; the garden will be a wilderness or, with luck, may have been used for potatoes; the shrubs, fruit-trees, etc., will usually require expert attention. To rehabilitate this property will cost anything from £1,000 down to £500.

3. A similar house, bought by local speculators when the price was reasonable, and possibly standing uninhabited for four or five years. This needs the most careful scrutiny from every angle. Dry-rot in the roof is the main danger. It is virtually impossible to buy really good seasoned wood for repairs, although a blarneying salesman will make the most elaborate promises. Don't be in a hurry; if the house were in good condition it would have been sold to me, or somebody like me, last year. Most houses of this class in Ireland have basements, most of them dank mausoleums redolent of fungoid growths. It is the fashion, among auctioneers and agents, to assure the customer that a basement keeps the house dry. When one could have plenty of servants and plenty of fuel to occupy and warm these dungeons this theory was probably credible; the reverse is true to-day.

* * * * *

My house comes under category 2 above. To put it into a proper state of repair, and to buy some farm animals, I had to borrow some money from the bank. My London bank, who have nourished my overdraft so willingly for thirty years, declined to put up the cash on the old-fashioned grounds, I think, that property in Eire is not a safe investment. However, they put me in touch with a Building Society who were prepared to advance me the amount required at

4½% for fifteen years before paying up the capital. That didn't appeal to me. An Irish bank, to whom I transferred my account, has allowed me to overdraw to the full amount, but charge me only 4% on the actual amount overdrawn at any one time. They hold the property deeds as security. My bank manager is quite upset that so far I have not had to go the limit.

The major work on the house was replastering two of the outside walls which had been eaten away by ivy. This cost £140. The plumbing, installation of a new kitchen range, a fire-place and renovation of three downstairs rooms cost me another £150. The rest of the house has been decorated, painted and made ship-shape by my family assisted by an excellent local carpenter at 13 shillings a day, and he works like four men. His grandfather had helped to build the house about a hundred years ago, and Nick took a personal pride in restoring it.

The Farm.—This in some ways is a muddy nuisance. I have 43 acres of fairly good land, all within view of the front door, and it seems to me silly not to farm it, even though in these rustic pursuits I am a virgin. I attended the auction of the previous tenant's farm stock. A neighbouring farmer held my hand and told me what to bid for and when to stop. Even so, before the day was over I possessed the following items:

2 cows.

1 four-year old cob, together with cart and harness.

1 slip (a pig virgin, aged 5 months.)

9 pure-bred pullets.

8 nondescript ducks.

A small store of hay.

Half a stack of straw.

A huge pile of mangolds.

A huge pile of turnips.

A heap of potatoes.

A terrific pile of manure.

A miscellaneous collection of farm implements.

The observant reader will perceive that once I had bought the cows I was up to my neck in it. In comparison with English prices my cheque for £120 will appear reasonable enough for such a lot of stuff. We had a very hard winter, and towards the end I ran out of feeding stuffs. The two cows were poor quality, and I later sold them in part exchange for a good Dexter and Friesian. As somebody remarked, a bad cow takes as much food and attention as a good one. Already in the beginning of June I have recovered 25% of my original outlay in the sale of milk to the creamery. The pig—I hope my many Muslim friends in India will realise that in Ireland a pig is supposed to pay the rent—has produced eleven youngsters, which I hope to sell when three months old for at least £4 each.

The hens were expensive, 14/6 each. On the 31st May they had laid 660 eggs in five months, which shows they understand the Labour slogan—Work or Want. Since then we added 60 day-old chicks, reared in a Hover with a lamp; 59 survived the treatment and are now in a paddock. The ducks, squalid creatures with an insatiable curiosity, laid some 250 eggs in the same period. To this Whipsnade we have added a gander, called Groppi, and two

charming geese, who used the utmost security measures to produce 5 goslings. With four young turkeys to complete we can now face the future with some confidence. O. C. Poultry is my wife. I should add that poultry demand meticulous man-management. Irish servants are as useless as Irish husbands.

Back to the Land.— The Government ordered me to produce 12 acres of Tillage as my quota, 3 of which must be Wheat, the remainder at my discretion. I think it is important to say that the Tillage Inspectors came to see me, advised me, saw at once my difficulties as a new-comer, suggested where I might hire machinery, and have never bothered me since. I told one that I intended to plant one acre of Sugar Beet. He gave me a blank form to sign, and in the course of time the seed and the chemical manures arrived at the nearest station. I have not to pay for them until the crop is harvested. I believe that when the Inspector sees the crop in a fair way to success I shall be granted an extra sugar ration for jam-making of about 28 pounds. Later I shall be able to buy sugar pulp for winter cattle feeding. The point I wish to make about this is its simplification of normal governmental procedure. (As a contrast I would mention that a great friend of mine in C.M.F. asked me to send him a black-thorn walking stick. I got the weapon, but to my surprise am not allowed to export any wood-product except under special licence from Dublin.)

When I was scratching my head over this tillage business the same neighbouring farmer tackled me after church on Sunday morning. He and his brother lent me their tractor and ploughed the land. Owing to the horrible weather they could not do the sowing, harrowing or rolling, but my man and another neighbour with the help of his and my cob did our combined job on a Soviet collective farm basis. My 3 acres of wheat and nearly 2 acres of oats are, so they say, the wonder of the parish.

The cob—grazing outside this window as I write—is the worst-bought, worst-fed and worst-groomed horse I have ever bought. I had never seen him until he was trotted up and down a confined yard among a host of farmers. The auctioneer allowed me to run my foolish hands down his legs, to view his action coming and going, to handle his head and look at his uncommunicative teeth. There was no vet. I got him for £30, and I believe he is without blemish. He was indispensable during the spring in carting manure, harrowing and rolling. He has shown some aptitude with a bridle and saddle, and enjoys jumping. He is now out on grass. Next winter I expect he will be hunting with the local hounds. With all this farming I am afraid I will not be able to enter him for the Grand National.

I could not afford to stock the whole land, so I let about 17 acres to a neighbouring cattle-dealer for eleven months. He paid me £50, which pays my annual land-rent and Poor Law Valuation for the year.

I am afraid now that, having enumerated all my blessings, some readers may imagine that farming in Eire is money for jam. I haven't at present the faintest idea if, in real terms of labour, capital expenditure, seeds and manures, animals, and equipment, I am making any profit. I am taking the popular long-term view. I am not aiming at anything higher than making the farm pay the man's wages plus the visible assets of milk, eggs, poultry, vegetables and healthy recreation for the house.

It is a very charming country with people, the country people especially, so ready to be friends, that in many ways I feel I might be back in the Punjab, or U. P., where one could always ascend to the peasant's mind by discussing the most important things in the world: weather and crops.

ADMINISTRATION AND STAFF WORK

BY AIR MARSHAL SIR THOMAS W. ELMHIRST, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C.*

WHAT is *good* Administration? If I might suggest a definition, it is "The smooth functioning of any organisation under one head, and with the smallest possible number of staff." An "organisation" may be a house or home, a factory, a Government department, an infantry company, a flight of aircraft or an Army.

May I quote a remark made to me by Sir Arthur Coningham, whom I served as his Chief of Administrative Staff for three and a half years in the field. "I went into so-and-so's caravan this morning. It was 'untidy'. If his own private domain is untidy he has an untidy mind and any Staff, department, or unit he commands will be untidy. He obviously cannot organise his own life. How then can he organise a fighting unit?" Good Administration is a "tidy" organisation running smoothly and economically.

In a fighting force how then can we obtain such a satisfactory state of affairs? The first essential is that each unit in the force must have a useful *function* to carry out, in part fulfilment of the purpose of the force as a whole. The second is that a very definite chain of command linking up units must be laid down.

The function of the unit or its "*policy*" should be written on its "Establishment", and that "Establishment" should be drawn up with just sufficient officers and men in the right ranks with sufficient vehicles (and/or materials) to meet the "*policy*" or function. No more, no less. If it has less or more personnel for its function it is "untidy" and uneconomical, and will not function smoothly. I cannot stress too much the need of good Establishments. A knowledge by all officers, both unit and staff, of how and why they are drawn up is a necessary background to all Administrative work.

Establishments should never be looked upon as unalterable. I know in the Royal Air Force, between the wars, it needed almost an earthquake to enable a unit's establishment to be increased by one fitter or cook, or decreased by one specialist man (whose job had ceased because the unit was using a different kind of aircraft or armament). In fact, an Air Ministry Committee had to sit in London to alter the establishment by one man of a unit in Singapore!

In war such a state of affairs becomes quite impossible. New units for specialist jobs have to be formed or old units reformed to meet the tactical needs in new circumstances in overseas theatres of war. Accordingly decentralisation of power to make and alter establishments was given by the Air Ministry to all Air Commanders-in-Chief in the field. The power was likewise given to Army Group Commanders.

For example, I can remember in Algeria, in the first setting up of the Combined H. Q. of 18th Army Group and the 1st Tactical Air Force, that we found many units, as they had disembarked from England, were either unnecessary or required complete reformation to meet local needs. Again other types of units and H.Q. had to be formed. In one week I drew up ten new R. A. F.

* In a lecture before officers of GHQ. in New Delhi.

establishments, had them agreed and issued; officers posted to fill the vacancies, and by the last day of the week the new units beginning to take shape. Speed was then essential, as we had been told that we had to capture Tunis within twelve weeks. The ability to alter establishments quickly to meet tactical needs is vital in war.

The American forces had the same difficulties soon after they came into the War. I remember a unit of theirs of a 1,000 men sent to N. Africa from across the Atlantic for a certain job, but on arrival the tactical air situation made the job unnecessary. But the unit sat idle for two months until Washington agreed that it could be disestablished and the men made use of otherwise. We were in the same position at the beginning of the War and learnt our lesson, and so did our U. S. friends. Don't let us forget it when another War comes.

The next stage in a tidy organisation is to see that units are "brigaded" together under the control of a superior formation. Such a process is usually known as the drawing up of the "Order of Battle" or chain of command, or family tree. For any unit or force to function smoothly every man, or unit, or formation concerned, must know who his superior officer is, *i.e.*, he must know the chain of command. As regards the number of units to be under one higher formation, or the number of Heads of departments to be under one superior staff officer, the supposed golden number is four. The number is variable.

My experience in the field was that it was most unwise to have more than four Fighter Squadrons in one Wing; with large bomber Squadrons three were sufficient. Four Wings in an R.A.F. Group were enough and we never in the field had more than four Groups in a Command. The number four is a good average. Operational circumstances forced us at one time to have seven Fighter Wings in a Group, and by stepping up the Administrative staff of the Group we got away with it, but it was too many.

If a superior formation has too many individual units to look after, those units will not get the attention they deserve; they will suffer and their work will suffer. The British Navy's rule used to be a Cruiser squadron of *four*, a Battle squadron or Destroyer flotilla of *eight*, but in this case with sub-divisions of *four* under a senior officer. British Army Groups in the last war had *two*, and occasionally *three* Armies under them. Armies usually have not more than *three* Corps. The number is flexible, but *four* is a good average for any organisation.

A family tree, order of battle, chain of command, or whatever you like to call it, with the name of every unit (or department of staff) on it should be drawn up and given wide circulation. Every unit commander wants to know with whom he is brigaded, who are his supply or signal units, etc. Every department of staff must know what units comprise the force they administer or operate, or whether units are under direct control or controlled through a sub-formation. If the staff do not know, how can they feed, supply, move, pay, attend to bodily and spiritual welfare, technically maintain, etc., the people under them?

In normal peacetime, Navies, Armies and Air Forces usually have a fairly settled Order of Battle, but in war or times of mobilisation or demobilisation units can be transferred almost daily between Commands and lower formations. For example, just before the Normandy invasion I was issuing complete new Orders of Battle for the R.A.F. thrice a week to all staff departments and down to unit level. For lack of an Order of Battle I have known units to be forgotten and fail to get the order for retreat, and be "put in the bag." And I have also known, as a result of forces being dissolved

after both wars or after a campaign, that a small unit has been quite lost sight of and has carried on doing nothing and living in peace in some remote spot because the superior staff had forgotten its existence!

The staff department who draws up and issues Orders of Battle may either be "G" or Air Staff, or the Administrative staff. But the two sections of the staff must work together in the drawing-up process. My personal experience was that the drawing up and issue of the Order of Battle was better carried out by the Administrative Staff after they had received from the "G" or Air Staff the firm Order of Battle of the operational units.

An Overall Order of Battle showing the "complete picture" with all administrative units fitted in could then be issued. The Administrative staff are just as much interested in a supply depot as a front line operational unit; they must have the complete picture. Another point is that in the field the provision and issue of a daily *unit location statement* and a daily *state of service-ability* of fighting units, men and tanks, or aircrew and aircraft are likewise a necessity. All Commanders and staff departments need this knowledge and without it good administration is impossible.

If we take it that we have now a "tidy" organisation we must see that it functions smoothly, that it is well administered, that every unit, as the Bible says, "can live and move and have its being." It is for the Administrative staff from the highest level down to Adjutants, or 1st Lieutenants of Naval units, to see that units can *live* properly, *i.e.* are well-fed, clothed, paid, promoted, medically and spiritually attended to, can move with speed and precision, and can have their being, which I interpret as being able to carry out the purpose for which they were formed.

I may now make a few general remarks from my own experience on "Special Administration," or the functioning of some of the important Administrative departments. They have different names in different Services but I will talk on them under Personnel and Discipline, Supplies, Technical maintenance, Movements, Bodily Welfare and last but not least, Pay. The points I shall mention go, I hope, to ensure good Administration.

The Personnel Branch.—A well-led force that has confidence in its leaders of every rank and its Staff Officers at all levels is capable of anything. It is then a happy force that knows that efficiency is the only path to promotion and awards, and that inefficient officers or staff in war are rooted out and *not* sent to comfortable jobs at the base! The Personnel staff has a heavy responsibility here; they must be, like Caesar's wife, above suspicion. They must be firm, but approachable and human.

It must not be thought that "string pulling" will get an officer out of a dangerous or uncomfortable job. Confidence in postings, promotions and honours, will make for a happy force, the contrary a disgruntled force. In war the steady flow of trained replacements to fill gaps in the front line is a great morale raiser and needs careful organising. The maintaining of discipline is one of the jobs of the Personnel staff. A human head of Provost Services can help a lot. But a jailor type with a ruthless police force can do immense harm.

Leave.—A firm leave scheme is another morale raiser. But the entitlement must be laid down, and the forward dates of commencement must be given.

The Supplying Branch.—The “Q” or Equipment department. Lack of supplies can immobilise and cause the defeat of any force. The slogan for the Supply Staff is “the right amount in the right place at the right time.” “The right amount” means both tonnage and the right specification. It’s no use having the right amount of shells with the wrong fuses. The right time and place means having a lot close up in the firing line if you are sure an advance is coming, but having the least possible amount there if you are expecting a retreat! Again, it means a good estimation of how much units should hold, and how much in the supply pipeline and how much in reserve at the forward base. Also a good organisation to ensure that such supplies and reserves are called forward and moved up quickly from base to front line.

In war the “Lines of Communication” are always a headache. They have never the capacity, whether road, rail, sea or air, to bring forward all the men and munitions a Commander would like. It is for “Q” to estimate its capacity and tell the Commander what force he can maintain at the end of it. For example, I can well remember two cases in the war when the M. G. A. and I jointly told our operational Commanders that the number of operational units they had decided upon for their next battle could not be supported by the L. of C. and they must make a cut. Which of course they did. And it must be absolutely firm that the user of supplies at the *forward end* calls forward the supplies from the base at the *rear*. Not, repeat not, the base to keep sending forward and clogging the L. of C. with supplies they *think* will be useful.

When Army and Air Forces are working together in the field, the major user of the L. of C. must be in charge. The M. G. A. and A. O. A. in the field must come to an amicable arrangement regarding their proportion of the total tonnage the L. of C. can handle. The M. G. A., as probably the biggest user, then calls forward the total tonnage. But each Service sends its own detailed “breakdown” of its requirements (within the agreed total) to its own Supply depots at the base.

A final word on Supplies. In any operation of war a “Supply plan” by the “Q” and Admin staff is a necessity before the campaign or battle opens. Otherwise some unit will go short before the battle finishes and be useless as a fighting unit.

The essential data for the drawing up of this Supply plan must first be obtained from the “G” and Air Staffs. This data is—

1. The expected duration of the battle. Commanders can usually give this duration to within one or two days.
2. The Order of Battle of operational units to be employed. This gives the number of personnel, the number and types of armament and vehicles.
3. The rate of effort expected of these units. (The number of days per week that tanks are to be fully employed, the rate of fire expected of artillery, or the number of sorties per day or per week expected of aircraft, etc.)
4. The type of missile to be employed in the battle in question. (Percentage of high explosive to armour-piercing, rockets or bombs, what type of bombs, whether fighters are to use belly tanks, on all sorties, etc., etc.)

I cannot stress too much the care that must be taken in drawing up a Supply plan. I have gone to the twelfth draft! And, I repeat, it needs the closest liaison between "G" and "Q", or Air and Equipment in the R. A. F. Once this data has been settled the "Q" or Equipment staff can work out the total amounts and ensure the right type in the right place at the right time.

The Technical and Maintenance Branches.—The weight of missiles that can be thrown daily at an enemy depends in modern war on the good maintenance of the missile thrower, whether it be ship, gun, tank or aeroplane. Likewise on the maintenance of the vehicles or ships bringing forward the missiles from the base. On the organisation of a sound repair and salvage plan for all mechanical engines of war depends the daily fighting strength of tanks, guns, ships, aeroplanes of which a Commander can make use. It is good administration that ensures that the daily fighting strength is kept as high as possible.

The Movement Branch.—Before this last War I had hardly heard of the word or department. I rather think there was not one in the R. A. F. ! After four years in the field I have realised that in modern war the ability to move quickly and to move and fight at the same time, and to move reserves, reinforcements and supplies quickly is vital to success. I would say the main cause of the German defeat was their inability to move their force, whether front line or reserve, quickly, in the last year of the War. Their fuel supply had been destroyed and they were "immobilised". A good Movements staff that can deal efficiently with moves of men and equipment by air, water, road or rail is an essential part of good Administration.

Senior Administrative officers must give their wholehearted backing to :

Their Doctors.—The knowledge that a sick or wounded man is in good hands and quickly back by air in a comfortable base hospital is a great morale raiser. And a good Medical organisation, with the consequent low sickness rate, increases the daily fighting strength, which is what a Commander wants.

Pay Staff.—They need backing; we all know how unhappy we are if we think we are not getting enough pay or our family is getting no allowances.

Catering is vital; a well-fed man is usually a contented man and capable of doing a full day's work.

Welfare is good in dribblets, but the welfare staff must not think that the only purpose of a fighting force is that it may receive welfare.

Post.—In overseas warfare a good postal and daily paper service is a good morale raiser. But it needs good organising.

There are other Administrative Departments in a big H. Q., but these are the main ones. It is up to the head of Administration to see that he has competent heads and keeps them in the picture. To do this he must be in the complete confidence of his Commander and know of any possible or likely operation that is in his Chief's mind. The Bible says: "Without vision the people perish" and if the head of Administration does not ensure that the right amount of supplies are in the right place at the right time, then front line troops or Air Forces will perish.

STAFF WORK.

What is good Staff Work? My own view is that it is "team work by competent officers" whose only purpose is to serve the front line fighting men. How does one get this team work? I put loyalty to the Chief first; with-

out that there will be no team work and no confidence either at the H. Q. or at the units under them. I do not put too high a value on brilliance in Staff officers; I would much rather choose a competent, hardworking, loyal officer who is a good mixer. If a Staff Officer thinks himself too superior to talk to his confreres or juniors he will not fit into any team, and the force will suffer. A Staff Officer who visits a unit with his "nose in the air" will neither help that unit nor draw out of the unit information (or gossip) that will be of use to the Commander or Staff of his own H. Q. Similarly, in a H. Q. if "G" and "Q" are not on speaking terms, there will be no team work, and lower formations, who take their cue from above, will likewise be at sixes and sevens.

On Responsibility.—Delegate responsibility as much as possible. The old business saying, "If you employ a man trust him—if you don't trust him sack him" is good advice. My wartime Chief said, "Give your juniors full responsibility, but if there is one failure on the Operational side, the man responsible must be sacked, as that means loss of life. Allow a second chance on the Administrative side, but no more!" The success or failure of any force or staff largely depends on the leader's choice of his staff and junior Commanders.

On "Minutes".—I never write a minute to someone in the same building if I can possibly help it. I either go and see the person or ring him up. There are cases where you have a busy Chief whose office you cannot get into, or he is away on a tour, and then there is something to be said for minute writing, but not often. I once found a Staff Officer writing a long minute to an officer of the same department and same rank in the next door office with a dividing door in between! He did not do it again.

On the writing of letters and orders. The fewer, the better. The personal visit, the personal telephone call, confirmed, if the order is complicated, by signal, will usually be better. For example, I recall that in the six months between the fall of Tobruk and its retaking, which included a long retreat, the battle of El Alamein and the advance to Benghazi, I wrote two Administrative and Supply plans, one for the retreat and one for the advance and six official letters, and I believe that no unit in the Desert Air Force was even in doubt as to where and when it was to move and where it would find its supplies. The units knew what their function was and did not need written orders on the subject.

On Telephoning.—If an officer is not capable of acting on a telephonic order he is of no use. I once had a case in a crisis of an officer saying he must have my telephonic order in writing. I told him that all he would get in writing from me was an order for him to report to the base as being of no value in the field. If in your job it is necessary to telephone more than once to a strange department, or officer, ensure that you visit him so that you both know what each other looks like at the end of the line.

Regarding Secrecy.—Not too much secrecy. I know of far too many operations and supply arrangements that were a failure because those taking part were not "in the picture". There are too many people who say "I cannot discuss this on the 'phone!" Over-secrecy in normal day-to-day operations handicaps everything. There is one vital secret that must be kept at all costs, and that is the shape and date of future operations. I speak with experience on this subject, as I have been a Director of Intelligence and know what an enemy can and has made use of and what matters little.

The Right Channels.—A good Staff Officer will find, know and use the "right channels". One is always wanting something; it may be more men,

aeroplanes, tanks, repairs, cars, food, whisky, a cheap trip by air on leave, etc., etc. You can generally get them, and quickly, if you know *the right channels*. There is always someone who deals with your particular want; the thing is to find him, and not his senior or junior (the former will be offended). I was known for some time in the field as "Channels Elmhirst" as I would get up at conferences when I heard a remark by a unit Commander that he was short of something, and say "If you or your Adjutant had only used the right channel, which was so-and-so, you could have had your request met the same evening."

Politeness.—"Please's" and "thank you's" in signals or letters from senior to junior formations cost nothing and always pay in enhanced good feeling. And never be frightened of retracting an order, if necessary the same day that it was issued, if you think the order was wrong. It is only the proud and inefficient officer who thinks his prestige will be lowered if he admits by signal or letter that he has issued a wrong order.

On Confidence.—A successful Armed Force is one where all formations and units in the force have confidence in each other, and in the Commander and staffs that run them. I would always say that it is the duty of the superior formation to gain the confidence of the lower formation or unit and not *vice versa*. Such confidence can best be obtained by (1) the junior staff or unit knowing that the senior Staff Officers have been selected for outstanding work in lower formations, and (2) by "visiting".

Time spent by Staff Officers on visits to units is never wasted. I have heard many Staff Officers say that they have so much in their "tray" they could not possibly get away on visits. My answer is "Rubbish!". A visit will find out what a unit really wants, or why it is a good unit or a bad one. There are many things that a unit will want but not request "in writing", for, as they think, the superior H. Q., are too busy, etc. A visit will also find out whether the C. O. or his staff are good or want changing, also what the unit think of the superior staff; perhaps it is they who want changing! A staff should have sufficient transport to enable officers to visit units when they so wish. And lastly a visit should be made to help and not to find fault. If faults are found action can come later. And visits should be "two-way". Unit Commanders or Staffs of lower formations should be encouraged to visit their senior H. Q. staff.

A word on the bullying Staff Officer. You will always find them and they want rooting out. They usually bully down the telephone to juniors, who cannot talk back, and they are usually too polite to their seniors! But they breed lack of confidence and are the negation of team spirit.

A Staff Officer should never take his Chief's name in vain and use it as a stick to beat the lower formation or unit. "The C.-in-C. is terribly annoyed", etc. If the Chief is annoyed, then it is he and he alone who should administer the reproof in person, in writing or on the telephone. There is nothing a C. O., of a lower formation dislikes more than to be "told off" by a Staff Officer of a senior formation, more especially if the "rocket" is in writing and signed by an officer of equal or (and I have seen it) lower rank!

Then there is the policy of "the open door". A Staff Officer should be approachable and encourage visits by other Staff Officers or Unit Commanders. He should if possible have his door open and get the reputation of never being too busy to welcome a visitor. And conferences (as long as they do not happen too often) where junior Commanders or Staff Officers can sit round a table and put up their suggestions to their seniors will always pay high dividends. The hospitality and drinks that go with such meetings adds 20% to their value,

One of the most difficult jobs of Staff Officers is to be able to concentrate their attention on the essentials of their jobs. Often a very great number of files and papers to read arrive in their "In" tray, and a lot of it possibly most interesting to "browse" through. But we have all only certain hours of daily work, and if we are going to keep our efficiency and health it is inadvisable to stretch these hours too much. My advice is to concentrate on the essentials, "maintenance of the objective", and be quite ready to pass a lot of stuff from the "In" tray to the "Out" tray direct as not touching the job you are established to do.

One other point on the daily work of the Staff Officer. Don't let dealing with the "In" tray be the daily sum of your work. I always say that 75% of an officer's time should be spent on current affairs, but that 25% of his time should, if possible, be spent in looking how he can improve the "set up" that he has to deal with. A newcomer to any job should have some fresh ideas that can improve a department or organisation, and he should not be satisfied with himself when he vacates that job if he has not got something new and valuable incorporated into the machine he has been part of.

Don't *make* work. If you have not a useful function, ask to be dis-established.

The title of this lecture is *Administration*. Administration is a dull word, but take it from me it is not a dull business. My four years of it in the War gave me the most satisfying interest of my whole Service career. Little can be more pleasant than seeing the unit, formation or H. Q., that you have shaped and built up, functioning smoothly as a flexible weapon and meeting every call of its operational Commander. And it can be just as interesting in peacetime when training and administration are the chief functions of a Staff Officer. Besides that personal satisfaction, if it is well done it can bring material rewards, like my present job and the herbaceous border on my chest.

LARGEST AIR LINES.

THE BRABAZON, Britain's largest air liner, weighs 126 tons. The 143-ft. long passenger compartment will hold between 70 and 100 people in bunks, or 120 in seats. It is pressurised to maintain a pressure equivalent to that at 8,000 ft. while the aircraft is flying at 25,000 ft. The crew of 12 will include five stewards. It is designed to maintain non-stop flights between London and New York.—*The Times*,

"WE MAY AGREE"

(An Ode to our Financial Advisers)

To sneer or cheer at G. H. Q.
Depends upon your point of view.
But if that's where you have to work
And you're one who doesn't shirk
But seeks with earnestness and zeal
To satisfy some pet ideal,
You'll discover in its dungeons,
A race of men with verbal bludgeons,
Alert to pounce at every chance—
The hungry watch-dogs of Finance.

After sitting up all night
Working at some brain-wave bright,
I really find it most annoying
And extremely soul-destroying
Whenever some financial wight
Takes a mischievous delight
In dissecting all my claims
That have the loftiest of aims.

Who, when there seems no time to waste
Displays no tendency to haste.
Or, when I've something shrewd to say
"The file is with the D. F. A."

Then when at last it is returned
By him, to find my project spurned
Alternatively find it shattered,
Pruned of all the bits that mattered
With that phrase I hate to see—
The royal touch—"We don't agree"

Then, when I read his stodgy 'blethers'
I yearn for tar and snow-white feathers.
The sort of thing I have in mind
's horse-trough of the ancient kind,
Or a lovely stagnant pool
Complete with jolly ducking-stool
For him who nullifies my toil
What better fate than boiling oil?

But it came to pass one day
An awkward "write-off" came my way.
I went to him in great distress.
He answered with a graceful "Yes."

His attitude was kind and mellow.
 I found him a delightful fellow.
 I met him later at a party,
 Where beer was good and laughter hearty.
 It seemed to me that I was seeing
 Quite a normal human being.
 This poor chap like me and you
 Had his lawful job to do,
 Which, though at first it irks a bit
 Quite often proves a benefit.
 I thought "Perhaps I've not been fair
 To decry the loving care
 With which he doles out each doubloon.
 "Who pays the piper, calls the tune!"

Second thoughts they say are best
 And this, I think, the acid test.
 The time will come, as come it will,
 Every time we foot a bill,
 We'll eulogise our D. F. A.
 Who saved our money, raised our pay,
 And (what is worthier of mention).
 Assured for us a decent pension.

I used to call him "sweet F. A."
 Now I know it doesn't pay.
 They're not just high-priests of frustration
 Who guard the finance of the nation.
 So greet him with due deference,
 "*Honi Soit*, who minds the pence"

W. L. A.

SNAKES OF INDIA

BY "PHEON."

EVERY year in India many people die from snake bite. Lieut-Colonel K. G. Ghanpurey in his book *The Snakes of India* puts the figure for British India alone as high as 23,000. There is no doubt that many of these people have been bitten by non-poisonous, or non-deadly, snakes and have died from shock or fear. A few are, possibly, the victims of murder. In any case deaths caused by snake bite far outnumber deaths caused by all other wild animals put together.

There is very widespread ignorance about snakes in general—even among educated people. The writer does not claim any special knowledge in the matter and these notes, based on the authority of Colonel Ghanpurey's book and on the Wall Charts of Colonel Wall and Colonel Knowles, were written primarily to clarify his own ideas on the subject.

Within Indian limits, including Burma, there are some 330 different species of snakes. Of these only 40 land snakes and 29 sea snakes are poisonous to man. Many of these poisonous snakes cannot kill a healthy, adult human being. All the sea snakes are poisonous, but these are only met on the sea coast and in estuaries. They can be distinguished by their flat, fin-like, tail. There is no authentic case of death being caused by sea snake bite. Of the land snakes only the Vipers, Cobras and Kraits are known to be fatal to man.

Snakes are normally timid and only bite man in defence—if cornered or frightened. Most snakes can climb well and all can swim. They like sunshine, and are generally seen when sun bathing; for the habits of many are nocturnal. They breed with their own species and no hybrids are known. The Vipers give birth to live snakes—hence their name; but the others (Colubridae) lay eggs. A snake may lay up to 100 eggs in a year. Snakes may live for some twenty years and, normally, attain full growth after four years. While having no external ears, they can hear footsteps, it is assumed through vibrations on the ground. Their colour may vary to conform with their surroundings, and therefore a snake's colour is not important in identification.

There are six common snakes whose bite is normally fatal to man. These are the Common Cobra, the King Cobra, Russell's Viper, the Saw-scaled Viper, the Common Krait and the Banded Krait. Every educated adult should be capable of recognising these six species.

THE COBRA.—(*Naia tripudians*). The Common Indian Cobra is usually from 2½ ft. to 5½ ft. long. Colonel Ghanpurey states that it is usually diurnal in its habits, though Colonel Knowles states that it is usually nocturnal. It is, however, probable that its habits depend on the locality and the presence of human beings. The poison of the Cobra is very potent, and will usually kill a man within two to six hours, though it may be as soon as thirty minutes after the bite. The first symptoms are severe local pain, swelling and bruising; this is followed by a creeping paralysis that starts at the legs and works upwards to the head. Death is brought about by failure of respiration, or asphyxial convulsions.

The cobra is found all over India, perhaps as high as 6,000 ft. above sea-level. The writer knows of one case of a cobra being killed at over 5,000 ft. in Garhwal. It may live in almost any surroundings and frequently near human habitations. It feeds chiefly on rats, mice, frogs, birds' eggs and other snakes. Cobras have been known to enter chicken runs and kill hens and chickens.

Like many other snakes the cobra cannot be identified by its colour. Its extended hood, when annoyed, is however distinctive. Normally there is a spectacle or monocle mark on the back of the hood. When dead the hood cannot be seen. It can be identified by—

- (i) The third shield on the upper lip is large and extends from the eye to the shield containing the nostril. This is a characteristic of cobras and coral snakes.
- (ii) On the lower lip a very small shield is wedged in between the fourth and fifth lower-lip shields.
- (iii) The sub-caudals (shields under the tail and behind the vent) are divided.

These three characteristics will identify a cobra in the absence of the extended hood. There are also, frequently, two or three black, or very dark, belly plates under the neck—that is between the 10th and 17th series of transverse scales.

A full-grown cobra is usually not aggressive. Many years ago the writer decided to destroy two cobras who lived in an old ant hill on the edge of the lines occupied by his company. One evening, as the work was about to start with a working party, tools and a gun, a deputation from a nearby village advanced and asked that the cobras should be spared. The villagers stated that the cobras had lived there for years and had never bitten anyone. If anyone annoyed them they would erect their bodies and extend their hoods but all that was necessary was for the person to stand still; the snake would then relax and glide away.

One old grass-cutter was most emphatic and said that the cobras had menaced him on numerous occasions, but because he always stood still as soon as he heard the snake hiss, or saw it erect, they had never attempted to strike. The villagers said that it might bring bad luck to the village if the snakes were killed. The writer agreed to spare them until one of them bit a man. The villagers departed with protestations that there was no chance of such a thing ever occurring.

THE KING COBRA OR HAMADRYAD. (*Naja bungarus*.)—The King Cobra is the largest poisonous snake in the world. Though normally from 9 to 12 feet in length, the Bombay Natural History Society have in their collection the skin of a King Cobra which measured 15 ft. 5 ins. long. On account of the amount of venom that it can inject in a single bite, death is caused after a very short time; a man may die as soon as fifteen minutes after being bitten by a Hamadryad. The poison is similar to that of the common cobra and causes death by asphyxial convulsions.

It is normally found only in dense jungle and is common in Assam and the Terai jungles. It has been found as high as 7,000 ft. above sea level. Its colour may be yellow, brown, green or black, but is usually distinguished by cross bars. There is no spectacle mark on the hood, as in the common cobra, but it has a hood—which is extended when annoyed. It is an aggressive snake and is credited with attacking man on sight. Some authorities doubt this, but

there are cases on record where a King Cobra has attacked without apparent provocation ; it is however possible that in these cases the snake was acting in protection of its eggs.

The writer knows of one case, on a Himalayan hill road, where a King Cobra attempted to strike a fast moving motor car. The driver, who had noticed a large snake on the road, saw the extended hood and the attack, which passed behind the car, in his driving mirror.

RUSSELLS VIPER. (*Vipera russelli*).—The Russells Viper is normally from 2½ to 4½ ft. long. It is a thick snake with a stout body but a short thin tail. It has the typical Viper arrow-shaped head. It is nocturnal in its habits and is sluggish in the daytime. Its poison is very potent, and at one bite it can eject enough venom to kill two adults. It has long fangs, sometimes as long as half an inch, attached to a movable upper maxilla.

The hiss of the Russells Viper is very loud, and when annoyed and about to bite it may spring off the ground. The part bitten shows considerable swelling and is most painful ; thin red-coloured fluid oozes from the fang holes which do not get sealed by clotting. The tissues near the wound slough and the patient dies of gangrene. Death may occur in a few hours or after some days.

The Russells Viper is found all over India, and though more common on the Plains may be found as high as 7,000 ft. above sea-level. The writer was once in a perimeter camp in the Tochi valley when two were reported to have been found by men digging slit trenches. It prefers open country and is rarely found in thick jungle. Its main food is rats, and it is not adverse to hunting them near human habitations. It is a prolific snake, producing 30 to 40 young in one brood.

The main points of identification are—

- (i) Broad plates on the belly.
- (ii) Small scales on the head.
- (iii) The sub-caudals under the tail are divided.
- (iv) Three series of black spots down the length of the back. These are similar in appearance to a chain—hence its name of Chain Viper.
- (v) On the head a mark like the letter ' V ' with the apex to the front.

The ground colour of the back may be light-brown or buff. The nostrils are larger than those of any other Indian snake. The eyes are also large. The young are poisonous from birth and are more likely to bite than the adults.

The ECHIS or PHOORSA or Saw-Scaled Viper. (*Echis carinata*). Is a small pitless viper, normally from 9 to 19 inches long, though one as long as 2 ft. 7 ins. has been recorded. Being a small snake it does not inject a large dose of venom, and it has been estimated that only 10 % to 20 % of persons bitten by the Echis die. Death may occur in 24 hours or as late as 20 days after the bite. The part bitten may slough, and there is a tendency to haemorrhages ; the victim dies of septic poisoning. It is normally found in desert or semi-desert country and prefers sandy soil to vegetation. It is said to be common in the Gujranwala district of the Punjab and in the Ratnagiri district of Bombay. Its range extends to Iraq and parts of Africa.

The main points of identification are—

- (i) On its arrow-shaped head is a white mark which resembles the foot print of a bird.
- (ii) The belly is white with light brown or coloured spots—the belly plates are entire.
- (iii) The sub-caudals under the tail are entire.
- (iv) There are small scales on the head.
- (v) The scales on the back are distinctly keeled and rough.

Its colour is brown, buff or sandy but may be green—it has a sinuous white line along either flank. It is an aggressive little snake and when annoyed rubs its coils together—producing a scratching rustling noise; hence the name *Phoorsa*.

The COMMON KRAIT. (Bungarus coeruleus). The Krait is generally from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ ft. in length, but may grow to over five feet long. It is very poisonous, its venom being estimated as three times as virulent as that of the cobra. Fortunately its mouth is small and its poison fangs are short; also most Kraits do not grow to a large size. Therefore it does not inject a large quantity of venom, though sufficient to kill a man. The symptoms of Krait poisoning are similar to those of the cobra, but in addition there is violent abdominal pain. The victim may die any time from six hours to several days after being bitten. There is no specific antivenene for Krait poison yet in general use.

It is a common snake found all over India, is nocturnal in its habits and prefers to live in or near houses. It is generally black or steel-black in colour, with white linear arches across the back beginning some way back from the head and continuing to the tail.

The main points of identification are—

- (i) It has broad belly plates.
- (ii) The sub-caudals under the tail are entire.
- (iii) The head is covered with shields.
- (iv) The central row of scales down the back is distinctly enlarged and these scales are, more or less, hexagonal.
- (v) There are only four shields along either side of the lower lip.
- (vi) The tail is round.

It is an inoffensive snake and will rarely bite unless trodden on or otherwise annoyed—though its bite is usually fatal. Kraits eat other snakes, rats, mice and frogs. They normally go about in pairs, and so if one is killed in or near a house a look-out should be kept for its mate.

The BANDED KRAIT. (Bungarus fasciatus). The Banded Krait is usually from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet in length, though one of seven feet has been recorded. It is a big stout snake, whose poison is said to be sixteen times as powerful as that of the cobra. It is found in the North East of India and as far south as the Mahanadi basin—though it has been reported as being found in Hyderabad State. Its range extends into China, Burma and Malaya.

It has all the characteristics of the Common Krait, and in addition has alternate yellow and black bands across the back, the bands being 1 inch to $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches broad.

OTHER POISONOUS SNAKES. Excluding the Russell's Viper and the Echis, there are five other pitless vipers, but of these four are only found in Baluchistan and the Frontier and one in the Kachin hills. There are also eleven species of Pit Vipers, all of which are poisonous, but their bite is rarely fatal to man. They are only found in hill regions from 1,500 ft. to 10,000 ft. above sea level, but one of them is peculiar to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The most common is the Green Pit Viper.

There are also seven species of Coral snake, whose poison is not fatal to man. All are highly coloured and in most of them parts of the belly are pink coral colour. Two of them are confined to Burma.

Excluding the Common Krait and Banded Krait there are eight other species of Krait, but of these all have restricted habitat, three are peculiar to Burma and beyond, one to Ceylon, and the others are rare.

NON-POISONOUS SNAKES THAT MAY BE MISTAKEN FOR POISONOUS SNAKES.

The DHAMAN or Common RAT SNAKE. (Zamenis mucosus). The Dhaman is a large, common snake that may grow to eight feet in length, is found all over India, and is diurnal in its habits. It may, if cornered, attack man. It can extend its neck, though this tends to arch the spine, in a contrary direction to the extension of the hood of the cobra. It can be mistaken for a cobra. The lip shields and the scales on the side of the throat have black borders. The body is green or greenish-brown. Snake charmers frequently have some Dhamans with them. They are not poisonous. There are ten species of Dhaman found in India.

THE COMMON WOLF SNAKE. (Lycodon aulicus). The Common Wolf Snake is similar in appearance to, and may be mistaken for, the Common Krait. It is a small snake, about two feet in length, is often found in houses, and is generally of a brown colour but may be black. It has a wavy, white line down the back, but in the Wolf Snake the white line starts at the head and finishes before the tail is reached, while in the Krait the line starts some way back on the body and runs to the tail. The sub-caudals of the Wolf Snake are divided—while those of the Krait are entire. It is an active snake and may bite. It is nocturnal in its habits. It is not poisonous. There are nine species of Wolf Snake found in India.

It must be remembered that while all snakes possess teeth, only poisonous snakes have fangs. The fangs are located on the top jaw. A bite from a poisonous snake should be identified by the deeper fang marks—though, of course, a glancing blow may cause a puncture by one fang only, or only a graze. In a dead snake the fangs can be located by drawing a pin, or twig, along the top jaw—thus causing the fang to become erect.

TREATMENT FOR SNAKE BITE

If possible kill and identify the snake at once. If it is not a Viper, a Krait or a Cobra the victim will at least know that, even if the snake is poisonous, the bite will not prove fatal. In any case, whether the snake is identified or not, endeavour to retain it to show the doctor. If poison has been injected into the wound there will be severe, stinging pain, and the part bitten will swell almost at once. If there is no swelling it is probable that no poison has been injected.

If the snake is identified as poisonous, or cannot be identified, place a tourniquet above the wound as quickly as possible, on the side towards the heart. A tourniquet can be made from a handkerchief, a torn strip of cloth or a shoe lace and twisted tight with a twig or pencil. It must be remembered that this may, to some extent, mask the swelling, as a tourniquet always causes some swelling. Then cut, with a clean, sharp knife, into both punctures—along the limb and not across to avoid cutting blood vessels. Cause blood to flow as freely as possible. Then wash with some antiseptic solution, or rub in a small quantity of potassium permanganate. The patient must then be rushed to the nearest hospital or dispensary.

At all hospitals there should be a supply of Cobra Russell's Viper antivenene. This is a specific against the poisons of these two snakes. Even when there is doubt if poison has been injected or not, the antivenene should be used, as it will cause no ill effects. There is no antivenene, at least in general circulation, for the effects of Krait or Echis poison.

It must be remembered that a snake bite is generally inflicted on the limbs, and that there is a reasonable chance that it will be minimised by any clothing worn. Also that, even in cases of cobra bite, it is unusual for the victim to die for some five hours, and if antivenene can be injected while there is still life, there is hope of recovery. Colonel Ghanpurey emphasises in his book that it is useless to make the patient walk up and down and that this may, by causing exhaustion, do harm. It is a popular fallacy that such movement will counteract the numbing effects of cobra poison in the legs.

Of course, people are liable to be bitten when they are more than five hours distance, in time, from the nearest hospital—the writer knows this to his cost. Some years before the war he was on a solitary shoot in East Africa, travelling light, on foot. At one camp, as it was getting dark, he was bitten in the leg and failed to identify the snake. It would have taken some 24 hours of rapid marching to reach medical aid of any sort. His knowledge of Swahili was very elementary, and it seemed hopeless to send one of the porters for help, which would have taken at least two days to reach him. The bite was half way up the shin on the left leg. The snake's fangs had penetrated khaki drill slacks and a woollen sock. The wound swelled up and a discharge mixed with blood oozed out and soaked the sock top near the wound in a few minutes.

As soon as he could get to his tent he applied a tourniquet, cut into the punctures with a new Gillette razor blade, squeezed out all the blood he could and then rubbed in pot. permang. crystals. He then sat down and tried to read details about snake bite treatment from a sporting handbook on African game, but there was very little in it on the subject.

He sat for some time, knowing that he must slacken the tourniquet at intervals to allow circulation and finally decided that the only thing was to take it off. He removed the tourniquet and took several stiff pegs of whisky, which the book said was bad for cases of snake bite. The leg hurt for several days, and the wound took some time to heal. The writer would not like to go through the mental agony of that night again, when he sat for hours wondering if he should write his last will and testament or not.

PROTECTION AGAINST SNAKES

Many snakes are nocturnal and therefore at night one should always have a light. This is important even inside a house, as some snakes, like Kraits,

have been found on electric light switches, or tops of doors and, possibly, inside slippers. One should never go round the house barefoot, and in the jungle boots and canvas gaiters or slacks should be worn. If one has to move about at night in snake-infested country without a light, it is wise to make as much noise as possible by stamping on the ground.

Do not needlessly explore deserted houses or ruins, or put your hands into crevasses in walls. Keep the surroundings of your bungalow free from rubbish heaps, ant hills and long grass. Have fresh gravel placed on the paths round the house yearly. It is wise, in certain areas, to have wire gauze fitted over the outlets from the bathrooms. If, at night, you hear a noise like a cycle tyre bursting it may be a Russell's Viper warning you off—so don't go towards the hiss. If a cobra rears up in front of you, and you are too near to spring clear with safety, stand stock still.

Both cats and dogs dislike snakes and some will attack them. The Mongoose, Pig, Hedgehog, Iguana and birds of the Stork family kill snakes. So it is a good idea to keep a pet and to encourage a Mongoose or Iguana to live nearby. Unfortunately most dogs chase a mongoose, and the uneducated call an iguana a '*Bis Cobra*'—which they say is twenty times as poisonous as a Cobra and can kill by spitting its venom from a great distance. In the writer's present bungalow compound a whole family of iguanas were annihilated last year by well-meaning persons. The mali's youngest son now reports that a cobra has gone to live in their abandoned lair.

It is advisable for persons living in, or visiting, snake-infested areas to keep a stock of potash. permanganate and a lancet ready at hand; and also to discover the nearest hospital or dispensary where antivenene is maintained.

In case these notes are liable to cause undue alarm about the snake danger, the writer suggests that one is more liable to be killed in a street accident in any of the world's big cities than to die from snake bite in, say, either the Terai or Assam jungle.

"Many years ago when I took over the editorship of a Service journal I was told that the policy laid down for it was never to criticise anything which could be termed official doctrine. So quite naturally I looked around for the most sacred piece of official doctrine I could find, and I took it to be the Principles of War as given in Field Service Regulations. I then wrote an article saying these principles were all 'boloney'—and that there were only two Principles of War—Surprise and Maintenance or Administration. Experience since has led me to the conclusion that this youthful provocativeness on my part was not entirely nonsense and that Administration is a fundamental principle to the extent that if your administration will not meet your operational demands, you have 'had it'".—General Sir William Slim, speaking in London.*

* General Slim was editor of the *U. S. I. Journal* in 1931—33.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S BODY GUARD*

BY "HISTORIAN."

I.

THE Body Guard was formed at Benares in September, 1773 by Warren Hastings, and consisted at first of 50 Troopers, but shortly afterwards it was augmented by 50 horses obtained from Rajah Cheyt Singh of Benares. The command of this troop was given to Captain Sweny Toone, an officer of the East India Company.

The then official designation of the unit was "The Governor's Troop of Moguls." It became "The Governor-General's Body Guard" on the change of title of Warren Hastings from Governor of Bengal to Governor-General in 1784. This title is still the official designation, although after the Queen assumed the Government of India in 1859 and Lord Canning became Viceroy, the Body Guard was styled unofficially "H. E. The Viceroy's Body Guard." In 1944 the unit became part of the 2nd Indian Airborne Division and was styled "The 44th Divisional Reconnaissance Squadron (G. G. B. G.)". In 1946 on adopting its present establishment, the unit reverted to its usual title of "The Governor-General's Body Guard."

The establishment of the unit has varied through the years, being increased during time of war and being reduced during the usual peacetime retrenchments. Its smallest establishment of 50 troopers was on being raised in 1773, and its largest was in 1844 prior to the Sikh War, when the Body Guard consisted of 469 all ranks, and two Rissalahs of Irregular Cavalry, each of 730 men, making a total of 1,929 all ranks in the Corps. In 1800 a detachment of Galloper guns was added to the Corps, and this form of weapon (whose prototype can be seen today outside the Viceroy's House in Delhi) remained part of the equipment until after 1857.

Between the two World Wars the Body Guard was on an establishment of 2 British officers, 3 V. C. Os., and 110 other ranks, divided into a Headquarters and four troops. In 1944 the unit was mechanized and later that year began training as paratroops. The unit was to have been used in the assault on Singapore had the war not ceased before this operation could begin. In December, 1945 the unit returned to Delhi from Field Service and was reorganized on its present establishment of a Headquarters and two troops mounted cavalry and two troops Armoured Cars. On mobilization the unit would again become an Airborne reconnaissance squadron; accordingly all men are trained in armour as well as in equitation and mounted ceremonial work, and if conditions permit it is hoped to continue paratroop training.

Apart from having acted as mounted and dismounted cavalry, artillery, mechanized cavalry and paratroops, the Body Guard was once employed as marines. This was in 1809 while sailing from Calcutta to Madras, when the activities of the French in the Bay of Bengal rendered this necessary for the protection of the transports.

WAR SERVICES OF THE CORPS

1773-1774.—*Operations against the Saniiyasis*, a band of robbers who preyed upon Bengal and who were driven from the Province as a result of these operations.

*This article was written before August 15, 1947.

1774.—*Battle of St. George against the Rohillas*.—A people of Afghan descent who inhabited Rohilkhand (ancestors of the present Adjutant!) and who as a result of this battle were driven into the districts of Meerut and Rampur State.

1781.—*Insurrection at Benares*.—Suppressed by Warren Hastings with troops that included the Body Guard.

1790—92.—*Third Mysore War*.—Against Tippoo Sultan. During this campaign an attempt on the part of the enemy to assassinate Lord Cornwallis was foiled by his escort of Body Guard.

1801-1802.—*Egyptian Expedition*.—A detachment of the Body Guard was sent to Egypt to ride the horses of an Experimental Troop of Horse Artillery. This was the first time that Indian soldiers served outside Asia, and was the result of a request for foreign service couched in the following terms:—

“Capt. L. Hooke. Secy., Mily. Dept.

“Baloogunge, 17 Nov., 1801.

“Sir,

Understanding that some difficulty has occurred in procuring volunteers from the Native Corps to complete the number of men required for Foreign service, I beg you will state to the Honourable Vice-President in Council that the whole of the detail now remaining at the Presidency of the Body Guard of His Excellency the Governor-General, is ready to embark at the shortest notice should it be judged necessary to call upon them.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your most obedient servant,
(Sd.) H. C. MONTGOMERY,

Capt.”

1803.—*Reduction of Cuttack*.

1804-1805.—*Mahratta War*.—Operations in Bundelkhand by 3 Troops and 2 Galloper guns of the Body Guard.

1811.—*Conquest of Java*.—The Body Guard was engaged in the capture of Weltervreden and of Cornelis, the Commandant, Capt. G. H. Gall, being mentioned in despatches. On the conclusion of the campaign the unit was granted permission to include the word JAVA amongst their Battle Honours—a distinction held today by no other unit of the Indian Army.

1817.—*Insurrection at Cuttack*.

1817-1818.—*Mahratta War*.—Operations against the Pindaris.

1821.—*Operations against the Larka Kols*.—An extract from the Calcutta Gazette reads:—“Singhboom.—A Squadron of the Governor-General's Body Guard was lately sent from the Presidency, towards Singhboom, in pursuit of a band of depredators that had appeared in that quarter, and we are glad to learn, from letters received in town, that they have completely succeeded in routing them.

“A letter now before us states that on the 16th, the squadron came up with the enemy, when they made a beautiful charge led on by Captain Thornton, and cut up between 50 and 60 of them. The loss on our side was trifling, two troopers being badly wounded, 1 syce and 1 doctor killed, 5 horses wounded and 1 missing. Both officers and men are said to have behaved with great spirit and gallantry in the charge.”

1824—1826.—*First Burmese War*.—Extract from a letter dated Shwe-Dagon Pagoda, Rangoon, 8th December, 1824, from Brigadier-General Sir A. Campbell, Commanding the Forces in Burma, regarding the action on 5th December, reads :—

“I directed Lieut. Archbold with a troop of the Right Honourable the Governor-General's Body Guard, which had been landed the preceding evening, to follow the column under Major Sale...and the Body Guard, gallantly charging over the broken and swampy ground, completed the enemy's terror and dismay: the Cassay Horse fled mixed with the retreating infantry.”

“On 15th December, a large body of the enemy who had rallied and had strongly entrenched themselves at Kokein, about 5 miles to the north of Rangoon, were vigorously attacked and driven from their position, with heavy loss. The force detailed for the assault was formed in two columns, the right of 540 men, with 60 of the Body Guard under Brigadier-General Cotton, the left 800 strong, besides 100 of the Body Guard, under Major-General Campbell the former being directed to make a detour, and take the work in rear, whilst the latter attacked them in front. The right column having gained the rear, attacked the centre, whilst the left, forming into two divisions, stormed the flank stockades.

“Besides the loss sustained by the enemy in the entrenchment, a number were destroyed in their retreat, and many were sabred by the Body Guard.”

Here, too, is an extract from a despatch by Brigadier-General Sir A. Campbell, dated, Headquarters Donabyo, 2nd April, 1825 ;

“During the siege the enemy made several bold and desperate sorties on our lines, but were on all occasions quickly repulsed. In one of these sorties a scene at once novel and interesting presented itself in front of both armies; seventeen large elephants, each carrying a complement of armed men, and supported by a column of infantry, were observed moving down towards our right flank. I directed the Body Guard under Captain Sneyd to charge them, and they acquitted themselves most handsomely, mixing boldly with the elephants; they shot their riders from off their backs and finally drove the whole back into the Fort.”

A report from Lieut. T. A. Trant, 95th Foot, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to Lieut.-Col. F. S. Tidy, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General, dated Watmachsote, 30th January, 1826, stated: “I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, that, having been directed by the Deputy Quartermaster-General to reconnoitre the road in advance, I proceeded this morning, accompanied by an escort of 34 men of the Governor-General's Body Guard, commanded by Subedar-Major Kazi Wali Mahmood, in the direction of Yaynan-gheoun, and marched for 10 miles without seeing any appearance of the enemy.

“At this distance I observed a small picket of Burman Cavalry rapidly retreating, and conceiving them to be detached from the Force under Moungtoung-bo, I thought that, by intercepting them, we might approach the Burman camp undiscovered. We therefore pursued them as rapidly as the nature of the country would admit for about two miles, and at the same time they entered a small valley, surrounded by steep hillocks, where between four and five hundred Burmans, well armed with muskets, were bivouacked.

“These were immediately charged by the Body Guard, who, pressing on the crowd, sabred or shot about fifty men, amongst whom was a Chief of rank

(supposed to be Moung-toung-bo), and completely dispersed the remainder, partaking refuge in their boats, and others running to the hills, where the activity was so great that we could not pursue them.

"Finding this to be the case, about 100 men, recovering from the panic, into which they had been thrown, took post on the crest and side of the hill, and from thence kept up a sharp but most ineffectual fire of jinjals and Musketry, by which, I am happy to say, only one man and a horse were wounded; but as I perceived their numbers were increasing, and that several men had been detached to our rear, apparently with the view of annoying us when returning, I thought it prudent to retire.

"The Body Guard behaved with its usual gallantry, and the coolness, zeal and courage manifested by Subedar-Major Kazi Wali Mahmood made him so very conspicuous during the affair, that I trust I may not be considered presumptuous in bringing his conduct to the notice of the Commander of the Forces."

As a result of this campaign AVA was added to the Battle Honours of the Body Guard.

1843.—*Gwalior Campaign*.—MAHARAJPORE was added to the Battle Honours of the Corps at the conclusion of this campaign. An order of the time reads:—

"Everywhere at Maharajpore the British and the Native Troops, emulating each other and animated by the same spirit of military devotion, proved that an Army so composed and united by the bonds of mutual esteem and confidence must ever remain invincible in Asia."

1845-1846.—*First Sikh War*.—The Battle Honours, MOODKEE, FEROZESHAH, ALIWAL and SOBRAON were gained during this campaign.

The following is a short account of the action at MOODKEE as told by Reynell Taylor, the Commandant, in a letter to his father written whilst he was lying wounded on 1st January, 1846 :

"My shoulder is very painful and I shall not be able to write much, so must tell you the heads of the things in as few words as possible. The Sikhs attacked us at a place called MOODKEE on the evening of the 18th, and we had just ended a march of 20 miles. They got preciously licked for their pains and lost nearly all the guns they had brought into the field. They took up a good position in some low brush jungle for their artillery, and the cannonade they opened upon us was tremendous. Soon after the commencement of the action the Dragoons and ourselves were ordered to attack the enemy's left, which rested on some much higher and thicker thorn jungle and consisted of a large body of horse and match-lock footmen.

"We accordingly took ground to the right, open column of troops, right shoulders forward. Conceive a Brigade or column of troops galloping through a thick thorn jungle enveloped in clouds of dust so dense that the standard of my squadron was the only landmark I could recognize, approaching nearer and nearer to the thundering batteries of the enemy and the yelling crowd protecting them.

"Above all the din I heard the word passed to wheel into line; it was merely a left turn for each individual, and on we rushed at the same pace. Loud shouts of friend and foe arose on our right as our gallant Dragoons dashed in, clearing all before them, and in another second we were in a mass of bloody-minded Sikh Horse and foot, but chiefly the former.

"I need not give you the details of such work. I believe the men we were opposed to were, or thought themselves to be, cut off from escape by the Dragoons, and they fought most furiously. I was personally engaged with five men at different times, and after a tussle of some seven or eight minutes, in which our adversaries were all cut down, shot, or driven off, I found myself wounded in three different places, my reins cut, and my horse "Pickle" very severely wounded by a sabre.

"On trying to pick up the pieces of the Regiment the result was: Dawkins down, shot through the thigh, Bouverie's two thousand rupee horse shot under him: Fisher and Stanners missing, the former, poor fellow, killed and the latter carried away in the confusion with the Dragoons; Harrington, the Brigade-Major wounded. This left Colonel Gough, our Brigadier, and Cornet Pakenham and self to form up the Regiment. Bouverie got another horse and was all right."

1849.—*Second Sikh War*.—A detachment escorted the Governor-General and was used in aiding the disarmament of the population across the Sutlej.

1855.—*Santhal Revolt*.—After the insurgents had been dealt with, the Body Guard returned to Calcutta by train, this being the first occasion that rail transport was used for troop movement in India.

1857-1858.—*Indian Mutiny*.—The Body Guard were twice used for disarming disaffected units in Calcutta. They were also employed in conducting remounts up country through disaffected areas.

1886.—*Third Burmese War*.—A detachment of the Body Guard accompanied Lord Dufferin on this campaign.

1914-1918.—*The Great War*.—A detachment of Body Guard were sent as reinforcements to the 3rd Skinners Horse and served in France.

1939-1945.—*Second World War*.—Opportunity to see active service was not given to the Corps. The Sikhs of the Body Guard were the first to volunteer as paratroopers, and their lead was followed by a number of Sikhs of other units.

THE BODY GUARD ESTATES.

Ballygunge.—The earliest reference to the Body Guard lines at Ballygunge in Calcutta is to be found in a lease dated 1st January, 1801. The area was improved through the years. In 1929 the lines were handed over to the Military Lands Dept., with the proviso that when required for the use of H. E. The Viceroy's Body Guard all buildings, including Officers' houses and stables, would be vacated. This arrangement still stands, although the Body Guard have not had occasion to accompany H. E. The Viceroy to Calcutta since 1940.

Dehra Dun.—In the latter part of 1830 Lord William Bentinck made an extended tour of the Upper Provinces, during which time he visited Mussoorie. Thence he went to Simla, while the Body Guard remained in Dehra Dun. This was the first occasion that the Corps summered in the locality which afterwards became, until 1944, the depot of the Regiment. Temporary stables were first built there in 1838, but the present site was occupied in 1847. This area was not, however, purchased by Government until 1881, when 229 acres were bought and now form part of the Viceregal Estate, the whole area being occupied by the Body Guard Lines and Farm land.

Initially the land was jungle, but this has been gradually cleared by the labour of the Body Guard and is now a most productive farm, on permanent

lease to the unit. Many of the buildings were erected by the unit at their own expense: some of these were transferred to the M. E. S., while others still remain the sole property of the Regiment. During the present century all land possible for cultivation has been cleared of jungle, and those nullah areas impossible to cultivate have been planted with valuable timber and fruit trees.

Up to the beginning of the late War it was the custom to move the Body Guard to Dehra Dun from Calcutta when the Government moved to Simla for the summer. When the Body Guard proceeded on Field Service in 1944 the Dehra Dun Lines were offered for the duration of the War to the Defence Department, who accepted the offer and the lines were converted into a Convalescent Home for Indian Troops. St. Dunstan's Home for Indian War Blinded later occupied the lines, and they are still carrying on their good work. The Farm and Farm buildings continue to be maintained by the Body Guard. Dehra Dun is still regarded as the Body Guard base and Delhi is even now referred to by the men as "their Delhi Camp."

Delhi.—Up to 1914 the Body Guard had only visited Delhi on the occasion of the Durbars of 1863, 1877, 1903 and 1911. During the Great War detachments were kept at Delhi during the cold weather, although the unit was stationed in Calcutta. In 1920 the unit was in Camp in Old Delhi for part of the cold weather, and this practice was repeated until 1923, when the Indian Cavalry Lines in Old Delhi were occupied.

In 1926 the present Escort Lines on the South Side of the Viceregal Estate in New Delhi were begun, and were completed the following year. These lines are now occupied by the Body Guard throughout the year. Before the late War the Body Guard had summered in Dehra Dun, sending a detachment on duty to Simla, had moved to Calcutta for the State Opening of the Bengal Assembly, and had then moved to the capital for the remainder of the cold weather.

DRESS AND EQUIPMENT

Up to 1857 the Body Guard was clothed entirely at the expense of the Commanding Officer. For this purpose he drew an annual sum from Government called 'Off Reckonings'. Any surplus left over became the property of the Commanding Officer. In addition to the articles of dress supplied by the Commanding Officer there were also certain minor items supplied by the men themselves, for which purpose they received a monthly allowance known as "Half-mounting".

In 1796 the following articles of dress were laid down for issue to the crews :—

2 Nankeen Jackets ; 2 prs. Nankeen Pantaloon ; 1 Turban ; 1 Leather stock ; 1 Brass leather Stock clasp ; 1 pr. Spurs ; 1 pr. Spur leather ; 1 pr. Boots ; 2 Shirts.

The colour of the dress was red with blue facings, and has remained so ever since.

In 1806 'Chacos' were worn.

In 1814 the uniform of the Body Guard was as follows:—

Full Dress.—Red and Dark Blue with silver lace.

Undress.—French Grey and Dark Blue with silver lace. Long gaiter Pantaloon and shoes were worn in Parade Order inside Government House.

In 1840 the uniform consisted of:—

Black varnished Shakos with black horse-hair plume. Scarlet Jackets or "Coatees" with Blue facings and silver lace.

Blue Cloth overalls with Scarlet stripe. Wellington boots.

Buckskin gauntlets.

After 1857 the system of "Off Reckonings" was abolished, and thence forward the clothing was supplied by the Army Clothing Dept.

In 1859 the shako was abolished, and a Blue and Gold twisted cord pugri with a black aigrette was adopted. This was designed by the Vicereine, Lady Canning.

In 1862 a Red "Chupkan" and blue Kamarband replaced the incongruous European coatee. Blue pantaloons were worn with this dress.

In 1864 gold lace was substituted for silver lace.

In 1879 the blue pantaloons were changed for white. About the same time the Kamarband was abolished and the girdle substituted.

In 1892 the present Blue and Gold lungi was substituted for the cord pugri.

In 1897 the scarlet "Chupkan" was replaced by the present Frock Coat.

In 1898 white Frock Coats were substituted for the white Chupkan worn in the summer.

In 1910 white lamb skins were introduced to cover the saddle and wallets.

In 1944 the airborne maroon beret and pugri was sanctioned for use in Field Service dress.

Standards and Banners.—Standards were originally issued to Squadrons of Native Cavalry in 1779. The earliest record of a Body Guard standard is in 1800, when the Marquess Wellesley presented Colours to the Corps at the conclusion of his review of the Guard. In 1815 the Countess of Loudoun and Moira presented a standard to a newly-raised Squadron of the Body Guard. There is no further mention of a standard until 1844, when two standards were supplied for two newly-raised squadrons.

In his description of the Battle of Moodkee in 1845 Reynell Taylor makes mention of the squadron standard. Standards were abolished in Regiments of Native Cavalry in 1864. In 1931 a guidon was presented to the Body Guard by Lord Willingdon, but was last carried on escorts in 1936.

Two Silver State trumpets with banners were presented by Lord Reading in 1924 on the 150th anniversary of the raising of the Corps. One banner represents the Star of India with the Battle Honours of the Corps, the other carries the coat of arms of the Viceroy. Each succeeding Viceroy presents a banner to the Body Guard on assuming office, banners of past Viceroys being kept in safe custody by the unit. These trumpets and banners are in present use.

Arms.—It is thought that the unit was originally armed with pistols and sabres. In 1810 two pistols per man were authorized instead of one. In 1813 carbine practice was carried out at Bally Gunge. In 1863 carbines were abolished and lances carried for the first time. In 1864 pistols were abolished and in 1893 Webley revolvers were introduced. In 1914 rifles were first issued.

The present armament includes rifles, bayonets, swords, lances, brems, stens, revolvers, besas and 2 pounders.

THE MEN AND THEIR HORSES.

The Corps was originally recruited solely from amongst the Moguls. Hindus were added in 1800. Twenty years later the composition consisted of Mohammedans, Brahmins and Rajputs. In 1883 Sikhs were enlisted for the first time, and in 1887 Punjabi Mussalmans were admitted. The recruiting of Brahmins and Rajputs ceased in 1895.

The present composition is half Jat Sikhs and half Punjabi Mussalmans of the Tiwana, Awan, Mogul and Rajput tribes. Recruits are not accepted unless 6 ft. tall, and in possession of educational qualifications above the 6th standard.

The men are to-day paid the same rates as the Indian Armoured Corps, and in addition receive a Body Guard allowance.

The horses are Indian breds averaging 15.3 in height supplied by the Remount and Veterinary Department. They are bright bays with no white points. Manes are worn on the near side instead of on the off side—a distinction held only by units of Household Cavalry.

CONCLUSION.

In 1805 the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company stated that "We are pleased to observe that the Body Guard is not kept up for purposes of mere Parade, but is capable of rendering useful Services in the Field".

Lack of opportunity only is the reason that the last hundred years have offered no occasion to the Body Guard of affording the successors to the Directors a similar pleasure. The Governor-General long ago ceased to lead the Forces in the Field in person, and consequently his Personal Troops have not had the same opportunities of seeing active service as existed during the first century of the unit's history. Nevertheless the Corps cannot be accused of resting on its laurels. In both World Wars the Body Guard was immediately offered for active service and it was not the fault of the unit that it was denied action.

To-day the Body Guard maintains its traditions as the Premier Unit of the Indian Army. As the only Ceremonial Unit in British India it may be seen in Delhi adding that touch of colour and dignity without which all State occasions lack impressiveness. At the same time the unit is trained in the latest forms of mechanized and airborne warfare, ready when necessary once more to render "Useful services in the Field".

With the new developments now taking place, the future of the Corps is not yet settled. It may well be that the Body Guard will be split into two parts: The Sikh portion forming the Body Guard of the Governor-General of India, and the Punjabi Mussalman portion forming the Body Guard of the Governor-General of Pakistan. Whatever the decision may finally be, it is certain that the two halves of the unit will both remain equally proud of their 200-year old tradition based upon courage, loyalty and discipline.

A SHORT STORY

FOR WANT OF A NAIL

By PHILIP WOODRUFFE

THE man in the jeep felt hungry and looked at his watch. It was still barely ten o'clock, but it was four hours since his hasty breakfast at divisional headquarters and it would be as long again before he reached the airfield. Surprising how hungry one gets sitting still in a jeep, he reflected; but probably the jolting on these rough trails is really quite hard exercise. He told his driver to stop, opened his haversack and took out three packets of K rations. He decided that on the whole he was less tired of the breakfast packet than the other two and moved into the back of the jeep, where there was more room to spread things about. The driver took his ration to the shade of a clump of bamboos by the side of the trail.

The man sitting in the back of the jeep, with his knees wide apart, bending forward over the packet of food, digging out chunks of chopped ham and egg with the point of his knife and wedging them on to his biscuits, was a sturdy and powerful figure. He contrived to look more untidy than most men even in a bush shirt, and there was a youthfulness and a look of the moss-trooper about him that made his brigadier's badges a surprise.

He was for the moment thinking exclusively about his food, but opening a packet of K rations was a matter of routine and his mind was soon free to think of other things. It turned then to the progress of the pipe-line that was being laid by the side of the trail. All he had seen of it confirmed what he had been told yesterday. It would not be safe to count on its being through to Burgundy, the name for the airfield, in less than two months. And it would take longer still to improve the trail to a standard that would take a truck in all weathers.

He did not think much about the scene before him, because it was too familiar, the clumps of bamboo near the trail, the path winding away up the hill to a Naga village, the blue sky and the circling vultures. Nor did he pay any attention to the small figure of a Naga woman coming down the path from the village. He could not know the part she was to play in his plans, the influence she was to have on the lives of the men under his command.

He finished his breakfast and drove away. The woman came on, down the path towards the trail. She moved hurriedly and looked apprehensively over her shoulder. She was afraid that her sister-in-law might be following her and she had a guilty conscience about her sister-in-law and the blanket she was carrying, hugged tightly to her breast.

Honali and her sister-in-law lived in two little huts, side by side on the outskirts of the village up the hill. The two brothers, their husbands, were now both working for the army, and they only came back for a few days leave every six months or so. Honali and her sister-in-law were luckier; their

[N. B.—Nothing at all like this ever happened and there has never been anyone in the world like anyone in this story.—P.W.]

work was close at hand. They were employed on moving earth and stones for the pipe-line and the road. Just now the work was almost at their door. As it progressed, they would be taken up the road in a truck; later still, they would be replaced by villagers from further forward.

The two brothers had just been home on leave, and that very morning had left together. But before that, some months ago, Dwarika, Honali's husband, had had an extra little spell of a week at home by himself, without his brother; and he had brought with him a great treasure. By some error in the quartermaster's stores, he had been issued with an extra blanket. Being an honest little man, he had mentioned the mistake, but he had been misunderstood; they thought he was complaining about what he had been given, and he had been pushed impatiently aside. So he had taken it that the extra blanket really was his and had brought it home in triumph for his family. He would certainly not have complained of its quality, for it was a wonderful blanket, thick and warm.

It was the pride of Honali's heart. Not the least part of the pleasure that its possession gave her was the fact that her sister-in-law had no such blanket, and envied her this; several times Honali had caught her fingering it covetously. And now, what must Dwarika do but sit up gambling with his brother all his last night at home, and lose the blanket and her two best cooking-pots! He had said nothing about it till the last minute, when he had carelessly told her to hand them over to her sister-in-law, just as he was going, pretending he had forgotten till then. Really of course he had been afraid of what she would have said if he had given her time. All she had not said was churning and fermenting within her now and it added to her bitterness. If it had been anyone else to whom she had to give them! But to a nagging interfering bitch like her sister-in-law, who always knew better than she did about everything, that was too much.

Honali made up her mind that whatever else her sister-in-law might get, she should not have the blanket. Her husband's brother, Hari, must have told his wife of his winnings before he left; she would come round to collect them before starting for work. Honali decided to start for work herself earlier than usual, taking the blanket with her; the visitor would find no one at home when she called and would undoubtedly then take it upon herself to search for the blanket. Meanwhile, Honali would hide it, somewhere safe, though as yet she had no idea where.

This was the reason why Honali looked over her shoulder as she hurried down the hill towards the pipe-line where the brigadier had been breakfasting in the jeep. A hundred yards before the trail, she looked round again and her fears were confirmed. Another female figure came round the corner where the path turned the hill, and although at that distance no details could be distinguished, Honali knew it must be her sister-in-law because it was still early for the workers to start from the village and in any case the others would start in a party, not one by one.

As quickly as she could without actually running, Honali slipped into a big clump of bamboos by the side of the trail. She looked round for somewhere to hide the blanket, for her sister-in-law was not only a stronger character but was also physically bigger than herself, and Honali could hope to keep the blanket only by hiding it. She could stuff it among the bamboos, but a searching eye might easily chance on it in any hiding-place of that kind. And then suddenly Honali saw just what she wanted. There, by the side of

the trail, but hidden by the bamboos from the pursuing figure on the path, was a pyramid of pipes, lying ready for the workmen, both ends of each pipe unplugged. Honali did not stop to think why they were there.

She hastily rolled the blanket into a thin tube, just as long as the width of the cloth, and pushed it into a pipe. It went in quite easily until its whole length was inside; then, as a little circle of grey wool showed where there should have been an empty opening, Honali took a bamboo stick and poked. She rammed her end of the blanket in about a foot, so that it could not be seen from outside; and in the course of her ramming she jammed the thick material firmly against the sides of the pipe. It occurred to her that it might not be quite so easy to get the blanket out as it had been to put it in, but she was not of a temperament to meet troubles half-way. She sauntered away down the line towards her place of work, no longer guilty or apprehensive.

When her sister-in-law caught her up, Honali had her answer pat.

"Blanket?" she said, "I forgot to give it to you. It's at the hut, of course. Couldn't you find it? We'll look for it this evening."

She worked all morning, carrying baskets of earth and stones on her head. As she worked, she planned; she was not happy about the pipe as a hiding-place because, however safe it might be from the prying eyes of her sister-in-law, one of the workmen or soldiers might find it. It had suited her at the moment when she had no time to dig, but she would much prefer to have the blanket safely buried for a week or two till she could arrange to take it to her mother's. At the midday interval, work stopped and the women squatted down to cook the food they had brought with them. Honali walked away from the trail into the jungle, as though on a private and purely physical errand of her own, but once concealed from sight she turned swiftly back to the bamboo clump where she had hidden the blanket.

The pile of pipes had disappeared.

Honali questioned some workmen nearby. The pipes? Oh yes, they had gone into the pipe-line and been buried that morning. It was a shock for a moment, but then Honali smiled. She had lost her blanket, but her sister-in-law at least would never get it now.

* * * * *

About two hours later, the brigadier in the jeep reached the airfield Burgundy, where his officers were waiting for him. He called them together at once, to explain the situation as he had learnt it from divisional headquarters. His brigade-major was there, his battalion commanders, and an American airman whose transport aircraft were vital to the plan. They crowded round him, eager for news.

They knew already that in two months time the brigade was to be brought up to this isolated airfield and thence flown south, over hundreds of miles of hill and jungle, to be dropped far behind the enemy's forward positions. There they were to cut his lines of communication, destroy bridges and railways, divert troops from the main battle, do anything they could to ensure the success of the offensive that would follow. What they did not know was the exact date, the arrangements that were to be made for their send-off. Although he was physically untidy, the brigadier had a neat mind and explained the situation well. He said:—

"This airfield was built before the monsoon, when you could get a loaded truck up the trail. They got it finished just before the rains broke. Now of course you can't use the trail for anything but a jeep, and that only in a fine spell. They're building an all-weather road and a pipe-line for petrol, but neither the road nor the pipe-line will be here for two months and the all-weather road will probably take a good deal longer. The trail won't be any use for traffic for at least two months either, so that until our operation takes place this airfield is an island; and unfortunately an island in a sea of which we haven't got command. The jungle and the weather have that. In other words, we can only get stores and petrol on to the airfield by flying them here.

"That of course was realised when they made the plan. The only way to stock up the airfield was to allot Callaghan's Dakotas to the job of flying in petrol and stores. They were to bring in enough petrol for the operation of flying in the Brigade, and enough stores and petrol to keep us going for two months. Callaghan will tell you what he thinks of using good aircraft to fly gas about the place."

"I hate it like hell," said Callaghan, "but war's wasteful any way you look at it." "...but it had to be done. His aircraft are just enough, doing two sorties a day, to bring in what we shall need for two months. Then for D-day, all the Dakotas in the area of this Corps were to be switched on to this one job and fly us in. Then they were all to go back to whatever they were doing before, except Callaghan's boys, who were to spend the next two months dropping on us the stores they'd brought up beforehand, using the petrol they'd flown in.

"That was the original plan. You might think it was a bit lavish to collect two months stores and petrol before the start, and that it would have been safe to rely on getting something in after D-day. But this is such a hellish country that there always seems to be a landslip or a cloudburst or a flood or an earthquake just where you least want it and they decided to take no chances. And it's just as well they did, because there's already been a development that has reduced the margin quite a lot.

"This bit of news was in today's newspapers, which you won't see till Thursday, and you might not think it would affect our show, but it does, although it's nearly a thousand miles away. In the Arakan, a Jap brigade has turned our position, marched right round the flank and come in behind 93 Division. They can't get anything by road to 93 Division at all, no stores, no petrol, no ammunition. Now if 93 can hold on where they are, those Japs will be liquidated; but the only way to do it is to supply 93 by air. That's an extra commitment, quite unforeseen. We thought we were going to attack down there but the horse blew first. It can only be met by scraping up every Dakota we can lay hands on. Half Callaghan's outfit has to go. I've brought him his orders from the group."

"Aw hell," said Callaghan, "just when I'd got to know you boys and was well on the way to making decent American citizens of you. Now I'll have to start in on another bunch of goddam Britishers."

"Don't worry, you're not going yourself," said the brigadier, "you're staying here with a reduced squadron. And since with half the aircraft you can't fly in two months petrol as well as two months stores, you're to start flying in the stores. You won't need to re-fuel here, and there won't be any

gas here at all. We take a chance on getting the pipe-line through by D-day. If it looks as though it won't be through in time, you'll have to switch over to flying in gas a fortnight beforehand. But by that time, we hope the business in the south will be settled, and they'll be able to give us back all your Dakotas and perhaps a few more. How soon the pipe-line gets through depends on the weather."

* * * * *

During the next two months, the brigade went on with its training in Central India. The pipe-line crept steadily forward towards the airfield. Sometimes a spell of bad weather slowed it down, but there were none of the major cataclysms which allied soldiers and airmen had come to regard as part of the normal climate of Assam.

Honali and her sister-in-law went back to village life as the head of the line moved out of their area. The spells of bad weather grew less frequent, and there seemed nothing likely to stop the pipe-line reaching the airfield by D-day and starting to deliver petrol during the next week. But the aircraft that were to be collected for the fly-in would have to re-fuel at Burgundy before they took off with the gliders full of troops for that long stretch southward over the jungle. So for the last week Callaghan's reduced squadron flew in gas, and nothing but gas. But there was only enough for the fly-in; for the months ahead, the food and ammunition that was the blood of the brigade depended on the pipe-line.

D-day came, and the tugs and gliders flew in. The Dakotas released the gliders, circled round to see them land on the natural clearings that had long been marked down for the purpose, and flew back to Burgundy. The units of the brigade sorted themselves out and moved off to their appointed tasks. The third day the brigadier came back in a light aeroplane which could land and take off in a forest clearing. He re-fuelled at Burgundy and flew on to report to his divisional commander.

He found the general looking serious. A neat, spare, precise little man, his finicky speech and habits were the result of years of self-discipline; inwardly he was a romantic and whenever he allowed his mind to be idle, it would call up pictures of himself, his youth recovered, sitting by a campfire with his platoon, crawling in the dark on a single-handed attempt to pass the enemy's picquets, running back as he touched off the fuse that would destroy the bridge, parrying with unwonted verbal skill the thrusts of the female super-spy.

On the night of the fly-in, he had dined with a battalion of his own regiment, the 159th, one of the three under the brigadier's command. He sat on a packing-case and ate from a mess-tin; it was very different from the guest nights of peace. But he liked the faces he saw round him, cheerful, young and eager. They had come from all over the world, from every kind of peace-time job, but the army had absorbed them, the regiment had set its seal upon them.

He was proud of them and they were proud of the regiment, its men and its battle honours. But later that night, as the Dakotas one by one roared away into the darkness with their load of gliders, his heart had been sad that he could not go with them, and sad too because he did not know how many of these cheerful young faces he would see again. Now three days later, he was grieved by the thought of what was in store for the brigade. He explained

to the brigadier. The two men could hardly have been less alike in appearance or in their mental approach to a problem ; but they understood each other.

The general sat upright on his packing-case, leaning slightly forward, talking slowly and carefully. The brigadier lolled, nursing a knee, watching the neat fresh-coloured face, the serious blue eyes, listening as his commander explained that before the roads had been opened to let stores go through to 93 Division, the Japanese had done the same thing again in the centre. Once again they had attacked, making a great circle through the jungle to come in behind Indian and British troops. But once again if air supply could be arranged, the tables would be turned on the enemy. It would be he who would be fought and starved until death or surrender released him. But it meant more Dakotas. Every Dakota in the command was needed for the job. An appeal had been made to the Mediterranean for help, but there too there was a crisis and no more could be sent. The long and short of it was that far from being reinforced, Callaghan's reduced squadron had been still further reduced.

The brigadier thought for a moment.

"We can just manage on that, Sir," he said. "I know Callaghan and he'll do all he can to bring up our stores. He'll work his pilots till they drop rather than let us go short."

The general shook his head. He said :—

"Wait. I haven't finished. You know we were depending on the pipeline. It was through on D-day, and we were reckoning on it to give us the petrol for Callaghan's aircraft. But there's an obstruction. Nothing will come through. They've got to pull it up bit by bit to find where the block is. They might have some luck and find it quickly, but they might take a month."

The brigadier uttered a short indeterminate sound, which might have been taken to mean that this was indeed a bitter blow, but that it was fate and Assam and the workings of an inscrutable Providence, and you had no right to expect more. Also, that he felt sorry for the general who had to give him such news. The general went on—

"I tried again to get more aircraft, after hearing this news, but it's no good. Everyone has to go short until they get through by road to the 47th Division. It means Callaghan will have to fly up petrol one day and carry stores on to you the next. It would have stretched him to the limit to give you the stores you need if he'd had the petrol at Burgundy. Now he'll have to stretch himself just as tight to give you half."

The brigadier thought. He said—

"They do realise, of course, Sir, that our scale is a pretty hard one at the best of times, and that we don't get everything that's dropped for us?"

"Yes, I'm afraid they do. It was a hard decision to make, but when all the facts were before me, I had to agree that it was right."

The brigadier stood up. He said—

"Very good, Sir, there's nothing for it but to manage as best we can. I'll let you know daily by signal whether the emphasis is on food or ammunition. Please tell Callaghan from me not to work his pilots so hard that they fly into a hill in their sleep. We shall want everyone of them."

It was some three weeks later that the brigadier next flew back to Burgundy. The general had chosen to drive up to meet him in a jeep. He had decided on this instead of flying in order to see what progress had been made towards finding the block in the pipe-line.

The brigadier looked much older than he had done a month ago. He had bitter news to tell. He said—

“It's the 159th, Sir. They've had a bad time. They had long marches to make anyhow, as you know, and they were on half rations. Then they missed a drop. I don't know where it went but they didn't get it. That meant twelve days from one drop to the next. Three days rations for twelve days. I've seen them and they're walking skeletons. What happened wasn't the men's fault, not the officers. They gave all they had. But three marches short of the railway at Kyaukchaung, Jack Elliott had to decide whether to leave half of them behind and push on with the fittest or reduce his pace. He knew he'd have to fight when he got to the railway and would want every man he'd got. Also, if he split he made the next drop more complicated and increased the chance of missing it.

“So he reduced the length of his marches and reached the railway a day late. He got his drop. Half rations instead of quarter. I think he was right. Anyway it was his decision. But it just made the difference. The Japanese must have got wind of his movements somehow, and their brigade from up the line got past on the day Elliott ought to have got to Kyaukchaung. Instead of being neutralised away in the jungles to the north-east that brigade is on its way to the main battle. Elliott of course didn't know this. He still thought he had to cut the line.

“There was a Jap battalion holding Kyaukchaung and Elliott attacked them. He had a lot of casualties, but hadn't got into the town when I called him off. I did that as soon as I knew the Jap brigade had gone through. No point in cutting that line now. I've sent him south to the junction. He had hoped for food in Kyaukchaung, but he may find some at the junction of course. I'm sorry, Sir. They've failed to do what they went for and lost a lot of men and some good officers. It wasn't their fault. It was a miracle they did so much. It went wrong because they slowed up, and they slowed up because they had it enough to eat. It was that pipe-line.”

There was much else to report and discuss, and the conference went on. When it was over and he was alone, the general's mind went back to his old regiment, his friends, the faces he remembered the night they flew in. He went over it till his mind was dazed with fatigue but he could not see anything more he could have done to help them. But he felt all the same that he had failed them. It had been the pipe-line. No one could have foreseen that block.

He woke next morning to miserable realisation of what had happened to his regiment. Their present sufferings were in his mind all the time, and as he drove back to his headquarters he asked every party of men he saw for news about the block in the pipe-line. He thought of what it had meant, the hunger of the brigade, the casualties to the 159th, that extra Japanese brigade in the main battle that might have been stopped. He got no news till about half-way back to his headquarters. Just as he was thinking that he was hungry and it was time to stop and eat, he saw a party of sappers by the side of the line, a group of villagers watching.

The officer in command of the sappers came up and saluted. He said—

“We’ve found the blocked section, Sir. They’ve got it up and they’re just getting the obstruction out.”

The general walked forward to look. One of the sappers was pulling on a metal hook, while others held the pipe section. The obstruction began to give, and slowly there emerged the beginnings of a shapeless grey mass, which suddenly came out with a run and revealed itself as a petrol-soaked army blanket.

One of the Naga women from the group of villagers ran out, and snatched the blanket up. She hugged it to her breast. But another woman sprang forward and in a torrent of shrill abuse claimed it as her own. She tried to snatch it away but the first woman resisted. The general decided to stroll a little way up the hill and eat his food in a quieter spot. As he walked away, the two women were still arguing fiercely.

CENTENARY OF THE LAWRENCE R. M. SCHOOL, SANAWAR*

BY THE RT. REV. GEORGE BARNE, C.I.E., O.B.E., V.D.,

Bishop of Lahore

OCTOBER 11th was a red-letter day in Sanawar, for on that day the Lawrence Royal Military School celebrated its centenary. One hundred years ago, in the short interval of peace which intervened between the battles of Sobraon and Gujrat, Sir Henry Lawrence founded his School for the education of sons and daughters of British soldiers "serving or having served in India," as the old charter runs.

Sanawar was destined to be the first of the four Lawrence sister-schools in India. In 1854 Sir Henry founded his second school at Mount Abu in Rajputana, in memory of his wife, Honoria, who died there. After his death on the fourth day of the siege of Lucknow in 1857 the two Memorial Schools at Ootacamund and Ghora Gali were founded in his memory. Thus the perfect square of Lawrence Schools was made complete. They constitute one of the most valuable and interesting features in the story of European education in India during the past hundred years.

So on October 11, 1947 the senior of these sister-schools kept her centenary—and a great day it was! After the early service of Holy Communion the special service of Remembrance and Thanksgiving for a hundred years' work was held. In my sermon I reminded the congregation of "the rock whence they were hewn and the pit whence they were digged." The ideals of Henry Lawrence, which had taken shape in his mind in Katmandu when he was Resident in Nepal, were translated into action.

Sir Henry's dream for British soldiers' children came true and Sanawar was born. He selected Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, to build and organise the School. There, on land given to the Founder by the Ruler of Bhagat, Hodson quarried his stone, cut his timber and worked out all the preliminaries before handing over to the first Principal, the Rev. W. Parker, who had been selected by Sir Henry in England.

So were laid the foundations for this new adventure, to which the Founder himself had contributed nearly a lakh of rupees. The School, he had laid down, was to provide a home, an education, and above all a Christian education, for children in a good climate: "an asylum," he had called it, "from the debilitating effects of a tropical climate and the demoralising influence of barrack life."

I took the thoughts of Sanawar right back to the Founder and his dying words at Lucknow—words afterwards given to his branch of the Lawrence family and since allowed to be used as the School motto: "Never Give In."

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The Service over, we made for "Peacestead," the Girls' school playground, thus named after the end of the first Great War in 1918. There preparations were in hand for the reception of the Governor-General of India and Lady Mountbatten, accompanied by Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Smith, Deputy Supreme Commander and President of the Board of Governors of the School, and the Hon. Pamela Mountbatten.

* Who was Principal of the School from 1912 to 1932.

The Boys' School formed a Guard of Honour, carrying their Colours (Sanawar is the oldest school in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth to carry Colours). The Governor-General took the salute, inspected the Guard, and passed on to the Indian Boys School, one hundred and fifty of whom were on parade, headed by the Boy Scout Troop.

Back at the Saluting Base the Staff were presented to Their Excellencies, who then made contact with the Girls' and Junior Schools. "Peacestead" made a very striking picture, with the crowd lining the high wall and steep slope above it, and with the flag of the Dominion of India broken at the flagstaff. The Principal and Mrs. Carter then led the party to the Chapel and thence to the War Memorial, where the students marched past the Governor-General by Houses, followed by the Indian Boy Scouts, on the way to Gaskell Hall in the Birdwood School.

There the Principal, Mr. E. G. Carter (ninth of his line since the foundation) welcomed Their Excellencies, reviewed the activities of the School during the past year, and finally reminded his hearers of what the Centenary really meant. He recalled the aims and spiritual ideals of the Founder, which had been carried out so faithfully by those who had worked with devotion to keep alive the Lawrence tradition for a hundred years. Those aims and ideals had been abided by so that the School could be handed over, with all that was good in its traditions, to Indian boys and girls. Faith and courage, said Mr. Carter, must be the watch-words for the future, as well as the Founder's dying words.

Then followed an inspiring speech by the Governor-General, who began by reading the following personal message from His Majesty the King :

"Many great events have happened in India during 1947, and not the least of them is the celebration by your famous school of its centenary. As you all know, the School was originally for the sons and daughters of British soldiers. Recently it has entered on a new phase of its life, and it is now open both to Indians and British alike.

"Your School is therefore marching with the times. It is in the school and on the playing fields where bonds of friendship are forged. You children who come from different parts of the world, therefore, have a unique opportunity to form close bonds of friendship—which will not be broken when you grow up—by building up faith and trust in each other, and with other peoples of the world you will do a great service to mankind.

"The Queen and I wish you and your school every success in the future".

The School and visitors stood to receive the King's message, and when it was concluded gave three hearty cheers.

Lieut. General Sir Arthur Smith followed with a characteristically delightful speech. As an intimate friend of the School he was on familiar ground and found no difficulty in bringing into his words a combination of commonsense, inspiration and humour, which exactly fitted the occasion. He appealed to the Indians present to keep up the Sanawar traditions, and paid a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Carter, the Principal, who had taken over a most responsible charge at an extremely difficult time; he had, however, shown that he could meet all the exacting exigencies of the day with understanding, efficiency and courage. His many years' work for Sanawar as Master and Secretary well fitted him for the post of Principal, and they could all be confident that the future of the School was safe in his hands.

Lady Mountbatten then distributed the prizes and the House trophies, and after lunching at the Principal's House, Their Excellencies left Sanawar, to the cheers of visitors, staff, and scholars. As he stood up in his car giving the naval salute, he announced a lavish granting of holidays to mark the celebration of one hundred years' work.

As they left, all Sanawar realised how honoured they had been by the visit of the distinguished visitors. It was the next best thing to having the King and Queen.

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No account of the celebrations of the Centenary would be complete without reference to the Rev. Harold Hazell, Principal of the School for the past eighteen months, during which time he had done outstanding work. During the War he had rendered distinguished service, winning the D.S.O. in Burma (to which Lord Mountbatten referred in his speech) and having been mentioned three times in despatches. He had proved an ideal Principal, for it was work which suited him admirably. He carried out his duties with meticulous care and assiduity, but had decided to return to the United Kingdom on account of his wife's health.

Other features of the Centenary were the presentation of "Ambrose Applejohn" by the Staff Amateur Dramatic Society; three one-act plays by the boys and girls; and the "Sleeping Beauty" by the Preparatory School; an evening of good music and singing; a tattoo on "Peacestead," when the boys gave a remarkable display of advanced work over the horse, and the girls, after hornpipes, reels and jigs, delighted everyone with their lantern marching and counter-marching; two well-organised athletic meetings, a swimming gala, and a Gymkhana. Old Sanawarians played the Girls' School at hockey and tennis, and the Boys' School at hockey; they won all the matches. The week concluded with an Old Sanawarian Dinner and Dance.

It was a matter of deep regret that so many Old Sanawarians and parents of present scholars were unable to make the journey to Sanawar, owing to the unsettled conditions and dislocated traffic facilities in the two Punjabs. Had conditions been normal hundreds of old pupils would have been present.

Many telegrams and letters, arrived, however, and among them were letters from Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood, Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode, Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, and Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob. Among the distinguished visitors was Mr. Compton Mackenzie, the well-known novelist and military historian, who is now writing a history of the Indian Army during the late World War.

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A hundred years! The new world, the old life. The new India, the old regime. For many years the School has provided the Army, the Civil Services, the Nursing profession, the Teaching profession, the Police, the Post and Telegraph Services, the Railways and business firms with recruits who have served India well. It will continue so in the future, and the supply will henceforth be mostly from India's own sons and daughters.

A great School, which has fulfilled the good intent of its Founder for one hundred years, passes on to another phase in its existence. I am sure I am right in thinking that nothing would have pleased Henry Lawrence better. He loved India and its inhabitants, and the fact that his Sanawar is now to be used by all alike—Indian and British, Civil and Military, and is being handed on as a completely up-to-date School, well fitted for twentieth-century needs, gives an added lustre and distinction to his foundation, and a happy augury for the future.

MILITARY CADET TRAINING AT THE I. M. A.

BY MAJOR A. J. WILSON, M.C.

The Rifle Brigade.

THERE has been considerable discussion since the end of the late war regarding the form and scope of officer training. Extra emphasis has been thrown on this topic by the re-opening in February 1946 of the Indian Military Academy, and in January 1947 of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. It is therefore worth while considering the methods by which officer qualities are developed, and to consider how far current methods are an advance on those obtaining before the war.

PRE-WAR CADET TRAINING.—Before 1939 the emphasis in cadet training at the I. M. A. was on turning out officers moulded to a pattern and with rigid and arbitrary standards. The cadet was trained to and by definite standards, with departure from orthodoxy not encouraged by the directing staff and also actively discouraged by public opinion on the part of the mass of cadets themselves. Much of the training was stereotyped (inevitably since separated by a gulf of nearly twenty years from the reality of a major war) and tended to produce conventional military thought. Little attempt was made to direct the cadet over a wide field of study—the object was a platoon commander, well turned out and well set up but without emphasis on intellectual aspirations or ambitions.

At the same time it cannot be denied that the old system, if on occasions wasteful and possibly unduly rigid in its application, yet produced many high quality officers with the basic military virtues. It would surely be the greatest error to criticise adversely and arbitrarily a system of military education which produced leaders with the qualities of many fine commanders during the late war. Nevertheless the old system, based as it tended to be on the theory that "leaders are born, not made", was often unduly wasteful. Training tended to be along "make or break" lines, and there can be little doubt but that much good material fell by the wayside during training.

MODERN TRAINING TO MAKE OFFICERS, NOT TO BREAK CADETS.—The emphasis on training at the I. M. A. is now on "making officers" and not "breaking cadets". The staff are trained to regard the withdrawal of a cadet as in a sense a mark of their own failure in a particular case. It is important that this basic approach to the problem should be realised and fully appreciated throughout the Army, though it must not be forgotten that a percentage, however small, of cadets will inevitably lack the basic mental or physical qualities which go to make up an officer. No system of cadet selection, however scientific, can be expected wholly to overcome this difficulty.

MODERN PROGRESS REPORTING.—Previously the system of reporting at the military academies both in India and the U. K. had as its primary object to determine only whether or not a cadet was fit to be commissioned. The cadet's grading was arrived at by the reporting officer expressing his opinion on the cadet's work. This *opinion* tended to be mainly intuitive, and may consequently often have been inevitably personal and arbitrary.

Three fundamental changes have now been made with the introduction of the modern and scientific system of reporting at the Indian Military Academy :

- (a) Instructors are trained to ensure that the object of progress reporting is to develop the character of the cadet. The cadet is shown his weak points and at the same time the manner in which he can strive to rectify them. The emphasis in fact is on looking forward to success and improvement, and not on the study of past failures.
- (b) Personality and character are divided scientifically into seven simply-defined factors. Assessment thus becomes objective, deliberate and comparative, and arbitrary subjective reporting is excluded. It is of course recognised that no system dealing with human beings can be expected to work infallibly in the case of every single individual, and full play must consequently be allowed to personal factors. The scientific system does however make certain that every aspect of a cadet's character is fully covered and ensures that personal prejudice on the part of instructors is largely offset.
- (c) The key-note of this progress reporting system is the cadet's periodical interview by his officer. This interview is informal and takes place in the officer's room or in the garden of his bungalow. The cadet is informed of his shortcomings and told how to rectify them. The object of the interview is to make certain that the cadet understands what progress he is making and to encourage him to put right his known shortcomings. It has been found that cadets genuinely look forward to these periodical interviews, and that uncertainty in the minds of the cadets as to whether or not they are making progress is to a large extent removed.

There can be no doubt but that the introduction of this scientific system of progress reporting has paid immense dividends. It is both interesting and encouraging to note that a "follow up" by the Selection of Personnel Directorate of cadets who attended the first course at the I. M. A. revealed that final gradings given by the I. M. A. coincided 95% with those given by the Selection Boards at their interviews of cadets before they joined the army.

MILITARY TRAINING AT THE I. M. A.

The object of training at the I. M. A. is to ensure that each cadet shall acquire the mental, moral and physical attributes essential to his progressive and continued development as an officer of the regular forces, and that he shall also gain the basic military knowledge and educational background essential to all officers *whatever their arm or branch of the service may be.*

To this end, cadets will—

- (a) be imbued with leadership qualities.
- (b) be given broad general basic education, both military and academic.
- (c) be trained to a high standard of physical fitness and endurance.
- (d) be given a high sense of duty, honour, purpose and service.
- (e) be made to realise the responsibilities of holding a commission in the regular forces.
- (f) be led to achieve an enthusiasm sufficient to ensure their own future unaided study of military subjects and general world affairs,

LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND THE "OBJECT—PLUS."—Having regard to this object, leadership training is *implicit* in every period of the programme at the I. M. A. and in all activities, both on and off parade. Instructors are trained to be constantly on the lookout for new methods of developing these qualities. In addition to being *implicit* in all training, leadership training is also *explicit* in the syllabus, *i.e.* special training camps and exercises take place, which are designed to develop powers of command and especially the qualities of initiative, physical and mental endurance, and self-reliance. Furthermore, a considerable number of periods are devoted to military instructor training, which directly develops self-confidence and personality.

The distinction between leadership training implicit in the syllabus and explicit leadership training is well exemplified by the difference between a normal training period in man management and a period of military instructor training. The object of the former period may be to teach the cadet the man management techniques employed in taking over a company from another officer, but it will also have as its "object plus" the task of developing leadership qualities. These might be developed in this case by making the cadet prepare notes for and deliver a talk to his company or in some similar manner.

Every single period of military training at the I. M. A. has this dual object—the basic object of the lesson and the no less important "object plus". Military instructor training on the other hand is explicit leadership training. It is specifically designed to develop leadership qualities in which the cadet is assessed as he instructs by his own class on a scientifically designed form covering all aspects of leadership in an instructor.

DIRECTION OF TRAINING.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that all training at the I.M.A. is directed not so much to the mere acquiring of knowledge and skills, but in the main to the development of a cadet's character and personality. The object in fact is to allow the spontaneous and constructive aspects of personality to grow and bear full fruit. The principles upon which this object depends for its successful fulfilment are largely psychological and were introduced into the Army by Brigadier Stephenson, late Consulting Psychologist to the War Office.

It may here reasonably be argued that cadets, even if they know what the qualities of personality and character are, are not in fact likely to put them into practice, for as General PATTON in his notes "Helpful Hints to Hopeful Heroes" says: "All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience". This is both a fair and a valid argument. The mere recapitulation of officer qualities achieves little or nothing. The development of officer qualities is a long process and can only be achieved by making character development the basis of the whole regime—on and off parade—at the Academy. Towards the end of the course remarkable results are seen to develop from this policy.

SCIENTIFIC DIVISION OF OFFICER QUALITIES.—It is perhaps worth while studying the scientific division of officer qualities. A human personality can be divided into the following seven factors with a view to assessing his potentiality as a leader:—

W—Will power, sense of responsibility, sense of duty, determination.

M—Maturity (approach to human affairs, tolerance, judgment).

S—Self development—ability to mix well, tact, initiative.

A—Application to any task, enthusiasm, energy, keenness, and "Go".

K—Knowledge, skills, and techniques.

C—Confidence in himself.

L—Leadership techniques which are capable of being taught.

'W' *Qualities*.—"W" is CHARACTER, as exemplified in persistence of motives and in motivation in general. It includes TOUGHNESS and ENDURANCE, but is more particularly concerned with RELIABILITY, FRANKNESS, SELF-RELIANCE, and a healthy independence both of action and of view. The secret of developing 'W' qualities is to teach the cadet why he undertakes the various forms of training.

Motivation in fact is made the core and essence of all training. This is achieved in many ways—by interest, by giving the cadet "goals" to achieve, by instilling the competitive spirit into training and by keeping the cadet constantly "in the picture" as to the reason behind all his activities. All efforts in training are directed by this principle of motive.

"A" *Qualities*.—Side by side with "W" comes "A"—ACTIVITY. This covers ENTHUSIASM and an energetic approach to military matters. Dash, the fighting spirit, ENERGY, Go—all are classed under the head of "A". Again, the development of these qualities is governed by the over-riding principle of motivation. It remains true to say in cadet training as in anything else that "you can drive a horse to water but you cannot make him drink".

Cadets are taught that their aim is to become modern professional soldiers and to appreciate that no soldier can be either modern or professional unless he makes a serious study of his profession. It is stressed that the opportunity of education which cadets get at the I.M.A. is unlikely to recur again throughout their service.

Company and platoon commanders are trained to take a personal and close interest in the work of their cadets, and great use is made in this connection of the tutorial system and of Private Business periods (a system of training copied from Eton College and adapted for military purposes).

PRIVATE BUSINESS PERIODS.

It is perhaps of value to examine in rather more detail the adaptation of Private Business periods for military purposes. Once a week the platoon commander is confronted with his platoon, and given a completely spare period with no programmed activity. The platoon commander may decide to talk to his platoon for ten to fifteen minutes on some topic of local or wider importance, and at end of his talk to throw the discussion open to the platoon. He may go through some aspect of military training which his platoon find difficult, or he may prefer to initiate a discussion on—for example—the class composition of units in the Indian Army.

Opportunity is also taken in these periods to "highlight" important aspects of training, and to direct cadets spare time activity and reading. In the case of the ex-University graduate it may, for example, be necessary to direct him on to the games field: in that of the ex-K. G. R. I. M. schoolboy to

encourage him to additional spare time work to make up academic leeway. In each case the direction of spare time activity is all important, and forms perhaps the most vital function of Private Business.

Subjects and methods vary with the character and interests of different platoon commanders, but the atmosphere remains essentially informal; in order to ensure informality officers use the gardens of their bungalows or the shade of a tree on the cricket ground as locations for these periods. There can be no doubt but that Private Business periods afford a valuable opportunity for the building up of the personal touch between officers and cadets, which plays such a vital part in developing leadership qualities.

Background Motive.—There is no passing out examination at the Academy, in contrast to universities, schools, and most other institutions of this nature all over the world. The main reason for holding an examination is to ensure that students do in fact cover the syllabus assigned to them. It must, however, be remembered that the task of the I.M.A. is not so much to teach knowledge and skills as to develop leadership qualities. The introduction of an examination at the I.M.A. would have the effect of making cadets devote more of their time to study than to games, hobbies, and outdoor activities. This would be contrary to the basic object, which is to develop the cadet's character and personality.

Experience in the past has been that many Indian boys are motivated considerably by anxiety, fear, apprehension of their future, and instabilities of a social kind. This form of motivation is implicit in the educational system of the country, and is not the fault of the boy himself. It will however be agreed that it forms an unsatisfactory background motive for the Army officer. The object of training at the I.M.A. is to replace fear and anxiety by FREE DEVELOPMENT. By this means it will be possible to produce young officers with a broad outlook, who will be capable of basing judgment and decisions on reason instead of on mere tradition and prejudice.

Qualities "M" and "S".—Quality "S" stands for SPONTANEITY—for a certain imaginative quality of mind. It embraces INITIATIVE, RELIANCE and ADAPTABILITY. It does not mean being imaginative in the bad sense of being over-imaginative, or the limited one of being merely clever or quick in the uptake. It consists rather of the quality of mental and emotional constructive activity. The man with highly developed "S" and "M" qualities has a sound standard of values, truly well developed, and is capable of living in full measure both as an individual and as a member of a group.

"S" qualities are developed in the young officer by training him to be apperceptive to military matters. He must learn to distinguish instinctively between the good, the bad, and the merely indifferent, and to recognise at the same time that only 100% standards are of any value.

Cadets are trained to do everything possible for themselves through playlets, discussions, the preparation of their own schemes and exercises, the running of their own clubs, hobbies, the messes, and entertainments. Cadets must be trained to apply knowledge genuinely, and not merely to absorb or store it away uselessly in the mind. The mind must never be regarded as an absorptive sponge in which the instructors pour the water of knowledge or skill.

Military Apperception.—As already stated earlier in this paper, modern cadet training is concerned not so much with the acquiring of mere skills and techniques as with the building up in the cadet of an apperception to things military. Apperception in the military sense means a sensitiveness to military affairs—alertness, acuteness and shrewdness where all aspects of the profession of arms are concerned.

If, for example, one goes for a walk with a naturalist, he will notice without any special effort on his part rare birds and plants as they occur, even though the general tenor of the conversation may be totally different. This is because he is apperceptive to these things, specially trained and subconsciously keyed up to notice them.

In the same way the soldier must become apperceptive to things military, to dead ground, to the suitability of a particular road for a Sherman tank, to good and bad administration, and so on. It is the development of these qualities that is the primary task of a cadet training establishment.

Its Development in Cadets.—This quality of military perception in cadets is developed not by “cramming” the officer aspirant with masses of detailed knowledge, but by teaching him the broad principles on which the efficiency of a modern army is based. In tactical training—for example—the emphasis is not on the learning by heart of rigid tactical drills but on instilling the idea that tactics are no more than applied common-sense.

The problems which confront the leading scout on a reconnaissance patrol are in many ways very similar to those which face a gamekeeper walking down a hedgerow trying to shoot a rabbit. Again, in studying military law the cadet is taught the basic principles which underly any code of law, and also the factors which make it necessary for the army to have its own system superimposed on the sanctions of the ordinary civil law.

This insistence on first principles ensures that detailed training in any subject (for example tactical training at the Infantry School after commissioning) is based on a firm foundation of common-sense and understanding, not as so often before the war on mere tacit acceptance of military dogma and formulas.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT.

It will be appreciated that it is often difficult to reconcile the conflicting claims of knowledge and the development of leadership qualities, for there is certain basic information without which the ex-cadet is imperfectly equipped to take his place as a commissioned officer. Consider for example the teaching of military abbreviations. It is essential for an officer to know the principles of and the necessity for using these, but there is no need at this stage to attempt the task of learning the pamphlet on military abbreviations off by heart. If the officer product is in fact apperceptive to things military, he will absorb the common abbreviations during his first year of service as a junior officer in a regiment, and in any case when the time comes for him to attend a course at the Tactical School or to read for the Staff College.

In strong distinction to the learning by heart of the pamphlet on military abbreviations can be placed the technique of issuing verbal orders. Cadets cannot be given too much practice in this respect, since the issue of verbal orders develops self-confidence, a vital leadership quality. It must

constantly be borne in mind that the task of the I.M.A. is not so much to fill its students with knowledge, as to develop in them those imponderable character qualities upon which as a foundation it will be the task of other G.H.Q. schools of instruction and of unit C. Os. to build a sound edifice of military knowledge.

MAN MANAGEMENT.

Instruction in man management forms, as might be expected, a focal point of the I.M.A. syllabus. The object of man management training at the Academy is:—

“To impress on the cadet the vital and continuous part played by efficient administration in the welfare and contentment of troops in peace and in the field, and to give him sustained instruction in man management techniques and in the practical handling of human problems”.

It should be noted that training in this subject is closely related to the department of organisation and administration, the object of which training is—

“To impress on the cadet the vital importance of administration, in all its aspects, in the Army, the unending responsibility that will fall on him in this respect throughout his service, and the necessity for constant forethought and initiative on his part to improve the administrative machinery of his command.”

Having regard to the close relation between man management and administration, the greater part of the periods allotted to this subject are devoted to practical problems with which the cadets are likely to be faced as young officers. For example, cadets are given practice in talking to troops, in giving advice to troops in family allotments, and in giving practical advice on resettlement problems. These are but a few instances of the practical problems which cadets are practised in approaching.

GAMES.—Games have an important part to play in the building of the young officer's mind and body. Not only do they afford ample opportunity for the co-ordinated working of mind and body, but they also afford an “object plus” of developing qualities of leadership and co-operation.

The management of games is so far as possible delegated to cadets themselves, and cadets are also taught to referee and organise the games which will be played by the men they are to command in future. Games are primarily to be enjoyed and although therefore good turnout, punctuality, and sound organisation are insisted upon, an “off duty” atmosphere is encouraged and officers are not allowed to employ games as an additional opportunity for assessing cadets.

RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY TO EDUCATIONAL TRAINING.

It must not be forgotten in a survey of the military training at the I.M.A. that purely educational training forms approximately 45% of the overall syllabus. It should be emphasised that the military and academic wings do not work in watertight compartments, but both programmes are carefully interlocked and related. For example, the study of military history is related to that of political and economic history, while academic periods as well as military are also approached from the standpoint of the “object plus”.

Further close liaison between the academic and military wings is ensured by the attachment of academic instructors to the various companies for the purpose of such activities as games and private business. This ensures that academic instructors do not become mere school-masters with no interest in the work of cadets outside the class-room.

DRILL.

It would not be appropriate to conclude a paper on cadet training without referring to the part played by ceremonial drill in developing officer qualities. It is on the parade ground that are set the standards which obtain in all training at the Academy, for it is on the drill square that the cadet learns that perfection is the only sound standard or target for an officer. It is here that the cadet learns that cleanliness and smartness by his standards when he joins as a civilian are mere shoddy mediocrity when judged by those of a professional soldier.

He learns also the place of ceremonial drill in a modern army—in particular the unique opportunity it affords for allowing a unit to express and demonstrate its corporate spirit. Cadets are also practised in drilling a squad and in the technique of giving a correct word of command, both of which types of training play an important part in increasing self-confidence and determination.

It is upon the maintenance of high standards of drill and discipline that an officer training establishment stands or falls, for it is in these matters that the pace is set for all other activities. The standards set at the I.M.A. will remain with the young officer all his service—it is for the drill square to ensure that the standards absorbed are those of perfection.

SERVICEMEN'S FAMILIES.

Investigation teams composed of an officer, V.C.Os, N.C.Os and 20 I.O.Rs are being sent out by Regimental Centres in the East Punjab to contact the families of soldiers, sailors and airmen. The teams carry postcards and envelopes to the families whereby they can give their relatives first-hand news of their welfare. News is also conveyed by the parties to the Information Bureau in A. H. Q. (India), to which office servicemen anxious about their families may also send inquiries. News of the welfare of the serviceman's family is also broadcast from All India Radio.

MEDICAL AID TO REFUGEES.

The Indian Army Medical Services have made available a large number of beds, equipment and nursing staff for the treatment of refugees in Delhi and the East Punjab. Surgical teams have been working in Jullundur, and medical officers in all the disturbed areas have been placed at the disposal of the Civil authorities.

THINGS PEOPLE SAY AND WRITE

"I am an optimist out and out. I always hope for the best".—*Mahatma Gandhi*.

"Envy and malice are always snapping at the heels of eminence".—*Sir James Grigg*.

"Work is something to be proud of, not merely a means of earning money".—*Mr. Max Ritson*.

"The Indian Ocean has become the greatest strategic centre of the world".—*Viscount Templewood*.

"Bombay police have instructions to be on the look-out for rumour-mongers and to prosecute them".—"The Statesman".

"We are facing a refugee problem of a magnitude unparalleled in the history of the world".—*The Jam Sahib of Nawanagar*.

"The British Commonwealth of Nations is not so much a single act of statecraft as a miracle of faith".—*Princess Elizabeth*.

"I am the mechanic who keeps the car running, but I do not sit in the driver's seat and turn the wheel".—*H. E. Viscount Mountbatten*.

"The Covenant of the League of Nations was content with 26 articles. The Charter of the United Nations runs to 111".—*Mr. Wilson Harris, M.P.*

"The world calls the present time an economic crisis, but fundamentally it is religious. There can be no economic recovery till we get the moral basis right".—*The Bishop of Southwell*.

"The Indian and British armies killed more Japanese in Burma than the Allies destroyed in the rest of the anti-Japanese theatres combined".—*Mr. Don Iddon, "Daily Mail"*.

"The total of men and women discharged from the British armed forces and auxiliary and nursing services from June, 1945 to the end of March, 1947 was 4,422,820".—*British Ministry of Labour and National Service*.

"During the late War 125 ships totalling 700,000 tons were sunk by enemy action in South African waters. The worst period was in 1942, when in two months packs of U-boats sank 52 vessels there".—*R. N. announcement in South Africa*.

"The spiritual is unlimited. There is any amount of it. One brave man in a company does not use up all the courage that there is. He actually increases the amount of what is there, because courage is infectious".—*Dr. S. C. Carpenter*.

"Let us not concentrate on mutual fault-finding, but on mutual assistance. Bitterness, sorrow and distress, and the seemingly slow pace of progress should be submerged by the over-riding need for concerted action. Let us get on with the job".—*Sardar Patel*.

"For method, planning and almost perfect sanitation give me a military camp. It gives valuable lessons in discipline, an exact time table containing provision for every useful activity. There is almost pin drop silence in such camps".—*Mahatma Gandhi*.

"Radar can beat the weather by eliminating from travel the risks of fog and other hazards of bad visibility. The air liner, while still many miles from the ground station, can be given by radar a particular track on which to come in, and can be guided along that track all the way in."—*Sir Stafford Cripps, M.P.*

"That Indian minds are now enriched by constitutional methods for reconciling liberty is the result of quiet, persistent work, maintained for generations, of British men and women who under the Indian sun and at the sacrifice of domestic happiness did their duty unflinchingly. The British official in India was, like the British climate, more than trying at times but very healthy to live with".—*The London "Times"*.

"We have spent in two wars the accumulations from hundreds of years of effort in defending not so much our territory but our soul and the liberty of the world. But if anybody in the world has got it in his head that Britain is down and out, please get it out. We have genius, science and productive capacity and while we have paid the price I prophesy that in a few years we shall be back where we have been hitherto".—*Mr. Ernest Bevin, M.P., British Foreign Secretary.*

"The root of revenge is in the weakness of the soul; the most timorous are the most addicted to it. The man who meditates on revenge is not content with the mischief he has received. . . . Murder for an injury arises only from cowardice; he who inflicts it fears that the enemy may live and revenge himself. The revengeful is feared; and therefore hated. Nothing is so easy as to revenge an offence; but nothing is so honourable as to pardon it".—*From some writings found in Lhasa, Tibet, two hundred years ago, and written centuries before in the language of the ancient Brahmins.*

"American tactics in the late War bore a close resemblance to a game of American football. Once the Americans had made a hole in the enemy's line, American armour seemed expert at broken field running. Russians fought as if they were playing a game of chess; it was intellectual and it was ruthless; they thought many moves ahead of the actual play. The way the British acted always made us think of cricket. Their game of war was interminably characterised by feats of individual skill and intermissions for tea. The British played war as if it was cricket in the right costumes and with good manners. The Germans? They lost the war because war wasn't a game of any kind to them. They took war too seriously".—*Mr. Ralph Ingersoll, in "Top Secret."*

"After the war R.A.F. teams searched in Burma for the crews of 300 odd aircraft which crashed there during the War. In spite of the difficulties, the teams succeeded in ascertaining the fate of about 200 men of the 1,000 or so known to be missing." "The area in which the least success was achieved is the very thickly wooded and high ground along the Indo-Burmese and Assam-Burmese borders. Some 50 crashes remain outstanding in those areas, and in view of the lack of positive information as to their location it is feared improbable that they will, ever be found". "In addition to their work in Burma the teams also searched parts of Siam and French Indo-China where several crashes were known to have occurred. All the aircraft that crashed in Siam were located, and two of the four known to have crashed in Indo-China were found".—*"Australian Newsletter."*

WHAT IS THE REAL VALUE OF L. R. P. ?*

By "EXPERIENTIA DOCET".

THE SUNDRY tasks performed by Long Range Penetration Groups have been widely publicised, not always with too strict a regard for the truth. The blowing-up of bridges, wrecking of trains, laying of ambushes—all these activities have a sensational appeal as operations which inflict damage and casualties on the enemy at low cost to ourselves. A raconteur requires no great skill to see that such stories do not lose in the telling.

Yet the truth is that such operations present no great difficulty in themselves, and can be easily handled by any commander of average competence. The real difficulty lies in getting the necessary troops and equipment into such a position that strokes of this kind are possible and, once they are there, in maintaining them and in controlling them. Any boxer can hit hard; the winner is he who knows how to get under his opponent's guard.

Guerrilla operations are, of course, nothing new, but controlled guerrilla operations on a large scale in a foreign country definitely are—or were—something right out of the hat. It was the late General Wingate who first saw how modern developments in communications and in transport aircraft could make such operations possible.

Previously guerrillas had always been limited to comparatively small parties, unco-ordinated by any centralised control. Now portable wireless sets with a wide range make control possible from a central headquarters in the Field, and with the development of supply-dropping techniques the size of Groups or Columns is limited only by considerations of control within themselves, allied to the necessity for adequate striking power. And the number of Columns is limited only by the number of men available, and by the number of aircraft to feed them.

Once these fundamental facts were grasped, during the late War, it remained only to devise a means of getting Columns into their operational areas. It was first done by infiltration through enemy lines. In the thick country of Upper Burma large bodies of men could move undetected through the jungle thus penetrating to the vulnerable vitals in the rear. The method was slow and was discarded when a better method was found.

Thus although the "Chindits'" operations in 1943 and 1944 were brilliant successes from an administrative point of view, it was not achieved without great expenditure of effort and material. The real point at issue is whether the actual operations of the Chindits justified the immense trouble and expense of getting them there and maintaining them once in position, and whether the large number of troops used would not have served a more useful purpose in lending additional weight to the main thrust.

* This article was written in 1944, the author having served in both the first Wingate expedition of 1943 and of 1944. Though the article was written before the operations of 1945, its contents provide much valuable knowledge for use in the future.

The possibilities of L. R. P. are tremendous. Numerous Columns operating behind enemy lines can, given good leadership and good conditions, play hell with any L. of C. They can disrupt and even block it altogether for considerable periods, draw troops away from the front line or divert others on their way there, inflict heavy casualties by ambushes, and make use of local information and personnel reconnaissance to give aerial targets to parent air forces.

Nothing is more disturbing for an enemy than to feel himself liable to attack at all times and in all places. Nothing is worse for the morale of front line troops than to feel that they are cut off from their main bases. Troops "looking over their shoulders" are already more than half-way to defeat.

It may be said that the Japanese are peculiarly subject to the effects of a cut and harassed L. of C., since they are dependent on supplies which have to travel by land. Other Powers have transport aircraft to supply troops otherwise cut off; but Japanese efforts at this type of maintenance were ineffectual and on a small scale. The Japanese soldier is said to be able to exist on next to nothing; this is a half-truth. He still needs rice to eat and ammunition to fire, and though in Burma he safeguarded himself by an extensive system of dumps, the operations of the Chindits in the Mu Valley caused him considerable physical suffering and mental anxiety. The 36 Division advancing to Indaw saw proof of this. Numerous men who had died of starvation were seen; prisoners were in a grievous state of undernourishment. The mills of L.R.P. may grind slowly, but they grind exceedingly small.

Where does this lead us? The answer is that without a follow-up, operations of L.R.P. lead us nowhere. After a certain time L.R.P. troops have to withdraw, and then the effects of it are wasted. The enemy is given time to recover, physically and mentally. L. R. P.G's are essentially supporting arms, like artillery and aircraft, to make the task of the main attacking infantry easier. The only immediate difference is that L.R.P. operates against the enemy's L. of C., while other supporting arms in the main have as their target his fighting troops.

Thus the main administrative and tactical pre-requisites of the successful prosecution of L.R.P. are clear. But there are certain additional conditions to be fulfilled before Columns can operate successfully. First and foremost, it is essential that the natives be friendly; without good intelligence no Columns can hope to get far, for hostile locals will betray its movements to the enemy and a Column waylaid on the march is a Column that has "had it." No body of 350 men carrying 60-lb. packs and marching in single file with 80 mules can hope to put up much of a show if attacked. Those who feel inclined to scoff at this are cordially invited to try it and see.

Conversely a Column will get no information of the enemy, and will therefore have difficulty in finding tasks to perform. It is not much use ambushing one road if the enemy is using another, and the natives will always know which road he is using. In Burma a Column without a detachment of Burma Rifles was like a ship without a compass.

Secondly, L.R.P. is feasible only in thick country, in which Columns can conceal their movements, otherwise it becomes impossible to achieve surprise. Thirdly, there must be few roads capable of taking M.T., as this confers superior mobility upon the enemy, who is in a position to concentrate superior forces. Finally, fine weather is vital to operations of this nature.

Upper Burma, the venue for Chindit operations for two years, provided those conditions for at least six months of each year. It was thus peculiarly suited to such ventures. It is, in fact, probably truer to say that L.R.P. was fashioned to suit fighting in Upper Burma than to suggest that the theory of L.R.P. was evolved *per se* and then tried out in Upper Burma because the latter was a suitable venue.

What did the achievements of the Chindits amount to ? The first of the two expeditions was carried out by Brigadier Wingate in 1943 with one Brigade of eight Columns, each about the size of half a battalion. Within itself it contained all sorts and conditions of men—a Company of Infantry, gunners, sappers, signallers, recce elements, interpreters and a Doctor with his medical orderlies.

Every officer and man carried his personal belongings and food (up to eight days rations) on his back, while unit equipment, such as wireless sets, mortars, heavy machine guns, “pyats,” flame-throwers, reserve ammunition and medical paniers were carried by mules. There were also a few horses and some bullocks. There were *no* (as was reported in certain publications) elephants, bloodhounds, canaries, carrier pigeons or falcons. At all halts of any length a Column would be in touch with its tactical Brigade H. Q. in the Field and with Rear Brigade at Air Base.

The only restriction on its activities were Supply Drops every six days. Otherwise it was, as Wingate conceived it, free and independent. The idea looked good on paper, and, in fact it was not a bad one on the ground. Like most units it was found in the event to have too long a tail and too small a body.

The story of the 1943 expedition is common knowledge and a subject of controversy. In retrospect it takes its place as an experiment rather than as a serious military operation, and this can be said without detracting from the many stirring individual efforts it evoked. It harassed the enemy and did a certain amount of physical damage ; but it was not followed up, and consequently what damage it did was quickly repaired. It was simply, in fact, an illustration of Wingate's theories.

It served to show for the first time in that theatre that, by wireless and aircraft, individual bodies of troops could be controlled and maintained even in an area so vast and so wild as Upper Burma. From the time Wingate and the other survivors returned in May, 1943, guerrilla operations on a large and organised scale, *i.e.*, L.R.P., were very definitely on the map.

Technically, many lessons were learnt. Most important was that the wireless sets then used left something to be desired ; as a result in 1944 we were equipped with the comparatively ancient, though hardy and reliable, 22 Set. The importance of radio communication cannot, of course, be over-estimated. In the theoretical edifice of L.R.P. it is the principal pillar. Without it supplies cannot be called for, nor can movements of Columns be co-ordinated. It was therefore a matter of some surprise to me, at any rate, to find that although room had been found in each Column for a Padre and an R.A.F. officer, there was no signal officer.

The experiences of 1943 also served as a basis for training in preparation for the next campaign. This was less fortunate, for although many important things had been learnt, they formed, by and large, a misleading basis for the next year's operations. Broadly speaking, in 1943 the 77 Brigade were kept on the run and forced to employ sundry “avoiding” techniques, all of which were laboriously learnt for employment in 1944. But by that time the boot was on the other foot. We then had the force to chase the Japs, so that not only were the “avoiding” techniques obsolete in themselves, but they also induced an altogether wrong attitude.

After his 1943 expedition, Wingate was invited to the Quebec Conference of that year. An erratic, often brilliant and always both a forceful and persuasive personality, he there persuaded the Allied Chiefs of the effectiveness of this new type of warfare. As a result, he was given six Brigades for his new Special Force, composed of British troops, with a smattering of Gurkhas. In addition, a most interesting development, he was given a small Air Force known as the 1st. Air Commando Group, under an American officer with a devil-may-care reputation—Colonel Cochran, of the U. S. A. A. F.

All in all, Special Force was a powerful combination, and to Wingate it must have seemed that the sky was the limit. But was the transfer of so much in the way of men and material justified? To answer that we must look to its achievements. Before doing so, however, the two main innovations inherent in the use of the new Force—the Air Component and the flying-in of troops with its concomitant "Fortress" system—present such interesting and novel features as to be worthy of a short examination.

Colonel Cochran was an officer with a manner equally as persuasive as that of Wingate, and in character almost as ruthless. "The R.A.F. only tell you what they can't do; we tell you what we will do"* is perhaps his most typical remark, while his famous comment on the loading of gliders: "The limit's the floor" is in the same strain. Even though in the event many gliders crashed and some tow-ropes broke through overloading, the value of such forceful ways is evident enough. Colonel Cochran belonged to a school which got things done, and that at least was refreshing.

His Group consisted of a squadron or two of Mustang fighters, Mitchell medium bombers and about a hundred light planes and some C. 47s. The Mustangs and Mitchells were for close support, and were held on call for Columns. Between the calling and the getting, however, there was a great gulf fixed. The normal allotment for close support was three Mitchells and four Mustangs, the former only if one was lucky.

Since jungle targets are not visible from the air, the idea was that they should be pin-pointed for the aircraft by mortar smoke fired by the Column or Columns taking part, whereupon the area of the smoke was bombed and strafed. Here again theory outstripped practice. When it came to the point it was not so simple. Neither was the target always accurately indicated, nor did the bomb always fall on the smoke, while the Japs soon learnt to add to the confusion by firing smoke back.

Although this had been foreseen, and it had been decided in such an eventuality to use coloured smoke, provision had not kept pace with planning and in the event no coloured smoke was available. In such case, although we were normally in touch with the air on the ground-to-air set, one could never be quite sure that all doubt had been eliminated as to which smoke was which; consequently air support came to be regarded as a two-edged weapon. To some, indeed, the game did not seem worth the candle. Fortunately or unfortunately, the problem solved itself; the aircraft were seldom forthcoming anyway, so people gave up asking for them and started sending rude messages instead.

But this was not the most interesting of the Air components activities. By means of their light planes they were our only means of evacuation of sick and casualties, and as such they assumed a high importance. To men in battle

* The author has since remarked that later, under monsoon conditions, it was the R.A.F. who took risks to bring the Chindits their supplies when the U.S.A.A.F. considered that flying conditions were too bad.

the importance of the evacuation of wounded cannot be over-emphasised. Before the 1944 campaign great stress had been made that that facility would be made available. The intention was that these light aircraft should be called for by Columns and that they would then come and land on the impromptu strip, taking casualties out with them.

On the whole, so long as weather conditions were reasonable, the system worked well, though sundry snags were encountered. First, which was unavoidable, was the fact that there were never enough of these machines; second, which was avoidable, was the unsatisfactory working of communications. For some reason, H. Q. Light planes (a) failed, for considerable periods, to keep their set open for requests, and (b) operated not only on an unsuitable wave-length but in some fanciful and quite unnecessary map reference code involving a moonrise table, which few possessed.

To illustrate this point, it took us on one occasion four days to get a Light plane when we were but 15 miles from where they were based. We then had a man with acute appendicitis, and it was feared his appendix would burst. This it ultimately did, and the doctor performed an emergency operation—on a bamboo table and by the light of our Aldis lamps, for peritonitis. Finally, a Light plane did arrive, and took him away but it is doubtful whether he survived. As this happened early on, and human life had not by that time become cheap, this incident created a profound impression on all concerned.

Nevertheless the Light planes did their stuff well. Some of their pilots performed miraculous feats of landing and taking off from incredible strips. There were faults on both sides, and some Columns asked the impossible in the strips which they made. Many planes crashed thereby, and the number of available planes became less. They were also used to drop, and to take out, light stores, such as medical supplies and radio components. Altogether they were a great success, and many men owe their lives to the skill of their pilots. Although Colonel Cochran's promise that his light planes would always be "right behind you, boys, just back of the nearest hill" was hardly fulfilled, such a high degree of proximity was of course unnecessary. As a rule, provided one got sufficiently agitated, they put in an appearance when required.

The flying-in of troops and establishing landing strips as "fortresses" was the second main novel feature of the 1944 campaign. The idea simply represented another aspect of Wingate's realisation of the immense strategic possibilities of air power. A clearing was selected from the air, tactical and topographical factors being taken into account. A body of men—approximately a battalion—with engineers were then landed at night by a glider, and with them came sufficient heavy equipment, including bull dozers, to construct a makeshift airstrip.

By the following night the strip was ready for Dakotas, complete with landing lights, ground-to-air signals, etc., the only limit on the number of troops to be landed then being the number of planes available. This was what happened at the famous "Broadway," where about 500 men were landed by glider one night and 82 Dakotas came in and took off the following night.

There were a lot of crashes and casualties the first night, this being due partly to the inexperience of many of the glider pilots and partly to the fact that the gliders were overloaded, but the determination of the men on the spot was sufficient to see the thing through. The chaos and confusion of that first night was in contrast to the remarkable spectacle 24 hours later. Only those

actually there can adequately describe the extraordinary impression created by the brilliant lights and constant roar of motors against the initial weird hostility of that distant jungle.

A feature of the whole operation just as amazing as its actual achievement was the lack of enemy air opposition. The whole business was a night-fighter's dream; the Dakotas went in unescorted and unarmed. The Jap was obviously taken utterly by surprise, for although similar operations continued for about a month he at no time offered effective air resistance. But credit must go where credit is due, and much of it must be accorded to the bombers which for some time previously had been hitting at enemy airfields, and were thus probably responsible more than any other one factor for the state of affairs.

Resistance on the ground was not to be expected, our propaganda merchants notwithstanding. Upper Burma covers an exceedingly wide area. The enemy could not garrison every mile of it, and the strips were always a long way from civilisation. From the enemy's point of view, such landings had to be nipped absolutely in the bud or not at all. There is no doubt in my mind that if the strip had been immediately attacked the landing would have failed. "Broadway" was attacked but once, and that some weeks after it had been established. By then the defences were in order, consolidation was virtually completed, and the attack was beaten off with heavy losses to the enemy, close support aircraft being employed to great effect.

The possibilities of attack on these "fortresses" can be accurately gauged only by examining the difficulties from the enemy's point of view. Such attacks involve a high degree of organisation, for the attacking party has not only to move upwards of 50 miles across country, but also has to take with it all their ammunition and food. This means animals. It also means that their operations are strictly limited as to time. They only have a certain amount of ammunition. It is not easy for them.

For instance, it took us months of training to make a Column a workable unit, and we had large resources at our disposal. The Japs had to collect what they could on the spot. Finally, the fortresses were heavily defended by two static columns, assisted by wire and booby-traps, with two others prowling round outside (known as "floater Columns") seeking intelligence of enemy attacks and endeavouring to waylay him.

The "fortresses" provided what L.R.P. had so sadly lacked—a secure base reasonably close at hand. Stocks of food and ammunition were kept there, and there was usually a sort of jungle hospital. It served as a light plane base whence returning casualties did the trip on to India by Dakotas, some of which flew in each night. Tactically, it was also intended as a bait for the enemy, but for reasons already given it was not sufficiently tempting.

This novel method of getting troops into their operational areas represented a very great advance in L.R.P. technique. It was quick and it saved fatigue. It accomplished in a few hours what would otherwise have taken months. The one Brigade which did march in 1944 was utterly exhausted on reaching its first objective, and accordingly failed to do itself justice. But while the physical achievement in the sense of machine-mastery represented by such landings deserves the highest praise, it is the intellectual conception of the whole operation that is most striking. It was the product of an original yet practical mind.

In its new guise, then, L.R.P. was all set for a real try-out in February, 1944. Half the Force had completed their training, and the rest were due to finish theirs in the next month or two. Only a select few, of course, knew the plan, but insofar as it was hinted at to those poor devils who, after all, had to carry it out, it appeared to be as follows.

The general area in which Special Force were to operate was on the Jap road lines of communication running east-west through Pinlebu and Banmauk, while some would also do their stuff in the Kabaw Valley. Some Brigades would march in; those for whom aircraft were available would fly. Everyone, of course, hoped he would fly, though if they had known what they later found out about gliders they might have thought differently. Some time would be given for our operations to take effect after which a direct attack on a broad front would be launched by our troops on the Indo-Burma border. "Then", as Wingate said, "will be the time for the 4th Corps to make a bold advance raft-wise down the Chindwin".

To start with everything went, literally, according to plan. One Brigade went in on foot in February, north via the Indawgyi Lake down towards Indaw, and early in March two more Brigades were flown in to "Broadway" and "Chowringhee", two airstrips. The first Brigade, after some difficult times, was coming along well, and the success of the "Broadway" airstrip had been in excess of everyone's hopes.

Then the Japanese took a hand. The 1943 show had put them on their guard against similar operations in the future, and when they became aware of the presence of three Brigades behind their lines they were not slow to react with a previously prepared plan, which consisted of nothing more or less than the invasion of India.

From the point of view of Special Force this was of profound significance, for it meant that any follow-up by main forces was now out of the question. The strength of the Jap invasion showed that our troops would have enough to do defending India, quite apart from contemplating an offensive themselves. For us in the Special Force it was an anti-climax. It was as though we had been the shells of an intense artillery barrage, and the subsequent attack had been cancelled.

It would have dismayed a lesser man than Wingate, but the latter was not only an able man, but an opportunist withal. He was determined at all costs to get his force into action. He accordingly proclaimed to his men that the Jap invaders were carrying with them only 21 days' rations, and that after the expiry of that period they would of necessity be forced to withdraw. L.R.P. Columns would by that time be waiting for them in their rear, and would pick them off as they came tumbling back.

It sounded just too easy. The unlikelihood of such an eventuality must have been realised only too well by Wingate himself, but this was the best justification he could find for sending his troops in. At any rate, it was said that he used it to such effect that he persuaded the High Command not only to persevere with the original plan but to reinforce it.

Really to have expected a Jap withdrawal within such a short period is almost incredible, and if there was to be no withdrawal, L.R.P. troops, placed as they were, could exercise no function whose utility was proportionate to their strength. The most likely explanation is that the ensuing plan was left to Wingate, whose fertile brain could be trusted to think up something effective,

and it was thus no ordinary disaster which befell Special Force when he was killed in an airplane crash on March 23.

Quickly it became obvious that the Chindits were, or had been, a one-man force. The days which immediately followed his death were a period of confusion and indecision, of schism and doubt, as anyone who was there would confirm. General Lentaigne, Wingate's successor, thus found himself very much in the position of holding someone else's baby. He had to cater for an extremely complex situation not of his own making. The situation called for a fresh appreciation and a fresh plan.

The plan actually evolved was largely a re-hash of the old one, which had been made before the Japanese had radically altered the situation with their attack. At the time it was difficult to see the point of it; in retrospect it is even more so. It commanded no one's confidence. As far as one could gather it was as follows :

Two Brigades were to operate against the road L's of C. running through Pinlebu and Banmauk, while another Brigade was to block the main railway artery in the Mu valley. A fourth Brigade, which had just marched in, was to attack Indaw, while the West African Brigade was split up and used in bits and pieces for odd jobs. Of those operations, only the railway block was a success; the Japs, who were living off dumps in the Upper Chindwin area, were not using the Pinlebu and Banmauk roads, while the Indaw attack failed for other reasons.

The important question concerns the nature of the support we were giving. Were we supporting troops? Whom were we supporting? Clearly, we could have been placed in no position less likely to render assistance to anybody. The two Brigades in the Pinlebu Banmauk area were presumably conducting operations designed to assist 33 Corps on the Imphal front, but they had little effect. The railway block and the Indaw attack could only help General Stilwell's advance down the Ledo Road, but if we had really been out to help Stilwell we would have done far better to go much farther north. To cap it all, we were under the command of 33 Corps.

The situation may be summed up thus : half the Force, which was supposed to help 33 Corps, found itself wrongly placed, while the other half, which could only help Stilwell, would have been able to do so far more effectively elsewhere, and they were both under the over-all command of the formation to which they were of the least value.

Not until two months had passed did some one "get wise", and about mid-May we were placed under Stilwell. The immediate result was—we got orders to move north. But by that time it was too late. Rains would shortly make L.R.P. impossible; men and animals had expended most of their strength in exhausting and ineffective operations in their original areas; many had been evacuated as sick and wounded; and most of the Force were still 100 miles from where they could be of most use to their new formation. By the time we could get there we would have been in Burma for three months—the limit of time for L.R.P. operations which Wingate laid down.

General Stilwell, however, was little acquainted with the theory of L.R.P. To him a fighting man was a fighting man, and if he could get the Chindit to a place quicker than he could get the Chinese—as he usually could—then they got the job. The attack on Mogaung, difficult enough for fresh troops suitably armed is a case in point. If he gave any consideration to the condition of the troops and the conditions under which they had to fight, he did not let it affect his plan.

Unfortunately, neither he nor the Divisional Commander found it possible to visit the troops and see conditions for themselves.

He in fact ordered one Brigade to capture Mogaung, while the other did odd jobs in the Hopin area. One of these latter occupied the ill-fated "Black-pool" block, and the other held the Kyusanlai Pass for three weeks; subsequently, both did some very laborious hill and jungle fighting west of Taungni, harassing the road and railway in the valley as and when they could. In addition the West Africans were re-formed into a Brigade and did some useful work, not of an L.R.P. nature, pushing down south from Mogaung.

For the greater part of these operations the troops concerned were out on their feet. They were physically exhausted and, many of them, mentally demoralised. They had done their stuff and they felt that they were now being sacrificed simply in order to bolster up Stilwell's otherwise flagging drive—flagging, it was (rightly or wrongly) felt, not for want of troops or equipment but because the troops in question lacked the necessary zeal.

Such beliefs, it may be remarked, were not groundless. Ugly rumours also drifted in that the political octopus, which every four years gives birth to a Presidential election in the United States, had stretched out one of its tentacles to this unsavoury area. For "political" reasons, we were told, it was "desirable" to keep British troops fighting in Burma. Men, understandably, prefer to die for greater causes, but the Chindits had no option. Many of them just died anyway.

It is difficult for anyone who has not experienced them to realise the peculiar strain of L.R.P. operations. They are no picnic. The majority of officers and men rarely feel safe at all. The strain of long daily marches with a pack weighing anything from 50 lbs. to 80 lbs. is literally hell. The infantry element in particular have a rough time. In addition to bearing the brunt of the protection of the Columns on the move, they have sundry fatigues to do and are on the perimeter every night.

Sometimes they have to do double sentries, and unless they have a sensible Column commander are up every night for six nights or so guarding and collecting the Supply drop. Most British troops are townsfolk, and the jungle oppresses them with cumulative effect. Men know that unless they get really sick the best they can hope for is a ride on a horse; the ordinary malaria case does his stuff with the rest on foot. Lastly, although the system of evacuation worked well enough while the weather was fine, it ceased once rains had started, except for the much-vaunted and over-publicised visit or two which seaplanes paid to the Indawgi lake. All these things got men down, and the longer they had to endure them, the more they got them down.

Although it is unnecessary to enlarge on the discomforts of living in the open during the rains there, the difficulties, if not the impossibility of guerrilla warfare in the wet weather, need to be pointed out. The difficulties were tactical and administrative. The slipperiness and boggiess of the ground were tactically of first importance. Frequently it was difficult for a man to make his way forward at all, which complicated manoeuvre. Under such conditions the advantage lies with the man who is stationary.

Main targets were in the valleys, which became water-logged, and a noiseless approach was not possible. To the lightly equipped L.R.P. soldier,

who relies on stealth and guile, this was important. In addition, the appalling state of the paths destroyed mobility; to move at all, it was frequently necessary to send Sappers ahead torevet the paths, which meant long and vulnerable halts. Even when on the move, six miles was a damned good day's march.

Administratively, rains meant the onset of disease and deprivation of the means of evacuation of serious cases and of battle casualties. Medically, we experienced a most virulent form of jungle fever, which utterly baffled our doctors, and for which no adequate treatment was available. In the concluding stages we set up an impromptu hospital, but although everything possible was done, men died there at the rate of two a day and there were several suicides.

Many more died on their feet while trying to struggle out in what were euphemistically known as "sick convoys". That this is no querulous complaint is shown by the fact that by the end of the campaign every Column was at less than half its original strength, while in no Column were there more than twenty men whom the doctors would have put in category "A".

In battle, the lack of evacuation had the effect of making commanders cautious about committing men to battle when they knew that a broken leg might mean death. Generally speaking, this one factor had far-reaching effects upon morale, particularly since it had been heavily stressed before we went in that this year (in 1944) such would not be the case. Not unnaturally, the good faith and control of the situation by the responsible commanders came to be called in question.

Such, then, is a brief history of the 1944 campaign. Like many campaigns, past, present and future, it was mostly mess, muddle and mud. The point is that it taught us little of the real value of L.R.P. During the first phase, while we were under command of 33 Corps, the only Chindit operations which substantially assisted anyone were those at and around the Mawlu, or "White City" block.

Even that was too far behind the enemy lines, and while it was on we were under command of a formation other than that which it was supporting. It is worthy of mention that the "White City" block killed 2,000 odd Japanese, and prevented either supplies or men going north for nearly two months. The main factor contributing to its success was the stupidity of the Japanese leadership, which could have reduced it in a week or two with four anti-aircraft guns.

The other operations were ineffectual in so far as they were (a) against unused L's of C and (b) were not followed up. During the second phase, when we came under the command of Stilwell, although the tactical situation was theoretically correct in that our operations were directed against an L. of C. which had to bear the strain of a strong frontal attack, the physical conditions militated strongly against, if they did not make actually impossible, L.R.P. operations.

Nevertheless, the fact that these operations paid a dividend—at a price already indicated—is shown by the speed of the advance of 36 Division. In fact, the first phase tells us practically nothing of what we wanted to know; but the second phase gave us a clear hint. There can be no question that the presence of L.R.P. Brigades in the flanking hills of the railway valley were a constant menace to the enemy, and drew off many troops which might otherwise have been used elsewhere. The damage to road and railway was also considerable and demanded constant attention of railway companies. Although the Chindits killed directly over 5,000 Japs, indirectly they accounted for a great many more.

Several technical lessons learned in 1944 are of interest. First was the important, and indeed vital, part which Columns could play in giving aerial targets. Half the time this intelligence may be wrong, but the other half it will be right, and then the information is "hot", up-to-date. That is where the enemy are, *then*. The target must be bombed at once. More important, the Column concerned must know that it will be bombed at once.

Our experience was that by the time the ordinary bombing mission was undertaken the bombs fell on metaphorically stony ground. The bombers were too late—the enemy had gone. We saw this happen, to our intense mortification, a score of times. We ourselves gave numerous targets where we knew both enemy and stores were. They were always either refused—presumably because aircraft were not available or bombed a day or two later, when it was too late. It was a thousand pities.

A whole Column is not necessary to perform this function, but it is a most important incidental duty. The effect of such bombing would have an extraordinary effect on morale—on both sides. It would add enormously to the enemy's feeling of being always liable to attack, while it would at the same time lend tremendous encouragement to our own chaps. It follows that the supporting Air Force must be divided into two separate entities—one for close support, the other for semi-strategic duties. In either case there must be plenty of aircraft.

Second lesson learned was that the monsoon has few terrors for the Supply Dropping aircraft. Rarely, even under the vilest conditions, did men go hungry; some aircraft usually managed to get through somehow, even to the most difficult places. On the other hand, if one only got two days' rations instead of five, it meant that one was stuck until the full five did arrive, since it would take that period to reach another Supply Dropping area. And as adequate food is of the highest importance in the rains, this factor was most important in its tactical effects. It meant that we were too often dependent on the weather for our mobility—and mobility is essential to L.R.P. troops.

The last lesson concerns training. Training must concentrate less on making commanders and men "escape-minded" and more on showing how they may properly approach and engage the enemy. The former attitude is a legacy from the experiences of 1943. It has been shown that when L.R.P. troops are in sufficient strength they will not, as a rule, be chased. They will be responsible for making their own contacts, consonant with the necessity of avoiding surprise attacks, such as ambushes and attacks in bivouac. Training should concentrate on teaching Columns to establish their own safe bases, from which fighting groups, suitably and lightly equipped, can proceed to carry out the operations projected. Movement is thus from secure base to secure base, which is a recognised principle in every type of warfare.

Thus L.R.P. is shown to be such an attractive proposition from the viewpoint of the junior commander. He can determine not only how the battle shall be conducted, but when and where he shall fight it. He has to move his Column in such manner that when the time comes he is in the most favourable position for striking at the enemy. He is concerned not only with tactics, but with strategy on a small scale. He has a miniature army of his own.

Moreover, to the man who knows his job, the rewards are high. The opportunities for striking hard blows at the enemy are unexcelled elsewhere. A well-planned and properly executed ambush is a most satisfying operation. The destruction of a train is a rich reward for a little patience and ingenuity. Such are the opportunities which L.R.P. provides in plenty.

But great and striking as its achievements on the field of battle were, Special Force rendered a comparable service in the administrative sphere to the war against Japan, in its demonstration of how troops can be controlled and maintained, even in the wildest country. The extent to which commanders have in the past been baffled by the problem of supplying troops in areas where communications virtually do not exist, is only too well known. Of all the causes to which the early Allied defeat in Burma have been ascribed, this was the most important.

Commanders do know now, however, that to maintain their men in the Field they do not have to keep them close to a good road, and to follow them up with fleets of lorries and armadas of mules. It has, in fact, been shown that maintenance can be carried out under conditions far more arduous and testing than those normally met with on a main front. It is Air Supply that made it possible for us to beat the Japs in the jungle, simply because it enabled us to outmanoeuvre them—and it was Special Force that proved the real value of Air Supply.

Experience confirmed the underlying assumption of L.R.P. that Columns of well-trained troops, properly organised and, above all, sensibly led, can be a grave menace behind enemy lines. Administratively, the method used to get them there and control and maintain them was tried and not found wanting. Examination of the Chindits' achievements shows that, besides pulling the Chinese-American offensive out of the bag into which it had stuck north of Kamaing, they did an enormous amount of damage in their own specialised role.

But their activities under General Stilwell were not L.R.P. in the true sense of the word, while the damage which they wrought earlier on could never be properly exploited. The fact that their operations in the first phase subsequently much facilitated the advances both of 36 Division and of the Chinese does not affect the fact that for much of that period half the Force was so placed that its operations could have no bearing on later developments, while that part of it which was engaged in useful activities could have been even more profitably employed elsewhere.

It follows that the full effects of an L.R.P. force in its proper role have not yet been demonstrated, and that no true estimate of its value can possibly be made on the basis of the past. Indeed, until such time as L.R.P. Forces are given the job of operating against an L. of C. which is subsequently made to bear the brunt of a powerful frontal attack, no true picture of their effectiveness will be available. The fact that Wingate's forces did, notwithstanding, achieve much was due to the overall magnificence of its soldiers and to the qualities of a few of its leaders, the most famous and quite the most outstanding of whom was Brigadier Calvert.

It is with regret, therefore, that one is forced to remark the waning of the L.R.P. star. The execution of Wingate's theories demanded no mean trouble, expense and sacrifice, while they were not, moreover, theories on which all were agreed. It required a personality of the calibre of Wingate to put them across. Yet now their practicability under certain physical conditions is proved beyond question and their value for certain tactical purposes cannot be doubted, their strategical possibilities, when correctly applied, have yet to be established. Are, then, those theories to be allowed to languish?

OFFICER PROSPECTS IN THE FUTURE I. A. *

By MAJOR D. K. PALIT.

WITHIN a year the Indian Army will be completely officered by Indians. All appointments will be placed in Indian hands. This means that not only will comparatively junior officers hold appointments far above their normal level, but also that there will be a large increase in the rate of intake of regular officers.

General Headquarters have already embarked upon several schemes to increase the rate of officer-intake. This fact has caused several of the post-war regulars to be apprehensive about their prospects in the Indian Army of the future. The bogey of promotion—blocks, or “war-crowding”, or early retirements, has been causing anxiety to many of the officers whose seniority date from 1941 onwards. For this reason I shall endeavour in this article to clarify certain points regarding future prospects, which may help the young regular to obtain a more balanced picture of his prospective career.

The scope of this article is necessarily limited to a general discussion of the possibilities in the future. Many decisions about future policy have yet to be made. It will not be until the political future of India is firmly decided that any definite Army policy can be laid down. I am not therefore attempting to forecast the future. I shall only try to explain the basic principles on which such questions as promotions, appointments and so forth, are based; so that the individual officer who is vexed with the question of his future, will be able to estimate his opportunities along the right lines.

Promotion, pay, and pension are the three main factors which are generally associated with future prospects in any career. On a combination of some or all of these three factors depends the economic and social security which any profession provides; and security is the underlying motive behind all anxiety in the unstable world of professionalism. I will therefore deal with each of these factors in turn, and hope that those anxious about their prospects will find in my conclusions some little reassurance.

PROMOTION

In accepting a commission, an officer virtually signs a contract with the existing Government. In this contract, the Government offers him certain terms and conditions. Under the present system, one of the terms is his entitlement to promotion. Provided that his work is found to be satisfactory, an officer is given a right to a basic scale of promotion. As we know it now, this system is called the “time-scale of promotion”.

This time-scale of promotion provides for the officer's economic security as he grows older and his social responsibilities increase. Thus, after a certain number of years of service, he is automatically promoted to the ranks of lieutenant, captain and major. This system precludes the possibility of such conditions as existed in olden times, (in the British Army, until fairly recently), where officers sometimes remained as subalterns for fifteen years or more, and could only be promoted when an officer casualty higher up created a vacancy. Nowadays promotion up to the rank of major is automatic, and provided that his work has been satisfactory, it is an officer's right.

Promotion beyond the rank of major is by selection, (except for officers commissioned before 1934, in whose cases the time-scale of promotion operates up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel). In the Peace Establishment of the Army, there are a certain number of authorised vacancies for lieutenant-colonels, colonels and general

*This article was accepted before the announcement was made that the Indian Army would be partitioned. Nevertheless, it enunciates principles which are of interest to all officers.

officers. These vacancies are allotted to particular appointments; and when an officer is selected to hold one of these appointments, he is granted substantive promotion to the rank authorised for that appointment, regardless of his relative seniority.

When acting and temporary ranks were first introduced during this last War, the system of promotions to substantive ranks to fill Peace Establishment vacancies was still continued, and termed Peace-Cadre promotions. It was continued during the War so that the war period of mass promotions to acting and temporary ranks would not deprive officers of an existing system of promotions to substantive ranks.

The last remaining system of paid promotions is the system of acting and temporary (and war-substantive) ranks. All officers are familiar with the rules and regulations which govern promotion to these ranks, and no more need be said here. It is however pointed out that time-scale and peace-cadre promotions are substantive promotions, whereas acting and temporary promotions are not, though they provide the benefits of war substantive ranks during the statutory duration of war.

Now that we have dealt with the various systems of promotions to paid ranks, let us examine the future possibilities in the Indian Army. When all or most of the British officers leave, their appointments will be filled by a very small cadre of senior officers, a somewhat larger cadre of "middle-piece" officers, (*i.e.*, with ten to eighteen years service), and a vast number of comparatively junior officers. The result will be that a large number of officers will find themselves holding appointments far senior to those in which they would normally have been posted. The question which interests all of us now, is: Under what system will these promotions be effected?

The time-scale will of course continue to operate unaffected. Minor alterations may be made in the scale, but it is quite improbable that the time-scale would be altered to accommodate any schemes of accelerated promotion. The time-scale, as we have seen before, is the basic and unchangeable element of contractual promotion, and should not be modified merely to suit an emergency. The next possibility, therefore, is the system of acting promotion (without, of course, the benefits of war-substantive rank).

Though acting ranks were the most suitable solution to the complex conditions under which the numerous war-time promotions were made, it cannot be denied that such promotions were invariably made to suit local conditions only. It was seldom possible to promote or demote, with fairness to all the officers in the army. When any army consists of forty or fifty thousand officers, the larger view cannot be taken into consideration without courting unnecessary delays. Besides, the war system of acting ranks became too complex to be adopted to peace conditions, though a modified system is feasible.

The principle which we are seeking to follow is this: An officer should hold the rank of the appointment which he is filling. If he has been selected to fill a particular appointment, it follows that he has been found suitable for it, and he must therefore be given the rank. The question now arises: Should it be acting or permanent rank? If permanent, down to what level?

Ranks above that of lieutenant-colonel, are decided by the Peace-Cadre system. After the final post-war Peace-Establishment is known, every officer who fills an authorised vacancy in an appointment carrying the rank of lieutenant-colonel or above, could be promoted to the substantive rank of that appointment.

This leaves us with the problem of promoting majors. The number of substantive majors among the pre-war regular cadre, is small; the number of majors' appointments, comparatively large. In my opinion the solution lies in a combination of the Acting and Peace-Cadre system. A list of the more important majors appointments—regimental and battalion second-in-command; second grade staff officers in certain appointments—could be called "qualifying" appointments, and those selected to hold then be given the substantive ranks of major.

Officers holding other majors' appointments—Squadron or Company Commanders; instructors; extra regimental appointments—would then be granted

acting ranks for the period of tenure. This system would obviate the necessity of starting "selection" at too low a level, for it must be remembered that once an officer is granted substantive rank before his time, he claims precedence in that rank regardless of actual length of service.

Lastly, we come to the all-important question of promotion-blocks, which probably is the source of most anxiety amongst newly-commissioned regular officers. In order fully to understand the implications of this term, we should first try to analyse the causes which lead to promotion-blocks.

During the peace period before 1939, the Army was fed by a normal flow of officers, to replace such normal casualties as retirements, resignations, dismissals and so forth. Since 1939 the officer-cadre of the Indian Army has already undergone one period of sudden expansion, and will undergo yet another in about a year from now. The first was caused by the tremendous expansion from a small peace-time army, to a large, mobilised army with about fifteen times its normal strength of officers. The second will be caused by the sudden taking over of the appointments vacated by senior British officers by a handful of pre-war regulars. Both of these two emergency measures will eventually cause promotion-blocks. It sounds anomalous that the second reason, which will give rise to immediate accelerated promotion, should cause an eventual promotion-block, but the reasons are explained below.

The number of war-time regulars (recruited between 1941—1947) will be at least eight times the number of pre-war regulars. It will also be considerably larger than the number of officers who will be recruited during the immediate post-1948 era, because the officer intake will naturally revert to normal. In other words, there will be a massed-block of officers whose effective seniority will date from 1941—1947, and they will hold back their immediate juniors of the post-1948 era when the time comes for selection for lieutenant-colonel's appointments.

In the normal course of events, this situation would cause a promotion-block; but for two reasons, this block will not be anything like as severe as it was after world war I. The first is that during this war, a large number of average officers have been accepted as regular officers. Most of these will have reached the retiring age-limits by the time the younger officers of post-1948 cadre attain the seniority level for selection to Lieutenant-Colonel. The second point is that, due to the advent of complete nationalisation of the army, the massed numbers of war-time regulars should not cause any ultimate prejudice to their juniors. An initial hold-up will occur, but then during the initial stages the time-scale operates, and the officers should therefore not lose in rank at all.

When the higher ranks of the army are taken over by the senior Indians, there will be a promotion-block, but only an apparent one. It will be apparent, and not actual, for this reason. When nationalisation is completed, the average age of general officers will be 40—48; that of colonels and lieutenant-colonels, 30—40. The corresponding ages during normal times is: generals, 52—60 or over; colonels and lieutenant-colonels, 42—50 or over. This means that once our senior officers have taken over their new appointments, all promotion by selection will cease for about 10—12 years. It is only natural that those officers will continue to hold their appointments until such times as normal conditions obtain. This will therefore cause a promotion-block amongst the senior war-regulars.

This state of "stalemate", however, even if as extreme as expressed above, need cause no actual disadvantage. It will cause a hold-up in further opportunities for accelerated promotion, but should not interfere with normal promotion. Those who come immediately after the senior most officers will, after say 8-10 years of waiting, have reached just the ages for normal promotion to lieutenant-colonel rank. Thus, the promotion-block would be only an apparent, and not an actual, one.

It will therefore be seen that the future prospects of promotion are not in the least dismal. There are some of course, among the more senior war-regulars, who

should gain additional advantages because of nationalisation, but it is anticipated that for the vast majority the prospects of promotion to higher ranks should be normal, and should in no way be jeopardised because of the "war-block".

PAY AND PENSION

The next two important factors which contribute towards an officer's security are pay and pension. They are the elements which directly provide for his economic security. I cannot of course deal with any matters regarding actual facts and figures of pay and pension, because the whole question is still under consideration. I can therefore merely point one or two important factors which might affect future prospects.

In the past, the system of pay has afforded too strong a basis for security. This is as true of all other services. Officers were not paid according to merit, but by virtue of rank and length of service. It was quite in order for an officer to struggle through his career with the minimum of effort and ambition, and yet to rise steadily up the pay scale and secure an adequate pension when the time came for him to retire. It is true that those who showed exceptional merit rose higher than others. But even so, while serving in the same rank no distinction could be made between the qualified professional and the "time-server".

Any system which provides such easy security is not going to make an efficient service. Security when too readily provided tends to kill initiative and individuality. I feel sure that the Governments of the future are going to insist that an essential part of an officer's pay should be composed of "efficiency allowance". The system of acting promotions is one indirect method of adopting this policy, but unfortunately even acting ranks are too often given on basis of seniority alone, and little heed paid to merit.

The British Army has now embarked upon an attempt to pay their officers according to merit, but much more needs to be done to make the system really equitable. For instance, an officer's basic salary (*i.e.* the security element of the pay) should not be more than 50 per cent of his maximum possible pay. Domestic responsibilities should claim up to 10 per cent. The remainder of his pay should be made up by his qualifications—gradings in various courses, languages, technical qualifications, and so forth. In this way, the Government would ensure that every officer is constantly striving to improve his professional knowledge and ability.

Pensions are an aftermath of pay, in that they also depend on officers' rank and length of service on their dates of retirement. The main difference is that whereas pay is usually calculated as one substantial whole (excluding of course various local or temporary allowances), pensions are made up of two different elements, calculated separately. Pension consists of the rank and the service elements reckoned apart. It is for this reason that promotion to the substantive rank of lieutenant-colonel is so important in an officer's career, for on promotion to this rank the rank element of pension increases by so great an amount that it overshadows the service element.

Age also has an important bearing on pension. All the "executive" arms have an age-limit for command. Suppose that this age-limit for command in, say, infantry is finally decided upon as 45. This implies that except under unusual circumstances, an officer who does not attain the rank of lieutenant-colonel by the time he is 45 years old, has to retire on a major's pension. An officer's age on first commission, therefore, becomes an important factor when viewed in the light of pensionary prospects.

An officer who is 20 years of age on the date of his first commission, has 24 years to serve, after which he can still be selected for a lieutenant-colonel's appointment. If he is not so selected, he still does not suffer to any great extent, for he has 25 years service pension to augment the rank element of a major. On the other hand, an officer who was, say, 28 on the date of his commission, would have to reach lieutenant-colonel's rank before his 18th year of service—or else he is retired as a major. Having retired as a major, he only has 17 years to reckon for the rank element.

In the future Armies in India it is hoped that some provision will be made to establish a minimum pensionary figure, to safeguard the interests of those overage officers who have been granted regular commissions during the war years. Many of them, no doubt, will be able to avail themselves of the advantages of nationalisation, but those who are not able to gain lieutenant-colonel's rank should be provided for by the State.

Before leaving the subject of pensions, I would like to point out to those over-ambitious junior officers who are looking for quick promotions in these days of Nationalisation, that there are certain pensionary disadvantages which might be caused by accelerated promotion. If an officer receives accelerated promotion during the earlier stages of his career, it might easily harm his chances of earning a reasonable pension. The reasons for this are explained below.

The majority of officers in the army at this time have a reasonable likelihood of attaining lieutenant-colonel's rank in their own turn. There should be sufficient vacancies in the Army of the future to ensure this. Selection after that however becomes much more difficult, and it will only be about 20 to 25 per cent of them who can hope for higher rank.

Now take the case of an officer who has been given accelerated promotion and granted the substantive rank of lieutenant-colonel after, say, 12 years service. He serves for three more years in that rank, but fails to qualify for further promotion. It is a recognised practice in the Army that an officer should not be allowed to stagnate in one rank too long, for not only does he hold up junior and abler officers, but he also tends to lose interest. The hypothetical officer whose career we are following is therefore compelled to retire at a comparatively young age, after about 16 or 18 years service. Had his promotion taken a more normal course, he would have been promoted lieutenant-colonel after about 20 years service, and retired with about 8 or 10 years more service—thus qualifying for a much higher rate of pension.

I would like to impress upon readers that I have written this article merely with the object of helping the junior officer of today to be able to view his future career in some sort of correct perspective. This is not a forecast of the future, I repeat, because none of the points I have discussed, or expressed an opinion on, is official, but merely my own ideas. I have not been able to make use of any of the statistics available today, since the future of the Armies in India is at present very much in the balance. I have therefore been able to touch upon the subject on very general lines only, but whatever the final outcome is, the general principles I have discussed will still apply.

Atomically Propelled Warship Foreseen.

The British Admiralty has issued a statement reviewing research and development work, in which it is stated:

"On the defensive side the Navy has to apply the lessons learned by its observers of the Bikini tests of the atomic bomb, but the implications of atomic energy are by no means limited to defensive aspects and may, contrary to initial reactions, lead to an enhancement of naval power in a highly modified form, and with wide offensive and defensive commitments.

"The atomically propelled warship, for instance, would have no immediate refuelling problems, and the period for which it could stay at sea would be limited only by other and generally less urgent supply problems, a vital factor if the ship proved less vulnerable than the harbour.

"Again, a revolution in naval ordnance, in the light of the guided rocket missile, opens a field in which research is essential to security. The Navy's commitments, which already include the conveying of food across the oceans, may even extend to assisting the discharge of cargoes on coastlines where ports are desolated."

THE CONVERSION

By "SILUND"

15th October 1946.—*My total weight of fish caught entirely on threadline, spinning with chilwa, was 216 lbs. in 7 days. Line used 6 lbs. breaking strain. Gut castle 8 lbs. Reel Altax No. 3. Rod—"NIMROD"—(Extract from a fisherman's diary).*

ONCE a year (not Once Upon A Time) George goes fishing in a big way. It is no exaggeration to say that this annual expedition is the culmination of twelve months thought and planning. The former is sub-conscious; the latter is automatic to one of his nature. Therefore, neither may be apparent to the casual observer.

In the later stages of the planning phase, in addition to the family and the dogs, by a judicious admixture of both blatant and subtle propaganda, Wallie became a partner in the campaign against the Mighty Mahseer, and also his less sought-after brethren. I use the word "campaign" to convey to the reader that no General Staff made plans and preparations in greater detail.

Fate decreed that another party in the shape of a "Doubting Thomas", should make the third rod. He is important because he caused this story to be written.

The scene of the saga is RAEWALA on the SONG, nine miles West of sacred HARDWAR.

Picture the three fishermen, from morn till dusk, every day for seven days, in a picturesque spot on the boulder-strewn banks of the river SONG. Casting—; Reeling—; Re-casting—. The sequence only broken by snippets of conversation of a highly controversial nature. "Thomas" sticking stubbornly to his guns that threadline is completely unsuited to the conditions prevailing in the GANGES or any of her tributaries; George expostulating on the superior merits of threadline for just such fishing; Wallie, in his wisdom, remaining a silent observer.

The river of the beautiful name rolls on. Chuckling, gurgling, tossing its sun-flecked way along to meet Mother GANGES somewhere many miles beyond, to lose its identity in her sombre embrace. The daily catch mounts ever higher. The threadline that came all the way from distant ZURICH gives a magnificent performance. But Thomas still doubts.

The short holiday has come to an end. The truck is loaded and all is ready for the impending departure. But the SONG must have sent forth a mystic siren call which ensnared George in its reverberations. He was lured to take out his "NIMROD" once more before departing and went down the bank for "one more cast, just to show Thomas how!"

The line went out with the familiar swish-whirr-plop. What was that tell-tale tug? Surely not a bite so quickly. Yes. Instinct had been right. There was no mistaking that ever-increasing pull which took out 80 yards of line. George had hooked a big one. Thomas came down the bank to scoff, and stayed to wonder.

Lying sullen for about 10 minutes the mahseer cunningly decided to shoot the rapids and fight his battle further down the stream. George, keeping his head and a taut line, followed him down to the lower pool where both hunter and hunted took up strategic positions.

The gold and silver monster struggled valiantly. George called all the science and skill of his craft to his aid. This memorable encounter endured for one hour, at the end of which came the grand finale. Thirty-six lbs. of gasping mahseer landed before Thomas, no longer doubting eyes or a 6 lbs. threadline.

And so back home in triumph, where the story is still being told of how Thomas the doubter was converted to the right idea. I wonder if any of my readers, not having seen, can believe this?

A REAL OLD SOLDIER

By C. H. T. M.

I MET one hundred-and-twenty-six year old Subedar-Major Ghulam Hussain in April, 1942, during the Allied withdrawal from Burma. He is, I feel, a character of interest, particularly of those who have served or are serving in the Indian Army, and after almost exactly five years I am writing this memory. I have, however, verified my story with some of those who were present with me at the time, and also with an officer who met Ghulam Hussain in Burma in 1936. That officer tells me that Ghulam Hussain then claimed to be over a hundred years old, and had told him that although he (the officer) was taller than Lord Roberts he was not half the man!

At the time I was commanding the 3rd Indian Light A/A Battery, with my troops widely scattered "B" and "C" Troops were in different divisions, and had withdrawn through "A" Troop, which was defending the Myitnge road-cum-rail bridge against possible Japanese air attacks.

While at H.Q. of "A" Troop at Myitnge, it was reported to me that a very elderly civilian had attached himself to the Troop H.Q. He was a Punjabi Mussulman, and in spite of his great age had that fine upright bearing which immediately betrayed his military upbringing.

He had affirmed to my V.C.O., Jemadar Lall Khan and several N.C.Os. that he had been a Subedar-Major in a Madrassi Regiment, had seen service in the Mutiny of 1857, and that he was 126 years old. He had been entertaining the gunners by demonstrating with astonishing vigour bayonet drill of the 1880s with the aid of a bamboo pole. They had christened him *Baba*.

Out of curiosity I told my orderly to ask him to come to me one evening. He came. In appearance he was about six feet tall, thin but lithe, toothless, active, and with unmistakable military upbringing. I asked his name, and how he came to be so far from his native Punjab.

He said his name was Ghulam Hussain, and proudly added that he had been Subedar-Major in the 93rd Burma Infantry, which in his days contained a large proportion of Madrassis. (Later I found that that regiment was originally the 1/17 Madras Native Infantry and then the 33rd Burma Infantry; afterwards it was re-designated the 93rd Burma Infantry, and in 1922 became the 5/8 Punjab Regiment. When it went to Burma in 1885 the troops were partly Madrassi and partly Punjabi Mussulman; gradually the Madrassi element was disbanded).

Ghulam Hussain said he went to Burma with his battalion during the annexation in 1885. A few years later he retired and, having taken unto himself a Burmese wife, decided to settle down there and live on his pension. He went on to say that he had lodged his medals in a bank in Mandalay for safe custody, but the Bank building had been destroyed in an air raid and all his medals had been lost.

I asked him if he could recall the Mutiny of 1857. Yes, he could, and claimed that he had fought on the Ridge at Delhi. To test the authenticity of his statement I asked if he could remember any of the famous British officers of those days—Nicholson, Outram or Havelock? I was beginning to doubt his

claim when I happened to mention "Hodson". At once his eyes lit up, and he said: "Certainly! Hodson Sahib Bahadur! A very impetuous (*bahut hi tez*) Sahib whom we all greatly feared". From contemporary accounts, this admirably describes the founder of Hodson's Horse.

Being a gunner, I asked him if he could remember any artillery or artillery men during the Mutiny—perhaps on the Ridge? After a pause, he replied that there was a mule battery commanded by Tombs Sahib, a very fine officer. I knew that General Tombs (after whom the Tombs Memorial Prize at the late R.M.A., Woolwich, was named) commanded a battery on the Ridge and was awarded the V.C. for his gallantry during the action.

As the old soldier left me I felt that there was a strong element of truth in his extraordinary tale. Throughout the interview Jemadar Lall Khan was present, and helped me at times when I was uncertain of the old soldier's meaning. With Jemadar Lall Khan's aid I was sure I had got my facts correct, or nearly correct. Curiously enough, I remember, no mention was made of Lord Roberts (a gunner) and I cannot recall the name of the man's village in the Punjab, since it meant nothing to me.

* * * *

At the time almost all the Indians had left for the North. Ultimately, most of them were to try and reach Assam on foot through the notorious Kabaw Valley or Hukawng Valley, and many were to perish in the attempt. I waited at Myitnge a few days until I received orders to withdraw. They arrived a few hours before the bridge was demolished.

The guns were to withdraw in early darkness, and as I was dressing in the late afternoon after my last bath at Myitnge I was surprised by the arrival of the old soldier in my room. I told him rather sharply to go outside and wait, but it was clear he had something urgent to tell me. I dressed and called him back to my room.

He pleaded that he might accompany the gunners towards India, for he had heard of their imminent withdrawal. His Burmese wife (a creature of a mere 80 years of age, I imagine!) had deserted him in the hour of his greatest need, and as he had reached the evening of his life he longed to see his Punjab before he died.

He paused, and from inside his shirt he produced a small chamois leather pouch. Undoing the leather thong, he rolled out on the table two magnificent uncut rubies, each, as I remember, about the size of an eight-anna piece. "These gems were found by me when my battalion occupied the Mogok Mines, and I've kept them ever since", he said. "If you will help me towards reaching India they are yours". (As he was presumably Subedar-Major when his battalion occupied the Mogok ruby mines in 1887, these two rubies were probably the pickings!).

Unfortunately, I had barely sufficient transport for my own gunners and equipment, and I feared that if one refugee were carried, very shortly more might be carried at the expense of my own gunners, or more probably, of my equipment. So very reluctantly I refused the old soldier's request and he departed with his rubies.

* * * *

During December, 1942, I was telling this story in the Battery Mess to some of the officers who had been present in the withdrawal from Burma. Lester,

one of the Troop Commanders at that time, was listening, and offered to continue the story. He had commanded part of the Battery to march first into Assam.

When his party completed the first stage by lorry as far as Shweygin, a village on the Chindwin, he found *Baba* amongst the party and regarded by the troops as a fellow Punjabi Mussalman, and one of their number. He (Lester) had succeeded with difficulty in getting aboard the only ferry boat crossing the river from Shweygin to Kalewa, and on arrival there, he had secured him a seat on a bullock cart bound for India, *via* the Kabaw Valley.

Lester and his party then marched by a track through the hills and left the Kabaw Valley. His orderly, Gunner Sardar Khan, however, had seen *Baba* afterwards. Gunner Sardar Khan happened to be in the Mess and was immediately summoned. He completed the tale by saying that he had met *Baba* in good health at Manipur Road railway station in Assam, and had managed to get him a seat—not easy, for the trains were packed with refugees. The train was bound for Calcutta.

And so 126-year old Subedar-Major Ghulam Hussain was last seen well on his way to his native Punjab, complete with his rubies. I wonder where he is now.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council of the Institution has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1948:

“ARE OFFICERS’ MESSES SUITABLE FOR INDIAN CONDITIONS” ?

Entries are invited from all commissioned officers. They should be typewritten (double spacing), submitted in triplicate, and be received by the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla, on or before June 30, 1948.

In order that the anonymity of each candidate should be preserved, a motto should be written at the top of each entry. A sealed envelope, bearing on the outside the words of the motto, and containing inside the name and address of the author of the essay, must accompany each entry.

Entries should not exceed fifteen pages (approximately 8,000 words) of the size and style of the Journal, and should not be less than 4,000 words.

Three Judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs. 500. either in addition to, or in substitution of, the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October, 1948 issue of the U.S.I. Journal.

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THREE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

BY BRIGADIER J. G. ELLIOTT

THE ARMY has not infrequently been accused of starting to fight each new war on the lessons learnt from the one before. However true this charge may have been in the past, there is no doubt of the danger of it coming true again unless we are very careful, for the good reason that superiority of technical equipment tends increasingly to tip the scales in favour of those who are lucky enough to enjoy it; and it is not easy to forecast what 15 or 20 years of research and experiment may produce, particularly if stimulated by war, or the imminent danger thereof.

It is correspondingly important that mentally and organizationally the army retains the ability to absorb and make full use of new developments, and it is suggested that salvation lies not so much in the dissection of the tactical details of victories of the closing years of the past war, but rather in discovering what were the decisive factors which operated for or against success. Once isolated from the mass of detail which tends to obscure their significance, these factors must again be examined to assess their relative importance in the light of such developments as seem likely to mature in, say, 10 to 15 years' time.

It should then be possible to do two things: conduct a critical review of the basic organization of the army, and lay down some broad principles to direct the activities and training of senior commanders and staffs. For the rest, though the point is not really relevant to the theme of this article, the army will be so small, and so scattered, that it will almost seem wiser to concentrate on very high standards of training up to brigade level designed particularly to inculcate in all ranks the military virtues of resource, adaptability and self-reliance, as the best foundation on which to expand if war is ever again forced on us.

Mention has already been made of the part played nowadays by technical equipment. The inescapable penalty that we pay for the benefits that science and industry bestow on us is an increasing dependence on the administrative layout, and it should be unnecessary to stress the importance of including it in our investigations. It is the object of this paper to select three outstanding administrative problems of the last war, two of which seriously hampered our attempts to win it, and to suggest certain measures that could be introduced now to place matters on a better footing. These problems are:—

- (i) The appalling complexity of modern military organization, and the multiplicity of interests concerned in solving even the simplest problems;
- (ii) The size not only of the administrative tail, but of the mammoth headquarters which sprang up like toadstools all over the world's surface, the two resulting in a severe drain on our manpower, particularly at the levels of higher education and skill;
- (iii) The need for a high degree of mobility and flexibility in administrative support, no less than in tactical operations.

Taking the most cursory glance into the future we can predict with some confidence that complexity will get worse and not better; that there is, unfortunately, every reason still to be prepared for war on a global scale; and that developments in troop carrying, both in the air and in armoured vehicles on land, will impose evergrowing demands on the mobility of the administrative services. There is therefore little apparent danger of our problems solving themselves, or of their fading into insignificance.

* * * * *

It is as well to preface a review of military organization by recognising that such a vast field of human activity can never be resolved to anything approaching real simplicity, and yet in war it will have to be worked to a large extent by amateurs and not by professionals. If we cannot be simple, we can at least try to be rational, for we must do everything we can to make it easy for the war-time soldier to understand in general how the great machine works, and to help him to do his own work without making things more difficult for others.

The basic organization of the army, that is to say, the grouping of the arms and services under the branches of the staff through which they are controlled is very much the same as it was in 1906, the numerous additions made since then having been grafted on to the appropriate parts of the old framework. Since it is at least questionable whether that framework meets the requirements of 1946, it is proposed initially to approach the problem for first principles, and only then to make comparisons with what exists to day.

It seems reasonable to define a rational organization as one in which the various arms and services, and the staffs through which they are controlled, are grouped strictly according to the functions they perform, so that as far as possible the various interests who are concerned in the solution of a problem are kept informed in the normal process of Branch co-ordination. What is not so easy, is to select from the welter of functions that can be attributed to the different parts of the army, the really fundamental ones we are in search of.

It is suggested that there are no more than four, corresponding to the phases through which every military operation must pass. The first is the plan; the second the provision, in the most literal sense of the word, of resources, in men and materials, in a condition fit for battle; the third the moving of those resources to where they are wanted; and the last, the control and direction of the operation once it has begun. These phases everywhere overlap both in point of time, and in the fact that the allocation of resources and their deployment by a higher formation form the basis on which those below it begin to plan.

It is obvious that the planning and the subsequent conduct of a battle cannot be separated, and they must therefore be combined in a single Branch which will be called "Planning and Operations". The responsibilities of this Branch will include the collection of information from all sources; the preparation of plans both before and after the commander has decided on his course of action; the conditioning of troops for the type of battle they are about to fight, i.e., training; and subsequently the control of operations.

Provision of resources will include the recruitment, selection, and allocation of manpower as between raising new units, and maintaining at full strength those already in the field; also control of the medical services who, humanitarian motives apart, play an important part in conserving manpower. On the material side there will rest the responsibility for demanding, storing and

repairing everything that an army requires, warlike and other stores, transport, fuel, and food.

The function of the third Branch consists in moving the resources provided, and the world resources is all-embracing, from wherever they may be to wherever they are wanted; to their deployment areas if they are fighting troops, or, if they are administrative units, to suitable positions in which they can discharge their responsibilities for keeping the army continuously supplied with all it wants. The Branch, which for convenience will be called the Executive Branch, must therefore control all movement agencies, quartering, signal communications, and their own traffic police.

With the object of presenting in outline the simplest possible picture of the whole, the duties of the three Branches have so far been confined to essentials; it is now necessary to fill in certain gaps and, more particularly, to show how co-ordination is to be achieved both within and between Branches.

"Planning and Operations" are obviously the mainspring of the machine, and in that role they must lay down the broad policy that directs the activities of the other two; but policy it must be, and not interference in details. Not only is it impossible for one Branch of the staff to exert universal control, but it is pre-eminently the business of this Branch to think, and to think clearly and ahead, and they will have neither leisure nor ability to do so if they lose themselves in the endless ramifications of military detail.

The first point which they will have to decide is the number of fighting formations required, expressed not necessarily as an arbitrary demand which may be impossible of fulfilment, but as a decision arrived at after consideration and adjustment; and there will need to be a broad definition of priorities.

Besides deciding on how large, they will also have to indicate what sort of an army they want, by laying down the tactical composition of formations, and the organisation of the fighting units. They must define also the standards of tactical training for the whole army, and last, but by no means least, it is for them to say what weapons and equipment must be provided. It would appear that the various answers to this question—what sort of an army?—are in fact the component factors governing a decision of first-class importance, no less than the doctrine, or more commonly, the tactics on which the army will fight.

These factors call for the closest possible co-ordination, and should be grouped under the control of a Director of Tactics. Advised by the operations and intelligence Directorates as to the nature of the army's task, he decides how best to set about fulfilling it, and must therefore correlate the tactical composition of formations and units, the specification and design of equipment, the methods to be employed, and the training which unites everything into a harmonious whole.

Turning now to the Resources Branch and their responsibilities for manpower, an examination of these responsibilities reveals two curious gaps in matters as they now stand. They recruit a man, and probably "select" him for the employment he is best suited to, but then hand him over to the General Staff, clamouring vociferously the while for him to be returned to them as a trained (*sic*) soldier at the earliest moment. He reverts to their control and they either post him to a newly-raising unit, in which event he gets looked after; or send him off as a reinforcement, which means that he may spend anything up to three months in transit. In the latter event they

disavow any responsibility for keeping him trained; and in three months a recruit can with no trouble at all forget everything he has ever been taught.

The solution surely is, that the staff responsible for manpower must be answerable for quality as well as quantity, and must undertake not only the training of the recruit, but the maintenance of his standards at a reasonable level until they deliver him to his unit in the field. The division of responsibility with the training staff would be perfectly clear cut: they would define the standards a trained soldier must reach, and control the central school to turn out instructors, and the manpower staff with that measure of guidance and support would see that the standards were reached and held.

Recruit training does not call for a wide knowledge of the art of war, but much more for imagination, and a sympathetic understanding of human nature. As well as treating the man as a soldier, we must not forget to treat the soldier as a man and provide for his pay, discipline, leave, awards, education and for the welfare, spiritual and material of himself and his family.

They are subjects sometimes referred to as the "imponderables", because of the difficulty of assessing the validity of proposals for improvements in such matters, and of the true effect of meeting or refusing these proposals. They usually involve demands for manpower, materials or movement facilities that are patently and urgently needed for more concrete projects, and the latter win the day. Inevitably there then comes the time when it is decided that there really was something in the "imponderables" after all, and a number of concessions and other measures are hastily put in hand which are probably far more generous than would ever have been necessary if the problem had been tackled more sympathetically to start with.


In the sum these problems have one end, to maintain the morale of the soldier, and it is under this heading that they should be classified, then everyone would know what they were about. Functionally they require co-ordination with "manpower", but must be represented, as to their head, on a level which will enable him to do battle on equal terms with those who are more materially minded.

One other problem arises in connection with the Resources group. They are responsible for producing men, on the one hand, and equipment on the other; they are also responsible for raising new units, which is the amalgamation of the two. It should be unnecessary to stress the importance of co-ordination throughout this process, and it is relevant here to discuss the position and responsibilities of Directors of Arms and Services.

At the higher levels these officers have a triple role: they are the advisers to their commanders and staffs on all matters affecting their Service; they are the agency through which the work of their corps is carried out; and they are responsible for providing the units required. It is apparent that the first two of these are carried out under the general direction of that Branch of the staff functionally concerned, and it may be either of the three, but the provision of new units is always the responsibility of the Resources Branch.

The problem then is whether to concentrate Directorates under their titular heads, or whether to group the sections of all Services dealing with unit raisings under the Branch of the staff functionally responsible. The latter alternative has been accepted as essential for manpower, and it seems that there are grounds for rounding off the process by the addition of the responsibility for equipment.

Planning, that is the calculation of the units required by the Service, would be retained within the Directorate; but the demands once formulated would be fulfilled under common co-ordination of the Resources Branch. Given the accepted relations between Services and staff it does seem logical that the former must deal through the part of the staff concerned with the problem in hand, even if it involves Service Directorates in physical separation. It is an intricate problem and no more need be said than that there must be a Co-ordination Directorate, which gives a layout for the Resources Branch somewhat on these lines:—



Taking as their basis the requirements formulated by the Planning and Operations Branch as to tactical formations and units required, and the dates by which operations must begin, it is the role of the Executive Branch to add to these the demands of the Resources Branch for the movement of administrative units and stores, to include movement and other units they require for the discharge of their own responsibilities, and to produce a co-ordinated plan for moving everything into place.

It is necessary to emphasise the claim of the Executive Branch to a deciding voice in the matter of non-tactical locations. Reinforcement camps, depots, hospitals, workshops, all are the temporary resting places of men or equipment *en route* to or from the theatre of operations. Though they are in themselves static, their object is to secure an uninterrupted flow of what the fighting troops require, and they must therefore be sited so as to promote and not check that flow.

Services must obviously be consulted to ensure that their units are not located where for technical reasons they could not operate, but only exceptional reasons, as for example the choice of suitable ground for a training area, will justify locations which complicate the general movement plan. It follows that all non-tactical orders of battle and location statements will be produced by this Branch.

If this general layout be accepted, it follows that there will have to be a reorganization of the administrative services, as it is at once obvious that the twin responsibilities of the R. A. S. C., for transport and supplies should now be separated. At a time when supplies were the main item to be delivered to the troops, and had, moreover, frequently to be collected by local purchase in the theatre of operations, it was natural to combine the two, but transport has now so many other commitments that it is a problem calling for the undivided attention of one Service.

The question then arises as to where to place "supplies", which are not of themselves sufficiently large to justify the extravagance of a separate Service. An examination of the respective responsibilities of the R. A. O. C. and the R. E. M. E., whereby the latter undertake the repair of part of the equipment

handled by the former, provokes the conclusion that although holding and repair are in themselves separate functions, they are, as far as the army at large is concerned, no more than two parts of the single function of providing equipment in a state fit for battle. Separating them gives rise to duplication, and undoubtedly renders effective co-ordination more difficult.

For example, a piece of equipment which is so badly damaged that repair will take a long time, must be replaced; it is handed back to the R.A.O.C. who send it to R. E. M. E. for repair, who return it to the R. A. O. C., who are then responsible for seeing that it is maintained in a serviceable condition until they re-issue it. Spare parts further complicate matters. Not only are they issued to units, but the whole R. E. M. E. repair programme stands or falls on a regular supply of them; the physical problem of classifying and recognising them in itself calls for specialised training; and yet this vital responsibility is divided.

It is surely more logical to divide everything that the army needs into two categories; the first covering equipment which in the normal course of its service life will require skilled repair; the second covering what is either immediately expendable, or after issue remains with a unit until worn out, and where repair is only an incidental feature of good maintenance. The former would include weapons, electrical and optical equipment, vehicles, and machinery of all sorts; the latter would consist of food, petrol, ammunition, clothing, and camp and barrack stores, and there should be two supply services, one technical, one non-technical, each entirely responsible for everything to do with the range of stores and supplies it deals with.

* * * * *

The changes that have been recommended in basic organization go down through the whole structure of the army, but it was more or less inevitable that the examination from which they emerge should be conducted largely from the viewpoint of the War Office, or of a General Headquarters. The second problem we have set ourselves, how to secure and improve administrative mobility and flexibility, belongs essentially to the theatre of operations, and it is relevant to point out that values vary somewhat as between the two places.

As has already been made clear, administrative problems sort themselves into two main categories, to provide, and to move: at War Office level the magnitude and complexity of the former are probably the greater of the two; in a theatre of operations the position is reversed. The needs of a modern army are met to a very large extent by centralised design and manufacture, so that provision in the field is susceptible of considerable standardization, and in fact becomes progressively simpler the lower you go; whereas movement problems change daily and vary on different parts of the front. Movement is the ruling problem and other interests, far from hindering it, must be prepared to make sacrifices to promote it.

In discussing mobility it is well to be clear that it involves something more than the mere provision of a number of mechanically propelled vehicles. Units, and equally formations, always consist of three elements: the first for command and control; the second operational, concerned with the role of the unit, which may be fighting, or boring a well, or baking bread; and the third for primary maintenance, to enable it to live and move about, within a limited range, for twenty-four hours at a time.

There is a fourth element which provides secondary maintenance, in other words facilities for storeholding and repairs. In small units it is a very

small affair but as we go up, through larger units to small and then large formations, these facilities have to be provided on a steadily increasing scale. To impose too great a weight of this fourth element, whether on unit or formation, in a search for greater mobility brings into operation the law of diminishing returns in that the unit or formation becomes large and unwieldy, and is liable to be repair-bound and unable to move at short notice, while the commander, who should be concentrating on his operational responsibilities, will be distracted by administrative cares.

A final disadvantage of overloading is that it is extravagant in that it locks up small packets of material and skilled men. In fact this fourth element must be kept as small as possible, and must be directly related to operational mobility, which in future must be thought of increasingly in terms of air lift where economy is imperative.

Administrative flexibility is sometimes, though quite erroneously, referred to as 'improvisation': a horrid word which bears a strong family resemblance to "improvident", and connotes a desperate existence in which some fresh gale invariably arises to wreck the patched-up craft in which one is trying to ride out the storm of yesterday.

The plain fact is that few commanders are ever in the lucky position of being able to say just how a battle will go: they plan, and are then for ever on the alert for new moves, new groupings, to retain the initiative, to exhibit success, or to defeat some unexpected stroke by the enemy. The administrative staff must equally plan, and have reserves, or must know where they can lay hands on them at short notice, to meet any swing of the tactical battle; but that is not necessarily improvisation.

The arch-enemy of flexibility is specialization, (which can always be supported by specious technical arguments), whereas both units and individuals should be able to handle as wide a range of tasks as can reasonably be expected of them. The corollary to this is that before units are permanently allotted to formations it should be proved that this permanency contributes materially to operational efficiency, and that there is no risk of units lying idle for considerable periods when they could usefully be employed elsewhere.

It will be seen that mobility and flexibility are closely related in that the conditions necessary to achieve them are largely common to both. They are that there must be a general purpose foundation stripped of non-essentials, but organised to absorb reinforcement when confronted with a specialised task, or removed temporarily outside the range of normal supporting echelons. Reinforcement may take the form of complete units or, on the analogy of "surgical teams", sent to forward medical units during active operations, may be self-contained specialist detachments designed temporarily to step up the scope of a general purpose unit.

A corollary of flexibility is the ability to control. Remembering that ease of movement is the star on which we march, it should be noted that centralization is axiomatic for the proper control of movement. It is further true, accepting that the degree of centralization will have to be varied, that it is far easier to go down from a central system that already exists, than to establish one in a hurry from a number of unco-ordinated parts. The criticism that over-centralization involves rigidity, and being out of sympathy with the changing demands of the local situation, can be met by attaching control elements to lower formations "in support". When decentralization is necessary they come "under command".

Flexibility of control will, in its turn, depend largely on a good inter-communication system. When the last war began administrative traffic was the Cinderella of the Signal office, and it was months, and even years, before there was any real improvement. Long-term deliberations on the comparative unpopularity of spam and soya links can admittedly go by post: but all movement traffic must have a high priority if what is delivered is to bear any relation to what the troops fighting the battle want.

It is a question of establishing the correct time ratio between the speed of the movement agency, and of the agency through which control is exercised. If the proposals made earlier for the co-ordinated control of all non-tactical movement and of all movement agencies were accepted, Signal priorities would no doubt be equitably allotted; but it is a link which must not be forgotten whenever developments elsewhere are leading to increased range and mobility.

It was mentioned earlier that all other interests must to some extent be prepared to sink their own convenience if by so doing they can promote ease of movement. The great contribution to be made by the Supply Services lies in achieving the highest possible degree of standardization, based on a careful analysis of administrative records and statistics. There is, for example, an established ratio of consumption as between petrol and lubricants, so that a demand for the former is held automatically to include the latter; it should equally be possible to evolve a standard pack containing replacements of clothing for 1,000 men for a month, or an estimate of medical stores required by a field ambulance for 500 battle casualties.

Those examples are taken at random, and may be nonsensical, but the principle is to establish that certain conditions always have certain consequences. The advantages are obvious; elimination of human forgetfulness which may forget to ask, reduction in signal traffic and office work, firmer data on which to plan, flexibility in that known demands can be fitted in as convenient to the movement programme, ease of handling, and economy in skilled storekeepers and clerical staff.

The economy problem, how to 'strip' the administrative tail, carried the obvious proviso that it must be done without impairing either symmetry or efficiency: that was one good reason for dealing with it last; an even better one was that an attempt to rationalise matters was almost certain to suggest where economies could be effected. If, by way of conclusion, it can be shown that the proposals made, singly or in combination, not only promote efficiency but may actually save manpower, then that is as good a way of rounding off the paper as any other.

As a start it is pretty certain that a ruthless examination of the "fourth element" in every unit, so necessary to promote mobility, should also result in considerable savings. It is necessary to apologise at this stage for selecting individual units for attention but, solely for example, could the organization of divisional R. A. S. C. transport be improved? Is such a large workshop element in each company really necessary? Could it not be cut drastically if there was a centralised repair unit for all companies, organised to send "step up" detachments with any company located out of reach of central repair? Would the centralised repair unit not show a considerable saving in technicians and specialised vehicles? Possibly not, but there is no harm in asking.

Must we accept as immutable the theory that staffs, and the staffs of services, increase by geometrical progression at each succeeding headquarters in the ascending chain? An examination of the "fourth element" functions of

field formations, as well of L. of C. areas, gives rise to some interesting speculations. Given a centralised control of all movement agencies, and considerable standardization of packing and supply, could the responsibility of army not begin at divisional rear boundaries, leaving the corps as the operational head of an operational group, with a very considerable saving at corps headquarters to recommend it? The location within those headquarters of an army movement control group, in support, would give the flexibility that operational planning demanded. It has already been suggested that standardization should enable considerable economy in all ranks of the administrative staffs in the lower formations.

A possibility which has not yet been discussed is a closer integration, at second and third grade level, of the staff proper and the staff of administrative services. The line is now clear drawn; on the one side is the war-time staff officer with an inadequate knowledge of his Services; on the other the war-time officer of a Service with very little staff training or knowledge of the army as a whole: and it is pretty certain that a good deal of time is wasted while each tries to tell the other what to do. If officers of the Services were given administrative staff training they should be able to undertake the detailed preparation of work based on directions issued by the staff proper at first grade level, with a consequent reduction in low grade staff appointments.

And in conclusion, what of the officer himself, as an officer? It is more or less our accepted policy in peace-time to maintain an officer cadre larger than is strictly justifiable, so that we have something spare for expansion when war comes. In consequence we have rather large ideas of the number of officers we really require. Few probably realise what an expensive commitment an officer is. To start with, he is non-effective for roughly six months while learning to be an officer, and the overheads of O. C. T. U.s, if they are maintained at a proper level, are appreciable.

It is also probable that some 30% of the officers trained do not subsequently put to any useful purpose a lot of what they are taught. This shortcoming is unavoidable, as a considerable degree of standardization in programmes is inevitable: it is mentioned to give point to wastage which must be accepted in producing officers, quite apart from the wastage of those who complete a course but are not commissioned.

Convention further demands that officers shall have higher standards of all classes of accommodation, and shall be provided with such extras as batmen, all of which form a cumulative drain on the nation's resources.

It is pertinent therefore to ask what are the qualities we demand in return. They can probably be listed as leadership, powers of organization, reliability, willingness to accept responsibility, and initiative: but it may well be said that, in embryo, we look for all five in the youngest lance-corporal, so that there must be more in it than that. The answer perhaps is that the essential attribute of an officer is that he can be relied on to do his work intelligently and well, even though removed from the immediate support and supervision of those above him; in fact, that initiative and willingness to accept responsibility are the key attributes.

Another factor to be considered is that in the lower ranks the officer has a complement in the warrant officer. The officer plans, organizes and generally watches progress; but the actual hour-to-hour supervision, the detailed execution, and the skill that takes on the most ticklish portions of a job, are

the contribution of the warrant officer. When we consider that a big percentage of officers of the Services are promoted from warrant rank it is sobering to reflect that though we may gain an officer, who has still to prove his worth as such, we have lost a good technician.

It is suggested that there should be, now, in peace, a drastic overhaul of all officer appointments, particularly in administrative units and installations, and at a third grade staff level to establish new standards for war establishments. To justify the demand for an officer there should be an unequivocal "yes" and "no" respectively to these two questions: Does this appointment demand qualities of responsibility and initiative that only an officer can be expected to possess? Could it not be filled equally well and perhaps better by a skilled warrant officer?

One runs the risk of being called anti-social and undemocratic for even hinting that the field marshal's baton should be condemned forever to remain in a number of worthy knapsacks, but war is fought to preserve the national existence and not to offer advancement to individuals.

The army of the Republic of Haiti, reputed to consist of 692 full generals and one private soldier, has probably the highest proportion of officers of any in the world. Can the British Army not be content to accept something rather more lowly than second place?

NEW R.I.A.F. DAKOTA SQUADRON.

Second Squadron of the Royal Indian Air Force to change over from single-engined fighters to twin-engined Dakotas, No. 6 R.I. A. F. Squadron has just started an intensive course of conversion training on this type. Commanded by Squadron Leader K.L. Bhatiya, the squadron is being trained in the latest methods of air navigation and radio aids by experienced personnel of No. 10 R.A.F. Squadron.

Composed entirely of Indian personnel, many of whom are flying with a crew for the first time, No. 6 R.I.A.F. Squadron has a record of which it is justly proud. Formed in December, 1942, under the command of Squadron Leader Mehr Singh, D.S.O., (now Group Captain in charge of flying training at Air Headquarters, India), the squadron operated from a coastline strip in 1943 and 1944 during the fierce battles of the Arakan. Flying Hurricane fighter aircraft squadron carried out 1,500 sorties and collected more than 16,000 photos.

It was during this period that Group Captain Mehr Singh flew a total of 82 operational sorties over enemy-held territory, and was awarded the D.S.O. for his fine leadership and high example.

PLANNING THE DEFENCE OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

By "HUGH CONWAY"

THE two new Dominions of India and Pakistan have started planning their Armed Forces, but unless they do this logically they will find themselves involved not only in muddles and delay, but in a great deal of unnecessary work. This article is devoted to setting down a logical sequence for planning their Armed Forces for the defence of India and Pakistan, and though reference throughout is made to India only, it is all equally applicable to Pakistan.

My first point is: *What is to be India's Foreign Policy?*—India is a member of U.N.O. and it is the policy of the Government (and of all the major parties) to keep free from any foreign entanglements which might lead India into war. Therefore, India is concerned only with the means of defending herself against any potential enemy, and of preserving peace and security on her own frontiers and in her own cities.

The next point: *How much money is there?*—During the war the annual defence expenditure reached somewhere about 250 crores. India, like all other countries, will grudge every anna spent on the Services (especially on war-like stores) for some years at least—a perfectly natural post-war reaction.

I suggest the most practical way to tackle the budget problem is for two figures to be agreed *before any planning is started*. The lower figure will be the amount the Indian Cabinet is prepared to accept almost unconditionally. We'll call this figure X crores. The upper figure will be the maximum up to which they might be persuaded to agree if the arguments are overwhelmingly strong. This figure we will call Y crores.

The Armed Forces could then draw up a firm plan on the lower cost and an alternative plan (obviously a better one from the defence aspect) based on the lower cost plan, but with increases which they consider the minimum essential for reasonably effective and efficient Armed Forces. This second plan would cost somewhere between the agreed minimum and the arguable upper limit.

But there is a great deal more to be done before real planning can start. The third matter to consider is *India's potential enemies and allies*. This will depend largely on India's foreign policy. Any country is a potential enemy of India. But certain countries only need be seriously considered now. These are Tom, Dick and Harry (yes, we all have roughly the same ideas, but this is not the time to express them—anyway there is no need).

Who are India's friends—real friends, I mean. A vast number of people voted in her favour at U.N.O., but it would be criminal folly to count on the assumption that, because certain politicians or diplomats took sides on behalf of their country for India against South Africa on a subject on which possibly none of them was competent to judge, those countries could be counted as allies

in war. Pandit Nehru's declared foreign policy might help. But again, it is unnecessary at this stage to decide who India's allies would be in the event of war. Let us call them Able, Baker, and Charlie.

Now we can set some planners to work. They must gaze into their crystals and tell us what India's Potential Enemies (Tom, Dick and Harry) are likely to do, and what counter-action is necessary. I am assuming, from India's foreign policy, that she will not be an aggressor. Next, they must tell us how much of that counter-action we can count on being carried out for India by Able, Baker, or Charlie. From the balance of counter-action required can be evolved the essential war roles of India's Armed Forces (roles D, E & F). But to these must be added any additional peace roles for frontier and internal security (G, H & J).

Now where are we? We *must* be prepared for roles G, H & J and would be unwise to skimp over roles D, E & F. To carry out G, H & J, and make adequate peace requirements to enable D, E & F to be carried out on the outbreak of war, we have X crores,—possibly able to be increased to Y crores.

Next, what armed forces are vital to carry out the required roles? First, we must decide this for G, H & J and then decide the additions vital for D, E & F. These must then be roughly costed and compared with X and Y crores. It is almost certain that whittling down will be necessary. In the final recommendations put to the Indian Cabinet, adequate Armed Forces must be provided to cover G, H & J which can be paid for with X crores, or less. The balance, if any, left over from X crores, plus an additional amount not exceeding Y minus X crores, will be taken up in the recommendations for Armed Forces to cover D, E & F.

So logically we should arrive at an Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force in the best proportion, and made up of the most suitable components, to carry out India's vital defence needs, primarily in peace and secondly in war, and costing what India can, and is prepared to, pay.

There is one aspect, however, to which I would like to turn back, and would like to discuss at greater length. That is the composition of the Armed Forces to carry out the roles required. Again, it is logic and principles that we are after, so I won't go into details. There is no shadow of doubt that X, or even, Y crores will not buy us all the Armed Forces we would like, so we shall have to cut out anything not absolutely vital, and probably much that is vital, too. How, then, can we eliminate the apparently essential?

The Armed Forces are composed of two main ingredients—personnel and equipment. All costs are related to one or the other of these two. Take personnel, and divide it into two: highly technical personnel requiring a long training, and less technical personnel who can be trained in a comparatively short time. With the modern forces as they are (and even more with what they are likely to be) I assume all personnel fall within these two categories. There are no non-technical personnel.

Highly technical personnel again fall into two groups: those whose civil technical training and employment largely fit them for their Service employment in war, and those whose Service employment will require considerable training and experience in the Services themselves. If we must restrict our hitherto considered essential personnel, it is better to cut down on the first of these two groups.

The less technical personnel, too, could be more easily reduced by shortening their terms of service to the minimum period necessary to turn them into a soldier, sailor, or airman of the required standard of efficiency. Suppose the terms of service are for 5 years regular service and 7 years in the reserve, and the necessary number of personnel of a given category is 1,000, it may be found possible for this category of personnel to attain the necessary efficiency in 3 years. Then, by changing the terms of service to 3 years regular service and 9 years in the reserve, the number of serving personnel can be reduced by two-fifths, *i.e.* to 600, without reducing the war potential. The cost will be reduced accordingly, of course.

Now consider equipment. It is obvious that for training, and for research and development, India will need some equipment of every type in her war equipment tables—Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is desirable that India should hold in peace all the equipment she will need for war, but again within the figure of X, or even Y, crores this is not likely to be possible. So how can the bill be reduced? I suggest there are two ways, or rather there are two categories of equipment less vital to maintain in peace up to full requirement.

The first category is equipment which can be produced very quickly either in India itself or by Able, Baker, or Charlie—but only if communications with whichever of these Allies is to manufacture the equipment concerned are reasonably certain to be kept open on the outbreak of war against Tom, Dick or Harry. A sub-category of this type of equipment of an even lower degree of essentiality is that equipment which requires little training for men to become proficient in its use.

The second category is that equipment which has a counterpart in civil use in India in sufficient quantities, so that it could be commandeered on the outbreak of war without dislocating unacceptably the civil end use from which it is withdrawn.

I would like to go on and discuss the more interesting side of all this—the actual composition of the Armed Forces. But here I would be breaking my own principles of planning logically. First, I would have to know India's foreign policy, how many crores X and Y are, who Tom, Dick and Harry are, and Able, Baker, and Charlie, and what are the roles D, E & F and G, H & J. So—a foreign policy please, Mr. Nehru!

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THE BROKEN RING IS AN UNBROKEN LINK

BY MAJOR F. G. HARDEN.

IN February last the life-time hoard of a famous collector of military badges and buttons was auctioned in London. One lot consisted of a velvet-covered card upon which was mounted one hundred or more pewter buttons, such as used to be worn upon soldiers' uniforms a century ago. These old buttons bore the numerals and insignia of British regiments, both regular and militia—with one solitary exception.

The top right-hand button on the card was impressed with the following design :—



* * * * *

Of the numerous military antiquarians who viewed these articles on display, or collectors who bid for them, possibly not one could correctly place this top right-hand button. The majority connected it with either the 42nd Highlanders (Black Watch) or else the 42nd (Dorset) Militia—puzzling over this, to them, unfamiliar variety.

Their guesses were wrong, for it came originally from the short jacket of a sepoy belonging to either the 42nd Bengal Native Infantry or else the 42nd Madras Native Infantry—either could have worn it, and the date would be between 1824 and 1850.

This button conforms to the particular design selected by the Honourable East India Company for its Indian troops. Not that it was exclusive in India to the regiments of the 'Company Bahadur', for a pewter button cut from the red coat of a Sikh soldier, a battle memento of Aliwal, is of very similar pattern and, indeed, we find today both Broken Circle and Laurels incorporated in the comparatively recently struck buttons of the "Sir Pratap Infantry" of Idar State.

Now the design adapted for these old buttons leads to interesting conjecture. Early buttons of the French army bore the regimental numeral within a *foliole*. Dupleix was the first to raise sepoy battalions trained, disciplined and partially equipped in the European manner, which doubtless included French style buttons.

The British, we know, countered by arming and training Indian regiments, and what is more probable than in imitating the French system they also copied their button design? The laurels ornamenting the rim were possibly added after victory ! Anyway, the Broken Ring and Laurels has formed part of the

design of Indian Army buttons from the earliest date of which we have knowledge.

* * * * *

After 1850, or thereabouts, brass replaced pewter for the sepoy's buttons, though the old design was not altered.

Some thirty years later, in conformity with a new British Army economy, Indian soldiers' regimental buttons were replaced by universal ones. The distinctive Broken Ring and Laurels was however retained: only the Imperial Cypher took the centre place, formerly reserved for the numerals, on buttons of garments supplied by the Clothing Factories.

Tradition, we know, dies hard, and men of the 16th Rajputs, 21st Punjabis and 108th Infantry were soon again wearing buttons, purchased regimentally, impressed with the number and century-old design of John Company's line.

Since 1922, however, the Broken Circle and Laurels has almost disappeared. It features on the buttons of none of the present-day regiments in India, and the only one which still reveals this ancient link with the battalions of Clive and Dupleix is that approved for Unattached Officers.

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INTERNAL SECURITY VEHICLE : A SUGGESTION

By "MARCH HARE"

MILITARY forces have constantly been used in aid of the civil power in India, as well as elsewhere within the British Commonwealth of Nations. One of the greatest drawbacks to the use of forces in this role is that they are unsuitably equipped, their armaments being excessively powerful for the purpose; particularly is this so where armoured troops are concerned. Equipped as they are with nothing less than machine guns, it is difficult to see how they can comply with the principle of the use of minimum force.

Yet the moral value of armoured forces is beyond question. For this reason it seems all the more remarkable that an armoured vehicle has not, to the best of the writer's knowledge, been designed and equipped especially for use in an internal security role. While attempting to describe such a vehicle, it is as well to consider what will be required of it.

The vehicle must be reasonably fast, for calls for its service may come from distant localities. These calls will not be made until the last possible moment, and then they will have to be answered with all possible speed, as the situation will be rapidly deteriorating and getting out of control of the local civil police force. This factor precludes the use of tracks on the vehicle, and as it will seldom if ever have to operate off the roads, wheels would be preferable.

The vehicle must be highly manoeuvrable, for it is visualised that it will be used in congested bazaars and closely built-up areas. It must be able to turn in its own length. This will necessitate steering with both front and back axles. Where there is no room to turn, as in a narrow bazaar, it must be capable of being driven backwards as well as forwards with equal ease and speed. Dual steering, front and rear is therefore necessary.

The vehicle must be capable of surmounting obstacles, such as hastily constructed road blocks, and even be able to negotiate small steps, such as are sometimes found in narrow bazaars. Four-wheel drive is therefore imperative.

The vehicle must provide protection for the crew, from lapid missiles and small arms fire. Some form of light armour, proof against rifle fire at short range, must therefore be provided. That found on the present Bren gun carrier would in all probability be found to be adequate, if not excessive. This armour must not only be on all four sides but on top also, so that cover from missiles thrown from roof tops can be obtained.

The vehicle must be capable of warning a truculent crowd of its presence, and that force may be used. This suggests the inclusion of a loud hailer or loud speaker amongst its equipment. Also some form of visual warning will have to be included. A red screen or board bearing a suitable inscription in the local dialect and easily displayed is suggested; so that those in the vicinity can read it and take heed.

To attract attention to these warnings an extremely loud and distinctive horn or siren must also be installed. In order that the screen may be seen by as many as possible of the assembled crowd, height will be an important consideration, and therefore within reason, the vehicle should be as high as possible. This height will also give the officer or magistrate in the vehicle a commanding view of the situation, and they can themselves be seen the more easily by a greater number of those present.

It must be capable of using minimum force, if the warnings referred to above go unheeded. This can best be provided by a powerful jet of water squirted through a nozzle with considerable force, and capable of reasonable accuracy. The writer has knowledge of an incident where a fire hose was used to disperse an unruly crowd of sweepers, containing a large proportion of women clad in thin muslin blouses. When the water was turned on them they were saturated, and the thin cotton blouses clinging to their bodies became transparent, with the result that the crowd fled in embarrassment to the huge delight of the more peaceful onlookers. The vehicle must therefore carry a tank containing water under high pressure, and a means of directing a jet of water up to 50 or more yards with considerable force.

If the water jet is unsuccessful, or considered unsuitable for the occasion, then greater force must be applied. *The vehicle must therefore be capable of projecting tear-gas bombs.* In order to do so a suitable high angle projector which can be loaded from inside the vehicle must be provided. The projectile must be capable of bursting above the heads of the crowd, necessitating some form of time fuse. The same projector might be used for launching small H. E. bombs in extreme cases. Something similar to the infantry 2 inch mortar, suitably modified, might answer the problem. Needless to say it must be so fitted as to fire in all directions, including on to the tops of houses overlooking the scene of action.

If firing has to be resorted to, then the minimum force is a single round. The vehicle must therefore be armed with a weapon capable of firing one round at a time. This rules out the M. M. G. and all similar heavy automatic weapons. But since a single round may be insufficient, and greater force necessary, two or three rounds may have to be fired in quick succession or even in a short burst. The only suitable weapon capable of doing this with which the army is equipped is the Bren or V. gun. Therefore the I. S. Vehicle must be equipped with one or two of these weapons and nothing more powerful.

It must also be remembered that A. F. Vs used in close proximity to a hostile crowd are themselves vulnerable to attack and destruction by fire. To prevent the crowd from coming into close contact with the vehicle, it will be necessary to surround it with an electric circuit, capable of giving those who touch it an electric shock sufficient to deter them from meddling with it. Warnings to this effect will have to be written in several languages on the vehicle.

Room will have to be provided within the vehicle for the crew (driver and gunner), and officer and a passenger (magistrate or police officer). The vehicles may be used not only for patrolling, but for the actual dispersion of an unlawful assembly. In all probability they would be used in pairs or groups of three. Additional equipment would include a wireless set, stretchers and first-aid kit, powerful head-lights, both front and rear, as well as a spot-light for night patrolling, run-flat or similar tyres incapable of deflation in the event of damage, and the usual break-down equipment carried on similar vehicles.

Their chief drawbacks seem to be their inability to make an arrest and succour the wounded after an engagement. These duties could however be performed by the civil police actually on the spot, provided the equipment is carried in the vehicles. There would appear to be no necessity for infantry on foot to accompany these vehicles, and the speed and economy in man-power with which they could come into action is self-evident.

It is now up to the more technical of your readers to state if such a vehicle is a practical proposition.

“READY AYE READY”

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL VIDYA DHAR JAYAL, D.S.O.

THE study of mottoes of units is an interesting one. The effect they have on the units concerned is even more interesting. In this respect, the motto of 6th Royal Bn. (Scinde). The Frontier Force Rifles is significant. The Battalion was raised under orders of Sir Charles Napier in 1843 as a mobile force, mounted on camels, to deal with the wild tribes of Baluchistan and Scinde. It had to be prepared to act at very short notice. Its mobility depended on a high state of efficiency and toughness of man and beast.

The motto “READY AYE READY” was bestowed upon the unit by Sir Charles Napier himself from its inception. Literally, it may be translated as: “to be prepared to deal with any situation.” Actually it could be interpreted in various other ways. The interpretation could be carried a little further and be considered to support the most important principles of war:—

- (a) *Mobility*.—Is directly dependant on the degree of preparedness.
- (b) *Offensive action*.—Cannot be undertaken without preparation and forethought.
- (c) *Surprise*.—To be prepared is the best guard against surprise, and the best means of effecting it.
- (d) *Security*.—To be ready is to be secure.
- (e) *Co-operation*.—It is not the preparedness of the individuals but the unit as a whole that matters. This can be attained only by co-operation. Hence the importance of the word “*Milap*” and its application throughout all subordinate Units in a Battalion.

The 59th is proud of its motto. It is not merely an adjunct to its crest but a byword, the spirit of which is understood by all ranks. If on occasions things go badly it becomes at once an inspiration, and a “war cry” to rally the men and urge them on to do or die.

The history of the Battalion up to the end of the Great War 1914—18 has been written. It is a glorious record of valour. In a foreword to the history, the Colonel Commandant wrote:—

“As G. O. C. Northern Army in India, I invariably noted against each corps what I considered its strongest point, and on looking over my diaries I find that against the 59th I always wrote “Very reliable.” This they certainly proved themselves to be in France and Flanders, 1914/15, where I was fortunate in having them under my command; and their record there, and later in Mesopotamia and Palestine, is one they may well be proud of.”

The 59th has made history in the World War 1939—45. It is much too early yet to make a historical record of its achievements in the late war. Suffice it to say that the traditions won for itself in the first World War were fully maintained in the second World War, and judging from the two following examples it is certain that Lord Birdwood would still enter it up in his diary as

"very reliable". Here are some remarks made by the Divisional Commander who himself served with the 59th in Eritrea:—

"The 'Unath' were truly grand and naturally it gave me the greatest joy to see their fine form. The Battalion was their Brigadier's standby for every most formidable task. The Brigadier was an ex-Scots Guardsman, and at the end of one spell of fighting I think he would have admitted that even his beloved Battalion could not have served him more truly."

Let me add short descriptions of the Battles of Keren and Amba Alagi.

Keren.—The Battalion had just put in a strong attack. It had suffered heavy casualties. One of the forward platoons of "A" Company commanded by a Havildar had gained its objective but had suffered nearly 60% casualties. While the platoon was consolidating the position, it became apparent that the enemy was going to launch a strong counter-attack. The platoon was already under heavy mortar fire, and the enemy could be seen about one hundred yards away. The noise was great and the dust from the shells was rising high. There was no time for elaborate order. While there was a slight lull, a clear voice was heard, "READY AYE READY." The counter-attack was repulsed.

Amba Alagi.—The Italians had made Amba Alagi into a formidable stronghold. They considered that they were holding an impregnable position, for Mt. Amba Alagi is 12,000 feet high. But they were to be disillusioned again. The first attack by the Brigade on the AMBA ALAGI position had failed.

On the 6th May 1941, at about 1600 hours, the Commanding Officer of the 59th was called to a conference and given an objective to be attacked at 0500 hours the next morning. It was a feature called Castle Hill, to the south-west of Amba Alagi peak. The distance to the objective from the position the Battalion was occupying was about 6 miles. The approach to the objective was difficult. It meant going down about 1,000 feet, crossing a ravine, and then climbing about 2,000 feet. It was nearly dark by the time orders were given to the Platoon Commanders, and they were pointed out the objectives in fading light. At 2100 hours, in pitch dark and torrential rain, the 59th started the approach march. No reconnaissance of the route had been made, and even the crossing place in the ravine was not known.

In manuals and pamphlets a great deal is written about night operations and what detailed preparations are necessary. But occasions will arise when books cannot be followed. That is where the spirit of "READY AYE READY" comes in. The attack was launched at 0500 hours as scheduled. The eye witness to Castle Hill battle was the ex-Scots Guards Brigadier himself, for he watched the action from the opposite peak. The attack was a silent one with no artillery support. An F. O. O. accompanied the forward company to provide artillery fire when wanted, but unfortunately he was wounded in the earlier stages of the attack.

The Italians were occupying a strong position on Castle Hill, as it was the most important outer bastion to the Amba Alagi position. Subjected to small arms and mortar fire, which was very accurate, the leading company suffered heavy casualties. The forward platoons were held up and the situation was pretty bad. At this rather critical stage the foremost platoon commander shouted, "*Guru di Saun—Unath di Qasam—Age Barho.*" Thereupon Sepoy Saudagar Singh, though quite seriously wounded, went forward with a bayonet.

His pugri came off in the thick scrub, and his long hair became loose. He must have looked like a real killer. When the position was captured his body was lying on top of a dead Italian in whose chest his bayonet was still sticking. Around him lay four more dead Italians who had met their death from the same bayonet.

After the action, in congratulating the Battalion, the Brigadier remarked that it was beyond his comprehension how the objective was taken. When he gave the objective to the 59th he knew fully well how difficult a task it was. He knew that without proper reconnaissance even the approach march was difficult, yet he knew too that the objective would be captured.

* * * *

Actions speak for themselves. A reputation for reliability can be won only after a succession of acid tests. In war, quite often plans go wrong. At such times a commander looks round for a "very reliable" Battalion in which he has the greatest confidence. Then "Ready Aye Ready" rises to the occasion, no matter how difficult the task may be.

The Battalion gained more laurels in Italy. The Italian winter was very severe. The Battalion remained continuously in action for months. In the snow, slush and mud of Italy, in conditions of greatest hardship, it maintained the same cheerfulness as it did in Flanders in the Great War 1914-1918. The spirit of "Ready Aye Ready" pervaded every man in the unit. It was this spirit that made Sweeper Mehar Din, I. D. S. M. carry ammunition forward under heavy fire.

According to the partition of the Army the Battalion has been allotted to Pakistan. To those who have served with the 59th it will always remain a matter of pride that its officers and men lived up to its motto. That motto was the Star that guided them along the path of glory.

Pah Makhe de Khah!

FIVE MORE INDIANS PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERALS.

The names of five new Indian Major-Generals and six new Brigadiers have been announced by A. H. Q. (India). They are included in the following appointments:—

Brigadier Thakur Nathu Singh and Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh have been selected for Major-General's appointment in Commands.

Brigadiers D. R. Thapar, I. A. M. C., A. N. Sharma, I. A. M. C., and S. B. S. Chimni, R.I.A.S.C., are also being promoted to the rank of Major-Generals.

Colonels Atma Singh, Tara Singh, Bal, J. C. Katoch and Sant Singh are promoted Brigadiers and given commands of Infantry Brigades.

Colonels C. B. Ponnappa, and Lakhinder Singh are also promoted Brigadiers and given commands of Sub-Areas.

Brigadier K. S. Thimayya is being given command of a new Brigade.

Brigadiers Madhuv Sinhji and D. S. Brar are to be appointed Commanders of Sub-Areas.

CONTINENTAL COMMENT

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL E. N. GODDARD, C.B., C.I.E., C.B.E., M.V.O., M.C.

HOW many of us today feel more or less (and most of us rather more than less) bewildered? Reactions after the efforts of the War; the complexity of our everyday problems, from which there is no retreat; and the lurking fear that perhaps we are inclined rather away from, instead of towards, a solution; these are the main causes for our state of mind. But without allaying this uncertainty, our efficiency as soldiers, sailors or candlestick makers and our worth as citizens are prejudiced. It is only by everybody putting both shoulders to the wheel and pushing all the time in the right direction that not only ourselves but the whole world will survive. But we must know in which direction to exert our efforts and all push the same way.

It is natural that, at such a time, we focus our eyes on ourselves and our own troubles rather than on the affairs of others. Restrictions on travel abroad prevent us seeing the problems of our neighbours and how they set out to meet them. Yet knowledge comes from experience and the observation of others.

I have recently had the opportunity of re-visiting France and Switzerland, two countries of which I am very fond and in which I have spent many happy days; and it may be that a cursory analysis of some of the conditions and trends in the two countries will help us to begin to sort out our own tangled skein.

The time and, therefore, the opportunity available were short, far too short, to study political thoughts and trends; but there is indeed some advantage in this, since remarks on current politics are usually construed as criticism and may make enemies rather than friends. Whereas observations, more general and less political, call forth no resentment.

The ravages of war in France, mainly in the North West—South West, have been small in comparison to the size of the country, which nevertheless has been pitted in its vitals—communications and factories—by the Allied Airforces. Even so, France has lost little of its beauty and Paris, despite lack of point and the absence of repair seven to the stone façades of buildings such as the Louvre, still retains its dignity and grandeur. The main streets washed down daily are in high contrast to those in London. However shabby the centre of Paris may become, it will never lose its air. The climate assists the three centuries of absolute power which went into the creation of the more noble parts of the city.

The austerity and high cost of food and drink makes French people amazed and angry. I witnessed the unconcealed rage of a young Frenchman at being asked to pay for radishes as a large part of an inadequate lunch in one of the French mail trains. Whatever privations Britain has so far experienced they fall far short of those now being shouldered by the people of Paris and the other big towns.

Rations, recently reduced, are inadequate, and even so, are just not available in the town. The consternation of the average French housewife

at not being able to procure butter or fresh vegetables amounts to incredulous wonder and can be likened to that of a child told that this year there will be no Christmas presents. "No butter in France!" they exclaim, and raise their eyes to heaven as if to prevent them dropping out of their heads.

A visit in the early morning to Les Halles, the French equivalent in the heart of Paris to Covent Garden in London, disclosed a display of meat, fresh vegetables and fruit woefully small for the capital of a nation who justly prided itself on its cuisine and to whom the thought of canned food is anathema. The old porters, as forthright as their counterparts in London and equally ready to seize an opportunity to sever your Achilles tendon with the front wheels of their barrows if you do not get out of their way, were almost tearful on the subject.

In England the psychological effect of empty markets has largely spent itself; the sting now remaining is merely physical. In France this will never be. The housewife can neither forget nor forgive that she is deprived, for some reason or other far beyond her control, of the essentials which enabled her to attain the high standard as a housewife which her husband has always demanded. She feels now that the dice is loaded against her. Previously she accepted ungrudgingly the formula that she must produce perfectly cooked meals, notwithstanding that they might well have to be prepared in a cramped, dank and even cockroach-ridden kitchen; whereas her American cousin would be content with nothing less than the latest Ideal Home plastic devices, although the extent of her exertion was likely to be limited to opening a few tins.

A small strata of society, hastily and rather inaccurately dubbed speculators and rich commercants, appears to be well off. The workers find a refuge in the pegging of wages to prices. But for those on fixed incomes it is as always in days of inflation a sad time. M. Blum's psychological shock of arbitrarily bringing prices down to meet wages by a reduction of 10% in prices has been tried and forsaken for a return to the less original solution of inflation. Labour disputes ensue; the Government meets the unions—called C. G. T.; and now there is the promise of American economic aid to Europe.

Meanwhile the middle strata suffers silently and with restraint. It is pathetic to see the elderly people, many in well-cut threadbare clothes and some wearing the rosette of the Legion of Honour, standing patiently in queues waiting for a few hundred grammes of indifferent bread. It took my mind back 25 years to other European capitals.

The large increase in the number of antique shops indicated forcibly the trend of the times. Into these there is a steady flow of treasures, good, bad and indifferent, to be sold. One wondered a little wistfully how many tears had been shed on parting with these bric-a-brac.

Talking to a fair cross section of the people of the capital—shop assistants, clerks, newspaper vendors, cloakroom attendants, taxi drivers, waiters, etc.—one heard the same word to describe their plight: "formidable", and the same remark, "England without coal, France without wheat, can it be?"

My first impression was that they were perhaps a little jealous that English people, not having suffered to the extent they had, were in a position to visit their country and see it bent to the storm. It soon began to dawn, however, that they were not really resentful but, like children when unhappy

and perplexed, wanted a shoulder on which to shed their tears. Once they realised that sympathy was there without asking, all their story was outpoured. How they expected so much after defeat, internal schism, resistance and liberation. How they simply could not understand why there were shortages of simple things previously so plentiful. Many of these people had played no inconsiderable part in the resistance movement, when to listen in to the B. B. C. news was to risk deportation.

The extent to which nationalization of important branches of national economic activity has been introduced is very considerable. The collieries of the North and of the Pas de Calais, the principle banks, the electricity undertakings and the insurance companies have so far been included in the measure which has now been in operation for two years; and although it is as yet early days the general remarks so far in the French Press are that whereas in the past the services, now nationalised, contributed large sums to the State in the way of taxes, now it appears that these will be more than swallowed up in the increased costs which have already fallen on the country. This is interesting; but even more arresting is that many Frenchmen are now saying, whereas they are wholeheartedly with the principle of nationalisation, they in no way agree with the speed and manner of its applications. This is very different from the deep desire of the French people as avinced up to two years ago to nationalise the main branches of their country's economic activity.

It requires more than inflation, shortage of food, and disappointment with things in general, however, to divest the Parisian of his capacity to enjoy himself quietly and sedately on a holiday. The large numbers who visit the many museums and historic buildings show such a pride in the past achievements of France and such joy in the greatness of which they are a symbol. This feeling has, I think, increased of recent years; perhaps adversity has caused it to grow. It certainly brought home to me the extent of France's cultural greatness and the belief that it will never be a wasting asset. How much more the French know of their country's story than many other nations? Moreover, their youth refrain from such actions as using the statues of national heroes in public places as football goal posts.

Compare the people in the Bois de Boulogne on a Sunday or in the Louvre garden on any day with its counterpart at Hampstead or in Hyde Park? I think the French crowd enjoys itself far more and certainly more quietly than we do. You never see a French woman making herself up in public and yet are they less sweet to look on than their English sisters? When a French woman smokes it is less frequently and more discreetly, with the result that it enhances her charm, to do which is surely the height of all feminine ambition?

Their innate sense of patriotism and decorum was exemplified in a small incident I saw at Versailles. A party of men and women—not French—were being conducted round. One couple had with them a squeaky wheeled push cart, in which was a rosy cheeked baby blissfully oblivious of its historic surroundings. On the threshold of some of the more exquisite exhibits, a kindly French woman attendant remonstrated gently on the sacrilege of dragging the pram over the polished wooden floor. All the father uttered was to the effect that he could carry the pram up the stone staircases; and we were left to witness the French lady stopping her ears while he manfully endeavoured to overcome the coefficient of friction in the wheels across the same floor as had once borne the satin slippers of Marie Antoinette.

I left France sorry for the people in their adversity. I felt that their pride in past history and achievement was a strong tonic against future ills, and I realised that we have more than a little to learn of dignity and behaviour.

* * * * *

To enter Switzerland is like visiting a new world. It is not only because of the air of plenty and the lack of restrictions. All things are not in abundance and there are numerous controls. It is something deeper, less tangible but more lasting. You have only to walk from one end of the long platform at Bale into the Swiss part of the station on one's journey from London to realise that here is something different from the rest of war-wracked Europe. Trivialities which are symptoms of this are that there is no overcrowding of the trains ; everybody has the time and is pleased to pass the time of day ; there is no haggle over tips ; and the luggage is moved swiftly and without any fuss.

Life both in the towns and the country seems to run on well-ordered lines ; quietly, steadily, smoothly. Most people seem happy ; all look well ; everyone is polite. One is welcomed cordially, but the attitude has nothing to do with the fact that the Swiss look to the foreign tourist traffic for most of their livelihood as they are fully aware of the good services they render to their visitors. Like all hill people they are independent ; and they are keenly conscious that their history, of which they are intensely but quietly proud, teaches them that they are real freemen with a magnificent record over hundreds of years.

They realise the danger in which they stood during the War and are grateful that it was averted ; but they are mindful to emphasise that they were prepared for the worst, and while they accepted the sacrifices necessary they would have stopped at nothing to preserve their independence.

Throughout the country, in houses, hotels, cinemas, etc., are pictures of General Guisan, who guided Swiss military destiny during the War. To these they point with pride, but with none of the arrogance which marked the Germans in their pre-war attitude about portraits of Hitler. These pictures of General Guisan have become symbolic of the attitude of the Swiss people towards their position in the post-war world. They realise things are not less, and will become more difficult, but are determined to meet these problems squarely and united, like a well-reefed ship, standing out from land in a storm, instead of seeking the false security of a shoal bordered port.

In Swiss newspapers of all types the standard of news and the manner in which it is presented brought home to me the immense interest which the average man in the street takes in the more important, as opposed to sensational and trivial happenings, not only round him, but all over the world. Surely this is a true indication of the stability of the country and its people ? Foreign news is presented in a compact, restrained, and, in my opinion, exceptionally well-edited form, covering a very wide plane and indicating that the Swiss want to know and, what is more these days, insist on knowing exactly what is happening in the world in preference to sensational, highly spiced and really trivial news calculated to acerbate unnecessarily and fray our badly worn nerves.

Surely this is a feather in the cap of those who have devised and directed the educational system ? Another significant point in Swiss newspapers is

the high standard and wide range of leading articles as apart from news. It indicates clearly that Switzerland, situated in the centre of Europe, looks and thinks in all directions, like a hub with spokes reaching to all points of the compass.

The Swiss Railways complete their centenary in August, an event which has been the signal for the publication of an attractively produced magazine, a copy of which one finds hung up in every railway carriage. The style in which the book is written shows the just pride the Swiss feel in their achievement and their satisfaction in portraying it to the world. They are pleased to tell those who travel in their trains—and their travellers are international—how the few kilometres of trundling line opened in 1847 have developed into the magnificent network of electric railways, much of it at a high altitude, covering the country and connecting the corners of Europe. The high standard of quiet and good manners shows itself in the fact that copies of the magazine are never defaced and are always replaced on the appropriate hook. It is interesting to note that the Swiss Government decided in the comparatively early days of the development of their railways to put a stop to individual development and to federate all lines.

I may have created the impression that Switzerland has no labour troubles. This is not so, and could not be so in any country in this post-war world. Certain classes of labour are short, which is intensified by a revulsion—probably temporary—against certain types of employment. There is a large pool of Italians ready to fill the deficiency, but this introduces other complications. Further, these problems are intensified by the large percentage of people living in the towns and the considerable proportion of the country which is uninhabitable mountainside.

But the sensible feeling, difficult to describe but easy to perceive, which seems to pervade the whole nation, gives the outside observer the impression that patience, trust and mutual concession in place of impetuosity, suspicion and selfishness are triumphing.

As an example of this is an incident with a Swiss master-builder whom I met on a hillside high above his native town, busying himself with repairing the hut in which he was living. He looked like some Olympic games athlete with that lithe appearance which comes of being born on skis. In the course of conversation I asked him why he was up there during the good weather time of the year, and not down in the town superintending his buildings. He replied to the effect that there was a strike on and that he had come up into the hills to think it over and give tempers time to cool off—just for a few days, after which the dispute would be settled.

The industry and pride in their work of all—men and women—in every walk of life struck me as remarkable; especially as it is accompanied by cheerfulness and comradeship which elsewhere is frequently absent. Whether the result of this state of mind tends to make a nation of craftsmen or whether it springs from the fact that the Swiss generally are natural craftsmen, I cannot say. But the fact remains that no matter whether it is a *chic* little waitress in a cakeshop, a skilled hand in a watch factory, a peasant sweeping the leaves off his hillside meadow, all seem to be imbued with the idea of doing the job as well and as quickly as can be without an eye on the clock, and that it is God's will that it should be so. And surely in their simple thoughts lies all their happiness and much of their prosperity? Nowhere is there any sense of inferiority, and their work certainly offers adequate proof of its worth.

I have mentioned the high percentage of the population collected in the towns. Swiss industries have to find world markets, and are doing so with considerable success although exchange is at present against them.

I have been apt to forget how international are the Swiss. The nation is made up of French, Germans and Italians ; all three languages are heard. Yet there is no question of the speakers not being Swiss. In no country that I have seen is the national spirit stronger. Yet by its very nature it is international ; and to witness this is to realise that surely a united Europe is possible and not merely an elusive dream but the genesis of a reality ; not merely the blue-print, but the working model itself is there.

I left Switzerland glad that I had had the opportunity to see again the happy, virile, God-fearing people who are pleased to show those who visit them the measure of their industry and the force of their conviction that it is not what you do which indicates your worth in this world but the manner in which you do it.

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THE AFRICA GENERAL SERVICE MEDAL, 1899—1920

BY BRIGADIER H. BULLOCK, O.B.E., F.R. HIST. S.

THE Africa General Service Medal was established in 1902 by King Edward VII, and was last awarded for the Somaliland operations of 1920. Its prototype was the East and Central Africa Medal of 1897-99, the reverse of the two medals being identical except that the word "Africa" is substituted for "East and Central Africa", while on the obverse the head of Edward VII replaces that of Queen Victoria. After George V's accession, his effigy of course appears.

No less than 44 bars were awarded, those for East and Central Africa being:—

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. B. C. A. 1899-1900. | *12. Jubaland 1917-18. |
| 2. Uganda 1900. | 13. Somaliland 1920. |
| 3. Jubaland. | 14. East Africa 1902. |
| 4. Somaliland 1901. | 15. East Africa 1904. |
| *5. Lango 1901. | 16. East Africa 1905. |
| 6. Somaliland 1902-04. | 17. East Africa 1906. |
| 7. Jidballi. | 18. East Africa 1913. |
| 8. Nandi 1905-06. | 19. East Africa 1913-14. |
| 9. Somaliland 1908-10. | 20. East Africa 1914. |
| 10. Shimber Berris 1914-15. | 21. East Africa 1915. |
| *11. Nyasaland 1915. | 22. East Africa 1918. |

The remaining 22 bars were for services in West Africa, and of them only one—"Gambia" (1901)—was awarded to Indian troops, with whose services in relation to the A. G. S. Medal this paper is concerned. The nine "East Africa" dated bars, and the three others marked with an asterisk above, are not known to have been earned by soldiers of the Indian Army, though it is probable that a few were awarded to Indians in the Colonial police forces and other employ. The remaining ten bars were given to bodies, large or small, of Indian troops.

The number, rank and unit which are found impressed on the rim of an A.G.S. Medal of a sepoy who belonged to one of the Contingents* are sometimes those allotted to him in the Contingent, or sometimes those borne by him in his parent Indian Regiment. Those particulars are invariably impressed in small sans-serif capitals, and to this extent an A. G. S. Medal is practically unfakeable, for any attempt to rename it can readily be detected. Faking by the removal or addition of bars is however, possible, and might sometimes only be discovered after reference to the original medal rolls or other records.

It is extremely difficult to find a medal with three bars awarded to an Indian soldier, or even one with two bars except for the combination "Somaliland 1902-04" and "Jidballi". ("Jidballi" is never found alone, for everyone present at the battle also qualified for "Somaliland 1902-04" as well). Bars are apt to get loose or become lost through rough treatment, or because additional bars, granted later, are often affixed insecurely by a regimental armourer or village silversmith.

*See article on the Indian Contingents in Africa, in *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, July 1944.

Medals struck in bronze instead of silver were given to certain followers till about 1914, and are scarce. "Somaliland 1902-04" in bronze is not too difficult to find, but I know of no others except for three or four examples of "Jubaland" (Murree Mountain Battery and Supply and Transport Corps), and a curious medal which has twice appeared in the London salerooms in recent years—it had two bars, "Somaliland 1901" and "Jidballi", and if the latter really belonged to it then a bar for "Somaliland 1902-04" must have been removed or lost, and the medal was defective. The recipient was an African follower of the Somali Levies, which perhaps indicates that the "Somaliland 1901" bar may have been authentic.

I will now deal with each bar in turn, as awarded to members of the Indian Army or to Indians in the King's African Rifles.

"B. C. A. 1899-1900".—The medal with this bar was sanctioned for the troops who had taken part in the operations (a) against Nkwamba, August to October 1899, (b) in N. W. Rhodesia, against Kazembe, September to November 1899, and (c) in Central Angoniland, against Kalulu, in December 1900. A detachment of 135 Sikhs of the Indian Contingent in British Central Africa is the only body of sepoys which I have definitely ascertained to have taken part in any of these expeditions—it fought against Nkwamba, co-operating with a Portuguese force; but it is not improbable that other Sikhs with the Contingent participated in the operations in Rhodesia and Angoniland.

Two medals, both awarded to sepoys of the 24th Punjabis, were once in the famous Payne and Montagu collections, broken up many years ago; and this had led to the erroneous statement that the 24th, as a regiment, took part in the 1899-1900 operations. I once had the medal awarded to a gunner of the 4th (Hazara) Mountain Battery, F.F., with two other medals of his, one being the Indian General Service Medal with the rare bar "Hunza 1891"—a very unusual combination; and Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Adams, R. Signals, has the medal awarded to a sepoy of the 15th Sikhs together with three other medals of the same man's, including the Ashanti Medal, 1900, with bar "Kumasi", an even more remarkable group. It may be noted that of the small number of Sikh sepoys—about 83—who received the Ashanti Medal, quite a few also had "B.C.A. 1899-1900". I have had two others with this bar, one awarded to a sepoy of the 45th Sikhs.

All the Indians' medals with bar "B.C.A. 1899-1900" which I have seen were impressed with the Indian Regimental number and unit, not with their description in the Contingent. The same practice seems always to have been followed both for Central Africa medals, 1891—1898, and Ashanti medals, thus making it easier to identify groups and to procure details of the recipients from the regimental records.

"UGANDA 1900".—This bar was awarded to the troops who took part in the operation in the Nandi country between 3rd July and October 1900 under the command of Lieut.-Colonel J. T. Evatt, D.S.O., Indian Army. The Indians all belonged to the 1st Uganda Rifles, and numbered 3 Indian officers, 1 hospital assistant, and 223 Indian other ranks, with 3 British officers of the Indian Army.* I have had two examples awarded to Punjabi Musalman riflemen, and another belonging to a Sikh.

"JUBALAND".—This was granted to all troops who took part in the Ogaden punitive expedition in 1901, and unlike the two preceding bars was

*These figures, taken from the medal roll, correct these given by Irwin.

earned not by the Indian Contingents in the colonial service but by regular units of the Indian Army. These were the Aden Camel Corps (52 rifles, apparently all Indians), one section of the 9th (Murree) Mountain Battery, and a wing (*i.e.*, half a battalion) of the 16th Bombay Infantry*; so the total number of Indian recipients of the bar must have been about 500. Irwin's book states that 465 silver and 26 bronze medals were issued to the army†. A number also went to the Navy. I have seen three Mountain Battery medals, and examples of the 16th Bombay Infantry medals sometimes come on the market in London. I have had a silver medal of a Sikh gunner of the Murree Mountain Battery, and a bronze one of a *salutri* (farrier) of the Supply and Transport Corps.

"**SOMALILAND 1901**".—This bar was granted for (*a*) operations against the Mad Mullah in 1901, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel E.J.E. Swayne, Indian Army, and to (*b*) those with the Abyssinian Force which co-operated between 22nd May and 30th July 1901. It is much the rarest of the eleven with which we are concerned, and Dr. Payne in his book stated that the total number issued was under 40. My own researches indicate that this figure is probably an under-estimate and that the actual figure may have been about 75; even so, the bar is one of the rarities of medal-collecting.

The available sources of information disclose the following: (*a*) Lieut.-Colonel Swayne stated in his dispatches that he had 21 British officers besides himself; and all these are named by Captain Malcolm McNeill in his book *In Pursuit of the Mad Mullah* (London, 1902); (*b*) Swayne also mentions having a British armourer-serjeant, two Indian hospital assistants, and 50 sepoys; (*c*) with the Abyssinian Force there were two British officers, and Dr. C. Martin of the Burma Uncovenanted Medical Service, a native of Abyssinia, who later became known to history as Ethiopian Minister to the Court of St. James at the time of the Italian aggression in 1935-36, and who was recently living in India.

Four British officers of the Indian Army received this bar: Lieut.-Colonel E. J. E. Swayne, 16th Rajputs (later Sir Eric Swayne, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E., Governor of British Honduras from 1906 to 1913); Major W.G.L. Beynon (later Major-General, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O.); Captain J. W. B. Merewether (later Lieut.-Colonel, C.I.E.); and Lieutenant H. St. G. Boulton, I. M. S. (later Major-General, C. B. E.). The fifty Punjabi sepoys, who were brought to Somaliland to act as drill and musketry instructors and as maxingun crews for the African Somali Levies, apparently received the medal, as all of them reached Burao, the base for the expedition. I have had two of the sepoys' medals, which were impressed with "Somali Levies", not their Indian parent unit.

"**GAMBIA**".—Amongst the troops who received this bar were a detachment of the 2nd Central African Regiment, with which a few of the Sikh Contingent in British Central Africa took the field. The Indian Army List for January 1908 shows Subedar Attar Singh of the 62nd Punjabis as having his bar, and as having served at the action of Dumbuti. He also had the Central Africa Medal with bar. The "Gambia" bar awarded to an Indian is very rare and I have never seen one.

* 8 B.Os., 8 I.Os., 1 hospital asst., 435 I.O.Rs., 21 public and 23 private followers. Now the 4th Bn. Mahratta Light Infantry.

† These figures are certainly understated, for apart from the Indian Troops at least four companies of the East African Rifles were engaged.

"SOMALILAND 1902-04".—In contrast to the small expeditions and campaigns already mentioned, this bar was granted to a very large number of land and sea forces engaged in protracted operations. No list even of the units can be given, and the Indian recipients must have amounted to five or ten thousand.

"JIDBALLI".—This decisive battle took place on 10th January 1904, many hundreds of Indian troops being present, including the 27th Punjabis and the 52nd Sikhs. The British casualties in killed were only 24, of whom 14 were African irregulars.

"NANDI 1905-06".—This bar was sanctioned for the operations in the Nandi country between 18th October 1905 and 6th July 1906. The Indian recipients were the two Indian companies—apparently all Sikhs—of the 4th King's African Rifles. Amongst the British officers three at least were of the Indian Army and one was in the I. M. S. The bar, whether awarded to an Indian or an African, is distinctly rare.

"SOMALILAND 1908-1910".—For the operations in these years against the Mullah and his followers, whole units of the Indian Army were employed, including the 113th Infantry and the 127th Baluch Light Infantry, as well as the 6th Battalion King's African Rifles, an Indian unit raised in 1904 and converted in 1905 to all-Indian, and disbanded when in 1901—11 it was decided to evacuate the hinterland, to arm certain tribesmen, and to withdraw the British forces to the coast. The bar is not rare, but a medal of the 6th K.A.R. provides an interesting relic of a now-forgotten Indian battalion.

"SHIMBER BERRIS 1914-15".—From now onwards the medal bears the effigy of King George V.

The troops engaged, who received the Shimber Berris bar, were in November 1914 the Indian Contingent of the King's African Rifles (250 strong), the Somaliland Camel Constabulary (450 Somalis and 150 Indians) and some tribal levies (all Africans)—in all some 14 officers and 520 rank and file; and in February 1915 the same, with a detachment of the 23rd Sikh Pioneers (one British officer and 13 rank and file)—15 officers and 570 other ranks in all. Rewards for gallantry to Indian soldiers were the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd class, to Havildar Teja Singh and Naik Sher Singh of the 23rd Pioneers for bravery on 4th February 1915 and the Indian Distinguished Service Medal to Jemadar Firoz Khan of the 56th Punjabi Rifles and Naik Shan Khan of the 76th Punjabis for bravery in November 1914. The last two were serving with the Indian Contingent.

I have had a single-bar specimen, and also a two-bar one (with "Somaliland 1920" as well), both awarded to sepoy of the Indian Contingent. The bar is very rare.

"SOMALILAND 1920".—The Indian troops who earned this bar were a wing of the 101st Grenadiers; a number of Indians in the Somaliland Camel Corps; and possibly some sepoys of the Indian Contingent King's African Rifles. The total number of Indians who received it must have been about 600. I have had medals of the 101st Grenadiers and the Somaliland Camel Corps, as well as the two-bar medal already mentioned. This bar also is of some rarity.

It may be noted that all Africa General Service medals have swivelling suspender-bars except those with the "Somaliland 1920" bar which, perhaps in some burst of post-war economy, have solid fixed suspenders of practically the same pattern as the British War Medal, 1914—18, but rather better finished.

In conclusion, the *estimated* number issued of each bar to Indians is thus summarised :—

B. C. A. 1899-1900	135
Uganda 1900	227
Jubaland	475
Somaliland 1901	52
Gambia	10 (?)
Somaliland 1902-04	7,500 (?)
Jidballi	2,000 (?)
Nandi 1905-06	200
Somaliland 1908-10	1,750 (?)
Shimber Berris 1914-15	600
Somaliland 1920	800

No figures for bronze medals can be given. There must have been several hundred at least of "Somaliland 1902-04", but all the others are rare in bronze. The issue of bronze medals instead of silver ones to followers was discontinued before 1914, so that "Shimber Berris 1914-15" and "Somaliland 1920" do not exist in bronze.

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CO-EDUCATION

BY MAJOR J. C. GONELLA.

Many civil and military officers whose children have hitherto been educated in India are now considering the continuation of their education at Home. To these parents, and indeed to educationists generally, the subject of co-education is one of extreme interest, and the author of this article faces it with frankness and candour.

AMID the welter of sense, practical foresight, idealism and fantasy which characterize the speeches and writings of those whose task it will be to guide Britain through the hazardous paths of post-war living, there emerges the fact that, even in the most addled brain, there is the realisation that much truth lies in the assertion that "a nation's greatness depends on the education of its people."

Education, unlike other phases of living, never ceases to exercise a considerable influence on the individual; at no time from childhood to old age does a man or woman exist under circumstances in which he or she cannot learn something; a million different facts come to light in every year of conscious life, and provided that the individual has learned the capacity for absorption, education, in its true sense, is always in progress. Like all other structures, however, a foundation is necessary to permit the building of the superstructure—it is this foundation, this vital basis, without which the superficialities are just so much frillery, which is by far the most difficult process; and it is in the schools of Britain, from the country board school of twenty pupils to the vast organization of a city or public school of twelve hundred, that this foundation is sketched and consolidated.

The pre-war educational system had many critics; the accusations of "feudal," "ineffective," "unimaginative," "inadequate" were levelled continuously. That one or two, while not all, the criticisms were justified, is admitted by educationists. The realisations of the last six years have emphasised the need for radical changes in the system of education in Britain—courageous changes which will perforce shatter many traditions which the conservative mind formerly considered essential. The educationist of the future will have to be, like Disraeli, "a Radical to uproot what is wrong and a Tory to preserve what is right." The process of elimination will not be easy; confiction of ideas will render co-ordination of methods a task calling for a great wealth of efficiency; a supreme tact and a very real human understanding.

Those who are charged with the effecting of the transition have the finest subjects in the world with whom to work and for whom to succeed. It will depend entirely on the success of their efforts whether Britain, and all for which she stands, can continue to exert the civilizing influence on mankind which she has so ably effected for five hundred years.

I, the most humble of critics, writing only with the justification of having been for sixteen years a fortunate escapee from our anachronistic educational methods, venture to state a point of view which in my opinion should be paramount in the minds of our post-war education planners. I refer to the much-maligned and little understood system of co-education.

The number of schools of this type in the United Kingdom which have names known beyond an immediate locality can be counted on the fingers of one hand—those recognised internationally are even less. I had the good fortune to start education in life at one of the latter from the age of five to the wisdom of nineteen and there I formed my first impressions of the intricacies of the maze which we call existence. My mind has broadened and advanced from those timid days when a conclusion of thought was a major adventure, and now in the late twenties, I am thankful, perhaps above all things, that my first faltering steps were led into and through the incomparable paths of that grand sponsor.

"Every man is, or should be, proud to the point of belligerence, of his alma mater; any breath of criticism against her should be challenged. She fostered, bred and moulded you—you are one of her works. Defend her!"

I heard these words uttered by a very famous man just prior to the war. Stirring words, partially true words—yes; but very open to misconstruction and subsequent narrowness of mind. I may be a reactionary, but I refuse to reverence anything or anyone who does not command my respect. Reverence, admiration and love must be spontaneous—these emotions are natural and, can never be cultivated, and if one is to accord to a school and a system these faiths, throughout life, then that school or system must continue to command them.

It is when the individual meets a circumstance, the understanding of which is essential for the proper handling of it, that the true test of education in its most valuable sense is made. The understanding of the world and the people who form its most vital force, can only be learned by living in it; histories, biographies and books of travel can fill a small part of the jigsaw, but living experience, above all things, colours the mind and determines the character.

It is a fact, perhaps in many cases, unfortunate, that character or these traits of character which last, are formed at an early age; at an age where every happiness or disillusionment, is recorded; where what might seem trivial at twenty-seven, is of first importance at eighteen; where the commonplace is magnified by uneducated imagination into the fantastic; where the guiding hand of the school and those who administer it might easily make or mar a personality for a lifetime.

That the individual is largely moulded by the atmosphere of this early training until the end of life has been, in many cases, only too obvious; that the immediate post-school years will be wholly influenced by what has gone before, is inevitable. It is in this period, from late youth to early manhood, that the full advantages of the co-education system are manifest. To avoid detailed and generally valueless comparison, it can be assumed that the standard of education in the accepted subjects of mathematics, literature, languages, and science in an exclusively boys' or girls' school was largely similar to that prevailing in a co-educational school.

In this connection it must be noted that I use my own school as the subject of comparison—a school which has a world-wide reputation of producing the type of young man and woman who, in the main, exemplify all that is desired in the citizen of the future—a school which has produced many famous men in all walks of life—Admirals of the Fleet and Generals, dozens of Rugby internationals, celebrated actors and musicians, scientists and scholars of all subjects, Colonial administrators and international athletes; a school which

for Sandhurst, Woolwich and Dartmouth and has counted many prizemen at the major British Universities among its former pupils in its one hundred and thirty years of existence ; a school which, in short, gives to a boy or girl all the opportunities enjoyed by one attending any Public School in Britain ; inasmuch as the chances given to a woman in such fields have until recently been limited, the achievements on the female side have been less spectacular ; even so many of Britain's outstanding women in the last hundred years have learned their first lessons in right living within its walls.

My critics, and there are many, say that I put forward the case of one school, and they admit in the face of uncontradictable evidence that the "experiment" has been markedly successful ; they do not grant that similar "experiments," equally well planned and administered, would succeed in the same way.

To the first charge, I plead guilty : for three reasons ; firstly, I know exactly what I say and write concerning it, and if occasionally my intense love for that school causes me to indulge in minor hyperbole, it is merely a further example of how it still commands my full reverence ; secondly, it is a perfect example of the success which can be achieved in this system of education ; and thirdly, it is one of the very, very few in Britain with which comparison can be fairly made.

I have written much that is fact and much that is assertion ; I have in the preceding pages championed the cause of co-education without attempting to define its meaning or outline its advantages. No argument can hope to be conclusive if it lacks either facts to support it or commonsense to make its point of view acceptable ; I propose, therefore, to show why co-education is the real answer to sound nationhood.

It is generally accepted fact that the heart of civilization as we know it is the home of the individual : the love for, and pride in, his family, is man's basic emotion ; the object of Creation of man and woman could not have been else than to give vitality to that which was intended to be their ultimate destiny ; whether one believes in the science of evolution or has the unquestioning faith of theology, this much is certain—that since the momentous dawn of human relationships, man and woman have been inseparable entities. The very reality of life is the relationship of the sexes. Every purely beautiful thought or deed in the history of mankind has emanated from this relationship. The many ugly and discordant notes which have marred the score is traceable in every case, not to a weakness in the basic perfection of the relationship, but to misunderstanding of the human in importance of one by the other.

Whether the men and women in the beginning were perfect in mind and body is a matter for dim conjecture and inconclusive theorising—that their present-day counterparts are not is a matter of sane observation and personal experience. The cause of the transition, if such there has been, is immaterial ; the fact which matters is that which is actual. In the men and women of the modern world, there are many shades of mind and character beyond all mortal praise ; there are, also, many deserving of unequivocal blame. The strength of a man or a woman lies firstly in admitting that these two opposites are inevitable, and secondly in learning that human understanding which removes the menace of the unexpected disillusionment.

This disillusionment of a man or woman, this realisation of fault in a being thought blameless, is the greatest disappointment in the human cycle. It is a cancerous disillusionment, because it strikes at what the human being

most fears—the mind. It seldom heals—it usually develops from the shocked unbelief, through the realisation, to the deep mistrust; and in mistrust lies the unhappiness of the individual, the instability of the community and the hypocrisy and inevitable disintegration of the nation.

The philosopher Alain said, "A woman's strength lies in being late or absent." In other words, to maintain her right to be considered desirable, she must retain her mystery—a mystery which is indeed, to the uninitiated, almost ethereal—a mystery which is unveiled to a man only when he has known women or a woman intimately, not only in body, but more important and much more difficult, in mind.

Under the educational and social system which we Britons champion the study and effects of a woman's mind is denied to the man till he is, in most cases, beyond his coming-age. He is cast out into life having little or no knowledge of an influence which, as his destiny rules, can encourage in him his greatness, or condone and multiply in him his baseness. It is unfortunate, but nevertheless, inevitable, that for all men, saving perhaps congenital perverts, the most powerful influence in his existence, whether for good or evil, will be woman.

Is it not practical sense, then, that from the earliest beginnings of co-ordinated perception, men should learn to understand the multiplicity of mind and emotion which form the basic existence of woman? Is it right that the disillusionment, which so often occurs, should be thrust upon a mind fatally unprepared to receive its initial shock and quite inadequate to alleviate its far-reaching repercussions?

The answers are obvious; any measure which can be practically adopted to educate man to an understanding of woman, and conversely (because all I have written has an almost equal converse application), woman to an understanding and appreciation of man, should be fostered assiduously.

Does the system of co-education, in fact, answer the requirements? I say, most emphatically, that it does. Welling from the fount of British hypocrisy, moral cowardice and misguided convention, a volume of protest has at many times engulfed the sponsors of movements for national co-education. Hands have been raised in horror at the thought of adolescent inter-understanding. The implications of sex are pointed out, elaborated and pilloried—national catastrophe is forecast because the succeeding generations will be composed of libertines and sex-maniacs.

That trend of thought is the most patently idiotic and harmful of any which pervade our national character. Five years ago I discussed this question with a very famous soldier; after a heated discussion he sought to shatter my opinion with this profound statement: "My boy, this great country of ours has achieved its greatness without any of your damfool notions throughout three hundred years—let its greatness be."

The words of a lovable anachronism—a statement with which I heartily agree with the exception of the four words which end it. Great we have been—great we are—but unless a courageous step is taken to reform our educational sociology, we will be, in shorter time than we realise, less than the dust.

Consider for a space the country which, above all others, has realised the value of an early understanding between the sexes. The United States of America, that great, virile nation, risen from insignificance to a position unrivalled in history, and with potentialities for greatness of a height never achieved by any empire—that country differing widely from her contemporary powers

in a thousand social customs, but essentially nationally honest in her conception of living. The rotten hypocrisy which is eating at the roots of British life was long ago cast out—practical problems were defeated by practical answers—if the traditional solution to a social, political or educational circumstance was provedly anachronistic, it was without hesitation sacrificed to the promotion of better living. Even at this early stage in American history the benefits are apparent—in one hundred years they will be uncontradictable.

A magnificent nation, destined by its own life *formulae* to achieve an unrivalled supremacy in internal perfection—a nation which by its aid and example can be to we British the most reliable complement in the world—if we British are prepared to adjust ourselves. No modern people is going to succeed by or exist by, those things which were—they must abide by what *is*, and conquer by anticipation of the future through realisation of the present, what *will* be.

One of the main secrets of America's eminence is her realisation of the necessity for basic understanding between the sexes, and this process goes on from early childhood, through the most difficult years, to manhood and womanhood.

In our own country, we too can achieve this understanding. In co-educational schools, where the essentials of book-learning are disbursed simultaneously to both sexes living in the same environment, sharing the same discussions, succeeding or failing in the same erudite objects, appreciating each other's ambitions, realising each other's natural failings and limitations—gaining at the very start of living an insight into character. This is an essential form of learning—learning which no book—no professor or other mentor, can instil. For the individual, the lesson of living has no compiler. Each man and woman records a separate volume—but it is the understanding of those chapters which are to the world attainable, that makes a unified people.

Sympathy, appreciation and tolerance can never be achieved by segregation, and without these qualities a true design for living can never be manifest. That this merging of the sexes towards a real understanding can be achieved is not in doubt; it has been and is being carried out with singular success all over the world and in very isolated instances in the United Kingdom; but the process must start from the beginning.

When we in Britain can put aside our inhibitions and raise the courage to attack our hypocrisy, even at the expense of our traditions, we may then be able to make general that which is now particular—the motto of a famous crest which I honour unreservedly:—"*Juventutis Veho Fortunas.*"

THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

In view of the partition of India, the title of the United Service Institution of India, which was established in 1876 has been changed to the United Service Institution of India and Pakistan.

Lieut.-General K. M. Cariappa has been elected President of the Council of the Institution.

ADDITIONS TO THE U. S. I. LIBRARY

THE WAR IN THE WEST

"Top Secret" (with maps) by Ralph. Ingersoll. (Partridge Publications Ltd., London. 15s.).

"Defeat in the West" (Illustrated) by Milton Shulman. (Secker and Warburg, London. 15s. Thacker and Co., Ltd., Bombay. Rs. 9/14).

"Report by the Supreme Commander on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6th June, 1944 to 8th May, 1945." (Illustrated). (H. M. Stationary Office. 2s. 6d.).

"Report by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean on the Operations in Southern France, August 1944." (Illustrated) (H. M. Stationary Office. 1s.).

DURING the past quarter the flow of books concerned with the Second World War has continued, those from America being still rather more numerous than books from elsewhere.

Ralph Ingersoll's hypercritical "Top Secret," written in his slick American style has already created sufficient argument to be known by most members. His pen pictures of episodes during the fighting in North West Europe are certainly among the best yet produced. Yet it was not those which gained for his book the notoriety it has achieved.

It is realized that the most senior of our Commanders in war must have a few staff officers from whom nothing is withheld, but one may sometimes wonder how Mr. Ingersoll (a Captain when he first went to England and finally no more than a Lieutenant-Colonel) could have been in possession of so many high level secret matters. For example, did he know all the different facts for and against the concentration of all the Allied Forces on one front in North West Europe? Could he justly accuse "the British" of shilly-shallying, in fact, of shirking the attack on North West Europe until forced into it by America and Russia? Didn't he see the difficulties of undertaking that huge task in 1942?

It will be disappointing for those who fought there to be told that the Italian campaign was unnecessary and the result only of the machinations of "the British," who thereby took away troops and equipment which ought to have been employed in the assault from the west.

At times the author is almost embarrassingly complimentary and at others he is bitingly damning. General Omar Bradley was his champion and General Montgomery suffers in the comparison. General Eisenhower is severely attacked for his support of Montgomery and for many other things. The British apparently took unto themselves the controlling hand by ensuring that his three chiefs were all British.

There are many controversial points: Caen and the relative parts played by the American and British Armies in Normandy, the handling of the advances

towards Germany, Walcheren, why the war was not ended in the autumn of 1944, the supply problem and so on. General de Guingand deals with the first in his book "Operation VICTORY" (shortly expected in the U.S.I. Library), and Major Shulman gives the enemy side of that picture in his book "Defeat in the West."

About Walcheren, Ingersoll says that Montgomery twice disobeyed Eisenhower's order to take Walcheren and that it was only after the latter had sent to Montgomery a written message containing the sentence, "It is my understanding that a soldier's first obligation is to obey orders," that Montgomery complied. Yet in his official report, General Eisenhower states that "the city—had fallen—on 4th September—and the joint naval, air, and ground force planning (for the reduction of Beveland and Walcheren Island) was immediately undertaken,—at the Headquarters of the Canadian First Army."

The official histories must give their verdict on these and many similar questions. Airmen will find that "Bomber Offensive" deals with the question of why the R. A. F. bombed by night and the USAAF by day, which Ingersoll also raises.

Field Marshal Montgomery has said that many accounts of the Falaise battle have been written but his own in "From Normandy to the Baltic" has been written after a careful study of the facts. Moreover, the report by the Supreme Commander is brief but clear. His tribute to the British and Canadian forces, "Without the great sacrifices made by the Anglo-Canadian Armies the spectacular advances made elsewhere by the Allied forces could never have come about" receives support from the figures quoted by General de Guingand and Major Shulman. But Mr. Ingersoll does not agree. He writes, "The facts did not support this when you took a G-2 map and counted the German troops, battalion by battalion; the forces opposite the Americans were actually slightly stronger than the forces the Germans kept on the Caen end of the line."

The British publisher of "Top Secret" states that he does not necessarily agree with the author, but owing to the wide interest and controversy the book has aroused since it was first published in America, he considers the British public should have an opportunity of reading it. The official view on such statements as, "one squad of soldiers on the Channel coast of France will mean more to the world than two armies ashore in Sicily," would be of interest to students.

* * * *

Field Marshal Maitland Wilson's report on the planning and execution of the sea and airborne attacks on Southern France in August, 1944 brings out a number of interesting points, besides giving a brief, clear picture of events.

He shows the major difficulties to be overcome before a commander can consider such an operation, its repercussions on other theatres, *e.g.*, Burma, Italy and N.W. Europe and the adjustments entailed in the same theatre. He shows, also, how difficult among Allied countries can be the problem of command when national prestige has to be considered with it.

A E. C.

THE STORY OF Bomber OFFENSIVE

"Bomber Offensive," by Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur Harris, G.C.B., O.B.E., A.F.C. (Collins, 21s.).

Sir Arthur Harris reminds his readers that he is, to all intents and purposes, a Colonial. In his "Bomber Offensive" he writes with the freedom from restraint usually credited to the Colonial, and he has on a number of occasions seized the opportunity for plain speaking.

After a brief outline of his own career, he launches straight into the story of Bomber Command from the first day of the Second World War. The story is inevitably, perhaps, told from the planning angle rather than from the point of view of the bomber crews.

There were many difficulties to be overcome—outdated aircraft, shortage of crews and craft, distracting demands from various directions (such as the panacea targets of the Ministry of Economic Warfare) and the problem of accurate target location. Many facts of considerable interest are revealed but again and again the narrative reverts to the problem of accurately locating targets. The several solutions are freely discussed without revealing any secrets. Their discussion shows how great a problem it was.

The author gives his views on the thorny subject of the bombing of cities. Material destruction is justified if it saves casualties for the bombing side. In the late war, bombing by the Allied Air Forces saved their Armies countless casualties. At the same time, it caused far fewer casualties among the enemy's civilian population than did the blockade of the first war.

In order to overcome the enemy's defences, continuous research and planning was essential. How this was done and how it was handicapped by the fear that the enemy might learn from it to his own advantage is an example of how courage and intelligent planning, combined with intensive training can overcome difficulties.

The story, told in the blunt language of a fighting man, is informative and absorbing.

A. E. C.

THE STORY OF MALAYA

"In Seventy Days—The Story of Malaya," by E. M. Glover
(Thacker & Co. Ltd., Bombay, Rs. 6/6).

As a newspaperman with fourteen years' experience of Malaya before the Japanese attack, Mr. Glover should be in a position to criticise the subject to which he here devotes much space—the civil administration. Perhaps the particular value of his book lies in its pictures of conditions in Malaya before the Seventy Days began and in Singapore during the Japanese bombing of the Island.

The author gives a detailed account of the loss of PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE, presumably from information provided by survivors. He was resident in Singapore during the Japanese advance down the Peninsula, so depended for much of his military information on the official communique. His other sources were a friendly member of the British Ministry of Information and representatives of his newspaper who stayed at their posts up-country until driven out by the Japanese. Military intelligence was itself in such a fog that a civilian is unlikely to have had a very clear picture of how the battle was fought, unless he picked it up subsequently. But much of this appears to have been written at the time of the events.

In the main, the book is a newspaperman's views on the reasons for the easy Japanese conquest of Malaya, together with his reporter's observations of the Japanese bombing of Singapore. All books which help us to get a clearer picture of events there and their reasons are to be welcomed.

A. E. C.

THE 1/14 PUNJAB REGIMENT

History of the 1st Bn. 14th Punjab Regiment. (Sher-Dil-Ki Paltan) by Brigadier G. Pigot, M.C., Roxy Printing Press, Connaught Circus, New Delhi, 1947.

IT is often supposed that the 14th, 15th and 16th Punjab Regiments of the Pakistan Army, except the late 5th Bn. of the 14th and the 3rd and 4th Bns. of the 16th, should date their origin back to 1857. This is the strict fact, for when the Punjab Administration under the energetic Sir John Lawrence was stirred on 11th May 1857 by the telegraphic news of the happenings in Meerut and Delhi, the bold course was at once taken of expanding the Punjab Irregular Force. Accordingly, the senior battalion of these present-day original Punjab Regiments was raised in the last week of July 1857. But preparations for this event had been afoot since early June.

Brigadier Pigot was Adjutant and Commandant of the battalion whose history he has now enriched. But he has succeeded also in weaving into his work frequent references to other battalions of his Regiment. Nor is this all, for the background of the picture on his tapestry depicts much of the story of the Indian Army. From all this can be gathered a sense of the tradition which bound officer and man in mutual respect, the spirit which led the Indian Army to the peak of fame in recent history.

Although the battalion was born officially in 1857 it traces its ancestry, through military police units formed in 1850 from the original Sikh Army, to a regiment famous in that Army as the "*Sher-Dil-Ki Paltan*." This unit—its designation has survived in a corrupted form—is thought to have been raised in about 1809.

The reader will follow the "*Sher-Dil-Ki-Paltan*" through scenes of action in 1858-59 with mutineer remnants in the Nepal Terai, with tribesmen in many campaigns and expeditions on the N. W. Frontier, and with Bhutanese and Tibetans in the North Eastern Himalayas. The last three chapters are a valuable contribution to the still scanty details of the old-style Indian Army's greatest disaster against strange and overwhelming odds in Malaya. After return from captivity and ill-treatment the battalion began its corporate life again on 16th May 1946.

But what is perhaps most interesting is the forty-three pages, or one-fifth of the book, allotted to the First World War. Here is a graphic description of operations in the van of a movement through Seistan across Persia to the great desert tract in the modern Turkmenistan Republic between the Caspian Sea and the River Oxus.

An ample set of clear maps and sketches appended to the history are well referenced in the text. The layout and printing are of a high order, if marred by unnecessary printer's devils. Errors are pointed out on a page at the end.

B. J. A.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

*"The Victory Campaign" (with maps) by "Strategicus."
(Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 12s. 6d.).*

IN his eighth and final volume of a contemporary history of the World War 1939-45, "*Strategicus*" covers the period from the allied attack in Italy in May 1944 which led to the capture of Rome, through Normandy and the great Russian offensives to the collapse of Germany and Japan.



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
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This is a handy and concise account of civilisation's latest and greatest upheaval.

A. E. C.

"This House Against This House" by Vincent Sheean
(MacMillan & Co. Ltd., London. Thacker & Co. Ltd., Bombay, Rs. 14/-.)

One of the less provocative of the books from America is this by Vincent Sheean, a reporter of considerable experience. He gives his story of the North African landings, Sicily and Italy (where he was with the American Air Forces) India and China (still with the U. S. A. A. F.) and of the last months in North West Europe.

It is not a history but a series of incidents, which are well recorded. I liked particularly his story of life on Cochran's airfield in Tunisia and his summing up of the average American's attitude towards the War. He presents his views on the French problem in North Africa, and on that other question popular with American writers—was the Italian campaign worthwhile? His verdict on India, after a brief visit, is the average American view.

Mr. Sheean begins his book with an inside picture of signing of the treaty at Versailles after the First World War, and with certain comments thereon. He ends with a pointed review of the San Francisco Conference and shows why Russia may be difficult in conference.

A. E. C.

REVIEWS IN BRIEF

"Jungle Diary," by Duncan Guthrie (MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 6s.).

Captain Guthrie was one of a party of parachutists dropped in the Karen hills in February 1945. He fell among trees and broke his ankle. This diary is a day-to-day account of his observations while hiding, crippled in the jungle from the Japanese. It is, more than anything, a tribute to the great loyalty of the Karens.

"Timberwolf Tracks" (Illustrated) by Hoegh and Doyle
(Infantry Journal Press, Washington).

An intimate and detailed narrative of the part played by the American 104th Infantry Division (The Timberwolves) in North-West Europe during the Second World War. It is excellently produced, but in the nature of a memento for members of the division.



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"The Future of American Secret Intelligence" by Dr. George S. Pettie.
(Infantry Journal Press, Washington).

The author held a high position in America's economic intelligence branch during the War, and is well qualified to write on this subject. He discusses the errors that were made the problems to be overcome and advocates a more efficient intelligence organization in peace-time.

"Women in Uniform—An Account of Women in War"
(Illustrated). Edited by D. Collett Wadge. (Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd., London. 21s.)

This excellently produced book of nearly four hundred pages contains the history of the formation, dress, duties, rates of pay and achievements, including the honours received, of the Women's Services in the U.K., the Dominions (excluding India and Pakistan) and the U.S.A. during the Second World War. Profusely illustrated.

"The Royal Manx Fencibles" (Illustrated) by B.E. Sargeant, M.V.O., O.B.E., F.S.A. (Messrs. Gale & Polden, Ltd., Aldershot. 10s).

This is a short account of the life of the Manx Fencibles between 1779 and 1811 which takes the form of a series of extracts from various documents and deals with every-day matters like organization, recruitment, promotions, dress and so on. Its examples of the application of military law are illuminating.

"The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty" by K. M. Panikkar
(Oxford University Press, Rs. 1-4).

Another of the pamphlets issued by the Indian Council of World Affairs, this was written more than a year before the transfer of government took place. As such, it was far-sighted and provokes careful thought. The author thinks that, though they are politically separate, India and Pakistan will have to be reintegrated as a single unit for purposes of defence.

"Pakistan is placed between the upper and nether millstones of continental and maritime powers. From the point of view of air, it is one of the most vulnerable areas. India's future lies clearly on the sea and in the air. It is peninsular India that forms the great central pivot of air traffic for the future. The political independence, economic organization and military strength of India are a primary world interest."

For the immediate future he suggests that "it is essential in the interests of security to have a short-term programme meant to raise the efficiency of large classes of young men."

"Advice to the Officers of the British Army, with the addition of some hints to the drummer and private soldier" (Illustrated) Anonymous. First Published 1782. Republished 1946 with illustrations by Frank Wilson (Lieut.-Colonel F. A. H. Wilson, I. A. C.) and Introduction by Bernard Fergusson.

In a small space, this book offers to all ranks from Commanders-in-Chief to private soldiers, advice which, unlike Infantry Training or the Manual of Military Law, may be read for pleasure. It should be noted, however, that the author accepts no responsibility for the consequences falling on those of his readers who follow his advice.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

A MEDAL COLLECTOR'S FIND

*From Colonel M. Hayaud Din, M.B.E., M.C., Joint Services Staff College
Chesham :*

"I read the article by the Rev. Basil Stratton on 'Chaplains in India' in your April issue with great interest—an interest made greater by reason of the fact that I am the proud possessor of the medal awarded to Padre Allen for his services in Afghanistan, to which the author refers.

I bought the medal a short time ago. It bears the inscription: "Rev. I. A. Allen, Chaplain, Bombay". His initials seem to differ from those given in the article. The medal bears the words: "Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul" and "1842" on the reverse. It is in very good condition, and is, I think, one of the earliest medals awarded to Chaplains.

I have been collecting medals for some years, and have always felt the need for organising a Society with the object of fostering interest in the hobby. The time has come when a more active interest might be taken in the subject in the armed forces of the two new Dominions.

If there are a large number of officers interested there should be little difficulty in getting together a Society of Medal Collectors. Could the U. S. I. of India open a register of those willing to join if such a Society was formed? After a list has been made I will help all I can to get it started.


Should any reader of the *U. S. I. Journal* wish to ask any questions about medal collecting perhaps he would send it into you and if you would pass it on to me I will endeavour to answer it. All this will help to widen interest in medal collecting, and perhaps other readers would help with suggestions in getting a Society started.

(Colonel Hayaud Din's letter is most interesting. Writing in his article about the Rev. I. A. Allen, the Rev. Basil Stratton said: "Padre Allen was greatly gratified by being awarded a medal in recognition of his services, but had hard work in retaining it, for on his return to Bombay the military authorities refused to confirm the award on the ground that 'Chaplains were not entitled to such a distinction'. On appeal to the Metropolitan, the latter considered 'that it is an ornament unknown to the ecclesiastical service', to which Allen replied: 'I do not regard it as a distinctive badge of war, but as a token of the approbation of the Government whose servant I am, for arduous services faithfully performed, as a memorial of providential preservation, and as a bond of union with the brave men of whom I was companion and minister'. In the end he got his medal".—*Ed., U.S.I. Journal.*)

"HOW IT SHOULD BE DONE"

From Major-General T. Scott, C.B., Rawalpindi :

I have read Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst's letter in your July issue. He appears to have missed two main points in my article :



Meet the Pilots

Soon, on your travels, you will be meeting our Pilots. But since you are never likely to meet them all, may we introduce them en bloc—all six hundred and forty? Quite a body of men, and more important, a very experienced one. Of our pre-war Pilots, none has flown less than the equivalent of sixteen times round the equator; forty-five have topped a million miles—and four have doubled that. B.O.A.C's future—and with it, no small part of the future of civil aviation—lies in these men's hands. And no hands could be safer.

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(a) The Lilliputians decided that three separate Fighting Services were inefficient and uneconomical. Consequently they combined the three into one: The Armed Forces, which were rationally organised in two branches, i.e., those which operated on and over the sea, and those which operated on and over the land.

(b) Their Reconnaissance Corps includes Fighter aircraft. These are not incorporated in "Task Forces" of the Land Based Armed Forces for reasons which are clearly stated in Part V of the article, but they are available for the protection and assistance of the "Task Forces" at all times.

The object of "How it should be Done" was to suggest a system by means of which we should be for ever done with "1066 and All That".

" AN INTERESTING POSER FOR HISTORIANS "

From Colonel Sir Patrick Cadell, Boars Hill, Oxford:

In his letter to you published on page 363 of your April, 1947 issue, Mr. Hurmuz Kaus refers to the fact that J. C. Marsman says that during the close of the 18th century the Hyderabad Army "carried the Colours of the French Republic, then at war with England, and wore the cap of liberty upon their buttons". Mr. Kaus says, however, that so far as his knowledge goes no buttons of the Hyderabad Army with the cap of liberty upon them are known to exist in any collection, public or private, in India or in Great Britain.


May I offer the following comments? The statement that Raymond's battalions carried the colours of the French Republic and had the Cap of Liberty on their buttons, is to be found in other historians (e. g., Mill and Briggs) besides Marshman. Their authority is Sir John Malcolm (*Sketch of the History of the Government of India*, p. 179). Nor could there be any better, since Malcolm had taken a prominent personal part in the disarming of the Corps in 1798. Malcolm himself took the Colours of the Corps to the Governor-General, Lord Mornington, later Marquess Wellesley (*Kaye's Life of Malcolm*, p. 80).

Wellesley wrote to Lord Greville: "My despatches do not mention a curious fact, that the standard of this army was the Tricolor Flag: the only one of that description erected on the Continent of India. This standard has fallen into my hands; and I shall send it home as the best comment upon the whole policy of making an effort to crush the French influence in India (Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 81). If further evidence is needed, it may be found in the McKenzie drawings of the flags of the French Brigades in the service of the Nizam, a reproduction of which is given at Volume II, p. 685 of Beveridge's *History of India*.

Raymond, we are told (Fraser: *Our Faithful Ally*, p. 146), took particular care to describe his force as a French body of troops, employed and subsidised by the Nizam. The fact that Raymond cast guns for the Nizam's Government without any symbols of the French Republic would not prevent his having his own symbols for what he regarded as his own Corps.

Mr. Kaus thinks that Raymond was an Imperialist, not a Republican. If by this he means that Raymond was a Royalist in his sympathies, this is not the case. William Kirkpatrick, who had been Resident at Hyderabad, in his Report to Lord Wellesley in 1798 (Briggs, II. p. 316) stated that all the officers of Raymond's Corps appeared to be "Jacobinical", i.e., extreme Republicans.

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One Frenchman, who had been an officer in the French Army, and expressed his attachment to Royalty, was dismissed. Wellesley described the officers as men of the most virulent type of Jacobinism (Martin's Despatches, vol. I, p. 280). Keightley (History of India, p. 134) calls Raymond a "fierce Republican". Raymond's successor, Piron, is called by Malcolm "a rough violent democrat" and by Briggs "an outrageous Jacobin".

Raymond had never been an officer in the French army. He had come out as a youth of 20 in a mercantile capacity, and had adopted the life of a military adventurer in the service of several Indian chiefs. He was in correspondence with the French Republican Government, then at war with Great Britain, and, it was announced, was given the rank of General by that Government. There is nothing surprising in his adopting French Republican colours and symbols, as his countrymen in Mysore also did.

In his final paragraph Mr. Kaus states that the Force which became the Hyderabad Contingent was a subsidiary force raised in 1792. It was really founded in 1800 to supply the contingent which the Nizam was bound to maintain under the treaty of that year. Part of the Infantry and the Artillery was reformed by the Resident, Henry Russell, in 1811 and the ensuing years, the Cavalry was reformed in 1816, and some Infantry battalions in Berar added to the force.

It was not at that time a Subsidiary Force, which term is properly applied to a Force belonging to the Indian Army and paid by the Government of India, the cost being charged against the State for whose benefit it was maintained. The Nizam's Army or Contingent was directly paid by the Nizam's Government till 1853, when it became the Hyderabad Contingent, a subsidiary force. This force was not, as stated by Mr. Kaus, disbanded in 1902 but was incorporated for general service in the Indian Army.

SMOKING

From "Charles", Rugby :

Like many others, I followed the correspondence in *The Times* (which you reproduced in the Secretary's letter in your July issue) concerning smoking, but the historical data which Mr. A. H. Dunhill put forward does not stand close analysis.

Does Mr. Dunhill know that the British soldier of olden days got a shilling a day, of which 6d. per day went for his messing and 3d. for upkeep of kit ? He only saw 3d per day of his pay, and that was usually paid two or three months in arrears. Of the countries in which they fought only India and America grew tobacco, and Europe did not exactly import this drug in any quantity.

The soldiery, when they got their pay, preferred to spend their princely 3d. on the wine of the country ; Jamaica Rum was, I think, 1s per gallon. (See Fortescue's *History of the British Army*).

I would also like to know from Mr. Dunhill how many Varsity rowing crews, Rugger internationals, or boxers he has seen trained on cigars, cigarettes or tobacco as against beer or stout. The Sikh is the same Punjabi stock as the P. M. and P. H., living the same life, eating the same food ; yet in athletic contests he invariably beats them. He is a non-smoker.

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OVERCOMING CASTE AND CREED

From Brigadier C. B. Ponnappa, President, No. 55 Service Selection Board, Agram, Bangalore :

Lieut.-Colonel Sanders, whom I should like to thank for his kindly references to my article on India's post-war Forces which appeared in the January U. S. I. Journal, directed attention in your April issue to my statement: "I would strongly recommend that battalions be organised on a provincial basis, rather than an All-India basis, to begin with".

Probably my remarks on the raising of Provincial Battalions were not very clear, but I do want to point out that the last three words "*to begin with*" were put there with a purpose.

Owing to the present difficulty regarding food, habits, etc., I thought it would be more easy to administer provincial battalions rather than all-India units. It was not at all my intention that provincial battalions should be treated as were the Presidency armies of by-gone days. Neither was it my intention nor is my intention, that the Presidency armies should be kept within the Presidency only.

If, for example, we could get, to start with, the people of the Presidency to live in the same unit without any caste prejudices, the administration of that particular unit would be much more simple than otherwise. When the handicap that at present exists in the Presidency owing to caste and creed is overcome, I am sure they will also get to on well with soldiers of other Provinces without much fuss.

My idea is that eventually a unit must be composed of any person who fulfils the standard laid down for a particular unit without any distinction of caste or creed. Centuries-old customs cannot be eradicated by a stroke of the pen. The defect of the old Presidency armies was that they were in different Commands, and were not under the central command of an all-India Government. But at the time my article was written, the Indian Army was under the command of one Government and one Commander-in-Chief, who were at liberty to use them in any way and anywhere they liked.

SOME MISSING ISSUES WANTED



From Colonel C. R. Buchanan, c/o Lloyds Bank, 6 Pall Mall, London, S. W. 1 :

I wonder if any of your readers have a spare copy of issue No. 308, July, 1942? I want it in order to complete the binding of that year's numbers, and should be grateful to receive one.

From Lieut.-Col. F. R. Cosen, Goddens, Applefore Road, Tenterden, Kent :

No. 308 of the U. S. I. Journal (July, 1942), is missing from my file and I should be very glad if one of your readers happens to have a copy he does not want, and could send it to me at the above address.

(We much regret that issue No. 308 for July, 1942 is completely out of print. Could any members oblige the above two members?—*Ed., U. S. I. Journal.*)



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THE SECRETARY'S LETTER

SIMLA.

DEAR READER,

The disruption of communications in Northern India has naturally had wide repercussions. In our own sphere it has delayed the production of this issue of the *U. S. I. Journal*, for whereas Simla is in the Dominion of India, Lahore (where the Journal is printed) is in Pakistan, and for the past couple of months correspondence with Pakistan has been badly held up.

The fact that no registered mail is accepted between the two Dominions, too, has meant that all "copy" for this issue has had to be duplicated, and the fact that the number is in print proves that the methods we had to adopt to get the material to the printers has been successful.

Paper, too, has been a difficult problem. Labour difficulties have for some time held up a big supply ordered from Calcutta, and just as we were hoping that the consignment would be coming through, the disturbances in Northern India broke out, and it could not be sent. Hitherto, the Director of Military Regulations and Forms has helped by loaning us some paper from a Government store near Lahore. That stock is now under the control of the Government of Pakistan, and on appealing to them they readily agreed to lend us a suitable quantity, with the result that this issue can be published. We are most grateful to them for their great help in the matter.

Many letters have, I fear, gone astray during the last couple of months, and if any member who has written to the Institution has not received a reply, it would be appreciated if a copy of the communication could be sent to us. Doubtless normal communications will soon be restored, but meantime perhaps members will bear with us should undue delay occur in receiving replies to letters.

Annual Council Meeting

Undoubtedly the most important subject discussed at the annual Council Meeting held in New Delhi in July under the chairmanship of Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Smith, President of the Institution, was that concerning the future of the United Service Institution of India. In addition to members of the Council, representatives of the Armed Forces Reconstruction Committees were invited to attend.

In response to an inquiry from the Chairman as to whether it was the general wish for the Institution to continue, there was an emphatic and unanimous "Yes", and after discussion it was agreed that a further meeting should be convened in November to enable those present to discuss and bring forward proposals for the new constitution of the U. S. I. Naturally, until the decisions are taken at the November meeting little can be done in the way of finally settling details, but meantime invitations have been extended to various officers to accept office on the Council, and practically all have accepted.

The President having expressed his view that the Presidency of the Institution should in future be held alternately by the head of the three Services, he offered his resignation as President in favour of Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Miles, pending the decisions to be arrived at the November meeting. The Chairman of the Executive Committee, Lieut.-General Sir Reginald Savory, emphasising that it was desirable that the management of the Institution should pass into the hands of those who would be controlling it in the future, proposed that Brigadier G. S. Dhillon should be elected Chairman of the Executive Committee, a proposal which was unanimously accepted.



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TO-DAY'S MOST
POPULAR INVESTMENT

The President reviewed the financial position of the Institution, which was satisfactory, and the Council endorsed the recommendation of the Executive Committee that the entrance fee of Rs. 10 should be re-introduced as from January 1, 1948. Members were reminded that the subscription rate had remained unaltered since 1921, while production costs and the size of the Journal had expanded greatly, and it was therefore necessary, in order to safeguard the future financial position of the Institution, that we should again avail ourselves of this source of income.

Three Judges were invited to select the best Essay submitted for the 1946-47 Competition, the subject being "Man Management". Fifteen entries had been received. For the 1947-48 Competition, entries for which must be submitted by June 30, 1948, the subject selected was "Are Officers' Messes Suitable for Indian Conditions?"

The meeting concluded with a vote of thanks to the Secretary for his work on behalf of the Institution.

A Striking Tribute

A striking and completely spontaneous tribute paid to our Patron, H. E. Viscount Mountbatten recently in Simla deserves to be widely known, especially among our readers in England who have served for many years in India. It occurred when His Excellency visited the Simla A. D. C. in order to present to the Club his heraldic shield, now added to the heraldic shields of all the Viceroys of India exhibited in the Refectory of the Simla A. D. C.

His Excellency and Viscountess Mountbatten, accompanied by their daughter, the Hon. Miss Pamela Mountbatten, after presenting the shield, visited the Green Room. Thousands of people gathered in the Mall below, shouting and cheering. On emerging from the entrance the Governor-General and Lady Mountbatten were greeted with roars from the crowd, the slogans varying from "Pandit Mountbatten ki jai" to "Jai Hind". On entering the car the Governor-General and Lady Mountbatten stood up and waved their hands, whereupon the shouts and cheers increased as the car slowly pushed its way ahead. From windows above the street and all around the crowds greeted the Governor-General as one of their own.

Altogether it was a most inspiring and deeply moving scene, particularly as no announcement had previously been made that the Governor-General was to visit the A.D.C. It was truly an indication of the high regard and deep affection in which he is held by Indians of all classes.

New Members

As was to be expected, the troubles which have afflicted Northern India and the separation of the armies has indirectly affected the election of new members to the Institution. Nevertheless, we are glad to announce the following list of new members who have joined the Institution since July 10, 1947:

ALI KHAN, Lieut. A., Royal Garhwal Rifles.
ARBAB, 2/Lieut. J.Z., 1st Punjab Regiment.
BAKHTAWAR SINGH, Captain, I.A.O.C.
BAKSHI, Esq., S.N.C., Civilian Ordnance Officer.
BERI, Captain G.L., I.A.O.C.
BHUPINDAR SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.
CHATURVEDI, Captain M.N., R.I.A.S.C.
CHOWDRY, Captain P., Royal Garhwal Rifles.

CRIPPS, Major A.T.H., Mahar M.G. Regiment.
 EIEDROOS, Captain S.A., F.F. Rifles.
 GAIROLA, Major S. N., Indian Signal Corps.
 GRINDAL, Esq., E.W., Military Finance Department.
 GROVER, 2/Lieut. K.B., I.A.O.C.
 GUL NAWAZ KHAN, Captain, 16 Punjab Regiment.
 HALL, Rear Admiral JOHN T.S., C.I.E., R.I.N.
 HARBANS SINGH, Captain, Indian Signal Corps.
 *HARDYAL SINGH SANDHU, Captain, Sikh Regiment.
 HARDIAL SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.
 HART, Captain M.B., Indian Signal Corps.
 HOBBS, HARRY, Esq.
 JAGDISH CHANDRA HANDA, Captain, I.A.O.C.
 KANNAN, Lieut. C.A., Indian Grenadiers.
 KAPOOR, Lieut.-Colonel S.D., I.A.O.C.
 KHALIL AHMAD, Major, Rajput Regiment.
 KHAN, Captain, S.M., R.I.A.S.C.
 KOCHHAR, Captain A.K., Dogra Regiment.
 MAN SINGH OBERAI, 2/Lieut, I.A.O.C.
 MEHTA, Captain B.N., Bihar Regiment.
 MOHD. ASLAM KHAN, 2/Lieut., 2 Punjab Regiment.
 MOHAN DIWAN, Major, Indian Pioneer Corps.
 PALIT, Major D.K., Baluch Regiment.
 PARANAVIS, Captain D.R., Kolhapur Rajaram Rifles.
 PEREIRA, Lieut. R.D., Rajputana Rifles.
 PRABHU, Esq., K.G., Ahmedabad Military and Rifle Trg. Association.
 PYARA SINGH DHILLON, Havildar, I.A.O.C.
 QAZI, Captain A.W., F.F. Rifles.
 RAJ SINGH, G.C., I.M.A.
 RAZA, Brigadier A.M., Pakistan Army.
 REKHI, Captain P.S., I.A.O.C.
 ROBERTS, Major A.R.E., Beds. & Herts. Regiment.
 ROW, Captain K.S., Indian Signal Corps.
 SADHU SINGH, Captain, Madras Regiment.
 SANT SINGH PADDA, Captain, R.I.A.
 SINGAL, Captain N.L., Jat Regiment.
 SINGH, Captain K.D., Sikh Regiment.
 SURINDAR SINGH GILL, Captain, R.I.A.S.C.
 TEWARI, Captain K.K., 1st Punjab Regiment.
 TOR GUL, Major M.C., F.F. Rifles.
 VICTOR, Captain L.J., Madras Regiment.
 WAHEED, Lieut. (S) S.A. R.P.N.

Subscribing members who have been enrolled during the past quarter include :—

1 Armoured Regiment (R.C.D.).
 4 Bn., The Dogra Regiment.
 46 Group, Indian Pioneer Corps.
 4 R.I.A.S.C. Training Centre (M.T.).
 509 Command I.E.M.E. Workshops.
 Bikaner Ganga Risala.
 Bikaner Sadul Light Infantry.

*Life Member.

Gold Medal Essay Competition

Particulars of the Gold Medal Essay Competition for 1947-48 will be found in the announcement on page 687 of this issue. It will be seen that the subject is "Are Officers' Messes Suitable for Indian Conditions?", and that entries must reach the Secretary by June 30, 1948.

MacGregor Memorial Medal.

Our frontispiece in this issue is the first public reproduction of this famous medal. For 1947 the Council of the U. S. I. and H. E. The Commander-in-Chief have approved the award of the Silver Medal to Colonel A. S. Lancaster, O.B.E., of the 10th Gurkha Rifles, for his valuable exploratory work and report.

Recommendations for the award of the MacGregor Memorial Medal should be submitted by May 1 of each year.

The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, who founded the United Service Institution of India. It is awarded for the best military reconnaissance or journey of exploration of the year which, during the war, may have been achieved during an escape from a Far Eastern enemy country into, for instance, India.

The awards are made in June, and are: (a) for officers, British or Indian silver medal, and (b) for soldiers, British or Indian, a silver medal with Rs. 100 as gratuity. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. The Council may also award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for specially good work.

The award of the medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

Eligibility for the award is open to: (a) Officers and other ranks of all forces of the British Commonwealth of Nations while serving with the India Establishment, or with South East Asia Command, (b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Royal Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving. The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia Leves, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal. Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary United Service Institution of India, Simla.

Library.

An extensive library is available for members of the Institution at the headquarters in Simla. Books may be loaned to members resident in India and those borrowing works in person must enter particulars in the book provided. Members stationed outside Simla may receive books on application; they will be sent post-free by registered parcel post, and must be returned within two months, or immediately on recall. No more than three volumes may be issued at any one time. Reference books and works marked "Confidential" may not be removed from the library.

Members wishing to retain a work for more than two months should notify the Secretary to that effect. If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled. Should a book not be returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, the cost of lost or defaced books being refunded by the member to whom they were issued. Such volumes which have become out of print will be valued by the Executive Committee, the members being required to pay the cost as fixed.

The issue of a book to any member under the above rules implies the latter's agreement with the regulations.

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